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Based on the analysis of written legends and legends, historians have concluded that the first mention of Japanese coal dates back to the 7th century AD. The oldest surviving record is the Nihon shoki (Chronicles of Japan). The book states: "In the 7th year of the reign of Emperor Tenji (668), burning earth and burning water were sacrificed from the Sen Country. There is no doubt that the "burning water" was oil, but there are various theories regarding the "burning earth." Whether it was coal or asphalt derived from oil is not clear, although one theory is that it was peat.
According to documentary sources, coal was first discovered in Japan in 1469, when a peasant from the village of Inari, Miike County (modern Omuta City) in Kyushu, went to nearby Mount Inari for firewood, collected fallen leaves, and set them on fire, and suddenly the black rock that was next to the fire began to burn, which is said to be the discovery of "burning stone" or coal. Subsequently, local peasants began to use these stones as a substitute for firewood.
In the second half of the 17th century, coal was mainly used for domestic consumption as a substitute for firewood in the Chikuzen and Nagato districts, but it was not until the early 18th century that it was not used for industrial purposes. At the end of the 18th century (the Kansei period), the demand for fuel for salt production in many provinces of the Land of the Rising Sun increased, and the coal industry in Japan became an important industry monopolized by the shogunate.
After the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the United States in 1854, the opening of ports such as Hakodate increased the need to supply ships with fuel. In 1857, the first Shiranuka coal mine was built in Kushiro to supply coal to Hakodate. In 1868, under the leadership of the Englishman Glover, the Saga clan reconstructed the Takashima mine (Nagasaki Prefecture), which at the end of the 18th century was considered a large mine and produced about 3800 tons of coal per year, and in 1855 it produced 20.5 thousand tons of coal. Japan began to mine coal according to the Western model using steam engines. This is how the first joint venture in Japan with foreign participation appeared. However, things did not go so smoothly at the Takashima mine, and in 1872 a conflict broke out between the workers and the management of the mine, which is considered the first real labor conflict in Japan.
In 1870, the new government created the Ministry of Industry (Kobusho) as an administrative body responsible for, among other things, the mines.
On March 27, 1872, the Japanese government promulgated the "Mining Regulations" (Decree No. 100) and the "Mining Law" (Decree No. 259) in July 1873. This law, consisting of 8 chapters and 33 articles, was drafted as early as September 1871 by a high-ranking official, Toru Yoshii, and J.K.H. Godfrey, a British mining engineer working for the Ministry of Engineering.
According to these documents, all minerals were in state ownership, and it was stipulated that the right to develop mine workings would belong exclusively to the state. Thus, the laws introduced the principle of a state monopoly on the extraction of minerals and limited the rights to coal mining by Japanese citizens, as well as prohibited foreign investment in the industry. Mines were leased for a period of no more than 15 years, and the land area of the mine was limited to 500 tsubo. This led to the formation of a huge number of small mines, predatory mining and lack of investment. Therefore, in 1882, the government decided to increase thethe minimum lease area of mining enterprises is up to 10 thousand tsubo.
In 1874, official statistics of domestic coal production appeared. That year, about 210,000 tons of coal were mined, of which 120,000 tons were exported. After that, the foreign geologist Lyman conducted geological surveys in Hokkaido, where coal mines in Yubari and Sorachi were subsequently discovered. And in Kyushu, the development of the Miike coal mine was resumed, which led to a significant increase in coal production in the country, reaching 1 million tons in 1883
To accelerate the development of the coal mining industry, the Meiji Restoration Government also hired foreign scientists and engineers, opened mining schools and colleges in order to "nurture" Japanese mining engineers. To train modern mining officials, the government hired a competent local scientist, Takato Oshima.
On the recommendation of Takato Oshima, the School of Engineering (Kogakuryo) was opened in 1871, and in 1873 the government reorganized it and opened the "Technical College" (Kobu Daigakk) with seven faculties, including the mining faculty, to train specialists. The course lasted six years, with two years each for preparatory, specialized, and practical training. In 1885, the Faculty of Mining graduated 48 graduates. They played an important role as pioneers in the modernization of Japan's mining industry. In addition, the government invited 78 foreign engineers from abroad (England, Germany and France) to work in state mines.
In 1889, the coal mines of the Kyushu region were equipped with the most modern coal mining equipment at that time and special railways were laid from the mines to the ports. On the other hand, mine accidents became more frequent, so in September 1890, the "Mining Law" Kogyo jorei (Law No. 87, came into force in June 1892) was promulgated. which spelled out the rules regarding the safety of field development. The same law abolished the state monopoly on the extraction of minerals and consolidated private enterprise in the mining industry.
By the end of the 1890s, the export of thermal coal for ships to the markets of the Far East (Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore) increased sharply (about 40% of production), which caused the entry of private capital into the industry and the creation of a full-scale coal industry in the country. In 1903, more than 10 million tons were already mined in the country's mines. Coal.
The first complete mining code for Japan was the "Mining Law" (Law No. 45, promulgated on March 8, 1905), which replaced previous legislation. It contained eight chapters, which established the rules for the extraction of minerals; land use issues; occupational health and safety; the situation of miners; taxes on mines, as well as rules for considering disputes in court.
From August 1905, the southern part of the island of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel under the Russian-Japanese peace treaty concluded in Portsmouth came under the sovereignty of the Empire of Japan.
The occupation of the island began as early as July 1905, and on August 23, on the basis of imperial decree number 156 in the year of Otomari, a civil administration was established. The period from August 1905 to March 1907 can be considered as the era of military rule or the era of the blockade of mining. On August 28, 1905, the administration issued Order No. 4 "On the Prohibition of Mining in All Areas of the Island" and Order No. 5 "On the Prohibition of the Export of Minerals from the Island". Thus, a system was created on Karafuto based on a certain mining policy, which was to prohibit any mining on the island and thus prevent the invasion of the so-called "black diggers", "mountain masons", who could start predatory mining and plundering of mineral wealth. At the same time, geologists Kawasaki Shigetaro, Jimbo Kotora and Katayama Ryohei were tasked with studying the geology and mineral resources of the island as a whole.
However, winter was not far off, and so in August 1905, the Japanese coal company "Hokutan Coal" signed a contract for the extraction and supply of coal for military needs to the occupied part of Sakhalin Island.
Since 1906, an active geological study of the mineral areas of the southern part of the island began. At the beginning of July 1906, Dr. Jimbo Kotora arrived on the island and for 4 months carried out geological and topographical surveys, being a member of the Russian-Japanese Delimitation Commission as an expert geologist. He went by land route from Korsakov to the south along the coast from Tunaichi to Chipisan. From there he sailed by boat to Cape Notoro and examined the area. which, in his opinion, could be important for the economy and development of the island.
Then he went by ship to Aleksandrovsk, inspected the border at 50 degrees and went down to Maoka. In his report, he noted that on the west coast of Northern Sakhalin there are coal mines south and north of Aleksandrovsk and in Sortunay, all of which were opened by the Russian government or private individuals, but shipping in the area was poor and hindered coal mining.
In the same year, Kawasaki Shigetaro and Katayama Ryohei were also commissioned to conduct a geological survey of the south of the island. They conducted a geological and topographic survey near the boundary line to get a general idea of the island's geology and the presence of minerals. The "Geology and Mineral Resource Study Report, with Special Mention for Coal" was prepared mainly by Kawasaki Shigetaro, who led the study. The book contained six chapters devoted to topography, geology, the state of mining before the war, mineral resources, as well as a final essay plus an excellent map of the geological structure of the entire Sakhalin Island in the section of 1:750000. In 1907, Shigetaro Kawasaki and Sujiro Shimotome explored the coal deposits of the Notoro Peninsula, and, in addition to coal deposits, discovered oil beds on the west coast.
In June 1908, the Ministry of Agriculture and Trade instructed the Mining Department of the colony to conduct a survey of the Sakhalin coal deposits to provide high-quality coking coal to the Yawata metallurgical plant. On June 13, 1908, six engineers were sent by the department to the area of the Naibuchi coal deposit to conduct geological surveys.
In May 1909, the government of Sakhalin sent an engineer of the mining department to survey the coal mining areas on the Tomarioro River, but the results of his research were unsatisfactory. Therefore, at the end of June 1909, geologist Hisayoshi Nishivada began field research on the south bank of the Small Tomarioro River. Together with him, surveyors, engineers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Trade, Asakichi Murayama and Hidefumi Kawamoto, who were engaged in topographic surveying, worked with him. Despite heavy rains and mosquito and tick bites, the team surveyed coal-bearing areas along the entire length of the river basin for 2 months.
In 1909-1910, Japanese geologists Kunio Uwatoko and Takeda Hadezo conducted geological research from the village of Kushunnai (now the village of Ilyinsky) in the north to the village of Ote (now the village of Novoselovo) in the south. Significant exploration work was carried out - 45 mechanical core drilling wells were drilled to identify coal seams at depth and prospects for the development of mines in this area. The total meter of the wells was 3767 linear meters, the minimum depth was 3.35 meters, the maximum was 306.55 meters, 13 wells out of 45 opened coal seams.
In 1911, engineer Otsuki Yonosuke commissioned the Ironwork Company to conduct a geological survey of the central part of the Naibuchi coal deposit for 100 days. He found seven coal seams ranging from 3 to 7 feet thick in the eastern part of the surveyed area and 3 seams in the north. The coal studied was of good quality, with a low sulfur content and a calorific value of 5600 to 6900 kcal. The total coal reserves in the survey area were estimated at 100 million tons.
The geological structure of the Karafuto coal deposits was also studied by Riichi Hirano in 1910, Yanosuke Tsurumaru in 1911, and Masutaro Ogata in 1913. In the 20-30s of the twentieth century, the stratigraphy of coal deposits in the southern part of the island was carried out by geologists of the Karafuto Mining Department and geologists from Japan. In 1921-24, Teiichi Tokuda surveyed a number of coal deposits. In 1928, Masaru Kawasaki explored deposits in the area of the Uryum, Naibuchi and Esutoru rivers. In 1929, on behalf of the Mitsubishi Mining Co, the stratigraphy of the Sakhalin coal deposits was studied by Doctor of Geology Hanjiro Imai. From 1905 to 1931, 45 geological exploration expeditions visited the south of Sakhalin, and in addition to them, "amateur geologists" carried out 253 research excavations.
In 1933, geologist Ryotaro Morita surveyed coal deposits on the banks of the Naibuchi River. In 1935-1943, geological and topographical expeditions of Kunio Uetoko, Fujio Tanaka, Shinichi Ichikawa, Kaoriuchi Toda, Bunji Shiro, Hisamichi Matsushita, Yoshiro Ogawa and others worked on the island.
According to the calculations of Japanese geologists, the coal deposits of South Sakhalin occupied about 20 percent of its entire territory, and coal reserves to a depth of 600 meters with a coal seam thickness of more than 1 meter were determined from 1250 to 1425 million tons, which was 19 percent of Japan's coal reserves (which in turn accounted for 0.1 percent of the world's coal reserves).
On April 1, 1907, Southern Sakhalin became known as the Karafuto Governorate and a system of prefectural administration was introduced on it. At the same time, the Karafuto Mining Department was created, which in 1910 published two geological maps of Northern and Southern Sakhalin at a scale of 1:500,000 based on Russian geological maps.
It should be noted that the Japanese had great views in relation to the newly acquired territory, because significant deposits of minerals in the bowels of the island, giant forests, and an abundance of fish in the waters washing the south of Sakhalin whetted the appetites of Japanese businessmen.
Prior to the Japanese seizure of Sakhalin, the main sources of livelihood on Sakhalin were fishing and agriculture, and the Japanese colonial authorities initially tried to promote agricultural colonization in order to attract and settle Japanese immigrants. However, the harsh climatic conditions and the "uncivilized" nature of the area did not allow this, and the attempts were unsuccessful. During the administration of the governorate, these efforts were replaced by the ideas of industrialization of the island.
On June 18, 1907, Emperor Mutsuhito signed Imperial Decree No. 233 "Implementation of Part of the Subsoil Law in Karafuto", which partially extended the "Japan Mining Law of 1905" to the newly acquired territory. In particular, the provisions on the application of the Mining Law to the island's mining industry, the regulations on geological exploration, the rules on the procedure for issuing mining permits, the rules on land use, as well as the rules on lawsuits, applications and rulings, with the exception of the rules relating to test drilling, were to be applied in Karafuto. The decree came into force on July 1, 1907.
In addition, Imperial Decree No. 234 of June 18, 1907 promulgated the "Decree on the Mining Industry of Sakhalin". In accordance with the first article of the Decree, mining could only be allowed in areas determined by the Minister of Internal Affairs. Those wishing to engage in mining should contact the governor of Karafuto.
In accordance with Article 17 of this Decree, the Governor of Karafuto, with the approval of the Minister of the Interior, could grant mining rights in restricted areas to those who possessed certain qualifications. Permits were issued based on the results of competitive bidding. The winner was the participant who offered the highest price. In accordance with Article 3 of the Decree, applicants for an application or request for mining had to pay the appropriate stamp duty. The law provided for the following payment for certain actions. For example, an application for a mining license cost 75 yen, a request to change the mining site was 50 yen, an increase or decrease in production was 5 yen, an application for a change of applicant for mining was 50 yen, a request for a license after approval of the application was 5 yen, and a petition for a merger or division of mines was 50 yen. Fees were paid by affixing a stamp on an application form, application form, application form or request form
The first exploration permits were granted to Chihiki Ishimatsu (939,510 tsubo, received on January 4, 1907), Kenjiro Ozawa (503218 tsubo, December 8, 1908), Otsuya Yamamoto (259,310 tsubo, April 5, 1909), and Minoru Takada (689287 tsubo, June 4, 1909). The sites were located in the river basins of the Otomari, Nagahama, Shikuka, Ambetsu, and Shiretoko Peninsula districts.
Initially, attempts to start coal mining in South Sakhalin were made by the Japanese in 1906, but ended in failure. At the end of 1908, at the expense of a state subsidy, the Kawakami exploration mine (Sinegorsk) was opened on the island as an experiment, and in June 1909, a coal exploration and research station was opened in Tomarioru (Tomari). In the first year of their existence, they produced 4.6 thousand tons of coal.
On July 15, 1909, the Tomarioru coal mine was visited by Nakagawa Kojuro, assistant head of the first department of the governorate, and Ivano Homei, a naturalist writer. He drew attention to how preparations were made for the construction of a light railway for transporting coal, the construction of the coal mine office and government buildings, and the coal mine itself, including geological exploration, is in an intact state. The writer was extremely disappointed by what he saw and expressed it in the following words: "This is a reckless work that can only be done with state support, but cannot be done by the private sector." He later stated: "They say that only Tomarioru does not know about the recession on Sakhalin, because people come to make money from coal mines, which can be closed at any time. Many of them are thugs who failed in Japan and then went to Sakhalin and failed three times."
As a result, due to the lack of normal transport links and due to the difficulty of development, coal mining in the experimental mines was curtailed. The Kawakami mine closed in April 1909, and Tomarioru, having limited coal production in September 1911, finally closed in April 1912. So, if in 1910 they amounted to 155 thousand yen, then in 1911 - 59 thousand, and in 1912 - only 7 thousand yen.
On January 20, 1909, Japanese Interior Minister Hirata Tosuke issued Order No. 2, which stated that the blockade of the island's coal fields was lifted in 8 districts and remained only in three major blockaded areas (the Southern Coal Field, the Central Coal Field, and the North Coal Field), as well as in the the area of the Esutoru and Kitanayoshi fields on the west bank. Thus, about 30 percent of the island's coal-bearing areas have been opened for coal exploration and mining to the public, by submitting a simple application with the payment of a fee.
On August 27, 1909, Imperial Decree No. 214 was published in the Official Gazette, which put into effect Chapters 3 and 7 of the Mining Law of Japan on the island, namely land use issues and the ability to file a complaint with the judicial authorities in case of violation of the rights of persons who applied for the allocation of a plot for mining. This strengthened the protection of the rights of private entrepreneurs, And they were not slow to take advantage of this. Soon, private mines appeared on Karafuto: Ambetsu (Return) and Nishisakutan (Boshnyakovo). But even here, the development of coal seams was carried out only in the second half of 1911, and then it was stopped due to the difficulty of mining. Coal business reached such a deplorable state that in 1913 only 83 tons of coal were mined in South Sakhalin (Kawakami mine).
In 1910, the Russian journal Industry and Trade wrote: "Turning now to the newly acquired province of Karafuto, it should be noted that, judging by official data, Japan has not yet begun to widely exploit the natural resources of the island and, in any case, does not yet derive almost any material benefits from it... No figures are provided for mining, only exploration and applications for coal, gold, iron and oil deposits are mentioned."
The main reasons for the stagnation in the coal industry, according to Japanese experts, were: the complexity of the geographical location, the peculiarities of climatic conditions, and underdeveloped infrastructure. However, the main reason was the low profitability of the mining industry. It required large investments and gave a return only after a few years. Therefore, Japanese entrepreneurs preferred to invest in more efficient sectors of the Karafuto economy.
In 1909, Sadatar (Jtar) Hiraoka was appointed governor of Karafuto. On June 20, 1910, under the leadership of Fujiwara and Jokichi Fujioka, chief engineer of the Mitsui Partnership's mining department, Yokichi Fujioka, the Mitsui Company's chief engineer of the mining department An expedition of 20-30 people was organized to study the forests and coal deposits of the region, which came to the conclusion that the production of paper and pulp has great prospects here.
In March 1911, by order of the governor, Nakamuta Goro was appointed head of the Karafuto Forestry Department. Convinced that "forests are the treasury of Sakhalin and the source of life" and "aware of the urgent need to take measures to appease the capitalists and comply with the rules for the disposal of the products of internal forests", he studied the pros and cons of clear cutting of Sakhalin pine and submitted a memorandum on the need to develop the pulp industry on the island. On the basis of this proposal, in December 1911, the "Special Order on the Disposal of Karafuto Forests" was issued and put into effect by Imperial Decree No. 297. According to it, the governorship received the right to lease the forests of the island for up to 20 years.
In the same year, Mitsui signed a contract with the Forestry Department of the Governorate, according to which significant forest areas of the island (710 thousand shaku) were allocated to the company for operation for a period of 20 years at a price that was 4 times lower than the average market price for the exploitation of forest areas on the island of Hokkaido. In May 1912, a group of engineers of the company (Naoki Takada, Kikujiro Ogasawara, manager of the Mitsui & Co. woodworking plant in Sunagawa, Eikichi Shibata, head of the forestry department of Mitsui, etc.) was sent to Sweden, at that time an advanced country in the field of pulp production technology, and after they received the necessary technological skills, the management of Mitsui decided to build a plant on Sakhalin.
Well aware that the operation of the plant required not only raw materials, but also fuel, and coal mining on the island was regulated only by two imperial decrees, which could be canceled or changed at any time, the company decided to lobby its interests in the country's parliament in order to provide the necessary legislative basis for them.
On June 21, 1912, the Emperor, on the proposal of the 28th Sejm of the House of Peers, signed Law No. 23 "On Coal Mining in Karafuto". It established that in Karafuto, the payment for coal production was to be collected within the areas determined by the competent minister (first the Minister of Internal Affairs, then the Minister of Agriculture and Trade, and from June 8, 1929, the Minister of Colonial Affairs). The rules governing the qualifications of bidders and the methods of their conduct were established by a separate imperial decree. A permit for the extraction of minerals was issued by the apparatus of the governorate. However, if for any reason the owner of the rights to extract minerals did not pay the license fee in full or violated the conditions of the mining permit, The mining department had the right to revoke the license.
On the same day, Imperial Decree No. 137 was signed, regulating the composition of bidders and the rules for their conduct. In particular, those wishing to participate in competitive bidding and obtain a mining permit under the Mining Law had to pay at least 1,000 yen in national tax per year and produce at least 50,000 tons of coal per year in the past 2 years. Also, the Minister of Internal Affairs, if necessary, consulted with the competent officials to determine additional qualification requirements for participation in the auction. The representative of the state at the auction was Governor Karafuto. Persons who, in the opinion of the governor, fell into one of the following categories during the auction, were excluded from participation in competitive bidding. Namely:
(a) Those who intended to reduce the bid price during the bidding.
(b) Those who have obstructed the competitive bidding process or obstructed the winning bidder in the performance of his duties.
(c) those whose mining rights have previously been revoked for any reason.
(d) those who have not paid the bond.
(f) who have placed two or more bets on their own behalf or on behalf of nominees.
The announcement of competitive bidding must be published in the Official Gazette and the Karafuto Nichinichi Shimbun no later than four months before the date of the tender. The place and date of the auction and the opening of envelopes with the proposals of the participants, as well as the mining area and the size of the site for which the license was issued, were determined by the governor. As a guarantee of participation in the auction, participants had to pay a bankruptcy deposit in cash or national bonds.
Envelopes with bids were opened only in the presence of all bidders. In the event that two or more bidders offered the same amount, the winner of the auction was determined by lot. If for some reason the winner of the auction could not be determined, then the auction was held again, and its date was determined by the governor. If it was revealed that bidders colluded to reduce the bid price, the governor terminated the bidding, and their results were invalidated.
On June 21, 1912, the Japanese Government issued Decree No. 1, which specified the additional conditions for competitive bidding and the conditions under which the competent minister could authorize such bidding, and Decree No. 2, according to which the main coal basins of the island were declared "reserve". All coal-bearing territories of the governorate subject to blockade were divided into three districts. The Northern Blockade Field, located between the northern state border and the Naikawa region; The Central Blockade Field, located in the basins of the Tomari, Minami Ote, Naibuchi and Kawakami rivers; The southern blockade field covered the entire Notoro Peninsula (Krillon Peninsula) south of the Uryum River basin.
As can be seen from the table, 60% of coal deposits fell under the "blockade" and only 40% were available for development. Entrepreneurs were provided mainly with remote and unpromising areas, in which coal mining presented considerable difficulties.
TABLE XXXIII.
Volumes of coal located in blocked areas and deposits owned by individuals and companies (in tons)
Name and location of the coal deposit | Above sea level | Below sea level | altogether | |
Northern Blockade Field | Fields of the Central Border Zone of Khandaza | 868000 | 13280000 | 14148000 |
Naikawa Field | 11702000 | 71786000 | 83488000 | |
Central blockade coal deposit | Tomarioru Deposit | 41861000 | 56819000 | 98500000 |
Naibuti Field | 113183000 | 484964000 | 598147000 | |
Kawakami Field | 17315000 | 98842000 | 116157000 | |
Southern blockade
| Tokombo Coal Mine | 10157000 | 58492000 | 68649000 |
Naikhoro Field | 6237000 | 47362000 | 53599000 | |
Minami Nayoshi Mine | 5341000 | 40502000 | 45843000 | |
Okunaikhoro Deposit | - | 274000000 | 274000000 | |
Uryum deposit | 5310000 | 57820000 | 63130000 | |
Total blocked coal deposits | 211794000 | 957267000 | 1069061000 | |
Private East Coast Coal Fields | Shiritori Field Nairo Field | 9352000 | 86089000 | 95441000 |
Tomarigishi Field | 18390000 | 8960000 | 27350000 | |
Kasiho Field | 520000 | 65147000 | 65667000 | |
Private West Coast Coal Deposits | Ambetsu and Chinnai fields | 2030000 | 2920000 | 4950000 |
Nishisacutan Field | 21030000 | 92190000 | 113220000 | |
Kitanayoshi Field | 15220000 | 51730000 | 66950000 | |
Toro Field | 5350000 | 37920000 | 43270000 | |
Taihei Field | 6670000 | 93600000 | 100270000 | |
Budoozava field | 4730000 | 52810000 | 57540000 | |
Kamiesutoru Field | 13180000 | 163220000 | 176400000 | |
Tennai field | 2500000 | 47380000 | 49880000 | |
Khorogishi deposit | 2370000 | 10957000 | 13327000 | |
Tinnai field | 1900000 | 12789000 | 14689000 | |
Total private coal deposits Total: | 103242000 | 725712000 | 828954000 | |
315036000 | 1682979000 | 1998015000 |
Coal mining in the blockaded areas was prohibited by law. It could be allowed only in exceptional cases by the Minister of Internal Affairs. As it is clear from the statement of the head of the Bureau of Colonization under the Ministry of Internal Affairs at a meeting of the Japanese parliament of the 28th convocation, the reason for the formation of "reserve basins" in the southern part of Sakhalin was two factors. which would lead to a high cost of coal. The second factor was the availability of sufficient coal reserves in Japan itself, which could also meet the needs of South Sakhalin. Thus, Japan needed reserve reserves of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk coal, which it needed in the event of a "big war" against the Soviet Union. This should be considered the main reason for the preservation of "reserve coal basins" in South Sakhalin. In addition, the Japanese government wanted to protect Japanese mine owners from falling domestic coal prices and competition with the owners of the Karafuto mines.
The head of the mining department of the governorate, Shinichi Kano, wrote the following: "In accordance with the Mining Law, the island is free to establish its own mines in coal-bearing areas. If we allow mines to open freely in these important areas, the result will be many coal mines, both large and small. This is contrary to the fundamental principle of the mining industry, which is to make full and efficient use of the country's mineral wealth. Yamato's losses from the loss of its mineral resources should not be underestimated. Therefore, the Japanese government decided to temporarily suspend coal exploration on the island, taking into account the situation with the supply and demand for coal in the country, as well as other economic conditions. The purpose of this blockade is to protect the mineral resources of the region from predatory mining.
However, since Sakhalin Island was still in the process of colonization, it was necessary to create a system that would allow the coal deposits to be closed, as the Japanese government had already had bitter experience with coal deposits in the country. a rational business. I believe that the existence of these blocked coal deposits is extremely necessary."
On August 23, 1912, the Karafuto Nichinichi newspaper published a notice from the colonial government that the first auction for coal mining would be held in one of the closed areas. The notice stated that after the Karafuto coal mines came under the jurisdiction of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, they were temporarily closed and all ownership rights were transferred to the government The first step is to bid for the right to develop the Kawakami coal deposit, located in the south of the central blockade field.
On August 25, the same newspaper published an article "Conditions for obtaining a permit for coal mining. The auction is scheduled for December 25." The article emphasized that the mine is the exclusive property of the state, and at auction companies could only be granted the rights to extract a certain amount of coal.
In total, the terms of the mining licensing contained 34 points, in particular, the payment of a guaranteed amount of 20,000 yen to the government within three days from the date of obtaining the mining permit (Article 1) and the construction of a railway line for the transportation of coal (Article 11). In the first year the production was to be 20,000 tons, in the second year 30,000 tons, and in the third year 50,000 tons (Article 5). The auction was scheduled for December 25, 1912. Coal mining was to begin no later than 1 year from the date of obtaining a license for the development of the deposit.
On this occasion, a newspaper reporter interviewed Yujiro Ozaki, head of the governorate's department of civil affairs and entrepreneurship (in charge of the island's mining industry), published on August 27, 1912 on the front page of the Karafuto Nichinichi Shimbun. Mr. Ozaki, in particular, stated the following:
"Part of the 741,510 tsubo of the Kawakami coal deposit, which will be put up for auction, will receive mining rights under a special system. Although the procedure for obtaining a license is different from other coal deposits, the rights granted are no different from the general mining rights defined in the 1905 law. As for the details, you will be able to know the details if you look at the terms and conditions that are available to everyone.
We hope that Kawakami's coal will be able to replenish the colony's budget more effectively, as well as keep the price of coal low. This would draw attention to Karafuto coal both domestically and abroad, as well as reduce the unemployment rate among coal mine workers.
Coal mining is expected to generate a net profit of 25,000 yen per year. All of this will contribute to the expansion of the island economy, population growth, industrial revolution, and reduction of household spending. In addition, the discovery of Kawakami's coal deposits should be accompanied by experimental geological studies, and although the quality of the coal is not uniform, it is generally good and on par with the coal from Hokkaido and Kyushu. The Karafuto government will take the initiative to open up the blocked coal deposits, and of course, the miners of the region will be maximally involved in the coal deposits and all this will contribute to the inflow of huge amounts of capital into the industry, because the slow progress in the development of the industry in recent years has led to an acute shortage of coal."
On August 28, 1912, the Karafuto Nichinichi Shimbun continued the development of the island's coal industry with an article titled "The Discovery of the Kawakami Coal Deposit." "The Mining Department of the Karafuto Governorate ," the newspaper wrote, " has so far explored coal deposits upstream of the Fushitaka River and currently uses them exclusively as fuel for steamships, trains, and as a contribution to solving economic problems in the development of coal deposits in the future. The rise and fall of Karafuto's industry will depend on the solution of the fuel problem, since the island is intensively developing railway transport, factories, power plants, etc. If we could buy coal at 4 yen per ton instead of the current price of 8 yen, the difference would be at least 40,000 yen for every 10,000 tons of coal mined. This would give huge savings to the island's budget. It is reasonable to assume that the demand for coal will not be limited to 10 thousand tons per year, because the development of forestry, the progress of colonization projects and a sharp increase in the number of migrants will inevitably lead to a shortage of fuel. And the price for it should be reasonable. In particular, in harsh winters and cold weather, when residents already have a lot of experience using local coal, the current amount of extracted and imported fuel cannot satisfy the settlers, who rely on wood and coal to heat their homes. In addition, the completion of coal transportation and storage facilities and the convenience of coal loading at the port of Otomari will allow coal to be exported to other areas of the island, and due to this and other factors, Karafuto coal will be 50 sen cheaper than Hokkaido coal. If our calculations are correct and the demand for coal continues to grow steadily and the supply of coal in the local market is insufficient, then even if 50,000 tons are mined and exported annually and a net profit of 50 sen per ton is made, the net profit for this industry can be estimated at 25,000 yen per year. The discovery of the Kawakami coal deposit will affect the mainland (Japan) and the consequences will be enormous: the expansion of the island's economy, the increase in the number of households, the Industrial Revolution and the reduction in costs are all too important to mention in passing. The discovery of the Kawakami coal deposit should be the most urgent priority in the development of the island.
In addition, the discovery of the Kawakami coal deposit is not without experimental aspects, and although the quality of the coal is not uniform, it is generally good and comparable to good grades of coal from Kyushu and Hokkaido, and there is no place on the island where there are no coal deposits. the discovery of the Kawakami coal deposit and the development of mines in the Kawakami area deserve great hope for the future, and we cannot but hope for even greater success."
On April 10, 1913, the auction was won by the coal magnate Kurauchi Yasufusa from Fukuoka Prefecture, who on May 28, 1913 received a license to mine coal in the Kawakami area. On June 9, 1913, the mining license was resold to Kojiro Iwasaki from Tokyo, who in turn resold it to Sakurai Teijiro from Aichi Prefecture, who began coal mining on a small scale - about 10 thousand tons per year Exclusively manual, the capacity was 3 tons per person, 30 tons per day. The construction of residential buildings for miners and administrative and economic premises began.
On November 28, 1913, the village of Kawakami-tanzan was established near the mine. This date is associated with the beginning of the commercial operation of the mine. The mined coal was initially transported on a horse-drawn sleigh along a road of about 10 miles, and then loaded onto rail transport and transported to Otomari. and they found it of excellent quality.
On March 20, 1916, the Kawakami coal mine became the property of the Mitsui Mining Co., which was now able to supply its already built paper mill with relatively cheap fuel. Mitsui soon signs a contract with Oji Paper to jointly mine coal in Kawakami.
The Kawakami mine was the largest mine in the southern part of the island (5514061 tsubo area (182,300 acres)), where coal mining continued until 1945, and where there were 14 coal seams, each one to two meters thick. By 1929, mining was carried out from seams number 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14, and in 1936 only seams 7 and 14 remained in operation. were important for the coal mining industry of the region.
Studies have found that the coal mined at the Kawakami mine was of good quality. It contained 5.19% moisture, 6.46% ash, 44.2% carbon, and a calorific value of 6963 calories. In the second half of the 20s, the mine began to introduce various machines and equipment for coal mining, such as pneumatic, hydraulic and electric drills and coal cutters. In 1929, an 11 kW Flottmann AZ-16 electric coal miner was purchased, and in 1930, a 22.4 kW Sullivan DP-321 electric miner (manufactured by Mitsui Miike Seisakusho Co.) was purchased, which significantly increased the efficiency of coal mining. At the end of 1930, 2 coal cutters, 17 pneumatic drills, 7 coal cutters and 21 electric drills were involved in the mine. Due to the introduction of mechanization of coal mining, the cost of production from 1929 to 1931 was reduced by 25%. In 1936, the mine had 5 Sullivan coal miners, 2 Mitsui Miike Works coal miners, 73 electric drills, 33 pneumatic drills and 10 coal cutters.
Inclined galleries were equipped with winches. In 1919, steel two-ton trolleys were introduced to transport coal in the mines, replacing the previously used horse-drawn trolleys. The trolleys were attached to an electric locomotive with a pantograph (by 1936 there were 3 pieces) and transported to the exit from the mine.
Due to their implementation, it was possible to reduce the cost of transporting coal by 45%. By 1930, the mine had 50 steel and 150 wooden wagons. Some tunnels used rubber belt conveyors 50 meters long. In May 1913, the construction of a 7.5 km railway with a gauge of 610 mm connecting Kawakami and Okuzawa (Artemovskoye) began to transport the mined coal to the processing plant. It was completed on April 10, 1914. It used 2 four-ton Westinghouse electric locomotives , 3 six-ton Siemens electric locomotives and one 6-ton Miike electric locomotive.
/>The washing plant had a capacity of 1,000 tons per 10 hours of operation, and electric sieves, tippers, 4 conveyors, sealing screens, and roller crushers were used in the process of sorting coal. All coal washing machines were powered by three-phase AC induction motors. The coal supplied from the mines was sorted into lump coal (more than 5 cm), medium lump coal (3-5 cm), and pulverized coal smaller than 3 cm. Lump coal was hand-picked and cleaned, and fine coal mixed with pulverized coal was supplied to the Karafuto Railway and the factories of the Oji Paper Stock Company. Lump coal was used for domestic use and sold. The coal storage capacity at the factory was more than 2000 tons. In 1922, the 1067 mm private Kawakami-Toyohara railway line with a length of 21.9 km was opened for the transportation of sorted coal.
To provide electricity to the mine and the miners' settlement, a thermal power plant with a capacity of 1040 kW was built in September 1919. The mine was equipped with stationary electric lighting, for which tungsten lamps were used. Edison's portable electric lamps operated directly in the mining areas, and safety devices were installed in the places of coal loading, where machines and mechanisms were used. Alternating current with a voltage of 100 volts was supplied through insulated cables of safety class 4.
To reduce the accident rate at the mine, a Safety Committee was created, which led emergency rescue teams, fire brigades and auxiliary services. As a result of its work, the injury rate decreased to 20-25% of previous years due to propaganda, improved safety regulations, the use of new equipment, etc. Although there was relatively little gas and coal dust in this coal mine, safety equipment included Draeger oxygen self-rescuers, gas masks, fire extinguishers. Water hydrants were installed to extinguish fires, and "fogging" equipment was installed in the most dangerous places to prevent coal dust explosions.
Ventilation was natural, but from 1929 onwards, portable fans were used in each of the main tunnels to facilitate ventilation during the spring and autumn winds. In addition, there were 14 main fans manufactured by Hitachi and Sirocco, the capacity of which ranged from 85 to 1135 cubic meters per minute. Twenty-one Fuji, Hitachi, Izumi and Mitsubishi portable fans and main fans were installed at appropriate locations within the mine and connected to forced ventilation pipes, ventilation ducts, etc., to ventilate certain areas of the mine as required.
The water in the mine was diverted naturally, since its inflow was small, 150-200 cubic feet per minute. In addition, coal was mined in seams above sea level, and each tunnel was equipped with a drainage ditch made of mixed soil or wood, and the water was discharged into sedimentation tanks to remove dirt and soil.
To prevent groundwater from seeping into the tunnels, from October 1925, the mine used Model N-1 cement-gun machines manufactured by the American International Cement Gun Company, which covered the tunnels with cement. They injected cement mortar into the cracks of the tunnel walls using a cement injector. As a result of the use of cement mortars, the cost of repairing tunnels has been reduced to almost zero.
To operate the pneumatic drills and cement guns, air compressors were installed in the mine: Ingersoll with a capacity of 50-100 horsepower, Miike with a capacity of 50-100 horsepower, and Sullivan with a capacity of 30-60 horsepower.
By 1936, the mine employed 580 people, of whom 30% were from Hokkaido and 40% from the Tohoku region. 15% of the workers were residents of Karafuto and another 15% were from Hokurikou, Kansai and other prefectures of Honsh Island. And if at first the so-called "guest workers" were employed at the mine and the turnover of the workforce was extremely high, then after the crisis of 1929-1932, many workers chose Karafuto as a permanent place of residence. As a result, labor turnover has decreased significantly. This was also facilitated by the policy of the company's management. In particular, by 1935, 430 houses with rooms for lonely miners, 18 houses for family workers, where one 2-room apartment was designed for 4-6 people, were built in the village. In 1935, 21 new houses with 3-room apartments were built. The rent was 50 sen per month for a room, 70 sen for a 2-room apartment, and 1 yen for a 3-room apartment. Each house had electric lighting, the monthly fee for a 5-candle lamp was 20 sen, a 10-candle lamp 30 sen and a 16-candle lamp 35 sen. Water supply to houses was free. The village had a supply station, as well as 2 vegetable and 2 fish shops, a tofu shop and 1 hairdresser. Next to the mine there was a small hospital, which employed 2 doctors, 1 pharmacist and 4 nurses. The hospital had the necessary surgical equipment and an X-ray machine.
However, the mine and the miners' settlement were located at a considerable distance from urban and cultural centers. Therefore, a theater-type club with a capacity of 900 people and a music club with 6 studios, designed for 10-20 people, were equipped in the village. 1-2 times a month free performances were staged in the club. The village also had a school built in 1937 (a 2-storey 110-meter building with 3 entrances), in which 1017 Japanese and Korean children studied by August 1945.
Classrooms in the school were spacious, bright, but very cold. In the classrooms there were iron stoves, which constantly needed to be heated. In addition to teaching general training courses, the school had sections for baseball, tennis, judo, athletics, archery and other sports. But most of all, the students loved skiing. In winter, they went to school on skis, and after school they were happy to go down the steep slope on them. Not far from the mine, a 46-meter springboard was equipped. Schoolchildren were repeated winners of city, regional and even all-Japanese skiing competitions.
The village also had a Shinto shrine (Oyamazumi jinja, founded on May 17, 1921), a cinema, a police station and several brothels. And if in 1930 3051 people lived in the village, then by 1945 Kawakami had turned into a large mining village, with 1986 households, in which 7230 people lived.
Many of the mine's workers were members of a union that provided benefits in the event of illness, injury or death of a worker, as well as pension benefits. The union created the Mutual Aid Association, which provided loans of up to 200 yen in case of marriage or funeral, birth of children, etc.
Following the Kawakami mine, other coal mines begin to open on the island. As early as November 1909, a certain Ikehara Torakichi, a postman from Higashi Shiraura, accidentally discovered open coal seams on the bank of a stream flowing near the village, and with the cooperation of several residents, applied for coal mining. Since this area at that time was not part of the blocked fields of the island, the administration of the governorate had no grounds for refusing to issue a permit. In December 1913, he ceded the mining license to Karafuto Mining Co., Ltd, which in January 1914 opened the Higashi Shiraura mine (779,125 tsubo (25,756 arshin)). The mine was located near the village of Shiranui, Sakaehama County.
The coal seams of the deposit belonged to the lignite group and five main coal seams were examined, the thickness of which ranged from 0.7 m to 7 meters. The strata extended from east to west with an average slope of 45 degrees to the south. By 1930, all five layers were being mined, and the coal mined was of high quality with low ash content, making it suitable for use in steam engines and for domestic use. Ventilation and drainage were carried out naturally. The coal mined in the face was loaded into wagons with a capacity of 0.6 tons, pushed manually to the entrance to the mine and from there delivered to the coal warehouse and processing plant outside the mine on horse traction. From the coal warehouse, the "sunstone" was immediately loaded into railway cars. The annual production of coal was about 20,000 tons. In 1936, 317 people worked at the mine, and the annual coal production amounted to 86629 tons.
The second largest coal mine, the Tomari coal mine, was sold at auction in 1914 to the Sakhalin Industries Corporation, founded in January 1913 by the head of the Okawa paper conglomerate, Heizaburo Okawa. The high-quality non-coking coal mined in the area was used in the paper mills in Tomari and Maoka. It was delivered by rail in the summer and stored in coal warehouses in the winter. Initially, coal was extracted from the inclined shafts of the upper seams, but over time they were completely depleted and coal was extracted from the lower seam. The coal was mined using the pillar cell method and ventilation was carried out naturally. A small amount of gas was released in the mine and two types of protective lights were used for lighting - Wolf and Lalany.
Water was pumped out of the mine using steam-powered pumps. In the first inclined tunnel there were three such units with a capacity of 10 hp each with a maximum capacity of 65 cubic meters, and in the second inclined tunnel there was one unit with a capacity of 5 hp with a maximum capacity of 54 cubic meters. In 1926, a large forest fire in the area destroyed almost all above-ground buildings and structures, and eventually the fire penetrated into the mine. As a result, the tunnels fell into complete disrepair, and the mine was closed in January 1928.
In September 1916, the Toho (Noboriho) Mine, located near the village of Hoyori, Motodomari County, on the east coast, is a 632437 tsubo (20,907 acres) mining area, which was purchased by Koshi Shigeru in December 1914. Winches, fans, drainage devices, a 74 kW power generator, etc., were purchased and installed for the mine, at a cost of about 50,000 yen. Ventilation wells were cut down for natural ventilation, and electric fans were installed in inclined shafts for this purpose. There was a small amount of explosive gas inside the mine, so Wolf, Cranue and Musserl (Museral) safety lights were used. The water inside the shaft was diverted into a drainage ditch that went to the water tank at the bottom of the shaft and from there it was pumped out of it. Coal was delivered by hand from the workings to the mouth of the mine, and then on horse-drawn carts from the mouth of the mine to the coastal coal yard.
View of the village of Noboriho
In February 1920, the rights to exploit were acquired by the Toho Coal Mine Co. which supplied coal to Fuji Paper Mills' Ochiai factory in Otiai, Eicham County. However, due to poor transport links, the company was forced to spend a large amount of money on transport costs, which did not cover production costs, and eventually closed in October 1926.
From all of the above, it follows that the coal industry in the southern part of Sakhalin did not develop in the first years of Japanese domination. In 1914-1917, with 3-5 operating mines in the Central Coal Basin, coal production was only 30-60 thousand tons per year. Since 1918, in connection with the opening of a new mine in the same area, it exceeded 100 thousand tons, and in 1926 at 9 mines it amounted to 245 thousand tons, which did not correspond to the volume of coal consumed in the southern part of the island.
The result of World War I was the rise of the mining industry in Japan, and Sakhalin, too, finally attracted the attention of the zaibatsu (oligarchs), and coal exploration teams from various mining companies began to arrive on the islands and cover the remote mountainous regions of Sakhalin. In 1918, Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. and Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ltd. began exploring the Naibuchi coal deposit, and in 1919, Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ltd. discovered promising coal deposits from Khorogishi on the west coast to Toro, and Nippon Kagaku Shiryo, the predecessor of the Fuji Paper Mills Ochiai Factory, explored the Toho coal deposit on the east coast and the coal deposits north of the area. Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. conducted a detailed survey of the coal deposits north of Esutoru on the west coast and obtained mining rights over a wide area, which led to an increase in the number of applications in 1918-1919, with the number of applications reaching 782 in 1919.
TABLE XXXIV
Mining and sandstone applications filed with the Mining Department of the Governorate from 1907 to 1942
year | Number of applications (total) | |||||||||
Applications for exploration and production of minerals | Including applications for coal exploration and production | Applications for exploration and production of sandstone | altogether | year | Applications for exploration and production of minerals | Including applications for coal exploration and production | Applications for exploration and production of sandstone | altogether | ||
1907 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 10 | 1926 | 195 | 135 | 9 | 204 | |
1908 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 14 | 1927 | 334 | 164 | 19 | 353 | |
1909 | 6 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 1928 | 511 | 156 | 40 | 551 | |
1910 | 15 | 15 | 27 | 42 | 1929 | 254 | 167 | 8 | 262 | |
1911 | 16 | 16 | 52 | 68 | 1930 | 280 | 96 | 15 | 295 | |
1912 | 46 | 12 | 1 | 47 | 1931 | 205 | 142 | 13 | 218 | |
1913 | 42 | 3 | 1 | 43 | 1932 | 211 | 116 | 6 | 217 | |
1914 | 82 | 16 | 0 | 82 | 1933 | 258 | 148 | 19 | 277 | |
1915 | 13 | 10 | 1 | 14 | 1934 | 690 | 600 | 14 | 704 | |
1916 | 40 | 2 | 3 | 43 | 1935 | 614 | 374 | 12 | 626 | |
1917 | 222 | 4 | 1 | 223 | 1936 | 1254 | 1039 | 80 | 1334 | |
1918 | 447 | 4 | 14 | 461 | 1937 | 4252 | 3163 | 135 | 4387 | |
1919 | 777 | 40 | 5 | 782 | 1938 | 1198 | 504 | 67 | 1265 | |
1920 | 641 | 13 | 0 | 641 | 1939 | 1119 | 631 | 45 | 1164 | |
1921 | 215 | 116 | 2 | 217 | 1940 | 1058 | 668 | 43 | 1101 | |
1922 | 124 | 81 | 0 | 124 | 1941 | 403 | n/a | 2 | 405 | |
1923 | 271 | 121 | 0 | 271 | 1942 | 860 | 772 | 0 | 860 | |
1924 | 93 | 70 | 2 | 95 | 1943 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | |
1925 | 284 | 127 | 1 | 285 | total | 17032 | 9533 | 659 | 17691 |
In total, from 1907 to 1942, more than 17 thousand applications for the exploration and production of minerals were submitted, most of which accounted for applications for the extraction and exploration of coal deposits. However, the number of mines on the island grew at a much slower pace, because not all applications were approved by the mining department of the governorate. Thus, from 1907 to 1917, only 64 permits were issued for 551 applications submitted to the Karafuto Mining Department (56 for coal, 5 for oil and 3 for gold, silver and copper). In 1925, 103 permits were issued for the extraction and exploration of minerals, sand and crushed stone, in 1926 76, in 1927 117, in 1928 98, in 1929 175, in 1933 202, in 1934 312, in 1935 195, in 1936 365. Moreover, many permits were subsequently canceled due to non-payment of taxes by licensees, or due to the latter's failure to comply with the conditions for issuing permits.
To stimulate the mining industry, the colonial administration did not limit itself to issuing permits. The financial subsidy to the coal industry from the treasury of Karafuto grew from year to year. So, in 1915 it amounted to 38 thousand yen, in 1917 - 89 thousand yen, in 1919 - 234 thousand yen.
In June 1918, in the valley of the Seij gawa River ("river in the western section" - Japanese, now the Staritskaya River), the Dayei (Tayei) coal mine - "Great Prosperity" (62,838 acres), located northeast of Tomari, was opened. In 1917, Tanaka Bun'ichir received a license for the exploration and production of coal in this area at number 35, who in 1918 ceded it to Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha. However, in the summer of 1921, a large forest fire broke out in the area, which burned down the coal mine and many of the miners' homes, so in November of that year the mine was temporarily closed, but work began again the following year. The developed coal seam was one layer with a thickness of 1.5-2 meters. The coal was of good quality with a high calorific value, suitable for use on steamships.
The amount of coal mined in the main mine was insignificant, but it gradually increased. In 1927, another mine was opened next to the mine and the annual production exceeded 60 thousand tons, and by 1935 the production was already 84,052 tons. The amount of coal mined per miner was 2.4 tons in 1925, and reached 3.7 tons in 1930.
The system of mine operation adopted by the Japanese miners was called "short poles (approaches)" despite the fact that this created significant inconveniences in terms of mechanization of mining. Coal cutting in the longwalls was carried out by a cutting machine, coal breaking was explosive, coal was delivered by chain and scraper conveyors. Blasting was carried out by drilling boreholes with hand electric drills. The location of boreholes in longwalls and entrances was in a checkerboard pattern. The consumption of explosives per ton was 290-300 grams. Fastening of the preparatory faces was carried out with an incomplete door frame every 0.8 - 1 meters.
The mined coal was loaded onto trolleys and sent to the coal yard for washing, sorting and subsequent storage. From the warehouse, the coal was transported by rail to the company's pulp and paper mills in Tomarioru and Noda. In addition to the railway, a 3.8-kilometer-long cable car was also used to reach the coal yard in Okuzawa. Initially, it was powered by an 80-horsepower steam engine, but in October 1930 it was replaced by a 45-kilowatt one electric motor, and the plant received an average of 10,000 kWh per month for the operation of the electric motor and the lighting of the tunnels and faces from the power plant of the Tomari Pulp and Paper Mill. Such an unusual way of transporting coal was due to the
difficult terrain, and such a bold and unusual engineering solution of the transport system, of course, distinguished the Dayei mine from other mines in Karafuto.
Dayay Mine
On July 23, 1920, a private primary school was opened in the village. It was located in a picturesque clearing under the slope of the hill, at some distance from the residential village. On November 9, 1926, the school was renamed the first municipal elementary school "Takasawa". In 1928, 356 children studied at the school, 8 teachers and 8 educators worked. On December 1, 1924, a post office was opened in the village, there were Shinto and Buddhist temples, and a police station.
In October 1918, an application was submitted for the exploration and development of coal from the Taihei (Ohira) deposit (29,467 ares), which in 1924 was transferred to the Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha Company. In March 1924, four mining sites were combined into one, where a coal mine was opened on August 1. At that time, Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha had begun construction of a pulp and paper mill in Esutoru, and it needed coal to fuel the plant.
All of the mine's coals were bituminous coal, with a high calorific value and low sulfur and ash content, making it suitable for use in steam boilers and in the home. From the opening of the mine in 1923 until 1927, coal was extracted mainly from the main mine, which mined seam number 1 with a thickness of 8 meters.
In each coal face, coal was loaded into coal cars with a capacity of 0.7 tons using "slurry boxes", primitive manual lifting equipment or steel plate conveyors. Inside the mine and from its mouth to the coal warehouse, a narrow-gauge railway was laid.
It should be said that there was no gas and coal dust in the air of the mines, so mainly natural ventilation was used in the mines, but ventilation ducts were installed in key places of the tunnels to ensure forced ventilation. The amount of water in the mine was relatively small, so wooden drains were installed on the sides of the tunnels for natural drainage.
Since 1929, the main mine has been turned into a coal mine. The topsoil at the surface of the 8-meter seam of the main mine was removed by electric excavators (Dokichi DNK model), and then the coal was mined in an open-pit method from May to the end of October, but mining ceased in the winter months. Coal from the quarry was rolled onto a belt conveyor with a capacity of 37.5 kW. and was delivered to the coal warehouse, from where it was transported to the paper mill in Esutoru at a distance of about 10 km. by narrow-gauge railway, as well as to the coal warehouse in the port of Esutoru, located 15 km. from the mine. The railroad had a gauge of 25 inches and used a steam locomotive that pulled ten five-ton wagons.
Before being sent to consumers, the coal delivered from the entrance to the mine to the coal yard was sorted using a grate into lump and cut coal. Lump coal was sorted by hand to remove waste rock and bad coal, and cut coal was immediately sent for use in the factory.
Electricity to power electric excavators, hoisting machines, drilling rigs, external conveyors, electric motors was supplied from a power plant attached to the paper mill and on average 18000 kWh per month was used by mines and quarries.
In 1919, the mining rights to the 59.28-acre Shiritori coal deposit were acquired by Utaro Tsukakoshi, who in April 1920 transferred the license to the Toho Coal Mining Co., which in turn transferred the rights to the mine to Fuji Paper Mills Co. in 1923. Exploration surveys showed that the deposit consisted of six layers with a thickness of 0.5 to 3 meters, and three layers (layers 2, 3 and 4) were being developed by 1931. Coal was suitable for use in steam boilers and domestic applications. In the first year after the opening of the mine (September 1923), the laying of the tunnel and drifts was completed and coal mining began immediately. The amount of coal mined by miners by 1931 reached 25000 tons. It was also planned to start open-pit coal mining.
The mined coal was transported through the mine by wooden trolleys with a capacity of 0.7 tons. Coal trolleys were hooked up to an electric two-axis winch with a capacity of 75 kW located at the entrance to the mine. and along the 18-inch double-track gauge, narrow-gauge railways went up. 15 trolleys with coal were taken out of the mine with the help of 32 kW. electric motor manufactured by the Allgemeine plant in Germany. Outside the mine there were three four-ton electric locomotives powered by the overhead line, which were used to deliver coal trolleys to the processing plant. There, the coal was sorted at an installation with a capacity of 300-400 tons of coal per 10 hours of operation. In addition to the sorting machine, the factory was equipped with a coal screen, a coal conveyor, a sorting belt, etc. The lump coal was broken into smaller pieces and then sent to a 6,000-ton coal depot at the Fuji Paper Mill, located directly below the beneficiation plant.
Natural ventilation was used inside the tunnels, but as the shaft deepened, 15-kilowatt aerolus electric fans were installed in four tunnels at an exhaust rate of 556 cubic meters per minute (20,000 cubic feet). Inside the inclined tunnels, 70-kilowatt electric sirocco fans with a capacity of 1,700 cubic meters (60,000 cubic feet) per minute were installed. In 1929, work began on the opening of a new shaft inside the mine, which was completed in October 1930, and at the same time a 130-kilowatt electric sirocco fan was installed with an exhaust air capacity of 2,880 cubic meters (100,000 cubic feet) per minute. Small 1.5 kW sirocco electric fans were used directly in the coal mining zones.
Inside the shaft, wooden drainage ditches were installed in each tunnel for natural drainage, and a 100 cubic meter wastewater tank was installed on the lower level. Water was pumped out of the mine through a steel pipe using electric pumps.
The mine and processing plant equipment ran entirely on electricity, which was supplied by a power plant attached to the Siritori paper mill, and consumed an average of 100,000 kWh per month.
At the outbreak of World War I, Europe, which was the center of world production at the time, became a battleground, leading to a decline in production and exports while the warring countries' demand for goods skyrocketed. Japan became one of the countries that filled the export niche, which led to an economic boom at home. It quickly turned into a creditor country.
After the end of World War I, European countries began to gradually rebuild their war-torn economies, and here they were also helped by Japanese exports.
The war itself did not have a negative impact on Japan, on the contrary, the country was swept by an economic recovery, active investments in production were carried out, and banks that had accumulated funds during the war actively issued loans, land and stock prices rose. However, investment soon turned into speculation, which led to a sharp deterioration in the economic situation. In addition, the European economy almost completely restored its pre-war potential in 2 years and the demand for Japanese goods fell sharply, which eventually led to a crisis of overproduction.
As a result, on March 15, 1920, the Tokyo stock market collapsed, and in April, the Masuda Building Broker Bank in Osaka went bankrupt and was forced to close. As production in Europe recovered, Japanese exports fell, and in July it became clear that the country's economy had entered a period of recession (the depression of 1920). The shares of many industrial companies collapsed, and from April to June, 169 banks went bankrupt in the country.
At the same time, zaibatsu-affiliated companies such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, as well as large spinning companies, achieved stable profits through sound management and even improved their economic position, which led to the consolidation of their monopoly in the market. And, consequently, they continued to strengthen their position not only in Japan, but also in their colonial possessions, investing significant capital in the development of industrial enterprises.
In 1914-1927, the Japanese built eight paper mills on Karafuto in the cities of Otomari (December 1914), Tomarioru (September 1915), Toyohara (January 1917), Ochiai (April 1917), Maoka (September 1919), Noda (February 1922), Esutoru (December 1925), Shiritori (January 1927). In 1934, factories in Tomarioru and Noda began to produce artificial fiber - viscose. a new factory was built in the year of Sikuk (Poronaysk), which produced viscose and cellulose. The island's pulp mills, under the terms of the Japanese government, were able to produce products at a lower price than those in Hokkaido and Honshu, which allowed them to make huge profits, as a result of which they acquired the status of the "dollar box" of the Japanese pulp and paper industry. In March 1917, it doubled (5.5 yen), and in April 1918 it tripled (8.5 yen), in March 1919 it was already 10.5 yen. Of course, such a sharp rise in prices led to a serious rise in production, and the Karafuto mills steadily increased the volume of production, which accounted for 25% of the total pulp production in Japan. In the mid-1920s, the share of island pulp in the total supply exceeded 50%, and by the end of 1941 it reached 70%. Thus, in the 20-30s of the twentieth century, the forest and pulp and paper industry actually dominated on the island. All other branches were put at the service of its interests.
In order to export such a huge amount of products outside the island region, a radical modernization of the transport infrastructure was necessary : from 1916 to 1929, the ports of Maoka (Kholmsk, built from 1921 to 1927, construction costs 2.5 million yen), Honto (Nevelsk, built from 1916 to 1926, construction costs 2.5 million yen) and Otomari (Korsakov, was built from 1920 to 1929, the construction cost was 5,870,400 yen), and a regular ferry service was established between the ports of Otomari and Wakkanai from May 1923, called Vakkamatari. Intensive railway construction was carried out on the island to transport raw materials and semi-finished products. The Toyohara-Maoka railway lines were built (it took 8 years to build, the cost was 14 million yen), Naihoro - Honto, Noda - Tomarioru - Kushunnai. By 1941, the freight turnover of the governorate's railways reached 1325 thousand tons By 1945, there were 797.8 km of railways on Karafuto, on which 101 steam locomotive pairs, 105 passenger and 1640 freight cars were involved. Along the entire length of the railway there were 127 stations, 24 tunnels, 618 bridges and hundreds of other engineering and technical structures.
More and more new settlers arrived from the metropolis to work at new enterprises. And if in 1915 there were only 60660 inhabitants in South Sakhalin, then by 1925 the population of the island increased to 189036, in 1935 332475 people lived on Karafuto, and in 1941 there were already 414981 inhabitants in the southern part of the island. Of course, the furnaces of power plants, machines in paper mills, steam locomotives and steamships needed coal. The need for coal also increased among the local population, who used it to heat their homes.
Already in 1935, the total consumption of coal in Karafuto amounted to 1 million tons, in subsequent years increasing to 1.5-2 million tons. Pulp and paper and other industrial enterprises accounted for an average of more than 73% of total coal consumption, the average annual consumption of coal on railways and ships was only about 10%, and about 17% was spent on household needs. The table below shows the dynamics of coal consumption in 1919-1945
Coal consumption by various industries of South Sakhalin in 1919-1945
Year | Altogether | Court | Railway | Plants | Other |
1919 | 158044 | 6267 | 8624 | 137777 | 5375 |
1920 | 208486 | 8061 | 18331 | 172496 | 9598 |
1921 | 155727 | 4222 | 19356 | 121906 | 10243 |
1922 | 203514 | 5055 | 17605 | 175720 | 5134 |
1923 | 210831 | 8790 | 18957 | 175596 | 7488 |
1924 | 259105 | 7073 | 23342 | 217116 | 11574 |
1925 | 308745 | 6304 | 23005 | 258488 | 20948 |
1926 | 447223 | 5422 | 24610 | 369488 | 47703 |
1927 | 458072 | 5412 | 24587 | 387304 | 40769 |
1928 | 475177 | 4850 | 37340 | 382885 | 50102 |
1929 | 528182 | 7448 | 33292 | 423990 | 63452 |
1930 | 745524 | 8920 | 50115 | 601663 | 72826 |
1931 | 762783 | 14188 | 60662 | 550006 | 137927 |
1932 | 617372 | 10273 | 36192 | 505969 | 64938 |
1933 | 728234 | 23324 | 38990 | 556288 | 109632 |
1934 | 821705 | 41861 | 39900 | 598255 | 141680 |
1935 | 962096 | 36638 | 43638 | 658296 | 223611 |
1938 | 1430000 | 91000 | 43000 | 768000 | 528000 |
1939 | 1583000 | 141000 | 39000 | 743000 | 660000 |
1940 | 2033000 | 189000 | 72000 | 864000 | 908000 |
1941 | 2348000 | 199000 | 86000 | 913000 | 1154000 |
1942 | 2295000 | 164000 | 83000 | 790000 | 1252000 |
1943 | 2253000 | 121000 | 81000 | 652000 | 1356000 |
1944 | 2166000 | 72000 | 119000 | 657000 | 1319000 |
1945 | 1663000 | 25000 | 118000 | 513000 | 997000 |
It should be noted that the cost of Sakhalin coal was much higher than the cost of coal mined in Japan itself. So, if in 1915 the wholesale and purchase cost of Honshu and Kyushu coal was 3.18 yen per ton, then the cost of Karafuto coal was 6.5 yen, that is, more than 2 times higher.
TABLE XXXVI
Wholesale cost of 1 ton of coal in Japan and Karafuto in 1909-1941
year | Japan | Karafuto | year | Japan | Karafuto |
1909 | 3,87 | 7,20 | 1926 | 7,35 | 9,69 |
1910 | 3,26 | 7,20 | 1927 | 7,67 | 9,95 |
1911 | 3,12 | 7,20 | 1928 | 7,52 | 9,08 |
1912 | 3,13 | 7,20 | 1929 | 7,17 | 9,04 |
1913 | 3,33 | 7,20 | 1930 | 6,15 | 8,72 |
1914 | 3,60 | 7,20 | 1931 | 5,43 | 8,23 |
1915 | 3,18 | 6,50 | 1932 | 5,06 | 7,68 |
1916 | 3,52 | 7,72 | 1933 | 6,01 | 6,42 |
1917 | 5,31 | 12,06 | 1934 | 6,84 | 7,62 |
1918 | 10,20 | 17,10 | 1935 | 7,15 | 7,54 |
1919 | 14,15 | 14,62 | 1936 | 7,31 | 7,14 |
1920 | 14,30 | 21,78 | 1937 | 8,37 | 7,66 |
1921 | 8,68 | 11,53 | 1938 | 11,54 | 9,59 |
1922 | 9,06 | 11,60 | 1939 | 10,94 | 9,26 |
1923 | 8,87 | 11,00 | 1940 | 9,30 | 11,36 |
1924 | 8,02 | 11,31 | 1941 | n/a | 12,88 |
1925 | 7,53 | 10,93 | 1942 | n/a | n/a |
Therefore, initially it was more profitable to import coal to the island from Japan. Between 30 and 40% of the coal consumed in Karafuto was imported. Until 1930, the missing amount of coal was imported from Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Fushun (Southern Manchuria). In 1926 alone, 100,000 tons, or about 30 percent of all coal consumed, were imported to the island. However, the increased demand for coal forced the Japanese government to partially lift restrictions on the development of reserve coal basins and to stimulate the development of the coal industry by preferential measures. These measures gave their result: by the mid-20s, 12 mines were already operating in South Sakhalin, and the average annual coal production was 300 thousand tons.
In 1929-1932, Japan was hit by an economic crisis. The country had to introduce the most severe austerity measures. The state budget for 1930 was reduced by 160 million yen. As a result, prices for goods began to fall sharply. By June 1930, prices had fallen by 22 per cent compared to June 1929, and prices for manufactured goods by an average of 37 per cent. In 1931, compared with 1929, the price of rice fell by 37 per cent. cotton by 44%, and raw silk by 55%. The crisis caused mass layoffs and a significant reduction in wages. The number of unemployed was estimated at more than 2.5 million people, more than a third of university and vocational school graduates were unemployed, and this unprecedented decline was called the "lumpen era". Japan's economic depression was further exacerbated by the onset of the world economic crisis, which led to a sharp decline in coal production. Thus, if in 1929 34.2 million tons were mined in Japan, then in 1930 - 31.3 million tons, and in 1931 - 27.9 million tons of coal. Bonds of Japanese mining enterprises fell significantly in price. Therefore, the mother country could no longer supply its northern colony with the necessary amount of fuel.
As a result, at the end of 1929, the government partially lifted the blockade of the northern and southern blockaded fields and tenders were held for the issuance of licenses for the development of new coal deposits. Under the terms of the auction, the participant who won the right to obtain a license for coal mining was obliged to pay a mineral extraction tax of 60 yen per 1000 tsubo of the leased territory of the deposit. and to pay 6 sen for each ton of coal mined. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Okura, Oji Paper, Karafuto Kogyo and Toho Coal Mine (Fuji Paper Co., Ltd.) took part in the auction.
On December 5, 1928, Mitsubishi received license number 86 for coal mining in the southern Naihoro coal basin, with a total area of 2389.9 hectares, and coal reserves in the mine area amounted to 99,442,000 tons. According to the terms of the license, the beneficiary had to pay a deposit in cash or government bonds equivalent to 10000 yen within 3 days after winning the auction. Coal mining was to begin within a year after obtaining the permit. In the first year, the company had to produce 20 thousand tons of coal, in the second - 30 thousand tons, in the third - 50 thousand tons, for the fourth - 70 thousand tons, for the fifth - 100 thousand tons of coal.
Officially, the company began preparatory work on January 17, 1929, starting the construction of a 12-kilometer railway line from Naihoro to Honto. In July of the same year, the construction of a mine, a coal factory and barracks for workers began, and by October the first stage of production work was completed. The mined coal was transported for sale to Honto and Otomari, and from 1931 a contract was signed for the purchase of coal for the needs of the Karafuto railway. In February 1932, the mine and all facilities were completed Nayhoro Coal Mine Railway was transferred to its territory , which was renamed Minami Karafuto Coal Mine Railway on January 15, 1935.
On December 5, Mitsui Kozan Co., Ltd received license number 87 for coal mining in the northern blockade area with a total area of 2597.25 hectares near the village of Naikawa. On January 23, 1929, work began on preparations for the opening of a mine in the northeastern coal basin in Naikava (Tikhmenevo). Under the terms of the license, the recipient of the license had to make a deposit in cash or government bonds equivalent to 15,500 yen within 3 days after winning the auction. Coal mining was supposed to begin within a year after obtaining the permit. In the first year, the company was supposed to produce up to 10 thousand tons of coal, in the second - over 10 thousand tons, in the third - 20 thousand tons, in the fourth - 30 thousand tons, in the fifth - 50 thousand tons of coal. The mined coal was delivered to the Oji pulp and paper mill on an 18-kilometer narrow-gauge railway. Part of the coal went to the needs of the local population.
In the early 30s, about 20 mines were already operating in South Sakhalin, and the average annual production was 600-700 thousand tons of coal. However, the vast majority of coal enterprises on the island were small-scale. The owner of the acquired coal plot limited himself to laying one mine, which he operated, regardless of any rules for conducting mine workings.
After the second half of the 1920s, Japan's coal industry entered an era of full-scale technological innovation focused on the mechanization of the coal mining process. The following factors contributed to this.
For example, the price per ton of Kyushu prime coal peaked at 28.55 yen in 1920 and then plummeted to 20.20 yen in 1921 and was maintained at 16 yen in 1922, but the price of first-class coal continued to fall even after 1922. In 1921, the "Coal Mining Association" was created in Japan, which included all large coal mining enterprises and actually performed a cartel function, that is, monitoring sales and production levels. In Karafuto, such a regional association was established only on March 16, 1928 by the administration of the governorate and representatives of the coal industry with the aim of "promoting the mutual friendship of Sakhalin miners, warming relations and discussing important issues of common interest to the industry, to promote and develop the Sakhalin mining industry." The association was a non-profit organization. additional funds. Each year, the association awarded prizes to mining engineers who have worked for more than five years in the same mine and who have made outstanding improvements or inventions, or who have contributed to the prevention of accidents and disasters, or who have distinguished themselves in other fields of activity. At the expense of the association, a monthly Mining Journal was published. The chairman of the board of the association was the head of the mining department of the governorate Kano Shinichi, the members of the council were Sanjozo Akasako, Takashi Watanabe, Shun Imamura, the trustees of this organization were geologists of the Japan Geological Committee Kawasaki Masaru and Nishida Fujichi.
In June 1935, under the auspices of the Karafuto Mining Association, a grand celebration was held on the island to celebrate reaching the 1 million ton production mark. Coal.
In May 1938, with the assistance of the association, a school for training mining engineers was opened on the basis of the high school in the city of Toyohara. The main purpose of opening the school was "to give those working in the coal mining industry the necessary knowledge and skills, and at the same time to cultivate their moral and spiritual development, as well as to train engineers who will participate in underground work in the mines of the island."
Secondary school graduates or similarly qualified individuals with practical experience in mines for a certain period of time could enter the school. The training lasted 2 semesters. The 1st semester was from May to October and included a theoretical course, the second lasted from October to April and included practical classes at island coal enterprises. After completing the training, students took final exams and received a diploma. At the same time, from 30 to 40 people studied at the school. In the year of opening, 38 people studied at the school. Students studied 12 subjects: mining, geology, geodesy, explosives and blasting, safety rules, electrical engineering, civil engineering, metrology, mining law, music, fundamentals of analysis, physical education. The total number of hours of training was 780, or 39 hours per week.
The association also engaged in projects related to the dissemination and development of knowledge about mining, including "technical seminars, technical training groups and practical exercises on the use of rescue equipment."
However, while mainly engaged in educational projects and grants, the Karafuto Mining Association, unlike the Japan Coal Mining Association, did not have the ability to influence the pricing and level of coal production on the island in any way.
But the All-Japan Association of Coal Mining, on the one hand, by limiting the price of coal by reducing coal production itself, on the other hand, obtained the exact opposite effect, expressed in the intensification of the import of imported coal into the country.
As can be seen from the table, coal imports increased sharply from 1922 onwards and exceeded exports in 1923-1924, and after 1927, Japan's coal industry, which had been export-oriented, turned into an import industry for the first time. This rapid increase in coal imports was caused by the low cost of Fushun coal due to "open-pit mining and the use of low-wage colonial labor." As mentioned above, the market price of coal has further declined, and the industry has found itself in an even more difficult position. The increasing competitive pressure of imported coal in the context of a chronic recession was the first factor that pushed for full-scale technological innovation in the coal industry.
Coal exports and imports of Japan and the Karafuto Governorate in 1909-1938
Year | Japan | Karafuto | Year | Japan | Karafuto | ||||
export | Import | export | Import | export | Import | export | Import | ||
1909 | 2890493 | 115948 | - | - | 1924 | 1724982 | 2011658 | - | 75835 |
1910 | 2816047 | 174611 | 1800 | - | 1925 | 2716071 | 1768348 | - | 83835 |
1911 | 3065678 | 182814 | 5100 | - | 1926 | 2611039 | 2044726 | 6200 | 99327 |
1912 | 3467807 | 308329 | - | 6683 | 1927 | 2190837 | 2703125 | 8388 | 67836 |
1913 | 3870600 | 576772 | - | - | 1928 | 2184839 | 2778690 | 1530 | 36389 |
1914 | 3586800 | 957709 | - | 6239 | 1929 | 2043584 | 3254484 | 16380 | 27404 |
1915 | 2924092 | 614677 | - | 7195 | 1930 | 2130825 | 2692684 | 12646 | 12687 |
1916 | 3016947 | 556110 | - | 3947 | 1931 | 1540061 | 2692546 | 38079 | 3574 |
1917 | 2813462 | 713080 | - | 8043 | 1932 | 1387827 | 2715994 | 51833 | 241 |
1918 | 2197037 | 767792 | - | 4031 | 1933 | 1560105 | 3495754 | 168604 | 1879 |
1919 | 2000697 | 699646 | - | 26136 | 1934 | 1087156 | 4060450 | 333500 | 1097 |
1920 | 2129530 | 797792 | - | 62311 | 1935 | 1018769 | 4048581 | 492749 | 2604 |
1921 | 2406810 | 789691 | - | 49456 | 1936 | 1112080 | 4200502 | 1027120 | 3454 |
1922 | 1704225 | 1187220 | - | 54843 | 1937 | 1027621 | 4426168 | 1135176 | 765 |
1923 | 1586899 | 1712951 | - | 56781 | 1938 | 758425 | 3756182 | 1896226 | 870 |
But while coal imports to Japan grew, imports to the Karafuto Governorate steadily decreased, and from 1930 the coal needs of South Sakhalin began to be met at the expense of domestic resources, and in 1931 the governorate turned from a coal-importing region into a coal-exporting region. By 1937, coal production in the island colony amounted to 7% of the total coal production in Japan. It should be noted that coal was exported not only to Japan. Ships from Korea, Hong Kong, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Egypt, as well as the Philippines and East Africa arrived for coal from southern Sakhalin.
The second factor that pushed the coal industry to radically modernize production processes was the development of mining legislation on labor protection. As early as 1905, the Mining Act recognized the liability of mine owners for accidents and occupational diseases of workers. On August 3, 1916, the Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture and Trade No. 21 "Rules on Labor Assistance to Miners" was promulgated, which came into force on September 1 of the same year hours, they were also given additional days off. Minors and women were prohibited: repair of machinery and electrical equipment, handling of explosives, steam engines, winches, support poles, work in places with harmful emissions of gas, dust, poisonous substances. According to the rules, persons suffering from mental and infectious diseases, tuberculosis, leprosy, syphilis, scabies, etc. were not allowed to work in the mines.
Medical care for a sick miner was provided at the expense of the mine owner. In case of injury, illness or death of a miner, the owner of the mine was obliged to provide the family with financial assistance. Sickness benefit for 3 months from the date of incapacity for work was paid in the amount of 50% of earnings, after 3 months - 1/3 of earnings. The payment of disability benefits was calculated in the amount of earnings from 30 to 170 days, depending on the severity. In the event of the death of an employee, the family was paid 170 days' wages and a funeral allowance of at least 10 yen. Violators of the rules faced a fine of up to 100 yen.
On October 29, 1919, the First International Labor Conference opened in Washington , at which conventions were adopted on the limitation of working hours, on the prohibition of night work, on the minimum age of workers, on the provision of leave to women before and after childbirth, the prevention of occupational diseases, etc. In 1883, with the passage of the German Workers' Insurance Act, it spread both inside and outside Europe. The spread of social insurance in developed countries also put international pressure on Japan, which was experiencing rapid industrial growth due to World War I.
In 1921, the "Employment Law" was adopted in Japan, which provided for the creation of state employment agencies. In April 1922, the law on health insurance for workers was adopted, which came into force on July 1, 1926. Insurance payments included payment for medical care, benefits for injuries or illness, funeral expenses, maternity benefits of the insured person. Initially, the insurance premium was 4% of earnings and the insured person and the employer bore the costs on an equal basis. In 1922, Japan ratified the ILO Convention on the Minimum Age for Workers, on the Prohibition of Night Work in Factories and Mines for Minors. On March 29, 1923, a ban on hiring children under 14 years of age was introduced, night work of women and minors under 15 years of age was prohibited. A provision on employment contracts has appeared. But all these laws were constantly violated by industrialists.
On September 1, 1928, the Minister of the Interior issued Order No. 30, introducing amendments to the Miners' Assistance Regulations of 1916. They introduced a ban on night work (from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m.) for minors under 16 years of age, women with children and other privileged categories, and the work of women in underground work was completely prohibited from 1932 Leave after childbirth. The working time of ordinary miners was limited to 10 hours. This was the first regulation of working hours for adult men in Japan. In 1930, when the problem of unemployment came to the fore in connection with the world economic crisis, the first Unemployment Insurance Act appeared. In the same 1930, another important law was adopted. This is the Law on Severance Pay from Enterprises, which began a new direction of labor policy in Japan. On 2 April 1931, the Accident Insurance Act and the Accident Assistance Act (entered into force on 11 July 1931) were promulgated.
However, the implementation of these laws in colonial territories required special orders from local authorities, which, as a rule, followed with a significant delay. Only on November 3, 1929, Governor Karafuto signed Order No. 38 "Regulations on Supporting the Employment and Labor of Miners", which introduced additional days off for minors and women, prohibited hiring people suffering from serious illnesses to work in mines, and shortened the working day for underage girls. Order No. 39 "Changes in the Rules for the Application of the Law on Mining Industry" established the rules for the payment of benefits to sick miners, employees who have been injured and mutilated, as well as the payment of funeral benefits, benefits to the disabled and dependents. In the event that the owner of the mine delayed payments, he had to pay a fine of 85 yen. In fact, it was these orders that introduced the law on health insurance and amendments to the rules for providing assistance to Japanese miners on the island.
Expenditures on medical care and social benefits of workers in the coal industry of Japan and the Karafuto Governorate in 1925-1937
Types of assistance | Karafuto | Japan | ||||||||||||||||
1926 | 1927 | 1928 | 1929 | 1930 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1925 | 1927 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | |
Medical expenses | 18303,85 | 22387 | 30051 | 43681 | 27419 | 26617,03 | 35684,34 | 42317,11 | 62647,24 | 87166,58 | 86766,51 | 1258127 | 262112 | 75980 | 80026 | 97011 | 89804 | 81626 |
Sickness benefit | 3426,12 | 3869 | 1716 | 6575 | 8503 | 30544,98 | 31528,24 | 36573,90 | 40800,25 | 58120,76 | 87285,36 | 2519611 | 400262 | 97261 | 107405 | 119137 | 125738 | 118716 |
Disability benefit | 7885,72 | 10481 | 8755 | 13560 | 15861 | 16640,11 | 36666,50 | 14566,39 | 20630,92 | 27154,30 | 31953,41 | 603674 | 1233219 | 1021704 | 1023892 | 674424 | 929912 | 1002464 |
Severance pay | 19989,16 | 26269 | 34127 | 35157 | 30008 | 4237,20 | 22353,63 | 8241,10 | 12018,01 | 24417.28 | 21831,17 | 317764 | 494324 | 740373 | 827234 | |||
Funeral allowance | 700 | 416 | 202 | 262 | 942 | 407,50 | 1398 | 597,3 | 1044,27 | 1971.69 | 1572,99 | 16003 | 5281 | 2561 | 4275 | 30466 | 3866 | 2791 |
Other | 600 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
Altogether | 50904,85 | 63381 | 74854 | 99236 | 82734 | 78520 | 127631,41 | 102295,80 | 139068,03 | 198830.61 | 229409,44 | 4715178 | 1900874 | 1197506 | 1215598 | 1415362 | 1727903 | 2032831 |
Asked for help (people) | 549 | 547 | 2262 | 1159 | 854 | 720 | 959 | 1571 | 1628 | 2727 | 3120 | 143129 | 130000 | 65373 | 57803 | 64101 | 61100 | 60937 |
Amount of assistance per 1 victim | 91,63 | 115,87 | 33,09 | 63,64 | 96,87 | 109,09 | 133,08 | 65,11 | 85,42 | 72,91 | 73,53 | 32,94 | 14,62 | 18,32 | 21,03 | 22,08 | 28,28 | 37,79 |
To ensure the improvement of the quality of labor protection, Order No. 37 amended the rules "On Mountain Police" (in our understanding of labor protection and safety departments). The rules themselves were spelled out in Order No. 41 of November 1913, but since then the mining industry on the island has undergone rapid development and the adopted norms have become outdated. Now each coal enterprise had to hire a special mining engineer responsible for safety at its own expense. Moreover, very high requirements were imposed on the candidate for the position, in particular, he had to have a diploma in mining technologies and work experience from 1 to 5 years, depending on the level of education. His duties included keeping a special "safety log", in which all observations were recorded during the daily rounds of the mine sections. In case of detection of danger, such as the smell of gas, violation of the fastening of the racks, signs of a possible collapse, etc., the engineer was obliged to immediately stop work on this section and report it to the Department of Mining, which, after an appropriate inspection, decided to resume work processes in this area or to close it completely or partially. He also ensured the inspection of the machines and mechanisms available at the mine and, in the event of a malfunction, prohibited their operation until the breakdown was completely eliminated. If blasting operations were carried out in the mine, then the engineer was entitled to a special assistant who separately kept a blasting log and controlled all issues related to explosives: monitored their purchase, delivery, storage conditions, etc. Fines for non-compliance were ridiculous, and employers calmly paid them.
The fact that there was practically no rescue equipment in the mines of the south of the island also speaks of the disregard for the life of ordinary miners. In 1936, only 4 out of 31 coal mines had 6 Brato self-rescuers, 11 Draeger oxygen respirators (manufactured by Kawasaki Shipbuilding), 10 Kokumin carbon monoxide gas masks (manufactured by Shigematsu Seisakusho), 9 conventional gas masks. A total of 36 units. In 1937, self-rescuers and gas masks were already at 5 mines of the island in a total of 66 pieces. This equipment was used exclusively by emergency rescue teams at mines, while ordinary miners did not have access to gas masks and self-rescuers.
The third factor that influenced the need to modernize the coal industry was undoubtedly wages. It should be noted that for such a low-profit industry as the coal industry, cheap labor was needed.
It should be noted that in Japan the forms of exploitation of miners in the late 19th and early 20th centuries can be conditionally divided into three types. The first form was reduced to the complete dependence of the workers on the capitalist. Under this form, he personally recruited labor and dealt with labor and housing issues, as well as the payment of wages. The second included a form of exploitation when the company hiring workers paid wages itself, but labor, housing, as well as the recruitment of workers were handled by contractors who entered into contracts with the company. This was the so-called "semi-feudal outsourcing". At the same time, recruitment agencies received a certain share of workers' earnings from both the workers themselves and the employers. Contractors received this share from entrepreneurs under contracts. They charged the workers much more than the established "share", since contracts as such with workers were usually not concluded at the time of recruitment, but were limited to verbal promises. Sometimes miners were given so-called "tickets" instead of money, which could not be exchanged for money and were used to obtain food in the company's stores. It was not until 1905 that the law required workers to be paid only in yen, prohibiting the use of local "quasi-money," but in some parts of the country such "receipts and checks" continued to be used until 1919.
In another case, the company contracted with the owner of the mine to extract coal at a certain price per tonne, hired workers at an hourly rate, and then sold the coal to the owner of the mine, and the difference between the contract price and the cost of production was its profit. This form of exploitation was prevalent until the end of the 1920s. In the third form of exploitation, all issues were resolved by the company with the help of its counterparties, and not by third-party contracting firms. This form was most common in Japan. In the mines of South Sakhalin, it became the main one only on the eve of and during the Second World War. At the same time, it is necessary to consider the methods of exploitation of miners. The measure for determining the volume of coal mined in a number of shifts was a box of a set volume. When checking the amount of coal mined, the standardizer could always find fault either with the volume or with the presence of stones in the coal. Moreover, if the tag attached to the box was lost, the rationer did not take into account the mined coal. All this indicates that the forms and methods of exploitation of the miners were very disguised and cruel.
In addition, the miners of South Sakhalin had to work in extremely difficult conditions. Many mines had very few ventilation units, although almost all of the mines in South Sakhalin were gas-hazardous. Until the mid-30s, in terms of the degree of mechanization and electrification, the mines of the southern part of Sakhalin lagged behind the mines of the metropolis, coal was extracted in them by hand. In addition, safety at many mines was very unsatisfactory. In such conditions, the working time of miners lasted 12 hours with a two-shift system with one day off. Due to this, miners could not work in the mines for more than 8 years and were dismissed for health reasons. According to Japanese data, in the early 1930s, 75% of miners left the mines after 3 years or moved to another job.
The average daily wage of Japanese coal miners in Japan in 1926 was 1.75 yen, in 1929 - 1.89 yen, in 1933 - 1.11 yen, in 1936 - 1.68 yen. The earnings of women employed in the coal industry were much lower and amounted to 1.34 yen in 1926, 1.1 yen in 1929, and 0.73 yen in 1933.
Average daily wage in the mines of Karafuto, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Korea in 1935-1938
year | Karafuto | Hokkaido | Kyushu | Korea | ||
Miners | Surface Workers | Average | ||||
1935 | 2,56 | 1,58 | 2,21 | 1,72 | 1,64 | 0,81 |
1936 | 2,63 | 1,51 | 2,13 | 1,73 | 1,73 | 0,87 |
1937 | 2,92 | 1,66 | 2,40 | 2,02 | 1,94 | 0,95 |
1938 | 3,55 | 1,96 | 2,86 | n/a | n/a | n/a |
In 1933, in terms of Soviet money, a man earned 45-50 kopecks, and a woman - 25-30 kopecks per day. For comparison, let's say that the average earnings of factory workers at that time was 2.43 yen. In the same 1933, the daily wage of a British coal miner in terms of Japanese currency was 5.70 yen, and a coal miner from the Ruhr - 4.37 yen. At the same time, their working day was much shorter.
Salaries of workers in the coal industry in Japan and the Karafuto Governorate in 1926-1938
year | Japan | Karafuto | |||
husband | Wives | Average | Miners | Average | |
Daily (* monthly) wage (in yen) | |||||
1926 | 1,763 | 1,265 | 1,669 | 3,56 | 3,12 |
1927 | 1,854 | 1,335 | 1,756 | 3,72 | 2,95 |
1928 | 1,907 | 1,216 | 1,802 | 3,89 | 3,11 |
1929 | 1,911 | 1,156 | 1,815 | 3,79 | 3,05 |
1930 | 1,700 | 1,033 | 1,613 | 3,64 | 2,90 |
1931 | 1,707 | 0,73 | 1,637 | 3,00 | 2,42 |
1932 | 1,681 | 0,837 | 1,637 | 2,70 | 2,17 |
1933 | 1,696 | 0,644 | 1,609 | 2,53 | 2.08 |
1934 | 1,706 | 0,711 | 1,637 | 2,74 | 2.12 |
1935 | 1,749 | 0,722 | 1,678 | 2,83 | 2.13 |
1936 | 187,2* | 79,1* | 114* | 2,89 | 2,20 |
1937 | 210,3* | 87,4* | 134* | 3,27 | 2,40 |
1938 | 247,2* | 107,2* | 154* | 3,96 | 2,86 |
The remuneration of miners in South Sakhalin was much higher than in Japan. However, if you look at the data in the table below, you can see that the earnings of Karafuto miners fit into the average wages of other workers on the island.
TABLE XLI
Average daily (*monthly) wage in Karafuto in 1914-1940
name | 1914 | 1927 | 1928 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1940 |
Underground mine workers | - | 3,72 | 3,89 | 3,79 | 3,64 | 3,00 | 3,38 | 3,64 | 3,59 | 3,84 | 3,75 | 3,81 | 3,96 | - |
Average by mines | - | 2,95 | 3,11 | 3,05 | 2,90 | 2,42 | 2,17 | 2,08 | 2,12 | 2,13 | 2,20 | 2,40 | 2,86 | - |
carpenter | 1,37 | 4,46 | 4,29 | 4,29 | 4,00 | 2,46 | 2,24 | 2,17 | 2,29 | 2,63 | 2,5 | 2,84 | 3,16 | 4,19 |
Plasterer | 1,54 | 5,11 | 4,58 | 4,64 | 4,42 | 2,52 | 2,26 | 2,34 | 2,45 | 2,80 | 2,56 | 3,11 | 3,54 | 4,40 |
Mason | 1,40 | 5,00 | 5,00 | 4,5 | 4,50 | 3,25 | 2,14 | 1,80 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Painter | 1,39 | 4,78 | 4,34 | 3,63 | 3,6 | 2,32 | 1,81 | 1,68 | 2,03 | 2,52 | 2,74 | 2,80 | 4,10 | |
Brick Stacker | 2,10 | 4,86 | 4,2 | 4,31 | 3,64 | 2,65 | - | 1,97 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
builder | 1,90 | 4,50 | 4,8 | 4,40 | 4,25 | - | - | - | 1,87 | 2,2 | 2,07 | 2,31 | 2,51 | 3,56 |
Gata Manufacturer | 1,18 | 2,8 | 55* | 62,50* | 54,00* | 2,10 | 1,85 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Shoemaker | 1,18 | 66,25* | 60* | 62,00* | 57,83* | 2,14 | 1,87 | 1,53 | 1,60 | 1,52 | 1,58 | 1,68 | 1,99 | 2,67 |
Tailor (Western style) | 0,52 | 42,67* | 54,28* | 55,71* | 52,86* | 1,71 | 1,97 | 1,35 | 1,89 | 1,97 | 1,91 | 1,99 | 2,20 | 2,54 |
Tailor (Japanese style) | 1,07 | 55,83* | 44,17* | 37,51* | 34,16* | 1,60 | 1,12 | - | 1,37 | 1,13 | 1,23 | 1,32 | 1,47 | 1,73 |
Joiner | 1,38 | 4,67 | 4,28 | 4,53 | 3,8 | 2,27 | 2,12 | - | 1,92 | 2,24 | 2,17 | 2,35 | 2,73 | 3,73 |
Shipwright | - | - | - | 4,50 | 4,17 | 2,62 | 2,35 | 2,10 | 2,14 | - | - | - | - | - |
Blacksmith | 1,3 | 88,33* | 57,14* | 72,14* | 60,28* | 2,07 | 2,00 | 1,95 | 2,07 | 2,23 | 2,04 | 2,29 | 2,29 | 3,44 |
Printer | 0,95 | - | - | 2,56 | 2,15 | 1,95 | 1,85 | 1,77 | 1,73 | 1,56 | 1,65 | 1,77 | 1,82 | 2,33 |
Confectioner | 0,88 | - | - | 45,00* | 42,86* | 1,71 | 1,51 | 1,40 | 1,27 | 1,31 | 1,53 | 1,44 | 1,44 | 2,00 |
Sake Brewing Worker | 18,63* | - | - | 71,67* | 78,00* | 3,28 | 2,75 | 2,55 | 2,34 | 2,22 | 2,26 | 2,27 | 2,41 | 3,10 |
Oil manufacturer | - | - | - | 73,75* | 36,00* | 2,29 | 1,87 | 1,95 | 1,95 | 1,95 | 1,75 | 1,80 | 2,1 | 2,45 |
Pulp and Paper Mill Worker | - | - | - | 4,28 | 3,68 | 2,01 | 1,72 | 1,91 | 1,72 | 1,77 | 1,75 | 1,95 | 2,01 | 2,56 |
Minor Municipal Employee | 1,33 | 4,12 | 3,42 | 3,66 | 2,14 | 1,72 | 1,6 | 1,56 | 2,13 | 2,23 | 2,34 | 2,60 | 3,31 | |
electrician | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1,71 | 2,28 | 2,42 | 2,59 | 2,66 | - |
Japanese Wage Worker (Male) | 0,87 | 3,25 | 2,57 | 2,53 | 2,34 | 1,53 | 1,53 | 1,26 | 1,36 | 1,57 | 1,54 | 1,83 | 2,27 | 3,23 |
locksmith | 1,5 | - | - | - | - | 2,13 | 2,13 | 1,81 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 2,03 | 1,98 | 2,40 | 3,44 |
Car driver | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1,92 | 2,28 | 2,61 | 2,97 | 3,09 | 3,99 | 4,43 | 5,32 |
Fisherman | 1,11 | 70* | 39,16* | 37,5* | 47,00* | 1,72 | 1,62 | 1,32 | 1,42 | 1,65 | 1,52 | 1,66 | 1,66 | 2,23 |
servant | - | 32,5* | 25,71* | 25,00* | 22,86* | 29,71* | 14,00* | 15,67* | 14,17* | 10,83* | 12,5* | 11,5* | 15,67* | 24,71* |
Housemaid | - | 19* | 14,29* | 14,29* | 12,14 | 22,86* | 9,00* | 8,00* | 7,71* | 7,86* | 9,83* | 8,21* | 8,43* | 12,88* |
It should also be borne in mind that prices for goods and food in the south of the island were significantly higher than the average Japanese ones, which negated the higher wages of Karafuto residents. For example, if 1 ce of rice in Japan in 1930 cost 0.18 yen, then in Karafuto it cost 0.33, refined sugar cost 17 sen in the Tokyo market, and 24 sen in the Toyohara market. Soy sauce cost 63 and 80 sen, and wheat flour 18 and 27 sen, respectively. The cost of imported sake was more than 2 times higher than the cost of rice vodka made directly in the colony. Moreover, in Tokyo, a bottle of sake cost 1.4 yen, while on the island the same bottle was sold for 2.5 yen. A package of paper (20 sheets) in the Tokyo market cost 7 sen, while in the Sakhalin market it cost 30 sen. Even firewood, which cost 2 yen in Tokyo, cost 7.3 yen on the "most forested island in the world". More detailed prices for goods and products of the Toyohara Market are shown in the table below.
Prices at the Toyohara Market in 1927-1940
name | Units. ism. | 1927 | 1928 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | 1940 |
Polished rice | 1se (1.8 l.) | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,27 | 0,27 | 0,34 | 0,36 | 0,36 | 0,39 | 0,52 |
Rice | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,47 | 0,38 | 0,37 | 0,33 | 0,25 | 0,27 | 0,31 | 0,25 | 0,50 | 0,36 | 0,36 | 0,46 | 0,64 |
wheat | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,25 | 0,24 | 0,22 | 0,23 | 0,16 | 0,17 | 0,16 | 0,17 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,23 | 0,27 | 0,42 |
Wheat flour | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 0,12 | 0,12 | 0,11 | 0,10 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,08 | - | - | - | - | 0,06 |
oat | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,15 | 0,12 | 0,10 | 0,18 | 0,16 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
soy | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,30 | 0,27 | 0,26 | 0,25 | 0,20 | 0,16 | 0,22 | 0,20 | 0,24 | 0,28 | 0,25 | 0,27 | 0,47 |
Bean | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,38 | 0,33 | 0,18 | 0,25 | 0,30 | 0,22 | 0,28 | 0,35 | 0,27 | 0,32 | 0,70 |
Dried vegetables | 100 momme (375 gr.) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,12 | 0,13 | 0,13 | 0,15 | 0,16 | 0,22 |
Sobo noodles | 1 ball | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,04 | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,06 |
miso | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 0,12 | 0,11 | 0,11 | 0,08 | 0,07 | 0,06 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,09 | 0,09 | 0,13 |
Salted vegetables | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 0,18 | 0,18 | 0,15 | 0,13 | - | 0,08 | 0,08 | 0,06 | 0,10 | 0,10 | - | - | - |
Dried prunes | 100 momme (375 gr.) | - | 0,30 | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,30 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,25 | 0,30 | 0,35 |
Tofu | 1 piece (350-1000 g) | - | - | - | - | 0,08 | 0,07 | 0,08 | 0,08 | 0,10 | 0,10 | 0,12 | 0,13 | 0,16 |
salted salmon | 1 can (3.75 kg) | 3,00 | 1,50 | 2,00 | 2,10 | 1,30 | 1,60 | 1,80 | 0,85 | 1,40 | 1,80 | 1,40 | - | 4,00 |
Salted trout | 1 can (3.75 kg) | 1,00 | 0,70 | 0,26 | 1,20 | 0,80 | 0,60 | 1,20 | 0,60 | 0,50 | 1,00 | 0,57 | 1,20 | 1,47 |
Algae | 1 can (3.75 kg) | 1,60 | 1,60 | 1,40 | 1,80 | 1,50 | 1,70 | 1,80 | 3,00 | 3,00 | 3,50 | 3,50 | 3,50 | 4,84 |
Dried bay leaf | 111.62 | - | - | - | - | - | 0,16 | 0,40 | 0,50 | 0,50 | 0,50 | 0,35 | 0,50 | 0,42 |
beef | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,50 | 0,60 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,81 |
pork | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 0,60 | 0,60 | 0,45 | 0,50 | 0,60 | 0,60 | 0,60 | 0,80 | 0,81 |
Chicken | 100 momme (375 gr.) | 1,70 | 0,80 | 1,80 | 1,80 | 1,40 | 1,00 | 0,80 | 0,90 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 1,20 | 1,33 |
milk | 1st. (0.18 l.) | 0,08 | 0,08 | 0,06 | 0,07 | 0,07 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,07 |
Egg | 10 pcs. | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,80 | 0,50 | 0,40 | 0,50 | 0,60 | 0,55 | 0,60 | 0,60 | 0,70 | 0,97 |
Soy | 1se (1.8 l.) | 1,10 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,80 | 0,65 | 0,60 | 0,60 | 0,58 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,68 | 0,80 | 0,82 |
Edible salt | 1 kin (600 g) | - | - | - | - | - | 0,04 | 0,04 | 0,04 | 0,05 | 0,04 | 0,06 | 0,05 | 0,07 |
refined sugar | 1 kin (600 g) | 0,35 | 0,31 | 0,27 | 0,24 | 0,22 | 0,21 | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,25 | 0,26 | 0,26 | 0,25 | 0,31 |
Granulated sugar | 1 kin (600 g) | 0,25 | 0,27 | 0,23 | 0,23 | 0,20 | 0,18 | 0,23 | 0,20 | 0,21 | 0,22 | 0,24 | 0,26 | 0,30 |
Japanese white radish | 100 momme (375 gr.) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,01 | 0,02 | 0,02 | 0,11 |
Potato | 100 momme (375 gr.) | - | - | - | - | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,02 | 0,02 | 0,04 | 0,02 | 0,03 | 0,03 | 0,09 |
Onion | 100 momme (375 gr.) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0,06 | 0,04 | 0,07 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 0,14 |
Wheat sake (malt) | 1 bottle of 4 go (0.72 l) | - | - | - | - | - | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,35 | 0,39 | 0,42 | 0,47 |
Karafuto Sake | 1se (1.8 l.) | 1,30 | 1,20 | 1,20 | 1,15 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 1,10 | 1,00 | 1,10 | 1,10 | 1,20 | 1,30 | 2,23 |
Sake Japan | 1se (1.8 l.) | 2,80 | 2,20 | 2,50 | 2,50 | 2,40 | 2,30 | 2,30 | 2,30 | 2,40 | 2,40 | 2,10 | 2,50 | 2,50 |
Cider | 1 bottle | - | - | - | - | - | 0,22 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 0,20 | - |
tea | 1 kin (600 g) | 2,00 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 1,80 | 0,80 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,65 | 0,90 | 1,15 |
bleached cotton fabric | 1 roll | 0,75 | 0,95 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 0,90 | 1,20 | 1,90 | 1,66 |
Flannel suit | 1 Piece | 18,00 | 22,25 | 9,70 | 10,20 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
Cotton for bedding | 1 can (3.75 kg) | - | - | - | - | - | 3,10 | 4,00 | 3,50 | 4,50 | 3,80 | 4,50 | 6,80 | 6,92 |
Wool Yarn | 1 thick piece | - | - | - | - | - | 2,20 | 2,50 | 3,30 | 2,35 | 2,50 | 3,20 | 5,25 | 4,42 |
kerosene | 1se (1.8 l.) | 0,65 | 0,55 | 0,60 | 0,50 | 0,45 | 0,50 | 0,50 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
coal | 1 ton | 0.10 (10 kg) | 0.07 10 kg | 17,50 | 17,50 | 16,00 | 14,50 | 11,00 | 12,25 | 13,25 | 13,50 | 14,30 | 15,15 | 13,68 |
Firewood (deciduous pine) | 1 shiki (0.18x3x5 meter about 2.7 cubic meters) | 8,50 | 7,50 | 7,50 | 7,30 | 3,80 | 4,00 | 4,20 | 4,50 | 4,00 | 6,00 | 7,00 | - | 9,40 |
charcoal | 10 can (37.5 kg) | 11.75 (1 t.) | 1,80 | 1,50 | 1,20 | 0,85 | 0,75 | 0,88 | 1,62 | 1,50 | 1,70 | 2,18 | 2,70 | - |
Rapeseed oil | 1se (1.8 l.) | 1,50 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 0,90 | 0,65 | 0,55 | 0,65 | 0,60 | 0,65 | 0,75 | 0,75 | 0,80 | 1,62 |
Tatami mat | 11.62 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1,30 | 1,30 | 1,25 | 1,00 | 1,20 | 1,35 | - |
Lumber | 1 ken (1.8 cubic meters) | 4,35 | 7,00 | 6,50 | 6,50 | 4,30 | 3,80 | 4,40 | 5,50 | 7,00 | 7,50 | 8,00 | 9,50 | 12,41 |
Treated boards | 1 tsubo (3.3 sq. m) | 2,30 | 3,50 | 3,00 | 3,50 | 1,55 | 1,20 | 1,30 | 1,70 | 2,00 | 2,00 | 2,35 | 2,35 | 3,06 |
electric power | For 1 month | - | - | - | - | 0,40 | 0,40 | 0,30 | 0,30 | 1,15 | 1,05 | 1,05 | 1,05 | 1,16 |
It should also be noted that the wage system in the Karafuto mines, while giving great advantages to the management and engineering and technical workers, when their wages were 4-5 times higher than the official rates and amounted to 1200-2400 yen per month, at the same time enslaved the worker through all kinds of allowances at the discretion of the management and together with them amounted to 135 to 172 yen per month for production workers, and for the most skilled workers up to 270 yen. Allowances were given: for good work - 15 yen, for long-term work - from 5 to 20 yen, for the quality of products - from 15 to 30 yen, for wife and children - up to 5 yen per month. In addition, the so-called six-month allowances were paid twice a year (in June and December): for 1 year of work - 6 percent, from 1 to 3 years of work - 12 percent, from 3 to 11 years - 18 percent and over 11 years - 24 percent of the six-month salary. It should be noted that women in the island coal industry, however, as well as in the metropolis, received 50 percent less than men.
A completely reasonable question arises, why were all these "incentive" allowances and payments introduced? The answer to this question is quite obvious if you look closely at the data in the table below - a colossal turnover of labor at coal mining enterprises.
Number of workers in the coal industry of Karafuto in 1926-1944
year | Beginning of the year | accepted | Dismissed | End of the year | ||||||||
husband | Wives | altogether | husband | Wives | altogether | husband | Wives | altogether | husband | Wives | Altogether | |
1926 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1056 | 64 | 1120 |
1927 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1231 | 93 | 1324 |
1928 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1629 | 87 | 1716 |
1929 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 2280* |
1930 | 1647 | 91 | 1738 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1529 | 51 | 1580 |
1931 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1501 | 67 | 1568 |
1932 | 1501 | 67 | 1568 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1553 | 79 | 1632 |
1933 | 1553 | 79 | 1632 | 4368 | 130 | 4498 | 3434 | 91 | 3525 | 2437 | 118 | 2555 |
1934 | 2437 | 118 | 2555 | 3372 | 237 | 3609 | 2489 | 141 | 2903 | 3370 | 214 | 3584 |
1935 | 3370 | 214 | 3584 | 3563 | 245 | 3817 | 2379 | 205 | 2584 | 4554 | 254 | 4808 |
1936 | 4554 | 254 | 4808 | 4422 | 370 | 4792 | 3514 | 311 | 3825 | 5476 | 313 | 5789 |
1937 | 5476 | 313 | 5789 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 7355 | 379 | 7734 |
1938 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 11343 | 316 | 11659 |
1939 (Sept.) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 14536 | 910 | 15735 |
1940** | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 23182 |
1941 (Aug.)** | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 32805 |
1942** | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 33411 |
1943** | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 20000 |
1944 (Feb)** | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 20146 | 1428 | 21574 |
* - mine workers, engineers, employees are indicated.
** - mine workers, engineers, employees and mobilized workers from Korea are indicated.
High norms of exploitation, low wages, high prices for food and basic necessities, as well as unsatisfactory working conditions in enterprises both in Japan itself and, of course, in its colonies, caused a high turnover of the labor force and the activation of the labor movement.
In addition, there were few skilled workers in the coal mines of the island. Mostly a motley audience worked. They were factory workers, craftsmen, carpenters, clerks, barbers, peasants, fishermen... Most of them were seasonal workers who came to the island from the interior of Japan, seduced by high wages. After working for several weeks and "tasting" all the delights of miners' skills, these people understood that such hard work would quickly make them disabled and quit production. As eyewitnesses wrote, "workers were replaced quickly, and no matter how many of them were replenished, it was not enough."
It must be said that even in the Meiji era, a certain idea of paternalism appeared in the ruling circles on the issue of labor relations, but it was paternalism, similar to the relationship of master and servant, based on the large status inequality between labor and capital. After the First World War, when this gap narrowed due to the rise of democracy in the Taish era and the spread of education, paternalism changed to the "principle of the family", which imitated the relationship between labor and capital as the relationship between parents and children. This idea was also associated with the values of the national traditional family (onjiteki ie), the modern hypostasis of which was proposed to be a capitalist industrial enterprise. In the spirit of this idea, it was proposed to develop a concept of social policy, according to which the provision of social benefits and payments to employees would be carried out not by the state, but by entrepreneurs as a concern of the head of the "patriarchal family" in relation to their households. So, this management principle was based on the concept of "the company is a family", where the workers involved in production are children, and the administrators and managers are caring parents. But many workers were well aware that in this family they were assigned only the role of Cinderella. And instead of a ball gown, a carriage, a fairy godmother and a handsome prince, they were offered an extensive system of allowances, payments and allowances "for diligence and obedience".
During the 5 years of the First World War, prices in the Japanese markets almost tripled, but instead of raising wages, employers preferred to introduce all kinds of allowances and "incentive" payments. Thus, during this period, there was a transition from the Western style of fixed wages and effective piecework and hourly wages to the unique wage system of Japan, consisting of complex systems of allowances, when they tried to retain qualified workers through a system of special benefits or privileges.
Employees were given a housing allowance, a travel allowance, an allowance for the purchase of work and casual clothes... And, of course, the most noticeable phenomenon in the field of labor relations during this period was the formation of an age-based wage system, which by the end of World War II had become an almost universal means of material incentives at heavy industry enterprises in Japan. Employees could be even more securely tied up by a system of monetary settlements, which considers the length of service at one place of work as the main criterion of wages. A constant increase in wage rates depending on age was the most effective means against staff turnover and, in addition, solved the problem of increasing labor productivity in conditions when it still largely depended on the length of service. If an employee was fired, or he quit himself, then in another company he was treated as a person whose career begins in the "middle of the road", i.e. everything that was earned for seniority in one company did not matter in another company. Thus, the remuneration system became the main means of correcting discipline, increasing efficiency and productivity, control of labor mobility. Workers, on the other hand, were deeply dissatisfied with the devaluation of prices and unstable incomes under the piece-work system, the lack of transparency in the standards of bonuses and raises, and the arbitrary assessments of managers' merit.
And nevertheless, this system, having taken root in Japan, gradually migrated to the south of Sakhalin. As a result, the number of workers in the coal industry in the second half of the 30s began to increase sharply. It should be noted that if in 1930 the coal industry of South Sakhalin employed 0.9% of the total population of the island (not counting children, the elderly and dependents), then by 1941 this figure increased to 7%, that is, the number of people employed at coal enterprises increased more than 7 times!
Structure of Japanese employment in Karafuto in 1942
Occupation | % of labor force |
Agriculture | 23 |
Fishing/Fish Products | 8 |
Mining (oil, coal, metals) | 15 |
Manufacturing sector | 17 |
Trade | 11 |
Transport | 7 |
Civil servants | 10 |
Servant | 1 |
Other | 8 |
It is important to note that Karafuto's workforce was highly mobile. People who called their main occupation "agriculture" in the census often worked part-time, and also took seasonal work in fisheries and forests. As such, the above statistics show the flexibility of many workers who have moved between different sectors and across the island as opportunities have arisen.
The total number of workers and specialists in the coal industry, including employees, in August 1941 was over 32 thousand people, including underground workers 16812 people and surface workers 13937 people. Miners and tunnellers accounted for over 36% of the total number of workers. During the Second World War, the coal industry of South Sakhalin employed more workers in the Pacific basin than in any other industry on the island.
Thus, the import of cheap coal from the colonies, the increase in the cost of wages and labor protection put the country's coal industry on the brink of survival. Under these conditions, it was necessary to reduce the cost of production, and this required a radical modernization of the entire industry, the replacement of expensive manual labor with machine labor, the use of mechanization and technological innovations. In particular, many American-made drilling machines, such as Hammer and German Siemens machines, were imported. Progress in mechanization was overwhelmingly dependent on the import of coal mining equipment from abroad. Prior to 1932, the level of domestic self-sufficiency in coal mining machinery was less than 20%, and more than 80% was imported from the United States and Germany. This was facilitated by deflationary processes and falling prices for imported products. However, after 1933, the internal level of self-sufficiency in coal mining machinery increased dramatically, and in 1935 it reached 50%. Domestic manufacturers that supported technological innovation were Hitachi and Komatsu, Sumitomo Machinery, Miike and Ashio. By 1936, there were 91 coal miners, 2751 augers (drilling machines), 1525 pneumatic perforators, 139 main and 741 auxiliary fans in the mines of Japan. In order to demonstrate the technological growth of the industry, let's take the example of the northernmost Japanese region Hokkaido. If in 1925 the mines of Hokkaido had only 44 units of coal mining equipment such as augers, combines, milling machines, etc., then in 1935 there were already 896 of them. That is, the number of equipment used has increased 20 times in 10 years. It should be noted that the introduction of new machines and mechanisms required a sharp increase in the throughput of the face, which led to the abandonment of the traditional method of mining and the introduction of longwall and long-wall mining methods, which in turn made it possible to introduce various downhole transportation machines such as coal conveyors. Electric equipment was also widely introduced, as it was more energy-efficient and safer. And to improve the quality of coal, the modernization of washing plants was carried out.
Of course, the modernization of coal mines and open-pit mines in the southern part of Sakhalin required significant investment, and so the "sharks" of Japanese business Mitsui and Mitsubishi, as well as electrochemical companies such as Nippon Soda and Showa Fertiliser, entered the game Corporation, as well as Sokuho Electric Power Company, Nippon Senshu Electric Power Co, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Co. In particular, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, which found a way to increase its electricity supply in Sakhalin coal as Japan's "national electricity policy agency", said: "It is necessary to purchase a large amount of high-quality coal and... to get coal, as cheap as possible from the point of view of management and calculation of the company..." The company's activities were based on the principle that "the coal mined on the island was not sold on the open market, but was sent directly to the factories of various development companies that did not have production bases on the island."
For its part, the colonial administration also began to support industrialists. In December 1931, the Governor's Office for the first time created a "10-year comprehensive colonization strategy" with the aim of "formulating comprehensive measures for the colonization of land, improving and developing various facilities based on these measures, and taking positive measures for the colonization of land through the rational improvement and development of existing industries and supporting the establishment of new industries", with a total budget of 115521434 yen (11552143 yen per year). The emphasis in the 10-year plan for the development of South Sakhalin was on coal mining and sugar beet production.
In 1934, the Japanese parliament approved the "15-year investment plan for the development of Karafuto", in which the financial aspect shifted from the coal industry to the development of transport infrastructure, namely: road construction (2.701 million yen), construction of railways (17701427 yen) and modernization of rolling stock (8578442 yen), reconstruction and repair of seaports (21.525 million yen). Most of the money was allocated to the development of forestry (23.99 million yen). Of the 162918650 yen provided for in the 15-year investment program, only 22865270 yen was allocated for the development of industrial enterprises on the island, and of this amount, the coal industry received only 1430240 yen and 1.5 million yen went to finance geological exploration.
Japanese demand for coal, which had stagnated amid the depression in the early 1930s, rose sharply in 1933 due to measures to emerge from the depression, the global promotion of export industries caused by the so-called "Manchurian Incident" of 1931, the ban on gold exports, and the intensive development of the country's heavy and chemical industries. And after the reduction in imports of Fushun coal in the 1930s, Sakhalin coal became the most popular coal in the region.
In the mid-1930s, the island's coal industry ranked second in terms of capital investment, which amounted to approximately 132 million yen by 1938. Over the 10 years, from 1928 to 1938, the amount of investment in the mining industry of South Sakhalin increased by 2.5 times. It should be noted that from 1932 to 1945, up to 20 Japanese coal mining joint-stock companies were engaged in coal mining in South Sakhalin. The figures from the table below show how serious their achievements were.
Coal mining in South Sakhalin in 1909-1945
Years | Number of shafts | Coal mining | |
In tons | in yen | ||
1909 | 2 | 4564 | 32860,80 |
1910 | 1 | 19998 | 143985,60 |
1911 | 3 | 26548 | 191145,60 |
1912 | 1 | 415 | 2988,00 |
1913 | 1 | 83 | 597,60 |
1914 | 3 | 14653 | 105501,60 |
1915 | 3 | 27626 | 179576,00 |
1916 | 4 | 37060 | 285950,00 |
1917 | 5 | 57830 | 697710,00 |
1918 | 6 | 104695 | 1790627,00 |
1919 | 5 | 135427 | 1980350,00 |
1920 | 5 | 154293 | 3360034,00 |
1921 | 6 | 115255 | 1328512,00 |
1922 | 6 | 114548 | 1238198,00 |
1923 | 6 | 166986 | 1809422,40 |
1924 | 8 | 199385 | 2255712,50 |
1925 | 8 | 250615 | 2737970,30 |
1926 | 9 | 245220 | 2375697,10 |
1927 | 7 | 357046 | 3552436,70 |
1928 | 12 | 539481 | 4897255,10 |
1929 | 12 | 635515 | 5743321,00 |
1930 | 15 | 644974 | 5622176,70 |
1931 | 17 | 637952 | 5249922,00 |
1932 | 18 | 677389 | 5200899,10 |
1933 | 17 | 888913 | 6703915,90 |
1934 | 21 | 1196647 | 9119166,40 |
1935 | 30 | 1515647 | 11475813,87 |
1936 | 31 | 2075157 | 15375127,60 |
1937 | 28 | 2535574 | 19421093,90 |
1938 | 28 | 3435396 | 32954444,40 |
1939 | 28 | 5000206 | 46310070,00 |
1940 | 35 | 6435929 | 73483794,00 |
1941 | 36 | 6471414 | 83388007,00 |
1942 | 30 | 4919976 | n/a |
1943 | 29 | 3720243 | n/a |
1944 | 26 | 3996720 | n/a |
1945 | 18 | 2662892 | n/a |
Total |
|
From the second half of the 30s, Japan one after another opened "reserve coal basins" of the entire southern part of Sakhalin. New mines were opened mainly in the northwestern coal basin, where the highest quality coal was found, as well as in a number of other areas. So, in 1939, there were already 28 mines, which gave 5 million tons. Coal.
Thus, thanks to the investments of large Japanese companies and the allocation of funding from the budget of the governorate, from the beginning of the 30s on the island there were conditions for the full-scale mechanization of coal mines. Prior to that, only in large mines it was possible to find a very small number of machines and mechanisms used in the extraction and delivery of coal to the surface and the haulage of wagons. In most mines, hard physical labor prevailed. Delivery of coal to the stopes with the help of conveyors was carried out only in four mines out of 30. As early as 1945, manual haulage was the main mode of transport in three mines, and in 13 mines it was used as an auxiliary means of transport.
The average output of 1 worker with a 12-hour working day in 1926 was 0.78 tons, and in 1930 - 1.29 tons; per 1 underground worker - 1.91 and 2.92 tons, respectively (which was slightly higher than the average Japanese - 0.5-0.6 tons per shift), while in the German coal industry with an 8-hour working day, productivity was 1.3-2 tons per shift, and in the British - 1.2-1.5 tons.
Some researchers believe that the growth of coal production in South Sakhalin, which took place in the period from 1919 to 1936, was achieved mainly due to an increase in the number of workers with low labor productivity, both in the leading professions and in general for underground workers. Statistics show that if in Japan the number of workers in the coal industry in 1919 was 348 thousand people, then in 1932 this number decreased to 138 thousand people, that is, more than 2.5 times, at the same time in South Sakhalin the number of coal miners for the same time period increased from 909 to 1632 people, that is, increased by 1.5 times. However, labor productivity in the Japanese coal industry from 1919 to 1932 increased by 2.26 times, and productivity in Karafuto - by 2.69 times. The reason for this was that the condition of the coal seams on Karafuto made mining relatively easy, and most of the island miners worked much better than the miners in Japan.
Dynamics of labor productivity and wages of workers in the coal industry of Karafuto in 1919-1939
year | Number of employees at the end of the year | average daily coal production per 1 worker | average daily coal production per 1 underground worker | Average daily wage in the mine | Average daily wage of underground miners |
1919 | 909 | 0,55 | - | - | - |
1920 | 1034 | 0,70 | - | - | - |
1921 | 601 | 0,59 | - | - | - |
1922 | 762 | 0,67 | - | - | - |
1923 | 1122 | 0,63 | - | - | - |
1924 | 1351 | 0,67 | - | - | - |
1925 | 1246 | 0,74 | - | - | - |
1926 | 1120 | 0,78 | 1,91 | 3,12 | 3,56 |
1927 | 1324 | 1,19 | 2,77 | 2,95 | 3,72 |
1928 | 1714 | 1,37 | 2,55 | 3,11 | 3,89 |
1929 | 1738 | 1,27 | 2,75 | 3,05 | 3,79 |
1930 | 1577 | 1,29 | 2,92 | 2,90 | 3,64 |
1931 | 1568 | 1,37 | 3,18 | 2,42 | 3,00 |
1932 | 1632 | 1,48 | 3,38 | 2,17 | 2,70 |
1933 | 2555 | 1,42 | 3,64 | 2,08 | 2,53 |
1934 | 3584 | 1,29 | 3,59 | 2,12 | 2,74 |
1935 | 4808 | 1,26 | 3,84 | 2,13 | 2,83 |
1936 | 5789 | 1,35 | 3,75 | 2,20 | 2,89 |
1937 | 7734 | 1,32 | 3,81 | 2,40 | 3,27 |
1938 | 11659 | 1,19 | 3,44 | 2,86 | 3,96 |
1939 | 15446 | 1,02 | - | - | - |
It should be noted that despite the introduction of mechanization in the coal mines of the island, labor productivity in 1936 amounted to 3.75 tons for underground workers and 1.35 tons on average for mine workers, that is, it not only did not increase, but even decreased in comparison with 1932. This is due to the fact that the number of operating mines on the island has doubled in 6 years, and the number of workers has increased 3.5 times. Coal production during this period increased by 3.21 times. At the same time, the process of mechanization of production processes affected only 11 mines out of 31 or 34% of the total. For example, at the Taihei Mine in 1936, the labor productivity of underground workers was 4.23 tons, at the Toro Mine - 2.75 tons, at the Kawakami Mine - 2.67 tons, at the Naihoro Mine - 2.43 tons, at the Naikawa Mine - 2.38 tons. Moreover, the cost of coal production at these mines was also the lowest on the island - from 0.62 to 1.17 yen per ton. But at the Hokushin mine in 1936, the labor productivity of underground workers was 0.58 tons, at the Khoronai mine - 0.56 tons, at the Chinnai mine - 0.72 tons, at the Noda mine - 0.84 tons, at the Nayoshi mine - 0.9 tons.
Dynamics of labor productivity of workers in the coal industry of Karafuto, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Korea in 1934-1936
Year | For 1 underground worker | For 1 worker of the mine | ||||||
Karafuto | Hokkaido | kyushu | Korea | Karafuto | Hokkaido | kyushu | Korea | |
1934 | 2,40 | 1,81 | 1,05 | - | 1,29 | 1,27 | 0,74 | 0,37 |
1935 | 2,14 | 1,84 | 1,06 | - | 1,26 | 1,29 | 0,74 | 0,31 |
1936 | 2,27 | 1,81 | 1,03 | - | 1,35 | 1,28 | 0,73 | 0,30 |
The low degree of mechanization of the mines of South Sakhalin until the mid-30s of the twentieth century is also evidenced by the level of their electrification. By 1935, only 4 coal mines (Kawakami, Esutoru, Naihoro and Shiraura) had their own power plants with a total capacity of 2110 kW. The rest of the mines received electricity from power plants at pulp and paper mills. But already in 1936, power plants were built at the Mita, Ambetsu, Naikawa mines and the total capacity increased 2.5 times - up to 5384 kW. In 1936, 14 electric generators in 7 coal mines generated 5220512 kWh in the amount of 229097 yen. The cost of a kilowatt-hour ranged from 4 to 8.5 sen. In 1937, 25 electric generators located in 13 coal mines (the total capacity increased to 7879 kW) generated 5649965 kWh in the amount of 283561.81 yen. The cost of 1 kWh ranged from 4 to 16 Sen. However, despite a significant increase in power capacity (by 46.34%), electricity generation increased insignificantly, by only 8.22%, which can be explained by the fact that most of the power plants were put into operation in the second half - end of 1937.
By 1938, 2 CHPP units with a capacity of 500 kW each were built at the Toro mine (Shakhtersk). each. By 1941, 19 mines already had their own power plants.
In many mines, due to the lack of vertical, skip and klent entrances, mechanical descent and lifting of people was not carried out. Workers walked on foot along inclined shafts and slopes up to 20R a distance of about 1000 meters In addition, the ascents and mine yards were not connected by telephone either to each other or to the surface. Telephone installation was generally poorly developed, and there was no warning system at all, which was often the reason for untimely assistance in case of accidents. It should also be noted that the lighting network in many mines was poorly made, there were almost no central grounding, and there were no local grounding at all.
In addition, the mines of South Sakhalin were extremely insufficiently equipped with ventilation units, which are of great importance in the safety and health of miners. Thus, despite the fact that almost all the mines of the island were gas-bearing, only 8 large mines (Toro, Naihoro, Kawakami, etc.) were equipped with appropriate ventilation installations for central ventilation. Most of the mines had low-power installations of a district nature. Even such a large mine as Naibuti had only diagonal ventilation. Moreover, there were no backup ventilation units in the mines. Of the 29 mines, 11 operated under natural ventilation until 1945. Such poor technical equipment with ventilation units could not but lead to frequent accidents. In 1925-1945, 42 outbreaks and 10 gas explosions were recorded in the mines of South Sakhalin. For example, on April 10, 1940, 10 miners died in a gas explosion at the Naihoro mine. On November 29, 1943, a gas explosion at the Shiratorizawa mine claimed the lives of 60 people. The heaviest explosions were recorded in Toro in 1941 and 1943, where 96 people died. During the period 1925-1945, 194 people died from methane explosions. In the mines of Naihoro alone, 35 fires were registered. It was this mine that had reserves of the so-called "spontaneously combustible" coal and therefore the issues of fire hazard and fire extinguishing should have been put in the 1st place. Alas, the mine management preferred to save money on preventive measures.
From the middle of the 30s , machines and mechanisms for the extraction and delivery of coal, haulage of wagons, steam and electric winches, electric fans, electric and pneumatic drills, electric trolleys, jackhammers and cutting machines appeared in the mines. As a device for coal enrichment, a number of mines used rock sampling plants, there were installations for washing coal. Thus, in 1936, an enrichment plant with a capacity of 25 tons per hour was installed at the Mita mine. 2 units with a capacity of 75 and 45 tons each were installed at the Naihoro and Esutoru mines, the Ambetsu mine acquired a processing plant with a capacity of 35 tons per hour, and the construction of coal preparation complexes was also completed at the Toro and Chitori mines.
A 3.6 km cable car was built between the Daiei (Ugolnoye) mine and Okuzawa (Artyomovskoye) to deliver coal. The road was powered by an 80 hp engine and operated at an average speed of 265 shaku (80 meters) per minute (1 shaku = 30.3 cm). During the day, the road transported about 350 tons of coal. For underground haulage of coal from the faces to the mouths of the tunnels, electric locomotives were used in some mines, of which there were 58 by the end of 1945. Mechanization made it possible to increase the production of "black gold" by an order of magnitude.
Machinery, tools and equipment on the balance sheet of the Karafuto coal mines in 1935-1938
year | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | |||||
Equipment Name | Units | Number of shafts | Units | Number of shafts | Units | Number of shafts | Units | Number of shafts | |
Compressors | 12 | 4 | 16 | 6 | 22 | 17 | 36 | 15 | |
Drilling machines, including augers (steam) | 96 | 118 | 4 | 149 | 15 | 212 | 22 | ||
Drilling machines, including augers (electric) | 195 | 263 | 11 | 295 | 15 | 401 | 22 | ||
Cutting machines (coal miners) | 10 | 2 | 14 | 3 | 17 | 3 | 17 | 3 | |
Pneumatic Jackhammers | 43 | 4 | 51 | 5 | 88 | 8 | 171 | 11 | |
Electric hoisting winches | 16 | 6 | 24 | 9 | 43 | 13 | 51 | 15 | |
Horizontal conveyor for transporting coal 35-100 kW. | 7 | 25 | 3 | 33 | 49 | ||||
Steam locomotive | 5 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 14 | 4 | 30 | 7 | |
Electric locomotive with pantograph | 6 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 3 | ||
Battery-powered electric locomotive | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | |
Diesel locomotive | - | - | - | - | 8 | 4 | 11 | 6 | |
Ropeway on steel cables | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | |
Aerial cable car | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
Bulk material handling machine | 14 | 26 | 5 | 29 | 4 | 46 | 6 | ||
1 ton trolleys (wooden) | 277 | 2257 | 23 | 2667 | 2829 | ||||
1-2 ton trolleys (wooden) | 888 | 1139 | 1705 | 2922 | |||||
2 ton trolleys (steel) | 90 | 1 | 120 | 1 | 265 | 1 | 640 | 1 | |
Main fans | 15 | 8 | 16 | 8 | 18 | 8 | 20 | 8 | |
Auxiliary fans | 83 | 10 | 99 | 11 | 118 | 13 | 178 | 20 | |
Drainage pumps | 35 | 6 | 42 | 8 | 59 | 12 | 100 | 25 | |
Wolf Oil Lamps | n/a | 1143 | 22 | 972 | 23 | 1859 | 28 | ||
Electric lamps | 1875 | 3233 | 13 | 4734 | 10272 | ||||
Concentrators with washing equipment | n/a | 4 | 6 | 11 | |||||
Dry Coal Sorting Processing Plants | n/a | 8 | 6 | 8 |
Some researchers believe that the equipment was imported to the coal enterprises of Karafuto mainly worn out, after many years of work in the mines of Japan, which could not but affect its performance. However, this applied only to the mechanisms of American and German production, which were used in the mines of Japan since the beginning of the twentieth century. The Japanese industry began to actively produce equipment for coal mining only in 1933 and therefore it is simply not "old and worn-out" It could be. In particular, drilling rigs of Japanese companies Hojo, Nippon Air Machinery Co., Hitachi, Miike, Mitsubishi, jackhammers of Showa, Izumi, Ashio, Nakayama, Chiyoda, Nagoya FK Manufacturing, Fuji and others were supplied to the island.
It should also be borne in mind that mechanization affected only the largest mines, of which there were only 15 in South Sakhalin. The rest of the mines were small and could not afford mechanized mining. In these mines, coal was excavated with the help of explosives.
A completely natural question arises: was it possible to reduce the cost of production with the help of the program for the mechanization and modernization of the coal industry of the governorate? We will find the answer in the table below.
The main components of the cost of coal production in Karafuto in 1934-1937
Description | 1937 | 1936 | 1935 | 1934 | |||||||
Total | Amount per 1 ton (yen) | % | Total | Amount per 1 ton (yen) | % | Amount per 1 ton (yen) | % | Amount per 1 ton (yen) | % | ||
Main costs | Wage | 4783129 | 1.83 | 50,4 | 3474839 | 1.62 | 60.2 | 1.58 | 60.1 | 1.60 | 65.0 |
timber | 1743523 | 0,67 | 18,2 | 1045362 | 0.49 | 18.2 | 0.43 | 16.3 | 0.39 | 15,8 | |
equipment | 1145328 | 0,43 | 12,1 | 291921 | 0.14 | 5.2 | 0.11 | 4.2 | 0.08 | 3,3 | |
Explosives | 729081 | 0,27 | 7,5 | 458253 | 0.21 | 7.8 | 0.24 | 9.1 | 0.22 | 8.9 | |
total | 3617932 | 3,20 | 88,2 | 1795536 | 2,46 | 91.4 | 2,36 | 89.7 | 2.29 | 93,0 | |
fuel | Coal | 441439 | 0,17 | 4,7 | 136026 | 0.06 | 2.2 | 0.09 | 3.4 | 0.05 | 2.1 |
electric power | 558008 | 0,21 | 5,8 | 337585 | 0.16 | 6.0 | 0.17 | 6.5 | 0.11 | 4.5 | |
Other | 119976 | 0,05 | 1,3 | 38141 | 0.01 | 0.4 | 0.01 | 0.4 | 0.01 | 0.4 | |
Total | 1119423 | 0,43 | 11,8 | 511752 | 0.23 | 8.6 | 0.27 | 10.3 | 0.17 | 7.0 | |
Altogether | 9520484 | 3,63 | 100 | 5782127 | 2.69 | 100.0 | 2.63 | 100.0 | 2.46 | 100.0 |
As you can see, the cost of production not only did not decrease, but even increased, since it was necessary to pay for the equipment for coal mining purchased and brought to the island. However, the share of wages in the cost of production decreased from 65% to 50.4%.
It should be noted that not only the cost, but also the market value of coal grew.
Cost of a ton of coal on the Sakhalin market in 1919-1937 (in yen)
Year \ Grade of Coal | Lumpy | powder | Cut |
1919 | 26,060 | 23,560 | 24,560 |
1920 | 25,580 | 22,100 | 23,520 |
1921 | 15,830 | 11,960 | 13,900 |
1922 | 14,020 | 12,770 | 13,370 |
1923 | 14,350 | 13,190 | 13,750 |
1924 | 13,900 | 12,380 | 13,140 |
1925 | 14,050 | 11,533 | 12,792 |
1926 | 13,975 | 11,633 | 13,221 |
1927 | 14,683 | 13,058 | 13,858 |
1928 | 14,883 | 13,067 | 13,975 |
1929 | 14,583 | 12,475 | 13,529 |
1930 | 13,170 | 10,930 | 12,050 |
1931 | 11,725 | 10,700 | 11,210 |
1932 | 11,310 | 10,410 | 10,860 |
1933 | 12,925 | 11,980 | 12,460 |
1934 | 13,633 | 12,992 | 13,318 |
1935 | 14,083 | 13,633 | 13,863 |
1936 | 14,575 | 14,125 | 14,355 |
1937 | 16,879 | 16,344 | 16,659 |
From 1938, market prices were eliminated in connection with the order to "freeze" prices.
To transport the mined coal, railway lines were brought to the mines, or narrow-gauge railways were built. Some coal enterprises were located near highways, and a number of mines had cable cars at their disposal. Coal warehouses were built to store coal.
However, with the increase in coal production, problems arose with the transport component. There were not enough wagons for transporting coal, there were not enough large-capacity ships for transporting coal from the island. In addition, seasonal restrictions applied to the transportation of coal. In most ports, navigation began at the end of March and ended in October, averaging 180 days a year.
To solve this problem, in July 1928, the construction of a loading complex with an average capacity of 120 tons per hour began in the port of Otomari for loading coal and pulp onto steamships. The complex was intended exclusively for the use of Mitsui Mining Company Co., Ltd. The work was completed in August 1930 and cost approximately 640,000 yen.
From 1934 in the port of Honto, and in 1935 in the ports of Otomari and Maoka, dredging works were carried out in the area of the berths, which made it possible to use vessels of larger tonnage. In 1939, construction began on the port of Esutoru with an initial construction estimate of 35 million yen, but it was not completed until 1945.
Many newly opened mines were located near the coastline, but it was quite far from the nearest port, so the owners of the mines solved the problems of transportation in much the same way as it was solved in Northern Sakhalin. A coal warehouse was built on the shore, from which transport communications went to the mine itself, in the form of a road or a narrow-gauge railway. And in the immediate vicinity of the warehouse, a wooden pier was arranged. from where it was reloaded onto barges. To the north of Esutoru, there were 14-15 such loading facilities. In summer, from 1 pier, the daily loading was from 3 to 5 thousand tons of coal. It should be noted that the cost of chartering ships transporting Karafuto coal to the interior of Japan was very high. On this occasion, on June 13, 1935, the Karafuto Nichinichi Shimbun wrote: "To supply coal to Japan from the island, when the cost of freight is so high, is ... extremely uneconomical. It would be very useful to process coal where it is mined, make it a high-value fuel, and then transport it to the interior of the country (Japan)..."
It should be noted that in the early 30s in Japan much attention was paid to the issue of obtaining liquid fuel from coal. Experimental work of the Fuel Research Institute under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, carried out on Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk coal, showed that the latter is a very suitable raw material for these purposes. In 1934, the joint-stock company "Naihoro Tanko Tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha" initiated the construction of a dry coal distillation plant at the Naihoro mine production of liquid fuels. This plant was one of the first in the country, and technical assistance in its construction was provided by the Fuel Department of the Ministry of the Navy of Japan, which indicates the military importance of this plant. 96 million yen was spent on the construction of the plant, including the cost of building a power plant with a capacity of 550 kW, an oil pipeline, and so on. A significant monetary subsidy was allocated by the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Japan for the construction of the plant. The planned production capacity of the plant was 100 thousand tons of coal per year. In June 1934, construction work began, in December the necessary equipment arrived from Japan and its installation began, and on April 1, 1935, the plant was put into operation. During the first 9 months of operation, due to the need for commissioning, the plant processed only 30 thousand tons of coal, in 1936 - 78 thousand tons, and since 1937 it has reached full capacity - 120 thousand tons. During 1936, they were paid 52,877 yen, and the average daily wage of a worker was 1.32 yen. Since 1938, the staff has expanded to 115 units. In 1944, about 2 thousand people worked at the plant. The work went on around the clock, in three 8-hour shifts.
Two furnaces of the Lurgi type of the German company Metallgesellschaft AG with a patented internal heating system were installed at the plant. Each furnace consisted of 2 parts a thermal dryer, where the coal was first dried and heated to 200 degrees, and a distillation furnace, in which the main chemical processes of obtaining liquid fuel and coke took place. 165 tons of coal each. Thus, taking into account the maximum load of the furnaces, the plant could process about 100 thousand tons of coal annually. During distillation, they gave 50 thousand tons of semi-coke, 7500 tons of heavy oils, 5000 tons of fuel oil, 900 tons of gasoline, 600 tons of paraffin. Hydrogen was extracted from water gas, by adding it to tar, many first-grade oils were obtained. By chemical synthesis, the plant produced valuable medicines: menthol, formalin, berkalite and special paints. Coal dust and lump coal of medium size were used as raw materials for distillation. It should be noted that the 15-year colonization plan of the Karafuto Governorate, adopted in 1934, provided for the allocation of a subsidy of 715,120 yen for the coal processing industry of the island for 7 years. On January 25, 1935, the "Low-Temperature Coal Distillation Subsidy Ordinance" was issued, and the company began to receive a subsidy of 1.5 yen for each ton of coal processed, and from 1936 the subsidy was increased to 2 yen. To encourage coal processing on the island, in 1938, the 72nd Sejm of the Japanese Diet passed a law on the provision of coal-bearing sites in the blockaded areas of Karafuto to enterprises intending to build synthetic oil plants. Such plots were to be provided without competitive bidding.
Quantity and Value of Products Manufactured at the Naihoro Coal Processing Plant in 1935-1938
Product Name | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 | ||||||||
Tons produced | cost | Cost of 1 ton | Tons produced | cost | Cost of 1 ton | Tons produced | cost | Cost of 1 ton | Tons produced | cost | Cost of 1 ton | |
Semi-coke | 14471 | 94061,5 | 6,5 | 31599,00 | 205393.50 | 6,5 | 49102 | 319163 | 6,5 | 67387 | 539096 | 8 |
Paraffin | 0,9 | 306 | 340 | 155.08 | 52727.20 | 340 | 300,75 | 108270,00 | 360 | 276,86 | 99659,6 | 360 |
Tar | 60,1 | 751,25 | 12,5 | 2015.58 | 25194,75 | 12,5 | 2983 | 37293,75 | 12,5 | 2767,69 | 47050,73 | 17 |
coke | 0 | 0 | - | 16.05 | 369.15 | 23 | 24,00 | 552,00 | 23 | 37,086 | 1513,84 | 41 |
Petrol | 135,053 | 14180,56 | 105 | 418.344 | 43926.12 | 105 | 820,775 | 98493,00 | 120 | 1205,139 | 162693,76 | 135 |
Bituminous oils | 0 | 0 | - | 3.941 | 141.88 | 36 | 0,591 | 21,27 | 36 | 5,088 | 254,40 | 50 |
Creosote oil | 770,135 | 23104,05 | 30 | 4850,876 | 145526.28 | 30 | 6284,659 | 188539,77 | 30 | 6926,232 | 277049,28 | 40 |
Other oils | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | - | 84,064 | 6745,62 | 80,24 | 118,418 | 11012,87 | 93 |
Total | 15455,188 | 132403,36 | 39058,871 | 473278,88 | - | 59599,839 | 759078,41 | - | 78723,513 | 1138340,48 | - |
Trial operation of the plant in the period from 1935 to 1937 gave a positive technical and economic result.
On August 18, 1937, Mitsubishi Mining established Mitsubishi Coal Oil Chemical Co., Ltd., with a registered capital of 20 million yen and a paid-up capital of 10 million yen, which absorbed the Minami Karafuto Tanko Tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha Joint Stock Company and continued to work on the expansion of the coal processing plant. On September 20, 1937, the company additionally acquired the Morotsu and Kitakozawa mines.
In 1938, the construction of the second stage of the plant began to expand the capacity to 250 thousand tons, which was completed in June 1939 In 1940, the plant processed up to 800 tons of coal per day. In 1942, this plant produced up to 8 tons of gasoline per day. For the entire period of operation, it processed 1545 thousand tons of coal and produced 14 thousand tons of gasoline. The total yield of semi-coke amounted to 817 thousand tons or 52.7% of raw coal. For the enrichment of solid fuel, a dry-type steam sampling unit with a capacity of 500 tons for 10 hours of operation was used.
On August 10, 1937, Law No. 52 "On the Production of Artificial Oil" was published in the Official Gazette. According to Article 6, companies producing artificial oil were exempt from income tax and operating profit tax for a period of 10 years, as well as for a period of 7 years from import tax (Article 8) when purchasing equipment and materials abroad from the date of entry into force of the law. The law came into force on January 25, 1938.
In May 1939, a new joint-stock company, Karafuto Artificial Petroleum Co., Ltd, began operating on the island with a registered capital of 40 million yen, specializing in the production of synthetic oil. In 1940, the construction of another coke plant began in Higashi-Naibuchi (Uglezavodsk) at an estimated cost of 40 million yen. Karafuto Petroleum Naibuchi Plant It was designed to process 2000 tons of coal per day, but due to the war in 1942, it was put into operation with a capacity of 700 tons per day. By 1945, the plant produced 420 tons of semi-coke and 5.6 tons of gasoline daily.
Both plants produced 4,000 tons of gasoline, 10,000 tons of fuel oil and 240,000 tons of coxin per year. All equipment, spare parts and components necessary for the operation of factories were imported from Japan.
Gasoline produced by the factories was used by the colony's vehicle fleet, and solar oil was used by diesel plants. Fuel oil was exported to Japan for combustion in furnaces or mixed with asphalt, and was used for the construction of airfield sites. Semi-coke was exported to Japan for briquetting and the needs of the chemical industry, but on the spot it was used in gas-generator cars and boats. The paraffin produced by the factories was exported to Japan until 1943, and since 1943 it has been used at candle factories in Toyohara (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), Otomari and Honto.
In March 1945, Karafuto Artificial Petroleum Co., Ltd. merged with Teikoku Fuel Industries Co., Ltd. to form Karafuto synthetic petroleum Co., Ltd. with a capitalization of 7,0481,000 yen divided into 800,000 shares. The main shareholders were Imperial fuel enterprise (599,800 shares), Oji brokers (79,600 shares), Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ltd. (39900 shares), Mitsui mining Co Ltd. (29900 shares). Obuchi Sanki was elected president of the company, Yamanaka Masayuki was elected executive director, and Fukunaga Tsutomu and Cho Mangi were directors.
In 1936, in honor of the 30th anniversary of the ownership of South Sakhalin, the governorship of Karafuto issued an anniversary historical and statistical collection, which, in particular, indicated the main mines operating on the island as of January 1, 1936. We have added to this list the mines that opened later.
Karafuto Mines in 1913-1945*
Mine name | Work start date | Whereabouts | Maximum annual production | Total amount of coal mined in 1943 | The owner of the mine. Notes. |
Kawakami | November 28, 1913 | Toyohara County, Kawakami Village (Sinegorsk). | 392659 | 6034900 | Ao Mitsui Kozan Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Siruara | January 5, 1914 | Sakaehama County, Shiranui Village. | 86614 | 867617 | JSC Karafuto tanko Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Toho | August 1, 1915 | Mototomari County | 39964 | 219452 | |
Tayei (To Dayey) | June 22, 1918 | Tomarioru County, Nayoshi Village (Lesogorsk). | 127004 | 1533273 | AO Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Taihei (To Ohira) | August 1, 1924 | Nayoshi County, Esutoru City (Uglegorsk). | 1003196 | 8241150 | In 1924, Jutaku Kogyo Shizoku began researching and supplying coal for the factory to the company, which merged with Oji and became part of the Oji Company. AO Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Chitori (Siritori) | September 7, 1924 | Mototomari County, Shiritori City. | 159991 | 2249006 | AO Karafuto Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Kasiho | June 25, 1926 | Nayoshi County, Mototomari Village | 115852 | 689620 | Toshige Hosoiri |
Tennai (To Esutoru) | December 20, 1927 | Nayoshi County, Esutoru City (Uglegorsk). | 207821 | 1121911 | Esutoru Tanko Kabushi Kaisha AO. |
Kita-Tomarijo | March 30, 1930 | Tomarioru County, Tomarioru City (Tomari) | 472 | 582 | Ryeoso Umeno |
Tokaj | September 27, 1930 | Mototomari County, Mototomari Village (Eastern) | 39525 | 72765 | Tohei Terashima |
Naikawa | July 16, 1929 | Sikuka County, Naikava (Tikhmenevo) Village. | 130020 | 898376 | Mitsui Kozan Kabushiki Kaisha |
Naihoro | January 30, 1929 | Honto County, Naikhoro Village (Gornozavodsk) | 395300 | 2697614 | AO minami Karafuto tanko tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Cio | March 19, 1930 | Higashi Shiraura, Shiranui Village, Eihama District | 4648 | 14913 | Shiraura Sensho Coal Mine Limited Partnership |
Nairo | November 18, 1930 | Siritori | 462 | 834 | Nairo Coal Company |
Mita | September 23, 1931 | Nagaha County, Shiretoko Village | 184492 | 875515 | Matsutaro Takiguchi |
Kurasi | November 1, 1931 | Noda County, the city of Noda (Chekhov). | 1567 | 1633 | Surai Kyofu |
U(no)su | November 16, 1932 | Noda County, the city of Noda (Chekhov). | 66866 | 227414 | AO Karafuto tangyo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Noda | October 20, 1917 | Noda County, the city of Noda (Chekhov). | 7458 | 33976 | Takejiro Hori Kamekishi Masuda |
Toro | January 4, 1933 | Nayoshi County, Esutoru City (Uglegorsk). | 1108700 | 6198039 | AO minami Karafuto tanko tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Khorogishi | February 19, 1934 | Kitausu, Wusu village, Usu district | 316 | 316 | Masuda Mining Co., Ltd. |
Tinnai | April 5, 1934 | Kusunnai County, Mihama Village. | 143912 | 653191 | AO minami Karafuto tanko tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Nayoshi | December 8, 1934 | Nayoshi County, Nayoshi Village (Lesogorsk). | 74379 | 132959 | Masuda Kamekichi |
Hokushin-ayuchi | November 1934 | Mototomari County, the year of Shiritori (Makarov). | 21256 | 48070 | Outi Masayoshi |
Otasu | February 5, 1935 | Kusunnai County, Mihama Village. | 112942 | 429659 | Matsuno Sumihisa |
Ambetsu | June 1, 1935 | Nayoshi County, Nayoshi Village (Lesogorsk). | 216210 | 972906 | AO Shinko Tanko Kabushiki Kaisha. (since 1938 Japan Steel Co., Ltd) |
Sirinai (Conan) | September 24, 1935 | Nayoshi County, Nayoshi Village (Lesogorsk). | 96938 | 349974 | AO Shinko Tanko Kabushiki Kaisha. (since 1939 Japan Steel Co., Ltd) |
Khoronai | November 1935 | Mototomari County, village. Mototomari (Eastern). | 8017 | 10905 | Yoshikawa Shigetaro |
Oticho | December 1935 | Tonnai uyezd, village. Tonnai (Okhotskoye) | 716 | 925 | Nakamura Shigeki |
Oticho minami | - | Tonnai uyezd, village. Tonnai (Okhotskoye) | 6 | 6 | Mikami Shigetaro |
Kita(k)ozawa | July 20, 1937 | Pic. Telnovsky | 587600 | 2356270 | AO minami Karafuto tanko tetsudo Kabushiki Kaisha. |
Toyohata | November 1, 1937 | Lesogorsk | 179770 | 874494 | Renamed Nakazuma Mine |
Tomarigishi | January 27, 1938 | Tomarigishi Village, Shikuka District | 215062 | 744720 | Nippon Steel Corporation |
Morotsu | November 12, 1937 | Heater | 93484 | 151384 | 1937 Morotsu Coal Industry Co., Ltd. is established. |
Kamitoro | 11 February 1938 | Pic. Krasnopolye | 426686 | 1632720 | It was explored by Fuji, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and others in 1919; acquired by Kanefuchi Boseki in 1937. |
Minnami Tinnai | June 10, 1938 | Tinnai City, Esutori District | |||
Nishisacutan | July 1, 1938 | 351701 | 1338969 | Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. | |
Shirakasawa | May 1939 | 1924 Registration of exploration rights | |||
Mihama | July 8, 1939 | Tinnai city, Esutoru district | Masajiro Abe Survey of coal seams since 1937 It was closed in December 1941 | ||
Higashi-Naibuchi | December 29, 1939 | Fukakusa (Uglezavodsk) | Karafuto Artificial Oil Co Mining Concession Registered in 1939 for Coal Liquefaction | ||
Sugimori | May 16, 1940 | Tinnai city, Esutoru district | The coal mine, operated by the Sota Mining Association, is acquired by Japan Transmission and Transmission Power Co., Ltd. | ||
Minami Naeshi | June 1940 | Toyo Takushoku Co., Ltd | 72581 | 91723 | Toyo Takushoku Firm, (Totaku). In 1940, exploration began, in 1941 - production. The rights are transferred to Karafuto Depelovment Co.LTD. |
* - exploration mines are not specified
The owners of small mines in Karafuto (11 private mines) did not have the opportunity to mechanize production processes at their enterprises and, in order not to "burn out", they intensively used the "explosive" method of coal mining: cheap and fast, but very dangerous. And in order to "cheapen" the cost of labor, they resorted to importing workers from Korea to South Sakhalin.
It should be noted that in 1905, only 24 Koreans lived in South Sakhalin. In 1917, for the first time, as an experiment, the Mitsui Coal Mine Company hired 102 Korean miners to work at its Kawakami mine. construction of new tunnels and galleries and repair of the railway line. However, important construction work was carried out with a long delay. The mine employed 400 workers, who consisted only of local residents, but they ran away without permission, they were fired, and eventually their number was reduced to about 150 people. According to the company's management, the reason for this was that the method of hiring workers was "wrong" and that it was necessary to hire the "right" workers and somehow complete the construction the following year. That is why the company signed a contract to hire Korean workers from the city of Sinuiju. The contract was concluded for a year and a half and provided, in particular, for the payment of transportation costs.
The Karafuto Nichinichi newspaper described the scene of the Koreans' arrival at the port of Otomari in August 1917: "They were dressed in white shirts with the Mitsui trademark printed on them and loose-fitting trousers. The arrival of a hundred men in Korean costumes made a lasting impression on those around them... A representative of the company said that the use of this batch of Korean workers is just an experiment and, if the results are good, the influx of Koreans to Karafuto will increase significantly."
At first, Korean workers were paid from 60 to 70 sen per shift, and later they began to be paid depending on the volume of coal production, and here they no longer differed from Japanese miners in terms of wages. It should be noted that the average earnings of skilled workers in Korea itself was 15-20 yen per month, so from a purely financial point of view, the working conditions in South Sakhalin were quite attractive. including a massive fight with Japanese miners. Adding to the company's concerns was the language barrier and apparently illiteracy rates among Koreans, which it believed prevented Koreans from working effectively. Following this experience and the principle of Seihy-Sgi, Mitsui decided not to hire any more colonial workers. However, the company did not keep its intention. As early as 1919, more than 200 Korean miners were working in Kawakami, and by the end of 1920, the number of Korean miners on the island had increased to 500 out of a total Korean population of 934. And to prevent them from moving to another place of work or returning to Korea, police forces were used as supervisory bodies. In the reports of the Karafuto Police Department, Koreans were characterized as "lazy", "envious" and "crazy". It was indicated that they "despise hygiene" and "uneducated", thoughtlessly spend money and quarrel with Japanese workers. The salary of Koreans was 70-80 yen per month, which was 2-2.5 yen per day.
In addition to Korean workers, the Karafuto government considered the possibility of employing Chinese workers. When hiring them, it assigned a quota to companies and contractors who expected to employ them. In addition, the authorities have prepared a detailed plan for the management of Chinese workers and forced employers to comply with it. The main aspects of this plan were as follows: 1) to hire Chinese as seasonal workers in order to prevent them from permanent residence; (2) to force Chinese workers to have as little contact as possible with the Japanese, and (3) to gather Chinese workers from the same district or village in order to tie up friends and relatives (the principle of mutual responsibility), which would serve as a deterrent to escapes.
So, from 1923 to 1927, Chinese workers were used on Karafuto as seasonal workers. They were collected from all over Shandong Province in Northern China and were involved in various enterprises such as railway construction, factory construction, mining and so on. Among these undertakings, the largest was the construction of the Karafuto East Coast Railway, leading from Ochiai to Shiritori. During the construction, about 1500 Chinese workers were employed. The Chinese used the Dayei coal mines (from May 4, 1923 to 1925, 85 Chinese worked at the mine) and Taihei (from 1924 to 1925, 52 Chinese workers worked at the mine).
However, some locals have started a movement against the use of Chinese workers on the project. Merchants in the Toyohara, Maoka, and Tomarioru districts were particularly opposed to employing Chinese workers on the grounds that they did not contribute to the local economy due to their propensity to save money and send remittances of wages to China.
In addition, Chinese workers often engaged in labor disputes over their position in factories. The main reasons for these disputes were poor working conditions, low wages, non-payment of wages, discrepancies in contracts, and fees from workers that they had to pay to intermediaries for travel to Sakhalin.
During this period, the wages of Japanese workers employed in the construction and industrial sectors ranged from 2.0 to 3.5 yen per day, and Korean workers from 1.8 to 2.5 yen per day. The cost of Chinese workers was about 1 yen, which later rose to 1.3 yen per day. But in fact, the import of Chinese to the south of the island was stopped in 1928. By the end of 1941, only 104 Chinese (76 men and 28 women) lived on Karafuto. Thus, local companies could only use workers from Korea as cheap labor.
The migration of Koreans to Karafuto in the early 1920s increased significantly. Thus, according to census statistics, if in 1916 only 35 people of Korean nationality lived on the island, then already in 1923 1398 lived on the island, in 1925 - 3206, in 1930 - 5359 Koreans, of which 1119 worked in the coal industry. Moreover, we are talking about those permanently residing on the territory of Karafuto, seasonal workers were not taken into account. Most of those who came to work at coal industry enterprises.
The mine administration signed a contract with Korean workers for 3 years. At the end of it, money was issued. And 10 percent of earnings to meet personal needs was given monthly. Workers lived in numerous dormitories, accommodating up to 600 people. They had to sleep in three shifts on the same futon (a kind of sleeping bag). The exploitation of labor was obvious and open. If one of the workers ran away before the end of the contract, then the escapee was not paid anything. There are known cases of miners' uprisings in South Sakhalin. When dealing with the leaders of the strikers, the Japanese did not stand on ceremony.
According to official data, the working day in the mining industry of Japan and the colonies was 10 hours, but in fact it was 11-12 hours. Statistics show that in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 28 percent of Japanese miners worked 10 hours, 24 percent 11 hours, and 41 percent 12 hours. In the colonies, the percentage of overtime workers was even higher.
Korean recruit Park No-hak recalls: "I worked at the Naibuti mine for about a month. It was scary to be in an underground pit, where the ceiling was about to collapse. We worked in two shifts of 12 hours each. Despite the fact that we were promised 7 yen a day when we were recruited, we were actually paid only 2.5 yen. Of this amount, 80 sen were withheld for food. Many Japanese worked in the mine. But they had their own home, and they earned 5-7 yen a day."
Another Korean who was recruited, or rather forcibly taken to the mines of Karafuto, Kim Ju Din, said that they deducted from the "salary" for housing, overalls, food and fines. And I was also supposed to work for free for two or three hours a week for Great Japan. But he does not remember anyone being given money at all: probably, everything was spent on fines. In addition to fines, corporal punishment was used. For example, if you ask the foreman to leave due to illness, and then the inspectors will definitely come to the barracks, and if they think that you are not so sick as not to work, you will be beaten with sticks. It was possible to move freely around the mining village during non-working hours, but it was not allowed to leave it. For breakfast, they piled up a bowl of soybean-rice porridge and immediately gave out a "brake" - a miner's lunch. Young guys sometimes ate this lunch along with breakfast. If the watchman at the checkpoint found such a disorder, they were also beaten. Japanese workers in Japan lived in much the same way, but in the Sakhalin mines the Japanese were only bosses.
Koreans brought to Karafuto were discriminated against not only in wages, but they were forced to work where it was most dangerous for life. According to the official data of the Japanese government for 1925-1938, the level of accidents in mines is characterized by the following indicators.
Accidents in the mines of Japan and Karafuto in 1925-1938
year | Karafuto | Japan | ||||||||
Number of employees | Number of accident victims | Per 1000 people | Number of employees | Number of accident victims | Per 1000 people | |||||
trauma | death | Trauma | death | trauma | death | death | trauma | |||
1925 | 1246 | 543 | 3 | 436 | 2,4 | 252898 | 171438 | 721 | 2,85 | 677,9 |
1926 | 1297 | 526 | 14 | 406 | 10,8 | 235044 | 143841 | 712 | 3,03 | 612,0 |
1927 | 1324 | 568 | 7 | 375 | 5,3 | 239167 | 151662 | 909 | 3,08 | 513,0 |
1928 | 1714 | 1067 | 1 | 506 | 0,6 | 237890 | 130978 | 799 | 3,36 | 550,6 |
1929 | 1738 | 942 | 4 | 536 | 2,3 | 228761 | 118692 | 881 | 3,85 | 518,8 |
1930 | 1577 | 612 | 7 | 386 | 4,4 | 204526 | 97295 | 791 | 3,9 | 475,0 |
1931 | 1613 | 491 | 2 | 304,4 | 1,23 | 154398 | 70042 | 635 | 4,1 | 453,6 |
1932 | 1785 | 511 | 3 | 286,3 | 1,68 | 137975 | 58256 | 608 | 4,4 | 422,2 |
1933 | 2611 | 609 | 16 | 233,2 | 6,12 | 143602 | 57778 | 740 | 5,2 | 402,3 |
1934 | 3379 | 993 | 8 | 293,9 | 2,36 | 168524 | 64088 | 795 | 4,7 | 380,3 |
1935 | 4613 | 1244 | 11 | 269,7 | 2,38 | 175137 | 61735 | 989 | 5,6 | 352,5 |
1936 | 5811 | 1644 | 28 | 282,9 | 4,81 | 198346 | 60963 | 1051 | 5,3 | 307 |
1937 | 7734 | 2142 | 20 | 276,9 | 2,58 | 222696 | 66283 | 884 | 3,97 | 298 |
1938 | 11659 | 2940 | 61 | 252,2 | 5,23 | 263632 | 68874 | 1165 | 4,42 | 262 |
It must be said that according to statistics from the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Japan, in the period from 1930 to 1945, the mortality rate per 1000 people in the coal industry was 17 times, serious injuries - 15 times, and minor injuries - nine times higher than in light and heavy industry enterprises of the country.
It should also be noted that the Land of the Rising Sun was the leader in the number of accidents among developed countries. And while in countries such as the United States, England and Germany, the level of accidents in coal mines gradually decreased, Japan, on the contrary, showed a significant increase, as can be seen from the following table.
Death tolls per 1,000 coal mine workers in Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany.
year | Japan | United States | Germany | United Kingdom |
1913-22 | 3,66 | 4.4 | 2.93 | 1.28 |
1922-32 | 3.4 | 4.8 | 2.2 | 1.0 |
1933 | 5.2 | 3 | 1.9 | 1.0 |
1937 | 3,97 | 2,39 | n/a | n/a |
1939 | 4,18 | 2,05 | n/a | n/a |
1941 | 4,5 | 2,32 | n/a | n/a |
1943 | 4,08 | 2,98 | n/a | n/a |
In the late 30s - early 40s of the 20th century, the situation worsened even more. The number of victims of mining accidents in Japan (per 1 million tons of coal mined) was 13 times higher than the number of victims in mines in the United States of America.
The number of coal mine workers killed in Japan and the United States per 1 million tons of production in 1939-1943
year | United States | Japan | ||||
death | trauma | altogether | death | trauma | altogether | |
1939 | 2.52 | 133.40 | 135,92 | 23 | 1489 | 1512 |
1940 | 2.99 | 128.62 | 131.61 | 24 | 1457 | 1481 |
1941 | 2.45 | 122.62 | 125.07 | 28 | 1506 | 1534 |
1942 | 2.52 | 119,25 | 121.77 | 27 | 1555 | 1582 |
1943 | 2.46 | 109.59 | 112.05 | 30 | 1544 | 1576 |
It should be emphasized that there were much more deaths among Korean workers on the island than among the Japanese, because, firstly, the proportion of Koreans in the total number of workers in the Karafuto mines was higher than that of the Japanese, secondly, Koreans were sent, as a rule, to underground work and to more dangerous areas, thirdly, many Koreans did not know the Japanese language well and therefore often did not understand the inscriptions on warning boards.
During the Pacific War, measures to forcibly introduce additional labor and intensify labor by turning workers into virtual slaves, which were implemented to compensate for the deterioration of production conditions, exceeded their limits and eventually led to the outright destruction of labor. This is evidenced by the sharp increase in coal mine accidents and the decline in employment rates. "Looking at the causes of disasters and accidents, the main ones being falling rocks, mining trolleys and machines, it can be concluded that this phenomenon was caused by factors such as a sudden increase in inexperienced workers, incomplete equipment due to the difficulty of obtaining materials, and decreased attention due to the intensification of work." And, although the total number of workers increased from year to year, the annual production of coal per person gradually decreased.
It can be concluded that the reckless conduct of mining during the war and the constant movement to increase production through the intensification of labor led to a high level of accidents in coal mines and a real decrease in labor productivity.
In the island mines, the number of accidents and accidents also increased dramatically during the war. So, for 5 years, from 1939 to 1943, about 32 thousand miners received injuries of varying severity, and about 550 people died.
Many Japanese coal companies preferred not to pay anything to their workers at all, organizing so-called "takobeya" at the enterprises. Takobeya (or kangokubeya) is a forcibly created bonded form of dormitory for workers who worked as prisoners in the mines of Hokkaido and South Sakhalin. These prisoners were called tacos. Takobei first originated in 1886 in Hokkaido, but at that time it was actually used by imprisoned criminals. Subsequently, recruited labor from Korea and China began to be used as tacos. Takobeia became widespread in Karafuto after the "Great Depression". Takobei existed in the mines of Ambetsu, Naihoro, Chinnai, Taihei, Kashiho, Toro, Shiraura, Tennai, and Esutoru. Initially, "tacos" were imported from the Tohoku region, as well as from Tokyo and Nagoya.
The organizers of the "takobei" were private contractors of Japanese firms. Therefore, the recruitment of "tacos" outwardly did not differ much from the usual organized recruitment. In order to recruit "tacos", they were given "lifting" or an advance. Further, the philosophy of "takobei" was very simple: the cost of recruiting workers is a considerable amount, and the advance payment must also be returned. So come on, "tacos", work. Until you repay the debt, there will be no freedom.
Workers' housing was located in a hard-to-reach place located far from settlements. At the head of the "takobei" was the so-called "oyakata" ("foreman"), his assistants were "sevayaku" ("steward") and "kogashira" ("brigadier"). At the head of each group, platoon and company were overseers. Among them, the most cruel were the "bogashira" ("overseer with a club"), who led groups consisting of 5-10 people. Thus, in general, "takobeya" was organized according to the military system.
The labor of the workers was depreciated to the extreme, although they worked in the most difficult and dangerous jobs. As a result, the takos always remained "debtors," which was the reason for their lifelong stay in takobeya. They were forbidden to talk to each other, they were handcuffed, violators of order and discipline were subjected to severe caning, often ending in death. Korean Kang Kye-kyung recalls: "At work, we were guarded by armed guards. We were building a wharf for loading steamers with coal. The work was hard, and there were many industrial injuries. Those who could not work due to a serious illness were finished off on the spot and thrown into the sea."
"Takobeya" was clearly manifested both in working conditions and in the methods of using "tacos" as a labor force. They worked in the most difficult and dangerous areas of work, and their working time lasted at least 16 hours a day. In addition, the overseers treated the "tacos" like draught animals. For example, the former "taco" Kimura Toyotaro in an interview given to the correspondent of the weekly "Karafuto" noted the following: "A patient who could not walk was carried on a stretcher to the place of work, after which the "overseer with a truncheon" gave the patient a shovel. If the patient could not hold a shovel, then he was not given food. The overseer beat him unconscious, then poured cold water on him. Many died of heart attacks, the bodies of the dead were thrown under stones." Physically weak people who lagged behind others in work were also beaten. Newly arrived workers were also subjected to caning. In the first days, they were deliberately beaten in order to accustom them to the discipline developed by the owners of the takobei, to physically weaken them in order to avoid a possible escape, to break their will. The beating was of a daily nature, and after the first days of being in takobeya, the takos ceased to feel pain at the time of the beating and felt only fear. The system of "takobei" was close to slavery in terms of the form of punishment. This is evidenced by the various forms of torture to which the "tacos" were subjected for violating the rules. Sometimes they were hung over a burning fire, and subjected to other tortures. Recalling his past hellish life in takobeya, Shizaki Shunji said: "In the evening, they strip naked, tie their hands and feet, after which the body is smeared with moonshine and thrown into the yard. Mosquitoes immediately flock and suck blood. In the first two minutes, you can endure, but after five minutes, even strong people lose consciousness. They say that in twenty minutes people die... Torture often ended in death. The takobei system was carefully hidden from the public. However, the outrageous facts of atrocities could not but become public. Materials testifying to the true position of the tacos, although rarely, were still leaked to the press. Progressive and revolutionary-minded figures demanded that the authorities ban the takobei system. Under pressure from the growing discontent of the taco workers, as well as the progressive public of Hokkaido, the authorities were forced to issue decrees (1914 and 1919) designed to soften the existing system. However, the interference of the authorities in the takobei system was limited to the formal issuance of laws, and the system continued to exist. In South Sakhalin, "takobeya" continued to flourish for a number of years. It was only in the mid-1920s that the central authorities of Japan were forced to intervene in the affairs of the takobei. For example, in 1925, the Colonial Affairs Department of the Ministry of the Interior issued a special decree aimed at mitigating the most severe abuses: handcuffing, using sick labor, etc. Of course, it was not in the interests of the authorities to completely put an end to this slave system, and therefore it continued to exist. The "tacos" were looking for various forms of resistance. One of the forms of struggle against the exploiters was numerous escapes. By committing them, the "tacos" were saved from lifelong bondage. Taco escapes were frequent and massive. The takobei system was finally banned in Japan in 1947.
By the beginning of World War II, the needs of the Japanese military structures for energy resources had increased enormously. The imperial war machine needed cast iron and steel, and therefore Sakhalin coal, which was also an ideal fuel for the ships of the Japanese Navy. Already in 1937, the export of coal from South Sakhalin exceeded local costs.
However, the increase in coal production in Karafuto was hindered by outdated legislation. Therefore, on March 23, 1939, at the suggestion of the Parliament, the Emperor adopted an amendment to Law No. 23 of 1912, which stated that "in order to promote the development of the business of producing artificial oil and promoting the development of Karafuto... to allow companies licensed to carry out the business of producing artificial oil to obtain coal exploration and coal mining sites from closed coal deposits without competitive bidding, thereby paving the way for the facilitation of their business."
On April 22, 1940, the President of Oriental Takushoku Co., Ltd., Komanosuke Sasaki, appealed to the Deputy Minister for Colonial Affairs Takeo Tanaka with a petition "To unblock the mothballed coal deposits of Sakhalin." "Given the current state of supply and demand for coal," the president wrote, "it is necessary to open part of the closed coal deposits of Sakhalin. The Sakhalin administration is trying to create an Island Colonization Company that will develop the closed coal deposits in the south (Minami Nayoshi) so that the profits from these activities can be used for the development and colonization of Sakhalin. However... The discovery of southern coal deposits is a matter that requires immediate action. Therefore, it is advisable to revise the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 2 on closed territories and exclude the territories of southern coal deposits from it. The mined coal will be supplied to interested parties such as the Ministry of Railways and Japan Electric Power Transmission Co., Ltd."
On May 10, this petition was considered and granted, and on May 16, 1940, the Colonial Office sent Order No. 3 to the Governor of Karafuto to lift the blockade of the Southern Reserve Coal Region. On June 12, 1940, the Mining Department of the Governorate registered licenses No. 165 and No. 166 for the extraction of minerals by Oriental Takushoku Co., Ltd. in the Minami Nayoshi area.
On October 31, 1941, by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan, part of the central blockaded coal deposit in the Naibuti region was discovered. Coal mining in this area was to be carried out by firms affiliated with the Japanese Navy, which was supposed to help provide the Imperial Navy with fuel and coking coal.
As a result of the incentive measures taken, the number of mines on the island increased to 30, and their productivity also increased. In 1940, the volume of imports of Sakhalin coal amounted to 3.124 million tons, which was almost four times higher than the volume of imports of Manchurian coal. The largest export of coal from the island was recorded in 1941 - it amounted to about 4 million tons. (62 percent of annual production) with an annual production of 6.5 million tons, but in 1944 the volume of supplies decreased to 808 thousand tons
The most productive were the mines in the Esutoru, Toro, Naibuti, Kawakami, and Ochiai districts; each of which annually produced over 350 thousand tons of coal. All of them were located in the northwestern and central coal basins. According to data for 1941, the mines of the first two districts accounted for 4.7 million tons against 1.9 million tons of coal mined by the rest of the mines. This is due to the presence in the northwestern coal basin of large reserves of coking coal and anthracite, which are necessary for the war economy and navy of militaristic Japan.
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, control over Japan's mineral resources was strengthened. Thus, in April 1939, the Law "On the Establishment of the Reich Mining Company" (Law No. 82) was adopted, which united small and medium-sized disparate mining enterprises under a single corporate management, which included 50 public and private firms and guaranteed profits to private shareholders.
On July 1, 1941, shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Karafuto Development Company (Karafuto Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha or Karafuto Development Co., LTD) was established under Article 6 of Law No. 50 to develop coal and forestry resources and achieve food self-sufficiency 50 yen each. Shareholders included Higashitaku (220,000 shares), Oji Securities (100,000 shares), Mitsubishi Mining (50,000 shares), Mitsui Mining (40,000 shares), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (20,000 shares), Kita Japan Kisen (20,000 shares), and Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (10,000 shares). Shin Shunkichi was elected president of the company, and the board of directors included Komanosuke Sasaki (president of Higashitaku), Kikujiro Takashima (president of Oji Paper), Koji Kawate (President of Mitsubishi Mining) and Saburo Kawashima (President of Mitsui Mining).
The newly-minted company was supposed to become a monopolist not only in the coal, but also in the fishing, forestry and agricultural sectors of the governorate. It is known that the company was allocated several coal-bearing areas in the Nayoshi area, for the speedy construction of mines and the beginning of intensive coal mining. The original plan was to produce 50,000 tons in 1941, 150,000 tons in 1942, 350,000 tons in 1943, 550,000 tons in 1944, 800,000 tons in 1945, and 1 million tons in 1946 for the use of the mined coal in both factories and households. The financial forecast for 1941 from coal production was 334,000 yen. for 1942 - 1.293 million yen, for 1943 - 2.153 million yen, for 1944 - 2.442 million yen, for 1945 - 3.230 million yen. But the outbreak of war disrupted these plans. In fact, the company produced 20 thousand tons of coal in 1941, 75 thousand tons in 1942 and 100 thousand tons in 1943.
Financial forecasts also did not come true. In 1943, the company suffered losses of 551,000 yen from coal mining, and in 1944, 181,000 yen, despite the fact that the governorate gave the company an annual subsidy of 500,000 yen. On October 26, 1945, the company was abolished.
In addition to the regional subsidy, coal enterprises also received subsidies from the Government of Japan, which created a whole system of subsidies to increase coal production. Compensation for the acquisition of coal companies, incentives to increase production, and subsidies for the development of new mines were provided. On May 4, 1940, Minister of Industry and Trade Fujiwara Ginjiro signed Order No. 27, which approved the rules for subsidizing the coal industry. October 2, 1940 in the Official Gazette Order No. 89 of Karafuto Governor Masayoshi Ogawa on the provision of subsidies to the island's coal industry is published. The government's expenditure to stimulate an increase in coal production was divided into three categories: (1) a payment to stimulate an increase in production in the amount of 2 per tonne of production growth calculated for the current year compared to the previous year, (2) a subsidy for the development of new mines in the amount of 35 per meter for the expansion of the development of new mines, and (3) a guaranteed purchase price. From the last item, mines were excluded, who mined coal for private needs.
Entrepreneurs applying for a subsidy had to submit a corresponding application to the mining department with the attachment of a justification and a geological map of the mining area. The monetary subsidies provided had to be used strictly for their intended purpose, and the persons receiving them were obliged to submit monthly reports to the mining department on the work carried out and the amounts spent.
According to the table, in 1937-1941, more than 17 million yen were spent on subsidies to coal mining enterprises from the colonial and state treasury. Annual expenditures to support the coal industry amounted to 10 to 17% of the island budget.
Subsidies of the Japanese Government and the Administration of the Karafuto Governorate of the Coal Industry of South Sakhalin in 1937 - 1945
year | 1937 | 1938 | 1939 | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
Subsidies to mines (thousands of yen) | 220 | 211 | 272 | 279 | 532 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
Costs of measures to increase coal production (thousand yen) | - | - | - | 5183 | 9088 | 14907 | 18472 | - | - |
Additional incentive payments (thousands of yen) | 200 | 195 | 233 | 223 | 446 | - | - | - | - |
Compensation for the purchase price of coal (thousand yen) | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 39960 | 7340 |
Mineral Extraction Tax (thousands of yen) | 281 | 368 | 511 | 281 | 258 | 250 | 274 | 249 | 317 |
In April 1940, Japan passed the Coal and Coke Distribution Act (Law No. 104), which became another mechanism for subsidizing the coal industry through the state-owned Japan Coal Co., which bought coal at a fixed price, financed mines, and distributed coal to consumers.
The Large Industries Ordinance of September 1, 1941, was the last important preparatory step before the events at Pearl Harbor in December. The Ordinance gave broad powers to control production and price fixing to industrial control associations, including the Coal Control Association and the Mining Control Association. The law of October 28, 1943 defined state control down to the individual company and mine. In order to encourage the exploration and production of strategic minerals, Japan issued Regulation No. 18 "On the Promotion of Mineral Extraction" (Ministry of Trade and Industry, April 1, 1943), which provided for the authority to subsidize mines, build coal preparation plants and coal processing plants, and purchase and install mining equipment.
In 1937, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro fully supported the Japanese military, which launched a full-scale offensive against the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. A year after that, the slogan "New Order" appeared in the country. As historian Andrew Gordon succinctly argues, the proponents of the new order "sought to replace disorderly pluralism with central planning and control of the economy, authoritarian rule based on a single political party, and harsher social discipline." Under the slogan of the "New Order", influential figures in politics, the army and the bureaucracy were looking for ways to "vertically" organize the economy and social structure (the vertical of power) in order to increase economic efficiency and suppress social protests.
In South Sakhalin, the bulletin of the "New Order" was the magazine "Karafuto", which began to publish numerous articles about the "political coup". The "first swallow" of the new policy was the Karafuto People's Patriotic Association (Karafuto Kokumin Hkkai). This organization was called upon to bring "the people" and "officials" closer together. As in Japan, each town and village of Karafuto also had its own Patriotic Association (Choson Kokumin Hokokai). Below them were districts (chnaikai) or village associations (burakukai), and below them were neighborhood associations (tonarigumi). By March 1941, there were more than 150 district and more than 250 village associations on the island. In addition to the Hokokai, other groups were formed that targeted specific segments of society. There was the "Karafuto Economic and Industrial Association" (Karafuto Shk Keizai Kai), which was designed to mobilize small business owners, the "Karafuto Farmers Association" (Karafuto Ngy Kai) united peasant farms. The leaders of these organizations were civilians who had a well-established reputation in local society that had been built up over the previous two decades. Examples include Sugawara Michitar, a worker at the Central Agricultural Experimental Station, Orito Soichi, a trade union leader in Karafuto, and Kimura Keiichi, a journalist. Media outlets such as Karafuto magazine portrayed them as sages capable of bringing together "the state" and "the people" the main principle of the "New Order." As Andrew Gordon argues, "The proponents of the New Order sought to remake the economic, political, and social order. They wanted to restructure industries and agriculture and transform cultural life." Life in Karafuto, as in other parts of the empire, was increasingly organized in such a way as to promote "forced homogeneity." In this way, Japanese propaganda was carried out in the direction of German propaganda "Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fhrer!" The Japanese nation "in the name of victory" had to rally around its emperor.
In the second half of the 1930s, the expansion of Japan's aggressive military operations and the transition to the policy of the "new order" necessitated the issuance of a number of prohibitive laws. Thus, on March 24, 1938, the law "On the General Mobilization of the Nation" was adopted, containing 6 sections and 50 articles, which provided for the establishment of state control over civilian organizations (including trade unions), the prohibition of strikes, the nationalization of strategic industries, price regulation and nationalization of the media. The law gave the government the authority to use unlimited budgets to subsidize the country's military-industrial complex and compensate producers for losses caused by the mobilization of the economy. Eighteen out of fifty articles determined fines for violators. In the same year, all of the country's labor agencies were nationalized to create a system for sending workers to strategically important sectors, and measures were taken to restrict hiring and movement in order to provide engineers and skilled workers in important sectors such as mining. The ban on limiting working hours in the coal industry, the ban on employing minors, a ban on night work, as well as a ban on women working in mines.
In April 1939, the "Ordinance on the Restriction of Employment of Employees" appeared, which was used to restrict the movement of engineers and skilled workers in the military industry, as well as some engineers and workers employed in occupations related to the heavy, chemical and mining industries. In the same year, the creation of the state pension insurance system was completed. This system was part of measures aimed at ensuring an increase in the workforce, and at the same time it was aimed at helping to raise funds for the military by using the accumulated insurance contributions of workers paid into the pension fund. Men working in industrial, mining and transport enterprises with 10 or more employees to whom the Health Insurance Act applied were insured automatically, with premiums divided between the employee and the employer. Five types of sickness, death, etc. benefits were provided as an insured event: funded pension (the payment is valid for 20 years, starting from the age of 55), sickness pension, disability benefit, survivor's pension and unemployment benefit. In particular, coal miners were provided with a new pension insurance system, taking into account the special nature of their work. In 1944, in response to changes in the employment structure due to the worsening war situation, the pension system was also applied to women and clerical personnel and extended to institutions with five or more employees.
In September 1940, the government issued a decree on wage control. In particular, it determined the minimum wage (men aged 20 to 40, women aged 20 to 30), officially determined the highest starting wage (up to 40 years), determined the average hourly wage and limited the amount of wages paid by employers to the total amount of wages received by multiplying it by the total duration of working hours. Subsequently, the Decree added the requirement to increase wages for all employees at least twice a year and by at least 5% per year. Article 13 of the decree required employers, in addition to wages, to pay employees compensation for overtime, additional night shift pay, vacation pay, family allowance (2 yen per month for each dependent under the age of 14), military training allowance, etc.
However, all these rules and decrees could not curb the intensive movement of workers. And in the face of an acute shortage of labor, in November 1940, the "Order on the Prevention of the Movement of Workers" was issued, replacing the "Order on the Restriction of Employment of Workers". It expanded the scope of restrictions on the transfer of workers from one place of work to another and strengthened the ban on hiring and firing. In addition, the "National Labor Manual Law" was promulgated in March 1941, and the prevention of the movement of workers was further strengthened, and on October 1, 1941, a system of employment record books was introduced in Japan.
In July 1940, political parties in Japan were dissolved and replaced by the Association for Assistance to the Throne. By 1943, business and industry were organized into a nationally unified system. Factory workers were organized into factory councils. Throughout Japan, however, the state's attempts to reorganize daily life around the Throne Assistance Association were often poorly understood by the general population.
At the beginning of the war, many men were mobilized for military service, the bulk of the conscripts were factory workers. The number of qualified miners has also decreased sharply due to conscription. As a result, there is an acute shortage of labor and enterprises begin to mobilize all citizens who can work, including girls, students and even high school students. Thus, if in 1939 the share of Japanese coal miners in the country's mines was 96.5%, then by 1945 it had decreased to 64.0%. The share of Korean coal miners steadily increased, amounting to 10% of the average payroll in 1941, 15% in 1942, 29% in 1943, 33% in 1944, and 31.2% in 1945. At the end of the war, almost one in three miners was an immigrant Korean.
In 1943, when the military situation worsened, the Ordinance "On the Promotion of the Employment of Miners" was amended to allow extended working hours for women and minors, night work, underground work for minors, and dangerous and harmful work for women...
On May 28, 1943, the government set the task of providing food to the workers of the coal industry. It was planned to allocate 5 grams of rice for men and 3.5 percent for women per day (1 g = 180 grams), the same amount of wheat, 300 grams of salt per month, 10-15 momme miso per day, (1 momme = 3.75 grams) of 5 soy sauce per month. 5 pairs of underground tabi shoes per year, 3 towels or hand towels per year, 8 pairs of work gloves per year, 3 bars of soap per month.
During the war, the provision of manpower to increase coal production was considered an important issue, and in 1944 the Cabinet of Ministers approved the "Guidelines for Emergency Measures in the Coal Industry", which consisted of providing labor for coal mines through conscription, the formation of volunteer brigades and the mass importation of workers from Korea, which was a reserve of labor for the Japanese and from where mainly young people of military age came from.
The migration of Korean workers to Japan and its colonial possessions can be divided into three stages. I. Recruitment from September 1939 to February 1942, II. Recruitment from February 1942 to September 1944 (National Conscription) and III. from September 1944 through the system of compulsory conscription.
It must be said that as early as September 1937, the Japan Coal Federation submitted a petition to the Minister of Trade and Industry on the need to increase the labor force in the coal industry, stating that "since the coal mining industry is always at a disadvantage in the recruitment of labor compared to the factories, a significant number of Korean workers should be hired for the coal enterprises every year."
On May 5, 1938, the "National Law on General Mobilization" was extended to the Korean Peninsula (Imperial Decree No. 316 "On the Implementation of the Law on General Mobilization in Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto" of May 4, 1938). Many Koreans were recruited to Sakhalin in accordance with the "Regulations on Labor Assistance to Korean Miners" (Imperial Decree No. 97), adopted in May 1938. The Rules determined the types of work, the procedure for hiring, the reasons and procedure for dismissal, the payment of expenses for returning home upon dismissal, the method and date of payment of wages, the method of accumulating savings and other reserves of miners, the reasons and procedure for return, the items of labor that miners must carry, working hours for positions and methods of re-equipment during work, holidays, bonuses and sanctions, as well as the method of payment of wages. When bonuses and sanctions were negotiated, the miners had to submit documents to the Governor-General of Korea.
However, it cannot be said that all this was observed. For example, the Korean Kavadode was recruited to the Mitsubishi coal mine at the age of 27. "I was promised a salary of 3 yen 20 sen a day, but in fact it was 2 yen. Eventually, it went up to 6 yen because I was doing hard work, but I was forced to save most of the money and never got more than 3 yen. When I asked to be sent home because I had worked for two years (the term of my employment), they refused, saying, "What are you talking about, we have to postpone this for the sake of the country." No one could return home."
On July 29, 1939, a memorandum entitled "Principles for the Recruitment of Korean Workers" was sent to the governors of the prefectures and deputy ministers of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to it, employers were required to report monthly to local governors on the actual conditions of labor management, including working conditions, living conditions, and wages. On the same day, the "Policy on the Resettlement of Korean Workers on the Mainland" was published, stating that Japanese employers should "ensure, as far as possible, that there is no discrimination between Korean workers and mainland workers in the treatment of Korean workers."
In September 1939, Japan decided on administrative measures to recruit Korean workers. These measures gave Japanese entrepreneurs suffering from labor shortages the authority to hire Korean workers. The procedure worked like this: employers applied to the Japanese government for permission to hire workers. The government then assigned Korean districts and townships to employers where they could recruit workers. In accordance with the quota set by the county offices, they hired the desired number of workers through the city's offices and labor and employment departments. Such was the system of labor exploitation thanks to the cooperation of the Japanese government and entrepreneurs.
In 1939, the Japanese authorities "voluntarily and compulsorily" recruited 53 thousand Koreans to work in various regions of Japan and its colony, including South Sakhalin.
Number of Korean Peninsula Residents Mobilized to Japan, Karafuto, and South Sea Islands from 1939 to 1944
year | Classification of regions | Quantity according to the National Mobilization Plan | Number of actually mobilized by industry | ||||
Coal mines | Mining | Civil engineering | Factories, etc. | altogether | |||
1939 | Japan | 85,000 | 32,081 | 5,597 | 12,141 | - | 49,819 |
Sakhalin | n/a | 2,578 | 190 | 533 | - | 3,301 | |
altogether | 85,000 | 34,659 | 5,787 | 12,674 | - | 53,120 | |
1940 | Japan | 88,800 | 36,865 | 9,081 | 7,955 | 2,078 | 55,979 |
Sakhalin | 8,500 | 1,311 | - | 1,294 | - | 2,605 | |
South Seas | n/a | - | - | - | 814 | 814 | |
altogether | 97,300 | 38,176 | 9,081 | 9,249 | 2,892 | 59,398 | |
1941 | Japan | 81,000 | 39,019 | 9,416 | 10,314 | 5,117 | 63,866 |
Sakhalin | 1,200 | 800 | - | 651 | - | 1,451 | |
South Seas | 17,800 | - | - | - | 1,781 | 1,781 | |
altogether | 100,000 | 39,819 | 9,416 | 10,965 | 6,898 | 67,098 | |
1942 | Japan | 120,000 | 74,098 | 7,632 | 16,969 | 13,124 | 111,823 |
Sakhalin | 6,500 | 3,985 | - | 1,960 | - | 5,945 | |
South Seas | 3,500 | - | - | - | 2,083 | 2,083 | |
altogether | 130,000 | 78,083 | 7,632 | 18,929 | 15,207 | 119,851 | |
1943 | Japan | 150,000 | 66,535 | 13,763 | 30,635 | 13,353 | 124,286 |
Sakhalin | 3,300 | 1,835 | - | 976 | - | 2,811 | |
South Seas | 1,700 | - | - | - | 1,253 | 1,253 | |
altogether | 155,000 | 68,370 | 13,763 | 31,611 | 14,606 | 128,350 | |
1944 | Japan | 290,000 | 71,550 | 15,920 | 51,650 | 89,200 | 228,320 |
- | - | - | - | - | - | ||
altogether | 290,000 | 71,550 | 15,920 | 51,650 | 89,200 | 228,320 | |
Altogether | Japan | 814,800 | 320,148 | 61,409 | 129,664 | 122,872 | 634,093 |
Sakhalin | 19,500 | 10,509 | 190 | 5,414 | - | 16,113 | |
South Seas | 23,000 | - | - | - | 5,931 | 5,931 | |
altogether | 857,300 | 330,657 | 61,599 | 135,078 | 128,803 | 656,137 |
Despite the forced conscription of workers in 1939, Japan continued to suffer from greater labor shortages as the "small victorious war" began to escalate into a full-scale and bloody one. In 1940, Korea established six government employment agencies, and enacted the "Workers' Movement Prevention Ordinance" and the "National Labor Manual Law" to tighten restrictions on Korean workers. In June 1941, the Governor-General of Korea established the "Korean Labor Association" to recruit Korean workers to work in Japan, and in December of the same year, the "National Decree on Employment Assistance" was enacted.
The table shows that in 1940-1941, under the slogan "Let's increase coal production in the name of the Motherland and in the name of the war", more than 128 thousand Koreans were sent to mines and other enterprises in Japan, South Sakhalin and the islands of the South Seas. In 1942, 120 thousand people were forcibly mobilized and sent to mines and earth-building work in Japan and South Sakhalin. In connection with the deployment of military operations in the Pacific Ocean, more than 656 thousand Koreans were mobilized, who were involved in the construction of airfields, ports, coal mining and other works. At the same time, we do not count the residents of Korea who were forcibly taken to work in China and Manchuria. According to official data published in the "Explanatory Note" of the 85th session of the Japanese parliament, the total number of mobilized Koreans was 724787 people. Of these, the number of Koreans mobilized on Karafuto was 16,113, 95% of whom were from the countryside of the south of the Korean Peninsula and only 5% from North Korea. The reason why so few North Koreans were brought to the island is that Japan built many military factories in the North to prepare for war with China. which has created a labor shortage in North Korea.
It should be noted that about half of the mobilized workers were used in coal mines. So, if in Hokkaido about 50% of miners were Koreans, then in South Sakhalin they were more than 50%. Nationwide, Korean coal mine workers accounted for 31 percent. Thus, Korean labor was used in the most labor-intensive industries. More than 70% of Koreans living in South Sakhalin by 1943 were men (by August 1945, about 34 thousand people). Although the literature describes cases of mobilization of women in Karafuto to work in the mines, the number of women and children working there was relatively small. It is known that more than 100,000 women were mobilized as "Japanese military sex slaves" ("comfort women"), some of whom were sent to Karafuto to work in brothels, which were available in every mining village on the island. Pak No-hak, who came to Karafuto from Korea in 1943, left detailed records of "comfort stations" for coal miners, divided into "for the Japanese" and "for Koreans". "Comfort stations" for Koreans were usually owned by Korean enterprises and staffed by Korean women. Interestingly, Park calls the girls who worked in brothels "joshigun". The term mainly referred to the "karayuki-san" (comfort women of foreigners) who traveled from Japan to Southeast Asia, India, and Africa, and seem to have been called the same on Sakhalin.
According to reports from coal industry organizations at the time, Korean "comfort points" near mines were seen as a kind of "entertainment" venues for Korean miners. They were called "Korean restaurants" and usually served four or five customers at a time. It was a time when there was a licensed prostitution system, and of course it was legal.
After the war, under the Soviet military government, these "comfort points" and female prostitutes were allegedly destroyed, however, it is known that some of these "businesses" continued in secret.
In the first years of the war, Koreans were recruited to the mines "voluntarily". Recruiters traveled to the villages and promised the local poor mountains of gold for a year or two of work on Karafuto. Someone believed, but most signed the contract simply out of fear of being on the lists of unreliable, over whom the local authorities, currying favor with the Japanese masters, established enhanced police surveillance. Those recruited, as a rule, tried in every possible way to evade sending.
On February 13, 1942, a Cabinet decree entitled "Measures for the Use of Korean Workers" was issued, announcing the mobilization of Korean workers with "government mediation" and also stating: "As for the treatment of these personnel, both physical and mental, they will be treated in the same way as workers from the mainland of Japan."
On February 22, 1942, the Governor-General of Korea issued a series of ordinances that appear to have been a breakthrough in forced deportation. The minimum duration of the employment contract was set at 2 years. Thanks to this series of measures, the Japanese abandoned the relative "voluntariness" and began to simply drive Korean guys onto steamships going to Karafuto. The road from Busan through Tokyo and Hokkaido to Otomari or Esutora took about 8-9 days.
The last means of mobilizing the Korean labor force was mobilization in accordance with the "Decree on National Military Service." It had been in effect in Japan since October 1939, but there were fears that its introduction on Korean territory would cause an intensification of national opposition and an increase in the resistance of the working masses. Nevertheless, due to the critical situation at the fronts and the acute shortage of labor, in September 1944, the "Decree on Conscription" was extended to the territory of Korea by a special decree and the forced deportation of Koreans, called "conscription", began.
By nature and form, the mobilization was of a military-police nature. By decree of the Governor-General of Korea, each county and village was required to allocate a certain contingent of people. Those who evaded labor service were subjected to six months' imprisonment, and their families were deprived of food rations. Mobilized workers were given military-style uniforms, and under the protection of the police, they were taken by a special train to the port of Busan. From here, after receiving a pass, they arrived in South Sakhalin and were distributed among the mines.
We do not have exact data on the number of Korean workers forcibly mobilized to South Sakhalin. However, the governorate's statistics on the national composition of the island's population allow us to say that in 1939, before the beginning of forced mobilization, about 9 thousand Koreans lived in South Sakhalin, at the end of 1944 - 26825 people, and in 1945 - according to various sources - from 23.5 to 50 thousand.
The social composition of the Koreans of South Sakhalin was almost homogeneous and consisted of workers. In quantitative terms, workers in the coal industry accounted for about 70% of the total, land-building workers - 20%, unskilled workers in the pulp-and-paper and forestry industries - 5%, other categories - 3%. The smallest number of Koreans (2%) were employed in agriculture, despite the fact that it was traditional for them.
The main reason for this distribution of Koreans was that the overwhelming majority of them were forcibly mobilized and distributed by the authorities to individual industries and enterprises without the consent of the workers themselves. In addition, this is due to the fact that this branch of the economy in South Sakhalin was unprofitable. It should be noted that there were also exploiting elements among the Koreans who profited at the expense of their compatriots. These are subcontractors of land development projects and mines, as well as owners of taverns, brothels (so-called "comfort stations") and shops. But their number was extremely small. In South Sakhalin, Korean workers mobilized in the mines actually turned into prisoners. The miners lived in barracks conditions. For example, about 1140 Korean miners worked at the Naibuti mine. Of these, 90% were from the Gyeongsang and Jeolla-do regions. By 1944, 1700 Koreans were already working at the mine. These workers were accommodated in 6 dormitories (hamba) "Sinwa ryoi" (New Harmony Dormitory). All dormitories were managed by a chief overseer from among the Japanese. Each dormitory was also headed by a Japanese overseer, who was subordinate to the chief overseer. In each dormitory there was a military instructor - a Japanese soldier. The entire contingent of the dormitory was divided into companies, companies - into platoons, platoon - into several units consisting of 20 people each. Koreans were appointed commanders of the company and other lower units. On Sundays, in their free time, the miners were engaged in military affairs. It was forbidden to enter the village without the permission of the commander.
Korean miners worked in a safety environment. They performed the hardest work, and in worse conditions than the Japanese. For example, Korean miners excavated coal mainly by hand, while many Japanese miners used machinery. The working day lasted more than 12 hours, and on Saturday 2 hours more as a sign of "service to the Motherland, in the name of the victory of the army."
Discrimination against Korean miners was also manifested in wages. During the Second World War in South Sakhalin, the wages of Japanese miners and tunnelers were 4-5 yen per day, and bolters - 4 yen. And forcibly mobilized Korean workers received 2.5-3 yen. Towards the end of the war, the Japanese (Tinnai mine) were paid between 7 and 24 yen per day, while Koreans were paid 3.5 yen per day for the duration of the mobilization period. The Japanese themselves explained such a significant difference in wages by the fact that Korean miners "did not earn" incentive allowances.
Pak Kyung-sik provides a comparative table of wages for Korean and Japanese miners in Hokkaido during the period of the imperialist war in the Pacific. Judging by this table, Korean workers received up to 50 yen per month, and Japanese workers received 90 yen, i.e. almost twice as much.
Other researchers, however, note that the data provided by Park Kyung-sik are incorrect, since they were based on the distribution of wages by ethnicity (for one month) in a certain coal mine in Hokkaido. In particular, researcher Lee Woo-yeon notes that there were isolated cases when the wages of Korean miners were higher than those of Japanese miners. E. W. Wagner wrote that "Korean miners received the same wages as Japanese miners," and R. Mitchell pointed out that in some cases Korean workers "were treated no worse than Japanese conscripts, and in some cases even better." In the conditions of total war and national mobilization, the most important thing was to increase production. To achieve this, workers needed to be offered incentives, and since companies had abundant funds by printing "war money" and supporting the war industry, there was no reason to discriminate against Koreans on financial grounds, regardless of production efficiency, as this would have a negative impact on the operation of the military system.
However, most studies suggest that racial discrimination in wages did occur. Park Kyung-sik cites the testimony of a worker who was mobilized in 1942: "When I was drafted, I found that my salary was 1 yen 30 sen, only half of what was announced. My plan collapsed in an instant. Sending money to relatives was out of the question. I could barely afford to support myself."
Yamada Shji also wrote in his study that "workers were forced to 'save' their wages and received pocket money only to prevent them from escaping to distant places." Hayashi Eida stated that "from the wages we received, we paid for food (60-65 sen per day), as well as bed linen, cigarettes, alcohol, and soap. We were forced to put money into Patriot Provident Funds, Pension Provident Funds, Ordinary Provident Funds, Government Bonds, and other forced savings, so not a penny was handed over to them." Cook and Cook also referred to the testimony of one mobilized person. "Salary? They didn't pay us anything. When we came from Korea, they said they would give us 1.5 yen a day. But we didn't get even that." Kim In-duk wrote: "There were almost no cases where people received wages on the spot. That seemed to be the rule... Even if people received a monthly salary, the amount was very small."
Historian Kim Min-yeon takes a more flexible position: "After deducting various expenses, the actual amount of payment was not very large, and few sent more than 15 yen, which was the maximum amount that could be sent home."
Jung Hye-kyung, using the testimony of unmobilized persons, concluded that the monthly salary was "an amount that could be spent in one day by going outside." Heo Kwang Moo also quotes the words of one of the forcibly mobilized people verbatim: "My monthly salary was only enough for pocket expenses, so I couldn't even think about sending money home."
Researcher Jung Ki-ho doubts that the remittances made by Korean workers were actually delivered to their families, and Yi Sang-vi suggests that after Japan's defeat in the war, the unpaid deposits may have included amounts that were not transferred to Korea.
For example, Nishinarita Yutaka wrote that according to documents from the Konomai mine of Sumitomo Ltd. in Hokkaido for 1942, "non-payment of wages was commonplace." In particular, he refers to a document dated July 8, 1942: "Request for the payment of workers' wages addressed to Kimura Seiji, head of Mokdong-myeon, Kongju-gun, and director of Sumitomo Konomai Mining Co., Ltd.... Workers who have worked in your mine since March 22, 1940 and returned home on April 27 of this year due to the expiration of their employment contracts. According to the request, due to a misunderstanding while leaving your company, they were unable to receive their wages. However, the caretaker of your company verbally informed them on board the vessel that the remaining wages should be transferred to their accounts in Korea. However, although two months have passed since they returned home, there has not yet been any transfer."
A similar situation with wages was in South Sakhalin. It should also be noted that Korean miners did not receive money at all. The administration of the mines was obliged to transfer their earnings to the savings bank after deducting food, clothing, dormitories and other expenses. Only at the request of the worker, the administration allowed a certain part of the earnings to be sent to relatives.
Salaries were paid through the head of the dormitory, but each worker was given no more than 10 yen per month. The remaining amount had to be saved (sent to a bank account) or transferred to the family in Korea. Transfers, as a rule, were limited to 15-30 yen. There were also so-called mandatory "patriotic savings", which amounted to 10% of wages. Japanese researcher Miwa Munehiro hypocritically states that "the savings of Korean workers were largely due to the aspect of preventing losing money due to gambling such as hanafuda, spending money due to alcohol consumption, etc., the need to have a financial cushion in case of illness or disasters in the mine, and ensuring the security of livelihood after returning home."
It should be noted that every day 25 sen was deducted from the miners' salaries for families and 35 sen for singles, who were used to buy war savings bonds. In many cases, the wages of Koreans were actually stolen. It is not surprising that in these years more than 35.6% of workers fled from their jobs. (In total, out of more than 650 thousand mobilized Koreans, 220 thousand people fled). On this occasion, Naoki Tanaka wrote: "Savage exploitation could not prevent the working class from revolting, although the methods of insurrection were inevitably very passive. This manifested itself in the form of 'idleness' and 'flight', and it was only natural that this was especially common among Korean workers, who were most dissatisfied with their jobs."
It should also be borne in mind that forced transfers of part of wages to bank accounts were also observed among Japanese miners. It was a political measure to curb inflation caused by wartime money printing.
However, the cost of money at that time decreased many times, and there was not much to buy with it. Since 1941, food cards have been introduced in South Sakhalin. So, per day, workers were entitled to 400 grams of rice, 1.5 grams of meat, 6 grams of fish, 0.6 grams of soybeans, 0.05 grams of tea... In addition, the workers were given from 120 to 210 grams of rice daily, depending on the type of work... But the "tacos" workers made do with two cups of rice a day.
On the black market, prices rose many times over from the pre-war level, and workers with their wages simply had nothing to do there.
During the Second World War, under the pretext of the fastest implementation of the idea of "unity of Japan and Korea" in Japan and its colonies, including South Sakhalin, the "Kyowa kai" ("Society for Assistance and Consent") was organized. This is evidenced by the fact that its branches were created at local police departments. At the head of such a society was the head of the local police department, his deputy was some pro-Japanese Korean. Members of the society's leadership were Koreans who collaborated with the police and authorities. In order to ensure the material income of the society and intensify its work, all Korean workers of South Sakhalin were forcibly included in the number of its members and monthly membership fees were collected from them.
The Society for Assistance and Harmony conducted agitation and propaganda work among Koreans, which was supposed to contribute to the Japanization of Koreans. The main form of this work was lectures, conversations, film screenings, collection of monetary donations for the war, etc. The "Society" closely cooperated with the police and gendarmerie, performed police and detective functions, identifying politically unreliable Koreans and collecting materials on them for denunciations to the police.
Such "public organizations" were created in order for Japan to achieve its aggressive goals in Asia, including the Soviet Far East. This is evidenced by the message of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, sent in March 1941 to the "Movement of Service to the Fatherland in South Sakhalin". "Southern Sakhalin," it said, "is located at the forefront of Japanese defense and colonization, and in the current international situation it is of exceptional importance as part of the Japanese Empire. Our influence must extend to the whole of East Asia. Therefore, the new national movement bears great responsibility for the fate of Japan..."
Under constant and close surveillance, Korean miners staged a total of eight protests between February 1940 and February 1944. So, in 1943, a conflict arose at the Naibuti mine between miners and the administration, the so-called "herring jerk incident". The fact was that the administration fed the workers with rotten herring for several days. The workers were indignant and declared a boycott.
It should be noted that 501 people, or 16% of the 3,134 Koreans who worked in the Karafuto mines, participated in strikes, sabotages and attacks, and 63 of them were arrested. Of the 20 Koreans detained in 1940, most were arrested, and all 43 detainees between 1943 and 1944 were arrested for violent acts and other violations.
Unrest of Korean miners was also noted in 1945 at a mine in the village of Taihei (Udarny) in Esutoru County. The reason for them was the contemptuous, chauvinistic attitude of the Japanese administration of the mine and the police commissioner Sano towards a group of Korean miners. The conflict was settled with the help of pro-Japanese accomplices and a detachment of military gendarmerie.
The core of the anti-Japanese national movement of Koreans was the "League of Brotherhood," which had two currents. One trend pursued a political goal: to unite local like-minded Koreans in the name of the struggle for the independence of their country; The other trend was economic in nature and boiled down to providing mutual assistance to members of the "League of Brotherhood". The second trend, which operated under legal conditions, became widespread. The "League of Brotherhood" of the political trend was joined mainly by literate young people.
The forms and methods of the "League of Brotherhood", which pursued a political goal, were as follows: monthly gathering of its members, explanation of the military-political situation in Asia, including Japan and Korea, patriotic education of the population in the spirit of patriotism; against Japanese domination in Korea. The underground activities of the "league" were noted in 1941 in the city of Siritori. Apparently, the Brotherhood League had connections with similar organizations in Japan and Korea, as evidenced by police information about the observation of Koreans.
Thus, archival, literary and other materials allow us to judge quite confidently that the political activities of underground organizations of communists, youth and democratic elements of South Sakhalin were carried out. This movement was directed against the reactionary domestic policies of Japanese imperialism and its colonial regime.
It was attended by representatives of Hokkaido Tankan Steamship Co., Ltd., Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ltd. and the Japan Coal Industry Association. It was assumed that about 5,000 people would be forcibly transported to Hokkaido and Karafuto, which were the main objects of migration, in 1940 (of whom about 1,000 were planned to be sent to Hokkaido). The main emphasis was on the coal industry of Karafuto, where it was originally planned to employ groups of Chinese workers of 300 people in 5 mines. Carefully selected single people aged 17 to 30 "with a sound mind" were subject to forced migration. A one-year contract with a possible extension was to be signed with them.
An official from the Ministry of Labor, who was present at the meeting, said that coolies are extremely able-bodied. He said, "We have coolies who work for our company, and if we can hire them, we'll hire them. They are absolutely submissive, and even if I beat them, they are like real brutes, they never resist. Compared to Koreans, their salaries are low and there are no restrictions on working hours."
However, representatives of the invited coal mining companies were extremely reluctant to express support for the idea of forced labor of the Chinese and stated that "it will be impossible to use a large number of coolies, given the current scale of the coal industry." For example, a representative of the Karafuto Mining Company, which had experience in using Chinese coolies, said that "the use of coolies turned out to be a huge failure," and gave the following reasons for this: "Firstly, they are ineffective; secondly, they have a different national feeling than the Japanese miners; thirdly, they get angry at small things... and are inclined to incite collective disorder ... (the fourth is omitted)... fifthly, they do not respect life and are not afraid of death, and they are worse than animals..." In the end, he expressed a negative attitude towards the import of Chinese.
The use of forced labor of Koreans, who were considered "Japanese" as a result of assimilation policies, did not seem strange to Japanese companies, which were characterized by homogeneity. However, the use of the Chinese was the introduction of something foreign and was therefore perceived as a threat to the organizational structure of Japanese companies. Therefore, in October 1940, it was decided to officially stop the "import of coolies" (forced transportation of Chinese). In 1942, this idea was returned to again and in 1943 1420 Chinese were brought to Japan. By the way, not a single Chinese from this game got to Karafuto. In total, in 1944, 3703 Chinese worked in the mines of Japan. Thus, the forced resettlement of Chinese workers to Japan, not to mention an island colony, was a complete failure.
In the course of the war, coal production began to decline. In 1942, the planned production of coal was 8 million tons, but was not carried out due to difficulties with the transportation of coal to Japan, since American submarines controlled the movement of Japanese ships through the La Prouse Strait. Since 1942, due to the reduction of coal production in South Sakhalin, a large number of miners were transferred to the mines of Kyushu. It should be noted that Japan planned to increase coal production in South Sakhalin to 15 million tons per year by 1948, but these plans were not destined to come true.
The export of island coal was also reduced. So, if in 1940 Japan received 18% of all coking coal imported into the country from Karafuto, then by 1944 its imports decreased to 10%. The export of ordinary coal decreased during this period by more than 2 times. As a result, the amount of coal in coal warehouses and warehouses in the area of wharves and ports began to increase. For example, in 1942, 625061 tons of coal accumulated in the coal depots at the Karafuto mines, and 1203004 tons of coal in the port and coastal warehouses. In 1943, there were 685849 tons of coal in the warehouses at the mines, and 2306360 tons in the port warehouses.
Planned and actual coal production and exports in Karafuto, Korea, Taiwan and Japan in 1937-1944
year | Actually mined in Karafuto | Karafuto Coal Mining Plan | Export to Japan (actual) | Karafuto Coal Export Plan | Mined in Korea | Mined in Taiwan | Mined in Japan | Coal exports to Japan |
1937 | 2616000 | 2540000 | 1048000 | n/a | 2535000 | 1877000 | 45257877 | 4426168 |
1938 | 3574000 | 2910000 | 1793000 | n/a | 2225000 | 2045000 | 48683689 | 3756182 |
1939 | 4993000 | 5540000 | 2421000 | 2360000 | 5171000 | 2608000 | 52408541 | 3855415 |
1940 | 6465000 | 5823000 | 3124000 | 2917000 | 6096000 | 2827000 | 57318622 | 5166373 |
1941 | 6471000 | 6985000 | 3302000 | 3659000 | 6803000 | 2754000 | 55602334 | 9585000 |
1942 | 4916000 | 8080000 | 2189000 | 4253000 | 6662000 | 2305000 | 54178544 | 8748000 |
1943 | 4979000 | 9070000 | 1650000 | 4917000 | 6754000 | 2324000 | 55538802 | 6029000 |
1944 | 2678000 | 7000000 | 808000 | n/a | 7061000 | 1653000 | 49334008 | 3135000 |
At the beginning of 1943, the most powerful coal region on the island, Esutoru, was mothballed. On August 11, 1944, the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan, at the request of the Minister of War Industry Fujiwara Ginjiro, adopted a resolution "On measures for the speedy relocation of workers and material and technical base in the Karafuto and Kushiro coal mines."
All island mines were divided into four categories: (1) closed coal mines, (2) mines that had been suspended, (3) partially operating mines, and (4) operating coal mines. For each of the four categories, it was decided that of the mines in Categories 1 and 2, "all but the women would be transferred to Japan. In the mines of the 3rd category, 10-20% of the personnel will be retained, and the rest will be transferred to the metropolis. On Sakhalin, the following coal mines were selected: Category 1 - Kamitoro, Shiatorizawa, Morotsu, Chio, Nayoshi, Toyohata and Konan, which were closed; Category 2 - Senmoro, Kitakozawa, Komonai and Ambetsu, which were idle. Category 3 - Toro, Taihei and Nishisakutan, and the rest of the mines were designated as functioning.
On August 19, 1944, the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan under the chairmanship of Koiso Kuniaki decided to close 18 mines on the island and send the freed miners to Japan. At the time of closure, 10021 people worked in the liquidated mines, with whom 25519 family members lived . In total, 26640 people worked in the industry at the time of the closure of the mines.
Governor Karafuto described the deportation of Japanese and Korean miners from the island as follows: "The issue of the mass transfer of coal mine workers to home areas, which is carried out in accordance with the government's policy, has been completed in a very peaceful and orderly manner: the Hakuryu Maru ship departed from the port of Esutoru on September 23, the number of workers reached 9,702 (including 7,749 coal mine workers and 1,953 cargo handlers) and 918 people from other categories since departure of the first vessel, Aniva Maru, on August 25. There were no serious conflicts, all the workers realized the importance of the situation and set off in high spirits. We hope that there is nothing to worry about and that we will do our best to support the families remaining on the island."
From August 25 to September 23, 1944, 3,022 Korean miners left the island out of a total of 7,801 people on the payroll of all Korean island miners (not counting tako prisoners). They were forced to move to Kyushu (Fukuoka, Nagasaki), Fukushima, and Ibaraki.) was forbidden to take. It is worth noting here that in addition to the Koreans mobilized on the Japanese mainland, 440 temporary contractors were subject to mobilization, who were engaged in work related to coal mines, such as civil engineering. It is known that out of 9437 "victims of labor mobilization", about 14.9% died and 19.4% went missing both as a result of their merciless exploitation and during the hostilities in South Sakhalin in August 1945.
As a result of "liquidation measures" instead of the planned 7 million tons. annual production, in 1944 only 2.7 million tons were mined on the island. Coal. The reduction in production is also due to the lack of sufficient sea tonnage for the export of coal and the constant shelling of Japanese ships in the La Prouse Strait by the American fleet. On August 1, 1945, 539 thousand tons of washed coal had accumulated in warehouses, and 1761 thousand tons of washed coal at the wharves. By July 1, 1945, out of 36 mines operating before the war, 20 were abandoned, 5 were mothballed. Only 11 mines worked, employing 11615 people, but due to conscription into the army and departure to Japan, by the time the Soviet troops arrived in the south of Sakhalin, there were very few workers left.
Schoolboy Kazuo Omi recalls: "In the spring of 1945, I moved to the second grade of middle school. In April 1945, at the first morning meeting of the new semester, students lined up on the square in front of the school building. The school principal instructed us: "studies are suspended for one year, and all of you will be mobilized to work." The site of the work was the Toro coal mine, located 20 km north of the school. By this time, most of the miners had been mobilized to develop coal deposits in the Kyushu region, leaving only a minimal number of miners and security personnel. Together with high school students, we marched to the city of Esutoru and settled in an old bachelor dormitory of the Mitsubishi coal mine, located on the outskirts of the city. I was ordered to be the squad leader of the second platoon of the fifth squad of junior schoolchildren of the second year of study. Ten classmates and I were crowded into one room. The next day I woke up at six o'clock in the morning. At the entrance to the mine, work assignments were drawn up: seniors worked in the mine, and sophomores worked on conveyor belts that lifted coal to the surface.
Second-year students were responsible for scooping up coal with a shovel when it fell off the assembly line. A piece of coal is like a drop of blood needed for a nation to win, so they had to scoop up any piece that fell. The work was done in groups of five, working in shifts of 30 minutes, and was supervised by Warrant Officer Nishio, the training instructor, who was always by our side. When it was time for a break, we were not allowed to lie down or even sit down, we had to rest in the "lotus position".
A mine worker who had been watching this from the beginning said, "Officer, if you work so hard today, the students won't be able to work tomorrow. After all, they have never done such hard work before."
The instructor said, "Please don't talk to us. I'm the one teaching the students," and continued in the same vein as before.
During the lunch break, the official came again and asked us to rest. He said: "When you arrive in the morning, you should take your time, but look around and make sure everything is done correctly. I am an expert in this work. You can't finish a job in two or three days. If you work too hard and for too long, your body will not keep up with your spirit. You don't understand that, do you? If you look at it in the long term, you'll see that I'm right. Ultimately, you'll be more effective if you do what I tell you. Don't work too much."
In the morning, when I walked out the door, I would get a lunch box packed in a hastily prepared wooden box, but when it was time for lunch, I would open the lid and find that about half of the rice had already been eaten. Most often, rice was mixed with soybeans, kelp, yomogi (wormwood) and other ingredients.
Then the work schedule was changed to two shifts: from midnight to noon and from noon to 12 o'clock at night with weekly night and day shifts. The work was hard and I was always hungry. There was no meat in the diet of the students and therefore my squad was assigned to dig shellfish. Work began on May 1. It was sunny and hot and we worked naked. Therefore, for the first time in a long time, I enjoyed freedom. This place was a sandy beach of Lake Toro, surrounded by hills. The shells of the clams were separated from the flesh with a knife, the meat was put in a jar designed for about 200 people, and carried to the dormitories. On Sunday, curry and rice were made from shellfish for lunch, and everyone could eat as much as they wanted. I was so full for the first time in a long time. The next day, however, I had a fever, my whole body was sluggish, I lost consciousness and fell to the floor."
On August 11, 1945, Soviet troops crossed the Russian-Japanese border to the 50th parallel and the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk offensive operation began, aimed at liberating South Sakhalin from Japanese troops. However, even before the attack, on August 9, 1945, a meeting was held in Toyohara between Governor Toshio Otsu, Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, Colonel Yasushi Suzuki, and Rear Admiral Goichi Kuroki. As a result, a tripartite agreement was signed, according to which the army and navy provided ships for the evacuation of civilians from the south of the island. However, this was no more than a preliminary plan, and it was kept secret from all but the signatories.
This plan was to evacuate men over 65 years old, women over 41 years old, and men and women under the age of 14. It was planned to evacuate 160,000 people within 15 days. The main evacuation site was the port of Otomari, for which 15 ships were used, including the ferry Soya Maru and a special naval gunboat. It was also decided that the cargo-passenger ship "Daiho Maru" will cruise from the port of Maoka. In total, up to 30 vessels were involved. Special trains, as well as trucks, were brought to the evacuation points.
The first voyage of the "Soya Maru" made on the evening of August 13 from Otomari, later the ferry "Karafuto Maru" was used. Repatriation ships began to depart from Maoki on August 16 (the cargo-passenger ship Taiho Maru) and from Honto on August 18 (the cargo-passenger ships Notoro Maru, Osaka Shosen, and a coastal defense ship cruised).
Sea transportation proceeded at a rapid pace, the number of passengers exceeded the capacity of ships by several times. On the night of August 23, the ferries Soya Maru and Kasuga Maru departed from the port of Otomari on their last voyage and arrived safely at the port of Wakkanai at 6 o'clock in the morning.
In just 10 days, 76,616 people were successfully evacuated from the island, about half of the planned number. Another 24713 people escaped on their own, using boats and homemade watercraft. Thus, less than a quarter of the residents of South Sakhalin were able to evacuate. 18,320 Japanese soldiers were captured. Of the remaining civilians during the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk offensive operation, about 3700 people died for various reasons. Among them were workers in the coal industry. During the retreat, they were ordered to blow up the entrances to the mines and disable the mine equipment. For example, at the Naihoro mine, a group of workers, in order not to be captured, blew up one of the tunnels of the mine and was buried under the rubble. The Kawakami mine was flooded.
On August 17, 1945, 23 nurses between the ages of 16 and 33 who worked at the Taihei Mine Hospital attempted suicide, and before that they had poisoned a group of seriously ill people so that they would not fall into the clutches of the Red Devils. Head nurse Tahakashi demanded that the other girls use large doses of sleeping pills for suicide. After the injections, the nurses cut their wrists "to be sure". However, only six people died, including the head nurse. 17 people miraculously survived.
By August 25, 1945, the entire southern part of Sakhalin Island was liberated from Japanese troops, thus ending the 40-year history of the Karafuto Governorate.
Thus, in Southern Sakhalin, during the period of its possession by Japan, the contradictory nature of the capitalist mode of management was fully manifested on the one hand, the effective use of capital investments, on the other hand, the merciless exploitation of Japanese coal miners and the use of forced labor of Korean workers forcibly deported to the island.
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