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The Military Balance 1985

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THE MILITARY BALANCE 1985

ВОЕННЫЙ БАЛАНС 1985

The Military Balance 1984

The Military Balance 1986

Readers Notes
USA: USA
Soviet Union: Soviet Union
Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Rumania
NATO: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Europe: Albania, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia.
Middle East: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libia, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen North, Yemen South.
Africa: Angola, Benin, Bostwana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambiqe, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegambia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somali, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zair, Zambia, Zimbabve.
China: China
Asia & Australia: Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippine, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam.
Latin America: Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican, Ecuador, Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua , Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Tables
Balances: USSR-USA strateg / Стратегический ядерный баланс СССР-США, NATO-WP / Баланс НАТО-ОВД, Airliners / Авиалайнеры, Economic Trends / Экономические тенденции

COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL PACTS

During the past twelve months the United States retired 11 Titan II ICBM (3 more will retire by November 1985). This has reduced the ICBM total weapons yield by 99 MT.. While there is still great uncertainty over the number of the MX ICBM to be deployed, its development is proceeding, with a planned Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of December 1986. The Midgetman ICBM is still in the very early concept stage and could not be deployed before the 1990s.

SLBM, however, have increased by 24 with the introduction of the sixth Ohio-class SSBN. A seventh is due to be delivered in October 1985, and this delivery would have put the US over the SALT II MIRVed missile ceiling. A Poseidon boat will be taken out of service to prevent this. The figures of 1 July, however, is 640 missiles in 37 SSBN, an increase over the twelve months of 48 missiles. The normal Poseidon warhead payload is 10 MIRV, of 40 to 50 KT each. The Trident C-4 carries 8 warheads of 100 KT. The present increase over the 1984 total is therefore 384 warheads, with a maximum of 38.4 MT. The intended replacement of the Poseidon boat with the seventh Ohio will mean a further net increase of 8 missiles, an increase in the number of MIRV of 32 and an increase in submarine-launched total weapons yield of 11.2 MT. The Trident D-5 (or Trident II) SLBM is in development, with a planned IOC of 1989.

There is no significant change in the B-52 or FB-111 fleets. However, the first of the new generation of strategic bombers, the B-1B, has been delivered. At present the first squadron of 16 aircraft is planned to be operational in late 1986. Three other squadrons and a training element will follow, to a total of 100 aircraft; 51 remain on order, and deliveries are expected to be at a rate of 4 per month from September 1986. This aircraft can carry three internal single or mixed nuclear loads of free-fall bombs, AGM-69A SRAM and AGM-86B ALCM, plus eight loads externally. Maximum single loads would be 22 ALCM (with the W-80-1 warhead - estimated yield: 200 KT), 38 SRAM, 20 B-28, 36 B-43/-61/-83 nuclear bombs, 128 500-lb Mk 82 or 36 2,000-lb Mk 84 conventional bombs. The B-52 will carry up to 20 ALCM.

The modernization of US strategic warning and control systems (land- and space-based) is proceeding.

The US Army is undergoing a period of reorganization. The armoured and mechanized divisions are being modernized; some of the infantry divisions are being converted to light divisions, and an experimental high-technology motorized division is being formed. The reorganization is affecting the Army Reserve structure, with a number of units being selected to form part of the existing Active structure when required. A parallel review of the weapons and communications components intended to replace older systems is also in progress. It is intended that there will be six distinct types of Army division, each with a somewhat different role and capability.

Deliveries continue to enhance and modernize US maritime and air capabilities. Three more Los Angeles-class SSN bring the 1 July total holdings to 29. A second Ticonderoga-class conventionally-powered guided-missile cruiser has joined the fleet; a third is expected later in 1985. Series production of the Perry-class guided missile frigate continues, with seven more entering service. A new class of destroyer (the DDG-51, Arleigh Burke) has been ordered.

Procurement scheduled over the longer term and funded also includes 6 more SSBN, 11 attack submarines, three carriers, 14 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and a number of amphibious warfare and support vessels. Of particular note is a revival of interest over the past few years in surface-based mine counter-measures vessels. The use of helicopters in this role is still important, as shown by purchases of additional aircraft for this purpose, but each has its own peculiar capabilities, and the two need to be used together as a team for optimum effect.

Naval air continues to see the replacement of the F-4 by the F-14 and the A-7 by the F-18. Greater range, and enhanced weapons loads improve the combat capability of the carrier based squadrons.

The Marine Corps will complete the upgrading of both the quality and quantity of its main amphibious vehicles, of its artillery support, and of its support aircraft.

The Air Force continues to modernize, introducing F-15 and F-16 to replace older types. Some of the displaced aircraft are being passed on to the Reserves, but the latter are also getting a few of the newer types. All the Services are aware that there is a danger that an all-volunteer force will be less capable of sustaining a long war than a nation which has a pool of former conscripts from which to draw. All have made considerable efforts to enhance their Reserve structures and continue to do so. Expanded training and administrative support programmes are helping to upgrade the numbers and capabilities of all Reserve components. There is still a shortfall, but it is less than it was.

US interest in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) continues, but this undertaking is still at the research stage. For the first time, both Houses of Congress have authorized funds for the manufacture of a new generation of chemical weapons, but with some qualifications. It remains to be seen whether the Administration will eventually produce binary chemical munitions.

US Defence Budget

The level of American defence expenditures is confusing to many, because several separate budgeting indices are used and because other agencies, apart from the Defense Department, administer parts of the defence programme. The budgetary or fiscal year begins on 1 October. Spending accounts have three denominations: Outlays are the actual expenditures (i.e. the cheques written during a given fiscal year); Budget Authority (BA) is the amount which may be committed to current and future outlays in a fiscal year, Total Obligational Authority (TOA) includes budget authority, obligations from previous fiscal years and other receipts (such as earned income, interest, etc). Less than 60% of outlays in any one year is obligated by the current year's budget authority. For example, $6 bn in budget authority was committed to build an aircraft carrier two years ago, but actual outlays will be made over a period of six years as the carrier is built. Hence the level of budget authority will indicate the level of both present and future outlays. Federal deficit calculations, however, are based on outlays.

The National Defense budgeting function includes spending administered by several departments and independent agencies. Total National Defense function outlays in 1984 ($227,413 bn) included the following spending categories: Department of Defense (DoD) ($220.84 bn), Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities ($6,120 bn), General Services Administration ($88 m), Central Intelligence Agency military activities ($86 m), Federal Emergency Management Agency ($240 m), Intelligence Community Staff ($16 m), and Selective Service System ($22 m). This does not include outlays on several other major programmes related to national security: International Security Assistance ($7,924 bn - administered by the Office of the President, the Treasury Department and the State Department), Veterans Administration Benefits ($25,614 bn), Foreign Economic and Financial Assistance ($4,478 bn) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ($7,048 bn) and the Coast Guard ($2,518 bn). The specific budgets of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and other intelligence activities are classified and are hidden within the National Defense budget function. It has been suggested that the intelligence budget is $16.5 bn.

The American defence budgetary process has three distinct parts: the Administration, or Executive Branch develops a budget proposal and sends it to Congress; Congress reviews and amends the budget as well as introducing legislation for levying taxes; the defence agencies spend their appropriations during the fiscal year. The DoD operates a five-year planning cycle. The Secretary of Defense issues the classified Defense Guidance which outlines overall US military strategy, gives guidance to the military services for their programmes, and, in its 'Fiscal Guidance', establishes the overall level of defence spending. The Services present their recommended programme and, with the Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget acting on behalf of the President, will prepare an overall programme and budget. The final Administration proposal year is due to begin. The proposal is outlined in the Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense and several other classified and unclassified supporting documents.

By statute, Congress must reconcile the entire federal budget in two budget resolutions which are debated in the House and Senate Budget Committees. Defence budgets must be written into law in an Authorization bill which originates in the Armed Services Committees, and funds to carry out the authorized programmes are granted in an Appropriations bill. Both the House and Senate must pass identical budget resolutions, authorizations and appropriations. The President may sign or veto either the Authorization or Appropriation bill (Congress can overrule a Presidential veto by a two-thirds majority of both Houses). But sometimes the process is amended. On occasion, the Congress has passed the Appropriations bill without an Authorization bill. Sometimes the Defense Authorization is provided by a continuing resolution.

Congress has increasingly tended to make reductions in the President's original submission. Budget authority and actual expenditure are obligated by the Department of Defense in the subsequent fiscal year. For FY 1984, Congress approved $231.0 bn outlays for the Department. Actual DoD expenditures in that year in fact totalled $220,860 bn, due to changes in prices estimates and contracts. For the current FY 1985, Congress approved $246,286 bn in outlays, but, if the spending patterns of the first eight months continue, actual FY 1985 outlays are likely to be $5-8 bn less.

The Reagan Administration came to office with a commitment to increase defence spending substantially after a period of little or negative growth immediately following the Vietnam war - although about 3% real growth was achieved during the Carter Presidency. (Defence expenditure, in constant 1980 dollars, is shown in the appropriate graph in the Analysis section at the end of the book.) Spending plans contained in the FY 1986 Budget project a 5% or higher real increase in both outlays and budget authority until 1990. In subsequent agreements between Administration and Congress the defence budget has been set to show zero growth in FY 1986, and 3% real growth will be hard to maintain towards the end of the decade:

Соединенные Штаты Америки

В течение последних двенадцати месяцев Соединенные Штаты вывели 11 МБР Titan II (еще 3 выведут к ноябрю 1985 года). Это снизило общую мощность МБР на 99 МТ. Пока еще не ясно, какое количество МБР МХ должно быть развернуто, ее развитие продолжается, с плановой начальной оперативной готовности (IOC) в декабре 1986 года. МБР Midgetman все еще находится на самой ранней стадии разработки концепции и не может быть развернута до 1990-х годов.

Число БРПЛ, однако, увеличились на 24 с введением шестой ПЛАРБ типа Ohio. Седьмая должна быть получена в октябре 1985 года, и эта поставка поставила бы США над потолком ракет с РГЧ ИН по ОСВ-2. Лодки Poseidon будут выведены из эксплуатации, чтобы предотвратить это. Цифра на 1 июля, однако, составляет 640 ракет на 37 ПЛАРБ, то есть увеличение за двенадцать месяцев 48 ракет. Нормальная полезная нагрузка боеголовки Poseidon составляет 10 MIRV, от 40 до 50 кт каждая. Trident C-4 несет 8 боеголовок по 100 кт. Поэтому нынешнее увеличение по сравнению с 1984 на 384 боеголовки, максимум на 38.4 МТ. Предполагаемая замена лодки Poseidon с седьмой Ohio будет означать дальнейшее увеличение на 8 ракет, увеличение количества РГЧ на 32 и увеличение запускаемых с подводных лодок мощности на 11.2 МТ. БРПЛ Trident D-5 (или Trident II) в разработке, с планируемыми поставками в 1989 году.

Во флотах B-52 и FB-111 существенных изменений нет. Тем не менее, первый из нового поколения стратегических бомбардировщиков, B-1B, был поставлен. В настоящее время первую эскадрилью из 16 самолетов планируется ввести в эксплуатацию в конце 1986 года. Три других эскадрилий и учебный элемент будет такой, чтобы в общей сложности было 100 самолетов; 51 остаются в заказе, а поставки ожидаются в размере 4 в месяц с сентября 1986 года. Этот самолет может нести три внутренние единые или смешанные ядерные нагрузки бомб свободного падения, AGM-69A SRAM и AGM-86B ALCM, плюс восемь подвесок снаружи. Максимальная единая нагрузка составит 22 ALCM (с боеголовкой W-80-1 - расчетная мощность: 200 KT), 38 SRAM, 20 B-28, 36 B-43/-61/-83 ядерные бомбы, 128 500-фунтовых Mk 82 или 36 2000-фунтовых Mk 84 обычных бомб. B-52 будет нести до 20 ALCM.

Продолжается модернизация американских систем стратегического предупреждения и управления (наземного и космического базирования).

Армия США переживает период реорганизации. Модернизируются бронетанковая и механизированная дивизии, часть пехотных дивизий переформируется в легкие дивизии, формируется опытная высокотехнологичная моторизованная дивизия. Реорганизация влияет на структуру резервной армии, с количеством выбранных в рамках существующей структуры Active при необходимости единиц. Параллельно проводится изучение компонентов вооружений и связи, призванных заменить старые системы. Предполагается, что будет шесть различных типов армейских дивизий, каждая из которых будет иметь несколько иную роль и возможности.

Поставки продолжают укреплять и модернизировать морской и воздушный потенциал США. Три ПЛА Los Angeles принятые до 1 июля довели их общее число до 29. К флоту присоединился второй ракетный крейсер типа Ticonderoga с обычным двигателем, третий ожидается позднее в 1985 году. Серийное производство ракетных фрегатов типа Perry продолжается и более семи введено в эксплуатацию. Был заказан новый тип эсминцев (DDG-51, Arleigh Burke).

Закупки, запланированные на более длительный срок и финансируемые также, включают еще 6 ПЛАРБ, 11 ударных подводных лодок, 3 авианосца, 14 крейсеров типа Ticonderoga и ряд десантных военных и вспомогательных судов. Особо следует отметить возрождение в последние несколько лет интереса к надводным противоминным средствам. Использование вертолетов в этой роли по-прежнему важно, о чем свидетельствуют закупки дополнительных вертолетов для этой цели, но каждый из них обладает своими особыми возможностями, и оба компонента должны использоваться вместе как команда для достижения оптимального эффекта.

Военно-морская авиация продолжает замену F-4 на F-14 и A-7 на F-18. Большой ассортимент, и усиленное вооружение улучшает боеспособность авианосных эскадрилий.

Корпус морской пехоты завершит модернизацию как качества, так и количества своих основных машин-амфибий, артиллерийского обеспечения и вспомогательных самолетов.

Военно-воздушные силы продолжают модернизацию, внедряя F-15 и F-16 для замены старых типов. Некоторые из снятых самолетов передаются в резерв, но последние также получают несколько новых типов. Все службы осознают, что существует опасность того, что силы, состоящие из добровольцев, будут в меньшей степени способны выдержать длительную войну, чем нация, имеющая резерв бывших призывников. Все они приложили значительные усилия для укрепления своих резервных структур и продолжают делать это. Расширенные программы профессиональной подготовки и административной поддержки помогают увеличить численность и расширить возможности всех резервных компонентов. По-прежнему существует дефицит, но он меньше, чем был.

Интерес США к стратегической оборонной инициативе (SDI) продолжается, но это начинание все еще находится на стадии исследования. Впервые обе палаты Конгресса санкционировали выделение средств на производство химического оружия нового поколения, но с некоторыми оговорками. Еще предстоит выяснить, будет ли администрация в конечном счете производить бинарные химические боеприпасы.

Оборонный бюджет США

Уровень американских оборонных расходов многих смущает, потому что используется несколько отдельных бюджетных индексов и потому что другие учреждения, помимо Министерства обороны, управляют частями оборонной программы. Бюджетный или финансовый год начинается 1 октября. Счета расходов имеют три наименования: расходы - фактические расходы (т. е. расходы, выписанные в течение данного финансового года); Бюджетные полномочия (BA) - это сумма, которая может быть выделена на текущие и будущие расходы в финансовом году, общие долговые обязательства (TOA) включает бюджетный орган, обязательства предыдущих финансовых лет и другие поступления (такие как заработанные доходы, проценты и т. д.). Менее 60% расходов в течение одного года приходится на бюджетные полномочия текущего года. Например, два года назад на строительство авианосца было выделено $6 млрд бюджетных средств, но фактические расходы будут производиться в течение шести лет по мере строительства авианосца. Таким образом, объем бюджетных полномочий будет определять объем как нынешних, так и будущих расходов. Однако расчеты федерального дефицита основаны на расходах.

Бюджетная функция национальной обороны включает расходы, управляемые несколькими департаментами и независимыми учреждениями. Общая функция национальных оборонных издержек в 1984 году ($227,413 млрд) включает следующие категории расходов: Министерства обороны (МО) ($220.84 млрд.), Министерства энергетики атомной энергетики оборонной деятельности ($6,120 млрд.), общие административные услуги ($88 млн.), Центрального разведывательного управления военной деятельности ($86 млн), Федерального агентства чрезвычайных ситуаций ($240 млн.), разведывательное сообщество сотрудников ($16 млн), и выборочного обслуживание системы ($22 млн). Это не считая расходов на несколько других крупных программ, связанных с национальной безопасностью: международная безопасность помощи ($7,924 млрд - в ведении Канцелярии Президента, Министерство финансов и Государственный департамент), управление по делам льгот ветеранов ($25,614 млрд), в иностранной экономической и финансовой помощи ($4,478 млрд) Национального управления по аэронавтике и исследованию космического пространства США ($7,048 млрд) и береговой охраны ($2,518 млрд). Конкретные бюджеты Центрального разведывательного управления, оборонного разведывательного управления, Агентства национальной безопасности и других видов разведывательной деятельности засекречены и скрыты в рамках функции бюджета национальной обороны. Предполагается, что бюджет разведки составляет $16,5 млрд.

Американский оборонный бюджетный процесс состоит из трех отдельных частей: администрация или исполнительная власть разрабатывает бюджетное предложение и направляет его в Конгресс; Конгресс рассматривает и вносит поправки в бюджет, а также вводит законодательство о взимании налогов; оборонные ведомства расходуют свои ассигнования в течение финансового года. МО осуществляет пятилетний цикл планирования. Министр обороны издает секретное руководство по обороне, в котором излагается общая военная стратегия США, дается руководство военным службам для их программ и в своем "бюджетном руководстве" устанавливает общий уровень расходов на оборону. Службы представляют свою рекомендованную программу и совместно с министром обороны и Управлением по вопросам управления и бюджета, действующим от имени Президента, готовят общую программу и бюджет. Должен начаться год окончательного предложения администрации. Это предложение изложено в ежегодном докладе министра обороны и ряде других секретных и несекретных вспомогательных документов.

По закону Конгресс должен согласовать весь федеральный бюджет в двух бюджетных резолюциях, которые обсуждаются в Палате представителей и сенатских бюджетных комитетах. Оборонные бюджеты должны быть законодательно закреплены в законопроекте о полномочиях, который принимается комитетами по делам вооруженных сил, а средства на осуществление утвержденных программ выделяются в законопроекте об ассигнованиях. И Палата представителей, и Сенат должны принимать одинаковые бюджетные резолюции, разрешения и ассигнования. Президент может подписать или наложить вето либо авторизации и законопроекта (Конгресс может отменить президентское вето большинством в две трети голосов обеих палат). Но иногда процесс корректируется. Иногда Конгресс принимает законопроект об ассигнованиях без соответствующего разрешения. Иногда разрешение на защиту предоставляется на основании постоянного решения.

Конгресс все чаще склонялся к сокращению первоначального представления Президента. Бюджетные полномочия и фактические расходы возлагаются на Министерство обороны в следующем финансовом году. По итогам 1984, Конгресс одобрил расходы $231.0 млрд. Фактические расходы Минобороны в этом году фактически составили $220,860 млрд, что связано с изменением ценовых оценок и контрактов. На текущий финансовый год 1985, Конгресс одобрил 246,286 млрд долл. в расходах, но, если структуры расходов первых восьми месяцев и далее, фактические расходы за 1985, вероятно, будут на 5-8 млрд долл. меньше.

Администрация Рейгана пришла к власти с обязательством существенно увеличить расходы на оборону после периода небольшого или отрицательного роста сразу после войны во Вьетнаме, хотя реальный рост был достигнут во время президентства Картера около 3%. (Расходы на оборону в постоянных долларах 1980 года показаны на соответствующей диаграмме в аналитическом разделе в конце книги.) Планы расходов содержатся в проекте бюджета на 1986 финансовый год 5% или выше реальное увеличение как расходов так и бюджетных полномочий вплоть до 1990 года. В последующих соглашениях между администрацией и конгрессом оборонный бюджет должен был показать нулевой рост в 1986 финансовом году, и 3% реального роста будет трудно сохранить к концу десятилетия:

THE UNTIED STATES
GDP 1983: $3,256.5 bn. 1984: $3,619.2 bn.
GDP growth 1983: 3.7%.1984: 6.8%.
Inflation 1983: 3.2%.1984: 4.3%.
Debt 1984: $340.0 bn.
Def budget 1984: $258.2 bn; NATO defn $250,011 bn.
Population: 239,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 27,300,000; 31-45: 25,740,000.

Women: 18-30: 26,800,000; 31-45: 26,300,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,151,568 (200,400).

Terms of Service: voluntary.
Active Reserves: 1,212,255 (? 121,300 women).

Army National Guard 443,255; Navy 256,800; Marines 43,900; Air National Guard 107,900.

Army Reserve 285,600; Air Force Reserve 74,800.
Individual Ready Reserves: 440,900.

Army 276,700; Navy 66,000; Marines 48,000; Air 40,700; Coast Guard 9,500.
Other (Stand by/Retired): 678,984.

Army 2,000; Navy 11,484; Marines 43,600; Air 618,800; Coast Guard 3,100.

A proportion of these (?120,000) have duties assigned on mobilization, and others would be suitable for duty.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: * (*Manpower incl in Army, Navy, AirForce totals.)
Offensive:
(a) Navy: 640 SLBM in 37 SSBN.
SSBN:

5 Ohio with 24 Trident I/C-4: (144msls) (1 more to be delivered late 1985).

19 Lafayette, 12 Franklin: 12x16 Trident I/C-4 (192msls) 19x16 UGM-73A Poseidon C-3 (304msls) (1 out of service in late 1985).

(On order. 6 Ohio SSBN; 168 Trident I/C-4 msls.)
(b) Strategic Air Command (SAC): 2 Air Forces. 12 divs (1 trg/spt).
ICBM: 1,026 (to be 1,023 by Oct 1985). 9 strategic msl wings (24 sqns), each 5 launch control centres, each controlling 10 msls.

3 wings (9 sqns) with 450 Minuteman II (LGM-30F).

3 wings (11 sqns) with 550 Minuteman III (LGM-30G) (3 MIRV).

3 wings (4 sqns) with 26 Titan II (LGM-25C) (planned 23 by Oct 1985; out by Nov 1987).

(On order 48 MX (10 MIRV); (10 to be deployed from late 1986)).
Aircraft: some 348 combat ac (eqpt: see p. 12); 18 bomb wings (1 trg).
Bbrs: 297.
Long-range: 241.

4 wings (4 sqns) with 90 B-52H (1 wing with B-1B(1) from mid-1985).

7 wings (8 sqns) with 151 B-52G: 5 sqns (90 ac) with ALCM; 3 sqns (61 ac) with Harpoon (non-nuc).
Medium-range: 56.

2 wings (5 sqns, 1 trg) with FB-111 A.
Recce: 24.

3 wings: 4 sqns: 1 with 9 SR-71A/B, T-38A; 1 with 7 U-2CT/R; 2 with 6 TR-1A (mainly tacrole), 2 TR-1B (trg).
Comd: 41.

6 sqns: 1 with 4 E-4A/B (converting to E-4B); 5 with 21 EC-135A/C/G/L, 16 RC-135.
Tanker: 646.

2 Regular gps, 5 wings, 34 sqns (1 trg): 32 sqns with 487 KC-135, 2 with 31 KC-10A. 13 Air National Guard (104 ac);

3 Air Force Reserve (24 ac).
Defensive:
Space Command: HQ, Colorado Springs; comds incl North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD),

a joint US-Cdn org(HQ: Cheyenne Mountain, USA).
Warning Systems:
1. ICBM, SLBM, satellites:
(a) Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS):
(i) Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC).

NORAD Combat Operation HQ, Cheyenne Mountain. Tracking, indentification, cataloguing of all space objects; command,

control and communications to all space associated commands and agencies; Surveillance, protection, countering of satellites.

(Replacement facility nearing completion.)
(ii) Satellites. Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS): Defense Meteorological Satellites (Defense Support Program).

TRW Block 647: 1 each over Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; infra-red surveillance and warning system.

Control and tracking stations at Guam, Pine Gap and Nurrungar (Australia) (to get 6 mobile ground terminals).
(iii) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). USAF 474N system with 3 stations: Clear, Alaska (AN/FPS-50, AN/FPS-92);

Thule, Greenland (AN/FPS-50, AN/FPS-49A); Fylingdales Moor, England (AN/FPS-50, -49,being upgraded).

12 radars detect and track satellites, ICBM and IRBM. 4,800-km range.
(iv) Spacetrack. USAF 496L system. FPS-17 detection, FPS-79 tracking radars at Pirinclik (Turkey);

Cobra Dane, Shemya; FPS-85, BMEWS at Clear, Thule and Fylingdales;

optical tracking systems in New Mexico, California, at St Margarets (NB, Canada), Pulmosan (S. Korea), San Vito (Italy), Maui (Hawaii),

Mount John (New Zealand).
(v) Cobra Dane. Phased-array radar system at Shemya, Aleutians: 120* arc, range to 46,000 km, augments BMEWS in Alaska.

(Cobra Judy, a Pacific-based, shipborne phased-array radar (SPQ-11), supplements Shemya and research programmes, but is not part of SPADATS

and has no early warning function. Cobra Ball, a RC-135 airborne system, supports both.)
(vi) Pacific Radar Barrier (PACBAR). Detection and tracking radars: 1 site at San Miguel, Philippines, 1at Kwajalein Atoll, third tobe determined.
(vii) Alternate Space Defense Center. 1 FPS-85 and 1 AN/FSS-7 station in Florida. Linked to Spacetrack and NAVSPASUR (see below)

through NORAD HQ; also to identify and track fractional-orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). (To be retired when Pave Paws completed.)
(b) USN Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR). 9 field stations in south-east US (3 transmitting, 6 receiving sites and civilian agencies).
(c) Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS). 1 north-facing phased-array system (130* arc, 2,800-km range)

at Grand Forks ND. Identifies and tracks individual re-entry vehicles, incl SLBM, in Central US, Arctic Ocean areas.

(Was Army Safeguard system support; to be enhanced.)
(d) Miscellanous radars. US Army: Kwajalein Atoll (Pacific). USAF: Ascension Island (Atlantic), Antigua (Caribbean), Kaena Point (Hawaii);

MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Westford, Mass.
(e) Under development: Ground-based ElectroOptical Deep Space Surveillance system (GEODSS):

White Sands NM, Taegu (S. Korea) and Maui (Hawaii); 2 more planned, 1 in Portugal, onein Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia).
(f) Integrated Operational Nuclear Detonation Detection System (IONDS). Detects and assesses nuclear detonations;

linked to 18 NAVSTAR global positioning system satellites (8 now in service; 18 by 1988).

Nuclear test ban monitoring and intelligence collection, potential damage assessment.
2. SLBM:

Pave Paws system. 1 phased-array radar (AN/FPS-115) each in Massachusetts and California; 5,500-km range.

1 building in Georgia, 1 more planned in Texas.
3. Intermittent programmed recce and EUNT satellites incl:
(a) USAF: KH-8, KH-9 low-altitude, film return.
(b) Big Bird,Hitch Hiker medium-altitude.
(c) USN: Ocean Surveillence (osus). 4 satellites to detect ships by infra-red and radar.
(d) CIA: KH-11 digital imagery.
(e) Rhyolite/Chalet (TELINT).
4. Anti-air (aircraft, cruise missile):
(a) Over-the-horizon-backscatter (OTH-B) radar system. Range 900 km (min)to 3,800 km; allaltitude capability planned.

One chain (3 sites: transmit, receive, control) in Maine, arc of cover under evaluation (to be operational 1987);

1 planned for Oregon/N. California, another under consideration for southernUS.
(b) Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line (under comd TAC).

31 AN/FPS-19/-30 radars (21 in Canada, 4 in Greenland, 1 in Scotland; 2 in Iceland being reopened) roughly along the 70*N parallel from Point Lay,

Alaska to Greenland, then to Iceland and Scotland; range to 320 km at 12,000 m.

To be replaced (with Pinetree Line) by end-1985 by 'North Warning System':

52 ground radar stations with 13 Seek Igloo FPS-117 automated (minimally attended radar (MAR)) systems (11 in Canada) and

39 unmanned short-range radar in Canada.
(c) CADTN/Pinetree Line: 24 stations in southern Canada (to close).
(d) Tactical Air Command (TAC):
(i) US-Cdn Joint Surveillance System (JSS). 7 Region Operations Control Centers (ROCC): 5 in US (1 in Alaska), 2 in Canada.

5 E-3A AWACS ac assigned (1 to each US ROCC).
(ii) Radars. 60 in US (14 in Alaska), 24 in Canada: for co-ordination/control with Federal Aviation Authority facilities of military and civil air traffic,

surveillance and tracking of objects in high- and medium altitude trans-polar flight.
(iii) Aircraft: 252 (not incl Cdn CF-101).
(a) Regular 90 (AD only): 4 air divs: 5 sqns: 4 with 72 F-15(8 AAM); 1 with 18 F-106.
(b) Air National Guard (ANG): 162: 11 sqns (1 forming): 7 with 126 F-4C/D (8 AAM); 1 with F-15; 3 with 36 F-106, T-33 (trg) (to get 144 F-15).
(c) Tactical Air Force augmentation: ac on call from naval, marine and air forces.
(d) Iceland: 1 sqn (see Forces Abroad).
AAM: Super Falcon, Sidewinder, Sparrow.

ARMY: 780,648 (75,500 women).
6 Army HQ, 6 Corps HQ (1 AB).
4 armd divs (6 tk, 5 mech inf bns).
6 mech divs (4 tk, 6 mech inf, 4 arty, 1 hel, 1 SAM, 1 armd cav bns; spt units).*
2 inf divs* (to be lt divs; 1 new div to form by 1986-7).*
(* 1 National Guard bde is incorporated in each of 1 armd, 2 mech and 2 inf divs.)
2 lt inf divs (1 forming; 10,220 men, 3 regular bdes).
(1 high-technology motor inf div forming.)
1 air assault div (3 bdes each 3 bns; 3 arty bns, avn gp: 4 bns, 1 attack, 3 tpt.
1 AB div: 3 bdes (each 3 para bns); 4 arty, 1 armed hel bns, 1 armd cav sqn.
9 arty bdes.
5 AA arty bdes.
1 indep armd bde.
4 indep inf bdes.
1 indep air cav combat bde (hel-borne ATK).
3 armd cav regts.
Special Operations Command (9,100):

4 Special Forces gps (8 bns: 4 Regular, 2 National Guard, 2 Reserve).

Delta Force, attack hel and tpt gp.

1 Ranger inf regt (3 bns).

1 Psychological Warfare gp (3 bns).

1 Civil Affairs bn.
4 Pershing (I/II) SSM bns (1 trg).
8 Lance SSM bns (in corps arty).
3 Patriot SAM bns to be 6 btys each 8 launchers, 4 msls; planned total 13 1/2 bns (81 btys, 103 fire units, 6,200 msls).
Army Avn:

1 Gp (4 bns; 60 attack, 200 tpt and utility hel).

1 air assault bde, indep bns and dets, mixed types of eqpt, assigned to HQ for tac, tpt and medical duties.
Tks: 13,423: 1,703 M-48A5, 1,535 M-60, 7,352 M-60A3, 2,833 M-1 Abrams.
AFV: some 21,650: MICV: some 2,150 M-2/-3 Bradley;

APC: some 19,500, incl 3,100 M-577, 2,150 M-901 with TOW, 12,300 M-113 (some with mor, TOW).
Arty: how: 5,250: some 1,100 M-102 105mm and M-114 155mm, 900 M-198 155mm towed, 3,250 M-109 155mm and M-110A1/A2 203mm SP;

MRL: 177 MLRS 227mm; mor: 7,400: 3,200 81mm, 4,200 107mm;

SSM: 222: some 50 Pershing IA, some 100 -II, 72 Lance launchers.
ATK: RCL: 1,000 90mm and 106mm; ATGW: some 600 Hellfire, 6,000 TOW, 10,000 Dragon launchers.
AD: guns: 220 M-l67 Vulcan towed, 380 M-163 20mm, 86 DIVAD 40mm SP;

SAM: Redeye, FIM-92A Stinger, 400 M-54 and M-48 SP Chaparral, 31 Roland SP, Nike Hercules, Improved HAWK, 33 Patriot (9 launchers),

8 Rapier.
Amph: combat spt craft: 268.
Avn: ac: some 522 incl 98 OV-1D, 9 RU-21, 19 C-7, 114 C-12D, 37 U-3, 50 U-8, 10 UV-18A (DHC-6), 129 U-21A; 2 T-41, 54 T-42;

hel: some 8,800 incl some 900 AH-1G/Q, 900 AH-1S, some 11 AH-64A Apache, 3,600 UH-1 (being replaced),

594 UH-60A (40 to be EH-60A ECM on conversion), 392 CH-47A/B/C, 61 -D, 63 CH-54, 369 OH-6A, 1,784 OH-58A/D.
AAM: MIM-92A Stinger.
Trg: ac: incl about 50 T-42; hel: 250 TH-55A.
(On order 1,635 M-1 Abrams MBT; 750 M-2/-3 Bradley MICV (total 6,882 planned), 120 M-109A2/A3 155mm, M-110A2 203mm SP how;

860 M-252 81mm mor; 39 MLRS MRL; 20,000 TOW, some 50 Pershing II SSM; Stinger, Rapier, 113 Roland, 300 Chaparral,

12 Patriot SAM launchers, 440 msls; 6 RC-12D ac; 11 AH-1S, 11 CH/MH-53, some 148 AH-64A, 248 UH-60A, 11 EH-60D Quickfix,

16 OH-58D hel; 3,971 Hellfire ATGW (ASM); 282 assault boats.)

DEPLOYMENT: Continental United States (CONUS) (incl Alaska, Hawaii and Canal Zone):
Strategic Reserve:
(i) US Readiness Command (REDCOM): 2 corps HQ, all CONUS-based active units.
(ii) Initial reinforcement, Europe: 1 corps HQ, 2 armd, 3 mech, 2 inf divs, 1 inf bde, 1 armd cav regt.

(1 armd, 2 mech divs, 1 armd cav regt have hy eqpt stockpiled in FRG. Storage facilities for 3 more divs beingbuilt.)
(iii) US Central Command (USCENTCOM): (1,100): forces, incl naval and air, apportioned for planning purposes.

Full deployment could involve 290,600 assigned from existing units and support elements on mobilization.

HQ: 1 army; 1 corps (131,000): 1 mech (-), 1 AB, 1 air assault divs, 1 air cav bde, special forces, Rangers.

Naval Force: 1: (112,300 incl 70,000 Marines): 3 carrier battle gps; 1 surface action gp; 3 amph ready gps (3-5 amph ships); 5 ASW patrol sqns;

13 (to be 17) prepositioned spt ships.

Marine Force: l 1/3 Amph Forces (MAF) (1 div, 1 air wing, 1 Force service spt gp),

1 Marine Amph Bde (MAB: 1 regt landing team, 1 air gp, 1 bde service spt gp).

Air Force: 1: (33,000): 1 div: 2 bbr wings (4 sqns) B-52H; 9 wings and 2 gps tac fighters; 3 wings and 1 gp strat and 1 tac recce;

1 airborne warning and control div, strategic and SAR, tac airlift, 1 refuelling sqn (KC-135A/KC-10A).
(iv) Alaska: (7,650): 1 inf bde (plus 1 res inf gp (5 bns: to become lt div)).
(v) Panama: (9,330): 1 inf bde (6,600); Naval sqn (490): patrol boats; Marines (155); 1 air div (2,100): A-7, C-130 ac.
(vi) Hawaii: (18,900): WESTCOM: 1 inf div less 1 bde (plus 1 res bde). (See also Forces Abroad, below.)

RESERVES:
(i) Army National Guard: 443,255 (22,500 women); 3,285 units; capable after mobilization of manning 10 divs:

2 armd, 2 mech, 5 hy inf, (1 lt inf div: 2 inf bdes forming);

17 indep bdes (3 armd, 6 mech, 8 inf),

5 'Roundout' bdes to complete regular army divs;

4 armd cav regts,

1 inf gp (Arctic recce, 5 scout/mech bns);

20 fd arty bde HQ:

2 Special Forces gps (6 bns: 2 with Regulars).

Indep bns: 5 tk, 2 mech, 50 arty, 4 ATK (TOW), 9 AD (1 Roland SAM, 8 M-42 40mm SPAA arty), 62 engr, 23 sigs, 141 other spt bns,

760 minor units to fill regular formations. 105 air units, 150 sections; 2,580 ac.
(ii) Army Reserve: 285,600 (46,500 women); 3,410 units;

12 trg divs,

3 trg bdes (1 cav, 1 fd arty, 1 police).

Indep combat bdes: 1 mech, 2 inf;

67 indep bns, incl 1 tk, 2 inf, 15 arty, 33 engr.

2 Special Forces gps (6 bns: 2 with Regulars);

3,225 coys and dets; 130 indep air units and sections with 566 ac.

NAVY: 568,781 (48,200 women): 4 Fleets: 4 cruise-missile, 95 attack subs, 213 principal surface combatants.

A further 35 major surface combat ships are in active reserve and storage.
Subs, cruise-missile (SSGN): 4.

3 Los Angeles with Harpoon SSM; 1 Sturgeon. All have 8 Tomahawk SSM.
Subs, Attack: 95:

Nuclear (SSN): 91 (79 with SUBROC, to be fitted with Harpoon and Tomahawk):

29 Los Angeles with Harpoon; 1 Lipscomb; 1 Narwhal; 37 Sturgeon (2 deep SAR spt); 13 Thresher, 2 Allen; 5 Skipjack; 3 Skate.

Diesel (SS): 4: 3 Barbel, 1 Tang.
Subs, Other roles: 2: 1 Tullibee, 1 Seawolf.
Aircraft carriers: 14: (1 trg).
Nuclear (CVN): 4: 3 Nimitz (91,400 tons) (1 on refit); 1 Enterprise (89,600 tons).
Conventional (CV): 10 (1 trg): 3 Kitty Hawk (78/80,800 tons); 1 Kennedy (82,000 tons); 4 Forrestal (76/79,000 tons) (incl 1 on refit);

2 Midway (51/62,000 tons); 1 (Lexington) trg, no ac assigned.
13 normally carry 1 air wing (70-95 ac) of 2 ftr sqns (with 24 F-14A, incl 3 RF-14 recce, or (2 Midway-class only) 24 F-4N/S),

3 attack (2 lt with F/A-18 or 24 A-7E, 1 med with 10 A-6E), 2 ASW (1 with 10 S-3A ac, 1 with 6 SH-3H hel), 1 ECM with 4 EA-6B,

1 AEW with 4 E-2C; 4 KA-6D tankers, 1 lt tpt ac.)
Principal Surface Combatants: 200.
Battleships (BBG): 2 Iowa with 4x4 Harpoon, 4x2 Tomahawk SSM.
Cruisers: 29:
Nuclear-powered GW (CGN): 9 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM:

4 Virginia with 2x2 Standard/ASROC SAM/ASW, 1 SH-2F hel (SH-60B Seahawk to replace);

2 California with 2x1 Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC ASW;

1 Truxtun with 1x2 Standard/ASROC, 1 SH-2F hel;

1 Long Beach with 2x2 Standard/Terrier SAM, 1x8 ASROC;

1 Bainbridge with 2x2 Standard, 1x8 ASROC.
GW (CG): 20 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM:

2 Ticonderoga (CG-47) (1 more in 1985) (to get Tomahawk SSM), 2x2 Standard/ASROC, 2 SH-2F hel;

9 Belknap with 1x2 Standard/Terrier, 1 SH-2D LAMPS hel;

9 Leahy with 2x2 Standard/Terrier.
Destroyers: 68:
GW (DDG): 37:

4 Kidd with 2x4 Harpoon, 2x2 Standard, 2x8 ASROC, 2 SH-2F hel;

21 with 2x4 Harpoon, 1x8 ASROC (8 Coontz with 1x10 Standard, 13 Adams with 1x2 or 1 Tartar SAM);

12 with ASROC (2 Coontz with 1x2 Standard, 10 Adams with 1x2 or 1 Tartar SAM).
Gun/ASW (DD): 31 Spruance (DD-963) with 2x4 Harpoon, 1x8 Sea Sparrow, 1x8 ASROC, 1 SH-3 or 2 SH-2F hel (to get Tomahawk SSM).
Frigates: 101:
GW (FFG): 48:

42 Perry with 1 Harpoon/Standard, 2 SH-2/-60 hel;

6 Brooke with 1 Tartar/Standard, 1x8 ASROC, 1 SH-2F hel.
Gun (FF): 53 with 1x8 ASROC:

40 Knox (FF-1052) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM (30 with Sea Sparrow Mk 5 BPDMS, 1 with Sea Sparrow Mk 29 SAM, 2 SH-2F hel);

10 Garcia; 1 Glover, 2 Bronstein.
Minor Surface Combatants: some 89.
Patrol craft: GW hydrofoils: 6 Pegasus with 2x4 Harpoon; inshore/river some 80 (most in reserve).
MCMV: 3 Aggressive ocean minesweepers; 7 inshore (boats).
Amph Forces: 61 ships, 54 craft.
Ships: 61:

comd (LCC): 2 Blue Ridge;

LHA: 5 Tarawa with 4 LCU and mix of AV-8A ac (4 only) or 12 CH-46, 4 CH-53, 3 UH-1N, 4 AH-1T hel;

LPH: 7 Iwo Jima (mix of 6 AV-8A, 4 OV-10 ac or 2 CH-46, 10 CH-53, 1 UH-1N hel);

LPD: 11 Austin, 2 Raleigh;

LSD: 11: 1 Whidbey, 5 Anchorage, 5 Thomaston (retiring);

LST: 18 Newport;

LKA (amph cargo ships): 5 Charleston.
Craft: 54: 51 Type 1610, 3 Type 1466; many smaller (LCM-5/-6, LCVP incl 2 landing craft air cushion (LCAC)); others with US Army.
Special Warfare Groups: 2: 6 sea/land/air teams, 2 special boat sqns; 62 boats/patrol craft.
Principal auxiliary ships: 80:

12 ammunition, 7 stores, 4 fast sealift, 14 oilers, 9 destroyer tenders, 12 sub tenders, 4 repair, 15 salvage/rescue, 2 comd, 1 hospital.
Military Sealift Command: 68: 1 ammunition ship, 19 stores, 22 oil, 3 gasoline, 2 ocean surveillance, 7 oceanographic, 5 missile intrumentation, 9 survey.

Chartered: 14 cargo (being replaced by 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships), 6 tanker, 4 research, 1fleet service.
Ships in active reserve and storage incl 5 SSN, 4 CV, 2 battleships to be reactivated, 3 cruisers, 3 DDG, 9 DD, 2 LSD, 3 LST, log spt, 10 troopships.

National Defense Reserve Fleet (NRF): 1 DD, 1 FFG,6 FF, 2 LST.

Ready Reserve Force: 4 dry cargo ships, 8 other vessels (579 govt-owned cargo ships and tankers could be used for auxiliary sea-lift).
Ships on refit (incl Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)) incl

6 SSBN (5 more planned to 1987), 11 SSN (3 Los Angeles, 4 Sturgeon, 2 Thresher, 2 Allen),

2 CV, 3 CGN, 5 DDG, 5 DD, 1 FFG, 8 FF, 1 LPH, 1 LPD, 3 LST.
Missiles:
ASW, nuclear RUR-5 ASROC, UUM-44 SUBROC.
SSM: Standard (SM-1), RGM-84 Harpoon, BGM-109B Tomahawk SLCM.
SAM: Standard, RIM-7 Sea Sparrow, RIM-24 Tartar, RIM-2 Terrier, RIM-66 (SM-1), -C (SM-2, -2MR), -67(SM-1), -67B (SM-2ER).
(Authorized and funded: 5 SSBN, 18 SSN, 3 CVN, 1 BBG, 14 Ticonderoga CG-47, 1 DDG-51, 7 FFG, 10 MCMV, 1 landing helicopter dock ship (LHD),

5 LSD, 14 landing craft (3 standard, 10 LCAC, Seafox special warfare craft), 7 fleet oilers, 24 supply, 4 salvage shrps;

124 BGM-109 Tomahawk, 315 Harpoon SSM, 1,100 Standard SAM, 37 Phalanx, 321 Sea Sparrow AD systems.)

NAVAL AVIATION: 13 attack carrier airwings.
Ftr: 24 sqns: 22 with F-14A; 2 with F-4A/N/S.
FGA: 37 sqns: 13 med with A-6E, KA-6D (tanker); 22 lt with A-7E;2 with F-18A (2 more to form 1985).
ECM: 2 ELINT sqns with EA-3, EP-3; 9 EWng sqns with EA-6B.
MR: 26 land-based sqns with P-3B, P-3C, P-3CIII.
ASW: 11 sqns with S-3A.
AEW: 12 sqns with E-2C.
Comd: 2 sqns with C-130Q (TACAMO).
Misc: 17 spt sqns with C-130F, LC-130F/R, EC-130G/Q, C-1A, C-2A, CT-39, C-131, C-117, UC-12B ac;andhel(see below).
Trg: 2 aggressor sqns with F-5E/F, A-4, T-38; 1 trg sqn with TF-18A; 16 with T-2B/C, T-28,T-34C, T-39D, T-44 ac; and hel (see below).
OCU: 18: 5 ftr/strike (2 with F-14, 1 with TA-4F/J, 1 with F-18, 1 with F-4); 6 attack with TA-7C, A-7E, A-6; 2 EWng with EA-3;

2 MR with P-3B/C; 2 AEW with E-2B/C; 1 ASW withS-3A.
(Other ac incl 35F/A-18.)
Hel:
ASW: 17 sqns: 2 with SH-60B (LAMPS* Mk 3); 6 with SH-2F (LAMPS Mk 1); 9 with SH-3D/H. (* LAMPS= Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System.)
MCM: 2 sqns with RH-53D, MH-53E.
OCU: 4 with SH-2/-3.
Misc: spt sqns with SH-3, UH-46.
Trg: sqns with TH-57A, TH/UH-1E.
Equipment: some 1,350 combat ac, some 160 combat hel.

F-14A: 300 (210 ftr, 30 recce, 60 ocu).

F-4A/N/S: 68 (48 ftr, 20 OCU).

F/A-18: 84: (44 FGA (12 with Navy Reserve), 25 ocu, 15 TF-18A trg).

F-5A: 25 (trg).

T-38: 25 (trg).

A-4/TA-4F/J (18 OCU; trg).

A-6: 166: 120 -E (FGA, OCU); 35 EA-6B (ECM); 11 KA-6D (tanker).

A-7E: 288 (FGA); TA-7C (OCU).

E-2C: 82: 48 (AEW); 34 -B/C (OCU).

EA-3: 11 (ECM).

P-3: 270: 45-B (MR); 40-B/C (OCU); 173 -C/CIII (MR); 12 EP-3 (ECM). (30 to convert to CP-3A tpt.)

S-3A: 110 (ASW).

F-21A: 3(trg).

C-130: 34: 7 -Q (comd); 13 -F/LC-130F/R (misc); 14EC-130G (misc).

C-1: 44: 34 -A(misc); 10 C-1A/C-2 (misc).

CT-39: 9 (misc). C-l 17 (C-47): 4 (misc).

C-9B (DC-9): 88 (tpt). UC-12A: 39 (misc). T-2/B/C: (trg). US-3 (tpt). T-28: (trg). T-34C: 210 (trg). T-39: (trg). T-44: (trg).
Hel:

RH-53D: 23(MCM).

SH-60B: 29(ASW).

SH-2F: 63 (ASW, ocu).

SH-3D/H: 66 (ASW, OCU; to be replaced by SH-60F).

TH-57/A: 112(trg). T/UH-1L: (trg).
Msls:
AAM: Sparrow,AIM-54A/C Phoenix, Sidewinder.
ASM: Standard ARM, Shrike, AGM-88A HARM (anti-radiation); Walleye, Harpoon.
(On order 24 F-14C/N firs, 38 A-6E attack, 6 E-2C AEW, 6 P-3CMR, 8 EA-6B ECM, 38 C-2A tpt, 15 Citation T-47A; 18 F-21A (Kfir) ftr/trg,

12 Hawk trg, 8 KA-6D tanker conversion; 2 C-130Q comd ac;44 SH-2F, some 8 MH-53 MCM, some 13 SH-60B, 108 TH-57C trg hel;

108 AIM-54C AAM, 190 AGM-65F Maverick, 350 HARM ASM, 108 Harpoon SSM.)

DEPLOYMENT AND BASES (average strengths of major combat ships, incl ships on refit):
Atlantic (Second Fleet): 34 SSBN, 50 attack subs, 4 carriers, 93 principal surface combatants, 24 amph.

Bases: Norfolk (HQ),Mayport, Roosevelt Roads (Puerto Rico), Charleston, New London, Newport, New York (Staten Island), Boston, NewOrleans,

Bangor, KingsBay.
Eastern Pacific (Third Fleet): 3 SSBN, some 25 SSN, 4 carriers, 72 principal surface combatants, 26 amph, 32 spt.

Bases: Pearl Harbor (HQ), San Francisco, Alameda, San Diego, Long Beach, Adak (Alaska).

(See also Forces Abroad, below.)

RESERVES:
Trg ships: 37 (assigned from active fleet):

1 DD, 5 Perry FFG-7, 6 Knox FF-1052, 17 ocean MCMV, 2 LST, 4 fleet tugs, 2 salvage ships. 10 more FFG, 2 FF authorized.
Avn: 23,000; 400+ ac.
2 carrier wings: 18 sqns: 6 attack (5 with 60 A-7B (converting to -E); 1 with 12 F/A-18 (active force ac)); 4 ftr (2 with F-14; 2 with 36 F-4S);

2 AEW with 12 E-2C; 2 ECM with EA-6A; 2 tanker with KA-3B.
2 MR wings: 13 sqns with 110 P-3A/B.
1 tac spt wing: 13 sqns: 2 composite with TA-4J, A-4E, -F; 11 spt with C-9B.
1 hel wing, 7 sqns: 4 ASW (2 with 14 SH-3D; 2 with 14 -F);2 lt attack with 16 AH-1J, 1 SAR with SH-3.
(To form: aircrew augmentation units: 2 for 18 F-14, 2 for 18 A-6E, 2 for 12 E-2C, 1 for 2 SA-3, 2 for 10 SH-3H).
Misc units:
Naval Construction: 2 bdes: 9 regts, 17 bns.
2 construction spt, 2 maintenance units; 6 cargo handling bns and 2,100 other units.

MARINE CORPS: 198,241 (9,200 women).
3 divs, each of 9 inf, 1 recce, 1tk, 1engr, 1 amph bns, 1 arty regt.
3 Force Service gps(each 7 bns).
Tks: 716 M-60A1.
AFV: APC: 984 LVT-7/-7A1, some 230 lt armd vehicles (LAV); amph: 4 LCAC.
Arty: guns: 175mm SP (to be replaced); how: 50 105mm (being replaced), 160 M-198/M-114 155mm towed, 100 155mm, 203mm SP; mor: 216 81mm.
ATK: ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
AD: SAM: Redeye, Stinger.

AVIATION: 3 air wings (27,000), (each wing 8 combat sqns, 15-17 spt elm sqns, 338-370 ac).
Ftr: 12 sqns: 8 with F-4 (being replaced); 4 with F-18 (2 more forming 1985).
FGA: 13 sqns: 8 lt (3 with AV-8A; 1 with AV-8B; 4 with A-4); 5 med with A-6.
Recce: 1 sqn with RF-4.
ECM: 1 sqn with EA-6.
Forward air control: 2 sqns with OV-10.
Comd: 2 sqns with OA-4/TA-4.
Tanker: 3 sqns with KC-130.
Trg: 7 sqns.
Hel: 28 sqns.
Attack hel: 53 sqns with AH-1.
Tpt hel: 25 sqns: 3 lt with UH-1; 14 med with CH-46; 8 hy with CH-53.
Equipment: some 605 combat ac, some 110 combat hel.

F-4: 141: 120 -N/S (ftr, 96 Regular); 21 RF-4B (recce).

F/A-18: 92 (67ftr, 25 misc).

AV-8A/C: 52 (44 FGA, 8 trg).

A-4: 197: 167 -E/M (FGA, 95 Regular); 30 OA-4M/TA-4F(comd).

A-6: 69: 50 -E (FGA); 19 EA-6A/B (ECM, 15 Regular).

OV-10A: 54 (forward air control, 36 Regular).

C-13O/KC-13OF/R: 47 (tanker, 36 Regular).
Hel:

AH-1 J/T: 110(80 attack (72 Regular), 30 misc).

UH-1E/N (Bell 204, 212): 112 (tpt).

CH-46C/D: 204 (tpt).

CH-53: 51 -A/D (tpt, 35 Regular); 33 -E (tpt).
Msls:
SAM: 2 bns with Improved HAWK.
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder. ASM: Maverick.
(On order Some 330 LVT-7A1, some 556 LAV-25 Piranha APC; M-198 towed, M-109SP 155mm how; 180 Mk-19 40mm grenade launchers;

SMAW 83mm RL; Stinger SAM. 75 F/A-18, 33 AV-8B ftr, 3 KC-130T tanker ac, 22 AH-IT, 11 CH-53E hel;

263 AGM-65E Maverick, Sidearm ASM.)

DEPLOYMENT:
Continental US: 2 Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF), (1 East, 1 West coast) each with 1 div, 1 air wing, 1 spt gp, 1 amph bde (MAB) (12,000).
Hawaii: 1 bde, service spt gp, ac gp (from MAF in Okinawa).

(See also Forces Abroad, below.)

RESERVES: 43,900 (1,446 women). Eqpt listed with Regular units.
1 Marine div: 3 inf, 1 arty regts; 21 combat and spt bns.
1 Fleet Marine Force; 1 Force Service gp (7 bns).
1 air wing: 100 combat ac, 8 combat hel.

Ftr: 2 sqns with F-4.

FGA: 6 sqns with A-4.

EWng: 1 sqn with EA-6A.

Forward air control: 1 sqn with OV-10.

Tanker: 1 tkr/tpt sqn with KC-130.

Spt: 32 units.
Hel:

Attack: 1 sqn with AH-1.

Tpt: 7 sqns: 4 lt with UH-1; 2 med with CH-46; 1 hy with CH-53.
SAM: 1 bn with HAWK.
Spt: 32 units.

AIR FORCE: 603,898 (67,500 women); some 3,700 combat ac.
Strategic: (organization: see p. 6).
Tactical: 26 active combat wings, comprising 109 sqns (sqn may be 12, 18 or 24 ac).
Ftr: 36 sqns: 17 with F-15; 19 with F-16.
FGA: 48 sqns: 19 with F-4; 10 with F-111; 14 with A-10; 5 Wild Weasel (I trg) with F-4.
Recce: 8 sqns with RF-4C.
EWng: 1 Airborne Warning and Control Wing; 7 sqns: 4 AWACS (1 trg) with E-3; 3 EWng with EC-130, EC-135, EF-111.
Forward air control: 12 tac air control sqns: 9 with OV-10/O-2; 3 with CH-3 hel.
Special: 1 air div: 1 wing; 6 special ops sqns: 3 with MC-130; 1 with AC-130; 1 with CH-3; 1 with HH-53/UH-1 hel; 1 det with UH-1H hel.
OCU: 18: 1 with F-lll; 1 with F-16; 7 with F-4; 1 with F-5; 2 with F-15; 2 with F-106; 3 with A-10; 1 with RF-4.
Trg: 4 aggressor sqns with F-5E/T-38; 30 trg sqns with F-16, T-33, T-37, T-38, T-39, T-41, T-43, UV-18, Schweizer Z-37,

C-5, C-12, C-130, C-141 ac and UH-60, HH-3, HH-53, U/TH-1 hel.
Tpt: 17 strategic tpt sqns: 4 with C-5; 13 with C-141. 14 tac airlift sqns with C-130.

Units with C-135, C-137, C-140, C-6, C-12, C-20, C-21, C-23, CT-39, C-35.
SAR: 8 sqns (inc SAC msl spt) with C-130 ac, HH-3, HH-53, H/T/UH-1, UH-60 hel.
Medical: 3 medical evacuation sqns with C-9.
Weather recce: 3 sqns with WC-130, WC-135.
Trials/weapons trg units with F-16, C-141.
Equipment:
Strategic: some 348 combat ac (Regular (incl strategic), Air National Guard, Reserve).

B-52: 263: 167 -G (90 with ALCM, 61 with non-nuclear Harpoon, 16 reserve); 96 -H (90 strike (getting ALCM), 6 reserve).

B-1B: 1 (strike).

FB-111A: 61 (56 strike, trg; 5 reserve).

SR-71A/B: 9 (recce).

U-2CT/R: 7 (recce).

TR-1: 8: 6 -A (tac recce); 2 -B (trg).

E-4 (Boeing 747): 4: 1 -A, 3 -B (comd/control).

C-135 (Boeing 707): 652: 16 RC-135 (comd/control); 21 EC-135A/C/G/L (comd/control);

615 KC-135R (tankers; 487 Regular, 104 Air National Guard, 24 Air Force Reserve).

KC-10A: 31 (tanker).
Tactical: some 4,000 combat ac, 17 combat helicopters.

F-4: 1,212: 741 (FGA), 150 ocu; 72 -G (Wild Weasel), 249 RF-4C (233 recce, F-16R to replace; 16 ocu).

F-15: 766 (incl 383 ftr, 40 ocu, 72 AD).

F-16: 584 (481 ftr, 29 OCU, 65 trials, 9 -B/D trg).

F-111: 286: 230 -A/D/E/F(FGA); 20 -A (ocu); 36 EF-111 (ECM).

F-5/T-38E: 94 (74 trg, 20 OCU).

F-106: 40 (36 AD, 4 trg).

A-7D/K: 360 (FGA).

A-10A: 555 (495 FGA, 60 ocu).

E-3A: 34 (AEW, 24 to convert to -3B).

OA-37B: 75 (forward air control).

OV-10/O-2A: 96 (forward air control).

C-9A/C (DC-9): 23 (medical).

C-141B: 270 (235 strategic tpt, 19 tpt, 12 trg, 4 -A trials).

C-5A: 70 (66 strategic tpt, 5 trg; 8 reserve).

C-130: 681: 534 (tpt), 28 (ocu); 20 AC-130H (special); 15 EC-130E/H (ECM); 50 HC-130H/N/P (45 SAR, 5 trg); 14 MC-130E (special);

20 WC-130E/H (weather recce).

C-135 (Boeing 707): 153: 8 (tpt); 129 KC-135A/Q (tanker); 11 EC-135K (ECM); 5 WC-135B (weather recce).

C-137 (Boeing 707): 5: 3 -B (707-153, VIP tpt); 2 -C (707-320B, VIP tpt).
Other ac: MiG-21: 24. MiG-23: 4. C-6A: 1 (tpt). C-12: 42 (2 trg, 40 -F tpt).

C-18 (Boeing 707-323C): 8 (advanced range instrumentation ac (ARIA)). C-20A: 3 (tpt).

C-21A (Learjet): 66. C-22 (Boeing 727): 1 (tpt). C-23A (Sherpa): 8 (tpt). C-35A: 35 (tpt). T-33A: 161 (trg). T-37B: 619 (trg).

CT-39 (Sabreliner): 46 (tpt). T-39: 4 (trg).

T-38: 620 (trg). T-41A/C: 50 (trg). T-43A: 4 (trg). Boeing 737A: 15 (trg). UV-18A (Twin Otter): 2 (trg). Schweizer Z-37: 8 (trg).
Hel:

HH-3: 59 (51 SAR, 8 trg).

HH-53: 45: 8 -B (SAR), 29 -C (SAR, trg), 8 -H (special).

UH-1 (Bell 212): 105: 9 -N (special); 96 -H/T/UH-1 (86 SAR, 10 trg).

UH-60A: 10 (SAR).
Msls:
AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow.
ASM: perhaps 1,170 AGM-69A SRAM, 1,380 AGM-86B ALCM. Maverick; Standard ARM, Shrike, HARM, GBU-15 glide bomb.
GLCM: 4 sqns, 1 trg unit.
(On order (all branches): MX ICBM, 51 B-1B bbrs (100 planned), 1 E-4B comd, 5 E-3A AWACS, 5 TR-1A recce ac (2 -IB trg), 30 KC-10A tankers,

4 EC-18B ARIA msl test ac; 240 AGM-86B ALCM. 192 F-16 (incl 60 -D), 48 F-15 ftrs, 5 F-5 FGA, 7 E-3C, 6 EF-111A,

13 C-5B, 6 C-12F Vie liaison, 3 C-17 hy tpt, 21 C-130 (10 -H), some 14 C-21A Lear Jet, 8 C-20A Gulfstream, some 12 C-23 Sherpa lt tpt;

AT-46A/T-46A, 40 C-12F Super King Air 200C trg ac; 22 Bell AH-T Super Cobra, 90 HH-60A Night Hawk hel;

108 launchers, 400 BGM-109 GLCM; 40 ALCM, HARM, 200 AGM-65D Maverick ASM,Stinger, 12 Rapier SAM.)

DEPLOYMENT:
(i) Continental United States (CONUS):
(a) Tactical Air Command (TAC; incl NORAD and Iceland-assigned AD ac): (104,412):

2 Air Forces; 12 air divs; 28 wings (15 combat): 36 combat sqns (30 ftr, 3 tac recce (converting to ftr/recce), 3 tac air control); 6 tac trg sqns.
(b) Alaskan Air Command: (10,830):

1 ftr wing (AD: 1 sqn with F-15, 1 with T-33), 1 composite wing (1 sqn with A-10.

1 with O-2A), 1 control (warning) gp, 13 radars (being modernized), 2 combat spt gps, 1strategic recce wing; 1 air base gp, 2 sqns.
(c) Military Airlift Command (MAC): (78,055):

3 Air Forces; 3 Airlift divs, 27 wings 4 tac, 8 strategic, 1 military airlift spt, 3 air base, 1 SAR, 1 SAR/weather recce, 1 medical, 1 special ops,

6 weather, 1 trg; 19 gps (2 tac, 3 strategic, 3 military airlift, 1 spt, 9 air base, 1 airlift/trg). Ac deployed as required, world-wide.
(d) Spt elm Comds: (171,500). Comms, Log, Systems Trg, Electronic Security.
(ii) Pacific Air Forces (26,926): 2 Air Force HQ: 3 air divs; 4 tac ftr wings and 2 indep ftr sqns; 1 tac control gp; 3 air base wings and 1 indep sqn.

1 weather wing (attached from MAC).

Hawaii ANG: 1 div: 2 AD sqns with F-4 (8 AAM).
(See also Forces Abroad, below.)

RESERVES:
(i) Air National Guard (ANG) : 107,900: 24 wings, 67 gps, 91 sqns (56 tac); some 1,020 combat ac.
Ftr: 10 AD interceptor sqns (1 to form); 162 ac (NORAD-assigned) (see Strategic AD).
FGA: 36 sqns: 1 with 15 F-16 (1 more forming); 15 with 188 F-4D (1 OCU with 20 -C); 1 Wild Weasel with 12;

14 with 360 A-7D/K (1 ocu, 10 replacing with F-16); 5 with 107 A-10A.
Recce: 7 sqns with 105 RF-4C.
ECM: 1 sqn with 8 EC-130.
Forward air control: 3 sqns with 75 OA-37B.
Tpt: 20 sqns: 19 tac (MAC) with 177 C-130A/B/D/E/H; 1 strategic with 12 C-5.
Tanker: 13 sqns with 104 KC-135.
SAR: 2 sqns with 8 HC-130 ac, 11 HH-3E hel.
Trg: 51: 4 T-39, 43 T-39A, 4 T-43A.
(ii) Air Force Reserve: 74,800. 17 wings, 56 sqns (36 with ac); some 233 combat ac.
FGA: 12 sqns (TAC): 2 with 10 F-16; 5 with 113 F-4C/D; 5 with 100 A-10.
Tpt: 15 sqns (MAC): 14 tac with 142 C-130A/B/D/E/H; 1 strategic with 8 C-141.
Tanker: 3 sqns (SAC) with 24 KC-135.
Special: 1 sqn (MAC) with 10A C-130 ac.
Weather: 1 recce sqn with 7 WC-130.
SAR: 4 sqns with 15 HC-130 ac, 8 HH-3E, 110 UH-1N hel.
Associate: 20 sqns (personnel only):

MAC: 4 sqns for C-5, 13 for C-141, 1 aero medical for C-9.

SAC: 2 sqns for KC-10.

Non-flying spt units: 137.
(iii) Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF): 321 long-. range commercial ac (numbers fluctuate): 200 passenger (Boeing 747, L-1011, DC-8/-10),

121 cargo (80 Boeing 707, 30 747, DC-8/-10);

16 short-range commercial (Boeing 727, DC-9).

Forces Abroad (520,000 incl 64,850 afloat).
GENERAL:
Europe 353,100 (27,250 afloat).
Pacific/Far East 143,800 (33,600 afloat).
Caribbean/Latin America: 15,700: incl Bermuda, 1,600; Cuba (Guantanamo Bay) 2,500; Honduras garrison 120; Puerto Rico 3,900; Panama 9,300 (1,000 afloat).
Other areas 7,400 (3,000 afloat).
ARMY: (257,800).
Europe: 217,100.

(i) Germany: 204,700. 1 army, 2 corps HQ; 2 armd, 2 mech divs; 1 armd, 1 mech, 1 cav bdes; 2 armd cav regts;

4 SSM bns with 54 Pershing IA, 54 Pershing II;

30 AD btys with HAWK; 1 bn (4 btys) Nike Hercules (being replaced by Patriot);

2 bns with Patriot (1 with 6 btys each 8x4 msls, 1 to be 6 btys late 1985); 5,000 MBT.*

(* Incl those stockpiled for the Strategic Reserve formations. The armd and mech bdes are from the divs in the US earmarked to reinforce 7th Army.)

(ii) West Berlin: 4,300. HQ elms, 1 inf bde.

(iii) Greece: 470.

(iv) Italy: 3,950.

(v) Netherlands: 930.

(vi) Turkey: 1,200.

(vii) Belgium: 1,160.

(viii) Other: 390.
Pacific: 32,300.

(i) South Korea: 29,750. 1 army HQ; 1 inf div (13,900).

(ii) Japan: 2,400. 1 corps HQ; base and spt personnel.
Middle East: Egypt: 1,200.
Caribbean/Latin America: 6,730.
NAVY: (90,900) (56,150 afloat).
Atlantic (Second Fleet): Cuba (Guantanamo Bay) 2,100, Bermuda 1,500, Iceland (Keflavik) 1,900, Britain (Holy Loch and other) 2,300.

NATO-assigned 14,850.
Mediterranean (27,200). Sixth Fleet: typically up to 6 SSN, 2 carriers, 12 surface combatants, 11 spt ships;

1 Amph Ready Gp (3-5 ships, Bn landing team or MAU).

Mid-Term Prepositioning Force: 3 stores ships. Italy (Gaeta (HQ), Naples, Sigonella, La Maddalena) 5,250, Spain (Rota) 3,600.
Western Pacific (41,400), Seventh Fleet: some 20 SSN and SS: 3 carriers (1 hel), 23 surface combatants, 6 amph, 8 spt ships. Japan (Yokosuka; HQ) 7,400.

Philippines (Subic Bay) 5,300; Guam (Midway) 4,900 incl Marine det.
Indian Ocean. Dets from Seventh Fleet 11,000; 1 carrier battle gp (some 6 surface combatants).

Near Term Pre-positioning Force (Diego Garcia) 1,300; 3 ammunition, 7 cargo ships, 3 barges, 3 oilers, 1water tanker.
Middle East Force (Persian Gulf-Bahrain): 1 comd ship, 4 destroyers/frigates.
MARINES: (38,150).
Caribbean: Cuba (Guantanamo Bay) 435; 1 reinforced marine coy.
Europe: 1,300.
Middle East (afloat: Mediterranean 1,900; 1 MAU*). Pacific:

(i) Japan/Okinawa: 26,000; 1 MAF (1 div(-), 1 air wing, 1 log sptgp).

(ii) Philippines: 660; MAU, 1 bn landing team*.
Indian Ocean: 660; 1 MAU deployed intermittently.

(* Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) are earmarked in Amphibious Ready Gps (ARG) comprising 4-7 amph ships with a reinforced inf bn gp,

incl tks, arty, composite air sqn (incl hel) and log gp (1,800).

Only 1 in Mediterranean and 1 in Pacific are regularly contituted. 1 Bn Landing Team (MAU less hel) also deployed in Pacific;

1 occaisionally formed for the Atlantic. A Marine Amphibious Force may have up to 50,000 men incl air support.)
AIR FORCE: (133,200).
Europe: 92,700: US Air Force, Europe (USAFE); some 725 combat ac, 64 GLCM.

(i) Belgium: 1,500; 1 tactical msl wing, 16 GLCM.

(ii) Britain: 27,500; 309 combat ac, 32 GLCM. 1 Air Force HQ:

4 wings, 14 sqns (7 with 150 F-111E/F, 1 with 12 EF-111 Raven, 6 with 108 A-10); 1 tac recce wing, 3 sqns (1 with 18 RF-4C, 1 with 19 F-5E,

1 with 2 TR-1A (SAC)); 1 tpt wing with 16 C-130 (MAC); 29 KC-135, 4 EC-135H (SAC); 1 SAR sqn with 5 HC-130, 5 HH-53.

1 tactical missile wing, 32 GLCM. 2 Air Base Gps.

(iii) Germany: 41,100; 324 combat ac, 7 armed hel. 1 Air Force HQ:

4 wings, 12 sqns (3 with 72 F-16A/B, 4 with 96 F-4E (2 to get F-16), 1 with 24 F-4G; 3 with 72 F-15C/D); 1 recce wing, 1 sqn with 18 RF-4C;

1 air control wing and 1 gp of 3 sqns (2 with 42 OV-10A ac, 1 with 7 CH-53C hel); 1 tpt wing (MAC) of 4 sqns (incl C-23A Sherpa, 16 C-130E);

1 special operations sqn (MAC) with 4 MC-130E. 2 Air Base Gps.

(iv) Netherlands: 2,000; 1 sqn with 24 F-15C/D.

(v) Spain: 5,300; 1 Air Force HQ: 1 tac wing of 3 sqns with 72 F-16A/B, 1 ftr trg wing (no ac assigned). 1 Air Base Gp, 1 SAR det (MAC), 3 UH-1N hel.

(1 TAC fighter wing (F-4E) in US on call as reinforcements.)

Italy: 5,800; 1 tac, 2 air base gps, 1 tac msl wing (16 GLCM).

Greece: 2,700; 2 airbase gps.

Turkey: 3,800; HQ, 1 tac, 2 airbase gps.

(vi) Other areas: 1,700.
Iceland: (TAC, 1,300); 1 AD sqn with 24 F-4E (12 being replaced with 18 F-15, 1985), 4 T-33, 1-3 E-3A AWACS. 1 SAR det (MAC) with 3 HH-3.
Pacific: Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): 37,500.

(i) Guam: 4,200; dets from SAC: 1 strategic bbr wing with 1 B-52 sqn; 1 refuelling wing with KC-135.

(ii) Japan: 16,600; 1 Air Force HQ: 1 div:

1 wing (3 sqns) with 72 F-15C/D, 2 F-16 (sqn complete Aug 85), 18 RF-4C, T-39A ac, UH-1E/F hel; det (TAC) with 3 E-3A AWACS ac.

1 tac tpt gp with 16 C-130 ac, 1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 4 HC-130 ac, 5 HH-53 hel. See Korea below.

(iii) Korea: 11,200; 1 div:

2 wings: 5 sqns (2 with 36 F-4E, 2 with 48 F-16, 1 with 18 A-10), 1 tac control gp with 18 OA-37; 1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 6 HH-3.

(iv) Philippines: 9,400; 1 Air Force HQ:

1 wing, 2 ftr sqns (1 with F-4E, 1 with F-4E/G); 1 special operations sqn (MAC) with 4 MC-130E; 1 tac airlift wing (MAC) with 16 C-130 ac,

1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 5 C/HH-3 hel. 1 trg gp with 15 F-5E, T-33, T-39A).

(v) Australia: 250.
Middle East (all services): Sinai (MFO)1,100; Egypt 1,300; Saudi Arabia 390 (USAF: 4 E-3A, 3 KC-135, 1 KC-10, spt staff).

PARA-MILITARY:
Coast Guard (by law a branch of the Armed Forces; in peacetime under the Department of Transportation):

Budget 1984: BA $2,767 bn, outlay $2,518 bn, 1985: BA $2,518 bn, outlay $2,640 bn.

Strength: 38,753 (2,287 women).
243 cutters (incl 17 high-endurance (2,600-3,000 tons), 31 med-endurance (1,000+ tons; 9 more ordered)), 6 ocean icebreakers, 6 icebreaking tugs,

76 patrol craft (16 ordered), 3 hovercraft, 28 ocean buoy tenders, 93 other vessels; some 2,250 small craft; 560 shore insallations;

63 ac (41 HU-25A, 20 HC-130H, 1 VC-4A, 1 VC-11A);

108 hel (8 HH-65A, 37 HH-3F, 69 HH-52A (to be replaced by 96 HH-65A (AS-365G Dolphin 2)).

(In reserve/storage: 2 C-130.)
Coast Guard Reserve: 24,400. Selected: 11,800; Ready 9,500; Standby 1,100; Retired 2,000.

167 port security units in 40 ports, 59 general spt units, 63 reserve gps, 1 cutter, 150 small vessels.
Coast Guard Auxiliary: 36,000 civilian volunteer force; augment regular force in emergencies.
Civil Air Patrol (CAP): 68,021 (26,215 cadets); HQ, 8 geographical regions, 52 wings, 1,936 units, 553 CAP ac plus 8,890 private ac.

Roles: (a) emergency services, SAR, disaster relief, civil defence and communications (b) aerospace education, (c) cadet trg, motivation.
State Militias: 11,500: volunteer groups org as cadre military units, lightly armed and equipped, active in nine States (California, Indiana, New Mexico,

New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Washington) and in Puerto Rico.

19 of the remaining 41 States report varying degrees of interest and support.

Intended to provide personnel for Home Guard, internal security, and disaster relief assistance in support of or as replacement for

Army National Guard or Civil police forces.

The Soviet Union

Strategic Forces

While there are numerous reports attesting the continuing modernization of the Soviet strategic inventory, there have been no significant changes in total numbers. The ICBM total continues to remain at 1,398, and there are no changes in the totals of the individual components of that inventory, although warhead numbers are increasing. There are indications that the older SS-11 and SS-13 missiles are to be replaced by a mobile missile now under test, the SS-X-25. A second new missile, the SS-X-24, is also close to deployment, first in silos and later possibly on rail-mobile launchers. There have been suggestions during the year that the warheads on the deployed missiles are being modernized, with different mixes of yield, penetration aids and guidance. It is not possible to verify these statements.

The strategic submarine force is following a similar pattern. There are now three Typhoon-class SSBN in service, one more than in 1984. Each boat has 20 SS-N-20 missiles, each with 9 200-KT MIRV. A new D-IV-class boat is reported. This carries 16 SS-N-23. Details of this missile are not yet available. At the same time 2 Y-l submarines, and the last two of the H-II class have been retired. This reduces the number of SS-N-6 SLBM by 32, and retires the last of the strategic SS-N-5. Thirty-nine of these remain in a theatre role outside SALT. The net effect of these changes is to reduce the overall number of ballistic missiles by two in each category, increase the number of Soviet submarines under the SALT Agreement by one, and reduce the number of boats outside that Agreement by two.

The only change in the strategic bomber inventory has come about through the re-opening of the production line of the Tu-95 Bear. Some 25 of the Tu-95H model have been produced as a vehicle for the new AS-15 ALCM. This missile has a range of some 3,000 km; details of its warhead are unknown. The Blackjack strategic bomber, widely reported to be similar to the US B-1B, is still under development.

Modernization of the Moscow ABM system continues with the deployment of new ground based interceptor missiles (SH-04/-08). The USSR is on the verge of deploying the SA-X-12 SAM, which may have some ABM capability.

The SS-20 IRBM continues to be deployed, and there is evidence that some of the missiles previously sited in Central Asia have been re-deployed to locations from which they can support the Western Operational Theatres. Information suggests that, of the total of 423 now in service, 216 are deployed facing Western Europe, 162 are in the Far East, and the 45 remaining in Central Asia are in the process of re-deployment. The SS-4 total has now been reduced to 120, just over half the figure for last year. There have been reports that a follow - on to the SS-20, identified as the SS-X-28, began flight tests in 1984; it also carries three warheads.

General-Purpose Forces

A number of details concerning the Soviet forces have emerged during the past months, requiring changes in the form of our country entry compared with previous years. In summary, its sequence has been changed to reflect the division of Soviet forces into five arms - Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Troops, Air Defence, Air Force and Navy - and the order of precedence that the Soviet authorities attach to them. We have accordingly separated the Air Defence component, placing it in appropriate Air Defence section. The division between Air Defence interceptors and air superiority fighters has still not been satisfactorily clarified, and some measure of speculation is inevitable when trying to identify types and inventories. In this regard, there are a number of cases where previous estimates may have included a measure of double counting. Insofar as the 'regular' Ground and Naval Forces are concerned, comparisons with our presentation in previous years should present little difficulty.

The Army's armoured force shows a slight increase, but precise figures identifying the specific models have been impossible to provide. We are also aware of the difficulties in reconciling a total based on the organizational structure of the Ground Forces with the numbers reported as a gross total inventory. In all categories of equipment, both new and obsolescent equipment is known to be stored for mobilization purposes. The exact status for the reserve stocks in terms of types and numbers is unknown. Again, more modern AFV are coming into service; older types continue to be used for day-to-day purposes.

One possible exception to the general comment on the Ground Forces is the formation of what appears to be a separate air component directly under Army control. Heretofore the Frontal Aviation has been considered an adjunct of the Army commanders' resources; the term 'flying artillery' described one such function. As in the armies of other nations, however, it is apparent that such control was not considered sufficiently tight or responsive. The new force comprises a mix of assault and transport helicopters; no fixed-wing aircraft have been identified within it.

The Soviet Navy has introduced three classes of diesel submarines. The M and S classes were reported on trials last year, they have been joined by a new class, the Akula. One Y-class submarine formerly in the strategic fleet is now being converted to a cruise-missile submarine with as many as 24 SS-N-24 SLCM. Though the total of attack submarines is up only slightly from that of 1984, newer boats are replacing some older models. The fourth Kiev-class aircraft carrier is now in service, and deployments and' exercises suggest that these ships are now being operated as carrier battle groups, much along US lines. The second Slava-class cruiser is now in service, although final trials may still be continuing. Sovremenny- and Udaloy-class destroyers continue in series production. There are a number of minor changes in the categories of minor combatants. The numbers of Osa missile attack craft are being reduced.

The re-organization of the Soviet forces under their Operational Theatre concept is intended to provide a system of tight control over all the forces, and so permit a theatre commander to use all the forces at his disposal in as efficient and controlled a manner as possible. The Soviet Union has divided her forces into three major Strategic Theatres (GTVD) - Western, Southern and Far Eastern - with the Strategic Forces and Strategic Reserves controlled centrally (although elements of them are physically located in the Theatres). The major Strategic Theatres are further sub-divided into regional theatre (TVD) commands, including those forces operating at sea. The Military Districts remain, assigned to the regional TVD as doctrine and geography dictate. Their roles embrace mobilization and administrative support; formations located within them would form fronts and armies on mobilization. We show the deployment of the several Soviet force components within this framework. We must warn that much of the presentation is speculative and would welcome comment and suggestions for its improvement.
Defence Expenditure

On 27 September 1984, Soviet Finance Minister Vasily Garbuzov announced an 11.8% increase in official defence spending to 19.063 bn roubles ($22,257 bn) for 1985, after it had been frozen at 17.054 bn roubles ($23,015 bn) since 1981. Official government defence spending held steady or slightly decreased in the 1970s. Although the purpose of the USSR's largest peace-time military budget is, in Garbuzov's words, 'to increase the combat readiness of our Armed Forces which are capable of giving a crushing rebuff to any aggressor', the Soviet leadership did not reveal which military programmes required additional funds. The largest spending increase in 25 years was portrayed as a measured response to recent increases in American defence expenditure.

Nearly all competent Western observers believe that the one-line official Soviet defence figures underestimate actual expenditure by a factor of ten or more, and that the USSR has consistently outspent the US for the last decade. Some unclassified defence expenditure estimates are listed in the Table overleaf.

Most observers believe that actual military spending represents 12-17% of the Soviet GDP. The majority of time-series assume stable, persistent growth in total defence expenditure in the range of 2-4% since the mid-1970s. Recent American and British estimates suggest that total annual defence expenditure grew by 4-5% before 1976, decelerated to a 2% annual rate in 1976-82 and rose at a rate of 3-4% in 1982-84.

There is widespread disagreement over what programmes should be included in the definition of defence expenditure. Many Western observers believe that the USSR includes the civilian space programme, internal security forces, military construction troops and civil defence as part of her concept of national defence. Consequently, estimates based on that wider definition (which are not included in the Table) will tend to overstate Soviet defence expenditure if compared to traditional Western defence allocations. Western estimates are separately calculated in roubles, which may indicate the defence burden on the Soviet economy, and dollars, which may facilitate a comparison with American programmes. Western soviet logists use two basic methodologies to calculate Soviet defence outlays. Some nongovernment analysts examine the published budget documents and infer additional militar ilyrelated expenditures in non-defence line items. Most analysts - including those of the US CIA, the US DIA and the British MoD - individually estimate procurement, RDT&E, O&M, personnel costs, rouble/dollar conversion rates and other micro-aggregates although the details are rarely part of the public record. Both the CIA and DIA spend considerable effort collecting raw data and developing indirect economic analyses in order to calculate independent dollar and rouble baselines. Procurement is based on estimated production runs multiplied by the adjusted cost of a similar weapon in the West. Sample unit price and production estimates include: T-80 tank $1.2-1.6 m (1982: 400 units); T-72 tank $1.0-1.3 m (1982: 1,000 units); and BMP-2 MICV $300-450,000 (1982: 4,000 units). Production statistics based on photographic reconnaisance and other intelligence appear to be reliable, but intelligence gaps, imprecise economic analyses, unverifiable data, and the lack of precise information concerning weapons exports and the structure of reserve stocks makes this analysis inexact. Production cost estimates cannot accurately reflect true procurement spending patterns, because resource costs and dollar/rouble conversions are difficult to quantify and, more importantly, Soviet procurement objectives are set in real unit terms without a strict requirement for money prices to coincide with the real costs of goods and services. Manpower costs are derived from known military salary rates, rank structure and ration scales, which appear to be fairly reliable; manpower costs have reportedly grown at 2% per year for the last ten years. It is difficult to estimate manpower support costs or the cost of conscription and other policies in terms of economic production forgone. The indirect drain on the Soviet economy is not inconsiderable, although direct manpower costs are much less than in the West. The published data base for the RDT&E and O&M accounts is minimal. Soviet R&D accounts are, in the CIA's words, 'the least reliable' and appear to be roughly derived from Soviet budgetary allocations to science, with classified sources providing some basis of micro-analysis. The Academy of Sciences administers - and presumably funds - military R&D, with planning, development and production steered by complex interdepartmental communication between the Ministry of Defence, GOSPLAN, the Academy of Sciences, the Council of Ministers and the production ministries. RDT&E programmes are thought to be on the scale of American efforts, including space-based defence and ground-based ABM technology. O&M accounts are usually estimated as a function of procurement and manpower estimates; precise fuel and maintenance costs are unavailable. Estimated O&M costs have grown 3-4% annually since 1976. It is believed that operations in Afghanistan have not substantially strained O&Mor total defence expenditure. Difficulties surrounding exchange rates were examined in previous editions of The Military Balance. Most observers believe that current methodologies are tainted by an element of institutional bias, a tendency to assume mirroring micro-economic phenomena, limited understanding of the Soviet budgeting process and Soviet military-industrial policy, and the limited number of Soviet studies programmes outside the intelligence community.*

(* For further background, see R. Kaufmann, S. Rosefielde, H. Schaefler, in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Hearings(annual); also previous editions of the The Military Balance.)

The lack of hard, openly verifiable data and the political implications of higher or lower spending estimates have caused considerable controversy and preclude a precise consensus concerning Soviet spending patterns - particularly with respect to procurement. The Soviet Government does not publish defence micro-aggregates. In 1976 the DIA and CIA revised their defence investment estimates upwards as a result of new analysis which showed that the Soviet defence industry was somewhat less efficient than previously believed. In 1983 the CIA lowered its estimates of Soviet military procurement. Transitions in the production cycle do not wholly account for the 1976-82 slowdown. Military and civilian observers argue that economic constraints, coupled with rising technological costs, have limited production. Technical delays, transportation difficulties and industrial bottlenecks spilling over into the defence sector are other major factors. Bottlenecks in the procurement cycle are often managed by stretch-outs and the application of additional R&D funds. The Soviet Union continues to narrow the technological gap, but it is difficult to insert rapidly expanding technology into the planned production cycle. Compliance with the SALT I and II Accords may have had a marginal effect. In 1984 the CIA and DIA openly disagreed on Soviet procurement spending, with the CIA reporting relatively slow growth of 2% annually from 1976-83, and the DIA a slightly faster rate which surged to 5-10% in 1982-83. Both agencies now appear to agree that the procurement accounts were stagnant in 1976-83 due to lower-than-expected production in the face of resource constraints. Preliminary reports suggest the upturn beginning in 1982 is of the order of 3-6%. It is believed that the latest CIA and DIA procurement estimates are based on the same production figures but differ in pricing estimates. Procurement costs have been affected by the nuclear programmes of the 1970s, steady tank acquisitions, a major ship-building programme in 1983 and aircraft purchases in 1984. Investment priorities - in terms of expenditure - have apparently shifted from strategic programmes to theatre nuclear and conventional forces.

At the present time it is impossible to develop estimates of Soviet defence expenditure which could be used for precise comparison with the American defence effort. Nor can we demonstrate the real economics of the defence sector. Numerous methodological problems have not been overcome:

1) most raw data is classified;

2) most researchers and agencies do not publish defence micro-aggregates, and a consensus baseline has not been developed;

3) internal Soviet budgeting policies are only roughly understood;

4) the rouble/dollar exchange rate series do not reflect true market rates nor actual pricing mechanisms;

5) the relation of defence expenditure and defence industries to the general economy is not well understood;

6) there is no consensus on a precise general economic data base - such as GDP and national income; and

7) the very nature of a command-based economy may nullify any comparison with Western economic and defence spending practices. Data on the American defence budget is easily accessible and verifiable; similar Soviet data is not.

Soviet military activities can be judged to be at least equal to those of the United States. Growth in military spending, having slowed between 1976 and 1982, has now apparently accelerated, despite the fact that expansion in the economy has been only in the 1-4% range for the last five years. There is no indication that defence production is being converted to civilian use. The burden of defence spending on the general economy remains great. The DIA believes that defence outlays in current roubles represented 12-14% of estimated GNP in 1970, 14-16% in 1980, and 15-17% in the mid-1980s.

The degree of Soviet military and civilian economic integration is far greater than in the West. Nine defence production ministries, the energy and machinery industries and the transportation sector are all involved in military production. Military production is believed to be allocated the best manpower, machinery and resources. Soviet industry bears heavy investment costs on behalf of the military, but military production is not immune to problems facing the general economy. Capital investment was not shifted to the industrial sector as planned in 1980-85 because of capital investment problems in all sectors of the economy. Statements by civilian and military officials concerned at lagging industrial technology and sluggish heavy industry performance, affecting both defence and consumer output, suggest that industry should receive more capital investment. Industrial capital investment has shifted from ferrous metals, light industry and consumer production to energy and (to a lesser degree) machinery during the last five years. The liberal economist Abel Aganbegyan and many military officials are calling for a larger shift to the machinery industry; the 1985 economic plan allocates a 14% increase in capital investment for that industry. The nine defence ministries are not part of the widely publicized economic experiments, although some related ministries are affected. Western reports suggest that there are no radical economic changes taking place in the defence industries. The economic experiments and the main thrusts of economic planning appear to be carefully controlled, suggesting that the Soviet leadership is following a conservative course in improving performance of the military-industrial complex and the general economy. Some Western observers believe that current economic and investment policies are a symptom of an overburdened economy; others perceive more aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, the high priority accorded to defence-related industries suggests that the Soviet economy continues to be capable of supporting large-scale military production. Although the command-based Soviet economy has several bottlenecks, technological inferiorities, inefficiencies and under-utilized industrial capacity, it is judged capable of sustaining or even expanding its defence effort should the Soviet leadership decide to make the sacrifice.

Although estimates of Soviet defence spending may provide some indication of the burden of defence on the economy and a rough comparison with the American effort, they are only estimates. Until more extensive data are published, current estimates are too imprecise to provide more than a trend line of Soviet activities.

Советский Союз

Стратегические силы

Несмотря на многочисленные сообщения, свидетельствующие о продолжающейся модернизации советского стратегического вооружения, существенных изменений в общей численности не произошло. Число МБР впродолжает оставаться на уровне 1,398, и никаких изменений в итоговой сумме, хотя число БЧ увеличивается. Есть признаки того, что старые ракеты SS-11 и SS-13 (УР-100 и РТ-2 -ЕТ) должны быть заменены мобильной ракетой, которая сейчас проходит испытания, SS-X-25 (Тополь -ЕТ). Вторая новая ракета, SS-X-24 (Молодец -ЕТ), также близка к развертыванию, сначала в шахтах, а затем, возможно, на железнодорожных мобильных пусковых установках. В течение года высказывались предположения о том, что боеголовки развернутых ракет модернизируются с использованием различных сочетаний средств поражения и наведения. Проверить эти утверждения невозможно.

Стратегические подводные силы следуют аналогичной схемы. Имеется три ПЛАРБ типа Typhoon (пр.941 -ЕТ) в строю, на одну больше, чем в 1984 году. Каждая лодка несет 20 ракет SS-N-20, каждая с 9 200-кт MIRV. Сообщается о новой лодке типа D-IV (пр.667БРДМ -ЕТ). Она несет 16 SS-N-23 (Штиль -ЕТ). Подробностей об этой ракете пока нет. В то же время 2 подводные лодки типа Y-1 и последние две подводные лодки типа H-II были выведены. Это сокращает количество БРПЛ SS-N-6 на 32 и выводит последнюю стратегическую ракету SS-N-5. Тридцать девять из них остаются в роли ТВД за пределами договора ОСВ. Конечным результатом этих изменений является сокращение общего числа баллистических ракет на две в каждой категории, увеличение числа советских подводных лодок в соответствии с соглашением ОСВ на одну и сокращение числа лодок вне этого соглашения на две.

Единственное изменение в составе стратегических бомбардировщиков произошло за счет повторного открытия производственной линии Ту-95. Около 25 самолетов модели Ту-95 были произведены в качестве носителей новой крылатой ракеты AS-15 (Х-55 -ЕТ). Эта ракета имеет дальность около 3000 км; детали ее БЧ неизвестны. Стратегический бомбардировщик Blackjack (Ту-160 -ЕТ), который, как сообщается, похож на американский B-1B, все еще находится в стадии разработки.

Модернизация московской системы ПРО продолжается с развертыванием новых наземных ракет-перехватчиков (SH-04/-08) (А-135 -ЕТ). СССР находится на пороге развертывания ЗРК SA-X-12 (С-300В -ЕТ), который может иметь некоторый потенциал ПРО.

БРСД SS-20 (Пионер -ЕТ) продолжает развертываться, и имеются свидетельства того, что некоторые ракеты, ранее размещенные в Центральной Азии, были переброшены в места, откуда они могут оказывать поддержку западным оперативным театрам. Согласно имеющейся информации, из 423 ракет, находящихся в настоящее время на вооружении, 216 развернуты в Западной Европе, 162 - на Дальнем Востоке, а 45 ракет, остающихся в Центральной Азии, находятся в процессе передислокации. Число SS-4 сократилось до 120, чуть более половины показателя за прошлый год. Поступали сообщения о том, что в 1984 году вслед за SS-20, начались летные испытания ракеты идентифицированной как SS-X-28 (Пионер-3 -ЕТ), она также несет три боеголовки.

Силы общего назначения

За последние месяцы появился ряд деталей, касающихся советских войск, требующих изменения формы справки страны по сравнению с предыдущими годами. В итоге, его последовательность была изменена, чтобы отразить подразделение советских войск в пяти видах вооруженных сил - ракетные войска стратегического назначения, сухопутные войска, ПВО, ВВС и ВМФ - и в порядке очередности. Соответственно, мы разделили компонент противовоздушной обороны, поместив его в соответствующую секцию противовоздушной обороны. Разделение между перехватчиками противовоздушной обороны и истребителями превосходства в воздухе до сих пор не было удовлетворительно уточнено, и некоторые спекуляции неизбежны при попытке определить типы и количество. В этой связи имеется ряд случаев, когда предыдущие оценки могли включать показатель двойного учета. Что касается "регулярных" сухопутных и Военно-Морских Сил, то сравнение с нашим представлением в предыдущие годы не должно вызывать особых трудностей.

Бронетанковые силы армии несколько увеличились, однако точные цифры, указывающие на конкретные модели, представить не удалось. Мы также осознаем трудности в совмещении общей основы организационной структуры сухопутных войск с числами, указанными в совокупном объеме запасов. Известно, что во всех категориях вооружения для целей мобилизации хранится как новое, так и устаревшее оборудование. Точное состояние запасов с точки зрения типа и числа неизвестно. Опять же, более современные ББМ вступают в эксплуатацию; старые типы продолжают использоваться для повседневных целей.

Одним из возможных исключений из общего замечания в отношении сухопутных сил является формирование, как представляется, отдельного воздушного компонента, находящегося непосредственно под контролем армии. До сих пор фронтовая авиация считалась дополнением к ресурсам армейских командиров; термин "летающая артиллерия" описывал одну из таких функций. Однако, как и в армиях других стран, очевидно, что такой контроль не считался достаточно жестким или оперативным. В состав новых сил входят как штурмовые, так и транспортные вертолеты; никаких самолетов в их составе выявлено не было.

Советский флот ввел три класса подводных лодок. Типы M и S (пр.685 и 945 -ЕТ) были зарегистрированы на испытаниях в прошлом году, к ним присоединился новый класс, Akula (пр.971 -ЕТ). Одна подводная лодка класса Y, ранее входившая в состав стратегического флота, в настоящее время переоборудована в подводную лодку крылатых ракет с 24 SLCM SS-N-24 (Метеорит -ЕТ). Хотя общее количество ударных подводных лодок немного выше, чем в 1984 году, новые лодки заменяют некоторые старые модели. Четвертый авианосец типа Киев сейчас на вооружении, и развертывание и учения предполагают, что эти корабли сейчас функционирует как авианосные группы, подобно США. Второй крейсер типа Слава в настоящее время находится на вооружении, хотя заключительные испытания, возможно, еще продолжаются. Продолжается серийное производство эсминцев Современный и Удалой. Существует ряд незначительные изменения в категориях малых кораблей. Сокращается численность ударных ракетных катеров Osa.

Реорганизация советских войск в соответствии с их концепцией оперативного театра призвана обеспечить систему жесткого контроля над всеми силами и, таким образом, позволить командующему театром использовать все имеющиеся в его распоряжении силы максимально эффективным и контролируемым образом. Советский Союз разделил свои силы на три главных стратегических театра (ГТВД) - Западный, Южный и Дальневосточный - со стратегическими силами и стратегическими резервами, контролируемыми централизованно (хотя их элементы физически расположены в театрах). Главные стратегические театры подразделяются на региональные театры (ТВД), включая силы, действующие на море. Военные округа остаются, закрепленные за ТВД, как диктуют доктрина и география. Их функции включают мобилизацию и административную поддержку; расположенные в них формирования сформируют фронты и армии при мобилизации. Мы показываем развертывание нескольких компонентов советских войск в этих рамках. Мы должны предупредить, что большая часть презентации носит спекулятивный характер и приветствовали бы комментарии и предложения по ее улучшению.

Оборонные расходы

27 сентября 1984 года, министр финансов СССР Василий Гарбузов объявил о повышении на 11.8% официальных расходов на оборону в 19.063 млрд рублей ($22,257 млд) за 1985 год, после того, как были заморожены на 17.054 млрд рублей (23,015 млрд долл.) с 1981 года. Официальные государственные расходы на оборону оставались стабильными или несколько сократились в 1970-х годах. Хотя целью крупнейшего военного бюджета СССР мирного времени является, по словам Гарбузова, "повышение боеготовности наших Вооруженных сил, способных дать сокрушительный отпор любому агрессору", советское руководство не раскрыло, какие военные программы требуют дополнительных средств. Самый большой рост расходов за последние 25 лет был представлен как взвешенная реакция на недавнее увеличение американских оборонных расходов.

Почти все компетентные западные наблюдатели считают, что официальные советские цифры по обороне в одну строчку занижают фактические расходы в десять и более раз и что СССР последовательно перерасходовал США в течение последнего десятилетия. Некоторые несекретные сметы расходов на оборону приводятся в таблице выше.

Большинство наблюдателей считают, что фактические военные расходы составляют 12-17% от советского ВВП. Большинство временных рядов предполагают стабильный, устойчивый рост общих расходов на оборону в диапазоне 2-4% с середины 1970-х годов. По последним американским и британским оценкам, общие годовые расходы на оборону выросли на 4-5% до 1976 года, замедлились до 2% в 1976-1982 годах и выросли на 3-4% в 1982-1984 годах.

Широко распространены разногласия в отношении того, какие программы следует включить в определение расходов на оборону. Многие западные наблюдатели считают, что СССР включает в свою концепцию национальной обороны гражданскую космическую программу, силы внутренней безопасности, военно-строительные войска и гражданскую оборону. Следовательно, оценки, основанные на этом более широком определении (которые не включены в таблицу), будут иметь тенденцию к завышению советских оборонных расходов по сравнению с традиционными западными оборонными ассигнованиями. Западные оценки отдельно рассчитываются в рублях, что может указывать на оборонную нагрузку на советскую экономику, и долларах, что может облегчить сравнение с американскими программами. Западные советологи используют две основные методики расчета советских оборонных расходов. Некоторые неправительственные аналитики изучают опубликованные бюджетные документы и делают вывод о дополнительных военных расходах по статьям, не связанным с обороной. Большинство аналитиков - в том числе из ЦРУ США, РУМО США и британского Министерства обороны - индивидуально оценивают закупки, RDT&E, O&M, расходы на персонал, конверсионные курсы рубля/доллара и другие показатели, хотя детали редко являются частью публичной записи. И ЦРУ, и РУМО тратят значительные усилия на сбор исходных данных и разработку косвенного экономического анализа для расчета независимых базовых показателей доллара и рубля. Закупки осуществляются на основе расчетных объемов производства, умноженных на скорректированную стоимость аналогичного оружия на Западе. Примерная цена единицы и производственные оценки включают: танк Т-80 $1,2-1,6 м (1982: 400 единиц); танк Т-72 $1,0-1,3 м (1982: 1000 единиц); и БМП-2 $300-450,000 (1982: 4000 единиц). Статистика производства, основанная на фотографической разведке и других разведданных, представляется надежной, однако пробелы в разведданных, неточный экономический анализ, непроверяемые данные и отсутствие точной информации об экспорте оружия и структуре резервных запасов делают этот анализ неточным. Оценки затрат на производство не могут точно отражать истинные модели расходов на закупки, поскольку затраты на ресурсы и пересчет в долларах/рублях трудно поддаются количественной оценке и, что более важно, советские цели закупок устанавливаются в реальном выражении без строгого требования о том, чтобы денежные цены совпадали с реальными затратами на товары и услуги. Расходы на личный состав рассчитываются на основе известных ставок окладов военнослужащих, структуры званий и шкал пайков, которые, как представляется, являются довольно надежными; расходы на личный состав, согласно сообщениям, росли на 2% в год в течение последних десяти лет. Трудно оценить затраты на поддержку личного состава или затраты на призыв и другие меры с точки зрения экономического производства. Косвенная утечка в советскую экономику не является незначительной, хотя прямые затраты на личный состав гораздо меньше, чем на Западе. Опубликованная база данных для счетов RDT&E и O&M минимальна. Советские НИОКР счетов, по словам ЦРУ, 'наименее надежны и практически выведены из советских бюджетных ассигнований на науку, с секретными источниками некие основы микро-анализ. Академия наук руководит - и предположительно финансирует - военные НИОКР, а планирование, разработка и производство осуществляются на основе комплексной межведомственной связи между Министерством обороны, Госпланом, Академией наук, Советом Министров и производственными министерствами. Программы RDT&E, как полагают, находятся в масштабе американских усилий, включая космическую оборону и наземную технологию ПРО. Счета O&M обычно оцениваются как функция закупок и расходов на личный состав; точные расходы на топливо и техническое обслуживание отсутствуют. Оценочные затраты на O&M выросли на 3-4% ежегодно с 1976 года. Считается, что операции в Афганистане не привели к существенному увеличению общих расходов на оборону. Трудности, связанные с обменными курсами, рассматривались в предыдущих изданиях The Military Balance. Большинство наблюдателей считают, что современные методологии запятнаны элементом институциональной предвзятости, тенденцией предполагать зеркальное отражение микроэкономических явлений, ограниченным пониманием Советского бюджетного процесса и советской военно-промышленной политики, а также ограниченным числом советских исследовательских программ за пределами разведывательного сообщества.*

(* Для получения дополнительной информации см. R. Kaufmann, S. Rosefielde, H. Schaefler, in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Hearings(annual); also previous editions of the The MilitaryBalance.)

Отсутствие достоверных, поддающихся открытой проверке данных и политические последствия повышения или понижения сметы расходов вызвали значительные разногласия и не позволили достичь четкого консенсуса в отношении советских моделей расходов, особенно в отношении закупок. Советское правительство не публикует оборонные бюджеты. В 1976 году РУМО и ЦРУ пересмотрели свои оценки оборонных инвестиций в сторону повышения в результате нового анализа, который показал, что советская оборонная промышленность была несколько менее эффективной, чем считалось ранее. В 1983 году ЦРУ снизило свои оценки советских военных закупок. Переходы в производственном цикле не полностью счета за 1976-82 замедление. Военные и гражданские наблюдатели утверждают, что экономические ограничения в сочетании с ростом технологических издержек ограничивают производство. Другими важными факторами являются технические задержки, транспортные трудности и промышленные узкие места в оборонном секторе. Узкие места в закупочном цикле зачастую устраняются за счет растяжек и использования дополнительных средств на НИОКР. Советский Союз продолжает сокращать технологический разрыв, но быстро расширяющуюся технологию трудно внедрить в плановый производственный цикл. Соблюдение соглашений по ОСВ I и II, возможно, имело незначительный эффект. В 1984 году ЦРУ и РУМО открыто не соглашались с советскими расходами на закупки, при этом ЦРУ сообщало о относительно медленном росте на 2% в год с 1976-83 годов, а РУМО о несколько более быстром темпе, который вырос до 5-10% в 1982-83 годах. В настоящее время оба учреждения, как представляется, согласны с тем, что в 1976-1983 годах счета закупок находились в состоянии застоя из-за более низкого, чем ожидалось, объема производства в условиях нехватки ресурсов. По предварительным данным, подъем, начавшийся в 1982 году, составляет порядка 3-6%. Считается, что последние оценки закупок ЦРУ и РУМО основаны на одних и тех же производственных показателях, но отличаются в оценках цен. На закупочные расходы повлияли ядерные программы 1970-х годов, постоянные закупки танков, крупная программа судостроения в 1983 году и закупки самолетов в 1984 году. Очевидно, что инвестиционные приоритеты - с точки зрения расходов - сместились со стратегических программ на тактические ядерные и обычные силы.

В настоящее время невозможно разработать смету советских оборонных расходов, которая могла бы быть использована для точного сравнения с американскими оборонными усилиями. Мы также не можем продемонстрировать реальную экономику оборонного сектора. Многочисленные методологические проблемы не были преодолены:

1) большинство необработанных данных классифицируется;

2) большинство исследователей и агентств не публикуют оборонные затраты, и консенсус-базовый уровень не был разработан;

3) внутренняя Советская бюджетная политика понимается лишь приблизительно;

4) курсы рубль/доллар не отражают ни истинных рыночных курсов, ни реальных механизмов ценообразования;

5) отношение оборонных расходов и оборонной промышленности к экономике в целом недостаточно изучено;

6) отсутствует консенсус в отношении точной общей экономической базы данных, такой, как ВВП и национальный доход; и

7) сама природа командной экономики может свести на нет любое сравнение с западной экономической практикой и практикой расходов на оборону. Данные по американскому оборонному бюджету легкодоступны и поддаются проверке; аналогичных советских данных нет.

Советские военные активы могут быть расценены как минимум равные с США. Рост военных расходов, который замедлился в период 1976-1982 годов, теперь, по-видимому, ускорился, несмотря на то, что рост экономики в последние пять лет составлял лишь 1-4%. Нет никаких признаков того, что оборонное производство переводится на гражданское использование. Бремя расходов на оборону для экономики в целом остается огромным. РУМО считает, что расходы на оборону в текущих рублях составляли 12-14% от расчетного ВНП в 1970 году, 14-16% в 1980 году и 15-17% в середине 1980-х годов.

Степень советской военной и гражданской экономической интеграции гораздо выше, чем на Западе. Девять министерств оборонно-промышленного комплекса, энергетики, машиностроения и транспорта занимаются производством военной продукции. Считается, что на военное производство выделяется лучшая рабочая сила, техника и ресурсы. Советская промышленность несет большие инвестиционные расходы для военных, но военное производство не застраховано от проблем, стоящих перед экономикой в целом. Капиталовложения не были перенесены в промышленный сектор, как планировалось в 1980-85 годах, из-за проблем с капиталовложениями во всех секторах экономики. Заявления гражданских и военных должностных лиц, обеспокоенных отставанием промышленных технологий и вялыми показателями тяжелой промышленности, влияющими как на оборонную, так и на потребительскую продукцию, свидетельствуют о том, что промышленность должна получать больше капиталовложений. За последние пять лет объем промышленных капиталовложений сместился с черной металлургии, легкой промышленности и потребительского производства на энергетику и (в меньшей степени) машиностроение. Либеральный экономист Абель Аганбегян и многие военные чиновники призывают к более масштабному переходу к машиностроению; экономический план 1985 года предусматривает увеличение капиталовложений в эту отрасль на 14%. Девять министерств ВПК не участвуют в широко освещаемых экономических экспериментах, хотя некоторые из них затрагиваются. Западные доклады свидетельствуют об отсутствии радикальных экономических изменений в оборонной промышленности. Экономические эксперименты и основные направления экономического планирования, по-видимому, тщательно контролируются, что свидетельствует о том, что советское руководство следует консервативному курсу в улучшении показателей военно-промышленного комплекса и экономики в целом. Некоторые западные наблюдатели считают, что текущая экономическая и инвестиционная политика является симптомом перегруженной экономики; другие воспринимают более агрессивные намерения. Тем не менее, высокий приоритет оборонной промышленности говорит о том, что советская экономика по-прежнему способна поддерживать крупномасштабное военное производство. Хотя советская экономика, основанная на командовании, имеет несколько узких мест, технологические недостатки, неэффективность и недостаточно используемый промышленный потенциал, она считается способной поддерживать или даже расширять свои оборонные усилия, если советское руководство решит принести жертву.

Хотя оценки советских оборонных расходов могут дать некоторое представление о бремени обороны для экономики и приблизительное сравнение с американскими усилиями, они являются лишь оценками. До тех пор, пока не будут опубликованы более обширные данные, текущие оценки слишком неточны, чтобы обеспечить более чем трендовую линию советской деятельности.

THE SOVIET UNION
NMP 1983: r 548.1 bn. 1984: 564.5 bn.
Est GNP range 1983: $1,608-1.850 bn. 1984: $1,672-1.920 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 4.0%. 1984: 3.0%.
Inflation 1983: 2.0%. 1984: -3.4%.
Debt 1983: $27 bn. 1984: $26 bn.
Est def exp and exchange rate: see text above.
Population: 276,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 31,077,000; 31-45: 25,295,000.

Women: 18-30: 29,994,000; 31-45: 25,630,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 5,300,000.* (* Excl KGB, MVD (600,000), but incl 615,000 railroad construction and labour troops and some 705,000 comd and

general spt tps no to the wise listed.)

Soviet forces comprise, in order of seniority, Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF); Ground Troops (Army); Air Defence (AD), Air Force and Navy.

Terms of Service: SRF/Army/AD/Air Force 2 years; Navy/Border Guards 3 years.
Reserves: 5,400,000 (service within last 5 years);

SRF 520,000; Army 3,500,000; Air Defence 520,000; Air Force 400,000; Navy 460,000.

Males have a Reserve obligation to age 50; total: some 25,000,000.

STRATEGIC FORCES:
(a) Sea-launched: (Navy: 20,000).
SLBM: 979 in 77 subs (940 SLBM and 62 subs come under SALT; 39 SLBM, 15 subs are outside it).
SSBN: 63:

3 Typhoon with 20 SS-N-20 (60 msls).

1 D-IV with 16 SS-N-23 (16 msls).

14 D-III with 16 SS-N-18 (224 msls).

4 D-II with 16 SS-N-8 (64 msls).

18 D-I with 12 SS-N-8 (216 msls).

1 Y-II with 12 SS-N-17 (12 msls).

21 Y-I with 16 SS-N-6 (336 msls).

1 H-III with 6 SS-N-8 (6 msls)
SSB: 14:

1 G-III with 6 SS-N-8 (6 msls)

13 G-II with 3 SS-N-5 (39 non SALT theatre msls).
(b) Ground-launched: (SRF: 300,000).

6 rocket armies, org in divs, regts, bns and btys of 1 msl launcher; 300 launch control HQ, 3 msl test centres.
ICBM: 1,398. (Figures may fluctuate slightly during conversion.)

SS-11 Sego: 520 (at 8 fields, SS-X-25 will replace).*

SS-13 Savage: 60 (at 1 field, SS-X-25 will replace).

SS-17: 150 (at 2 fields; mod 1; mod 3, 4 MIRV).*

SS-18: 308 (at 6 fields; upgrading to mod 4, 10 MIRV, in progress).

SS-19: 360 (at 4 fields; mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV).*

SS-X-24 being introduced at two locations, each 50 msls.

SS-X-25: some 400 may replace SS-11 and SS-13 from late 1985; 20 bases, each for10 msls, reported under conversion.*

(* SS-11, SS-17, SS-19, and perhaps SS-X-25 have variable range capability, enabling them to be used for theatre support.)
IRBM/MRBM: 543: 336 in western, rest in central and eastern USSR).

SS-20: 423 mobile IRBM (3 MIRV) (216 west of Urals, 162 in Far East; 45 launchers in Central Asia are being relocated to sites in Western USSR

already being built; further sites are reported under construction.*

(*Usually in some 46 complexes with an average of 9 launchers (1 regt). Reload capacity hasbeen reported.)

SS-4 Sandal: 120 MRBM in western USSR (being retired).
(c) Air-launched: (100,000).
STRATEGIC AVIATION (under Supreme High Command): 5 Armies; about 1,680 combat ac, some in western USSR.

1 Army may be for intercontinental roles, 4 for Theatre spt.
Bbrs: 1,120.
Long-range: 170: 125 Tu-95 Bear A/B/C/G/H, (some 80 Bear B/C/G have AS-3/-4 ASM, 25 -H have AS-15 (ALCM));45 Mya-4 Bison.

(Blackjack strategic bomber under development.)
Medium-range: 500: 130 Tu-22M Backfire B/C (AS-4 ASM);

240 Tu-16 Badger G (in regts each with 2 sqns, 36-48 Tu-16, plus 1 composite sqn: 2-4 Badger H, 1-2 -J, 3-6 Tu-16A tankers;

130 Tu-22 Blinder A/B.
Short-range: some 450 Su-24 Fencer.
Recce: 100: 4 Tu-95 Bear E, 15 Tu-16 Badger F, 15 Tu-22 Blinder C, 24 MiG-25 FoxbatB/D, 42 Yak-28 Brewer D.
Ftrs (base defence): some 300 MiG-23 Flogger/B/G, MiG-21 Fishbed J/K/L/N.
ECM: 160: 100 Tu-16 Badger H/J/K, 60 Yak-28 Brewer E.
Tankers: 50: 30 Mya-4 Bison A, 20 Tu-16 Badger.
ASM: AS-3 Kangaroo, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt, AS-6 Kingfish. ALCM: AS-15.
(On order Blackjack, Tu-22M Backfire bbrs, Tu-95 Bear H (ALCM mod), AS-15 ALCM).
DEPLOYMENT: see composite entry, below.

GROUND FORCES: 1,995,000 (perhaps 1,400,000 conscripts).
3 GTVD, 3 TVD HQ.
51 tk divs (Type: 3 tk, 1 motor rifle, 1 arty, 1 SAM AA regts, 1 SSM, 1 MRL bns, spt units).
141 motor rifle divs (Type: 3 motor rifle, 1 tk, 1 arty, 1 SAM regts, 1 SSM, 1 ATK, 1 MRL bns, spt units).
7 AB divs (each 3 para, 1 arty regts, 1 AA bn).
Some 8 air assault bdes (each 4 rifle bns, arty, SAM, ATK, spt tps).
Front and Army tps:

16 arty divs (Type (Front): 3-4 bdes (11 bns): 3 bns each 24 152mm guns, 3 each 24 152mm gun/how, 3 each 24 200mm MRL,

1 of 12 203mm how and 1 of 12 240mm mor (nuc)).

Arty bdes (Type (Army): 4 bns: 1 of 24 152mm guns, 1 of 24 152mm gun/how, 2 each of 24 152mm SP guns).

Tk, arty, SSM, ATK, AD (SAM and arty), engr bdes, sigs, electronic warfare, hy tk tpt regts, NBC defence, cw bns, spt services.
Special forces (Spetsnaz): 16 bdes, 3 regts.
Army Avn: regts and sqns assigned to division and above; some 20 are assigned as 'attack' regts with 60+ Mi-8 and Mi-24 armed hel

(see also Air Force below).
Ministry of Defence tps: Rear Services.
Troops of Civil Defence: (150,000 permanent staff, 16,000,000+ on mobilization).

Nationwide programme Lurssen to city/rural/industrial level incl some 75 comd posts within 120 km of Moscow, 1,500 hardened deep shelters;

accommodation for at least 175,000 officials, and local urban hardened shelters for essential workforce and some ofthe general population.
Tks: some 52,600: some 33,500 T-54/-55/-62, some 9,300 T-64, 9,800 T-72/-80 (most fitted for deep fording); lt: PT-76.
AFV: some 70,000: recce: 7,500: incl BRDM-2, GT-S, BMP variants, many with ATGW; ACRV-1/-2/-3 comd/recce;

MICV: 27,000: 24,000 BMP-1/-2/-3 with 30mm gun, some 3,000 BMD (AB);

APC: 35,500 BTR-50P/-60P/-70/-152 (-70, BMP-2 replacing -50/-60), GTT, MT-LB (with SA-13/-19 SAM).
Arty: some 33,000 (some 4,700 SP): guns: incl M-1966 76mm, D-74 122mm, M-46 130mm, M-1976 152mm, S-23 180mm towed, 2-S5 152mm SP;

gun/how: M-1937/D-20 towed, 3,500+ M-1973 (2-S3) 152mm SP;

how: M-1938/D-3O 122mm, M-1938/D-1 152mm towed, M-1974 (2-S1) 122mm, M-1975 203mm SP;

mor: 11,000 120mm, 160mm and M-1975 240mm SP;

MRL: 6,200 M-1964 (BM-21)/M-1972 (RM-70) 40-tube, M-1975 12-tube, M-1976 36-tube 122mm, BM-14-16/-17 16/17-tube,

RPU-14 16-tube 140mm, M-1977 (BM-27) 16-tube 220mm, BM-24 12-tube 240mm.
ATK: RL/RCL: RPG-16/-18 73mm, RPG-7 82mm; SPG-9 73 mm;

guns: 7,000 76mm, D-44/SD-44 85mm, T-12/-12A/M-55 100mm towed and ASU-57/-85 SP;

ATGW: AT-2 Swatter, AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-6 Spiral.
SSM (nuclear-capable): some 1,500 launchers (units organic to formations), incl some 750 FROG/SS-21, 600 Scud/SS-23, 125 SS-12/SS-22.

GLCM: SS-X-4 reported under development.
AD: guns: 21,000: ZU-23 23mm, 37mm, S-60 57mm, 85mm, KS-19 100mm, 130mm towed,

ZSU-23-4 23mm, 30mm (incl ZSU-30-6 trials), ZSU-57-2 57mm SP;

SAM: 4,300 crew-served field mobile systems; (some 440 units):

SA-4 Ganef (twin): 1,400 (Army/Front weapon).

SA-6 Gainful (triple): 900 (div level).

SA-7 Grail (man-portable): perhaps 25,000 (unit weapon).

SA-8 Gecko (2x2 or 2x3): 700 (at div).

SA-9 Gaskin (2x2): 575 (at regt).

SA-11: 50 (at div, being introduced).

SA-13 Gopher (2x2): 675 (replacing SA-9).

SA-X-12 (to replace SA-4 from 1986).

SA-X-14 (unit weapon) reported under development.

Radar:

(i) Surveillance: Long Track (SA-4/-6), P-50 Bar Lock.

(ii) Height-finder Thin Skin.

(iii) Missile control: Pat Hand (SA-4), Straight Flush (SA-6), Land Roll (SA-8).

(iv) AA arty fire control: Gun Dish (ZSU-23-4), Fire Can (57mm, 85mm), Whiff, Fire Wheel (57mm, 130mm).
Avn: some 4,300 hel (see also Air Forces of MDs and Gps of Forces):

Armed: 1,250; 150 Mi-17 Hip E, 1,100 Mi-24 Hind. Mi-28 reported under development.

Tpt: some 2,300; some 1,500 Mi-8 Hip C, 250 Mi-17 Hip H (assault); 450 Mi-6 Hook; ?12 Mi-26 Halo A (hy).

ECM: 10 Mi-17 Hip J.

Lt recce/ATK/utilily: 740 Mi-2 Hoplite, 20 Mi-4 Hound; Mi-17 HipD/G (comms).

DEPLOYMENT: see composite entry below.

Soviet divs have 3 categories of combat readiness:

Category 1, full strength on 24 hours notice, eqpt complete.

Category 2, 50-75% strength, complete with fighting vehicles, full manning planned to take 3 days.

Category 3, cadre (some 20% strength), combat eqpt possibly complete, older models, planned to be fully manned in some 8-9 weeks.

The system may now be changing, with some units in a formation being at full strength, others at cadre only.

'Second Generation' divs using key personnel from the active divs and older reservists and equipment could be mobilized and retrained in some months.

Some 13 of these are reported to exist.

The 30 divs and 1 arty div in Eastern Europe, AB divs and air assault bdes are Category 1.

About 20% of the divs in European USSR are in Category 1 or 2.

Most in Far Eastern, Central and Southern USSR are likely to be Category 3.

Tk divs m Eastern Europe have up to 325 MBT, motor rifle divs up to 271; holdings elsewhere may be lower.

NATIONAL AIR DEFENCE TROOPS (Aviation of Air Defence-APVO): 635,000.
5 Air Defence District Commands: Air regts and indep sqns; AD regts; 14 specialist schools.
ABM:

ABM-1B Galosh: 32: range 320+ km, warheads nuclear, presumably MT range. 8 sites in 4 complexes around Moscow.

New ABM (SH-04 exatmospheric, SH-08 supersonic endoatmospheric) being emplaced.
Aircraft:
Interceptors: 1,200+: some 430 MiG-23 FloggerB/G (6 AAM); 300 MiG-25 Foxbat E (4 AAM); 1 regt, some 36 MiG-29 Fulcrum (6 AA-10);

(?5 bns), 75 MiG-31 Foxhound A (8 AA-9); 200 Su-15 Flagon E/F (2 AAM); 90 Yak-28P Firebar (2 AA-5); 90 Tu-28P Fiddler B (4 AA-5).
Airborne Warning and Control: 9 Tu-126 mod Moss; 4 Il-76 Mainstay (replacing Moss).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-3 Anab, AA-5 Ash, A-6 Acrid, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, AA-9, AA-10.
SAM: strategic role; some 9,600 launchers (some 14,000 launcher rails) in some 1,200 sites:

SA-1 Guild: 2,875 (being replaced by SA-10).

SA-2 Guideline: 2,900 (SA-10 may be replacing);

SA-3 Goa: 1,250 (2 or 4 launcher rails, over 300 sites, low- to med-altitude intercept).

SA-5 Gammon: 2000+ launchers (100+ complexes, long-range intercept);

SA-10: some 520 (quad, some 60 complexes; 30 with a strategic role).
Warning Systems:

Some 7,000, incl satellites and EWng and ground control intercept radars.
(a) Satellites: 9 with highly elliptical semi synchronous orbits (anti-ICBM/SLBM launch detection capability).

Others incl 9 EWng, 6 ELINT, 2-4 recce, 1 launch detection.
(b) Over-the-horizon (backscatter) radars: 3: 2 near Minsk and Nikolayev (Caucasus), targeted on the US and polar areas;

1 near Nikolayev-na-Amur, on China.
(c) Long-range early-warning radars:
(i) ABM-associated:
(a) 5 phased-array systems at Lyaki, Krasnoyarsk (under construction), Sary-shagan, Pechora, Mishelevka. 2 other sites reported.
(b) 11 House (Hen)-series; range 6,000 km, 6 locations covering approaches from the west and south-west, north-east and southeast and (partially) south.

Linked to intermediate-range Dog House (range 2,800 km) and Cat House and Try Add msl control radar.
(c) Flat Twin; Pawn Shop (ABM-3/SH-04 -08).
(ii) AD-associated: Tall King, range 600 km (SA-5); P-12 Spoon Rest, 275 km (SA-2).
(d) Search, surveillance/target-acquisition radars: (7,000; 1,200 sites):

Back Trap; P-15 Flat Face/Squat Eye, 200 km (SA-3); P-50 Bar Lock; P-50 Back Net, 320 km (SA-5).
(e) Height Finder radars: Cake-series (e.g., Rock Cake), 200 km; Side Net, 180 km; Odd Pair; Odd Group.
(f) Missile control radars: Yo-Yo (SA-1); Fan Song A to E (SA-2); Low Blow (SA-3); Square Pair (SA-5); Flap Lid (SA-10).
(g) Civilian air control equipment.

AIR FORCE: 570,000.
Air Forces of the Soviet Union: (315,000). 17 MD and Groups of Forces.

Air Forces, Military transport Aviation (VTA- see p. 24), Strategic (p. 21) and Air Defence.

In wartime will control all strategic, theatre, tactical and transport air.
Combat: some 5,900 ac, 2,830 hel; strengths vary, mostly org in divs of 3 regts of 3 sqns, total 135 ac;

the regts' roles incl AD, interdiction, recce, tac air spt. Div may have a mix of roles.
FGA: some 2,350: 135 MiG-21 Fishbed L, 760 MiG-27 Flogger D/J, 130 Su-7 Fitter A, 1,000 Su-17 Fitter D/H/K,

250 Su-24 Fencer (450 more with Strategic), 75 Su-25 Frogfoot.
Ftrs: 2,360: 530 MiG-21 J/K/L/N, 1,700 MiG-23 Flogger B/G, 130 MiG-25 Foxbat A/E (Su-27 Flanker may be about to enter service).
Attack assault hel: 2,650: Mi-8 Hip C/E; Mi-24 Hind D/E.
Recce: 560: 170 MiG-25 Foxbat B/D, 50 MiG-21 Fishbed H, 150 Yak-28 Brewer D, 190 Su-17 Fitter H/K.
ECM: ac: 30 Yak-28 Brewer E; hel: 180 Mi-8 Hip J/K.
Trg: Some 1,000 ac, 700 hel; perhaps 600 combat capable (ocus).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, AA-9.
ASM: AS-7 Kerry, AS-10; hel-borne: AT-2 Swatter, AT-6 Spiral.
MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (VTA): (65,000); some 600 ac.
Org in 5 divs, each 3 regts, each 30 ac. Some indep regts.

270 An-12 Cub, 270 I1-76M/MD Candid B (replacing Cub),55 An-22 Cock, 3 An-124 Condor (in production).

(Il-76 med tanker under development.)
Assigned to Air Comds in regts and sqns (not VTA): 1,250: 265 An-2 Colt, An-24 Coke, An-26 Curl, Il-14 Crate.
In addition, 1,400 med- and long-range passenger ac, incl some 200 Cub and Candid of the civilian Aeroflot fleet and the

1,250 tpts of the other Services, could augment VTA airlift.

DEPLOYMENT: see composite entry below.

NAVY: 480,000 (20,000 in Strategic), (some 75% conscripts), incl Naval Air Force, Naval Infantry, Coastal Artillery and Rocket Troops.
Subs: 371 (381- see Attack, below):
Cruise missile: 66:
Nuclear (SSGN): 49.

1 Y-class with perhaps 24 SS-N-24 SLCM.

2 O-class with 24 SS-N-19.

1 P-class (10 msls; ?SS-N-9 Siren).

17 C-class: 11 C-I with 8 SS-N-7; 6 C-II with 8 SS-N-9.

28 E-II: some 20 with 8 SS-N-3a; some 8 with 8 SS-N-12.
Diesel (SSG): 17:

16 J-class with 4 SS-N-3a.

1 W-Long Bin with 4 SS-N-3.
Attack: 203 (213 if all Y-I and H-2 converting from SSBN were incl):
Nuclear (SSN): 72: 6 A, 12 N, 1 Akula, 1 M, 1 S, 16 V-I, 7 V-II, 20 V-III, 5 E-I, 1 Y, 2 H.
Diesel (SS): 131: 7 K, 19 T, 50 F, 15 R, 50 W.
Other roles: 102:

Comd conversion: 3 G-I; trg: 4 B; rescue: 2 I; research: 3: 1 U and 1 X SSN, 1 L; SLBM research: 1 G-V; reserve: 10 F, 4 Z, 75 W.

(10 Y-I SSBN are being converted to other roles incl SSN). Apart from the older N and E, most SSN probably carry SS-N-16

and/or SS-N-15 nuclear ASW weapons.)

A new land target naval cruise msl, SS-NX-21, is being developed which could be carried in some of the modern SSN.
Principal surface combatants: 289.(For KGB units seep. 30.)
Carriers: 6:

4 Kiev (37,000 tons) (1 on trials) with 4x2 SS-N-12 Sandbox SSM, 2x2 SA-N-3 and 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1x2 SUW-N-1 ASW,

14 Yak-38 Forger A/B V/STOL ac, 16 Ka-27 Helix A, 3 Ka-25 Hormone B hel.

2 Moskva (17,000 tons) with 2x2 SA-N-3 SAM, 1x2 SUW-N-1 (FRAS-1) ASW, 18 Hormone A hel.
Cruisers: 39:
CGN: 2 Kirov with 20 SS-N-19 SSM, 12 SA-N-6, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1x2 SS-N-14 Silex ASW (1 ship only), 3 Ka-25 Hormone B hel.
CG/ASW: 27:

2 Slava (1 on trials) with 8x2 SS-N-12 Sandbox SSM, 8 SA-N-6, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1 Ka-27 hel;

7 Kara with 2x4 SS-N-14 ASW, 2x2 SA-N-3, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM (1 trials with 1x6 SA-N-6 replacing twin SA-N-3), 1 Ka-25 Hormone A hel;

10 Kresta-II with 2x4 SS-N-14, 2x2 SA-N-3, 1 Ka-25 Hormone A hel;

4 Kresta-I with 2x2 SS-N-3b SSM, 2x2 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 Hormone B hel;

4 Kynda with 2x4 SS-N-3b, 1x2 SA-N-1.
Lt: 10 Sverdlov (2 command with 1x2 SA-N-4, 1 Ka-25 hel).
Destroyers: 69:
DDG: 13:

4 Sovremenny with 2x4 SS-N-22 SSM, 2 SA-N-7 SAM, 1 Hormone B hel;

6 mod Kashin with 4 SS-N-2C, 2x2 SA-N-1;

3 mod Kildin with 4 SS-N-2-C.
ASW: 34:

5 Udaloy with 2x4 SS-N-14, 2 Ka-27 hel;

13 Kashin (12 with 2x2 SA-N-1, 1 with SA-N-7 (trials));

8 Kanin with 1x2 SA-N-1;

8 SAM Kotlin with 1x2 SA-N-1.
DD: 22: 12 Kotlin, 9 Skory, 1 Kildin.
Frigates: 175:
FFG: 32: 21 Krivak-I, 11 -II with 1x4 SS-N-14, 2x2 SA-N-4.
FF: 35: 1 Koni, 34 Riga.
FFL (corvette): 108: 50 Grisha-I/III with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM; 18 Mirka-I/-II; 40 Petya.
Minor surface combatants: 700:
GW patrol boats (FLG): 37:

1 Tarantul II with 2x2 SS-N-22 (trials); 2 Tarantul I, 10 - II all with 2x2 SS-N-2c;

24 Nanuchka-I/III with 2x3 SS-N-9 (Siren), 1x2 SA-N-4.
FAC: (G): 109: 60 Osa-I, 32 Osa-II, all with 4 SS-N-2; 17 hydrofoil (1 Sarancha with 2x2 SS-N-9, 1x2 SA-N-4; 16 Matka with 2 SS-N-2c);

(T): 113: 15 Pauk with 1x4 SA-N-5; 58 Poti, 10 Shershen, 30 Turya torpedo hydrofoils;

research: 2: 1 Slepen, 1 Babochka.
Patrol craft: 81: 20 SO-1 (some KGB), 5 T-58; 2 T-58, 9 T-43/PFR radar pickets; river 45 Shmel.
Mine warfare: 358:
Minelayers: 3 Alesha.
MCMV (ocean): 115: 35 Natya-I/-II, 45 Yurka, 35 T-43;

(coastal): 175: 2 Andryusha, 50 Sonya, 3 Zhenya, 5 Sasha, 70 Vanya, 45 Evgenya;

(inshore): 65: 10 Ilyusha, 5 Olya, 20 TR-40, 30 K-8.
Amph forces: 178: 79 ships, 99 craft.

LPD: 2 Ivan Rogov with 1x2 SA-N-4, 4x4 SA-N-5,2-3 Ka-27 hel.

LST: 32: 18 Ropucha, some with 4x4 SA-N-5; 14 Alligator (some with 3x2, 1 with 2x2 SA-N-5).

LSM: 45: 41 Polnocny, some with 2 or 4x4 SA-N-5; 4 MP-4.
Amph craft: 99:

LCU: 30: 5 Vydra, 5 SMB-1, 20 Ondatra.

Hovercraft: 69: 17 Aist, 18 Lebed, 30 Gus, 2 Utenok, 1 Tsaplya, 1 Ekranoplan experimental.
Principal auxiliary ships: 305:
Tankers: 71: 28 replenishment, 30 spt, 13 special liquid.
Spt: 234: 12 msl, 10 supply, 80 cargo, 20 submarine tenders, 36 repair, 2 hospital, 22 submarine rescue, 25 salvage/rescue, 10 trg,

7 msl range ships, 10 icebreakers.
Merchant fleet (auxiliary/augmentation): 1,900 ocean-going, incl 17 ramp-fitted roll-on/roll off (RO/RO) (10 Arctic service);

700 river ships (in deep sea service).
Intelligence collection vessels (AGI): 60.
Research: 495: 40 naval, 105 survey; 350 civilian oceanographic, fishery, survey, space associated and hydrographic vessels.
Additional in reserve: 2 Sverdlov CC (1 with 1x2 SA-N-2 SAM); 6 Kotlin, 5 Skory DD; 10 Riga FL; 35 Shmel; 10 T-43, 5 Sasha MCMV; amph vessels.
(On order. 3-4 Typhoon, D-IV SSBN; O SSGN; Akula, M, S SSN; K SS; 1 65-75,000-ton, 1 Kirov CGN; 1 Slava CG; 4+ Sovremenny, 4 Udaloy DDG;

Krivak-III FFG, Grisha-III FFL; Tarantul, Nanuchka FLG; Muravey, Stenka, Pauk FAC(T); Sonya coastal MCMV;

Ropucha LST; Aist, Lebed hovercraft; Balzan AGI).

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (70,000); some 875 combat ac, some 310 combat hel.
Four Fleet Air Forces; org in air divs, each with 2-3 regts of HQ elements and 2 bns of 9-10 ac each; recce, ASW, tpt/utility org in indep regts or sqns.
Bbrs: some 345 ac: 5 regts of some 100 Tu-22M Backfire B (AS-4 ASM); 7 regts of some 160 Tu-16 Badger C, 50 G/G-mod (AS-5 ASM);

2 regts of some 35 Tu-22 Blinder B.
FGA: 135: 70 Yak-38 Forger A/B v/STOL (in carriers), 65 Su-17 Fitter C.
ASW: ac: some 195: 55 Tu-142 Bear F, 50 Il-38 May, 90 Be-12 Mail; hel: some 250: 90 Mi-14 Haze, 120 Ka-25 Hormone A, 50 Ka-27 Helix A.
MR/ECM: ac: 170: 40 Tu-16 Badger D/E/F/K (MR), 40 H/J (ECM), 20 Tu-22 Blinder C, 45 Tu-95 Bear D, 25 An-12 Cub C/D;

hel: 25 Ka-25 Hormone B hel.
MCM: some 10 Mi-14 Haze B hel.
Tankers: 75 Tu-16 Badger.
Tpt/trg: ac: 400: incl An-12 Cub A, An-26 Curl, Il-14 Crate, Il-18 Coot, An-4 Coke, Il-76 Classic, hel: Mi-6/-8 Hook/Hip.
ASM: AS-2 Kipper, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt, AS-6 Kingfish, AS-7Kerry.

NAVAL INFANTRY (Marines): (16,000).
Div HQ: 1
Bdes/regts: 5 inf: (Type: 3,000; 3 inf, 1 tk, arty bns; 31 MBT, 10 lt tk/MICV, 30 122mm SP how, 6 MRL, 6 ATK.MICV, 4 SPAA guns, 4 SP SAM).
4 naval Special Forces (Spetsnaz) bdes (one in each Fleet).
Indep units: 20:
Tks: 155 T-54/-55; lt: 50 PT-76. AFV: recce: 30 BRDM-2 with Sagger ATGW; APC: BTR-60P/PA/PB.
Arty: how: 251 122mm SP; mor 82mm, 30 120mm; MRL: 30 BM-14 17-tube 140mm or BM-21 40-tube 122mm; ATGW: AT-3/-5.
AD: guns: 20 ZSU-23-4 SP; SAM: SA-7, 20 SA-9, MTB-LB/SA-13 SP. Hel: Mi-8 Hip E.

COASTAL ARTILLERY AND ROCKET TROOPS: (14,000).
1 coastal arty div:
Eqpt: incl SM-4-1 130mm; SSM: perhaps 100 SS-C-1b Sepal (similar to SS-N-3). Protect approaches to naval bases and major ports.

DEPLOYMENT AND BASES (all Services):
(Soviet strategic planning envisages three major Strategic Theatres (GTVD) which may be further subdivided into regional Theatres (TVD),

perhaps four associated Oceanic Theatres (OTVD), and a Central Reserve.

Forces within these Theatres are centrally controlled and co-ordinated, integrating all the elements assigned to accomplish the operational mission.

The deployments shown for SLBM and ICBM and for AB divs reflect their physical location, but control of them is exercised centrally.
A possible assignment, of necessity speculative, of known forces may be as follows (average strengths, excl units in reserve;

eqpt strengths based on typical organizational establishments):

WESTERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD):

(HQ: Kiev: ) 3 subordinate continental, 2 associated oceanic theatres (OTVD).

NORTH-WESTERN TVD (with Arctic OTVD): (HQ: Petrozavodsk):
Strategic Forces (SLBM under central control):

SLBM: 576: Northern Fleet: 3 Typhoon subs (60), 21 D (300), 13 Y-I/-II (204); 1 H-III (6), 1 G-III(6).

ICBM: Plesetsk test site only.

Bbrs: nil.
Air Defence Forces:

EWng systems: major site near Kovdov, W.Kola, detail deployments unknown.

AD: 1 district: Arkhangel (incl Kola Peninsula).

Ftrs: .270 (some dual role FGA): perhaps 9 regts MiG-23 Flogger, MiG-25 Foxbat, MiG-29 Fulcrum, MiG-31 Foxhound; Su-15 Flagon; Yak-28P.

AEW: 6 Tu-126 Moss (some 4 Il-76 Candid replacing).

SAM: over 50 complexes: SA-2/-3/-5/-10.
Ground Forces: Leningrad MD (HQ Leningrad): 9 motor rifle, 1 AB divs, plus 1 arty div and 1 air assault bde.

Mobilization could field 1 Front, 2 all-arms armies with 2,400 MBT; 2,100 arty, MRL, hy mor; 36 FROG/SS-21, 50 SCUD/SS-23, 12 SS-12/-22 SSM;

300 attack and tpt hel.
Tactical Aviation: Leningrad MD Air Force (HQ: Leningrad): combat: 175 ac, some 75 hel.

FGA: 3 regts (145 ac) MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-27 Flogger, Su-17 Fitter C/D.

Recce: 3 sqns (30 ac) MiG-21/-25; Su-17 Fitter H.

Hel: 115: attack: 35 Mi-24 Hind; assault 70 Mi-8 Hip C; ECM: 10 Hip J.

Tpt: ac: 30; hel: 90 Mi-8 Hip, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hoplite.
Navy: Northern Fleet (HQ Severomorsk): Bases: Kola Inlet, Motovskiy Gulf, Gremikha, Polyarny.

Subs: 116: SSGN/SSG: 35; SSN/SS, 81. (8-10 normally deployed to Mediterranean.)

Principal combatants: 81: 1 carrier, 13 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 17 frigates, 30 corvettes; dets to Mediterranean Sqn.

(See South-Western TVD below.)

Minor combatants: 110.

Amph: 13.

Auxiliaries: 87 principal.
Naval Aviation: combat: 305 ac, 70 hel.

Bbrs: 50 Tu-16 Badger C.

Ftr/FGA: 20 Yak-38 Forger.

ASW: 150: ac Tu-142 Bear F, Il-38 May, Be-12 Mail; hel (afloat): Ka-25 Hormone, (ashore): Ka-25, Mi-14 Haze, Ka-27 Helix.

Recce: 85: Tu-16 Badger, Tu-95 Bear, Tu-22 Blinder MR, ECM.

Tankers/tpt: 40 ac incl Tu-16 tankers, perhaps 60 hel.
Naval Infantry: Bde: 3,000: 5 bns.

WESTERN TVD (with Atlantic OTVD): (HQ: Legnica):
Strategic Forces (msls and ac under central control):

SLBM: 18: Baltic Fleet: 6 G-II SSB (18).

ICBM: (?50): SS-17 (1 field). (Could have theatre role.)

IRBM: (?162): SS-20 (6 fields).

MRBM: 120: SS-4 (2 fields).

Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ: Legnica): some 150 incl Su-24.
Air Defence Forces:

EWng Systems: 2 OTH(B) near Minsk, 1 major complex near Tallinn; deployment details unknown.

Ftrs: See Tactical Aviation (MDS).

SAM: 6,500 SA-2/-3/-5/-10; more than 150 sites.
Ground Forces: (HQ: Legnica): 3 Groups of Soviet Forces, Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian MDs; 62 divs (31 tk, 29 motor rifle, 2 AB), plus 6 arty divs.
East Germany (GSFG): (HQ: Zossen-Wiinsdorf: (380,000): 1 Gp, 5 Army HQ; 10 tk, 9 motor rifle plus 1 arty divs;

1 air assault, 1 SS-12/-22, 2 Scud/SS-23, 5 arty bdes; 5 attack hel regts.
Poland (NGF): (HQ: Legnica): (40,000); 1 Gp, 1 Army HQ; 2 tk divs; 1 Scud/SS-23 bn; 1 attack hel regt.
Czechoslovakia (CGF): (HQ: Tabor): (80,000): 1 Gp, 2 Army HQ; 2 tk, 3 motor rifle divs;

1 air assault bn; 1 SS-12/-22, 2 Scud/SS-23, 1 arty bdes; 2 attack hel regts.
Baltic MD: (HQ: Kaliningrad): 3 tk, 6 motor rifle, 2 AB plus 2 arty divs.
Belorussian MD: (HQ: Minsk): 10 tk, 4 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Carpathian MD: (HQ: Lvov): 3 Army, 4 tk, 7 motor rifle, plus 2 arty divs.

The 26 divs in Central Europe, the 2 AB and perhaps 11 of the 34 line divs all in the Soviet Union are Cat 1 or 2.

Mobilization of these divs in the TVD could produce five Fronts, 13-14 Armies (which would also command the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact formations)

and up to 13,000 MBT; 7,900 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 150 FROG, (?48) SS-21, 250 Scud/SS-23, 65 SS-12/-22 SSM; 2,220 SAM).
Tactical Aviation: combat: some 1,860 ac, 1,160 hel.
East Germany: Air Forces of the Group of Soviet forces Germany (HQ: Zossen-Wiinsdorf): combat: some 690 aircraft; 560 helicopters.

FGA: 320 Su-17 Fitter D/H/K, MiG-27 FloggerD/J, Su-24 Fencer.

Ftrs: 300: MiG-21 Fishbed L/N, MiG-23 Flogger B/G.

Hel: 550: Mi-8 Hip C/E; Mi-24 Hind D/E.

Recce: 50 Su-17 Fitter H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D.

ECM: 20 Yak-28 Brewer ac; Mi-8 Hip J/K hel.

Tpt: 60 ac and hel.
Czechoslovakia: Air Forces of the Central Group of Forces (HQ: LVOV): combat: 105 ac; 100 hel.

FGA: 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 45 MiG-23 Flogger B.

Hel: 100: Mi-8 Hip D/E, Mi-24 Hind D/E.

Recce: 15 Su-17 Fitter H.

Tpt: 5 ac and hel.
Poland: Air Forces of the Northern Group of Forces (HQ: Legnica): combat: no ac: 120 hel.

Hel: 120 Mi-8 Hip C/E, Mi-24 Hind D/E.

Tpt: 10 ac and hel.
Baltic MD Air Force (HQ: Kaliningrad): combat: some 360 ac; 80 hel.

FGA: 90: 2 regts: Su-17, MiG-27 Flogger B/J.

Ftrs: 250: Hel: 80 Mi-8/-24.

Recce: 1 bn(?12) MiG-25.

ECM: 15.

Tpt: 5.
Belorussian MD Air Force (HQ: Minsk): combat: 365 ac; 150 hel.

FGA: 135: Su-17, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 200 MiG-21 Fishbed J/K/L; MiG-23 Flogger B/G.

Hel: 150 Mi-8/-24.

Recce: 30 MiG-21 Fishbed H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D.

Tpt: n/a.
Carpathian MD Air Force (HQ: Vinnitsa): combat: 330 ac, 150 hel.

FGA: 180: 4 regts with MiG-17, MiG-27, Su-7, Su-17.

Ftrs: 120: 3 regts MiG-21/-23.

Hel: 50 Mi-8 Hip E, 10 Mi-24.

Recce: 10: 1 sqn.

ECM: 20.
Navy: Baltic Fleet (HQ: Kaliningrad): Bases: Kronshtadt, Paldiski, Liepaya, Baltiysk, Riga.

(Probably has dual role: to support Soviet operations in Central Europe by sea control and amph operations against the German coast,

and to support a North-Western TVD operation against Scandinavia.)

Subs: 26: 4 SSG, 22 ss.

Principal combatants: 45: 3 cruisers; 11 destroyers; 14 frigates; 17 corvettes.

Minor combatants: 230.
Amph: 25.
Auxiliaries: 50 principal.
Naval Aviation: Combat: 99 ac, 30 hel.

Bbrs: 2 regts: 35 Tu-22M.

FGA: 1 regt: 30 Su-17.

ASW: 50: 10 Il-38, 10 Be-12G ac; 30 Ka-25, Ka-27, Mi-4 hel.

Recce: 14 ac.

Utility: 45 ac and hel.
Naval Infantry:

Bde: 1: 5 bns; 3,000.
Coast Defence:

SSM: 1 div: 6 bns: some 100 SS-C-lb Sepal.

Arty: 11 bns: some 72 130mm guns.

SOUTH-WESTERN TVD (HQ: Vinnitsa).
Strategic Forces:

SLBM: nil.

ICBM: (?180) SS-19 (2 fields).

IRBM: (?54) SS-20 (2 fields).

Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ: Vinnitsa): some 140 incl Su-24.
Ground Forces (HQ: Vinnitsa): 1 Group of Forces, 2 MDS; 26 divs (9 tk, 16 motor rifle, 1 AB), plus 3 arty.
Hungary (SGF): (HQ: Budapest) (65,000): 1 Army HQ: 2 tk, 2 motor rifle divs.
Odessa MD (HQ: Odessa): 8 motor rifle, 1 AB, plus 1 arty divs.
Kiev MD (HQ: Kiev): 6 tk, 4 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs. (Киевский ВО пропущен, приведены данные из MB.1984 -ЕТ)

The 4 divs in Hungary, plus perhaps 4 of the divs in the Kiev MD are Cat. 1 or 2.

Mobilization of these forces (and those of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) could produce 4 Fronts plus perhaps 5 all-arms Armies.

The Soviet equipment total would comprise up to 2,400 MBT; 3,260 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 85 FROG/SS-21, 100 Scud SSM; 500 SAM.
Tactical Aviation: (HQ: Vinnitsa): combat: 525 ac, 185 hel.
Hungary: Air Forces of the Southern Group of Forces (HQ: Budapest): combat: 210 ac, 65 hel.

FGA: 60: 2 regts: Su-17 Fitter D, Su-24.

Ftrs: 135: 3 regts: MiG-21 Fishbed K/L.

Hel: 60: 1 regt: 50 Mi-8, 10 Mi-24.

Recce: 10: 1 sqn: Su-17 Fitter K.

ECM: 10 ac/hel.

Tpt: 20 ac/hel.
Kiev MD Air Force: (HQ: Kiev): combat: some 110 ac, some 40 hel.

FGA: 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 45 MiG-23 Flogger G.

Hel: 30 Mi-8 Hip E.

Recce: 20.

Tpt: 5.
Odessa MD Air Force (HQ: Odessa): combat: 200 ac, 80 hel.

FGA: 40: 1 regt MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 150: MiG-21, MiG-23 Flogger B/G.

Hel: 80 Mi-8, Mi-24.

Recce: 10: 1 sqn: Su-17 Fitter H.

Tpt: ac/hel:
Navy:

(Black Sea Fleet) (HQ: Sevastopol): Bases: Sevastopol, Balaclava, Poti, Odessa.

(Fleet primary mission probably to support operations in Thrace with Mediterranean Sqn; secondary role, sea control off Turkish coast.)

Subs: 30: 2 SSB, 28 SS.

Principal combatants: 78: 1 carrier, 2 ASW hel carriers, 9 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 15 frigates, 30 corvettes (5 in Caspian).

Minor combatants: 160.

Amph: 21.

Auxiliaries: 53 principal; (7 in Caspian).
Naval Aviation:

Bbrs: 100: 1 regt Tu-22M Backfire; 2 regts Tu-16 Badger C/G.

FGA: (?65): afloat: Yak-38: ashore: 35 Su-17.

Recce/EWng: 1 regt, some 35 Tu-22; 1 regt, 1 bn Tu-16, Il-38, Be-12, An-12 Cub.

ASW: (?50): 2 regts: Tu-142 Bear, Il-38.

ASW hel: 40: afloat: 1 bn Hormone A; ashore: 1 bn Hormone A.
Naval Inf: 3,000: bde: 5 bns.
(Mediterranean Squadron) (HQ: Afloat): elms of Northern and Black Sea Fleets; average composition:

Subs: 8-10.

Principal combatants: 8.

Amph: 2.

MCMV: 1.

Auxiliaries: 17-25; AGI: 2-3.

CENTRAL RESERVE:

HQ: MOSCOW:
Strategic Forces (under central control):

SLBM: nil.

ICBM: ?858: SS-11 (4 fields, (?260) msls), SS-13 (1 field, 60 msls), SS-17 (1 field, ?100 msls), SS-18 (3 fields, ?158 msls), SS-19 (2 fields, 180 msls).

IRBM: ?27: SS-20 (1 field).

Bbrs: 360: 2 Air Armies:

(HQ: MOSCOW): 160: 4 divs: Mya-4 Bison, Tu-95 Bear.

(HQ: Smolensk): 460: 60 Tu-22M Backfire, Tu-22 Blinder, Tu-16 Badger. Recce/ECM: 150.

Tpt: 90.
Air Defence Forces:

EWng Systems: major sites near Pechora, Pushkino; detailed deployments unknown.

AD: 1 Area: (HQ: MOSCOW).

Ftrs: some 450: 10 regts: MiG-25, MiG-31; MiG-23, Su-15.

ABM: Moscow complexes: 2 Galosh; 7 new missile sites reported under construction.

SAM: 1 complex (Moscow area).
Ground Forces: 3 MDS; 18 divs (3 tk, 14 motor rifle, 1 AB). Roles would be to protect Moscow and provide first-line reinforcement.

All 7 AB divs are centrally controlled, though deployed as shown.
Moscow MD (HQ: Moscow): 2 tk, 6 motor rifle, 1 AB divs.
Ural MD (HQ: Sverdlovsk): 1 tk, 4 motor rifle divs.
Volga MD(HQ: Kuybyshev): 4 motor rifle divs.

Div readiness: perhaps 2, plus the AB, Cat. 1; rest Cat. 2 or cadre.

On mobilization could field 4,500 MBT; 2,630 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 75 FROG, 30 Scud, 10 SS-12 SSM.
Tactical Aviation: Moscow MD Air Force (HQ: Moscow): combat: some 150 ac, 50 hel.

FGA: 45: 1 regt Su-17.

Ftrs: 90: 2 regts MiG-23/-27, (?12) MiG-29.

Hel: 60: Mi-8, Mi-24 (some 50 armed).

Recce: 20 ac.

SOUTHERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD) (also may be referred to as 'Near Eastern').

(HQ: Tashkent): incl North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus, Turkestan MDs, Afghanistan).
Strategic Forces (ac under central control):

Bbrs: 1 div: some 60 med bbrs, (?1 bn) Su-24 Fencer, 2 bns of spt ac.
Air Defence Forces:

EWng System: 1 site: Lyaki (Trans-Caucasus).

AD: 1 area (see MD Air Forces, below).
Ground Forces: 3 MDS; 30 divs (1 tk, 28 motor rifle, 1 AB) plus 2 arty.
North Caucasus MD (HQ: Rostov): 1 tk, 7 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Trans-Caucasus MD (HQ: Tbilisi): 12 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Turkestan MD (HQ: Tashkent): 6 motor rifle divs.
Afghanistan: (HQ: Kabul): 1 Army HQ, 3 motor rifle, 1 AB divs; 2 motor rifle, 1 air assault indep bdes.

Perhaps 1 or 2 divs Cat. 1, 2 or 3 Cat. 2, rest Cat. 3 - except in Afghanistan, where units will be Cat. 1 but divs may lack such eqpt as SAM.

Mobilization could put 2-3 Fronts, perhaps 9 all-arms armies, in the field.

This org could have: 5,500 MBT; 6,300 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 100 FROG, 70 Scud SSM; 1,600 SAM.
Tactical Aviation (HQ: Tashkent): combat: 680 ac, 405 hel.
Trans-Caucasus MD Air Force (HQ: Tbilisi): combat: 420 ac, 160 hel.

FGA: 180: 4 regts: Su-17, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 200: 5 regts: MiG-21, MiG-23 Flogger B/G, MiG-25 Foxbat A.

Hel: 160: Mi-8, Mi-24.

Recce: 40: 1 regt: Su-17 Fitter H.

Tpt: 18.
Afghanistan: 1 Air Army (HQ: Kabul (Bagram)): combat: 257 ac, 245 hel.

FGA: 4 regts: 80 MiG-21, 40 MiG-23, 80 Su-17, 30 Su-25 Frogfoot.

Recce: 2 bns: 15 MiG-21 Fishbed R, 12 MiG-25.

Hel: 4 regts: some indep bns, 140 Mi-24 attack. 105 Mi-8. 40 Mi-6, 40 Mi-2.

Tpt: incl An-22 Cock, VTA and Aeroflot ac from USSR in spt.
Navy: (Caspian Flotilla) (HQ: Baku):

Principal combatants: 5 corvettes.

Minor combatants: 30.

Auxiliaries: 7 principal.

FAR EASTERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD); (with Pacific, Indian Ocean OTVDS):

(HQ: Irkutsk) Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaykal, Far Eastern MDs, Mongolia.
Strategic Forces (under central control):

SLBM: 385: 16 D- (220), 9 Y- (144), 5 G-II (15) subs; Bases: Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk.

ICBM: (?380): SS-11 (4 fields, ?260 msls), SS-18 (3 fields, ?120 msls). (SS-11 could have theatre role.)

IRBM: 207: SS-20 (7 fields, 20 sites).

Bbrs: some 150: 1 Air Army (HQ: Irkutsk): 5 regts: 2 with Tu-22M Backfire, 3 with Tu-22 Blinder, Tu-16 Badger.

Spt: perhaps 30 recce: (2) Tu-95 Bear E, (6) Badger F, (4) Blinder C, (18) Badger H/J/K.

Tkrs: some 9 Tu-16A.
Air Defence Forces:

EWng systems: 40 in areas: Kamchatka, Nikolayev-na-Amur, Mishelevka, Abalakova, Sary-shagan.

AD: 3 areas: 1 in Transbaykal, 2 in Far East MDS (see MD Air Forces, below).

SAM: SA-5, SA-10.
Ground Forces: 4 MDS: 53 divs (7 tk, 45 motor rifle, 1 AB) plus 4 arty.
Central Asian MD (HQ: Alma Ata): 1 tk, 6 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Siberian MD (HQ: Novosibirsk): 6 motor rifle plus 1 arty divs.
Transbaykal MD (HQ: Chita): 2 tk, 8 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Far Eastern MD (HQ: Khabarovsk): 2 tk, 22 motor rifle, 1 AB, plus 1 arty divs.
Mongolia (HQ: Ulan Bator): 1 Army HQ, 2 tk, 3 motor rifle divs. (See also Forces Abroad, below.)

Div readiness: 35% at Cat. 1 or 2. Mobilization could put 4 Fronts, perhaps 12 Armies (4 tk), into the field.

This org could have: 14,500 MBT; 10,300 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 225 FROG, 100 Scud, 38 SS-12 SSM; 1,100 SAM.
Tactical Aviation (HQ: Irkutsk): (150,000): combat: some 1,460 ac, 500 hel.
Central Asian MD, incl Siberian MD Air Force (HQ: Novosibirsk): combat: 280 ac, 70 hel.

FGA: 90 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 150 MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger.

Hel: 70: Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind.

Recce: 40 MiG-25 Foxbat B/D.
Transbaykal MD Air Force (HQ: Chita, incl Mongolia): combat: 395 ac, some 180 hel.

FGA: 200: 3 divs, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.

Ftrs: 150: 3 regts: 90 MiG-21 Fishbed J/K, MiG-21 Fishbed L/N, MiG-25 Foxbat A/E, MiG-23 Flogger B/G.

Hel: 180: Mi-8, Mi-24.

Recce: 3 bns: 45 Yak-28.

Tpt: Mi-6.
Far-Eastern MD Air Force (HQ: Khabarovsk): Control centres: Petropavlovsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; Combat: some 785 ac, 250 hel.

FGA: 250: 2 divs: MiG-21 Fishbed L, MiG-27 Flogger D/J, Su-7 Fitter A, Su-17 Fitter D/H/K.

Ftrs: 450: MiG-23, MiG-25 Foxbat A, MiG-31 Foxhound.

Hel: 250 Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind.

Recce: 80: Yak-28 Brewer D, MiG-21 Fishbed H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D.

ECM: 5 Yak-28 Brewer E.

Tpt: incl some 100 Mi-6 Hook hel.
Navy (Pacific Fleet): (HQ: Vladivostok): Bases: Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Sovyetskaya Gavan.

Subs: 88: 26 SSGN/SSG, 62 SSN/SS.

Principal combatants: 85: 2 carriers, 14 cruisers, 17 destroyers, 22 frigates 30 corvettes.

Minor combatants: 200.

Amph: 19 (incl 1 Rogov LPD).

Auxiliaries: 98 principal.

Detachments (average 2-3 subs, 8 principal combatants, 2 amph, 12 spt ships) are normally deployed in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea;

facilities also in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay), South Yemen (Aden, Socotra) and Ethiopia (Dahlak Is.).
Naval Air (Pacific Fleet Air Force): (HQ: Sovetskaya Gavan): Combat: some 290 ac, 85 hel.

Bbrs: 160: 1 regt Tu-22M, 4 regts Tu-16 Badger G/C.

FGA: 26: (afloat): 2 bns Yak-38 ForgerA/B.

ASW: 68: 1 regt 20 Tu-142, 1 18 Il-38; 1 bn 30 Be-12.

ASW hel: some 83: afloat: 2 bns, 38 Ka-25 Hormone A; ashore: 1 bn, some 10 Ka-27 Helix, 2 bns 35 Mi-14.

MR/EWng: some 35 ac.

Tpt: perhaps 150 ac and hel.
Naval Infantry: 2 regts, each 1 tk, 3 inf, 1 arty bns.

FORCES ABROAD:
Afghanistan: 115,000 (some 10,000 MVD, KGB). See Deployment, Southern GTVD.
Mongolia: 75,000. See Deployment, Far Eastern GTVD.
Vietnam: (7,000); averages 25-35 vessels (incl subs, 5-10 combat vessels, 15-20 auxiliaries),

16 Tu-16, 8 Tu-95, 14 Tu-10P/K MR or ASW, 1 sqn with 14 MiG-23 fir ac, AA, SAM, electronic monitoring station.
Other: Algeria 1,000; Angola 500, plus 6 ships, MR ac; Congo 100; Cuba some 8,700 (1 bde (2,800), advisers (?2,800) plus some 3,100 technicians);

Ethiopia 1,500 plus MCMV, dry dock, Il-38 ac, naval inf det; India 200; Iraq 600; Kampuchea 200; Laos 500; Libya 1,400; Mali 200;

Mozambique 300; Nicaragua 50; Peru 160; Syria 2,500; Vietnam 2,500; N.Yemen 500; S. Yemen 1,000; Africa (remainder) 900.

PARA-MILITARY: 675,000.
KGB: 250,000: border tps, with tks, SP guns, AFV, ac and ships

(1 Krivak-III, 8 Grisha-II, 1 Purga frigates; 95 Stenka FAC(P); 4 Muravey, 8 Pchela hydrofoils; 30 Zhuk<, some SO-1, 10 T-58,

14 T-43 patrol craft; 8 Susanin icebreakers (6 armed));

Kremlin Guard; Special Guard; Special Sigs unit (40,000 tps).
MVD: 350,000: security tps; some 30 divs with tks and AFV. By law part of armed forces of USSR.
DOSAAF (part-time military training organization). (5 million are instructors/activists);

330,000+ units: flight training, shooting, parachuting and pre-military training of those aged 15 and over in schools, colleges and workers' centres.

Young Pioneer (ages 8-15), some trg.

The Alliances and Europe

THE WARSAW PACT

We have seen no significant changes in the manpower or equipment inventories of the ground forces of the European countries. There have, however, been a number of increases in both personnel strengths and equipment holdings of their navies and air forces.

Bulgaria may have increased her Air Force personnel by some 1,200, a rise of about 3.5% which would accord with the changes seen in the inventory. She has almost trebled her holdings of MiG-23BM FGA; there is some evidence that, despite our earlier assessment, some MiG-17s continue to be employed in the interceptor role. Czechoslovakia now has the Su-25 Frogfoot close support aircraft - the first non-Soviet Pact member to receive this type. Nevertheless, her elderly MiG-15s are believed still to be in service in this role. The East German navy is increasing its holdings of Parchim missile corvettes and may have phased out six elderly Hai-class large patrol craft; air force holdings of MiG-23BM have doubled, and some Su-22 have been received, enhancing the close air support fleet. Hungary has also received Su-22s but appears to have the reconnaissance version; our earlier assessment of her attack helicopter inventory was apparently over-generous. Poland and Romania do not appear to have made significant changes over the past twelve months, perhaps partly at least as a result of economic stringencies.

ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР

Существенных изменений в кадровом составе и материально-техническом оснащении сухопутных войск европейских стран не произошло. Вместе с тем было отмечено увеличение как численности личного состава, так и техники в их военно-морских и военно-воздушных силах.

Болгария, возможно, увеличила военно-воздушные силы на около 1200, рост около 3,5%, что соответствует изменениям в оснащении. Она почти утроила количество истребителей-бомбардировщиков МиГ-23БМ; есть некоторые свидетельства того, что, несмотря на нашу более раннюю оценку, некоторые МиГ-17 продолжают использоваться в качестве перехватчиков. В настоящее время в Чехословакии имеется самолет непосредственной поддержки Су-25 Frogfoot - первый несоветский участник пакта, получивший этот тип. Тем не менее, их старые МиГ-15, как полагают, все еще находятся на службе в этой роли. Военно-морской флот Восточной Германии наращивает свои силы ракетных корветов Parchim и, возможно, прекратил выпуск старых больших патрульных кораблей типа Hai; число МиГ-23BM в ВВС удвоилось, и некоторые Су-22 были получены, что увеличило авиацию непосредственной поддержки с воздуха. Венгрия также получила Су-22, но, по-видимому, разведывательную версию; наша предыдущая оценка числа их ударных вертолетов была, по-видимому, чрезмерной. Польша и Румыния, по-видимому, не претерпели существенных изменений за последние двенадцать месяцев, возможно, отчасти в результате экономических трудностей.

BULGARIA
NMP 1983: leva 23.5 bn. Est 1984: 24.6 bn.
Est GNP range 1983: $26.0-36.0 bn. 1984: $27.0-37.1 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 3.0%. Est 1984: 4.6%.
Inflation 1983: 1.2%. 1984: 1.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.70 bn. 1984: $1.40 bn.
Est def exp 1984: leva 969 m ($1,491 bn). 1985: 1.010 bn ($1,656 bn).

$1=1983: leva 0.97 (official), 0.71 (adjusted); 1984: 1.007 (off.), 0.65 (adj.); 1985: 1.05 (off.), 0.61 (adj.).
Population: 8,970,000.

Men: 18-30: 832,000; 31-45: 927,000.

Women: 18-30: 795,000; 31-45: 924,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 148,500 (94,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army and Air Force 2 years, Navy 3 years.
Reserves: 195,000. Army 150,000 (600,000 more have a reserve liability); Navy (to age 55, officers 60 or 65) 25,000; Air (to age 60)

20,000 (AD 15,000).

ARMY: 105,000 (73,000 conscripts).
3 Military Districts:
8 motor rifle divs (3 at Cat. 3 = cadre).
5 tk bdes.
3 SSM bdes with Scud.
4 arty regts.
3 AA arty regts.
2 SAM regts.
1 para regt.
Special commando coys.
Tks: 400 T-34, 1,400 T-54/-55, some 60 T-72.
AFV: recce: 250 BRDM-1/-2; MICV: some 60 BMP-1; APC: 1,000 BTR-50/-60, 35 OT-62, MT-LB.
Arty: guns: 25 M-1942 76mm, 25 D-44 and SD-44 SP 85mm, M-1944 100mm, 700 M-1931 122mm, M-46 130mm; gun/bow: M-1937, D-20 152mm;

how: 100 M-1938 (M-30), D-30 122mm;

RML: 100 BM-21 122mm, some M-51 130mm;

SSM: 39 FROG-7, 27 Scud;

mor: 82mm, 350 120mm and 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 150 SPG-9 73mm; guns: 90 M-1942 76mm; ATGW: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP).
AD: guns: 500 ZU-23 23mm, M-1939 37mm, S-60 57mm, KS-12 85mm and KS-19 100mm towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; SAM: SA-4/-6/-7.

NAVY: 8,500 (3,000 conscripts); 3 combat hel.

Bases: Varna, Burgas, Sozopol, Atiya.
Subs: 2 R-class.
Frigates: 2 Riga.
Corvettes: 3 Poti.
FAC: (G): 6 with Styx SSM: 3 Osa-I, 3 Osa-II; (T): 6 Shershen.
Patrol craft: 13: 6 SO-1 large, 7 Zhuk< coastal<.
MCMV: 31: 2 T-43 ocean; 2 Sonya, 5 Vanya coastal; 4 Yevgenya, 18 PO-2 inshore<.
Amph: LCU: 22 Vydra; LCA: 4 MFP D-3.
Spt: 1 underway replenishment ship.
Hel: 2 sqns: 1 ASW with 3 Mi-14 Haze, 1 SAR with 2 Mi-2, 6 Mi-4.
Coastal arty: 2,100: 2 regts: 20 btys; 100mm, SM-4-1 130mm, 150mm guns.
Naval Guard: 3 coys.

AIR FORCE: 35,000 (18,000 conscripts); some 226 combat ac, some 20 armed hel.
1 air division: 7 combat regts:
FGA: 2 regts (6 sqns) with 60 MiG-17, 40 MiG-23BM.
Interceptor/ftr: 4 regts (?8 sqns): some 20 MiG-23M Flogger B; 60 MiG-21PFM, 10 MiG-17.
Recce: 1 regt with 36 MiG-17/-21.
Tpt: 1 regt with 10 Il-14, 4 An-24, 2 Tu-134, 9 An-2.
Hel: 1 regt with 10 Mi-2, 40 Mi-4/-8 (perhaps 10 armed), 12 Mi-24 (attack), 12 Ka-26 Hoodlum.
Trg: incl 80 L-29, Yak-11/-18, L-39, 30 MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex.
1 para regt.
1 AD div: (?4,500): 3 zones: 30 SAM sites; 280 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of Interior border guards 15,000; 16 regts. Security police: 7,500.

People's Territorial Militia 150,000.

'Voluntary Organization for Co-operation in National Defence'.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
NMP 1982: Kcs 508.10 bn.
Est GNP range 1983: $73.0-150.0 bn. 1984: S75.5-155.0 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 2.4%. Est 1984: 3.2%.
Inflation 1983: 1.0%. 1984: 1.0%
Debt 1983: $3.90 bn. 1984: $3.60 bn.
Est def exp* 1984: Ks 26.9 bn ($5,052 bn). 1985: 27.5 bn ($5,189 bn). (* Incl police and security budget.)

$1=1983: koruny 6.45 (off.), 5.788 (adj.); 1984: 6.7 (off.), 5.325 (adj.); 1985: 6.95 (off.), 5.30 (adj.).
Population: 15,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,531,000; 31-45: 1,626,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,472,000; 31-45: 1,609,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 203,300 (118,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army 2 years, Air Force 3 years.
Reserves: 280,000. Army 250,000 (295,000 more with liability to age 50 (men) or 60 (officers)), Air 30,000.
ARMY: 145,000 (100,000 conscripts).
2 Military Districts:
5 armd divs (1 at Cat. 1,2 each Cats 2 and 3).
5 motor rifle divs (Cat 1).
1 arty div: 2 arty, 3 Scud SSM bdes, 2 ATK regts (6 bns).
1 AB regt.
6 engr bdes.
Civil Defence Troops (10,000): 5 regts.
Tks: 3,500 T-54/-55/-72.
AFV: recce: 1,250 OT-65 and BRDM; MICV: 1,100 BMP; APC: 2,700 OT-62/-64/-810.
Arty: guns: M-52 85mm, 250 M-53 100mm, 100 M-1931/37 122mm, 75 M-46 130mm; gun/how: 90 M-1937, D-20 152mm;

how: 250 D-30, M-18/49 105mm, M-30 towed and M-1974 SP 122mm, 250 M-18/46 and DANA (Tatra 813 truck mounted) SP 152mm;

MRL: 200 RM-70 122mm, 120 M-51 130mm; SSM: 40 FROG, 27 Scud.
ATK: RL: P-27 112mm; RCL: 100 82mm; ATGW: 400 AT-3 Sagger and AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 600 S-60 57mm towed, M-53/59 30mm SP; SAM: SA-4/-6/-7/-9.

AIR FORCE: 58,000 (18,000 conscripts); 474 combat ac, some 24 armed hel.
2 air armies: 5 air divs: 15 combat regts:
FGA: 11 sqns: 3 with 60 Su-7BM/U; 3 with 36 MiG-23M; 3 with 42 MiG-21/-21U; 1 with 12 MiG-15;

1 with (?12) Su-25 Frogfoot (may be replacing MiG-15).
Interceptor: 18 sqns: 275 MiG-21/-21U/-23 (about half AD, half battlefield spt).
Recce: 3 sqns: 2 with 25 MiG-21RF; 1 with 12 L-29.
Tpt: 2 regts: 2 An-12, 6 An-24, 40 Il-14 (replacing with An-26), 1 Tu-134,2 LET L-410M.
Hel: 1 regt: 3 indep sqns: attack: 24 Mi-24; tpt: med: 10 Mi-8, 100 Mi-4; lt: 20 Mi-2, 40 Mi-1.
Trg: L-29, 24 L-39, Zlin 526.
Liaison ac incl Zlin Z-43.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll
AD: Comd HQ: 3 divs: 6 SAM regts: some 40 sites; 250 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY: Border Troops 11,000; 7 bdes, AFV, ATK weapons. Militia 120,000.

'Association for Co-operation with the Army'.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
NMP 1983: DMO 210.1 bn. Est 1984: 221.66 bn.
Est GNP range 1983: $85.5-172.0 bn. 1984: $90.0-180.0 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 4.4%. 1984: 5.5%.
Debt 1983: $12.20 bn. 1984: $11.30 bn.
Def budget 1984: DMO 16.961 bn ($7,710 bn). 1985: 18.069 bn ($7,856 bn).*

(* Incl DMO 4.739 bn (1984), 5.028 bn (1985) for internal and border security.)

$1=1983: ostmarks 2.5533 (off.), 2.555 (adj.); 1984: 2.8459 (off.), 2.2 (adj.); 1985: 3.213 (off.), 2.30 (adj.).
Population: 16,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,780,000; 31-45: 1,680,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,695,000; 31-45: 1,635,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 174,000 (94,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army, Air Force 18 months; Navy (sea-going) 36 months.
Reserves: 400,000. Army 330,000, up to 3 months call-up per year to total 24 months

(250,000 more have Reserve commitment to 50 (other ranks) or 60 (officers)); Navy 40,000; Air 30,000.

ARMY: 120,000 (71,500 conscripts).
2 Military Districts, 2 Army HQ:
2 tk divs (each 3 tk, 1 motor rifle regt). (All divs Category 1.)
4 motor rifle divs (each 1 tk, 3 motor rifle regts). (All divs Category 1.)
2 SSM bdes with Scud.
2 arty, 1 AA arty regts.
8 AD regts: 2 with SA-4; 6 with SA-6 SAM.
3 sigs regts.
3 engr regts.
1 railway construction regt.
2 ATK bns.
1 AB bn.
Tks: About 1,500 T-54/-55/-72 (1,600 more (incl T-34) in storage).
AFV: recce: 1,000 BRDM-1/-2; Mice 1,000 BMP; APC: 1,500 BTR-50P/-60P/-152, 200 BTR-70 (M-1978), MT-LB.
Arty: guns: 400 D-44, SD-44 SP 85mm; M-1931/37 122mm, 72 M-46 130mm; gun/how: 108 M-1937; 54 M-1973 SP, D-20 152mm;

how: D-30, M-1938 (M-30), M-1974 SP 122mm; M-1943 SP 152mm;

MRL: 108 BM-21, Cz RM-70 122mm, BM-24 240mm; SSM: 24 FROG-1, 18 Scud B; mor: 250 120mm.
ATK: guns: 120 T-12 100mm; ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 96 ZSU-23-4 sp; SAM: SA-4/-6/-/9.

NAVY: 15,000 (8,000 conscripts) incl Frontier Bde; 18 combat hel.

Bases: Peenemiinde, Warnemiinde, DranskBug, Sassnitz, Wolgast, Tarnewitz, Barhoft, Stralsund.
Frigates: 2 Rostock (Koni) with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 16 Parchim with 2x4 SA-N-5 SAM.
FAC: (G): 15 Osa-I with 4 Styx SSM (3 in reserve (trg); to be replaced); 1 Tarantul I (4 SS-N-8).

(T): 49: 18 Shershen, 31 Libelled (1 unarmed, trials).
Patrol craft: 6 Hai HI large (may now be in reserve, replaced by Parchim).
MCMV: 27 Kondor-II coastal (2 trg).
Amph: LST: 12 Frosch I.
Intelligence vessels (AGI): 2 mod Kondor-I.
Spt: 6 supply ships, 5 tankers, 2 Frosch II lt tpts.
Hel: 1 sqn with 13 Mi-8 (3 SAR),8 Mi-14 Haze ASW.
Coastal Frontier Bde (GBK.; 2,750): (administered by Frontier Tps) 5 beach patrol bns, 3 afloat 'divs', 1 boat gp (recce);

(34 vessels incl 10 Bremse, 19 Kondor-I; 152mm guns; Samlet SSM).

AIR FORCE: 39,000 (15,000 conscripts); some 380 combat ac, some 70 armed hel.
2 air divs
FGA: 2 regts, (?6 sqns): 3 with 35 MiG-17; 2 with 24 MiG-23MF, some Su-22.
Recce: 1 sqn with 18 MiG-21.
Tpt: 1 regt: 3 sqns: 18 An-26, 15 Tu-134, An-2/-14/-26B, some 6 L-410 UVP.
Hel: 3 regts: 9 sqns: 3 attack with 30 Mi-24; 3 assault/tpt with 36 armed Mi-8; 3 tpt with some 45 Mi-8.
AD Command: (26,000): 2 AD districts:
Air: 6 regts: 6 sqns with 100 MiG-21F/MF/PF/U; 12 sqns with 200 MiG-23.
SAM: 7 regts: some 30 sites with 200 SA-2/-3.
Radar: 2 regts.
Trg: incl Yak-II, L-39, Zlin 226, MiG-15UTI, MiG-21U.
Liaison: ac incl Zlin Z-43.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
ASM: AT-3 Sagger ATGW.

Forces Abroad: Algeria 250, Angola 500, Ethiopia 550, Guinea 125, Iraq 160, Libya 400, Mozambique 100, S. Yemen 75, Syria 210.

PARA-MILITARY: 77,500 Regulars, perhaps 1 million in an emergency.
Ministry of Defence: Frontier Troops (47,000): 18 border, 2 indep, 1 special, 6 trg regts (?66 bns), 1 boat section; 24 patrol craft.
Ministry for State Security: 1 Guard regt (Berlin) (7,000): 6 motor rifle, 1 arty, 1 trg bns;

PSZH-IV APC, 120mm mor, 85mm, 100mm ATK, ZU-23 AA guns, hel.
Ministry of Interior: People's Police Alert Units (12,000): 21 bns; BTR-40/-152 APC, 82mm mor.

Transport Police (8,500): 16 coys; small arms, RPG-7 RL.
Workers' Militia: 3,000 Regulars, 500,000 potential: 15,000 combat groups; AFV incl SK-1 APC, 82mm mor, 76mm ATK, 23mm, 37mm AA guns.
Society for Sport and Technology (youth aged 16-18): 450,000, 75% active: 1 central, 14 regional subordinate district gps, some 15,000 units;

small arms; trg ac (civil).

HUNGARY
NMP 1982: forint 730 bn. 1983: 763.5 bn. Est
GDP range 1983: $21.0-65.2 bn. 1984: $23.2-67.2 bn.
NMP growth 1983: -0.5%. 1984: 3.0%.
Inflation 1983: 7.2%. 1984: 8.5%.
Debt 1983: $8.30 bn. 1984: $9.10 bn.
Def budget 1983: forint 33.4 bn ($1,942 bn). 1984: 34.6 bn ($2,136 bn). 1985: 37.228 bn ($2,402 bn).

$1=1983: forint 42.666 (off.), 17.2 (adj.); 1984: 48.042 (off.), 16.2 (adj;); 1985: 51.078 (off), 15.5 (adj.).
Population: 10,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 965,000: 31-45: 1,162,000.

Women: 18-30: 922,000; 31-45: 1,158,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 106,000 (58,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army (incl Border Guard) 18 months; Air Force 24 months.
Reserves: 135,000 (Army and Navy); Air 8,000 (to age 60).

ARMY: 84,000 (50,000 conscripts) incl Danube Flotilla.
1 tk div (at Cat. 2).
5 motor rifle divs (2 at Cat. 2, 3 at 3).
1 arty bde, 1 SSM bde with Scud.
1 AA arty, 4 SAM regts (1 indep with SA-4, 3 div with SA-6).
1 AB bn.
Tks: some 1,200 T-54/-55, 30 T-72; lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: recce: some 750 BRDM-2/FUG (OT-65); MICV: 200 BMP-1; APC: 1,000 PSZH-IV and MT-LB.
Arty: guns: D-44 85mm; M-1931/37 122mm; gun/how: M-1937, 40 D-20, 20 M-1973 SP 152mm;

how: 225 M-1938, D-30, 50 M-1974 SP 122mm; 100 M-1943 152mm; mm.: 50 BM-21 122mm, BM-24 240mm;

SSM: 24 FROG-7, 9 Scud; mor: 300 82mm, 100 M-43 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 125 SPG-9 73mm; guns: 125 85mm and T-12 100mm; ATGW: 100 AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), 100 AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 75 ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm, 100 S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP 57mm, KS-19 100mm; SAM: 30 SA-4, 60 SA-6, 500 SA-7, 50 SA-9.

Danube Flotilla (700); 10 100-ton patrol craft, 5 Nestin river MCMV, 5 small LCU, small tp tpts, river icebreakers.

AIR FORCE: 22,000 (8,000 conscripts); some 155 combat ac, 12 armed hel.
1 air div:
AD: 3 ftr regts: 9 interceptor sqns with 120 MiG-21F/PF/bis/U, 25 MiG-23M.
Recce: 1 sqn with (?12) Su-22.
Tpt: 1 regt: 2 tpt sqns: 24 An-24/-26,2 Il-14.
Hel: 1 regt: 3 hel sqns: 12 Mi-24, 30 Mi-8, 25 Ka-26 Hoodlum (trg/civil duties).
Trg: incl L-29, MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
AD: 1 div: 3 SAM regts, some 20 sites; 120 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY: Border guards 15,000 (11,000 conscripts); 11 districts.

Part-time Worker's Militia 60,000. 'Sport Association for National Defence'.

POLAND
Est NMP 1983: zlotys 5,038 bn. 1984: 5,290 bn.
Est GDP range 1983: $92.2-178.0 bn. 1984: $95.0-181.0 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 6.0%. 1984: 5.0%.
Inflation 1983: 22.0%. 1984: 13.0%.
Debt 1983: $27.5 bn. 1984: $29.4 bn.
Def budget 1984: zlotys 218.7 bn ($5,911 bn). 1985: 288.7 bn ($6,874 bn).

$1=1983: zlotys 90 (off), 30 (adj.); 1984: 115 (off), 37 (adj.); 1985: 159 (off), 42 (adj.).
Population: 37,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 3,951,000; 31-45: 3,860,000.

Women: 18-30: 3,819,000; 31-45: 3,829,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 319,000 (189,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army, internal security forces, Air Force 2 years; Navy, special services, afloat 3 years, ashore 2 years.
Reserves: 501,000: Army some 415,000; Navy some 55,000 (to age 50); Air some 31,000 (to age 60).

ARMY: 210,000 (153,000 conscripts).
3 Military Districts:
5 armd divs (all at Cat. 1).
8 mech divs (3 at Cat. 1,2 at 2, 3 at 3).
1 AB div (Cat. 1).
1 amph assault div (Cat. 1).
3 arty bdes, 1 arty regt.
3 ATK regts.
4 SSM bdes with Scud.
1 AD bde with SA-4; 9 AD regts: 7 with SA-6, 2 with SA-8 SAM.
Tks: 3,400 T-54/-55, 50 T-72; lt: 110 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 800 FUG/BRDM-2; APC: 800 BMP-1, 2,500 SKOT/SKOT-2AP and TOPAS/TOPAS-2AP.
Arty: guns: some 300 D-44 and SD-44 SP 85mm, 120 M-1931/37 122mm; M-46 130mm; gun/how: 150 M-1937 152mm;

how: 520 M-1938, D-30 towed and M-1974 SP 122mm, 120 M-1943 152mm; MRL: 250 BM-21 122mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-24 240mm;

SSM: 51 FROG-3/-5/-7, 36 Scud B; mor: 750 82mm, 120mm.
ATK: guns: some 300 T-12 100mm; Rd: 73mm; ATGW: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 750 ZU-23 23mm and S-60 57mm towed, 130 ZSU-23-4 SP; SAM: SA-4/-6/-7/-8/-9.

NAVY: 19,000 (6,000 conscripts).

Bases: Gdynia, Hel, Swinoujscie, Kolobrzeg, Ustka.
Subs: 3 W-class.
Destroyer: 1 SAM Kotlin with 1x2 SA-N-1 Goa.
Corvettes (G): 3 Tarantul with 4 SS-N-2C SSM, 1x4 SA-N-5 SAM.
FAC: (G): 13 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2 SSM; (T): 18: 13 Pilica, 5 Wisl.
Patrol craft: 8 mod Obluze large.
MCMV: 51: 12 Krogulec. 11 T-43 ocean, 3 Notec, 2 Leniwka coastal, 23 K-8.
Amph: LCT: 23 Polnocny; ICM: 3 Marabut; LCA: 15 Eichstaden.
Intelligence vessels (AGI): 2 B-10 (mod Moma), 1 T-43 radar picket.
Naval Aviation: 1 div (2,000); 44 combat ac:
Attack: 1 regt: 3 sqns with 34 MiG-17.
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 Il-28, 5 MiG-17.
Hel: 1 regt: 2 sqns: 10 Mi-2,20 Mi-4, 5 Mi-8.

AIR FORCE: 90,000 (30,000 conscripts); 675 combat ac, some 12 armed hel.
6 air divs (incl AD).
FGA: 3 divs; 6 regts; 18 sqns: 3 with 35 SU-7/-7U; 3 with 35 Su-20; 12 with 150 MiG-17.
Interceptors: 11 regts; 3 divs; 33 sqns with some 400 MiG-21/U/-23.
Recce: 6 sqns 35 MiG-21RF, 5 Il-28, 15 LIM-6.
Tpt: 2 regts: 9 An-2, An-12, 12 An-26, 12 Il-14.
Comms/liaison: 1 sqn with 2 Tu-134A, 6 Yak-40, Il-18.
Hel: 3 regts: 100 Mi-2, 12 Mi-4, 25 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 12 Mi-24 (attack).
Trg: 300 ac: TS-8/-11, MiG-15/-21UTI, Su-7U, PZL-130 Orlik.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll.
Air Defence Command: (48,000).
SAM: 9 regts: some 50 sites; 400 SA-2/-3.
(On order. PZL-130 Orlik trg ac.)
Forces Abroad: Syria (UNDOF): 153.

PARA-MILITARY: 218,000.
Ministry of Interior border troops (160,000): 8 bdes;

some 42 patrol craft incl 5 Obluze, 5 Pilica, 3 KP-131, 1 Oksywie, 12 Wisloka, 21 K-8, 9 Gdansk.
Internal defence troops (58,000): tks, AFV, ATK guns. Citizen's Militia 350,000. 'League for National Defence' (some 200,000 active).

RUMANIA
NMP 1983: lei 654.5 bn. Est 1984: 704.9 bn.
Est GNP range 1983: $80.0-115.0 bn. 1984: $84.0-119.0 bn.
NMP growth 1983: 3.7%. 1984: 7.7%.
Inflation 1983: 5.2%. 1984: 0.2%.
Debt 1983: $8.9 bn. 1984: $8.0 bn.
Def budget 1984: Jei 11.70 bn ($1,345 bn). 1985: 12.278 bn ($1,395 bn).

$1=1983: lei 4.47 (of T.), 8.3 (adj.); 1984: 4.75 (off), 8.7 (adj.); 1985: 4.47 (off.), 8.8 (adj.).
Population: 23,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,196,000; 31-45: 2,230,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,113,000; 31-45: 2,190,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 189,500 (108,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army, Air Force 16 months; Navy 24 months.
Reserves: 565,000; Army 500,000+ (300,000 with service in last 5 years); Navy 20,000 (to age 50); Air 45,000 (to age 60).

ARMY: 150,000 (95,000 conscripts).
4 Army Areas:
2 tk divs(l at Cat. 1, 1 Cat. 2).
8 motor rifle divs (1 Cat. 1, 3 at 2, 4 at 3).
3 mountain bdes/regts.
2 arty, 2 AA bdes, 4 arty, 2 AA arty, 5 ATK regts.
2 Scud SSM bdes.
2 AB regts.
Tks: 200 T-34, 1,000 T-54/-55, some M-77, 30 T-72.
AFV: recce: 400 BRDM-1/-2; APC: 2,600 BTR-50/-60 and B-72 (BTR-60).
Arty: guns: 50 M-1942, 75 SU-76 SP 76mm, 50 D-44 85mm, M-1944, 175 SU-100 100mm, M-1931/37 122mm;

gun/how: 150 M-1937 and D-20 152mm; how: 600 M-1938, D-30 122mm and M-1938 152mm;

MRL: 175 BM-21/RO 122mm, 150 M-51 (ZIL) 130mm; SSM: 30 FROG, 15 Scud; mor: 700 82mm, 200 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm, 260 76mm and 82mm; guns: M-1943 57mm; ATGW: 120 AT-1 Snapper and AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 300 30mm, 37mm, 250 57mm, 85mm, 100mm; SAM: SA-6/-7.

NAVY: 7,500 (3,500 conscripts).

Bases: Mangalia, Constanta; Danube: Braila, Giurgiu, Sulina, Tulcea.

Black Sea Fleet, Danube Sqn, Coastal Defence.
Frigates: 3 Tetal.
Corvettes: 3 Poti.
FAC: (G): 6 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2 SSM; (P/ASW): 19 Ch Shanghai; (T): 40: 12 Epitrop, 22 Ch Huchwan hydrofoils<, 6 Sov P-4<.
Patrol craft: 3 Kronshtadt large, 46 river incl 18 VB-76 monitors.
MCMV: 16 minesweepers (4 GDR M-40 coastal, 12 Sov T-301 inshore); 20 VD-141 minesweeping boats<; 2 MCM spt ships.
SAR hel: 4 Mi-4.
(On order 1 destroyer).
Coastal Defence: (2,000).

HQ Constanta.
4 sectors. 10 coastal arty btys with some 110 130mm, 150mm and 152mm guns, observer post tps, naval engineers. Some 8 btys of AA arty reported; eqpt unknown.
Would get 2 regts of naval inf on mobilization.

AIR FORCE: 32,000 (10,000 conscripts); 378 combat ac.
3 air divs (incl AD): 4 combat regts:
FGA: 6 sqns: 70 MiG-17, some 20 IAR-93A, 40 IAR-93B.
Interceptor: 12 sqns: 1 with 30 MiG-23; 11 with 200 MiG-21F/PF/U.
Recce: 1 sqn with 18 Il-28.
Tpt: 1 regt with 4 Il-14, 3 Il-18, 2 U-62, 11 An-24, 8 An-26, 4 Li-2, 1 Boeing 707.
Hel: 1 regt with 10 Mi-4, 25 Mi-8, 45 IAR-316B (Alouette III), 30 IAR-330 (Puma).
Trg: 40 L-29, 20 MiG-15UTI, (?10) L-39ZA, 10 IAR-28MA.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
AD: 1 div: 18 SAM sites with 108 SA-2.
(On order some 125 IAR-93B FGA/trg ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: 37,000. Border guards (17,000); 12 bdes.

Ministry of Defence security troops (20,000); AFV, ATK guns.

Local Defence: some 900,000 Patriotic Guard (perhaps 12,000 full time).

Youth Homeland Defence: 650,000.

'Voluntary Sports Association'.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The need to strengthen the Alliance's conventional forces, and to make better use of the increasingly constrained economic resources, through more co-ordinated production and greater internal efficiency, dominated defence discussions during 1984 and 1985. Though President Reagan made his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proposal on 23 March 1983, discussions not only about its impact on arms-control negotiations but also about the possible effect that such a programme might have on spending on conventional weapons did not really surface in public until early in 1985. European participation in the SDI programme has been sought, and the whole question of European developments in high technology in the weapons field is receiving greater prominence. The Warsaw Pact has a considerable variety of missile types which can be used against Europe, while European nations have no means to protect European territory against them. Thus one of the issues for the Alliance is whether, and to what extent, the SDI should apply to Europe. This has by no means been resolved.

Joint procurement programmes that have been successful include that for the NATO Standard E-3A Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft, 18 of which are now in service or are being fitted out for completion by mid-1986. Unfortunately, Britain's intended contribution to this effort, the AEW Nimrod, is well behind schedule and much over cost. The joint Anglo-German-Italian Tornado programme continues, with Britain now receiving her Air Defence versions. A five-nation agreement to co-operate in the design and manufacture of a standard medium troop transport or anti-submarine warfare helicopter for the 1990s, EH-101, has been signed by Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Contacts between Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain over a similar programme for a European fighter failed to generate agreement over the basic concept of its role and size and over work-sharing agreements, and a smaller consortium without France is to form.

Individual programmes include the continuing F-16 purchases by Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Turkey. Canada will bring her new F/A-18s (CF-18) into service to replace her elderly CF-104 Starfighters in Germany from July 1985. Denmark will also retire her F-104s when her final order of 12 F-16s is delivered. Germany's procurement of tanks and self-propelled anti-tank systems continues to enhance her ground forces' defensive capabilities. The Italian navy has received its eighth Maestrale guided-weapons frigate, although the future role, and therefore equipment, of its new carrier continues to be a matter of controversy. The Netherlands has increased the size of her ground forces by about 4%, has more than doubled her holdings of Leopard II MBT and is upgrading her artillery holdings. She has increased her order for F-16s. Norway is reorganizing her ground forces to make more efficient use of her mobilizable reserves and national resources, especially for the defence of northern Norway. The Portuguese Army has acquired 30 Saladin armoured cars which, though not new, have permitted the retirement of even older Panhards. The country is faced with an extensive modernization programme which is quite beyond its economic resources. Turkey, too has a very large modernization task ahead. Her ageing F-104 aircraft, many obtained as other NATO members retire theirs, are showing signs of coming to the end of their service life. A programme to licence-build F-16s will help to improve her air combat capability. Greece has ordered 40 Mirage 2000 from France, but a question-mark remains over the order for a similar number of F-16 from the US.

The British Polaris upgrading programme involving the Chevaline penetrating aids is now virtually complete, and the missiles are being re-engined; the modified missiles are being introduced as the Resolution-class boats are given their routine refits. Long-lead items for their Trident replacements have been ordered.

France has now brought into service her sixth SSBN, in which is deployed the new M-4 missile with 6 MIRV. Her programme of modifying the elderly Mirage IV to take the ASMP nuclear air-to-surface missile is in hand, with 18 conversions expected by the end of 1986.

There has been considerable discussion in NATO about the technologies for long-range interdiction, particularly in the context of the Air Land Battle 2000 and Follow-on Forces Attack debate. Financial constraints and impending manpower shortages would seem to be forcing the Alliance increasingly to look to high technology to solve its problems. The enhancement of command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), air defence and anti-tank defence, together with other force improvements, are all under study. While NATO's aim remains that of deterring any attack, an improved ability to contain an attack if deterrence fails and the raising of the nuclear threshold are at the forefront of its needs - and it is hard to see how either of these can be achieved without substantial additional resources. Although Ministers have given rhetorical support to the commitment to maintain a 3% growth of defence spending in real terms over the forthcoming years, very few governments seem likely to meet this target.

Official NATO and IMF data suggest that the 3% goal has been met only by the US, Britain, Canada and France. Canada is certainly attempting to rebuild her conventional forces, but the others (especially France and the US) devote a significant proportion of their defence budgets to their nuclear forces. If spending on these nuclear forces is excluded, the national average growth rates are some 6.5% for the US, about 4.0% for Britain and perhaps 2.0% for France. In Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, real defence spending actually decreased in 1983 and 1984. Data from other official sources such as Central Banks, which use different accounting procedures, suggest that in almost all NATO countries actual defence expenditures may indeed be lower than Defence Ministries have claimed.

The relative positions of the US and her European allies must be viewed, in part, in the light of their respective economic climates. In 1983 the US economy was characterized by strong growth, low inflation, declining unemployment and a rising dollar. This growth continued in 1984, albeit at a slower rate, and has slowed further throughout the first half of 1985. The economic recovery of the NATO Allies continues to lag behind that of the United States. Their economic performance has been characterized by rising unemployment, mixed economic growth, declining exchange rates - which have a significant effect upon a country's ability to buy military equipment from the United States - severe capital flight to the higher interest rates paid in North America, mixed success against domestic inflation, and social pressures on the budget. Virtually all West European states have, with varying degrees of success, introduced measures to control inflation and to cut their respective budget deficits, but must meet rather ambitious social welfare programmes and high unemployment levels which place heavy demands on welfare budgets. Nor is there the same perception of imminent threat as in the US, although there is no intention of compromising freedom. In the light of these circumstances, most West European governments believe that they are spending all they can afford on their defence establishments.

West Europeans are also sceptical of what they tend to regard as simplistic comparisons based on 'standard' criteria for defence expenditures. European nations argue that they bear other defence burdens, less clearly identified (see also pp. 197-9). These include indirect economic and social costs, such as those stemming from conscription (applicable to most European armed forces), while military use of public facilities and land, especially in West Germany, have no equivalent in the US. Because of their nature it is difficult to assess the true costs of these additional burdens, but they are politically relevant.

Nor is it easy to forecast when this situation is likely to ease. Operation, maintenance and capital costs are demonstrably higher in the military sector and are therefore subject to different inflationary pressures, usually higher than in the general economy. The OECD predicts that the US recovery will encourage economic growth in Europe and Canada through 1984 and 1985, but, as the OECD has said, 'with tight policies - dictated by concerns over budget deficits and inflation fears - the recovery outside North America seems likely to be weak and hesitant by past standards'.

The 3% real growth target was intended to upgrade conventional defences, to develop NATO infrastructure, to re-distribute NATO's costs more broadly across the Alliance, to facilitate US reinforcement of Europe and, overall, to reduce NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. Though that figure is unlikely to be met, it must be stated that most West European countries managed to increase their outlays and improve their military posture during the 1970s, when real defence spending in the US was decreasing. Some of the cushion from that investment still remains, although replacement of existing equipment by the more sophisticated equipment of the next generation will be costly. If it is true that little additional real investment can be achieved, there may be an increasingly strong initiatives to ensure more effective political and fiscal control of defence expenditure and military resources.

Economic pressures continue to have a significant impact on all national defence procurement. There is some evidence of closer attention to priorities, although budgetary constraints often impose delays in production schedules which result in overall increases in the unit costs of individual items. Co-operation in arms procurement, long a goal of NATO planners, continues to take place, but at a rather desultory pace. However, agreement has been reached to begin a programme for the procurement of a NATO Standard Frigate. Initial US hesitation was overcome, but how many will be ordered still remains to be seen.

There seems little doubt that the incorporation of advanced technology is going to add yet more inflationary pressure to defence procurement. In 1984 this was estimated by the US Congressional Budget Office to be 6.4% annually in real terms. Others suggest that real annual increases of the order of 8% are not unlikely. At the same time, the cost of munitions, spare parts and support facilities are likely to rise, as NATO attempts to raise stock levels to sustain a longer period of conventional conflict.

СЕВЕРОАТЛАНТИЧЕСКИЙ ДОГОВОР

Необходимость укрепления обычных вооруженных сил Североатлантического союза и более эффективного использования все более ограниченных экономических ресурсов посредством более скоординированного производства и повышения внутренней эффективности доминировала в дискуссиях по вопросам обороны в 1984 и 1985 годах. Хотя 23 марта 1983 года президент Рейган выдвинул свое предложение по стратегической оборонной инициативе (СОИ), дискуссии не только о ее воздействии на переговоры по контролю над вооружениями, но и о возможном воздействии, которое такая программа могла бы оказать на расходы на обычные вооружения, в действительности не всплыли публично до начала 1985 года. Стремление обеспечить европейское участие в программе СОИ, и весь вопрос о европейских достижениях в области высоких технологий в области вооружений приобретает все большее значение. Варшавский договор имеет значительное разнообразие типов ракет, которые могут быть использованы против Европы, в то время как европейские страны не имеют средств для защиты европейской территории от них. Таким образом, один из вопросов для Североатлантического союза заключается в том, следует ли и в какой степени применять СОИ в отношении Европы. Это никоим образом не было решено.

Успешные совместные программы закупок включают в себя стандартные самолеты предупреждения и управления Е-3А НАТО, 18 из которых в настоящее время находятся на вооружении или готовятся к поступлению к середине 1986 года. К сожалению, предполагаемый вклад Великобритании в эти усилия, ДРЛО Nimrod, значительно отстает от графика и намного превышает начальные затраты. Совместная англо-германо-итальянская программа Tornado продолжается, Англия сейчас получает его версию противовоздушной обороны. Британия, Франция, Германия, Италия и Нидерланды подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве в разработке и производстве стандартного транспортного и противолодочного военного вертолета среднего класса на 90-е годы EH-101. Контакты между Великобританией, Францией, Германией, Италией и Испанией по аналогичной программе для европейского истребителя не привели к достижению согласия в отношении базовой концепции его роли и размеров, а также соглашений о совместном выполнении работ, и предстоит сформировать меньший консорциум без Франции.

Отдельные программы включают продолжающиеся закупки F-16 Бельгией, Данией, Нидерландами и Турцией. Канада введет в эксплуатацию новые F/A-18 (CF-18) для замены старых истребителей CF-104 в Германии с июля 1985 года. Дания также отправит на слом свои F-104, когда будет окончательно поставлен ее заказ на 12 F-16. Закупка в Германии танков и самоходных ПТРК продолжает укреплять оборонительные возможности сил. Итальянский флот получил восьмой фрегат с управляемым вооружением Maestrale, хотя будущая роль и, следовательно, оборудование его нового авианосца по-прежнему вызывает споры. Нидерланды увеличили численность своих сухопутных войск примерно на 4%, более чем удвоили число танков Leopard II и модернизируют свои артиллерийские запасы. Они увеличили заказ на F-16. Норвегия реорганизует свои сухопутные войска, с тем чтобы более эффективно использовать свои мобилизационные резервы и национальные ресурсы, особенно для обороны Северной Норвегии. Португальская армия приобрела 30 бронированных автомобилей Saladin, которые, хотя и не новые, позволили снять еще более старым Panhard. Страна ведет обширную программу модернизации, которая выходит далеко за рамки ее экономических ресурсов. Перед Турцией тоже стоит очень большая задача модернизации. Ее стареющие самолеты F-104, многие из которых были получены в результате их передачи от других членов НАТО, демонстрируют признаки окончания срока службы. Программа лицензионного строительства F-16 поможет улучшить ее боеспособность. Греция заказала 40 Mirage 2000 во Франции, но вопрос остается над заказом на аналогичное количество F-16 из США.

Британская программа модернизации Polaris с использованием проникающих средств Chevaline в настоящее время практически завершена, и ракеты переоснащаются; модифицированные ракеты вводятся по мере того, как лодки класса Resolution проходят плановую модернизацию. Более дальнобойные Trident заказаны.

Франция сейчас ввела в строй шестую ПЛАРБ, в котором развернута новая ракета М-4 с 6 ГЧ ИН. Ее программа модификации устаревшего Mirage IV для доставки ядерной ракеты класса "воздух-поверхность" ASMP уже осуществляется, и к концу 1986 года ожидается 18 конверсий.

В НАТО активно обсуждаются технологии для перехвата на большие расстояния, особенно в контексте воздушного сражения 2000 года и последующих дебатов о силах нападения. Финансовые трудности и надвигающаяся нехватка рабочей силы, как представляется, заставляют Североатлантический союз все чаще прибегать к использованию высоких технологий для решения своих проблем. Изучаются вопросы укрепления командования, управления, связи и разведки (C3I), противовоздушной и противотанковой обороны, а также другие усовершенствования сил. В то время как цель НАТО по-прежнему заключается в сдерживании любого нападения, улучшение способности сдерживать нападение в случае неудачи сдерживания и повышение ядерного порога находятся на переднем крае ее потребностей - и трудно понять, как можно достичь любой из этих целей без существенных дополнительных ресурсов. Хотя министры дали риторическую поддержку обязательству поддерживать 3-процентный рост расходов на оборону в реальном выражении в предстоящие годы, очень немногие правительства, похоже, достигнут этой цели.

Официальные данные НАТО и МВФ предполагают, что цель в 3% была достигнута только США, Великобританией, Канадой и Францией. Канада, безусловно, пытается восстановить свои обычные силы, но другие страны (особенно Франция и США) выделяют значительную часть своих оборонных бюджетов на ядерные силы. Если исключить расходы на эти ядерные силы, то средние национальные темпы роста составляют около 6,5% для США, около 4,0% для Великобритании и, возможно, 2,0% для Франции. В Бельгии, Дании и Нидерландах реальные расходы на оборону фактически сократились в 1983 и 1984 годах. Данные из других официальных источников, таких как центральные банки, которые используют различные процедуры учета, позволяют предположить, что почти во всех странах НАТО фактические расходы на оборону действительно могут быть ниже, чем утверждали Министерства обороны.

Относительные позиции США и ее европейских союзников должны рассматриваться, в частности, в свете их соответствующих экономических условий. В 1983 году экономика США характеризовалась сильным ростом, низкой инфляцией, снижением безработицы и ростом доллара. Этот рост продолжался и в 1984 году, хотя и более медленными темпами, и еще более замедлился в первой половине 1985 года. Экономическое восстановление стран НАТО продолжает отставать от США. Их экономические показатели характеризовались ростом безработицы, малым экономическим ростом, снижением обменных курсов, которые оказывают значительное влияние на способность страны покупать военную технику в Соединенных Штатах, резким бегством капитала в страны с более высокими процентными ставками, выплачиваемыми в Северной Америке, малым успехом в борьбе с внутренней инфляцией и социальным давлением на бюджет. Практически все западноевропейские государства с разной степенью успеха приняли меры по сдерживанию инфляции и сокращению своего соответствующего бюджетного дефицита, однако они должны выполнить довольно амбициозные программы социального обеспечения и оплатить высокий уровень безработицы, которые предъявляют большие требования к бюджетам социального обеспечения. Также нет такого же восприятия неминуемой угрозы, как в США, хотя нет никакого намерения компрометировать свободу. В свете этих обстоятельств большинство западноевропейских правительств считают, что они тратят все, что могут себе позволить, на свои оборонные предприятия.

Западноевропейцы также скептически относятся к тому, что они склонны считать упрощенными сравнениями, основанными на "стандартных" критериях расходов на оборону. Европейские страны утверждают, что они несут другое бремя обороны, менее четко обозначенное (см. Также стр. 197-9). К ним относятся косвенные экономические и социальные издержки, такие как расходы, связанные с призывом на военную службу (применимо к большинству европейских вооруженных сил), в то время как военное использование общественных объектов и земли, особенно в Западной Германии, не имеет эквивалента в США. В силу их характера трудно оценить реальные издержки, связанные с этим дополнительным бременем, однако они имеют политическое значение.

Не так легко предсказать, когда эта ситуация, вероятно, облегчится. Эксплуатационные и капитальные затраты в военном секторе явно выше и поэтому подвержены различному инфляционному давлению, обычно более высокому, чем в экономике в целом. ОЭСР прогнозирует, что восстановление экономики США будет стимулировать экономический рост в Европе и Канаде до 1984 и 1985 годов, но, как сказала ОЭСР, "при жесткой политике , продиктованной опасениями по поводу бюджетного дефицита и инфляционных страхов, восстановление за пределами Северной Америки, вероятно, будет слабым и нерешительным по прошлым стандартам".

Цель реального роста в 3% была направлена на модернизацию обычных средств обороны, развитие инфраструктуры НАТО, более широкое распределение расходов НАТО по всему Североатлантическому союзу, содействие укреплению США Европы и, в целом, снижение зависимости НАТО от ядерного оружия. Хотя эта цифра вряд ли будет достигнута, следует отметить, что большинству западноевропейских стран удалось увеличить свои расходы и улучшить свою военную позицию в 1970-х годах, когда реальные расходы на оборону в США сокращались. Часть средств, выделенных на эти цели, все еще остается, хотя замена существующего вооружения на более современное вооружение следующего поколения будет дорогостоящим. Если действительно можно добиться незначительных дополнительных реальных инвестиций, то могут быть выдвинуты все более решительные инициативы по обеспечению более эффективного политического и финансового контроля за оборонными расходами и военными ресурсами.

Экономическое давление по-прежнему оказывает значительное воздействие на все национальные оборонные закупки. Имеются некоторые свидетельства более пристального внимания к приоритетам, хотя бюджетные ограничения часто приводят к задержкам в графиках производства, что приводит к общему увеличению удельных затрат по отдельным статьям. Сотрудничество в области закупок вооружений, которое уже давно является целью планировщиков НАТО, по-прежнему осуществляется, но довольно малыми темпами. Однако достигнута договоренность о начале программы закупки стандартного фрегата НАТО. Первоначальное колебание США было преодолено, но сколько будет заказано еще предстоит выяснить.

Представляется маловероятным, что внедрение передовых технологий приведет к еще большему инфляционному давлению на оборонные закупки. В 1984 году бюджетное управление Конгресса США оценивало этот показатель в 6,4% в год в реальном выражении. Другие предполагают, что реальное ежегодное увеличение порядка 8% не маловероятно. В то же время стоимость боеприпасов, запасных частей и вспомогательных средств, вероятно, возрастет, поскольку НАТО пытается повысить уровень запасов для поддержания более длительного периода обычного конфликта.

BELGIUM
GDP 1983: B fr 4,190 bn ($81,945 bn). 1984: 4,513.0 bn ($78,101 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.5%. 1984: 1.5%.
Inflation 1983: 7.7%. 1984: 6.3%.
Debt 1984: $31.8 bn.
Def exp 1984: B fr 100.336 bn ($1,736 bn); NATO defn $2,553 bn. 1985: 106.655 bn ($1,702 bn); NATO defn $2.50 bn.

$1=francs 51.132 (1983), 57.784 (1984), 62.668 (1985).
Population: 9,890,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,040,000; 31-45: 1,023,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,000,000; 31-45: 980,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 91,570 (3,580 women, 30,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: 8 or 10 months.* (* Conscripts serve 8 months if posted to Germany, 10 months if serving in Belgium.)
Reserves: 178,500. Army 120,000 (Medical Service 40,000), to age 45; Navy 4,500; Air 14,000.

ARMY: 67,200 (incl Medical Service; 25,300 conscripts).
1 Corps HQ, 2 Div HQ.
1 armd bde (2 tk, 2 mech inf, 1 SP arty bns, spt units).
3 mech inf bdes each with 1 tk, 2 mech inf, 1 SP arty bns, spt units.
1 para-cdo regt.
3 recce bns.
1 tk bn.
2 mot inf bns.
4 arty bns (2 SP).
1 SSM bn with 4 Lance.
4 AD bns: 2 SAM with 36 Improved HAWK; 2 AA each with 24 Gepard.
5 engr bns (3 fd, 1 bridge, 1 eqpt).
Reserves: some on immediate recall status; 1 mech, 1 mot inf bdes; combat, combat spt, log spt tps.

Territorial defence: 11 mot inf regts, 4 mot inf bns.
4 lt aviation sqns.
Tks: 334 Leopard 1; lt 116 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 154 Scimitar, MICV: 10 FMC AIFV-B; APC: 1,425 incl 333 M-113, 262 Spartan, AMX-VCI (to Reserves), M-75 (with Reserves).
Arty: how: 90 M-108 SP 105mm (to retire October 1985); 25 M-44 SP (to be retired), 39 M-109 towed (to be upgraded to A3); 168 M-109A2 SP 155mm;

15 M-115 (M-2A1) 8-in., 10 M-110 SP (being upgraded to A2) 203mm; SSM: 5 Lance.
ATK: guns: 80 JPK-90mm SP; ATGW: Milan, 40 Striker AFV with Swingfire.
AD: guns: 36 20mm, 54 Gepard 35mm sp; SAM: 39 Improved HAWK.
Avn: ac: 5 Islander, hel: 61 Alouette II (to be replaced by 76 multi-role hel).
(On order: 504 MICV, 272 M-113A2 APC, 150 Mistral SAM launchers, 1,000 msls.)

NAVY: 4,550 (1,160 conscripts).

Bases: Kallo, Ostend, Zeebrugge.
Frigates: 4 E-71 with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM.
MCMV: 3 US Aggressive ocean, 6 US Adjutant coastal; 14 Herstal inshore; 2 log spt/comd ships.
Patrol craft, riven 6.
Auxiliaries: 10.
Hel: 3 Alouette III.
(On order: 10 Flower (tripartite) MCMV.)

AIR FORCE: 19,820 (4,040 conscripts).
FGA: 5 sqns with Mirage 5BA/BD; 2 getting F-16A/B.
AD: 2 ac sqns with F-16A/B; 4 SAM sqns with Nike Hercules (modernized); 1 NADGE command reporting centre, associated radar.
Recce: 1 sqn with Mirage 5BR.
Tpt: 2 sqns with C-130H, Boeing 727QC, HS-748, Merlin IIIA, Mystere-Falcon 20.
Liaison: 1 fit with CM-170 Magister.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with SF-260MB, 2 with Alpha Jet
SAR hel: 1 sqn with HSS-1 (S-58), S-61 Sea King.
Equipment: 181 combat ac.

Mirage. 72: 54 5BA/BD (FGA); 18 5BR (recce).

F-16: 109: 56 -A (22 FGA, 34 AD); 18 -B (13 FGA, 5 AD); 35 in store.

C-130: 12 (tpt).

Boeing 727: 2 (tpt). HS-748: 3 (tpt). Merlin IIIA: 5 (tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20: 2 (tpt).

Fouga CM-170: 21 (liaison).

SF-260: 31 (trg). Alpha Jet. 31 (trg).
Hel: Sea King: 5 (SAR). HSS-1: 3 (SAR).
Msls:
SAM: 36 Nike Hercules.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
(On order: 44 F-16A ftr ac).

Forces Abroad: Germany: 28,900 (to be reduced by some 800);

1 corps HQ, 1 div HQ, 1 armd, 1 mech inf bdes; 3 recce, 1 tk-, 3 arty, 1 SSM, 2 Gepard AA, 2 SAM, 3 engr bns, 240 MBT;

3 aviation sqns, 4 Nike SAM sqns.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 15,900; 62 FN, 4 RM/62F armd cars, 5 Alouette II, 3 Puma hel.

BRITAIN
GDP 1983: £300.81 bn ($448,970 bn). 1984: £318.39 bn ($400,038 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.4%. 1984: 2.5%.
Inflation 1983: 4.6%. 1984: 5.0%.
Debt 1984: $62.0 bn.
Def exp 1984/5: £17.033 bn ($21,401 bn); NATO defn $21,995 bn. 1985/6: £18.056 bn ($22,559 bn); NATO defn $23,072 bn.

$1=£0.67 (1983/4), 0.7959 (1984/5), 0.8004 (1985).
Population: 56,020,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,726,000; 31-45: 5,585,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,500,000: 31-45: 5,520,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 327,100 incl 16,400 women and some 9,800 enlisted outside Britain.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 294,449.

Army: 227,484. Regular 148,500; Territorial Army (TA) 72,200 (to be 86,000 by 1990); Ulster Defence Regt (UDR) 6,469 (3,778 part-time);

Home Service Force some 2,500 (to be 4,700).

Navy: 30,880. Regular 22,900; Volunteer 5,300 (to be 7,800); Auxiliary Service 2,680 (to be 3,242).

Marines: 3,300. Regular 2,300; Volunteer 1,000.

Air Force: 30,600. Regular 29,600; Volunteer 1,000.

STRATEGIC FORCES: (2,300):
SLBM: 4 Resolution SSBN, each with 16 Polaris A3TK msls.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Fylingdales (to be upgraded).

ARMY: 163,000 (incl 6,700 women and 9,430 enlisted outside Britain, of which 8,074 are Gurkhas).
1 corps, 3 armd, 1 inf divs, 25 bdes, 1 Field Force HQ.
14 armd regts (2 trg).
5 armd recce regts.
53 inf bns (6 Gurkha).
3 para bns (1 in inf, 2 in para role).
1 Special Air Service (SAS) regt.
1 SSM regt with Lance (4 btys, each 3 msls).
18 arty regts: 1 hy (203mm), 2 'depth of fire' (175mm), 8 SP, 6 fd (1 cdo), 1 locating; 4 indep SAM btys: 2 Blowpipe, 2 Javelin.
3 SAM regts with Rapier. 2 of 3 btys (36 launchers), 1 of 4 btys, 2 SP (48 launchers).
13 engr regts: 11 fd (1 Gurkha), 1 armd, 1 amph.
4 army aviation regts; 16 sqns (1 cdo), 5 indep fits; 2 trg sqns, 6 fits.
Tks: some 130 Challenger, 900 Chieftain (150 in reserve); It 271 FV 101 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 290 FV 107 Scimitar, 1,070 Ferret, some 200 Fox,

APC: 2,338 FV 432, some 60 FV 603 Saracen, 500 FV 103 Spartan, some 150 AT-105 Saxon, some 48 MCV-80.
Arty: guns: 100 towed, 120 FV 433 Abbot 105mm SP, 4 5.5-in. (140mm) trg, 36 M-107 175mm SP;

how: 95 FH-70 towed, 101 M-109/A2/A3 155mm SP, 16 M-110 203mm SP; MLR: 4 MLRS 227mm (trials); SSM: 12 Lance.
ATK: RCL Carl Gustav84mm, 120mm; ATGW: Milan, Swingfire (incl FV 102 Striker, FV 438 SP).
SAM: Blowpipe, Javelin;120 Rapier (some 48 SP).
Avn: ac: 9 Beaver AL-1; het 40 Scout; 9 Alouette IIC, 155 Gazelle AH-1, 110 Lynx AH-1 (some with TOW), 4 Agusta A-109.
Landing craft: 14: 2 log, 2 LCT, 9 small, 1 munitions.
Misc vessels: 25.
(On order some 195 Challenger MBT; some 1,000 MCV-80 MICV; some 247 AT-105 Saxon APC; LAW-80 RL, Milan, TO W ATGW;

some 150 Rapier (some 80 SP), 48 Blowpipe SAM; 5 Gazelle, 24 Lynx AH-5 hel (6 with TOW), 3 LCM, 3 patrol craft, 12 combat spt craft.)

DEPLOYMENT (see also Forces Abroad, below):
United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF): 42,100:

Reinforcements for 1 Br Corps, Germany: 1 inf div HQ, 4 inf bdes. (2 Regular, 2 TA):

United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF): 1 air portable inf bde and log spt gp.

Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (LAND) (AML(L)): 1 inf bn, 1 armd recce, 1 sigs sqns, 1 arty bty, 1logbn; 1avn fit.

Home Defence: 10 inf, 1 AB bdes.
HQ Northern Ireland: (some 9,000): 2 inf bde HQ, 8 major units in inf role (6 resident, 2 temporary inf bns), 1 SAS, 1 engr sqn, 1 army aviation regt of 2 sqns.

RESERVES:

2 armd, 3 lt recce regts, 35 inf bns (6 more forming, 1986), 2 SAS, 2 fd, 1 arty recce, 3 AD, 7 engr regts (4 airfield repair sqns forming).

Ulster Defence Regiment: 9 bns (internal security role in Northern Ireland only in peacetime).

Home Service Force: some 33 coys (to be 47).

NAVY: 70,600 (incl Air, Marines, 3,800 women and 375 enlisted outside Britain); 60 major surface combat vessels (incl 2 LPD).

Bases: Devonport, Faslane, Portland, Portsmouth, Rosyth.
Subs (attack): 28: SSN: 13 (2 Trafalgar, 6 Swiftsure, 2 Valiant, 3 Churchill); SS: 15 (13 Oberon, 2 Porpoise).
Carriers: 4 ASW with 5 Sea Harrier V/STOL ac, Sea King hel:

3 Invincible with 1x 2 Sea Dart SAM, 20mm Phalanx AD system;

1 Hermes (for disposal) with 2x4 Seacat SAM.
Destroyers: 15 GW:

2 County with 1x2 Seaslug, 2x4 Seacat SAM, 4 Exocet SSM, 1 Lynx HAS-2 hel;

1 Bristol with 1x 2 Sea Dart SAM, 1 Ikara ASW;

12 Sheffield (Type-42) with 1x2 Sea Dart, 1 Lynx hel.
Frigates: 39:

6 Broadsword (Type-22) with 4 Exocet SSM, 2x6 Sea Wolf SAM, 2 Lynx hel;

6 Amazon (Type-21) with 4x1 Exocet SSM, 1x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx hel;

23 Leander (1 trg) with 1 Wasp/Lynx (9 with Ikara ASW, 2x4 Seacat;

12 with 4 Exocet, 5 with 1x 4, 4 with 2x4, 3 with 3x4 Seacat; 5 with 1x6 Sea Wolf);

4 Rothesay with 1x4 Seacat, 1 Wasp hel (1 to trg Sept. 1985).
MCMV: 39: 10 Hunt, 24 Ton (5 reserves, 6 fishery patrol), 5 River (reserves); 1 Abdiel spt ship.
Patrol vessels: 32: 1 Endurance, 5 Peacock, 7 Island, 2 Castle, 2 mod Ton, 4 Bird (2 trg), 2 Loyal, 3 Protector, 4 Fleet tenders (trg); 2 32-metre.
Amph: LPD: 2: each 4 LCM, 4 LCVP, 4x4 Seacat SAM; landing ships: 7: 2 leased commercial (in Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA)); LCM: 13; LCH>: 29.

See also Army.
Misc: 1 sub tender, 9 survey vessels, 1 seabed ops vessel, 1 Royal Yacht (hospital ship), 2 hel spt ships (RFA), 1 forward repair ship, 1 salvage ship,

5 Tracker trg. See also Air Force.
Incl in above refitting or in reserve are: 1 SSBN, 2 SSN, 5 diesel subs, 1 Type-82 DD,6 frigates, 4 MCM, 1 patrol vessel, 1 LPD, 1 landing ship (RFA),

1 sub tender, 1 survey ship.
ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY (RFA): (2,600); naval vessels, civilian crews.

Tankers: 14: 4 large, 5 small, 5 spt.

Fleet replenishment ships: 4.
ROYAL MARITIME AUXILIARY:

10 service vessels, 3 coastal tankers, 7 munitions, 70 water tenders, 59 tugs, 4 trials, 4 docks, 20 other.

(Reserves): 4 Regional divisions: 9 MCM, 8 patrol, 72 Auxiliary Service units.
ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE (RNAS):
AD/attack: ac 3 sqns with Sea Harrier FRS-1, 1 T-4N.
ASW hel: 8 sqns: 7 with Sea King HAS-2/-5, 1 with Wasp HAS-1 (in indep fits).
ASW/attack hel: 2 sqns with Lynx HAS-2/-3 (in indep fits).
AEW hel: 1 sqn with Sea King AEW-2 forming.
Cdo/assault tpt hel: 3 sqns: 1 with Sea King HC-4; 1 with Wessex HU-5; 1 with Wessex CC-4.
Spt/SAR hel: 2 sqns with Wessex HU-5.
Trg: 2 sqns: 1 with Jetstream ac; 1 with Gazelle HT-2 hel.
Fleet spt: Canberra T-18/-22, Hunter T-7/-8, GA-1.
Equipment: 32 combat ac, 121 med hel.

Sea Harrier: 32: 29 FRS-1 (21 ftr, 8 trg); 3 T-4N (trg).

Canberra: 12 (spt); Hunter. 25 (spt). HS-125: 2 (VIP tpt).
Hel:

Sea King: 104: 86 HAS-2/-5 (64 ASW, 22 trg); 14 HC-4 (cdo); 4 AEW-2.

Lynx. 46 (35 ASW, 11 trg).

Wasp: 32 (22 ASW, 10 trg).

Wessex. 41: 21 HU-5/CC-4 (cdo); 20 HU-5(7 SAR, 3 spt, 10 trg).

Gazelle: 19 (trg).
Msls:

ASM: Sea Skua. AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
ROYAL MARINES: (7,800).

1 cdo bde: 3 cdo gps; 1 cdo arty regt, 1 bty (Army); 2 cdo engr sqns (1 Regular, 1 Reserve), 1 log regt (with army); 1 lt hel sqn, spt units.
1 Special Boat, 3 assault sqns.
(Reserve): 1 assault sqn.
Arty: guns: 18 105mm; mor. 18 81mm. ATGW: Milan. SAM: Javelin, Blowpipe. Hel: 12 Gazelle AH-1, 4 Lynx AH-1.
(On order. RN: 4 Trafalgar SSN, 1 Upholder (Type-2400) ss; 2 Type-42 destroyers, 1 Duke (Type-23), 8 Type-22 frigates (1 in late 1985),

3 Hunt, 7 River MCMV (1985); 10 trg patrol craft; 1 landing ship (logistic), 1 hel carrier trg auxiliary ship, 1 coastal survey vessel; 3 salvage ships;

72 Trident II SLBM, 10 Phalanx 20mm, Goalkeeper 30mm AD systems, Harpoon SSM, Javelin, Seawolf, Light weight Seawolf SAM.

RNAS: 23 Sea Harrier FRS-1, 4 Jetstream Mk 3 ac; 19 Sea King (6 HAS-5, 13 HC-4); 3 Lynx HAS-3 hel; Sea Eagle ASM.

Marines: 18 Mk 4 LCVP, 3 LCU).

AIR FORCE: 93,500 (incl 5,900 women).
Strike: 11 sqns: 8 with Tornado GR-1 (2 more to form); 2 with Buccaneer S-2A/B (assigned maritime, with Sea Eagle ASM); 1 with Jaguar GR-1/T-2.
FGA: 5 sqns: 3 with Harrier GR-3/T-4; 2 with Jaguar.
AD: 9 sqns: 2 with Lightning F-6/F-3/T-5; 7 with Phantom.
Recce: 2 sqns with Jaguar GR-1; 1 fit with Canberra PR-9.
MR: 4 sqns with Nimrod MR-1/-1A/-2 (Harpoon ASM, Sidewinder AAM being fitted).
AEW: 1 sqn with Shackleton AEW-2.
Tanker: 3 sqns: 2 with Victor K-2; 1 with VC-10 K-2/-3 (being phased in).
Tpt: 5 sqns: 1 strategic with VC-10C1/Tristar-1-500; 4 tac with C-130H/-HC3.
Liaison: 2 comms sqns with HS-125 Dominie, Andover, Pembroke, BAe-146-100. Queen's Fit: Andover.
ECM: 3 ECM/target facility/calibration sqns with Canberra, Nimrod MR-1, Andover E-3/C-1.
Trg: 12 ocu: Tornado GR-l/F-2, Buccaneer Mk 2, Phantom FGR-2, Jaguar GR-l/T-2, Harrier GR-3/T-4, Nimrod, Canberra B-2/T-4, C-130H, Victor K-2.

2 tac weapons units: Hunter F-6/GA-9/T-7, Hawk T-1, Jet Provost.

Trg units: Hawk T-1, Jet Provost, Jetstream T-1, Bulldog T-1, Chipmunk T-10, Dominie T-1, Husky T-1.
Tac hel: 5 sqns: 1 with Wessex; 2 with Puma HC-1; 2 with Chinook HC-1.
SAR hel: 9 fits: 5 with Wessex HC-2; 4 with Sea King HAR-3.
Trg hel: Wessex, Whirlwind, Gazelle.
AD: 2 SAM sqns with Bloodhound 2, 1 Royal Auxiliary AF sqn with 12x2 35mm Oerlikon AA guns with Skyguard (see also RAF Regt).
Equipment: some 599 combat ac.

Tornado: 123: 121 GR-1 (79 strike, 20 in trinational trg sqn (Cottesmore)), 22 weapons conversion unit); 2 F-2 (ocu).

Buccaneer. 52 (25 attack, 9 ocu, 18 reserve).

Jaguar. 120 (53 strike, 24 close spt, 24 recce, 19 ocu).

Harrier. 53 (33 close spt, 20 OCU).

Phantom: 150: 36 FG-1; 12 F-3 (F-4J) (ftr); 102 FGR-2 (48 ftr, 18 ocu, 36 reserve).

Lightning: 22 (ftr).

Hunter: 5 (tac weapons unit).

Hawk: 117 (72 tac weapons unit (Sidewinder capable), 45 trg).

Canberra: 38: 31 (ECM/target facility/calibration); 3 PR-9 (recce); 4 B-2/T-4 (ocu).

Nimrod: 34: 3 (ECM); 3 (OCU); 28 MR-1/-1A/-2 (MR).

Shackleton: 10 (5 AEW, 5 reserve).

Victor: 23 (16 tanker, 7 ocu).

Tristan: 9: 2 (tanker/cargo, to be 6), 7 (strategic tpt, to be 3).

VC-10: 20: 11 C-l (strategic tpt); 5 K-2 (tanker); 4 K-3 (tanker, to be 5).

C-130: 46 (41 tac tpt, 5 ocu).

Andover: 12 (5 ECM/target facility/calibration, 3 Queens Fit, 4 comms).

Dominie. 25: 19 T-1 (trg); 6 CC-1/-2 (comms). Pembroke: 6 (comms). BAe-146: 1 (comms).

Jet Provost: 147 (2 tac weapons unit, 145 trg). Jetstream: 11 (trg). Bulldog: 11 (trg). Chipmunk: 60 (trg). Husky: 1(trg).
Hel:

Wessex: 56 (20 tac tpt, 18 SAR, 4 ocu, 14 trg).

Chinook 30 (25 tac tpt, 5 OCU).

Puma: 31 (26 tac tpt, 5 ocu).

Sea King: 14 (SAR). Gazelle: 22 (trg). Whirlwind: 5 (trg).
Msls:
AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow, Red Top, Firestreak, Sky Flash. ASM: Martel, Harpoon, Sea Eagle.
SAM: 64 Bloodhound.
Marine Craft: 23 (21<).
(On order, Harrier GR-3/T-4, 62 Harrier II (AV-8B = GR-5), Tornado (some 264 GR-1, 164 F-2), 11 Nimrod AEW-3, HS-125-700,

BAe-146-100 (VIP), 3 VC-10 K-2/-3, 130 Tucano trg; 3 Chinook, Sea King HAR hel; AIM-9L Sidewinder, Rapier SAM,

Sky Flash AAM, 750 ALARM, Sea Eagle ASM, AR-3D AD radar.)
ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT:
4 wing HQ.
5 lt armd sqns.
7 SAM sqns (Rapier).
36 Scorpion lt tks; 90 Spartan APC; 72 Rapier SAM.
(Reserves (Royal Auxiliary Air Force)): 1 air movements sqn; 6 fd def sqns; 1 lt AA gun sqn with 12x2 35mm Oerlikon and Skyguard.

DEPLOYMENT:
Strike Command: 3 Gps; operational home command responsible for the UK Air Defence Region and Near and Far East;

overseas command (RAF Germany, Belize and Falklands).
Support Command: training, supply and maintenance support of other commands.

Forces Abroad: 96,141. Army 70,682, Navy/Marines 8,117, Air Force: 17,342.
Antarctica: Navy: 1 ice patrol ship.
Ascension Island: Navy: Det 3 Wessex HU-5 hel. RAF: Hercules C-1P tanker dets.
Belize: 1,500. Army: some 1,200; 1 inf bn, 1 armd recce tp, 1 fd arty bty, 1 lt AD (Blowpipe) det, 1 engr sqn, 1 hel fit (4 Gazelle AH-1).

Navy: 1 destroyer/frigate (guard ship), 1 spt ship. RAF: (200); 1 fit (4 Harrier GR-3 FGA, 4 Puma hel), 1 Rapier AD det (4 units) RAF Regt.
Brunei: Army: 1 Gurkha inf bn, hel fit (3).
Canada: Army: training and liaison unit.
Cyprus: Army: 3,250: UNFICYP (750); 1 inf bn less 2 coys, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 hel fit, engr and log spt.

Garrison: 1 inf bn plus 2 inf coys, 1 armd recce, 1 engr spt sqns, 1 hel fit.

RAF: 1,347; 1 hel sqn (task incl spt for UNFICYP), periodic dets of other ac, 1 fd sqn RAF Regt. Navy/Marines: 23.
Egypt (Sinai MFO): 38 technical and admin personnel.
Ethiopia: RAF: air despatch units: 3 Hercules.
Falkland Islands: 2,400. Army: 1 inf bn gp, armd recce sqn, 1 arty, 1 engr fd sqn, 1 sqn army air.

Navy (varies): 1 SSN/SS, 2 escorts, 3 patrol, spt and auxiliary ships.

RAF: 1 Phantom sqn (9), 6 Hercules K-l, 3 Sea King HAR-3, 6 Chinook hel, 1 Rapier SAM sqn. (Details may vary through the year.)
Germany: 68,728: British Army of the Rhine (BAOR): 55,288;

1 corps HQ; 3 armd divs incl 8 armed, 1 air mobile (trials) inf bdes; 11 armd, 2 recce, 12 arty (1 msl), 2 AD, 7 engr,

3 army air (10 air sqns, 2 indep fits) regts; 13 inf bns.

Berlin Inf Bde: 3,000; 3 inf bns, 1 armd sqn.

RAF: 10,440: 12 ac, 2 hel sqns: 2 Phantom FGR-2, 5 Tornado, 2 Jaguar (1 recce) (3 sqns Tornado to replace), 2 Harrier, 1 Pembroke (comms);

1 Puma, 1 Chinook (tpt); (RAF regt) 4 Rapier SAM, 1 fd sqns.
Gibraltar 1,969: Army: 793; 1 inf bn, 1 engr team, 1 arty surveillance tp.

Navy/Marines: 720; 1 escort, 1 spt ship; Marine dets. Base unit. RAF: 456; periodic Jaguar ac dets.
Hong Kong: 8,741: Army: 7,662; (British 1,976, Gurkha 4,446, Hong Kong Regt 1,240);

Gurkha Field Force with 1 Br, 4 Gurkha inf bns, 1 each Gurkha engr, sigs, tpt regts,

1 hel sqn (-) with 10 Scout AH-1, spt units, 3 small landing craft, 3 other vessels.

Navy: 811 (375 locally enlisted); 5 Peacock patrol craft, (12 patrol boats in local service), 1 Marine Raiding sqn. RAF: 268;

1 Wessex hel sqn (10 HC-2).
Indian Ocean: 2 destroyers/frigates, 1 spt ship; Diego Garcia, 1 naval, I Marine dets.
Military Advisers: 667 in 30 countries.

CANADA
GDP 1983: $C 402.58 bn ($US 324.792 bn). Est 1984: $C 437.20 bn($US 331.31 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.2%. 1984: 4.2%.
Inflation 1983: 5.8%. 1984: 4.4%.
Debt 1983: $US 105.0 bn. 1984: $US 110.0 bn.
Def exp 1984/5: $C 8.767 bn ($US 6.644 bn); NATO defn $US 7.027 bn. 1985/6: $C 9.385 bn ($US 6.822 bn): NATO defn n.a.

$US1=$C 1.2395 (1983/4), 1.3196 (1984/5), 1.3757(1985).
Population: 25,150,000.

Men: 18-30: 3,075,000; 31-45: 2,800,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,980,000; 31-45: 2,757,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 83,000 (to be 90,000 by 1989).*

(* The Canadian Armed Forces were unified in 1968. Of the total strength, some 41,200 are not identified by service.)

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 24,700. Army (Militia) 19,000; Comms 1,500; Navy 3,200; Air 1,000. (Total to increase to 40,000 by 1989.)

ARMY (Land Forces): 21,000.*
Mobile Command (about 18,000 land and air).*

(* Mobile Command commands land combat forces, and Maritime Command all naval forces.

Air Command commands all air forces, but Maritime Command has operational control of maritime air forces.

Mobile Command has operational control of TAG. HQ 4 ATAF in Europe has operational control of CAG.

There is also a Communication Command and a Canadian Forces Training System.)

2 bde gps: each 1 armd regt, 3 inf bns, 1 arty (2 close spt, 1 AD btys), 1 engr regts, spt units.

1 special service force (4,000): 1 armd regt, 1 inf bn, 1 AB, 1 arty, 1 engr regts, 1 spt unit.

1 mech bde gp (see Forces Abroad, Europe, below): 1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bns, 1 arty, 1 engr regts, spt units.

(Reserves): 131 combat arms and spt units.
Tks: 114 Leopard C-1. AFV: recce: 174 Lynx, 195 Cougar, APC: 961 M-113, 269 Grizzly.
Arty: how: 12 model 44 (L-5) pack, 190 towed 105mm; 55 M-114, 50 M-109 SP 155mm.
ATK: RL: 787 Carl Gustav 84mm; ATGW: 149 TOW.
AD: guns: 57 L-40/60 40mm; SAM: 111 Blowpipe.

NAVY (Maritime Forces): 5,500.*
Maritime Command (MARCOM; about 9,000).
Subs: 3 Oberon.
Destroyers: 4 DDH-280 ASW, each with 2 CH-124 Sea King hel, 2x4 Sea SparrowSAM.
Frigates: 19 ASW: 2 Annapolis, 6 St Laurent with 1 Sea King hel (to be retired from 1989); 4 Improved Restigouche with ASROC;

4 Mackenzie; 3 Restigouche.
Replenishment spt ships: 3 (one in refit), each with 3 Sea King hel.
Auxiliaries (civilian-manned): 11: 3 oceanographic research, 1 diving spt, 7 tugs (2 ocean, 5 coastal<).
Trg: 22: 6 coastal, 5 gate, 1 yacht<, 10 small.
(On order 6 ASW frigates (1990), 36 AGM-84D Harpoon ASM, Sea Sparrow SAM, radar.)

DEPLOYMENT AND BASES:

Atlantic: 3 subs, 4 ASW destroyers, 9 ASW frigates (1 in reserve), 2 replenishment spt ships. Halifax.

Pacific: 10 ASW frigates (2 in reserve), 1 replenishment spt ship. Esquimalt.

AIR FORCE: 15,300.*
Air Command (23,000).
Canadian Air Group (Germany) (CAG):

Ftr: 2 sqns with CF-104/-104D Starfighter (converting to CF-18 (F/A-18) July 1985 to 1988).
Fighter Group:

FGA: 3 sqns (1 trg) with CF-116/-116D (F-5A/D) (2 NATO-assigned); to get CF-18 from 1987. 1 trg sqn with CF-18D Hornet.

AD: 2 sqns with CF-18 (trg sqn to augment).

ECM: 1 trg sqn with CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20), CT-133 (T-33), CF-101 Voodoo.

EWng: 4 main, 17 auxiliary sites of Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line; region operational control centre (ROCC).

24 long-range radar sites (CADIN/Pine Tree Line; 17 to be phased out 1986-8). 1 space tracking and identification site.
Maritime Air Group.

MR: 6 sqns: 4 (1 trg) with CP-140 Aurora; 2 (1 reserve) with CP-121 Tracker.

ASW: 3 hel-sqns (1 trg) with CH-124 Sea King, afloat.

Liaison: 2 utility sqns with T-33, CP-121 ac; CH-135 (Bell 212) hel.
Air Transport Group:

Tpt: 6 sqns: 4 with CC-130E/H Hercules; 1 with CC-137 (Boeing 707); 1 with CC-109 Cosmopolitan, CC-117, CC-132 (DHC-7R) Ranger,

CC-144 Challenger.

SAR: 4 tpt/SAR sqns with CC-115 (DHC-5) Buffalo, CC-138 (DHC-6) Twin Otter, CH-113 (BV-107) Labrador, CH-135 hel.
Training Group:

Trg: 3 flying schools with CT-133, CT-134 Musketeer, CT-114 (CL-41) Tutor, CC-129 (C-47) ac; CH-139 (Bell 206) hel.

1 demonstration unit with CT-114.
Tactical Air Group (TAG):

Tac hel: 6 sqns with CH-135, CH-136 Kiowa, CH-147 Chinook.
Air Transport Group:

SAR hel: 4 tpt/SAR sqns (see SAR above) with CH-113, CH-135. 2 of these sqns MARCOM-assigned.

Liaison hel: 4 base flights with CH-118 (Bell 205), CH-135.
Equipment: 181 combat ac; 32 armed hel.

CF-104/-104D: 42 (ftr).

CF-116 (F-5A): 49: (24 FGA); 25 -D (F-5D) (FGA).

CF-18D (F/A-18): 52 (46 FGA, 6 trg).

CF-101: 2 (1 ECM , 1 trg).

CP-140: 18(MR).

CP-121: 22 (15 MR, 3 liaison, 4 reserve).

CC-130E/H: 28 (tpt). CC-137: 5 (tpt). CC-109: 7 (tpt). CC-117: 7 (2 tpt, 5 trg). CC-144: 5 (tpt). CC-132: 2 (tpt). CC-138: 8 (tpt). CC-115: II (tpt).

T-33: 9 (liaison). CT-133: 17 (trg). CT-114: 111 (trg). CT-134: 20 (trg). CC-129: 2 (trg).
Hel:

CH-124: 32 (ASW afloat).

CH-135: 38 (31 tac, 5 tpt, 2 liaison). CH-136: 36 (tac). CH-147: 7 (tac). CH-113: 13 (tpt).

CH-118: 9 (tpt). CH-139: 14 (trg).
(On order some 80 CF-18 (77 F-18A, 3 -B) ftrs, 4 CC-144 (CL-601) tpts, 6 CC-142 (DHC-8; 4 tpt, 2 trg); Sidewinder, SparrowAAM.

Forces Abroad:
Europe:

1 mech bde gp (4,056; being increased by 1,200 in 1985/6): 1 armd, 2 inf, 1 arty bns, engr regt, hel sqn:

59 Leopard 1 MBT, 363 M-113 APC/recce, 59 Lynx comd/recce, 24 M-109 155mm SPhow, 40 TOW ATGW,

50 40mm AA guns, 18 Blowpipe SAM,

12 CH-136 Kiowa hel. 1,729 reinforcements in Canada.

1 Air Group: (760): 3 ftr sqns with 42 CF-104/-104D (54 CF-18 to replace from July 1985). 1 det: 2 CC-132 and 4 CT-133 liaison ac.
Cyprus (UNFICYP): 515.
Syria/Israel (UNDOF): 226.
Other Middle East (UNTSO): 20.

PARA-MILITARY:

Coast Guard: 6,561 (civilian-manned); 1 large, 7 med, 3 lt icebreakers, 38 SAR vessels, 25 tenders, 2 DHC-7R ac, 37 hel,5 hovercraft.

Canadian Rangers: 1,300(component of Militia).

DENMARK
GDP 1983: Kr 515.4 bn ($56,359 bn). 1984: 568.4 bn ($54,883 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 4.2%.
Inflation 1983: 5.8%. 1984: 4.1%.
Debt 1983: $34.0 bn. 1984: $36.8 bn.
Def exp 1983: Kr 10.314 bn ($1,128 bn); NATO defn $1,214 bn. 1984: 12.508 bn ($1,208 bn): NATO defn $1.31 bn. Budget 1985: * 11.262 bn ($1,007 bn).

(* 1 Jan 1984 price levels.)

$1=9.145 (1983), 10.3566 (1984), 11.184 (1985).
Population: 5,150,000.

Men: 18-30: 512,000; 31-45: 583,000.

Women: 18-30: 490,000; 31-45: 560,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 29,600 (9,900 conscripts).

Terms of service: 9 months (to be 12 in combat arms).
Reserves: 162,200; 84,200; Home Guard 78,000 (11,700 women) (to age 50).

Army: 129,900.

Augmentation Force (immediate recall): 4,500 (to 'covering force').

Mobilization Forces: Field Army Reserve (FAR) 41,000 - comprising Covering orce Reserve (12,000):

5 mech inf bns (1 per bde), men (to bring units to war strength);

Other (29,000); 5 mot inf bns, men for regimental combat teams, combat and log spt.

Regional Defence Force: 7 Regions: 24,000. Hjemmevaernet (Home Guard): 60,400 (8,400 women).

Navy: 9,900; 4,700; Home Guard: 5,200 (1,500 women).

Air: 22,400; 10,000; Home Guard: 12,400 (1,800 women).

ARMY: 17,000 (8,100 conscripts): Standing Force (8,500); ('Covering Force' in wartime) HQ, schools, administration (7,250) (trg force 5,750, UN 500).
2 div HQ.

5 mech inf bdes, each with 1 tk, 2 mech, 1 arty bns, spt units.

6 regimental combat teams, each with 2-3 inf, 1 arty bns, spt units.

8 indep inf bns.

1 Army avn unit, some 8 platoons (being re-org).
(Reserves): 10 inf (5 mech, 5 mot), 4 arty bns, ATK sqns, spt units.
Tks: 120 Leopard 1, 88 Centurion; lt: 48 M-41. APC: 650M-113, 68 M-106 mor-armed.
Arty: guns: 24 155mm; how: 144 105mm, 96 155mm, 12 M-115 203mm towed, 72 M-109 155mm SP; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RC U 400 Carl Gustav 84mm, 252 106mm; m: LAW; ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: 36 L/60 40mm; SAM: Hamlet (Redeye).
Avn: ac: 16 Saab T-17 lt; hel: 12 Hughes 500M.
(On order: Carl Gustav Mk 3 84mm RCL.)

NAVY: 5,700 (1,100 conscripts).

Bases: Copenhagen, Korsor, Frederikshavn.
Subs: 4: 2 Narhvalen, 2 Delfinen.
Frigates: 10: 5 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM (2 Peder Skram, 3 Niels Juel); 5 Hvidbjernen fishery-protection with 1 Lynx hel.
FAC: (G): 10 Willemoes with 8 HarpoonSSM; (T): 6 Seleven (2 in active reserve).
Patrol craft: 27: 22 large (8 Daphne, 3 Agdlek, 2 Maagen, 9 Barse), 5 coastal (Botved<).
MCMV: 13: minelayers: 7 (4 Falster, 2 Lindormen, 1 Langeland); minesweepers: 6 Sund (US Type 60)coastal.
Coast defence unit: 2 coastal fortresses; 150mm guns.
Hel: 8 Lynx (4 embarked).
(Reserves (Home Guard)): 37 coastal patrol craft.
(On order 7 Standard Flox 300 multi-role patrol boats, Type 617 torpedoes, Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM.)

AIR FORCE: 6,900 (700 conscripts).
Tactical Air Command:

FGA: 3 sqns with F-16A/B.

FGA/AD: 1 sqn with F-35XD Draken.

FGA/recce: 1 sqn with RF-35XD Draken.

Ftr: 1 sqn with F-104G (to replace with F-16).
Air Defence Group:

AD: 1 SAM bn: 6 batteries with Improved: HAWK(2 more to be formed).
Air Materiel Command:

Tpt: 1 sqn, 3 comms fits with C-130H, Gulfstream III, Saab T-17.

SAR: 1 sqn with S-61A hel.

Trg: 1 flying school with T-17.
Equipment: 102 combat ac.

F-16A/B: 55 (48 FGA, 7 reserve).

F-35: 32: 16 F-35XD (FGA/AD); 16 RF-35XD (recce).

F-104G: l5 (ftr).

C-130: 3 (tpt). Gulfstream III: 3 (tpt). Saab T-17: 22 (7 tpt, 15 trg).
Hel: S-61: 8 (SAR).
Msls: AAM: Sidewinder.
SAM: 36 Improved HAWK.
(On order 12 F-16A/B; AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM.)
Forces Abroad: Cyprus (UNFICYP): 1 bn: 341. Other: 159.

FRANCE
GDP 1983: F fr 3,934.9 bn ($516,303 bn). 1984: 4,302.0 bn ($492,270 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.0%. 1984: 1.3%.
Inflation 1983: 7.7%. 1984: 5.7%. "
Debt 1983: $102 bn. 1984: $94 bn.
Def exp* 1984: F fr 142.962 bn ($16,359 bn); NATO defn $20,113 bn. Budget 1985: 150.20 bn ($15,859 bn).

(* A 5-year military development plan for 1984/8 totalling fr 850 bn is being implemented.)

$1=francs 7.6213 (1983), 8.7391 (1984), 9.4707(1985).
Population: 55,170,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,575,000; 31-45: 5,920,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,400,000; 31-45: 5,640,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 476,560 (13,135 women, 245,560 conscripts).* To be reduced by 37,500 by 1988.

(*Incl Inter-Service Central Staff and Service de Sante, but not Gendarmerie.)

Terms of service: 12 months plus post conscription voluntary system of 16-24 months.
Reserves: 393,000; Army 305,000, Navy 30,000, Air 58,000.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: (18,700; some 2,800 Army, 4,900 Navy, 10,200 Air Force, 800 Gendarmerie).
SLBM: 5 SSBN:

1 with 16M-4, 4 with 16 M-20 msls (2 on long refit).

1 experimental/trials SSB with 2 SLBM tubes.
IRBM: 18 SSBS S-3 msls in 2 sqns.
Aircraft:
Bbr: 2 wings: 4 sqns with 21 Mirage IVA (AN-22 nuclear bombs), 1 Mirage IVP (ASMP nuclear ASM);

(10 more Mirage IVA being converted; total 18 by end-1986.)
Trg: 12 Mirage IIIB, 4 Noratlas N-2501/SNB.
Tankers: 1 wing: 3 sqns with 11 KC-135F.
(Reserve): 6 Mirage IVA recce.
(On order. 1 SSBN (1994), 16 M-4 SLBM, ASMP nuclear ASM, 4 Transall Astarteac.)

ARMY: 300,000 incl Army Aviation, 6,250 women (189,000 conscripts).
1 army HQ, 3 corps HQ.

6 armd divs.

2 lt armd divs.

2 motor rifle (APC) divs.
Army corps regts: 3 recce, 2 drone, 2 arty, 5 SSM with Pluton,

8 SAM (3 (11 btys) with 66 HAWK, 5 (each of 4 btys) with 56 Roland I/II and twin 30mm AA guns), 3 combat hel, 5 engr, 6 sigs, 4 tpt, 3 log bdes.
Rapid Action Force(FAR):

1 para div (13,500): 6 para inf, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 comd spt regts, 1 spt bn.

1 air portable marine div (8,500): 4 inf, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 AA, 1 engr, 1 comd/spt regts.

1 lt armd div (7,400): 2 lt armd, 2 APC inf, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 comd/spt regts.

1 alpine div (9,100): 6 mountain inf regts, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 comd/spt regts; 1 engr bn.

1 air mobile div (5,100): 1 inf, 3 combat hel, 1 comd/spt regts (incl 1 tpt hel bn).

1 sigs regt.
Foreign Legion (8,500): 1 armd, 1 para, 4 inf (trg), 2 engr regts.

1 log bde (spt units incl 1 tpt regt).

Indep regts: 1 EW, 2 para, 4 engr, 5 tpt.

(Reserves): 8 inf divs, 1 formed from military schools; 6 'Home' bdes: 23 territorial defence regts.
ARMY AVIATION (ALAT): (7,000); 177 combat hel.

Combat hel regts: 6. 7 lt gps, 2 schools.

6 sqns: 3 attack with Gazelle (AS-11/HOT), 2 lt with Gazelle, 1 manoeuvre with Puma.

1 utility bn; 5 sqns with Alouette; 1 with Gazelle.
Tks: 1,260 AMX-30 (169-B2); lt 342 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 194 AMX-10RC, 48 ERC-90F4 Sagaie, 600 AML-60/90; MICV: 780 AMX-10P/PC/Milan;

APC: 1,100 AMX-13 VTT, 1,900 VAB, 24 VAB (HOT).
Arty: 699: guns: 76 AU-F-1 155mm SP; how: 165 HM-2, 208 BF-50, 6 TR-F-1 155mm towed, 30 AU-50 105mm; 214 F-3 SP 155mm.

SSM: 44 Pluton; mor: 596 120mm.
ATK: RL: 12,000 89mm, Apilas 112mm; ATGW: 158 AMX-13/SS-11, 1,400 Milan.
AD: guns: 817: 100 76T1, 270 53T2 20mm, 390 30mm and 40mm towed, 57 AMX-30 DCA twin 30mm SP;

SAM: 225: 69 HAWK, 138 Roland I/II, 18 Mistral.
Avn: hel: 187 Alouette II, 68 III (AS-11 ATGW); 130 SA-330 Puma, 162 SA-341F and 109 SA-342M Gazelle hel with HOT;

ac: 17 Broussard, 14 L-19 lt; 4 CL-89 drones.
(On order. 800 AMX-30B2 MBT; 600 Panhard M-11 VBL, 90 AMX-10RC, 130 ERC-90F4 armd cars; AMX-10P MICV; 294 VAB APC;

200 AU-F-1 155mm SP guns; 175 TR-F-1 155mm how; 3 227mm MLRS; 23 120mm mor; 12,500 Apilas RL; 907 HOT (VAB and Gazelle) ATGW;

407 20mm AA guns; 50 Roland, 297 Mistral SAM; 15 SA-341L, 45 SA-342M (HOT) hel.)

NAVY: 67,710 incl Naval Air, (1,185 women; 17,970 conscripts); 47 major surface combat vessels. 2 home (CECLANT, CECMED), 2 overseas comds.

Bases: Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Toulon.
Subs (attack): 18: SSN: 2 Rubis; SS: 16 (4 Agosta, 9 Daphne, 3 Narval).
Carriers: 3: 2 Clemenceau, 1 Jeanne d'Arc.

2 attack: 39 ac (3 fits with 20 Super Etendard, 1 with 7 F-8E, 1 with 6 Alize; 1 det with 4 Etendard IVP, 4 hel).

1 ASW (LPH) (capacity 8 Lynx hel) with 6 Exocet SSM (trg).
Cruiser: 1 command with 4 Exocet SSM, 1x2 Masurca SAM.
Destroyers: 19:
ASW: 15: 4 Leygues with 4 Exocet, 1x8 Crotale SAM, 2 Lynx hel;

3 Tourville with 6 Exocet, 1x8 Crotale, 1 Malafon, 2 Lynx;

1 T-56 with 1 Malafon, 1 hel;

1 T-53 with 4 Exocet, 1 Lynx;

5 T-47 with 1 Malafon;

1 C-65 with 4 Exocet, 1 Malafon.
AA: 4: 2 Suffren with 4 Exocet, 1 Malafon ASW/SSM, 1x2 Masurca SAM;

2 T-47 with 1 Tartar SAM).
Frigates: 25: 8 Riviere (4 with Exocet); 17 Type A-69 (4 with 2 Exocet, 5 with 4; 1 more in 1985).
FAC(G): 7: 4 Patra with 6 SS-12; 3 P-400 with 2 Exocet MM-38 SSM (3 more in 1985).
Patrol craft: 3 large: 1 Mercure, 1 Sterne, 1 P-681 Albatros.
MCMV: ocean: 13: 5 Cantho, 3 Eridan, 5 Circe; coastal: 10: 5 Berlaimont, 5 Type D.
Amph: assault ships: 6: 2 Ouragan (4 Super Frelon or 6 Gazelle/Alouette hel, 9 LCM or 2 LCT), 4 Batral; LST: 4; LCT: 9; LCM: 6.
Tankers: 6 ocean, 6 maintenance/log/supply.
Msls: SSM: Exocet MM-38, MM-40 (SM-39 sub launched being introduced); ASW: Malafon; SAM: Crotale,Masurca, Tartar.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (12,300).

Strike: 3 sqns with Super Etendard (AN-52 nuclear weapons; 20 to be mod for ASMP).
Ftr: 1 sqn with F-8E (FN) Crusader.
ASW: 2 sqns with Alize (mod).
MR: 6 sqns with Atlantic, Gardian.
Recce: 1 sqn with Etendard IVP.
OCU: Etendard IVM; Fouga Zephir, Alize.
Trg: 5 units with Nord 262 Frigate, Navajo, EMB-121 Xingu, Rallye-100S, CAP-10.
Misc: comms/liaison/SAR units (1 VIP) with Navajo, Nord 262, Nord N-2504, Xingu, Alize, Rallye-S&O, Gardian, MS-760 Paris,

Mystere-Falcon 10MER.
ASW hel: 3 sqns with Lynx. >
Cdo hel: 2 assault sqns with Super Frelon.
Trg hel: Alouette.
Misc hel: comms/liaison/SAR units with Alouette II/III, Lynx, Super Frelon.
Equipment: 104 combat ac, 23 combat hel.

Super Etendard: 36 (strike).

Etendard: 20: 8 IVP (recce); 12 IVM (trg).

F-8E Crusader. 12 (ftr).

Alize: 23 (16 ASW, 5 trg, 2 misc).

Atlantic: 27 (MR).

Gardian: 5(MR).

Zephir. 12 (trg). Nord 262: 22 (12 trg, 10 misc).

Navajo: 10 (2 trg, 8 misc). Xingu: 13 (9 trg, 4 misc). Rallye: 16 (13 -100S trg, 3 -800 misc).

CAP-10: 6 (trg). MS-760: 8 (misc). Mystere Falcon 10MER: 5 (misc). Nord N-2504: 1 (misc).
Hel: Lynx. 26 (23 ASW, 3 misc). Super Frelon: 15 (12 cdo, 3 misc). Alouette. 38 (10 trg, 28 misc).
Msls: ASM: Exocet AM-39, AS-12/-30, Martel AS-37. AAM: R-530, Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
COMMANDOS: (590): 4 assault units (1 reserve), 1 sub spt unit.
NAVAL BASE DEFENCE FORCE: (2,400).
(On order: 4 SSN; 7 C-70 (Cassaret) destroyers (3 ASW, 4 AA), 7 A-69 frigates, 8 P-400 FAC(G) (delivery by end-1986), 7 minehunters;

1 TCD-90 LSD, 2 LCT; 1 ocean tanker, 33 Exocet SM-39 sub-launched SSM; 14 Crotale 8B SAM; 36 Atlantic II ASW ac.)

DEPLOYMENT:
Atlantic Fleet: 5 SSBN, 9 other subs, 1 hel carrier, 20 escorts, 11 MCM, 8 amph.
Channel Flotilla: 3 frigates, 7 MCM.
Mediterranean Fleet: 2 SSN, 9 subs, 2 carriers, 14 escorts, 5 MCM, 5 amph.
PUBLIC SERVICE FORCE (MHSP): Naval personnel, general coastguard duties;

1 Sterne, 1 Mercure patrol craft, 1 ex-trawler, 1 Albatros fishery protection vessel, 3ac.

AIR FORCE: 96,550 (5,700 women, 36,450 conscripts).
Air Defence Command (CAFDA): 7,600.

Ftr: 11 sqns: 1 with Mirage IIIC (1 in Djibouti); 8 with Mirage F-1C; 2 with Mirage 2000C/B.

Trg: 1 OCU with Mirage F-1B; 4 trg fits with CM-170 Magister, Broussard.

AD system: automatic STRIDA II, 10 radar stations.

SAM: 12 sqns (1 trg) with 24 Crotale btys (48 fire, 24 radar units).

AA: 240 btys (20mm guns).

AAM: R-530, Super 530F, R-550 Magic I/II, Sidewinder.
Tactical Air Force (FATAC): (19,500).

Strike: 5 sqns: 3 with Jaguar, 2 with Mirage IIIE (AN-52 nuclear bombs).

FGA: 10 sqns: 3 with Mirage IIIE; 2 with Mirage 5F; 5 with Jaguar A.

Recce: 3 sqns: 2 with Mirage IIIR/IIIRD (F-1 replacing); 1 with Mirage F-1CR.

Trg: 2 OCU: 1 with Mirage IIIB/E; 1 with Jaguar A/E. 8 trg fits with Magister, Broussard.

AAM: Sidewinder, R-550 Magic, R-530. ASM: AS-30/-30L, Martel AS-37.

(Attached to COTAM):

AEW: 2 sqns: 1 with Noratlas; 1 with DC-8 (EE-51) ELINT.

Liaison: 3 sqns with Magister, Broussard.

Hel: 1 sqn with Alouette II/III.
Air Transport Command (COTAM): (4,200).

Tpt: 21 sqns: 1 hy with DC-8F; 5 tac with Transall C-160/-160NG, 1 with Noratlas;

14 lt tpt/trg/SAR with Fregate, Mystere Falcon 50, Paris, Broussard, DHC-6 Twin Otter, Caravelle, Xingu.

Trg: 1 OCU with Noratlas, Transall C-160.

Hel: 5 sqns with Alouette II/III, Puma, Dauphin, Ecureuil.

Trg hel: 1 OCU with Alouette II/III, Puma, Ecureuil.
Training Command (CEAA): (6,300).

Trg: Alpha Jet, Magister, Noratlas, Xingu 1, Epsilon, CAP-10B/-20.

Misc (trials units): 1 sqn with Mirage F-1, Mirage 2000, Jaguar, 1 sqn with DHC-6, Frigate.
Equipment: 475 combat ac.

Mirage: 342: 14 F-1B (trg); 120 F-1C (ftr); 15 F-1CR (recce); 10 IIIC (ftr); 90 IIIE (30 strike, 45 FGA, 15 ftr); 19 IIIR (recce); 11 IIIRD (recce);

30 -5F (FGA); 30 -2000 (ftr); (also 1 F-1, 2 -2000 in trials sqn).

Jaguar: 135+ (45 strike, 75 FGA, 15 trg + trials sqn ac).

Alpha Jet: 113(trg).

DC-8: 6 (5 tpt, 1 EE-51 AEW).

Transall C-160: 69 (42 tac tpt, 7 OCU, 20 -NG tac tpt).

Noratlas: 24 (10 tac tpt, 5 AEW, 3 OCU, 6 trg).

Nord 262: 20 (19 misc, 1 trials).

Mystere Falcon: 15: 14 -20 (misc), 1 -50 (misc).

MS-760: 39 (misc). Broussard: 23 (trg, misc). DHC-6: 10 (9 misc, 1 trials). Caravelle: 4 (misc). Xingu: 22 (16 trg, 6 misc).

Magister: 155+ (trg), Epsilon: 45 (trg). CAP-10B/20: 57 (trg).
Hel: Alouette: 72 (9 II OCU, 55 II/III lt tpt, 8 III OCU).

Puma: 27 (24 tpt, 3 OCU).

Dauphin: 15(tpt).
(On order some 32 Mirage 2000C/B, 47 -2000N, 30 F-1CR ftrs; 107 Epsilon trg ac; 18 AS-355 Ecureuil-2 hel,40 20mm AA guns.)

INTER-SERVICE CENTRAL STAFF: 3,588.
SERVICE DE SANTE: 8,712 (2,140 conscripts).

Forces Abroad:
Europe: Germany: 48,500; 3 armd divs (400 MBT; to be increased). Berlin: 2,700; 1 armd regt, 1 inf regt.
Overseas Dependencies: 18,800; Army 11,500, Navy 3,700, Air 1,200, Gendarmerie 2,400.
Four inter-service overseas commands:

Antilles-Guyana (7,500; 1 marine inf regt, 1 marine inf bn, 2 ships, 1 Atlantic MR ac).

South Indian Ocean (Mayotte, La Reunion) (2,200; 1marine inf regt, 2 inf coys, 1 air tpt unit).

New Caledonia (2,400; 1 marine inf regt, 1 inf coy, C-160 tpt ac, Puma hel).

Polynesia (5,300, incl ALPACI; 1 marine regt).
Two naval commands:

Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN): 1,400, 5 frigates, 3 minor combatants, 1amph, 3 spt ships.

Pacific (ALPACI): 3 frigates, 5 minor combatants, 7 amph, 12 spt ships, 5 Gardian MR ac.
Other Over seas: some 9,220 from all services

(numbers vary according to local circumstances). Eqpt incl 120 AFV, spt vessels, 25 combat and 25 tpt ac, 43 hel.
Central African Republic (CAR) (1,650). 1 armd car sqn and 1 tp (AML), 3 inf coys, 1 arty bty (105mm), 1 ALAT det (3 L-19 ac; 3 attack, 6 med tpt hel);

air elms with Jaguar, L-19 observation, C-160 tpt ac; SA-330 Puma, Gazelle (HOT) hel.

Garrison: 1 bn gp incl 2 motor coys; 1 platoon AML armd cars (6); spt coy with L-19 lt ac, 120mm mor, Milan ATGW.
Djibouti (3,800). 2 regts: 2 lt tk (AMX-13/AMX-SS-11), 1 mixed armd sqns; 2 motor inf coys; 1 arty bty (105mm); 1 AA arty bty; 1 Pioneer coy;

1 ALAT det (5 attack, 5 med tpt hel); 1 sqn with 10 Mirage IIIC, 1 C-160 tpt ac, 3 Alouette II hel; naval elms incl 1 Atlantic MR ac.
Gabon (600). 1 marine inf bn; Jaguar, 1 C-160, Atlantic ac, 1Alouette III hel.
Ivory Coast (500). 1 marine inf bn, 1 Alouette III hel.
Senegal (1,250). 1 marine inf regt, 2 Jaguar FGA, 1 Atlantic MR, 1 C-160 tpt ac, 2 Alouette III hel.
Middle East. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1,380): 1 inf bn, log bn. Sinai MFO (40): incl 2 Twin Otter, 1 C-160 tpt ac.

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie 89,505 (incl 1,068 women, 8,961 conscripts, 975 civilians);

3,675 territorial squads, 130 intervention units; 93 general traffic units, 25 highway sqns, 3 platoons, 25 squads; 130 mobile sqns; 240 overseas units.

121 AML, 28 VBC-90 armd cars; 37 AMX-13, 33 AMX-VTT, 155 VBRG-170 APC; 288 81mm mor; 66 patrol boats;

6 Cessna 206C ac; 23 Alouette II, 8 AS-350B Ecureuil, 12 Alouette III hel.

GERMANY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GDP 1983: DM 1,669.6 bn ($653,899 bn). 1984: 1,745 bn ($613,163 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.3%. 1984: 2.6%.
Inflation 1983: 3.0%. 1984: 2.4%.
Debt 1983: $115 bn. 1984: $109 bn.
Def budget 1984: DM 47.752 bn ($16,779 bn); NATO def $20,430 bn. 1985: 49.014 bn ($15,740 bn); NATO defn $19,184 bn.

$1=2.5533 (1983), 2.8459 (1984), 3.1139 (1985).
Population: 61,200,000.

Men: 18-30: 6,534,000; 31-45: 6,490,000.

Women: 18-30: 6,180,000; 31-45: 6,160,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 478,000 (228,400 conscripts).*

(* Incl 11,200 military personnel in the Ministry of Defence, Central Military Agencies, Central Medical Agencies and

6,100 reserve duty training positions.)

Terms of service: 15 months (to be 18 months from 1989).
Reserves: 770,000 (men to age 45, officers/NCOs to 60): Army 645,000, Navy 22,000, Air 95,000, Others 5,000.

ARMY: 335,600 (180,300 conscripts)*. (*Excl inter-service personnel and part-time reservists.)
HQ Support Elements: 25,400: General Army Office subordinate echelon and spt tps.
Field Army: 266,000.
3 corps: 12 divs (6 armd, 4 armd inf, 1 mountain, 1 AB); 36 bdes:

17 armd (each with 3 tk, 1 armd inf, 1 armd arty bns),

15 armd inf (each with 1 tk, 3 armd inf, 1 armd arty bns),

1 mountain, 3 AB.

Total: 66 tk, 62 armd inf, 4 mountain, 12 para, 32 armd arty, 1 mountain arty bns.

11 armd recce bns.

Corps arty: 6 bns (each 18 203mm SP how), 4 SSM bns with Lance.

Div arty: 11 regts (each 3 btys: 18 FH-70, 6 203mm, 16 MRL).

3 AD regts, 1 AD bn with Roland II SAM.

11 AA regts with Gepard 35mm SP guns.

3 army aviation comds, each with 1 lt, 1 med tpt hel regt; 1 indep ATGW hel regt.

1 mixed aviation regt.

Engr units.
Territorial Army: 44,200.
3 Territorial Commands, 5 Military District Commands, 29 Military Region Commands, 80 Sub-region Commands (county/town level):

12 Home Defence bdes (each with 2 tk, 2 lt inf, 1 arty bns): 1 at 85%, 3 at 65%, 2 at 52% manning levels, 6 eqpt holding units only in peacetime.
4 Territorial Service spt comds.
Security tps: 15 Home Defence Regts (with 45 mot inf bns only), 150 coys, 291 security platoons;

defensive, comms, military police and service units on mobilization.
Tks: 4,662: 295 M-48A2/A2C, 650 M-48A2G (Territorial bns), 2,437 Leopard 1A1, 1,280 Leopard 2.
AFV: MICV: 408 SPz-2 Luchs, 2,136 Marder, APC: 797 TPz-1, 2,560 M-113.
Arty: how: 1,293: 257 105mm, 216 FH-70, 594 M-109 155mm, 226 M-110A2 203mm SP; MRL: 209 LARS 110mm; 2 MLRS 227mm;

mor: 987 120mm (535 SP (M-113)); SSM: 26 Lance.
ATK: guns: 284 JPz-4-5 90mm SP; RCL: 105 106mm;

ATGW: 1,975 Milan systems, 346 TOW systems, 316 RJPz-(HOT) Jaguar 1,162 RJPz-(TOW) SP; (PAH-1 hel with HOT).
AD: guns: 2,389: 1,712 20mm towed, 426 Gepard 35mm SP, 251 L-70 40mm; SAM: 723 Redeye, 143 Marder/Roland SP.
Avn: hel: 187 UH-1D, 148 Alouette III, 211 PAH-1 (BO-105P with HOT), 96 BO-105M, 105 CH-53G.
(On order 520 Leopard 2 MBT; 312 Wiesel AB recce/MICV; 193 TPz-1 APC (79 in 1985); 198 227mm MLRS MRL;

81 (40 in 1985) RJPz- (TOW) Jaguar 2 ATGW veh (rebuilt JPz-4-5).

NAVY: 36,200, incl naval air (10,000 conscripts).* (* Excl inter-service personnel and part-time reservists.)

Bases: Borkum, Cuxhaven, Eckernforde, Emden, Flensburg, Kiel, Olpenitz, Wilhelmshaven.
Subs: 24: 18 Type 206,6 Type 205.
Destroyers: 7:

3 Lutjens (1 Type 103A with 1 Tartar SAM, 8 ASROC; 2 103B with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 2 RAM-ASMD SAM);

4 Hamburg (Type 101A) with 2x2 Exocet MM-38 SSM.
Frigates: 9: 6 Bremen (Type 122) with 2x4 Harpoon, 1x8 Sea Sparrow, 2 RAM-ASMD, 2 Lynx hel;

3 Koln (Type-120).
Corvettes: 6: 5 Thetis (Type 420); 1 Burkner utility/trials.
FAC(G): 40 with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM: 10 Type 143, 10 Type 143A, 20 Type 148.
MCMV: 57: 18 Lindau (12 Type 331 (2 A, 10 B) coastal minehunters (MHC),

6 Type 351 Troika drone control minesweepers (MSCD), 18 F-1 drone vessels (MCD));

8 Type-393/393B inshore, 21 Schutze (7 Type-340, 14 Type-341), 10 Type-394/394A coastal minesweepers.
Misc: 10Rhein depot, 4 Luneburg (Type 701 A), 4 Coburg (Type 701C) spt ships, 4 tpts, 9 tankers, 3 Type-422A/B AGI.
Amph: LCU: 22 Type-520; LCM: 28 Type-521.
(On order 20 Type-323, 10 Type-343 MCMV, 2 Type-423 AGI, 110 SM-1 Standard, 126 RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM.)
NAVAL AIR ARM:
FGA: 3 sqns: 2 with Tornado; 1 with F/TF-104G (to convert 1986).
Recce: 1 sqn with RF-104G.
MR/ELINT: 2 sqns with Atlantic.
Liaison: 1 sqn with Do-28-2 Skyservant.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Sea Lynx Mk 88.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 41.
Equipment: 122 combat ac; 12 combat hel.

F-104: 56: 29 F/TF-104G (FGA); 27 RF-104G (recce).

Tornado: 47 (FGA).

Atlantic. 19 (14 MR, 5 ELINT).

Do-28: 19 (liaison).
Hel: Sea Lynx. 12 (ASW). Sea King: 22 (SAR).
Msls: ASM: AS-30, Kormoran.
(On order. 63 Tornado, 3 Sea Lynx (1986).)

AIR FORCE: 106,000 (38,100 conscripts).* (* Excl inter-service personnel and part-time reservists.)
Tactical Command (GAFTAC).
4 divs: 2 tac, 2 AD.
FGA: 20 sqns: 3 with F-104G; 4 with F-4F; 6 with Tornado; 7 with Alpha Jet.
Ftr: 4 sqns with F-4F.
Recce: 4 sqns with RF-4E.
ECM: 1 trg sqn with HFB-320 Hansa Jet.
SSM: 8 sqns with Pershing 1A.
SAM: 3 regts (each 2 bns of 4 btys) with Nike Hercules; 3 regts (each 3 bns of 4 btys) with Improved HAWK.
Radar: 4 aircraft control and warning regts; 9 sites; 1 US Control Report Centre (CRC) and 3 remote radars.
AAM: Sidewinder.
Transport Command (GAFTC).
Tpt: 4 sqns with Transall C-160.
Special operations: 1 special air mission wing with Boeing 707-320C, C-140 Jetstar, Hansa Jet, VFW-614, Do-28 ac; UH-1D hel.
Hel: 5 sqns with UH-1D (liaison).
Training Command:
FGA: 1 det (Cottesmore, UK) with Tornado.
Ftr: OCU (George AFB, US) with F-4E.
Trg: NATO joint pilot trg (Sheppard AFB, US) with T-37B, T-38A; primary trg unit with P-149D.
Liaison: liaison, range and base fits with Do-28D.
Equipment: 586 combat ac.

F-104G: 90 (FGA).

F-4: 186: 120 -F (60 FGA, 60 ftr); 8 -E (ocu); 58 RF-4E (recce).

Tornado: 137 (75 FGA, 22 OCU, 20 in tri-national trg sqn, 20 reserve).

Alpha Jet: 173 (126 FGA, 47 reserve).

Transall C-160: 75 (tpt).

Boeing 707: 4 (special). Jetstar. 3 (special).

Hansa Jet: 13 (6 special, 7 ECM trg).

VFW-614: 3 (special). Do-28: 71 (6 special, 65 liaison). T-37B: 35 (trg). T-38A: 41 (trg). P-149D: 34 (trg).
Hel: UH-1D: 96 (92 liaison, 4 special).
SSM: 12 Pershing 1A.
SAM launchers: 216 Nike Hercules, 216 HAWK.
(On order. 58 Tornado FGA, 7 CL-601 Challenger tpt ac; AIM-9L Shorad (Sidewinder), 14 Patriot (779 msls), 95 Roland SAM,

AGM-65 Maverick ASM, 866 AGM-86A HARM msls.)

PARA-MILITARY:

Border Police (Ministry of Interior): 20,000;

FV-601(D) (Saladin) armd cars, MOWAG SW-1/-2 APC; 2 P-149D, 1 Do-27A-3 ac, BO-105M, 32 Alouette II, 13 UH-1D, 10 Bell 212, 22 Puma hel.

GREECE
GDP 1983: dr 3,040.7 bn ($34,530 bn). Est 1984: 3,708.5 bn ($32.90 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -0.3%. 1984: 2.3%.
Inflation 1983: 20.2%. 1984: 18.5%.
Debt 1983: $11.5 bn. 1984: $14.0 bn.
Est def exp 1984: dr 247.722 bn ($2,198 bn); NATO defn $2,204 bn. 1985: 281.713 bn ($2,053 bn); NATO defn n.a.
FMA 1983: $310.0 m. 1984: $530.0 m.

$1=drachmas 88.054 (1983), 112.72 (1984), 137.23(1985).
Population: 10,300,000.

Men: 18-30: 954,000; 31-45: 898,000.

Women: 18-30: 904,000; 31-45: 944,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 201,500 (132,000 conscripts, 1,800 women).

Terms of service: Army 22, Navy 26, Air Force 24 months.
Reserves: some 404,000 (to age 50).

Army some 350,000 (Field Army 227,000; Territorial Army 23,000; National Guard 100,000 (incl 5,000 reservists on 4-week trg)),

Navy about 24,000, Air about 30,000.

ARMY: 158,000 (105,000 conscripts incl 1,400 women).
Field Army.
3 Military Regions, 4 corps, 1 special comd HQ.
1 armd div (1 armd bde, 1 arty bn).
1 mech div.
11 inf divs.
1 para-cdo div (1 para, 1 cdo, 1 marine bdes, 3 cdo bns).
5 armd bdes.
2 mech bdes.
4 armd recce bns.
12 fd arty bns.
8 AA arty bns.
2 SSM bns with 8 Honest John.
2 SAM bns with Improved HAWK.
3 army aviation bns.
1 indep aviation coy.
Tks: 320 M-47, 900 M-48 (incl 250 -A3, 265 -A5), 285 AMX-30, 106 Leopard 1A3; lt 190 M-24.
AFV: recce: 180 M-8, 60 M-20 armd cars; MICV: 240 AMX-10P; APC: 160 Leonidas, 220 M-3 half-track, 430 M-59, 1,000 M-113.
Arty: 1,124: guns: 36 M-59 155mm, 36 M-107 175mm SP; how: 108 M-56 pack, 216 M-101, 108 M-102, 72 M-52 SP, 54 M-108 SP 105mm,

54 M-44 SP, 240 M-114, 108 M-109 SP 155mm, 72 M-115, 20 M-110 SP 203mm.

mor: M-l, EBO, M-125A1 SP 81mm, M-2, M-30, M-106A1 SP 107mm, M-120RT-61 120mm; SSM: 8 Honest John.
ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, 75mm, some 350 EM-67 90mm, 700 106mm;

ATGW: 82 M-113A2 SP TOW, 14 M-901 Improved TOW, SS-11, Cobra, TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: RH-202 twin 20mm, 40mm, incl M-42 twin SP, M-51 75mm, M-l 17/118 90mm;

SAM: 36 MIM-23B Improved HAWK (216 msls), 37 M-48 Chaparral, Redeye.
Avn: ac: 2 Super King Air, 2 Aero Commander, 1 DHC-2 Beaver, 50 U-17A;

hel: 8 AH-1 with TOW, 10 CH-47C, 5 Bell 47G, 22 UH-1D, 50 AB-204B/-205, 10 AB-206A.
(On order: 36 M-901 Improved TOW SP ATGW (108 msls); 58 M-198 155mm how; Artemis 30 twin 30mm AA guns;

20 AH-1S attack hel (160 TOW), 20 NH-300C trg hel.)
Territorial Army: 23,000 (incl 10,000 conscripts, 5,000 reservists on refresher trg).
3 Territorial, 17 Sub-Commands.

12 indep inf bdes.

4 armd bns.
National Guard: 100,000.

100 bns (mainly coastal defence).
Tks: 30 M-47, 106 M-26; lt: 80 M-41A3. AFV: recce: 60 M-20; ARC: 100 M-2, 160 M-3.
Arty: gun/how 468 25-pdr (88mm); how: 108 M-116 75mm pack; mor: 60mm, 81mm. ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, 200 M-20 75mm, 106mm.
AD: guns: M-1 40mm.

NAVY: 19,500 (12,000 conscripts incl 200 women); 23 combat hel.

Bases: Salami's, Patras, Mitilini, Thessaloniki, Suda Bay.
Subs: 10: 4 Glavkos, 4 Poseidon (Types 1100 and 1200), 2 US Guppy (trg).
Destroyers: 14: 7 Gearing (6 with 1x8 ASROC, 1 with 1 Alouette III hel), 1 Sumner (facilities for 1 Alouette hel), 6 Fletcher.
Frigates: 7: 2 Kortenaer (8 Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 AB-212 hel), 4 US Cannon, 1 FRG Rhein.
FAC: (G): 16: 14 La Combattante II/III (8 with 4 Exocet, 6 with 6 Penguin SSM), 2 L'Esterel with 4 SS-12;

(T): 15: 5 Ger Zobel, 5 Jaguar, 5 Nasty<.
Patrol craft: 9 coastal<.
MCMV: 17 coastal (2 LSM-1, 10 MSC-294, 5 US Adjutant).
Amph: LSD: 1, LST: 7, LSM: 5, LCT: 2, LCU: 6.
ASW: 1 hel div (3 sqns: 2 with 18 AB-212, 1 with 5 Alouette III).
(On order 2 Poseidon (Type 1200) SS, 2 Phalanx 20mm AD, Artemis 30 twin 30mm gun systems.)

AIR FORCE: 24,000 (16,500 conscripts incl 200 women).
Tactical Air Force: 7 combat wings: 1 tpt wing.
FGA: 8 sqns: 3 with A-7H; 3 with F-104G; 2 with F-5A.
Ftr: 6 sqns: 3 with F-4E; 1 with F-5A/B; 2 with Mirage F-1CG.
Recce: 2 sqns; 1 with RF-84F, RF-4E; 1 with RF-5A.
MR: 1 sqn with HU-16B Albatross.
Tpt: 3 sqns with C-130H, YS-11, C-47, Do-28 Skyservant, Gulfstream.
Liason: T-33A.
Tpt hel: 3 sqns with AB-205A, AB-206A, Bell 47G, UH-1D, AB-212, CH-47C.
SAM: 1 wing: 1 gp with Nike Ajax.
Air Training Command:
Trg: 4 sqns: 1 with T-41A; 1 with T-37B/C; 2 with T-2E/F-104G.
Equipment: 314 combat ac.

A-7H: 53: 48 (FGA); 5 TA-7H (FGA).

F-104: 74: 72 F/TF-104G (FGA); 2 RF-104 (recce).

F-5: 72: 54 -A (36 FGA, 18 ftr); 8 -B (6 FGA, 2 ftr); 10 RF-5A(recce).

F-4E: 54 (47 ftr, 7 RF-4E recce).

Mirage F-1GC: 33 (ftr).

RF-84F: 16 (recce).

HU-16B: 12 (MR).

C-130H: 12 (tpt). YS-11-20O: 6 (tpt). C-47: 9 (tpt). Noratlas: 20 (tpt). Gulfstream I: 1 (VIP tpt).

T-33A: 59 (liaison). T-41: 20 (trg). T-37: 25 (trg). T-2: 36 (trg).
Hel: AB-205A: 12 (tpt). AB-206A: 3 (tpt). Bell 47G: 5 (tpt). AB-212: 4 (tpt). CH-47C: 7 (tpt).
Msls: AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder, Falcon. ASM: Maverick, Bullpup.
SAM: 36 Nike Ajax.
(On order 40 F-16G (F-16A), 40 Mirage 2000 ac; AIM-7 Sparrow AAM; Artemis 2x30mm AA guns.

Forces Abroad: Cyprus: 1,750; 1 inf bn (950), cdos (350); officers/NCOs seconded to Greek Cypriot forces (450).

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie: 25,000; MOWAG Roland, 15 UR-416 APC.

Coastguard and Customs: 4,000; some 100 patrol craft, 2 Cessna Cutlass ac.

ITALY
GDP 1983: L 538,998 bn ($354,884 bn). 1984: 612,112 bn ($348,385 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -1.2%. 1984: 2.8%.
Inflation 1983: 14.7%. 1984: 10.8%.
Debt 1983: $66.0 bn. 1984: $67.5 bn.
Def exp 1984: L 13,820 bn ($7,866 bn); NATO defn $9,929 bn. 1985: 16,380 bn ($8,248 bn); NATO defn $10,365 bn.

$1=lire 1,518.8 (1983), 1,757 (1984), 1,986 (1985).
Population: 57,150,000

Men: 18-30: 5,650,000; 31-45: 5,647,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,442,400; 31-45: 5,631,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 385,100 (257,890 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army and Air Force 12, Navy 18 months.
Reserves: 799,000. Army 550,000 (obligation to age 45), immediate mobilization 250,000.

Navy 221,000 (to age 38 for men, variable for officers to 73) Air 28,000 (to age 25 or 45 (specialists)).
ARMY: 270,000 (205,000 conscripts).
3 corps HQ.
1 armd div (2 armd, 1 mech bdes).
3 mech divs (each of 1 armd, 2 mech bdes).
2 indep mech bdes.
4 indep mot bdes.
5 alpine bdes.
1 AB bde.
2 amph bns.
1 hy spt bde (1 Lance SSM, 3 hy arty gps; 3 Improved HAWK SAM bns).
Aviation:

4 wings (10 sqns, 29 fits); 10 indep sqns (21 fits). (Fit usually has 6 ac/hel.)

9 lt ac sqns with SM-1019/O-1E; 11 hel sqns (9 with AB-206, 2 with AB-205A).

Recce: 10 sqns with AB-206 hel.

Target acquisition: 2 sqns: 1 with SM-1019 ac; 1 with AB-206 hel.

Multi-role: 17 hel sqns: 1 with AB-204B; 15 with AB-205A; 1 with AB-205B.

Med tpt: 4 sqns with CH-47 hel.

Other 1 trg, 1 repair units.
Tks: 1,770: 500 M-47, 300 M-60A1, 970 Leopard 1. APC: 4,110 M-106, M-113, M-548 and M-577, AMX-VCI.
Arty: guns: 1,110: 18 M-107 175mm SP;

how: 320 Model 56 105mm pack, 724 155mm (incl 150 FH-70 towed, 220 M-109E SP), 36 M-115, 12 M-110 SP 203mm;

mor: 81mm, 120mm; SSM: 6 Lance.
ATK: RCL: 57mm, 106mm; ATGW: Cobra, SS-11, TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm, 230 40mm; SAM 60 Improved HAWK, Stinger.
Avn: ac: 70 SM-1019, 30 Cessna O-1E (tgt acquisition/utility);

hel: AB-47G/J, 5 AB-109 Hirundo, 18 AB-204B, 100 AB-205A, 140 AB-206A/A1, 14 AB-212, 24 CH-47C Chinook.
(On order. 130 FH-70, SP-70, M-109 155mm how; 20 FIROS 6 51mm MRLS; 850 TOW, Milan ATGW; FIM-92A Stinger SAM+ msls;

60 A-129 Mangusta hel.)

NAVY: 44,500, incl 1,500 air arm, 750 marines (24,590 conscripts).

Bases: La Spezia, Taranto, Ancona, Brindisi, Augusta, Messina, La Maddalena, Cagliari, Naples, Venice.
Subs: 10: 4 Sauro, 4 Toti, 2 US Tang (1 to retire).
Carrier (hel): 1 Vittorio Veneto with 9 AB-212 ASW hel, 4 Teseo (Otomat Mk 2) SSM, 1x2 Terrier SAM.
Cruisers: 2 Andrea Doria with 4 AB-212ASW hel, 1x 2 Terrier SAM.
Destroyers: 4 GW: 2 Audace with 2 AB-212ASW hel, 1 Standard SAM;

2 Impavido with 1 Standard.
Frigates: 16: 8 Maestrale with 4 Teseo SSM, 1x4 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 2 AB-212 hel;

4 Lupo with 4 Teseo SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 AB-212 hel;

2 Alpino with 2 AB-212 hel;

2 Bergamini with 1 AB-212 hel.
Corvettes: 8: 4 De Cristofaro, 4 Albatros.
Hydrofoils: 7 Sparviero with 2 Teseo SSM.
FAC: 2 Freccia (can carry 1 x 5 Sea Killer SSM; to retire 1985).
MCMV: 22: 2 Lerici, 4 Storione (US Aggressive) ocean; 9 Agave coastal (retiring), 7 Mandorlo (US Adjutant) minehunters.
Amph: LST: 2: US De Soto County; LCM: 19 US; 2 Stromboli replenishment tankers.
Marine: 1 inf gp: 30 VCC-1, 10 LVTP-7 APC, 16 81mm mor, 8 106mm RCL, 6 Milan ATGW.
NAVAL AIR ARM: (1,500); 83 combat hel.
ASW: 5 hel sqns with 30 SH-3D Sea King, 53 AB-212.
ASM: Marte Mk2.
(On order. 2 Sauro subs, 1 hel carrier (delivery 1985), 2 Audace destroyers, 4 Minerva corvettes with Albatros multi-role weapon system,

2 Lerici minehunters, 2 LPD; 6 SH-3D, 9 AB-212, 6 AB-412 Griffon hel.)

AIR FORCE: 70,600 (28,300 conscripts).
FGA: 6 FGA/recce sqns: 3 with Tornado; 1 with F-104S; 2 with G-91Y.
Tac: 3 sqns: 1 lt attack with MB-339; 2 lt attack/recce with G-91R/R1/R1A (await replacement).
Ftr: 7 sqns with F-104S.
Recce: 2 sqns with F/RF-104G.
MR: 2 sqns with Atlantic (Navy-assigned; being increased).
ECM: 1 ECM/recce sqn with G-222VS and PD-808.
Calibration: 1 navigation-aid calibration sqn with G-222, PD-808, C-47, MB-339.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 2 with G-222; 1 with C-130H.
Comms: sqns with P-166M Albatross, SIAI-208M, PD-808, MB-326, DC-9 ac; SH-3D Sea King hel.
Trg: 1 ocu with TF-104G; 1 det (Cottesmore, UK) with Tornado; 6 sqns with G-91, MB-326/-339A, SF-260M ac; AB-204B, AB-47 hel.
SAR hel: 4 sqns and 6 dets with AB-204, AB-212, Sikorsky HH-3M.
AD: 8 SAM groups with Nike Hercules, Spada.
Equipment: 315 combat ac.

Tornado: 64 (54 FGA, 10 in tri-national trg sqn).

F-104: 150: 102 -S (18 FGA, 84 ftr); 30 F/RF-104G (recce); 18 TF-104G(ocu).

G-91: 122: 36 -Y (FGA); 36 -R (lt attack/recce); 50 -T (trg).

MB-339: 80 (15 tac, 65 calibration, trg).

MB-326: 30 (15 liaison, 15 trg).

Atlantic. 14 MR.

C-130: 10 (tpt). G-222: 38 (32 tpt, 4 calibration; 2 -VS ECM). DC-9: 2 (liaison). C-47: 4 (calibration).

P-166: 16 (liaison). PD-808: 14 (6 ECM, calibration, 8 liaison). SF-260: 30 (trg). SIAI-208: 32 (liaison).
Hel: CH-3: 20 (SAR). SH-3D: 2 (liaison). AB-204: 23 (20 SAR; 3 -B trg). AB-212: 18 (SAR). AB-47: 20 (trg).
Msls: AAM: AIM-7E Sparrow, AIM-9B/L Sidewinder. ASM: Kormoran.
SAM: 96 Nike Hercules, 4 Spada.
(On order 20 Tornado; 187 AMX FGA; 20 MB-339 lt attack, G-222 tpt, SF-260M trg ac; 18 AB-212, 10 HH-3F hel;

AGM-65 Maverick ASM; Spada SAM systems, Aspide AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO)(90); 3 minesweepers. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (48).

PARA-MILITARY:
Carabinieri 90,000: 1 mech bde: 13 bns, 1 AB bn, 2 cav sqns;

37 M-47 MBT; Fiat 6616, 80 M-6, M-8 armd cars; 470 Fiat 242/18AD, 240 M-113APC; 23 AB-47, 2 A-109, 5 AB-205, 23 AB-206 hel.
Ministry of Interior: Public Security Guard 67,927: 11 mobile units;

40 Fiat 6614 APC, 3 P-64B ac; 1 AB-47Y3B-1, 6 A-109A, 12 AB-206A1, 4 AB-212 hel.
Treasury Department: Finance Guards 48,691; 6 AB-47J, 69 NH-500M hel, 350 patrol craft.
(On order 3 AB-212, 1A-109A hel.)

LUXEMBOURG
GDP 1983: fr 172.50 bn ($3,374 bn). 1984: 186.90 bn ($3,234 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 2.2%.
Inflation 1983: 7.7%. 1984: 6.0%.
Def budget 1984: fr 1.367 bn ($23,657 m); NATO defn $39,728 m. 1985: 1.393 bn ($22,228 m); NATO defn $36,970 m.

$1=francs 51.132 (1983), 57.784 (1984), 62.668 (1985).
Population: 367,000.

Men: 18-30: 27,311; 31-45: 26,083.

Women: 18-30: 25,922; 31-45: 24,994.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 720.

Terms of service: voluntary, minimum 3 years.
ARMY: 720.
1 lt inf bn.
1 indep coy.
APC: 5 Commando. ATK: RL: LAW; ATGW: TOW. Misc: 1 river cruiser (ceremonial).
AIR: (Luxembourg had no air force of her own, but for legal purposes NATO's E-3A AEW ac have Luxembourg registration.)

1 sqn with 18E-3A NATO Standard.
PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 470.

NETHERLANDS
GDP 1983: gld 376.72 bn ($131,993 bn).1984: 393.10 bn ($122,511 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.6%. 1984: 2.2%.
Inflation 1983: 2.8%. 1984: 3.3%.
Debt 1983: $16.5 bn. 1984: $16.5 bn.
Est def exp 1984: gld 12.757 bn ($3,976 bn); NATO defn $3,976 bn. Budget 1985: 13.420 bn ($3,816 bn): NATO defn n.a.

$1=guilders 2.8541 (1983), 3.2087 (1984), 3.5164(1985).
Population: 14,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,624,000; 31-45: 1,674,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,555,000; 31-45: 1,570,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 105,975 (incl 4,400 Royal Military Constabulary); 1,450 women; 48,773 conscripts.

Terms of service: Army 14-16, Navy and Air Force 14-17 months.
Reserves: 176,300 (men to age 35, NCOS to 40, officers to 45).

Army 150,300 (many on short leave, immediate recall), Home Guard (4,300), Navy some 20,000 (7,500 on immediate recall),

Air 6,000 (immediate recall).

ARMY: 67,000 (43,250 conscripts), though see Reserves.
1 Corps HQ, 3 mech div HQ.
2 armd bdes.
4 mech inf bdes.
1 SSM bn with Lance.
3 hel sqns (Air Force manned).
(Reserves): 1 armd, 2 mech inf bdes, corps troops and 1 indep inf bde would be completed by call-up of reservists;

some inf bdes could be mobilized for territorial defence.
Home Guard: 3 sectors; inf weapons.
Tks: 1,146: 468 Leopard 1 (some mod to 1A4), 335 Leopard 2, 343 Centurion (some 250 may be in reserve).
APC: 744 M-113, 734 YP-408 (to retire), 1,301 YPR-765.
Arty: bow: 467: 42 M-101 105mm, 140 M-114 155mm (some to be modernized), 222 M-109 155mm, 63 M-110A2 203mm SP.

mor: 333 81mm, 194 107mm, 152 120mm; SSM: 6 Lance.
ATK: RCL: Carl Gustav 84mm, 175 106mm; ATGW: 360 Dragon, 320 TOW.
AD: guns: 54 L-/70 40mm towed, 100 Gepard 35mm SP.
Avn: 64 Alouette III, 29 BO-105 hel.
(On order 110 Leopard 2 MBT; 841 YPR-765 APC; 386 Stinger SAM.)

NAVY: 16,694, incl naval air arm and marines (1,187 conscripts).

Bases: Den Helder, Flushing, Curacao.
Subs: 5: 2 Zwaardvis, 2 Potvis, 1 Dolfijn.
Destroyers, GW: 2 Tromp (flagships) with 8 Harpoon SSM, 1 Standard, 8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 Lynx hel.
Frigates: ASW: 16 with 8 Harpoon SSM:

10 Kortenaer with Sea Sparrow SAM, 1-2 Lynx hel;

6 Van Speijk with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx hel.
Patrol craft: large: 3 Balder.
MCMV: 17: 8 Dokkum coastal, 9 Alkmaar.
Misc: 2 Poolster combat spt, 3 survey, 2 Buyskes North Sea, 1 oceanographic.
Amph: LCA/LCVP: 10<.
NAVAL AIR ARM: (1,682);
MR: 3 sqns (1 trg)with P-3C Orion II.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Lynx SH-14B/C.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Lynx UH-14A.
Equipment: 15 combat ac, 17 combat hel.

P-3: 13 (MR).

F-27: 2 (MR) with Air Force crews.
Hel: Lynx: 22: 17 SH-14B/C (ASW), 5 UH-14A (SAR).
MARINES: (2,800).
2 amph cdo gps.
1 mountain/arctic warfare coy.
(Reserve): 1 amph cdo gp.
(On order. 4 Walrus SS; 4 M-class multi-role, 2 Heemskerk AD frigates; 6 Alkmaar MCMV; 2 LCVP; Harpoon SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 16,810 (3,565 conscripts).
FGA: 5 sqns: 2 with F-16; 3 with NF-5A (to convert from 1986).
Ftr: 2 FGA/ftr sqns with F-16A/B.
Recce: 1 sqn with F-16.
Tpt: 1 sqn with F-27.
Ocu: 2 sqns: I with NF-5B; 1 with F-16B.
SAR hel: 1 fit with AlouetteIII.
SAM: 14 sqns: 12 with Improved HAWK (8 in Germany); 2 with Nike Hercules.
AD: 25 Shorad/Flycatcher, 40 L-70 systems.
Equipment: 218 combat ac.

NF-5: 72: 54 -A (FGA), 18 -B (ocu).

F-16: 146 (40 FGA, 58 FGA/ftr, 18 recce, 12 ocu, 18 reserve).

F-27: 12(tpt).
Hel: Alouette: 4 (SAR).
Msls: SAM: 36 Improved HAWK, 23 Nike Hercules.
AD: Shorad/Flycatcher: 25. L-70 AA guns: 40.
(On order 57 F-16A/B FGA ac; 100 Stinger, 20 Patriot SAM launchers, 160 msls.)

INTER-SERVICE ORGANIZATION: 1,071 (271 conscripts).

Forces Abroad:

Germany: 5,500; 1 armd bde, 1 recce, 1 engr bns, spt elements.

Lebanon (UNIFIL): 162: 1 inf coy.

Egypt (Sinai MFO): 105: 1 det.

Netherlands Antilles: 1 frigate, 1 amph combat det, 1 MR det with 2 F-27MPA ac.

PARA-MILITARY: 8,700:

Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee): 4,400 (500 conscripts); 3 divs comprising nine districts with 87 'bdes'.

Home Guard: 3 sectors, inf weapons.

Civil Defence: (Corps Mobiele Colonnes): 22,000 on mobilization; disaster relief under Army command.

NORWAY
GDP 1983: N kr 401.34 bn ($55,005 bn). 1984: 446.62 bn ($54,723bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.2%. 1984: 4.3%.
Inflation 1983: 8.4%. 1984: 6.2%.
Debt 1983: $30.5 bn. 1984: $29.5 bn.
Def exp 1984: N kr 12.921 bn ($1,583 bn); NATO defn $1,555 bn. Budget 1985: 14.327 bn ($1,598 bn); NATO defn $1,665 bn.

$1=7.2964 (1983), 8.1615 (1984), 8.9641 (1985).
Population: 4,150,000.

Men: 18-30: 420,000; 31-45: 440,000.

Women: 18-30: 400,000; 31-45: 420,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 37,000 (23,200 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army, Navy Coast arty, Air AD elms, Home Guard 12; Navy, Air Force 15 months.
Reserves: 201,000; total war strength incl Home Guard 320,000; total national mobilization strength some 495,000.

Army 138,000; 21 days refresher training each 3rd/4th year to age 44, may volunteer for extension.

Navy 22,400. Air 30,600. Home Guard 10,000.

Civilian resource mobilization: up to 25,000 hy veh, private ac, hel, 220 vessels.

ARMY: 20,000 (13,000 conscripts).
2 Operational, 5 regional, 16 operational territorial commands.
1 bde: 3 inf bns, 1 tk coy, 1 SP fd arty bn, 1 AA bty, spt units (North Norway).
1 all-arms gp: 1 inf bn, 1 tk coy, fd arty, AA btys (South Norway).
2 border garrison bns.
1 inf bn (Royal Guard).
Indep armd sqns, inf bns and arty regts.
(Reserves): 42 cadre units to form on mobilization 13 bdes (each some 5,000 men),

plus separate field and territorial inf, cav, arty, engr, sigs, def and spt units.
Tks: 70 Leopard 1, 30 M-48A5; lt: 70 NM-116 (M-24/90); MICV: NM-135 (M-113/20mm); APC: M-113.
Arty: 380: how: 250 105mm and 155mm towed, 130 M-109 155mm SP. Mor: 81mm, 107mm.
ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, M-20 75mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, M-40A1 106mm; RL: M-72 66mm; ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: FK20-2 20mm, 40mm; SAM : RBS-70.
Avn: lt ac: 23 O-1E, 8 L-18.
(On order: M-113 APC, 108 RBS-70 SAM (delivering from July 1985)).

NAVY: 7,600, incl 1,000 coast artillery (5,000 conscripts).

Bases: Horten, Haakonsvern (Bergen), Ramsund, Olavsvern (Tromso).
Subs: 14 Kobben (Type 207).
Frigates: 5 Oslo with 6 Penguin SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x 6 Terne ASW.
Corvettes: 2 Sleipner with 1x6 TerneASW.
FAC(G) with Penguin SSM: 38: 18 Storm (6x1), 14 Hauk (6x1), 6 Snogg (4x1).
MCMV: 2 Vidar, 1 Borgen minelayers; 9 Sauda (US MSC-60), 1 Tana; 2 diving tenders.
Amph: 5 Reineysund LCT.
Spt: 1 Horten depot/trg ship, 7 coastal tpts, 2 trg, 1 patrol vessels, 12 harbour tpt.
Coast defence: some 30 fortresses: 50 arty, mine and torpedo btys: 75mm, 105mm, 127mm, 150mm guns.
SAR/recce: 1 hel sqn with 6 Lynx (coastguard).
(On order 6 Ula (Type 210) SS; 8 120mm coast defence guns.)

AIR FORCE: 9,400 (5,200 conscripts).
FGA: 5 sqns: 4 with F-16; 1 (OCU) with F-5A.
MR: 1 sqn with P-3B Orion (2 may be assigned to coastguard).
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with C-130, Mystere-Falcon 20; 1 with Twin Otter ac, UH-1B hel.
Trg: Saab MFI-17 Safari.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 43.
Liaison hel: 2 utility sqns with UH-1B.
AD: 4 lt arty bns; 1 SAM bn (4 btys).
Equipment: 92 combat ac.

F-5A: 16 (ocu).

F-16A/B: 69 (FGA).

P-3B: 7 (MR).

C-130H: 6 (tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20S: 3 (tpt).

DHC-6: 4 (tpt). Safari: 15 (trg).
Hel: Sea King: 10 (SAR). UH-1: 28 (2 tpt, 26 utility).
Msls: AAM: Sidewinder. ASM: CVR (AGM-12B Bullpup).
AD: 32 L-60, 64 L-70 40mm guns; 128 MIM-14B Nike Hercules SAM.
(On order (lease) 54 HAWK launchers and 162 msls (4 btys).)

JOINT SERVICES ORGS: 300.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 861; 1 inf bn, 1 service coy, plus HQ personnel.

PARA-MILITARY:
Home Guard 80,000 (incl 10,000 reservists).

Land: 71,400; districts, areas (500-1,500 men), subareas (100-300 men).

Sea: 6,000; 8 Tjeld FAC(T), 2 Kralsund LCT, 400 fishing vessels.

Air 2,600; 2 bns (7 btys), 2 indep btys, lt AA; 72 L-60 40mm guns.
Civil Defence: 112,500: Regional: 54 Districts, 14 mobile columns. 108 local units. Permanent staff some 500; total mobilization strength 80,000.

Industrial: 32,500. Coastguard: (220: 130 Navy, 90 Air Force, incl 55 civilians):

13 (7 chartered) patrol vessels incl 3 Nordkapp fitted for 6x1 Penguin II SSM, 6 Lynx hel (Air Force manned), 7 armed fishery protection vessels.

PORTUGAL
GDP 1983: esc 2,289.6 bn ($20,668 bn). Est 1984: 2,846.7 bn ($19,446 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -0.1%. 1984: -2.1%.
Inflation 1983: 25.5%. 1984: 29.5%.
Debt 1983: $19.5 bn. 1984: $20.5 bn.
Def exp 1984: esc 92.009 bn ($628,520 m);NATO defn $628,520 m. Budget 1985: 114.659 bn ($655,269 m); NATOdefn $655,269 m.
FMA 1983: $55.0 m. 1984: $71.0 m.

$1=escudos 110.78 (1983), 146.39 (1984), 174.98 (1985).
Population: 10,280,00.

Men: 18-30: 1,095,000; 31-45: 863,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,072,000; 31-45: 997,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 73,040 (48,900 conscripts): see Army.

Terms of service: Army 16, Navy 24, Air Force 21-24 months.
Reserves: 173,000 (all services) (obligation: men to age 45; officers to 70).

ARMY: 45,740 (40,000 conscripts, 3 in takes a year, 4 months alternating service).
6 Geographical Commands (4 military region, 2 island).
1 mixed bde.
2 cav regts.
1 armd regt.
11 inf regts, 3 indep inf bns.
1 special forces bde: 1 cdo regt, 4 spt bns.
2 fd, 1 AA, 1 coast arty regts.
2 engr regts.
1 sigs regt.
1 military police regt.
Tks: 66 M-48A5.
AFV: recce: 30 Saladin, 63 AML-60/-90 lt armd, 32 Ferret Mk 4; APC: 132 M-113 (incl A2 TOW), 9 M-577A2 (81mm mor), 81 Chaimite.
Arty: guns: 24 5.5-in. (140mm); how: 20 M-101A1 105mm towed, 6 M-109A2 155mm SP; coast: 35 150mm, 152mm, 234mm; mor: 20 107mm.
ATK: RCL: 15 90mm, 25 106mm; ATGW: 35 TOW.
AD: guns: 18 Rh-202 20mm, 20 Bofors L-60 40mm; SAM: 16 Blowpipe.
DEPLOYMENT: 3 inf regts, 2 fd arty btys in Azores and Madeira.

NAVY: 13,936 incl marines (4,400 conscripts).

Bases: Lisbon (Alfeite), Faro.
Subs: 3 Albacora (Fr Daphne).
Frigates: 17: 3 Silva (2 fishery protection), 4 Belo, 4 Andrade, 6 Coutinho.
Patrol craft: 19: 10 Cacine, 2 Aleixo, 5 Albatroz, 2 Bonanza.
Amph: LCT: 2; LCM: 10; LCA: 1.
Spt: 1 tanker.
MARINES: (2,000) (1,000 conscripts).
3 bns (2 inf, 1 police), spt units.
Chaimite APC, mor, amph craft.

AIR FORCE: 13,364 incl 2,000 para (4,500 conscripts).
1 combat command, 5 administrative wings:
FGA: 4 sqns: 2 with A-7P Corsair, 1 with G-91R3/T3; 1 with G- 91R4/T3.
Recce: 1 sqn with CASA C-212B.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with C-130; 1 with C-212.
SAR: 3 sqns: 1 with C-212 ac; 2 with SA-330 Puma hel.
Liaison: 2 ac sqns with Reims-Cessna FTB-337G, 2 utility hel sqns with Alouette II.
OCU: 1 with Northrop T-38 Talon.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with C-212 ac, Alouette III hel; 1 with Cessna T-37C; 1 with Chipmunk.
Para: 1 para gp (1 bn, 2 coys).
Equipment: 116 combat ac.

A-7: 50 (44 FGA, 6 trg).

G-91: 50: 20 -R3 (FGA); 10 -T3 (FGA).

T-38: 12 (ocu).

C-212: 24 (12 tpt, 6 SAR; 2 -A trg; 4 -B recce).

C-130: 5 (tpt). T-37: 20 (trg). Cessna 337: 32 (liaison). Chipmunk: 30 (trg).
Hel: Puma: 12 (SAR). Alouette II/III: 40 (37 liaison, 3 trg).
(On order. 3 C-130 tpt ac; 12 A-109A hel (4 with TOW).)

PARA-MILITARY: National Republican Guard 14,600; Commando Mk III APC.

Public Security Police 15,291. Fiscal Guard: 7,385.

SPAIN
GDP 1983: pts 22,778 bn ($158,566 bn). 1984: 25,935 bn ($161,327 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.2%. 1984: 2.5%.
Inflation 1983: 12.2%. 1984: 11.3%.
Debt 1983: $37.0 bn. 1984: $37.0 bn.
Est def exp 1983: pts 535.30 bn ($3,726 bn); NATO defh n.a. 1984: 620.90 bn ($3,862 bn); NATO defn n.a.
FMA 1983: $400.0 m. 1984: $400.0 m.

$1=pesetas 143.65 (1983), 160.76 (1984).
Population: 39,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 4,057,000; 31-45: 3,532,000.

Women: 18-30: 3,940,000; 31-45: 3,591,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 320,000 (214,000 conscripts) (to be reduced).

Terms of service: 15 months (Army to reduce to 12 months by 1987).
Reserves: 1,085,000 (all services) (to age 38 (men)).

ARMY: 230,000 (170,000 conscripts); to reduce to 195,000 1985-8.
Immediate Intervention Force:

1 armd div (1 armd, 1 mech bde).

1 mech div (1 mech, 2 mot bdes).

1 mot div (2 mot bdes).

1 armd cav bde.

1 para bde (3 bns).

1 airportable bde (3 bns).

1 arty bde.

1 locating, 1 fd rocket, 1 lt AA regts.

1 engr, 1 sigs regts.

1 chemical/nuclear defence regt.
Territorial Defence Force: (to disband 1985-8).

8 Military Regions (to be 6, incl Ceuta and Melilla), 2 overseas comds (see Deployment).

2 mountain divs (each 2 bdes; to Immediate Intervention Force).

Legion: HQ, 3 regts, spt units (overseas forces), 1 depot regt, 1 special operations gp.

8 inf bdes (to be disbanded)
Region Command:

1 arty bde (incl 1 HAWK SAM gp, 1 Nike Hercules bty).

2 hy arty regts.

7 coast/AA arty regts.
General Reserve Force:

1 ATK inf regt.

1 engr, 2 railway engr regts.

1 sigs regt.
Independent Units:

Army HQ inf gp.

Royal Guard Regt (incl inf, naval, air force coys and escort cav sqn).
Army Aviation (FAMET): 40 armed hel.

HQ with 1 hel, 1 spt, 1 trg sqns.

1 attack bn.

1 tpt bn (1 med, 1 hy coys).

3 utility units.
Tks: 319 AMX-30, 350 M-47E, 110 M-48 (105mm); lt: 180M-41.
AFV: MCIV: 250 BMR-600; recce: 60 AML-60, 80 AML-90; APC: BLR, 500 M-113.
Arty: 1,179: guns: 168 122/46 122mm towed, 12 M-107 175mm SP;

coast: 200 88mm (?reserve), 200 6-in. (152.4mm), 24 203mm, some 12 12-in. (305mm), some 12 15-in. (381mm);

how: 911 105mm M-26 and M-56 pack, 84 M-114 155mm, 12 M-115 8-in. (203mm) towed,

48 M-108 105mm, 24 M-44, 96 M-109A 155mm, 4 M-55 203mm SP.

mor: 1,200 81mm, 107mm, 400 120mm; MRL: R-2B 105mm, Teruel 140mm, L-21 216mm, L-10 300mm, L-8 381mm.
ATK: Rd: 350 106mm; ffl.: 42 M-65 88.9mm, C-90C 90mm; ATGW: 50 Milan, 50 Cobra, 18 Dragon, HOT, 12 TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm, 64 35/90, 280 40/90, 120 90mm; SAM: 10 Nike Hercules, 24 Improved HAWK.
Avn: hel: 56 HU-8/-10B (UH-1B/H), 3 HA-16 (Alouette III), 70 HA-15 (BO-105; 12 with 20mm guns, 28 with HOT),

5 AB-206A, 4 AB-212, 12 HR-12B (OH-58A), 12 HT-17 (CH-47C).
(On order. VEC 3562 recce, 250 BMR-600 MICV, 176M-113 APC; 1,100 C-90C 90mm RL, 540 TOW, 250 Milan, 150 HOT ATGW;

6 CH-47C, 28 AB-412, 18 OH-58A hel; 96 Chaparral SAM (1,760 msls); 18 Roland SAM launchers (1985), 500 msls); 28 Skyguard AD systems.)
DEPLOYMENT:
Ceuta and Melilla: 19,000; 2 armd cav, 2 Foreign Legion, 2 coast/AA arty, 2 engr regts, 3 Regulares infgps, 2 special seacoys.
Overseas Forces comds: 2:

Balearic Islands: 5,800; 3 inf, 2 coast/AA regts, 1 engr bn, 1 lt cav gp, 1 cdo coy.

Canary Islands: 10,000; 3 inf regts (1 cadre), 1 Foreign Legion (2 bns, 1 lt cav gp), 2 coast/AA arty regts, 1engr gp (2 bns), 1 lt cav gp, 1 sea coy.

NAVY: 57,000, incl marines (44,000 conscripts).

Bases: Ferrol (Galicia), Cadiz (San Fernando)/Rota, Cartagena.
9 Commands (Fleet, Naval Air, Submarine, Mine Warfare, Marines, 4 Naval Region HQ).
Subs: 7: 3 Agosta (4th 1985), 4 Daphne.
Carrier: 1 US Independence (9 AV-8A, 24 hel).
Destroyers: 11: 6 with 1 Hughes 500 hel (1 de Lauria; 5 US Gearing with 1 ASROQ; 5 US Fletcher (3 to retire).
Frigates: 11: 5 Baleares (F-70) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 16 Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;

6 Descubierta (F-30) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow/Aspide SAM.
Corvettes: 4 Atrevida (1 to retire).
FAC(P): 12: 6 Lazaga, 6 Barcelo.
Patrol craft: 87: 14 large (3 ex-minesweepers), 40 coastal, 33 inshore<.
MCMV: 12: 4 US Aggressive ocean, 8 Jucar coastal.
Tpts: 2.
Amph: LSD: 1, LST: 3, LCT: 7 (3 to retire), LCU: 2, LCR: 20.
NAVAL AIR:
FGA: 1 sqn with AV-8A Matador (Harrier II), TAV-8A.
Liaison: 1 sqn with Comanche, Citation
ASW hel: 2 sqns: 1 with Hughes 500; 1 with SH-3D/G Sea King.
Tac hel: 2 sqn with AH-1G.
Comd/recce hel: 1 sqn with AB-212.
Liaison hel: 1 sqn with Bell 47G.
Equipment: 10 combat ac, 40 hel.

AV-8: 10(8 AV-8A FGA; 2 TAV-8A FGA).

Comanche. 2 (liaison). Citation II: 2 (liaison).
Hel: AB-212: 14 (comd/recce).

Sea King: 14 (ASW).

Hughes 500: 11 (ASW).

AH-1G: 4 (tac).

Bell 47G: 10 (liaison).
MARINES: (12,196).

1 marine regt (2 inf, 1 spt, 1 log bns).

5 marine garrison regts.
Tks: 18 M-48S. AFV: LVTP-7 amph.
Arty: how: 8 OTO Melara, 8 M-52A1 SP 105mm; mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm; RL: M-72 66mm; ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
(On order: 1 Agosta SS (delivery 1985), 1 carrier, 4 FFG-7 frigates (1 in 1985), 4 32.2-metre patrol craft, 20 15.9-metre patrol vessels;

12 Bravo (AV-8B) ac, 6 Model 414 (SH-60B) hel; 25 RGM-84A Harpoon SSM, SM-1 Standard SAM; 17 Scorpion lt tks).

AIR FORCE: 33,000 (to be reduced).
Air Combat Command (MACOM):

3 wings.

Ftr: 6 sqns: 2 with F-4C Phantom; 2 with Mirage IIIEE/EB; 2 with Mirage F-1CE, F-1CE/BE.

Liaison: 1 fit with Do-27.
Tactical Command (MATAC):

2 wings.

FGA: 2 sqns with F-5A, F-5B, RF-5A.

MR: 1 sqn with P-3B Orion.

Liaison: 2 fits with O-1E, Do-27, Do-28.

AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
Air Command, Canary Islands (MACAN):

FGA: 1 sqn with Mirage F-1C.

Tpt: 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar, Do-27.

SAR: 1 sqn with F-27 ac, AB-205 hel.
Transport Command (MATRA):

3 wings:

Tpt: 5 sqns with C-130, KC-130, T-7 (CASA 207 Azof), CASA C-212Aviocar, 12 DHC-4 Caribou, Do-27.
Training Command (MAPER):

OCU: 2 sqns with F-5A/B, Do-27.

Trg: 14 sqns with Aztec, Navajo, Bonanza, Baron, King Air, C-101 Aviojet, C-212 Aviocar, CASA 1-131 (Bucker 131A Jungmann), T-6 Texan.

Trg hel: 2 sqns with AB-205, Hughes 300C, UH-1H.
Air Force HQ Group (ACGA):

Tpt: 2 sqns with DC-8, Mystere-Falcon 20, Navajo, C-212.

Spt: 3 sqns with Canadair CL-215, Do-27, C-212, DHC-4A, T-7.

SAR: 2 sqns with C-212, Do-27 ac, Super Puma, AB-205, AB-206, AB-47, Alouette III hel.

Liaison: 1 hel sqn with Puma.

Trg: 1 sqn with C-101, C-212.
Equipment: 177 combat ac.

F-5: 33: 14 -A (FGA); 6 -B (FGA); 13 RF-5A (recce).

Mirage: 97: 23 F-1C (FGA); 44 F-1CE (ftr); 3 F-1CE/BE (ftr); 21 IIIEE (ftr); 6 IIIEB (ftr).

F-4C: 39 (35 ftr, 4 RF-4C recce).

P-3B: 6 (MR).

DC-8-52: 2 (tpt).

C-130H: 11 (5 tpt, 6 KC-130H tanker).

CASA 207: 14 (6 tpt, 8 spt).

C-212: 82 (55 tpt, 4 SAR, 5 spt, 2 trg; 14 -E trg; 2 TR-12D EW).

C-101: 85 (trg).

CL-215: 12 (spt). DHC-4: 32 (30 tpt, 2 -A spt).

Mystere-Falcon 20: 4 (tpt). F-27: 3 (SAR).

Do-27/-28: 58: 34 -27 (10 tpt, 4 SAR, 20 spt); 24 -27A28 (liaison).

T-33: 49 (trg). T-6: 45 (trg). O-1: 6 (liaison).

Other: 46 (6 Aztec, 2 Navajo, 29 Bonanza, 6 King Air, 3 Baron).
Hel: AB-205: 20 (SAR). AB-206: 4 (SAR). Alouette III: 3 (SAR). Puma: 5 (liaison). Super Puma: 12 (SAR). Hughes 300C: 18 (trg). Bell 47: 25 (trg).
(On order 72 F-18 Hornet ftr, 2 P-3C Orion MR, 40 T-35C Tamiz (Pillan) ac; 6 CH-47 Chinook hel; Super SidewinderAAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Guardia Civil 63,500: 25 inf tercios (regts), 3 reserve mobile comds, 1 railway security, 1 traffic security gps, 1 anti-terrorist special gp (UAR);

BLR APC, 1 B-11T (BK-117) hel. (On order 20 BO-105, 3 BK-117 hel.)
Policia Nacional 47,000: 26 inf bns, 2 cav sqn gps, 3 cav tps, 1 special ops cdo gp (GEO), civil security gps.

Ministry of Transportation and Communications:

Maritime Surveillance Force; some 54 patrol boats (10 320-ton, 4 3-2-metre, 16-metre), many armed.

TURKEY
GDP 1983: TL 11,468 bn ($50,864 bn). Est 1984: 17,795 bn ($48,531 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.7%. 1984: 5.4%.
Inflation 1983: 31.4%. 1984: 48.4%.
Debt 1983: $24.0 bn . 1984: $25.9 bn.

Def budget 1984: TL 583.60 bn ($1,592 bn); NATO defn $2,190 bn. Est 1985: 860.80 bn* ($1,645 bn); NATO defn n.a.

(* Excl some TL 100 bn for military police and internal security.)
FMA 1983: $320.0 m. 1984: $635.0 m.

$1=liras 225.46 (1983), 366.68 (1984), 523.41 (1985).
Population: 49,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,957,000; 31-45: 4,010,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,656,000; 31-45: 3,863,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 630,000 (552,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 18 months.
Reserves: 936,000 to age 46 (all). Army 800,000, Navy 70,000, Air 66,000.

ARMY: 520,000 (475,000 conscripts).* (*About half the divs and bdes are below strength.)
4 army HQ: 10 corps HQ.
1 armd div.
2 mech divs.
14 inf divs.
6 armd bdes.
4 mech bdes.
11 inf bdes.
1 para bde.
1 cdo bde.
4 SSM bns with Honest John.
1 SAM bty forming.
Corps units: 10 tk, 30 hy/med, 20 AA arty bns, indep fortress defence regts.
Tks: 2,922: 700 M-47, 2,575 M-48A1, 200 M-48A5, 77 Leopard 1A3.
APC: 2,000 M-113.
Arty: 2,225: guns: 150 M-59 155mm towed, 36 M-l07 175mm SP; how: 180 M-116A1 75mm, 600 M-101A1 216 M-7 SP, 72 M-8 SP,

108 M-52 105mm, 144 M-44 SP, 378 M-114A1, 72 M-109 SP 155mm, 140 M-115, 81 M-55 (US) SP, 48 M-110 SP 203mm.

SSM: 18 Honest John; mor: 1,750: M-2 60mm, M-l, Soltam M-125A1 81mm SP, M-2, M-30 4.2-in. (107mm), M-106A1 107mm SP, Soltam 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 1,200 M-18 57mm, 390 M-20 75mm, 1,000+ M-40 106mm; ATGW: 85 Cobra, SS-11, TOW incl M-113 SP, Milan.
AD: guns: 300 twin 20mm, 900 M-1A1, L/70 40mm, M-51 75mm, M-117/-118 90mm; SAM: some 4 Rapier, Redeye.
Avn: ac: 2 DHC-2, 20 U-17, 40 O-1E, 8 Cessna 206, 20 Cessna 421, 5 Do-27, 20 Do-28, 15 Baron, 5 T-42, 40 Citabria 150S trg;

hel: 65 AB-204/-205, 15 AB-206A, 20 Bell 47G, 30 UH-1D, 3 OTH-300C.
Eqpt in store incl 200 M-47 MBT, 100 M-4 lt tks; M-8 recce, 350 M-59, 800 M-2/-3 APC;

108 M-7 towed, 216 M-52 SP 105mm, 144 M-44 SP 155mm how.
(On order: TOW, 2,500 Milan ATGW, 26 AH-1S (Improved TOW) attack, 40 UH-1H hel, some 32 Rapier SAM.)

NAVY: 55,000, incl marines (42,000 conscripts).

Bases: Golciik, Istanbul, Izmir, Eregli, Iskenderun, Aksas (Marmaris) under construction.
Subs: 16: 5 Type 1200, 9 US Guppy (2 in reserve), 2 Tang (on loan).
Destroyers: 12: 8 Gearing (5 with 1x8 ASROC), 2 Carpenter, 1 Sumner, 1 Smith.
Frigates: 6: 1 Meko 200 with 1x4 Harpoon SSM, (?1x4) Sea Sparrow, Aspide SAM; 2 Berk each with 1 hel; 3 Koln.
FAC: (G): 9: 5 Dogan (Lurssen FPB-57) with 2x4 Harpoon; 4 Kartal (Jaguar-type) with 4 Penguin 2 SSM;

(T): 4 S-141 Jaguar, 5 mod Kartal, 7 Zobel-type.
Patrol craft: 29: 25 large (1 Girne, 2 US Asheville, 12 AB-25, 6 PC-1638, 4 PGM-71); 4 coastal 83-ft<.
MCMV: 33: minelayers: 7: 1 Nusret, 6 coastal;

minesweepers: 26: 12 US Adjutant, 4 Cdn mine clearance boats, 6 FRG Vegesack coastal, 4 US Cape inshore.
Amph: LST: 6 (3 are dual-purpose minelayers); LCT: 29; LCU: 13; LCM: 20.
Auxiliary ships: 56: incl 1 US destroyer tender, 2 FRG depot ships (trg), 9 tankers (5 fleet).
(On order. 1 Type 1200 SS, 3 Meko-200 frigates, 12 LCT, 1 tanker.)
NAVAL AVIATION: 20 combat ac; 7 combat hel.
ASW: 1 sqn with 20 S-2E ac; 3 AB-204B, 4 AB-212ASW hel.
MARINES: 1 bde: (4,000): HQ, 3 bns, 1 arty bn (18 guns), spt units.

AIR FORCE: 55,000 (35,000 conscripts).
2 tac, 1 tpt, 1 air trg commands.
FGA: 17 sqns: 2 with F-5A/B; 3 with F-100D; 5 with F-4E; 7 with F-104G/TF-104.
Ftr: 2 sqns with F-104S/TF-104G.
Recce: 2 sqns: 1 with RF-5A; 1 with RF-4E.
Tpt: 5 sqns: 1 with C-130; 1 with Transall C-160; 3 with C-47, Beech 18, Viscount-194 (VIP) ac, UH-lH hel.
VIP: 1 fit with C-47.
Liaison: 3 fits: C-47, AT-11, T-33 ac; UH-1H hel; 10 base fits with C-47, T-33, AT-11 ac, UH-1H, UH-19B (S-55) hel.
OCU: 5 sqns: 2 with F-5A/B, F-104G; 2 with T-33, T-38; 1 with T- 37C.
Trg: 3 sqns with T-33, T-34, T-41; trg schools with C-47 ac, UH-1H hel.
SAM: 8 sqns with Nike Hercules; 2 Rapier sqns forming.
Equipment: 368 combat ac.

F-5: 91: 30 -A (FGA); 16 -B (FGA); 24 -A/-B (OCU); 18 RF-5A (recce); 3 RF-5B (recce).

F-100D: 72 (FGA).

F-4E: 67 (60 FGA; 7 RF-4E recce).

F-104: 138 (80 FGA, 17 ocu; 9 TF-104 FGA; 28 F-104S ftr, 4 TF-104G ftr).

C-130: 7 (tpt). Transall C-160D: 20 (tpt). Viscount: 3 (VIP). C-47: 44+ (40 tpt, 2 VIP, 2 base fit + comms fit, trg school ac).

Beech 18: 2 (tpt). T-33: 82 (48 trg/ocu, 34 -A liaison/OCU).

T-37: 35 (ocu). T-34: 15 (trg). T-41: 30(trg).
Hel: UH-1H: 15+(15 tpt, others in liaison, base fits, trg schools).

UH-19B: 5 (base fits, trg schools).
Msls: SAM: 72 Nike Hercules.
(On order. 160 F-16 ftr, 2 Citation II trg ac; 15 AH-1S Cobra hel, Super Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM; AGM-65 Maverick; 24 Rapier SAM.)

Forces Abroad:

Cyprus: 1 corps of 2 inf divs (17,000); 150 M-47/-48 MBT; M-113 APC; 212 105mm, 155mm, 203mm guns/how; 40mm AA guns.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 125,000 (incl 3 mobile bdes with V-150, UR-416 APC).

Coastguard 1,100: 35 large, 10 coastal patrol craft.

(On order 5 SAR-33 FAC).

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Albania: Albania joined the Warsaw Pact in 1955 but left it in 1968, moving into a closer relationship with China. After Chairman Mao's death in 1976, Chinese aid was progressively reduced. Since 1978 little military aid has been received from any source. The Constitution precludes the establishment of foreign bases or the stationing of foreign troops in Albania.

Austria: Austria's constitution contains a declaration of permanent neutrality. A small indigenous arms industry supplies many of the armed forces' needs and provides a few foreign sales.

Cyprus: In 1959 Britain, Greece and Turkey signed a Treaty of Guarantee assuring the independence, territorial integrity and security of the bi-national Republic of Cyprus. Under this Treaty Britain maintains a garrison in two Sovereign Base Areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. An associated Treaty of Alliance with the Republic entitles Greece and Turkey to maintain contingents on the island. In 1963 a constitutional dispute led the Turkish-Cypriot community to withdraw from the central government and, in 1983, to form the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. The Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities each maintain armed forces. The United Nations has interposed a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) between the communities since 1964. The United States has a signals establishment on the island.

Finland: Pursues a policy of neutrality. Under the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, Finland is committed to repel aggression against herself or against the USSR through Finnish territory. In such a case, Finland can, if needed, request assistance from the USSR, subject to special agreement. Finland maintains a permanent UN peace-keeping force and has provided personnel for UN duties since 1956. Finland's own defence industry provides nearly half her needs. Her major arms systems have been acquired from the USSR and Sweden, together with special equipment from Britain, France and the United States.

Ireland: Independent since 1922, Ireland plays an active role in UN peace-keeping operations. With no significant arms industry, Ireland has bought arms from many sources, e.g. Britain, France, Sweden and the US.

Malta: After independence in 1964, Malta had a defence agreement with Britain. The island was a NATO base from 1972 to 1979. In September 1980 Malta undertook to remain neutral, outside any alliances, and banned foreign troops and bases, including Soviet, warship docking facilities. Italy agreed to consultation if Malta were attacked and to guarantee her independence (1980); this agreement was not renewed in 1984. In December 1981 France and Algeria also agreed to support and guarantee her neutrality. In November 1984, and despite disputes over territorial waters, Libya signed a five-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation under which Malta agreed to exclude foreign military bases and Libya to answer requests for assistance against aggression.

Sweden: Neutral in both World Wars, Sweden has a permanent peace-keeping organization which has provided personnel for UN duties since 1964. Her self-defence organization is largely supported by a domestic defence industry but some external purchases have been made, mainly from the United States.

Switzerland: Permanently neutral since 1815, Switzerland belongs to no defence alliance. Her small armaments industry produces most of her equipment and plays a small role in the Swiss export trade.

Yugoslavia: Expelled from the Cominform in 1948, she has since been a leading force in the Non-Aligned Movement, maintaining a balanced relationship with each Bloc. She has no defence alliances, though a limited naval repair agreement exists with the USSR. She has her own defence industry but has bought most of her major military equipment from the USSR.

ДРУГИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА

Албания: Албания присоединилась к Варшавскому Договору в 1955 году, но покинула его в 1968 году, перейдя к более тесным отношениям с Китаем. После смерти председателя Мао в 1976 году китайская помощь постепенно сокращалась. С 1978 года из любых источников поступает мало военной помощи. Конституция запрещает создание иностранных баз или размещение иностранных войск в Албании.

Австрия: Конституция Австрии содержит декларацию о постоянном нейтралитете. Небольшая местная оружейная промышленность удовлетворяет многие потребности Вооруженных сил и обеспечивает небольшой экспорт.

Кипр: в 1959 году Великобритания, Греция и Турция подписали Договор о гарантии обеспечения независимости, территориальной целостности и безопасности двухнациональной республики Кипр. В соответствии с этим договором Британия содержит гарнизон в двух суверенных районах базирования в Акротири и Декелии. Ассоциированный договор о союзе с Республикой дает Греции и Турции право содержать контингенты на острове. В 1963 году из-за Конституционного спора турко-кипрская община вышла из состава центрального правительства, а в 1983 году образовала Турецкую Республику Северного Кипра. Каждая из общин киприотов-турок и киприотов-греков имеет вооруженные силы. С 1964 года Организация Объединенных Наций осуществляет взаимодействие между общинами в рамках миротворческих сил (UNFICYP). США имеет связное оборудование на острове.

Финляндия: проводит политику нейтралитета. В соответствии с Договором о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи 1948 года Финляндия привержена отражению агрессии против нее самой или против СССР через территорию Финляндии. В таком случае Финляндия может, при необходимости, обратиться за помощью к СССР по специальному соглашению. Финляндия поддерживает постоянные миротворческие силы ООН и предоставляет персонал для выполнения обязанностей ООН с 1956 года. Собственная оборонная промышленность Финляндии обеспечивает почти половину ее потребностей. Ее основные системы вооружения были приобретены в СССР и Швеции, а также специальное оборудование в Великобритании, Франции и Соединенных Штатах.

Ирландия: независимая с 1922 года, Ирландия играет активную роль в миротворческих операциях ООН. Не имея значительной оружейной промышленности, Ирландия закупала оружие из многих источников, например из Великобритании, Франции, Швеции и США.

Мальта: после обретения независимости в 1964 году Мальта заключила соглашение об обороне с Великобританией. Остров был базой НАТО с 1972 по 1979 год. В сентябре 1980 года Мальта обязалась сохранять нейтралитет, не вступая в какие-либо союзы, и запретила присутствие иностранных войск и баз, в том числе советских, и причаливать военным кораблям. Италия согласилась проводить консультации в случае нападения на Мальту и гарантировать ее независимость (1980 год); это соглашение не было продлено в 1984 году. В декабре 1981 года Франция и Алжир также согласились поддержать и гарантировать ее нейтралитет. В ноябре 1984 года, несмотря на споры по поводу территориальных вод, Ливия подписала пятилетний договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве, в соответствии с которым Мальта согласилась исключить иностранные военные базы, а Ливия - ответить на просьбы об оказании помощи в борьбе с агрессией.

Швеция: нейтральная в обеих Мировых войнах Швеция имеет постоянную миротворческую организацию, которая предоставляет персонал для выполнения обязанностей ООН с 1964 года. Ее организация самообороны в значительной степени поддерживается отечественной оборонной промышленностью, но некоторые внешние закупки были сделаны, главным образом, из Соединенных Штатов.

Швейцария: постоянно нейтральная с 1815 года, Швейцария не принадлежит ни к одному оборонному альянсу. Ее небольшая оружейная промышленность производит большую часть ее оборудования и играет небольшую роль в швейцарской экспортной торговле.

Югославия: исключенная из Коминформ в 1948 году, она с тех пор является ведущей силой в Движении неприсоединения, поддерживая сбалансированные отношения с каждым блоком. У нее нет оборонных союзов, хотя с СССР существует ограниченное соглашение о военно-морском ремонте. Она имеет собственную оборонную промышленность, но большую часть своей основной военной техники приобрела в СССР.

ALBANIA
Est GNP 1981: leke 2.30 bn ($2,460 bn). 1982: 15.50 bn ($2.58 bn).
Debt 1984: $5.4 bn.* (* Estimated total since 1949.)
Def budget 1984: leke 1.01 bn ($130.32 m). 1985: 1.70 bn ($188.89 m).

$1=leke 5.0 (1981), 6.0 (1982), 7.75 (1984), 9.0 (1985).
Population: 3,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 379,000; 31-45: 255,000.

Women: 18-30: 365,000; 31-45: 248,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 40,400 (22,400 conscripts).

Terms of service: Army 2 years; Air Force, Navy and special units 3 years.
Reserves: 155,000 (to age 56): Army 150,000, Navy/Air 5,000.

ARMY: 30,000 (20,000 conscripts).
1 tk bde.
5 inf bdes.
4 arty regts.
8 lt coastal arty bns.
Tks: 70 T-34, 15 T-54, 15 T-59.
AFV: recce: 20 BA-64 armd, BRDM-1; APC: BTR-40/-50/-152, K-63.
Arty: guns: M-1942, SU-76 SP 76mm, D-44, Type-56 -85mm, M-1931/37 122mm, Type-59-1 130mm;

gun/how: M-1938, Type-60 122mm, M-1937, Type-66 152mm; how: D-l 152mm;

MRL : Type-63 107mm; mor: 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: ML: T-21 82mm; guns: M-1942 45mm, M-1943 57mm, D-44, Type-56 85mm.
AD: guns: M-1939 37mm, S-60 57mm, KS-12 85mm, KS-19 100mm*. (*Spares are short; some eqpt may be unserviceable.)

NAVY: 3,200 (1,000 conscripts), t

Bases: Durres, Valona, Sazan Island, Pasha Liman.
Subs: 3 Sov W-class (1 trg).
Patrol craft: 2 Sov Kronshtadt large.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-II; (T): 12 Ch P-4. Hydrofoil: 32 Ch Huchwan<.
MCMV: 1 T-43 ocean, 2 T-301 inshore, 9 PO-2 utility.
(Plus, in reserve: 1 W-class sub, 2 Kronshtadt patrol craft, 1 T-43,4 T-301 minesweepers).

AIR FORCE: 7,200 (1,400 conscripts); some 100 combat ac*. (*Spares are short; some eqpt may be unserviceable.)
Ftrs: 6 sqns with 20 MiG-15/F-2, 30 MiG-17, 30 MiG-19/J-6, 20 Ch J-7.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 I1-14M, 10 An-2.
Hel: 2 sqns with 30 Mi-4.
Trg: 1 sqn with MiG-15UTI.
SAM: some 5 SA-2 sites.

PARA-MILITARY: 12,500. Internal security force (5,000); frontier guard (7,500).

AUSTRIA
GDP 1983: OS 1,206 bn ($67.14 bn). 1984: 1,285 bn ($64.22 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.1%. 1984: 2.2%.
Inflation 1983: 3.3%. 1984: 5.6%.
Debt 1984: $11.8 bn.
Def exp 1984: OS 15.843 bn ($791.79 m). Budget 1985: 17.875 bn ($816.62 m).

$1=schilling 17.963 (1983), 20.009 (1984), 21.889(1985).
Population: 7,550,000.

Men: 18-30: 800,000; 31-45: 770,000.

Women: 18-30: 774,000; 31-45: 760,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 54,700 (27,300 conscripts, some 70,000 Reservists on refresher training).

Terms of service: 6 months recruit trg; 60 days reservist refresher trg during 15 years (or 8 months trg, no refresher), 30-90 days additional for specialists.
Reserves: 170,000; Immediate: 28,000. 970,000 (being increased) have a reserve commitment (men to age 51, specialists, NCOs, officers 65).

ARMY: 50,000 (25,000 conscripts).
Army HQ.
Standing Alert Force (some 15,000):

1 mech div of 3 mech bdes (3 tk, 3 mech inf, 3 SP arty, 2 SP ATK bns); 3 comd/spt, 1 airmobile, 2 mountain, 1 guards, 1 AA, 1 engr, 1 sigs bns.
Standing Field Units (regional defence force):

Army: 1 HQ, 1 recce bns; 1 sigs, 1 log regts.

Corps: 2 HQ, 2 arty, 1 SP ATK, 2 AA, 2 engr, 2 sigs bns; 2 log regts.

9 Regional (county) Commands.

29 Landwehrstammregimente (trg regts).

Peacetime: trg and maintenance.

Mobilization: active personnel for mobile and territorial forces.
Cadre Force (full strength on mobilization):

8 mobile bde HQ:

Bde tps (45,000): 24 inf, 8 arty, 8 engr/ATK, 8 comd/spt bns.
Territorial tps (82,000): 26 inf regts, 86 inf coys, 42 guard coys; 16 hy, 14 lt inf, 11 inf/ATK bns, 13 engr, 5 ATK coys.
Tks: 50 M-60A3, 120 M-60A1. APC: 464 Saurer 4K4E/F.
Arty: guns: M-6 75mm, 84mm, 85mm, some 100 M-36 90mm, and some L-7A2 105mm (tank turrets), 22 SFKM2 155mm fortress;

how: 108 IFH (M-2A1) 105mm, 24 FHM-1 155mm, 18 M-109 155mm;

MRL: 18 M-51 128mm; mor: 451 81mm, 105 M-2/M-30 107mm, 82 M-60 (M-38/41) 120mm.
ATK: RL: LAW; Rd: Miniman 74mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, 397 M-40A1 106mm;

guns: 240 M-52/M-55 85mm towed, M-36 90mm SP, 225 Kuerassier JPz SK 105mm SP; 150 M-68 (L-7A1) 105mm turret mounted.
AD: guns: 512 20mm, 74 35mm towed, 38 M-42 twin 40mm SP.
(On order some 180 Centurion MBT, L-7A2 105mm gun turret (for fixed defences).)

AIR FORCE: * 4,700 (2,300 conscripts); 32 combat ac.

(*Austrian air units, an integral part of the Army, are listed separately for purposes of comparison.)
1 Air Div HQ; 3 Air Regts:
Multi-role (ftr/FGA/recce): 4 sqns with 32 Saab 105OE.
Recce: some L-19 (arty fire control, retiring).
Hel: 6 sqns: recce/arty fire control: 12 OH-58B Kiowa, 16 AB-204; med tpt: 23 AB-212; lt tpt: 12 AB-206A; SAR: 12 Alouette III.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 2 Skyvan 3M, 12 PC-6 Turbo Porter.
Trg: 18 Saab 91D Safir, some 10 PC-7 Turbo Trainer.
AD: 3 bns with 36 20mm, 18 M-65 35mm AA guns; Super-Bat and Skyguard AD, Goldhaube
EWng, Selenia MR(S-403) 3-D radar systems.
(On order 24 J-35D Draken interceptors, 6 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer.)

Forces Abroad: Cyprus (UNFICYP): 1 inf bn (301). Syria (UNDOF): 1 inf bn (533). Other Middle East (UNTSO): 13.

CYPRUS

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
GDP 1983: £C 1.092 bn ($2,076 bn). 1984: 1.215 bn ($2,070 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3%. 1984: 3.3%.
Inflation 1983: 5.1%. 1984: 5.0%.
Debt 1983: $600 m.
Def budget 1983: £C 30.395 m ($57.80 m).

$1=£C 0.5259 (1983), 0.587 (1984).
Population: 668,000.

Men: 18-30: 74,000; 31-45: 67,000.

Women: 18-30: 71,000; 31-45: 67,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 10,000

Terms of service: conscription, 26 months, then Reserve to age 50 (officers 65).
Reserves: 60,000 (have yearly refresher training): 30,000 immediate; 30,000 second-line.
NATIONAL GUARD: 10,000.* (*Mainly Greek-Cypriot conscripts, but some seconded Greek Army officers and NCOS.)
1 armd bn.
2 recce/mech inf bns.
20+ inf bns (under strength).
8 arty bns.
8 spt units.
Tks: 8 T-34.
AFV: recce: 18 VAB-VC1, 120 EE-9 Cascavel, 20 Marmon-Harrington armd cars (in reserve); APC: 66 VAB-VTT, 17 BTR-50, 15 BTR-152.
Arty: guns: 130 M-1942 76mm, M-1944 100mm, M-101 105mm and 25-pdr (88mm); how: 4 M-116A1 75mm pack, M-56 105mm pack;

MRL: 8 Yug YMRL-32 128mm; mor M-41/-43 82mm.
ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, M-40 106mm.
AD: guns: 100 M-55 20mm, 40mm and 3.7-in. (94mm); SAM: SA-7.
Patrol craft: 2: 1 30-metre, 1 10-metre.
Air wing: ac: 12 L-21A Super Cub; hel: 1 AB-47G, 1 FH-1100.
PARA-MILITARY: Armed police 3,000; 1 96-ton patrol boat, 1 Islander lt tpt ac.

NORTHERN CYPRUS
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 36,500 (25,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 24 months, then reserve to age 50.
Reserves: 5,500 first-line, 10,000 second-line.
SECURITY FORCES: some 4,500.
7 inf bns.
1 armd coy.
Tks: 5 T-34 (operability questionable). Mor: 50 81mm and 120mm.

FINLAND
GDP 1983: m 274.94 bn ($49.36 bn). 1984: 304.48 bn ($50.66 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.9%. 1984: 2.9%.
Inflation 1983: 8.6%. 1984: 7.6%.
Debt 1983: $21.46 bn. 1984: $24.33 bn:
Def exp 1984: m 4.528 bn ($753.41 m). Budget 1985: 4.693 bn ($725.31 m).

$1=markkaa 5.5701 (1983), 6.01 (1984), 6.4703 (1985).
Population: 4,825,000.

Men: 18-30: 472,000; 31-45: 600,000.

Women: 18-30: 451,000; 31-45: 570,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 36,500 (25,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 8-11 months (11 months for officers and NCOs); three entries per year.
Reserves (all services): some 700,000 (35,000 a year do conscript training; 43,000 reservists a year do refresher training: total obligation 40 days

(75 for NCOS, 100 for officers) between conscript service and age 50 (NCOS and officers 60)).

Some 210,000 would, with the Regulars, form the 'fast deployment force' to cover full mobilization.

Mobilization units supporting general, local or spt forces org in some 20 bdes, some 100 indep bns, etc., under Military Areas.
ARMY: 30,900 (22,300 conscripts).
7 Military Areas; 23 Military Districts:
1 armd bde.
7 inf bdes (1 lt).
Field arty: 2 regts, 2 indep bns.
Coast arty: 2 regts, 3 indep bns(1 mobile).
1 AA arty regt (incl 1 SAM bn with SAM-79).
4 indep AA arty bns.
2 engr bns
Sigs: 1 regt, 1 bn.
Tks: T-54/-55/-72; lt: PT-76.
AFV: MICV: BMP-1; APC: BTR-50P, BTR-60 (to retire), A-180 Sisu.
Arty: guns: M-54 (M-36) 130mm; coastal: D-10T 100mm (tank), 110mm, M-60 122mm, 130mm, 152mm; gun/how: M-83 (M-74) 155mm;

how: M-37/-61 105mm, M-38/D-30 122mm, M-40 150mm, ML-20 152mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: M-55 55mm, Miniman 74mm, SM-58-61 95mm; ATGW: SS-11 (also as SSM), M-82 (AT-4 Spigot), M-83 (BGM-71A TOW).
AD: guns: ZU-23 23mm, 30mm, GDF-002 35mm, L-60/L-70 40mm, S-60 57mm towed, ZSU-57-2 SP; SAM: SAM-79 (SA-3), SAM-78 (SA-7).
(On order A-180 Sisu APC).

NAVY: 2,700 (1,400 conscripts).

Bases: Upinniemi (Helsinki), Turku.
Corvettes: 2 Turunmaa.
FAC: 6 Nuoli; (G): 1 Helsinki (4 RBS-15SF SSM); 4 Tuima (Sov Osa-II), 1 Isku (experimental) with MTO-66 (SS-N-2A) SSM.
Patrol craft: 5 R-class large; 1 Hurja coastal< (experimental).
MCMV: 3 minelayers (1 trg), 6 Kuha, 1 Kiiski 'slave' inshore minesweepers. 1 HQ/log ship.
Spt: 3 Pukkio.
LCU/tpt: 14 small, 5 Valas, 6 Hauki.
(On order: 3 Helsinki FAC(G); RBS-15SF SSM (1985-6).)

AIR FORCE: 2,900 (1,300 conscripts); 64 combat aircraft. 3 AD districts: 3 fighter wings.
Ftrs: 3 sqns with 27 MiG-21bis, 24 J-35F/BS/XS Draken; 8 Hawk Mk 51, 2 Magister (to get Draken).
OCU: 6 MiG-21U/UM, 3 J-35C; 10 F-35F, 2 F-35C.
Recce: 1 fit with 4 MiG-21F (at HQ).
Tpt: ac: 1 sqn with 3 F-27-100, 3 Learjet 35; hel: 1 fit with 6 Mi-8(also SAR), 2 Hughes 500.
Trg: 34 Hawk Mk 51, 13 Magister, 30 Vinka (Leko70).
Liaison: 9 Cherokee Arrow, 6 Chieftain.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, RB-27, RB-28 (Falcon).
(On order. 10 J-35 Draken AD, 8 Hawk trg ac, AD system.)

Forces Abroad: 947(UN only, not within Force totals). Cyprus (UNFICYP) 10. Syria (UNDOF) 1 bn (411). Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1 bn (500).

Other Mid-East (UNTSP) 22, Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 4.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of Interior Frontier Guards 3,500;

4 frontier, 3 coastguard districts, 7 bns (17 coys); 4 large, 9 coastal, 34 patrol craft; ac and 3 Mi-8 hel (SAR).

(On order. 1 large, 4 Lokki coastal patrol boats<.)

IRELAND
GDP 1983: £I 14.477 bn ($18,026 bn).Est 1984: £I 16.069 bn ($17,468 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.6%. 1984: 3.5%.
Inflation 1983: 10.6%. 1984: 8.6%.
Debt 1983: $18.9 bn. 1984: $16.1.
Def exp 1984: £I 260 m ($282,639 m). Budget 1985: £I 277 m ($278,588 m).

$1=£I 0.8031 (1983), 0.9199 (1984), 0.9943 (1985).
Population: 3,596,000.

Men: 18-30: 391,000; 31-45: 316,000.

Women: 18-30: 375,000; 31-45: 304,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 13,742.

Terms of service: voluntary, 3-year terms to age 60, officers 65.
Reserves: 16,358 (obligation to age 60, officers 57-65). Army: 1,174 first-line, (714,823) second-line. Navy (7361), 5 coys.

ARMY: 11,944.
1 inf force (2 inf bns).
4 inf bdes: 2 with 2, 1 with 3 inf bns, 1 fd arty regt, 1 motor recce sqn, 1 engr coy; 1 with 2 inf bns, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 fd arty bty.
Army tps: 1 tk sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 Ranger coy.
Total units:

12 inf bns (3 with MICV coy; 1 UNIFIL bn ad hoc - dets from other bns).

1 tk sqn.

4 recce sqns (1 armd).

3 fd arty regts (each of 2 btys); 1 indep bty.

1 AD regt (1 regular, 3 reserve btys).

3 fd .engr coys.

1 Ranger coy.
Reserves:

4 Army Gps (garrisons).

6 inf bns.

6 fd arty regts.

3 motor sqns.

3 engr sqns.

3 supply, 8 tpt coys.

3 sigs coys.

3 AA btys.
Tks: lt 12 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 20 AML-90, 32 AML-60; APC: 60 Panhard VTT/M3, 10 Timoney.
Arty: guns: 12 105mm lt; gun/how: 35 25-pdr; mor 199 60mm, 250 81mm, 72 120mm.
ATK: Rtt: 447 Carl Gustav 84mm, 96 PV-1110 90mm; ATGW: 4 Milan. AD: guns: 24 L/60, 2 L/70 40mm; SAM: 4 RBS-70.

NAVY: 912 (to be increased to about 1,500).

Base: Cork.
Patrol craft: 1 P-31 offshore, 4 coastal.
MCMV: 2 Br Ton coastal (fishery protection).
Hel: 3 SA-365F Dauphin If (for P-31, 2 to be delivered Sept 1985).

AIR FORCE: 886; 15 combat ac.
3 Wings (1 trg):
COIN: 1 sqn: 6 CM-170-2 Super Magister.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 9 SF-260WE ac, 2 SA-342L Gazelle trg hel.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 7 Reims Cessna F-172H, 1 F-172K.
Hel: 1 sqn with 8 Alouette III.
Composite sqn: 3 King Air (2 MR, 1 trg), 1 HS-125-700 (VIP).
(On order 3 SA-365F Dauphin II MR hel.)

Forces Abroad: (759). Cyprus (UNFICYP) 8.

Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1 bn+ (730); 4 AML-90 armd cars, 13 VTT/M-3 APC, 4 120mm mor.

Other Middle East (UNTSO) 21.

MALTA
GDP 1983: LM 457.6 m ($1,059 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 2.2%. 1983: 0.9%.
Inflation 1983: 0.4%. 1984: 1.0%.
Debt 1983: $103 m. 1984: $120 m.
Def budget 1983: LM 6.38 m ($14,762 m). Est exp 1984: 7.1 m ($15,421 m).
FMA 1983: $3.0 m.

$1=liri 0.4322 (1983), 0.4604 (1984).
Population: 380,000.

Men: 18-30: 42,800; 31-45: 41,600.

Women: 18-30: 41,400; 31-45: 44,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 775.

Terms of service: voluntary.
TASK FORCE: 500.

1 inf bn; RPG-7 RL, 50 ZPU-4 14.5mm quad machine guns.

1 marine section; 11 patrol, 4 spt craft<.

1 hel fit; 1 AB-206 Jet Ranger, 3 Alouette III (serviceability questionable), 3 AB-47G.
ARMED FORCES OF MALTA: 275.

1 AD bty; 6 40mm AA guns.

1 general duties coy.

1 electrical and mechanical engr coy.
PARA-MILITARY: Reserves (Id Dejma) some 900.

SWEDEN
GDP 1983: S kr 704.47 bn ($99,080 bn). 1984: 784.03 bn ($98,936 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.3%. 1984: 3.0%.
Inflation 1983: 9.3%. 1984: 8.2%.
Debt 1983: $39.9 bn. 1984: $47.5 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: S kr 23.671 bn ($2,676 bn). 1985/6: 25.081 bn ($2,784 bn).

$1=kronor 7.1101 (1983), 7.9246 (1984), 8.846, (1984/5), 9.0081 (1985).
Population: 8,343,000.

Men: 18-30: 764,000; 31-45: 990,150.

Women: 18-30: 730,300; 31-45: 944,200.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 65,650 (48,900 conscripts): mobilizable to about 800,000 in 72 hours, 850,000 maximum excl 500,000 auxiliary orgs.

25,000 civilians provide spt services.

Terms of Service: Army and Navy 7 1/2-15 months, Air Force 8-12 months.
Reserves (all services; obligation to age 47): 735,500; voluntary auxiliary organizations 500,000.

ARMY: 47,000 (38,000 conscripts).*

(* There are normally some 95,000 more conscripts (70,000 Army, 4,500 Navy, 6,000 Air Force) plus 15,000 officer and NCO reservists doing

11-40 days refresher training at some time in the year. Obligation is 5 times per reservist between ages 20 and 47.)

6 Military commands; 26 Defence districts (Laens).
Peace establishment:

50 armd, cav, inf, arty, AA, engr, sig spt regts (local defence, cadre for mobilization, basic conscript plus refresher trg).
War establishment (700,000 on mobilization, incl 100,000 Home Guard):

4 armd bdes.

1 mech bde.

19 inf, 5 Norrland bdes.

60 indep armd, inf, arty and AA arty bns.

1 army aviation bn (4 coys; 40 hel).

11 arty aviation platoons (66 ac and hel).
Local Defence Districts: 100 indep bns, 400-500 indep coys and Home Guard units.
Tks: 340 Strv-101, Strv-102/-104 (Centurion), 330 Strv-103B; lt 200 Ikv-91. APC: Pbv-302.
Arty: guns: BK-1A 155mm SP; how: Type-4140 105mm, M-39 150mm, FH-77-A and (SP)-B 155mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: BCL: Miniman 74mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, PV-1110 90mm; ATGW: RB-53 (Bantam), RB-55 (TOW)-
AD: guns: 20mm, 40mm; SAM: RB-69 (Redeye), RBS-70 (incl Lvrbv SP), RB-77 (Improved HAWK).
Avn: ac: 66 SK-61C (Bulldog) observation, Do-27 tpt; hel: 15 HKP-3 (AB-204B) tpt, 10 HKP-5 (Hughes 300C) trg, 24 HKP-6 (Jet Ranger) utility.
(On order: Pvrbv 551 TOW veh; 20 BO-105 (HKP-9A) ATK hel.

NAVY: 9,650, incl coast arty (6,250 conscripts),* 10 combat hel.

Bases: Musko, Harnosand, Karlskrona, Goteborg (spt only).
Subs: 13: 3 Nacken, 5 Sjb'ormen, 4 Draken; 1 Mala two-man.
Destroyer: 1 Holland.
FAC: (G): 30: 2 Stockholm (Spica III) with 6 RBS-15 SSM, 16 Hugin with 6 RB-12 (Penguin), 12 Spica II (R-131) with 4 RBS-15 SSM;

(T): 6 Spica I (T-121).
Patrol craft: 4 Hand large, 29 coastal incl 11 Skanor.
Minelayers: 3 large; 1 trg; 10 coastal, 17 inshore.
MCMV: 2 Landsort, 9 Arko coastal, 23 inshore.
Amph: LCM: 12; LCU: 80; LCA: 55.
Icebreakers: 6.
Coast arty: 5 bdes: 30 mobile and static bns: guns: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm, 152mm; SSM: RB-08, RB-52. Coast rangers (coys).
Marine: 10 coastal, 17 inshore minelayers; 18 60-/70-class coastal patrol craft; 9 LCM, 80 LCU, 55 LCA.
Hel: 2 sqns with 10 HKP-4B/C (KV-107) ASW/MCM, 10 HKP-6 liaison.
(On order 4 A-17 subs, 4 Stockholm FAC(G), 4 Landsort minehunters; RBS-15 SSM; 6 MCMV; 6 V/KV-107 ASW hel.)

AIR FORCE: 9,000 (4,650 conscripts);* 524 combat ac.
1 attack gp.
4 AD districts.
12 wings (liaison ac: 48 SK-50 (Saab 91) Safir).
FGA: 6 sqns: 5 with 95 AJ-37 Viggen, 1 with 20 SK-60B/C (Saab 105).
AD: 12 sqns: 6 with 109 J-35F Draken, 2 with 36 J-35D, 4 with 68 JA-37 Viggen.
Recce: 6 sqns: 52 SH/SF-37 Viggen; 2 Caravelle (ELINT); 3 J-32B Lansen (radio activity monitors).
OCU: 1 with 15 SK-37 Viggen (6 SK-35C Draken in store).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 C-130E/H.
Comms units: SK-60A, 2 CT-39 Sabreliner, 2 Cessna 404, 1 Metro III (leased).
Trg: incl 124 SK-60A/B/C, 57 SK-61, 20 J-32 (14 -32E ECM trg, 6 -32D target tug).
SAR: 1 sqn with 10 HKP-4, 10 HKP-5 hel (2 HKP-9B (BO-105) for delivery July 1985).
Utility unit: 6 HKP-2 (to retire), 7 HKP-3 hel.
AAM: RB-24, AIM-9J/L Sidewinder, RB-27 (Falcon), RB-28 (Improved Falcon), RB-71 (Skyflash).
ASM: RB-04E, RB-05A, RB-75 (Maverick).
AD: Semi-automatic control and surveillance system, Stril 60, co-ordinates AD components.
(On order. 76 JA-37 Viggen, 30 JAS-39 Gripen multi-role ac, 4 BO-105 SAR hel, RBS-15F, Hellfire ASM, AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM.)

Forces Abroad: (526). Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1 inf bn (376). Lebanon (UNIFIL) HQ/log/medical tps (150).

PARA-MILITARY: Coast Guard (550); 2 TV-171 fishery protection vessels, 67 patrol craft; (Air Arm: ) 1 Cessna 337G, 1 402C.

Civil Defence: shelters for some 5 million people outside military ages (16-65).

SWITZERLAND
GDP 1983: fr 203.9 bn ($97,137 bn). Est 1984: 213.2 bn ($90,735 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.7%. 1984: 2.0%.
Inflation 1983: 2.9%. 1984: 3.0%.
Debt 1983: $29.0 bn. 1984: $30.0 bn.
Def exp 1984: fr 4.6 bn ($1,958 bn). Budget 1985: 5.128 bn ($1,957 bn).* (*Excl communes' and cantons' contributions.)

$1=francs 2.0991 (1983), 2.3497 (1984) 2.6198(1985).
Population: 6,513,000.

Men: * 18-30: 507,000; 31-45: 560,000 (*Excl foreign population.)

Women: * 18-30: 410,600; 31-45: 642,400

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: about 1,500 regular and 18,500 recruits* (mobilizable to some 1,100,000 incl Civil Defence in 48 hours).

(* Two recruit intakes a year (Feb/Jul) each of 17,000. Some 400,000 reservists a year do refresher training.)

Terms of service: 17 weeks recruit training followed by reservist refresher training of 3 weeks over an 8-year period between ages 20-32 for Auszug,

2 weeks over 3-year period (33-42) for Landwehr, 1 week over 2-year period (43-50) for Landsturm.
Reserves (all services): 625,000 (45,000 officers, 110,000 NCOS, 3,000 women auxiliaries).

ARMY: War establishment: 580,000 on mobilization.
3 fd corps, each of 1 mech, 2 inf divs; corps tps: 3 infantry, 3 cyclist, 3 engr regts (3 bns); 3 sigs, 3 traffic control bns; 3 hel sqns, 3 lt ac fits.
1 mountain corps of 3 mountain inf divs, corps tps; 1 mountain inf, 1 engr, 1 sigs regts; 7 indep inf, 2 pack horse bns; 1 traffic 1 hel sqns.
17 indep bdes (11 frontier, 3 fortress, 3 redoubt).
6 Territorial Zones: 13 medical, 12 log, 11 civil def regts.
Indep units: 3 hy arty, 3 engr, 2 sigs.
20 Fortress Guard companies.
Tks: some 6 Pz-Leopard 2, 300 Pz-55/-57 (Centurion), 150 Pz-61, 390 Pz-68. APC: 1,350 M-63/-73/-64 (mor) (M-113).
Arty: guns: some 900 Model-35 105mm; how: Model-46 105mm, M-50 towed, 290 PzHb-66/74 (M-109U) 155mm SP;

MRL: RWK-014 30-tube 81mm; mor: 3,000 M-33, M-72 81mm, M-74 120mm.
ATK: guns: 1,340, Model-50-57 and 90mm; ML- M-58 106mm; m: 20,000 M-58, M-80 83mm;

ATGW: 6 MOWAG Piranha with TOW; 800 B/B-65 (Bantam), B/B-77 (Dragon).
AD: guns: 1,200 43/57, 54 20mm, 600 63, GDF-002 35mm; SAM: B/L-84 (Rapier).
Marine: 11 Aquarius patrol craft<.
(On order some 374 Leopard 2 MBT, 125 M-113 APC, Dragon, TOW-2 ATGW.)

AIR FORCE* 45,000 on mobilization (maintenance by civilians); 299 combat ac. (* Aviation Corps, an integral part of the Army.)
3 air regts.
FGA: 9 sqns with 139 Hunter F-58/T-68.
Ftrs: 6 sqns with 98 F-5E, 12 F-5F.
Interceptors: 2 sqns with 30 Mirage IIIS/BS.
Recce: 1 sqn with 16 Mirage IIIRS.
Liaison/SAR: 4 sqns with 16 PC-6 Porter, 24 PC-6A Turbo-Porter, 6 Do-27, 3 Twin Bonanza.
Hel: 4 sqns with 21 Alouette II, 76 Alouette III.
Trg: incl 40 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer, 37 DH-100 Vampire T-55, 65 Vampire Mk 6, 4 Mirage IIIBS, 68 Pilatus P-3.
AAM: Sidewinder, AIM-26B Falcon. ASM: AS-30.
1 air force fd bde (3 fd regts, 1 para coy, 1 lt ac wing).
1 airbase bde with 3 AA arty regts, each with 4 batteries of 20mm and 35mm guns.
1 AD bde with 1 SAM regt (2 bns, each of 2 btys; 64 B/L-64 (Bloodhound), some 6 Rapier SAM);

7 AA arty regts (each of 3 btys; 20mm and 35mm guns, Skyguard fire control).
3 comd and comms, 1 log regts.
(On order, some 54 Rapier SAM launchers; 500 AGM-65 Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Civil Defence: 480,000 (300,000 fully trained).

Shelter programme for 5,500,000; emergency supplies and medical facilities.

YUGOSLAVIA
GMP 1982: YD 2,294.8 bn ($58,175 bn). 1983: 4,083.5 bn ($43,985 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -1.3%. 1984: 2.0%.
Inflation 1983: 58.0%. 1984: 47.7%.
Debt 1983: $19.0 bn. 1984: $19.3 bn.
Def budget 1984: YD 244.3 bn ($1,599 bn). 1985: 391.3 bn ($1,461 bn).

$1=dinars 50.276 (1982), 92.839 (1983), 152.822 (1984), 267.85 (1985).
Population: 23,308,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,544,000;* 31-45: 2,356,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,445,000; 31-45: 2,319,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 241,000 (154,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 15 months.
Reserves: Army 500,000 (mobilization troops to complete units to war establishment), Navy 45,000 (to age 55, officers 60), Air ? (to age 60).

ARMY: 191,000 (140,000 conscripts).
7 Military Regions:
12 inf divs: 9 active (est 75% strength), 3 reserve.
8 indep tk bdes.
9 indep inf bdes (incl 3 mech, 3 lt).
3 mountain bdes.
1 AB bde (Air Force manned, HQ control).
12 fd, 11 AA arty regts.
6 ATK regts.
4 SAM regts (SA-6).
Tks: 760 T-54/-55, some 100 T-74 (mod T-72), 60 M-47; lt: PT-76.
AFV: recce: 100 M-3A1, 20 M-8, some 50 BRDM-2; MICV: 200 M-80; APC: 200 BTR-40/-50, 300 M-60P.
Arty: guns: 1,800 M-48 pack, M-1942, SU-76 SP 76mm, SU-100 SP 100mm, M-1931/37 122mm, M-46 130mm, M-59 155mm;

gun/how: M-1937, D-20 152mm; how: M-101, M-56, M-18, M-7 SP 105mm; D-30, M-1938, 2S1 SP 122mm; M-65, M-114 155mm;

mor: 82mm, 120mm; MRL: M-73, M-63 128mm; SSM: 4 FROG-7.
ATK: guns: M-1943, PAL-40 75mm, M-63B2 90mm (incl SP), T-12 100mm; RCL: 57mm, M-60PB 82mm SP, M-65 105mm;

ATGW: BOV-1 veh with ATGW, Snapper, Sagger.
AD: guns: M-55/-75, Bov-3 SP triple 20mm, M-53, M-53/59, Bov-3 twin SP 30mm, M-1939 37mm, M-1, L/70 40mm, S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP 57mm,

M-1944 85mm, M-117 90mm, 3.7 in. (94mm); SAM: SA-6/-7/-9.
Reserves: some 250 T-34/85, 400 M-4 MBT, AA guns; 300 M-18 Hellcat 76mm, M-36B2 90mm SPATK guns in store.
(On order T-74 MBT, some 300 M-80 MICV.)

NAVY: 13,000 incl 1,500 marines (6,000 conscripts).

Bases: Lora/Split, Pula, Sibenik, Kardeljevo, Kotor.
Subs: 9: 3 Sava, 2 Heroj, 2 Sutjeska (trg); 2 S-11 (Mala) two-man.
Frigates: 2 Koni with 4 Styx SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 3: 2 Mornar, 1 Le Fougueux (in reserve).
FAC: (G): 16: 6 Rade Kohcar, 10 Osa-I with 2 and 4 SS-N-2A/B; (T): 14 Sov Shershen.
Patrol craft: 18 large: 10 Kraljevica, 7 Type 131 (to retire), 1 Kobra ASW.
MCMV: 22 minesweepers: 4 Vukov Klanac coastal, 10 inshore (4 Ham, 6 M-117), 8 Nestin riveK (some in reserve).
Amph: Leu/minelayers: 13 DTM-211 (to retire 1985/6); LCA: 24 DJC-601-type<.
2 marine bdes (2 regts, each of 2 bns).
25 coast arty btys: guns (Army: ) M-44 85mm, M-36 88mm, M-37 122mm, M-54 130mm, D-20 152mm; SSM: Samlet, Brom (truck mounted SS-N-2).
(On order: 1 Koni frigate, some 9 Kobra, 1 Nestin MCMV, 1 PO-91 spt/trg ship.)

AIR FORCE: 37,000 (8,000 conscripts); some 420 combat ac, 20 armed hel.
2 air divisions:
FGA: 12 sqns: 25 Kraguj, 150 Galeb/Jastreb, some 25 Orao, some G-4 Super Galeb.
Interceptors: 9 sqns: 130 MiG-21F/ PF/M/bis, 20 MiG-21U.
Recce: 2 sqns: 35 Galeb/Jastreb RJ-1, some Orao.
OCU: 30 Galeb/Jastreb J-l/Ty-1, some Orao.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with 10 Ka-25 (Navy-assigned).
Tpt hel: 1 sqn with 20 Mi-8, SA-341 Gazela (Navy-assigned).
Tpt: 6 sqns: 2 ac with 6 Yak-40, 2 An-12, 15 An-26, 2 DC-6B, 2 Mystere-Falcon 50 (VIP), 4 CL-215, PC-6 Porter,

4 hel with 20 Mi-4, 70 Mi-8, 45 Gazela, 2 A-109 Hirundo (some 20 hel are armed.)
Trg: ac incl 80 Galeb/Jastreb, 100 UTVA-75, UTVA-66; hel: 15 Gazela.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AGM-65 Maverick.
Air Defence Force:
15 AA regts.
8 SA-2, 6 SA-3 SAM bns.
(On order: Super Galeb, some 180 Orao FGA, PC-6A tpt ac, some 94 SA-341H Gazela hel.)

PARA-MILITARY (under Army): Frontier Guards 15,000; some 7 Mima patrol craft.

Territorial Defence Force 1 million. Militia: mobile inf bdes, TAB-71/-72 APC, arty, AA bns.

Civil Defence 2 million on mobilization.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean

Bilateral Agreements with External Powers

The Soviet Union signed a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Iraq in April 1972 and a further agreement in December 1978. A similar treaty was signed with Syria on 8 October 1980, under which Soviet air defence units were deployed in Syria. A Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with South Yemen was ratified in February 1980, and an agreement of Joint Co-operation was signed in January 1983. Soviet units use Aden's naval and air facilities. All three countries have received significant Soviet arms deliveries. Despite this, Iraq has tried to broaden her contacts with the West, particularly with France and Italy. In November 1979 Iran unilaterally abrogated two paragraphs of a 1921 treaty under which the USSR reserves the right to intervene in Iran's internal affairs if a third country threatens to attack her from Iranian territory. Moscow has refused to accept this abrogation. A 20-year Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and North Yemen was signed in October 1984; details are not known.

Bulgaria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) signed a Protocol for Co-operation in April 1980 and a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation on 14 November 1981. Similar agreements with Hungary were reported in April and November 1981. Libya signed treaties of Friendship and Co-operation with Bulgaria and Romania in January 1983. Sudan and Romania signed an agreement providing technical co-operation and training in November 1982.

The United States concluded a mutual defence agreement with Israel in July 1952. A strategic co-operation understanding, reported in early 1982, led in March 1984 to a series of agreements covering aid and support, details of which have still not been published. A 1981 agreement enables the US to use Egyptian bases, but with significant Egyptian reservations. A similar agreement was reached with Morocco in May 1982. An agreement has been concluded with Oman to provide economic and military aid in exchange for permission to use Salalah and Masirah as staging bases. An agreement with Bahrain permits the US Navy to use port facilities. In November 1981 a strategic co-operation agreement was signed with Tunisia.

Britain concluded treaties of friendship with Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in August 1971 and a defence co-operation agreement with Oman in June 1985. She has supplied arms to Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and the UAE. France has continuing arms-supply arrangements with Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. West Germany provided technical training assistance to Sudan under a 1982 agreement. Spain has reached a defence agreement with Morocco enabling her navy to use Moroccan ports; the benefits to Morocco have not been identified.

China signed a Treaty of Friendship with North Yemen in 1964, under which minor arms were provided. Arms and spare parts were sent to Egypt under agreements signed in 1978/9 and 1983. A military co-operation agreement was signed with Sudan in January 1982 and arms supplied. North Korea and Libya signed a Treaty of Alliance or Friendship and Cooperation in November 1982 which permits exchanges of military data, specialists and supplies.

Peace-Keeping Forces

The United Nations withdrew the 4,000-man United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai on 24 July 1979; its duties were temporarily assumed by the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), 298 officers (Observer Group Beirut some 50 observers), which has monitored the cease-fire on Israel's northern border since 1949. The Egyptian-Israeli border is now patrolled by the 2,642-man Multi-national Force and Observers (MFO) under the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty; contingents come from the US (1,186), Australia (which will be replaced by Canada in 1986) (109), Britain (37), Colombia (500), Fiji (500), France (43), Italy (90), the Netherlands (102) and Uruguay (75).

The United Nations also deploys in the Golan Heights the 1,323-man Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), made up of contingents from Austria (533), Canada (226), Finland (411) and Poland (153).

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) consists of some 5,822 men from France (1,380), Fiji (626), Finland (500), Ghana (709), Ireland (730), Italy (48), Nepal (666), Netherlands (162), Norway (851) and Sweden (150).

Arrangements within the Region

Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and North and South Yemen are members of the League of Arab States (Egypt's membership was suspended in March 1979). Among its subsidiary bodies are the Arab Supreme Defence Council, comprising Foreign and Defence Ministers (set up in 1950), the Permanent Military Committee of army general staffs (1950), which is an advisory body, and the Unified Arab Command (1964).

Syrian and Palestine Liberation Army forces, comprising the Arab Deterrent Force, remain in northern Lebanon. Syria has reinforced her component and maintains a measure of control over the Arab guerrilla group elements in the Beqa'a Valley and northern Lebanon. Israeli forces, supported by a Lebanese Christian militia and a Home Guard, control a stip of territory in the south.

Algeria and Libya signed a defence agreement in 1975. Egypt and Sudan came to a joint defence agreement in 1977; its present status is unclear. The Joint Defence Council's minutes of December 1981 were tantamount to another agreement, and in October 1982 an 'Integration Charter' was signed covering, inter alia, military policy; the status of this, too, is unclear. Saudi Arabia has long supported Morocco against Polisario guerrillas; the two countries signed a security pact in February 1982. A Mutual Defence Agreement between Libya and Morocco was ratified in September 1984; no change in Saudi policy is reported. Libya signed a 'Strategic Agreement' with Iran in June 1985; no details have been released. An understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iraq is believed to have been signed in 1979. Jordan and Iraq ratified a defence agreement in March 1981. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), created in May 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is developing a mutual defence structure to include a joint 'rapid deployment' force, air defence, transport and procurement. It is being reinforced by internal security pacts between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Qatar, Oman (1982) and the UAE. A draft Gulf security agreement is being considered. Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia formed an Aden Treaty Tripartite Alliance in 1981; it included a joint defence commitment but nothing more concrete has been reported. North and South Yemen have agreed to a merger (1981); the details remain obscure. Jordan, Morocco and North Yemen- have announced the departure of unspecified numbers of volunteers to assist Iraq against Iran, but no formed units have been despatched. Iraq has stated that multi-national composite units have been formed; their roles are obscure. Sudan and Ethiopia agreed a regime of security, stability and non-interference in each other's internal affairs in July 1982. Actions since the coup in April 1985 suggest that this agreement is being implemented.

Arms movements in the region are peculiarly complex. Egypt has supplied arms to Morocco, Sudan and Iraq. Algeria and Libya have supplied arms to Polisario, and most Arab countries have ' applied Palestinian guerrillas with arms. In some cases a third nation funds the recipient's foreign arms purchases. Iran has reportedly received arms, supplies and spares from, inter alia, Israel, North Korea and Eastern Europe and is also buying material on the open market in Western Europe. Some Chinese weapons have been identified in Iranian service. Iraq has apparently recently received arms from Egypt, the USSR, China, North Korea, France, Portugal and Brazil.

In 1975 an Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) was set up in Egypt under the aegis of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Sudan to encourage indigenous Arab arms production. Arab involvement ended following Egypt's rapprochement with Israel. Egypt has been entering into co-production agreements with Britain, France, the US and Yugoslavia. To replace the AOI, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE agreed in 1979 to set up an S8-billion arms industry in the UAE. This proposal is still being studied by the GCC.

Military Developments

In the Gulf war Iraq's predominance in materiel continues to counter Iranian numerical superiority. Reports of Iraq's employment of chemical agents and of Iran's use of surface-to-surface missiles add new dimensions to the conflict. Iraq has also made greater use of her superior air capability to attack Iranian urban areas, dominate the immediate battlefield and interdict tanker traffic to Iran's northern oil facilities. Iraq's financial reserves are exhausted, and her international debt is enormous. Given the state of the world's oil markets, the new pipelines she is building are unlikely to bring in the revenue she needs. Iran, for the time being at least, is winning the economic war, she still cannot win on the ground. Iraq's only hope of breaking the stalemate appears to lie in attacking Iranian civilian and oil targets with a view to weakening popular support for the regime. This gambit has not been successful in the past and has obvious political disadvantages.

Israel continues to maintain her position of conventional superiority over any of her neighbours, but the emergence among the Lebanese guerrilla groups of the myth that the IDF was defeated and driven from Lebanon bodes ill for future peace. Despite claims by Polisario, the Moroccan 'Great Wall' seems largely to have curtailed incursions and has established a secure zone in which relatively normal economic development is taking place.

Economic Factors

Despite the international economic situation, the Middle East and North African countries in general were able to attain a GDP growth rate of some 2.5%. The oil-producing countries, however, showed a continuous decline in revenues, as output fell and prices were lowered. Countries like Saudi Arabia experienced a drastic reduction in oil exports, from a high of 384 bn riyals ($104 bn) in 1982 to 165 bn riyals ($47 bn) in 1984. In consequence, most governments had to adopt deficit financing and draw on their international reserves. While imports into the OAPEC countries have generally fallen, this trend was riot reflected in arms acquisitions. The Middle East and North Africa remains the largest importer of weapons in the world, largely due to the continuing war in the Gulf as well as the conflicts in the Lebanon, Chad and the western Sahara.

While the oil-producing states have substantial financial reserves, many of the others are faced with severe debt problems. In terms of debt/GDP ratio Israel leads with 130%, followed by Sudan and Morocco with 112%; Egypt and Jordan have debt burdens of 65%, while those of most other countries of the region are in the 10-25% range. In practically all countries inflation is manageable, although in some of the Arab countries (Sudan, Egypt and Iran) it is acute. Israel's inflation has assumed Latin American proportions - having reached 450% at the end of 1984, and 750% by mid-1985 - and her inordinate dependence on foreign aid (especially from the United States) has substantially reduced her economic performance. Because of the continuing war in the Gulf, Iraq is heavily dependent on large aid, grants and credits (estimated to total some $45 bn since 1980). Iran, on the other hand, has managed to maintain fair economic growth despite the war and with little foreign assistance.

Ближний Восток и Северная Африка

Двусторонние соглашения с внешними державами

Советский Союз подписал пятнадцатилетний договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве с Ираком в апреле 1972 года и еще одно соглашение в декабре 1978 года. Аналогичный договор был подписан с Сирией 8 октября 1980 года, по которому в Сирии были развернуты советские подразделения ПВО. В феврале 1980 года был ратифицирован Договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве с Южным Йеменом, а в январе 1983 года было подписано соглашение о совместном сотрудничестве. Советские части используют военно-морские и воздушные средства Адена. Все три страны получили значительные поставки советского оружия. Несмотря на это, Ирак пытается расширить свои контакты с Западом, в частности с Францией и Италией. В ноябре 1979 года Иран в одностороннем порядке отменил два пункта договора 1921 года, согласно которым СССР оставляет за собой право вмешиваться во внутренние дела Ирана, если третья страна угрожает напасть на него с иранской территории. Москва отказалась принять эту отмену. 20-летний договор о дружбе между СССР и Северным Йеменом был подписан в октябре 1984 года, подробности не известны.

Болгария и Йеменская Народно-Демократическая Республика (Южный Йемен) подписали Протокол о сотрудничестве в апреле 1980 года и Договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве 14 ноября 1981 года. Аналогичные соглашения с Венгрией были заключены в апреле и ноябре 1981 года. Ливия подписала договоры о дружбе и сотрудничестве с Болгарией и Румынией в январе 1983 года. В ноябре 1982 года Судан и Румыния подписали соглашение о техническом сотрудничестве и подготовке кадров.

В июле 1952 года Соединенные Штаты заключили с Израилем соглашение о взаимной обороне. Достигнутое в начале 1982 года соглашение о стратегическом сотрудничестве привело в марте 1984 года к заключению ряда соглашений о помощи и поддержке, подробная информация о которых до сих пор не опубликована. Соглашение 1981 года позволяет США использовать египетские базы, но со значительными оговорками Египта. Аналогичное соглашение было достигнуто с Марокко в мае 1982 года. С Оманом было заключено соглашение об оказании экономической и военной помощи в обмен на разрешение использовать Салалу и Масиру в качестве плацдармов. Соглашение с Бахрейном разрешает ВМС США использовать портовые сооружения. В ноябре 1981 года было подписано соглашение о стратегическом сотрудничестве с Тунисом.

Великобритания заключила договоры о дружбе с Бахрейном, Катаром и Объединенными Арабскими Эмиратами (ОАЭ) в августе 1971 года и соглашение о сотрудничестве в области обороны с Оманом в июне 1985 года. Она поставляла оружие Бахрейну, Египту, Иордании, Кувейту, Оману, Катару, Саудовской Аравии, Судану и ОАЭ. Франция продолжает выполнять соглашения о поставках оружия с Египтом, Ираком, Ливаном, Ливией, Марокко, Суданом и Тунисом. Западная Германия оказывала техническое содействие, обучение в Судане по договору 1982. Испания достигла оборонного соглашения с Марокко, позволяющего ее флоту использовать марокканские порты; выгоды для Марокко не определены.

В 1964 году Китай подписал договор о дружбе с Северным Йеменом, по которому было предоставлено незначительное количество оружия. Оружие и запасные части были направлены в Египет в соответствии с соглашениями, подписанными в 1978/9 и 1983 годах. В январе 1982 года было подписано соглашение о военном сотрудничестве с Суданом и поставлено оружие. В ноябре 1982 года Северная Корея и Ливия подписали Договор о союзничестве или дружбе и сотрудничестве, который разрешает обмен военными данными, специалистами и поставками.

Миротворческие силы

Организация Объединенных Наций отозвала около 4 000 человек Чрезвычайных вооруженных сил ООН (UNEF) с Синайского полуострова 24 июля 1979 года; его обязанности были временно возложены на надзорные организации ООН по перемирию (UNTSO), 298 должностных лиц (группы наблюдателей в Бейруте около 50 наблюдателей), которые следят за прекращение огня на северной границе Израиля с 1949 года. Границу Египет-Израиль теперь патрулируют 2,642 человек многонациональных сил и наблюдателей (MFO) в рамках израильско-египетского мирного договора; контингенты из США (1186), Австралии (которая будет заменена Канадой в 1986 году) (109), Великобритании (37), Колумбии (500), Фиджи (500), Франции (43), Италии (90), Нидерландов (102) и Уругвая (75).

Организация Объединенных Наций также развернула на Голанских высотах 1323 наблюдателей за разъединением (UNDOF) в составе контингентов из Австрии (533), Канады (226), Финляндии (411) и Польши (153).

В состав временных сил Организации Объединенных Наций в Ливане (UNIFIL) входят примерно 5822 человека из Франции (1380), Фиджи (626), Финляндии (500), Ганы (709), Ирландии (730), Италии (48), Непала (666), Нидерландов (162), Норвегии (851) и Швеции (150).

Региональные соглашения

Алжир, Бахрейн, Джибути, Иордания, Ирак, Йемен, Катар, Кувейт, Ливан, Ливия, Мавритания, Марокко, Оман, Организация освобождения Палестины (ООП), Саудовская Аравия, Сомали, Судан, Сирия, Тунис и Северный и Южный Йемен являются членами Лиги арабских государств (членство Египта было приостановлено в марте 1979 года). К числу его вспомогательных органов относятся арабский Высший совет обороны в составе министров иностранных дел и обороны (создан в 1950 году), постоянный военный комитет Генерального штаба армии (1950 год), который является консультативным органом, и Объединенное арабское командование (1964 год).

Силы Армии освобождения Сирии и Палестины, входящие в состав арабских сил сдерживания, остаются на севере Ливана. Сирия укрепила свой компонент и сохраняет определенный контроль над элементами Арабской партизанской группы в долине Бекаа и на севере Ливана. Израильские силы при поддержке ливанского христианского ополчения и ополчения самообороны контролируют территорию на юге страны.

Алжир и Ливия подписали соглашение об обороне в 1975 году. Египет и Судан пришли к совместному соглашению об обороне в 1977 году; его нынешний статус неясен. Протокол Объединенного Совета обороны от декабря 1981 года был равнозначен другому соглашению, а в октябре 1982 года была подписана "Хартия интеграции", охватывающая, в частности, военную политику; статус этого соглашения также неясен. Саудовская Аравия давно поддерживает Марокко в борьбе с повстанцами Полисарио; обе страны подписали пакт безопасности в феврале 1982 года. Соглашение о взаимной обороне между Ливией и Марокко было ратифицировано в сентябре 1984 года; никаких изменений в политике Саудовской Аравии не сообщается. Ливия подписала "стратегическое соглашение" с Ираном в июне 1985 года; никаких подробностей не сообщается. Считается, что соглашение между Саудовской Аравией и Ираком было подписано в 1979 году. Иордания и Ирак ратифицировал соглашение об обороне в марте 1981 года. Совет сотрудничества стран Залива (ССЗ), созданный в мае 1981 года Бахрейном, Кувейтом, Оманом, Катаром, Саудовской Аравией и ОАЭ, разрабатывает структуру взаимной обороны, включающую совместные силы быстрого развертывания, противовоздушную оборону, транспорт и закупки. Она подкрепляется пактами о внутренней безопасности между Саудовской Аравией и Бахрейном, Катаром, Оманом (1982 год) и ОАЭ. В настоящее время рассматривается проект соглашения об обеспечении безопасности в заливе. Ливия, Южный Йемен и Эфиопия сформировали трехсторонний союз по Аденскому договору в 1981 году; он включал в себя совместное оборонное обязательство, но ничего более конкретного не сообщалось. Северный и Южный Йемен договорились о слиянии (1981 год); детали остаются неясными. Иордания, Марокко и Северный Йемен объявили об отъезде неустановленного числа добровольцев для оказания помощи Ираку в борьбе с Ираном, однако ни одно сформированное подразделение не было направлено. Ирак заявил, что были сформированы многонациональные сводные подразделения; их роль неясна. Судан и Эфиопия договорились о режиме безопасности, стабильности и невмешательства во внутренние дела друг друга, в июле 1982 года. Действия, предпринятые после переворота в апреле 1985 года, свидетельствуют о том, что это соглашение выполняется.

Движение оружия в регионе является особенно сложным. Египет поставляет оружие Марокко, Судану и Ираку. Алжир и Ливия поставляли оружие Полисарио, и большинство арабских стран "отправляли оружие палестинским партизанам". В некоторых случаях третье государство финансирует иностранные закупки оружия. Согласно сообщениям, Иран получает оружие, поставки и запасные части, в частности, от Израиля, Северной Кореи и Восточной Европы, а также закупает материалы на открытом рынке в Западной Европе. Китайское оружие было обнаружено на иранской службе. Ирак, по-видимому, недавно получил оружие из Египта, СССР, Китая, Северной Кореи, Франции, Португалии и Бразилии.

В 1975 году в Египте под эгидой Саудовской Аравии, Катара, ОАЭ и Судана была создана арабская организация по индустриализации (АОИ) в целях поощрения местного арабского производства оружия. Участие арабских государств прекратилось после сближения Египта с Израилем. Египет заключает соглашения о совместном производстве с Великобританией, Францией, США и Югославией. Чтобы заменить АОИ, Ирак, Кувейт, Катар, Саудовская Аравия и ОАЭ договорились в 1979 году создать в ОАЭ оружейную промышленность на 8 миллиардов долларов. Это предложение все еще изучается ССЗ.

Военные события

В войне в Персидском заливе преобладание Ирака в материальной части продолжает противостоять численному превосходству Ирана. Сообщения о применении Ираком отравляющих веществ и использования Ираном ракет поверхность-поверхность добавили новое в конфликт. Ирак также шире использует возможности воздушного нападения на иранские города, доминируя в боях и перехватах танкерных перевозок в северных нефтяных объектах Ирана. Финансовые резервы Ирака исчерпаны, а его международный долг огромен. Учитывая состояние мировых нефтяных рынков, новые трубопроводы, которые он строит, вряд ли принесут ей необходимый доход. Иран, по крайней мере пока, выигрывает экономическую войну, но все еще не может победить на поле боя. Единственная надежда Ирака на выход из тупика, как представляется, заключается в нападении на иранские гражданские и нефтяные объекты в целях ослабления поддержки режима населением. Этот гамбит не был успешным в прошлом, и имеет очевидные политические недостатки.

Израиль продолжает сохранять свою позицию обычного превосходства над любым из своих соседей, однако появление среди ливанских партизанских групп мифа о том, что ИДФ потерпели поражение и были изгнаны из Ливана, является дурным предзнаменованием для будущего мира. Несмотря на заявления Полисарио, марокканская "Великая стена", как представляется, в значительной степени сократила масштабы вторжений и создала безопасную зону, в которой происходит относительно нормальное экономическое развитие.

Экономические факторы

Несмотря на международную экономическую ситуацию, страны Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки в целом смогли достичь темпов роста ВВП около 2,5%. В то же время в нефтедобывающих странах наблюдается непрерывное снижение доходов, поскольку объем производства падает, а цены снижаются. Такие страны, как Саудовская Аравия, испытали резкое сокращение экспорта нефти с 384 млрд риалов ($104 млрд) в 1982 году до 165 млрд риалов ($47 млрд) в 1984 году. Вследствие этого большинству правительств приходится прибегать к дефицитному финансированию и использовать свои международные резервы. Хотя импорт в страны ОАПЕК в целом сократился, эта тенденция нашла отражение в приобретении оружия. Ближний Восток и Северная Африка по-прежнему являются крупнейшими импортерами оружия в мире, главным образом из-за продолжающейся войны в заливе, а также конфликтов в Ливане, Чаде и Западной Сахаре.

Хотя нефтедобывающие государства располагают значительными финансовыми резервами, многие другие сталкиваются с серьезными долговыми проблемами. По соотношению долг/ВВП Израиль лидирует со 130%, за ним следуют Судан и Марокко со 112%; Египет и Иордания имеют долговое бремя в 65%, в то время как большинство других стран региона находятся в диапазоне 10-25%. Практически во всех странах инфляция управляема, хотя в некоторых арабских странах (Судан, Египет и Иран) она является острой. Инфляция в Израиле приняла латиноамериканские пропорции - достигнув 450% в конце 1984 года, и 750% с середины 1985 года - и ее чрезмерная зависимость от иностранной помощи (особенно от Соединенных Штатов) существенно снизила его экономические показатели. Из-за продолжающейся войны в Персидском заливе Ирак сильно зависит от крупной помощи, субсидий и кредитов (по оценкам, с 1980 года общая сумма составляет около 45 млрд. долл. США). Иран, с другой стороны, сумел сохранить экономический рост, несмотря на войну и при небольшой иностранной помощи.

ALGERIA
GDP 1982: AD 208.7 bn ($45,447 bn). 1983: 231.2 bn ($48,425 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0%. 1984: 3.5%.
Inflation 1983: 3.7%.
Debt 1983: $12.9 bn. 1984: $15.8 bn.
Def budget* 1984: AD 4.631 bn ($929,285 m). 1985: 4.793 bn ($937,506 m). (* Excl eqpt expenditures.)

$1=dinar 4.5922 (1982), 4.7888 (1983), 4.9834 (1984), 5.1125 (1985).
Population: 22,106,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,449,000; 31-45: 1,330,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,374,000; 31-45: 1,471,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 170,000 (at least 100,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: Army: up to 150,000.

ARMY: 150,000 (perhaps 100,000 conscripts).
6 Military Regions.
2 armd bdes.
5 mech bdes.
8 mot inf bdes.
1 AB/special force bde.
28 indep inf bns.
4 para bns.
5 indep arty bns.
5 AD bns.
4 engr bns.
12 coys desert troops.
Tks: 300 T-54/-55, 300 T-62, 100 T-72.
AFV: recce: 150 BRDM-2; MICV: 650 BMP-1; APC: 450 BTR-50/-60, 100 BTR-152.
Arty: guns: 60 ZIS-3 (M-1942) 76mm, 100 D-44 85mm, 120 M-1931/37 122mm towed, 40 ISU-122, 70 M-1974 122mm, 50 ISU-152 152mm SP;

how: 40 M-30, M-1938, 100 D-30 122mm, 20 M-1937 152mm towed;

MRL: 150 BM-21 122mm, 20 BM-24 240mm; mor: 180 M-43 120mm and M-43 160mm.
ATK: guns: 90 ZIS-2 57mm, 50 SU-100 SP; RCL: T-21 82mm, B-ll 107mm; ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (some SP/BRDM-2), Milan.
AD: guns: 150 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm, 130mm, towed, 130 ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP; SAM: 18 SA-6, SA-7/-9.

NAVY: 8,000.

Bases: Algiers, Annaba, Mers el Kebir.
Subs: 2 R-class.
Frigates: 3 Koni with 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 4 Nanuchka with 4 SS-N-2b SSM, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC: 6 Brooke Marine Kebir, (G): 11: 2 Osa-I, 9 Osa-II with Styx SSM.
MCMV: 1 T-43 ocean minesweeper (in reserve).
Amph: tsr 2 Brooke; LCT: 1Polnocny.
(On order: 2 corvettes, 3 P-1200 patrol craft, 2 802 harbour craft.)

AIR FORCE: 12,000; some 332 combat ac, some 35 armed hel.
FGA: 10 sqns: 1 with 12 Su-7BM; 4 with 60 MiG-17; 4 with some 60 MiG-23BM; 1 with some 18 Su-20 (Fitter C).
Interceptors: 4 sqns: 3 with 95 MiG-21MF/F; 1 with 15 MiG-25 Foxbat A.
Recce: 1 sqn with 6 MiG-25R Foxbat B.
MR: 1 sqn with 8 F-27-400 (Navy-assigned), 2 Beech Super King Air T-200T.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 An-12, 11 C-130H, 6 C-130H-30, 1 Il-18, 1 Mystere-Falcon 20, 2 Caravelle Super B.
Hel: 9 sqns: attack: 3 sqns with 35 Mi-24;

tpt (hy): 3 sqns with 35 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 4 Mi-6; (med): 2 sqns with 28 Mi-4, 5 SA-330 Puma; (lt): 6 Hughes 269A, 4 Alouette II.
Misc: 2 CL-215 SAR, 12 King Air, 12 Beech Sierra 200,3 Queen Air.
Trg: combat: 20 MiG-17/-21UTI, 8 Su-7U, 2 MiG-23U, 3 MiG-25U, perhaps 20 MiG-15U, 6 T-34C; basic: 20 CM-170 Magister, 41 Gumhuriya, Yak-11.
AD: guns: 3 regts: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm; SAM: 1 regt: 24 SA-2(96 msls), some 20SA-3.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Interior):

Gendarmerie 30,000; 44 Panhard M-3 APC.

Coastguard 550: 38 patrol craft< (2 P-6, 16 Baglietto (6 Mangusta, 10 Type-20 GC), 20 small).

BAHRAIN
GDP 1982: BD 1.74 bn ($4,628 bn). Est 1983: 1.914 bn ($5,090 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 8.2%. 1983: 4.5%.
Inflation 1983: 3.0%. 1984: 5.5%.
Debt 1983: $420 m. 1984: $330 m.
Def exp 1982: BD 105 m ($279,255 m). Est 1983: 125m ($332,447 m).*

(*Bahrain shares a $1.0-bn common defence fund with Oman, set up under the auspices of the GCC.)

$1=dinar 0.376 (1982/3/4).
Population: 400,000.* (*Incl some 150,000 non-Bahrainis.)
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,800.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 2,300.
1 bde:
1 inf bn.
1 armd car sqn.
1 arty, 2 mor btys.
AFV: new: 8 Saladin, 20 AML-90, 8 Ferret; APC: AT-105 Saxon, 110 Shorland M, Panhard M-3.
Arty: guns: 8 105mm It; mor 6 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 6 MOBAT 120mm; ATGW: BGM-71A TOW,
AD: SAM: 6 RBS-70.
(On order. 7 M-198 155mm how, TOW ATGW).
NAVY: 300.

Base: Jufair (Manama).
FAC: 2 Lurssen 38-metre; (G): 2 45-metre with 4 MM-40 Exocet SSM. Lurssen
AIR FORCE: 200.

Hel: 1 sqn with 10 AB-212, 3 BO-105, 2 Hughes-500D.

(On order 4 F-5E,2 F-5F FGA ac, 60 AIM-9P3 Sidewinder AAM).
PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Interior): Coastguard 180; 19 coastal patrol craft, 2 landing craft, 1 hovercraft.

Police 2,000; 2 Bell 412, 2 Scout hel.

(On order 1 Wasp coastal patrol craft.)

EGYPT
GDP 1982/3: £E 24.634 bn ($35,196 bn). Est 1983/4: £E 23.56 bn ($33,662 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 7.5%. 1984: 6.5%.
Inflation 1983: 20.0%. 1984: 18.5%.
Debt 1983: $22.2 bn. 1984: $24.0 bn.
Est def exp 1984/5: £E 2.65 bn ($3,786 bn).
Def exp 1985/6: 2.9 bn ($4,143 bn).
FMA 1983: $1,327 bn. 1984: $1,367 bn.

$1=£E 0.6999 (1983/4/5).
Population: 48,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,427,000; 31-45: 3,986,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,289,000; 31-45: 3,951,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 445,000 (some 250,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 3 years (selective).
Reserves (totals tentative): 380,000; Army 323,000, Navy 15,000, Air Force 12,000, AD 30,000.

ARMY: 320,000 (perhaps 180,000 conscripts).*

(* Most Soviet equipment now in reserve. Incl 1,200 MBT, 397 combat aircraft.

Some shown as Soviet has been refurbished with Western, Chinese and domestically-produced components.)
3 Army HQ:
3 armd divs (each with 2 armd, 1 mech bdes).
6 mech inf divs (each with 2 mech, 1 armd bdes).
3 inf divs (each with 2 inf, 1 mech bdes).
1 Republican Guard Div (2 bdes).
1 indep armd bde.
2 indep mech inf bdes.
5 indep inf bdes.
2 airmobile, 1 para bdes.
12 indep arty bdes.
2 hy mor bdes.
6 ATGW bdes.
7 cdo gps.
2 SSM regts (1 with FROG-7, 1 with Scud B).
Tks: 900 T-54/-55, 600 T-62, 659 AM-60 (M-60A3); lt: 30 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 300 BRDM-2; MICV: 200 BMP-1, some 217 BMR-600P;

APC: 2,500: OT-62, Walid (to National Guard), Fahd (being introduced), BTR-40/-50/-60; 550 M-113A2.
Arty: guns: 1,500 D-44 85mm, M-l944 towed, 200 SU-100 SP 100mm, M-31/37, Type-60 122mm, M-46, Type 59-1 130mm,

SU-152 SP 152mm and S-23 180mm; gun/how: M-l937, D-20 152mm; how: M-l938, D-30 122mm, M-1943, D-l 152mm, M-109A2 SP 155mm;

MRL: about 300 VAP-80-12 80mm, BM-21/Sakr-18/-30 122mm, M-51/Praga V3S 130mm, BM-13-16 132mm,

BM-14-/16 140mm and BM-24 240mm;

SSM: 12 FROG-7, 9 Scud B; mor: 400 M-43 120mm, M-43 160mm and M-1953 240mm.
ATK: RCL: 900 B-10 82mm, B-11 107mm; guns: 900 M-1943 57mm, M-1942 76mm, T-12 100mm;

ATGW: 1,000 AT-1 Snapper, AT-2 Swatter, AT-3 Sagger, Milan, Beeswing, Swingfire and TOW (incl M-901 (M-113) SP).
AD: guns: 350 ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 23mm and ZSU-57-2 57mm SP; SAM: 75 SA-6, SA-7/as Saqr, SA-9, 20 Crotale.
(On order: some 250 M-60A3 MBT; some 350 BMR-600P, some 500 M-113A2 APC; some 54 M-109A2 155mm SP how; JPz SK-105 SP ATK guns,

some 40 M-901 SP Improved TOW AFV; 100 M-106A2 and M-125A2 mor carriers; 200 TOW launchers, 4,000 msls (incl 2,500 Improved TOW),

2,000 Swingfire ATGW; as Saqr (SA-7), 60 Chaparral SAM.)

NAVY: 20,000 (10,000 conscripts).*

Bases: Alexandria, Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Port Tewfig, Hurghada, Safaqa.
Subs: 14: 10 R-class (4 Ch Type-O-33), 4 Sov W-class.
Destroyers: 3: 2 Sov Skory (1 with 1x2 Styx SSM), 1 Br Z-class.
Frigates: 7:

FFG : 4: 2 Ch Jianghu with 4 Hai Ying-2 SSM, 2 Spanish F-30 (Descubierta) with 2x4 Harpoon:

FF: 3 Br (1 Black Swan, 1 Hunt, 1 River (trg and sub spt ship)).
FAC: 18: 4 Shershen with 1x8 BM-21 122mm or 1x12 BM-24 240mm MRL, 1 SA-7 SAM; 12 P-6< with 1x8 BM-21; 2 Shanghai.
FAC: (G): 30: 6 Ramadan with 4 Otomat SSM; 6 October-6 (P-6)< with 2 Otomat; 8 Sov Osa I with 4 Styx SSM, SA-7 SAM;

6 Huangfen with 4 Hai Ying-2 SSM; 4 Komar with 2 SS-N-2A SSM<.
FAC: (T): 14: 2 Shershen, 8 P-6<, 4 P-4.
Patrol craft: 30 large: 12 Sov SO-1 (6 with 1x8 BM-21 122mm MRL, some with SA-7 SAM), 9 Ch Hainan, 9 Timsah.
MCMV: 12 minesweepers: 10 ocean (6 T-43, 4 Yurka), 2 T-301 inshore.
Minelayers: 3 SRN-6 hovercraft.
Amph: LCT: 3 Polnocny, LCU: 13 (9 Vydra, 4 SMB1).
Coastal defence unit (Army manpower, Navy control): guns: SSM-4-1 130mm; SSM: 30 Otomat and Samlet.
(On order 2 Ch Type-O-33 SS; 4 Luda DDG; 2 Jianghu FFG; 6 Cormoran FAC(G); 4 Shanghai II FAC, 2 Hainan, 9 Swift, 13 Timsah patrol

boats; 14 SRN-6 hovercraft; 6 LST; Stingray torpedoes; 16 Harpoon, Otomat SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 25,000 (10,000 conscripts); some 427 combat ac, 48 armed hel (incl AD comd).*
Bbr: 1 bde (sqn) with 13 Tu-16.
AD/FGA: 2 bdes (4 sqns): 70 J-6, 33 F-4E.
FGA: 2 bdes (4 sqns): - 54 Mirage 5SDE2 (Mirage 2000EM being delivered), 19 Alpha Jet MS-2.
Interceptors: 6 bdes (9 sqns): 5 sqns with 100 MiG-21F/PFS/FL/PFM/M/MF, 1 with 12 J-6; 1 with 20 J-7; 2 with 32 F-16A.
Recce: 1 bde (2 sqns): 6 Mirage 5SDR, 15 MiG-21F/RF, 13 Il-28(MR).
ELINT: 2 EC-130H.
Hel: 11 sqns: attack: 1 bde (4 sqns): 24 SA-342M Gazelle (HOT), 24 SA-342L (20mm gun); ASW: 1 bde (sqn) with 5 Sea King Mk 47;

tac tpt: 3 bdes: (hy): 1 sqn with 15 CH-47C Chinook, (med): 3 sqns with 56 Mi-8, 1 sqn with 23 Westland Commando Mk 2 (2 VIP);

(lt): 1 sqn with Hiller UH-12E.
Tpt: 2 bdes (3 sqns): 2x22 C-130H, 9 DHC-5D Buffalo, 4 Mystere-Falcon 20 (VIP), 1 Boeing 707, 1 Boeing 737.
Trg: incl 16 MiG-19 (ocu), 8 Alpha Jet MS-1, 50 L-29 (being replaced), 36 Gumhuria, 36 Yak-18 Max, Wilga 35/80, 4 JJ-6,

6 Mirage 5SDD, 6 F-16B, 2 EMB-312 Tucano.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, R-530, Matra Sparrow, R-550 Magic, AIM-9P3/AIM-9L Sidewinder.
ASM: AS-1 Kennel, AS-5 Kelt, AGM-65 Maverick, HOT.
(On order: Some 40 Ch J-7 (MiG-21-type), 80 F-16C/D, some 40 Mirage 2000EM, 4 -BM, 16 Mirage 5E2 ftrs, 26 Ch J-6,

some 18 Alpha Jet (MS-2 FGA, MS-1 trg); 5 E-2C AEW, 3 C-130H tpt, some 18 Tucano trg ac;

12 Sea King ASW, AS-332 Super Puma, 24 AH-1 Cobra with TOW, 15 CH-47, 18 UH-12E, 24 Gazelle (some 12 with HOT ATGW), 4 Bell 222,

1 AS-61 tpt hel; Sparrow, 150 Sidewinder AAM; Exocet AM-39, Maverick ASM.)

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: 80,000 (50,000 conscripts).
12 centres under construction.
AD: 2 divs: regional bdes.

100 AA and msl bns, radar bns.
AD: guns: 2,500 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm;

SAM (sites): some 60 SA-2 (400 launchers), 50 SA-3 (240 launchers).

Some Amoun AD systems. 75 SA-6, 12 Improved HAWK (36 msls), 16 Crotale.

Radar: AN/TPS-43/-59/-63, AN/TS9-73, Fan Song, Flat Face P-15, Spoon Rest P-12, Low Blow, Straight Flush missile/gun and

Squint Eye, Long Track EWng.
(On order: Ch CSA-1, Spada, LPD-20 search radar; some 18 Amoun (Skyguard/AIM-7F Sparrow AD systems (36 twin 35mm guns, 36x4 SAM)).

8 btys totalling 96 launchers, 288 Improved HAWK SAM.)

Forces Abroad: Iraq, Oman, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire.

PARA-MILITARY: 139,000 National Guard 60,000; (getting Walid APC). Frontier Corps 12,000. Defence and Security 60,000.

Coast Guard 7,000; 3 Nisr, 6 Crestitalia, 6 Bertram patrol boats, 34 rescue launches.

IRAN
GDP 1982/3: rial 8,700 bn ($99,738 bn). 1983/4: 11,276 bn ($122,687 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.2%. Est 1984: 3.4%.
Inflation 1983: 16.0%. 1984: 20.0%.
Def exp 1983/4: rial 1,500 bn ($17,196 bn). Est 1984/5: 1,853 bn ($20,162 bn). Est budget 1985/6: 1,295 bn ($13,877 bn).*

(*Incl war zone reconstruction and revolutionary guard budgets but excl armaments industry budget ($145 m for 1984/5).

$1=rial 84.4523 (1982), 87.2283 (1983), 91.906 (1984), 93.317 (1985).
Population: 43,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,158,000; 31-45: 3,406,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,005,000; 31-45: 3,309,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 305,000.

Terms of service: 24 months.
Reserves: Army: 350,000, ex-service volunteers.

ARMY: 250,000 (100,000 conscripts).
(?3) Army HQ.
3 mech divs (each 3 bdes: 9 armd, 18 mech bns).
7 inf divs.
1 AB bde.
1 Special Forces div (4 bdes).
Some indep armd, inf bdes (incl 'coastal force').
12 SAM bns with HAWK.
Reserve: 'Quds' (bns, ex-service volunteers).
Ground Forces Air Support units.
Tks: 1000: T-54/-55, 50 T-62, 100 T-72, 300 Chieftain Mk 3/5, 200 M-47/-48, 250 M-60A1; lt: 50 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 130 EE-9 Cascavel; MICV: 180 BMP-1; APC : perhaps 250 M-113, 500 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, perhaps 250 M-113.
Arty: some 1,200: guns: 1,000 M-116 75mm pack, M-1965 85mm, M-46 130mm towed, 30 M-107 175mm SP;

how: M-101 105mm, M-114 towed, M-109A1 SP 155mm, M-115 towed, 10 M-110 SP 203mm;

MRL: Ch Type-63- 12x107mm, 65 BM-21 40x122mm; mor: 81mm, M-30 4.2-in. (107mm), 3,000 120mm; SSM: Scud.
ATK: RCL: 57mm, 75mm, M-40A/C 106mm; guns: some 120 ASU-85 SP; ATGW: ENTAC, SS-11/-12, M-47 Dragon, BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 1,500 ZU-23 towed, ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm, 37mm towed, ZSU-57-2 SP 57mm, 85mm towed; SAM: HAWK/Improved HAWK, SA-7.*
Ac incl 46 Cessna (185, 310), 10 O-2A, 2 F-27, 5 Shrike Commander, 2 Mystere-Falcon.

hel (attack): AH-1 Cobra; (hy tpt): CH-47C. (270 Bell 214A, 35 AB-205A, 15 AB-206 were also held.)*
(Captured Iraqi eqpt in service.)
(On order 100 TAM, 200 Ch T-58 MBT; Type-60 122mm gun, Type-54 122mm how, Type-59 130mm gun; Type-63 107mm, 40x122mm MRL).

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: (Pasdaran):

250,000; some 10 divs org in bdes; some indep bdes. In bns may include armd, arty, engr, AD units.

Serve indep or with Army; small arms, spt weapons from Army, Naval elm; some Air.

NAVY: 20,000, incl naval air and marines.*

Bases: Bandar Lengeh, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e-Anzelli, Bandar-e-Khomeini, Chah Bahar (building).
Destroyers: 3 with 4 Standard SSM: 1 Br Battle with 1x4 Seacat SAM; 2 US Sumner (in reserve).
Frigates: 4 Saam with 1x5 Seakiller SSM, 1x3 Seacat SAM(1 probably non-operational).
Corvettes: 1 US PF-103.
FAC(G): 7 Kaman (La Combattante II) with a total of 7 Harpoon SSM (?3 serviceable).
Patrol craft: 7 large (5 lost?): 3 Improved PGM-71, 4 Cape; 2 BH-7 hovercraft.
MCMV: 2 US coastal.
Amph: LST: 4 Hengam; LCU: 1 US.
Spt: 1 replenishment, 2 fleet supply, 1 repair ships.
Marines: 3 bns.
(On order 6 Type-120C subs.)
NAVAL AIR: 2 combat ac, 12 combat hel.
MR: 1 sqn with 2 P-3F Orion may have
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 12 SH-3D J combined
MCM: 1 hel sqn with 2 RH-53D.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 Shrike Commander, 4 F-27, 1 Mystere-Falcon 20, 7 AB-212.

AIR FORCE: 35,000; perhaps 80 serviceable combat ac.
FGA: 8 sqns: 4 with some 35 (?23) F-4D/E; 4 with some 45 F-5E/F.
Interceptor/FGA: (?20) F-14.
Recce: 1 sqn (dets) with some 5 F-14A, 3 RF-4E.
Tanker/tpt: 2 sqns: 10 Boeing 707, 7 747.
Tpt: 5 sqns: 26 C-130E/H, 10 F-27, 2 Aero Commander 690, 4 Mystere-Falcon 20.
Hel: 10 Sikorsky S-55 (HH-34F), 10 AB-206A, 5 AB-212, 39 Bell 214C, 10 CH-47 Chinook, 2 Sikorsky S-61A4.
Trg: incl 26 F-33A/C Bonanza, 7 T-33, 46 PC-7.
SAM: 5 sqns: Rapier, 25 Tigercat.
AAM: Phoenix, AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-7 Sparrow. ASM: AS-12, Maverick.
(On order 12 Ch J-6 FGA; trg ac; 11 CH-47 tpt hel; CSA-1 SAM).

Forces Abroad: Lebanon: Revolutionary Guard.

PARA-MILITARY: Basidj 'Popular Mobilization Army' volunteers, mostly youths; small arms, ancillary to main field forces.

Gendarmerie (70,000 incl border guard element).

Mostazafin (Guards). Hezbollahi (Home Guard) 2,500,000.

Border Tribal Militia. Cessna 185/310 lt ac, AB-205/-206 hel, patrol boats.*

(* Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes estimates very tentative. Reports of Chinese tk and ac deliveries unconfirmed; MRL identified.

Operational status of US-source equipment impossible to determine precisely.)

IRAQ
Est GDP 1982: ID 10.324 bn ($34,598 bn). 1983: 9.50 bn ($30,556 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -6.0%. 1983: -8.5%.
Inflation 1983: 18.0%. 1984: 22.0%.
Est debt 1983: $35 bn. 1984: $40-45 bn.* (*Incl loans from GCC states and massive credits from the USSR, France and Brazil.)
Est def exp 1983: ID 3.20 bn ($10,293 bn). 1984: 4.30 bn ($13,831 bn).

$1=dinar 0.2984 (1982), 0.3109(1983/4).
Population: 15,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,699,000; 31-45: 1.144,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,631,000; 31-45: 1,104,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 520,000.

Terms of service: basic 21-24 months, extended for war.
Reserves: Army 75,000.

ARMY: 475,000.* (* Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes estimates very tentative.)
4 corps HQ.
6 armd divs ('Type' comprises 1 armd, 1 mech bde; varies).
5 mech/mot inf divs.
5 inf divs.
4 mountain divs.
1 Presidential Guard div (2 armd, 1 inf, 1 cdo bdes).
2 special forces divs (6 bdes).
9 Reserve bdes.
15 Peoples Army/volunteer inf bdes.
Tks: 2,900: T-54/-55/-62/-72, 450 T-55E (Ch T-59), 200 Ch T-69, 50 Rom M-77, (?150) Chieftain Mk 3/5; It: 250 PT-76.
AFV: about 3,000: recce: incl BRDM-2, FUG-70, ERC-90, MOWAG Roland, 200 EE-9 Cascavel, EE-3 Jararaca;

MICV: 500 BMP; APC: BTR-50/-60/-152, OT-62/-64, 100 VC-TH (with HOT ATGW), M-113A1, Panhard M-3, 900 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: suns: some 3,500 incl 75mm pack, 1,000 85mm, 50 SU-100 100mm SP, ISU 122mm SP and M-46 130mm, some 5 GCT 155mm SP;

gun/how: 150 GHN-45 155mm; how: M-56 pack, M-102 105mm, D-30 towed, M-1938, M-1974 122mm SP, M-1943, M-1955 towed,

M-1973 SP 152mm, M-114/M-109 SP 155mm; MRL: FGT 108-R (SS-06) 108mm, BM-21 122mm, 22 ASTROS II 127mm, BM-14 140mm;

SSM: 19 FROG-7, 9 Scud-B, 15 SS-12; mor: 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: Rd: SPG-9 73mm, B-10 82mm, 107mm; guns: 85mm, 100mm towed, 100 JPz SK-105 105mm SP;

ATGW : Sagger, SS-11, Milan, HOT (incl Panhard M-3 SP).
Avn (Army Air Corps): hel (attack): (?)45 Mi-24 Hind; 15 SA-342 Gazelle (with HOT); 5 Super Frelon, some with Exocet AM-38 ASM;

some Alouette III with AS-12 ASM; some 44 BO-105 with SS-11 ATGW;

ATGW: 360 HOT, AS-11/-12, Swatter.
AD: guns: 4,000: 23mm, ZSU-23-4 SP, M-1939 and twin 37mm, 57mm incl ZSU-57-2 SP, 85mm, 100mm, 130mm;

SAM: 120 SA-2, 150 SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, 30 Roland.
(Captured Iranian eqpt in service.)
(On order 140 M-77, T-62 MBT; 100 EE-9 Cascavel, EE-3 Jararaca recce; 80 EE-11 Urutu APC; some 80 GCT 155mm SP guns; M-1973 152mm SP,

38 ASTROS II 127mm MLRS; SS-11 ATGW; X-40, Scud B SSM; Mi-24 hel; SAM).

NAVY: 5,000.* (*Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes estimates very tentative.)

Bases: Basra, Umm Qasr.
Frigate: 1(trg).
FAC: (G): 10 Osa with 4 Styx SSM; (T): 5 P- 6<.
Patrol craft: large: 3 SO-1; coastal: 8: Poluchat, Nyryat II, PO-2, Zhuk<<
MCMV: minesweepers: 2 Sov T-43 ocean, 3 Yevgenya<, 3 Nestin < inshore.
Amph: LCT: 3 Polnocny.
Spt ship: 1.
(On order: 4 Lupo FFG, 6 It Assad 685-ton corvettes, 3 LST, 1 Stromboli, (reported commissioned but undelivered, 1 Agnadeen tanker, 1 tpt);

Otomat-2 SSM, Albatros/Aspide SAM.)

AIR FORCE: 40,000 incl 10,000 AD personnel; some 500 combat ac, perhaps 100 armed hel.*

(*Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes estimates very tentative.)
Bbrs: 2 sqns: 1 with perhaps 7 Tu-22, 1 with 8 Tu-16.
FGA: 11 sqns: 4 with some 48 MiG-23BM; 6 with some 75 Su-7 and 50 Su-20; 1 with 8 Mirage F-1.
Interceptors: 5 sqns: some 25 MiG-25, some 40 MiG-19, some 200 MiG-21, 6 Mirage F-1EQ, 4F-1BQ.
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 MiG-25.
Tpt: ac: 2 sqns: 10 An-2 Colt; 10 An-12 Cub, 6 An-24 Coke (retiring); 2 An-26 Curl, 13 Il-76 Candid, 2 Tu-134 Crusty, 13 Il-14 Crate, 1 Heron;
hel (hy): 5 Mi-6 Hook; (med): 60 Mi-8, 20 Mi-4, 10 SA-330 Puma; (lt): some 20 Alouette III, 35 Gazelle.
Trg: incl MiG-15/-21/-23U, Su-7U, Hunter T-69; 10 Yak-11 Moose, 10 L-29 Delfin, 20 L-39 Albatross, 48 AS-202/18A, 16 MBB-223 Flamingo,

50 PC-7 Turbo Trainer.
AAM: R-530, R-550 Magic, AA-1/-2/-6/-7/-8. ASM: Exocet AM-39, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt.
(On order, status unclear, some 90 MiG-23/-25, 31 Mirage F-1, 100 Ch J-7 ftrs; 30 Su-20, 80 EMB-312 Tucano trg ac (Egypt);

3 Super Frelon, 10 Gazelle, Lynx, 26 Puma, 6 AS-61TS, 8 AB-212 (ASW) hel; MPS-1, 20 Exocet AM-39 ASM; Super 530 AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:

Frontier Guards. Security troops 4,800. People's Army 650,000.

(*Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes estimates very tentative.)

ISRAEL
GDP 1983: IS 1,414.5 bn ($25,164 bn). 1984: 6,844.7 bn ($23.344 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.8%. 1984: 1.6%.
Inflation 1983: 191%. 1984: 445%.
Debt 1983: $28.0 bn. 1984: $30.0 bn.
Est def exp 1984: IS 1,700 bn ($5,798 bn). 1985: 3,600 bn ($3.621 bn).*

(* Hyper-inflation and continued conflict in Lebanon will increase operational and ordinary budget outlays, despite proposed budget cuts.

Israel will have to rely on continuous US military aid, which has so far reached a total of $18.3bn.)
FMA 1983: $1.70 bn. 1984: $1.76 bn.

$1=shekels 56.21 (1983), 293.21 (1984), 994.07(1985).
Population: 4,300,000.

Men: 18-30: 464,000; 31-45: 403,000.

Women: 18-30: 441,000; 31-45: 397,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 142,000.

Terms of Service: Military service: men 39 months, women 24 months (Jews, Druze only; Christians and Arabs may volunteer).

Annual training for reservists thereafter to age 54 for men, 34 (or marriage) for women.
Reserves: 370,000 (all services) Army 310,000, Navy 10,000, Air Force 50,000.

ARMY: 104,000 (88,000 conscripts, male and female); some 400,000 on mobilization.
11 armd divs
33 armd bdes (3 tk, l mech inf bns)
5 mech inf bdes.
5 para bdes.
12 territorial/border inf bdes with Nahal militia.
15 arty bdes (each 5 bns of 3 btys).
AD: 2 Vulcan/Chaparral btys.
Tks: 3,600 incl 1,100 Centurion, 600 M-48A5, 1,210 M-60/A1/A3, 250 T-54/-55, 150 T-62, 250 Merkava I/II.
AFV: recce: about 4,000 incl Ramta, RBY, BRDM-2, M-2/-3; APC: 4,000 M-113, OT-62, BTR-50P.
Arty: guns: M-46 130mm, 140 M-107 175mm SP; how: 70 M-101 105mm, 100 D-30 122mm, M-68/-71 155mm towed, 300 Soltam M-68, M-50, M-72,

300 M-109A1/A2 155mm, 48 M-110 203mm SP; MRL: BM-21 122mm, LAR-160 160mm, BM-24 240mm, MAR-290 290mm;

SSM: MGM-52C Lance, Ze'ev (Wolf); mor: 900 81mm, 120mm and 160mm (some SP).
ATK: RL: B-300 82mm; id: 106mm; ATGW: BGM-71 TOW, Cobra, M-47 Dragon, Picket 81mm.
AD: guns: 24 M-163 Vulcan 20mm gun and M-48 Chaparral msl systems, 900 20mm, ZSU-23-4 23mm SP, 30mm, 37mm and L-70 40mm;

SAM: MIM-42A Redeye
(On order Merkava, 125 M-60 MBT, Re'em AFV; 800 M-113 APC; 200 M-109A1B SP 155mm how, M-107 175mm SP guns; Lance SSM,

TOW, Dragon ATGW.)
(Does not include captured PLO equipment: T-34, T-54, APC, 130mm guns, BM-21 MRL, ZSU-23-4 AA guns, SA-9 SAM.)

NAVY: 10,000 (3,300 conscripts), 10,000 on mobilization.

Bases: Haifa, Ashdod, Eilat.
Subs: 3 Type 206.
Corvettes: 6 Aliya (Sa'ar-4.5) with 4 Gabriel and 4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Bell 206 ASW hel.
FAC(G): 24: 9 Reshef (Sa'ar-4) with 5 Gabriel III, 4 Harpoon SSM; 6 Sa'ar III with 3 Gabriel 3, 1x2 Harpoon; 6 Sa'ar II with 5 Gabriel 2;

1 Dvora with 2 Gabriel 3; hydrofoil: 2 Shimrit (Flagstaff 2) with 2 Gabriel 3, 2 Harpoon SSM; 1 Snapirit with 4 Harpoon, 2 Gabriel SSM.
Patrol craft: 45 coastal<: 37 Dabur, 2 Dvora, 6 Yatush.
Amph: ism: 3; LCT: 6; LCM: 3.
MR ac: 7 Seascan 1124N.
Naval cdo: (300).
(On order: 5 Sa'ar-5 corvettes, 10 Shimrit hydrofoils.)

AIR FORCE: 28,000 (2,000 conscripts, in AD), 37,000 on mobilization; some 684 combat ac (perhaps 90 stored), 60 armed hel.
FGA/interceptor: 15 sqns: 2 with some 46 F/TF-15; 5 with 131 F-4E; 5 with 150 Kfir C1/C2/C7; 3 with 67 F-16A, 8 F-16B.
FGA: 4 sqns with 130 A-4N/J Skyhawk.
Recce: 13 RF-4E, 2 OV-1E.
AEW: 4 E-2C.
ECM: 4 Boeing 707 (some comd), 2 C-130, 4 RU-21J.
Tpt: 1 wing: incl 7 Boeing 707 (2 tanker mods), 20 C-130E/H, 18 C-47, 2 KC-130H.
Liaison: 1 Islander, 5 Do-27, 14 Do-28D; 18 Cessna U-206C, 2 T-41D, 2 180; 12 Queen Air 80; 2 Westwind; 20 Super Cub.
Trg: incl 73 TA-4E/H, 50 Kfir (incl TC-2), 85 Magister/Tzugit.
Hel: attack: 1 sqn with 30 AH-1G/S, 1 with 28 Hughes 500MD; KM/SAR: 1 sqn with 37 Bell 206, 212;

tpt (hy): 17 CH-53A/D; (med): 8 SA-321 Super Frelon, 17 UH-1D; (lt): 2 sqns with 50 Bell 206A, 212.
Drones: Mastiff 3, Scout, Teledyne Ryan 124R, MQM-74C Chukar II.
SAM: 15 bns with MIM-23B HAWK/Improved HAWK.
AAM: AIM-9/-9L Sidewinder, AIM-7E/F Sparrow, Shafrir, Python III.
ASM: Luz, AGM-65 Maverick, Shrike, AGM-62A Walleye, Bullpup, Gabriel III (mod).
(On order some 5 F-15(end 1985), 75 F-16 ftrs; 60 Kfir-C1 and TC-2 trg ac; 200 Improved HAWK SAM; 200 Sidewinder AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (est 500).

PARA-MILITARY: Border Guards 4,500; BTR-152 APC. Arab Militia; small arms.

Coastguard; 3 US PBR, 3 other patrol craft<.

Gadna (youth bns), volunteers 15-18. Premilitary service trgby Defence Force.

JORDAN
GDP 1983: JD 1.434 bn ($3,950 bn). r984: 1.523 bn ($3,965 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.4%. 1984: 2.4%.
Inflation 1983: 5.4%. 1984: 6.8%.
Debt 1983: $2.4 bn. 1984: $2.9.
Def budget 1984: JD 204.63 m ($532,752 m). 1985: 206.0 m ($508,893m).
FMA* 1983: $52.8 m. 1984: $210 m. (* Excl Gulf Co-operation Councilaid.)

$1=dinar 0.363 (1983), 0.3841 (1984), 0.4048 (1985).
Population: 2,650,000 (excl West Bank).

Men: 18-30: 397,000; 31-45: 212,000.

Women: 18-30: 360,000; 31-45: 205,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 70,300.

Terms of service: voluntary. People's Army (militia, forming): conscription, 2 years authorized.
Reserves (all services): 35,000. Army 30,000 (obligation to age 40).
ARMY: 62,750.
5 armd bdes.
6 mech bdes.
2 indep inf bdes.
1 indep Royal Guards bde.
1 Special Forces bde (3 AB bns).
15 arty bns.
4 AA bdes.
Tks: 795: 140 M-47/-48A5, 186 M-60A1/A3, 278 Khalid, 191 Centurion. APC: 850 M-113, 32 Saracen.
Arty: guns: 17 M-59 155mm; how: 36 M-101A1 105mm, 38 M-114 towed, some 20 GHN-45, 20 M-44, 80 M-109A2 SP 155mm, 4 M-115 towed,

24 M-110 SP 203mm; mor: 500 81mm, 107mm and 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 300 106mm and 120mm; ATGW: 300 BGM-71A TOW, 310 M-47 Dragon.
AD: guns: 100 M-163 Vulcan 20mm, 16 ZSU-23-4, 250 M-42 40mm SP; SAM: Redeye, 20 SAM-8, Improved HAWK.
(On order 180 GHN-45 155mm how; SA-8 SAM.)

NAVY (Coast Guard): 350.

Base: Aqaba.
Patrol craft: 9 armed<.

AIR FORCE: 7,200; 121 combat ac.
FGA: 3 sqns with-68 F-5E/F.
Interceptor: 2 sqns with 35 Mirage F-1CJ/EJ.
OCU: 1 sqn with 15 F-5A,3 F-5B.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-130B/H, 2 Sabreliner 75A, 2 C-212A.
VIP: 1 sqn with 2 Boeing 727, 3 Mystere-Falcon 20, 1T-39 Sabreliner ac, 4 S-76 hel.
Hel: 2 sqns with 16 Alouette III, 14 S-76, 8 Hughes 500D hel.
Trg: 13 T-37C, 19 Bulldog, 1C-212 ac.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
AD: 14 btys with 112 Improved HAWK SAM.
(On order: 14 C-101/5 Aviojet trg/coin, 2 CN-235 tpt, 1 C-212 lt tpt ac; 24 AH-1Q Cobra hel with TOW; 6 Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY: 11,000: Public Security Force 3,500, Civil Militia 7,500.

Palestine Liberation Army: 2,000; bde (forming).

KUWAIT
GDP 1982: KD 5.728 bn ($19,697 bn). 1983: 6.219 bn ($21,269 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -1.5%. Est 1984: -3.5%.
Inflation 1983: 1.9%. 1984: 1.5%.
Def budget 1982/3: KD 340.0 m ($1,169 bn). 1983/4: 418.0m ($1,430 bn).

$1=dinar 0.2908 (1982), 0.2924 (1983).
Population: l,800,000.* (*Incl non-Kuwait population.)

Men: 18-30: 222,000; 31-45: 251,000.

Women: 18-30: 160,000; 31-45: 124,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 12,000.

Terms of service: 2 years (university students, 1 year).
Reserves: planned conscript force.

ARMY: 10,000.
2 armd bdes.
1 mech inf bde.
1 SSM bn.
Tks: 70 Vickers Mk 1, 10 Centurion, 160 Chieftain. AFV: recce: 100 Saladin, 60 Ferret; APC: 175 M-113, 100 Saracen.
Arty: how: 20 AMX Mk F-3, 18 M-109A2 155mm SP; SSM: 4 FROG-7; mor: 81mm. ATGW: HOT, BGM-71A TOW, Vigilant.

SAM: SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 Gecko.
(On order. Scorpion lt tks, 188 M-113 APC, 56 M-113 SP TOW veh, 4,800 Improved TOW.)

NAVY: (admin by Ministry of the Interior 1,100).

Base: Kuwait City.
FAC: 2 Lurssen FPB-57; (G): 6 Lurssen TNC-45 with 4 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft: 48 coastal< (15 armed).
Amph: 3 320-ton spt ships; LCU : 6 Loadmaster, 3 landing craft.
(On order. 20 Sedan patrol craft; 6 SRN-6 hovercraft; SA-365N Dauphin II hel; Exocet MM-40 SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 2,000;* combat: 76 ac, 23 hel. (* Excluding expatriate personnel.)
FGA: 2 sqns with 30 A-4KU.
Interceptor: 1 sqn with 32 Mirage F-1CK, 2 F-1BK.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 12 Hawk.
Tpt: 2 DC-9; 2 L-100-20, 4 L-100-30 (used also in civil role).
Hel: 3 sqns: attack: 23 SA-342K Gazelle; tpt: 12 SA-330 Puma.
Trg: incl 9 Strikemaster.
AD : 1 bn (4 btys) with 8x3 Improved HAWK SAM.
AAM: R-550 Magic, Super R-530, AIM-9 Sidewinder. ASM: AS-11/-12.

(Store: 12 Lightning, 9 Hunter.)
(On order 6 AS-332F Super Puma hel; 12 Exocet AM-39 ASM; AD radar/comd system.)

PARA-MILITARY: National Guard: Palace, Border Guard. 20 V-150, 62 V-300 Commando APC.

LEBANON
Est GDP 1982: £L 17.0 bn ($3,584 bn). 1983: £L 11.25 bn ($2,484 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -6%.
Inflation 1983: 18%.
Def budget* 1983: £L 1.50 bn ($331,257 m). 1984: £L 2.030 bn ($311.775 m).]

(*Most information unreliable. Actual defence outlays estimated to be some $L 6.5 bn (about $ 1.0 bn).)
FMA 1983: $101.7 m. (*Excl subsidies to various militias by external powers.)

$1=£L 4.7435 (1982), 4.5282 (1983), 6.5111 (1984).
Est population: 2,700,000.

Men: 18-30: 306,000; 31-45: 161,000.

Women: 18-30: 339,000; 31-45: 202,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: perhaps 17,400.

Terms of service: 18 months.

ARMY: perhaps 16,000 (all units well below strength).ї

(*Army divided on sectarian lines:

perhaps 10,000 pro Gemayel Christians (2+ bdes); 3 Shi'ite, 1 Sunni, 2 Christian, 3 mixed Muslim/Christian, 1 Druze (forming).

9 inf bdes (1 'AB'; 10th said to be forming).
Tks: some 50 M-48; lt 60 AMX-13 (40 with 75mm, 20x105mm gun).
AFV: recce: 70 Saladin, 20 Ferret; APC: 400 M-113, Saracen, 20 UTT.
Arty: guns: M-46 130mm; how: 18 M-102, M-1938 122mm, 36 M-50, M-114, M-198 155mm; mor 200 81mm, 83mm.
ATK: RL: RPG-7 85mm, 88mm; RCL: 106mm; ATGW: ENTAC, 40 Milan, 18 BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm, ZU-23 23mm, 30mm towed, M-42 40mm SP.
(Eqpt in storage incl up to 40 M-48A1/A5 MBT, 20 Saladin, 300 M-113).
(On order 12 155mm how.)

NAVY: 300.

Base: Juniye.
Patrol craft: 4: 1 37-metre, 3 Byblos coastal<; also 6 9-metre, 1 small landing craft.

AIR FORCE: 1,100; 7 combat ac, 4 armed hel.
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 7 Hunter F-70 (operational status questionable).
Hel: 1 sqn: attack: 4 Gazelle with SS-11/-12 ASM; tpt (med): 7 AB-212, 12 SA-330 Puma; (lt): 9 Alouette II/III.
Trg: 5 Bulldog, 3 CM-170 Magister.
Tpt: 1 Dove, 1 Turbo-Commander 690B.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of the Interior Gendarmerie: 5,000. Internal Security Force 8,000; 30 Chaimite APC.

Border Guard (forming, planned 20,000). Customs; 1 Tracker, 5 Aztec patrol craft.

PRIVATE MILITIAS (status, strengths, questionable):
Maronite Christian: 5,000 regulars; up to 30,000 reservists.

Lebanese Forces Militia (Kata'eb = Phalange): (?20,000); 50 M-48 MBT, 50 155mm how, 1 Tracker, 2 Yatush patrol boats.

Guardians of the Cedars: MARADA Brigades (Zehorta Liberation Army): pro-Syrian militia.

South Lebanon Army (SLA; Israeli-backed): Maronite and some Shi'ite: perhaps 1,200; 40 M-4, 15 captured T-54 MBT.

National Guard: Israeli-backed village militia linked to SLA (forming).

Al-Tanzim: extremist militia (part of Lebanese Forces).
Druze: Progressive Socialist Party (Jumblatt): (?4,000) (reserves perhaps 12,000 more); T-34/-54, MBT, MRL.
Sunni:

Islamic Unity Movement: Tripoli (?600).

Al-Mourabitoun (independent Nasserites) militia (underground; 2,500).

October 24 Movement: secular militia.

Jundullah ('soldiers of God'): PLO-financed: (?few hundred).
Shi'a:

Amal (orthodox): (?5,5OO regulars; ?15,000 reservists): pro-Syria. '

Al Amal al Islam (Islamic Amal): (few hundred); break-away faction, links with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Hizbollah (The Party of God'): fundamentalist, pro-Iranian.

Islamic Resistance Movement: Hizbollahlinked; 400 'Grad' (BM-21 122mm) RL, Sagger ATGW.
Other.

Lebanese Arab Army: Lebanese Army deserters; pro-Syrian.

Lebanese National Resistance Front: umbrella for anti-Israeli forces in South Yemen.

Tawhid (Islamic) Unification Movement: Sunni; reported Tripoli 1982, status now unclear.

LIBYA
GDP 1982: LD 8.846 bn ($29,875 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -2%.
Inflation 1983: 9.0%.
Est def exp 1982: LD 210 m ($709.22 m).

$1=dinar 0.2961 (1982).
Population: 3,550,000.

Men: 18-30: 439,000; 31-45: 375,000.

Women: 18-30: 361,000; 31-45: 254,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 73,000.

Terms of service: selective conscription, term varies.
Reserves: People's Militia, some 40,000.

ARMY: 58,000.*
1 tk, 1 mech inf div HQ.
20 tk bns.
30 mech inf bns.
1 National Guard bde.
10 arty, 2 AA arty bns.
2 special forces gps (10 bns).
3 AD regts.
2 SSM bdes.
3 AD regts with SA-6; 9 div SAM bns with SA-6, SA-8, SA-9/-13.
Tks: 2,500 T-54/-55/-62, 300 T-72.
AFV: recce: 200 BRDM-2, 300 EE-9 Cascavel; MICV: 700 BMP; APC: 900 BTR-50/-60, OT-62/-64, 100 EE-11 Urutu, Fiat 6614, 160 M-113A1.
Arty: guns: 60 D-74 122mm; 360 M-46 130mm; gun/how: D-20 152mm; how: some 60 M-101 105mm, 330 M-1938, D-30 122mm towed,

78 M-1974 122mm SP, 48 M-1973, DANA 152mm SP, 200 Palmaria, 18 M-109 155mm SP;

MRL: some 600 BM-11 107mm, BM-21/RM-70 122mm and M-51 130mm; mor: 450 81mm, 120mm, 160mm and 240mm; SSM: 48 FROG-7, Scud B.
ATK: RCL: 200 106mm; ATGW: 3,000 Vigilant, Milan and AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM SP).
AD: guns: 450 ZSU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 23mm SP, 30mm incl M-53/59 SP, L/70 40mm, 57mm; SAM: 350 SA-6, SA-7/-8/-9/-13.
(On order Fiat 6616, EE-9 Jararaca armd cars; 100 Urutu APC; Astros II SS-40 MLRS.)

NAVY: 6,500.

Bases: Tarabulus, Benghazi, Darnah, Tubruq, Bardiyah, Al Khuma, Ras Hilal (building).
Subs: 6: Sov F-class.
Frigates: 1 Vosper Mk 7 with 4 Otomat SSM, 4 Albatros/Aspide SAM.
Corvettes: 9: 4 Assad with 4 Otomat SSM (1 with 1x4 Aspide SAM);

4 Sov Nanuchka II with 4 SS-N-2C SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM; 1 Vosper Mk IB 440-ton.
FAC(G): 25: 10 Sharara (La Combattante II; see also Coastguard) with 4 Otomat SSM; 12 Sov Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2C SSM;

3 Susa with 8 SS-12M SSM.
Patrol craft: 5: 4 Garian, 1 78-ft coastal.
MCMV: 7 Sov Natya.
Amph: LSD: 1 (log spt/HQ ship); LST: 2 PS-700; LCT: 3 Polnocny, 20 C-107.
Misc: 1 tpt (could be minelayer).
Drone craft: 50.
(On order 4 Assad corvettes, 4 Rade Koncartype FAC(G), 1 Benina patrol craft (?Coastguard); 10 C-107 LCT.)

AIR FORCE: 8,500; some 535 combat ac, 42 armed hel.*

(*Much equipment, including 1,400 MBT, 450 combat aircraft (Tu-22, MiG-21/-23/-25, Su-22) in storage.

Soviet, Syrian, Pakistani, North Korean and Palestinian pilots also reportedly fly Libyan aircraft;

expatriates form a large proportion of the technical support staff.)
Bbrs: 1 sqn with 7 Tu-22 Blinder A.
Interceptors: 3 sqns and 1 ocu: some 26 Mirage F-1ED, 6 F-1BD, 143 MiG-23 Flogger E, 50 MiG-25 Foxbat A, 55 MiG-21, 5 MiG-25U.
FGA: 5 sqns and 1 OCU: 45 Mirage 5D/DE, 13 5DD, 14 Mirage F-1AD, 18 MiG-23BM Flogger F, 14 MiG-23U, some 100 Su-20/-22 Fitter E/F/J.
COIN: 1 sqn with 30 J-l Jastreb.
Recce: 1 sqn with 7 Mirage 5DR.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 5 An-26 Curl, 8 C-130H, 2 Boeing 707, 9 G-222, 2 Mystere-Falcon-20, 4 C-140 Jetstar, 2 CL-44, 9 Il-76 Candid, 1 Corvette 200,

2 King Air, 8 F-27-600, 10 Turbolet L-410.
Hel: 8 sqns: attack: 2 with 30 Mi-24 Hind; ASW: 1 with 12 Mi-14 Haze; SAR: 1 with 8 Super Frelon;

tpt (hy): 1 with 19 CH-47C; (med): 1 with Mi-8, 2 AB-212; (lt): 1 with 5 AB-206, 1 with 10 SA-342 Alouette III, 9 AB-47.
Trg: 4 sqns: 2 with 61 G-2 Galeb ac; 2 with 20 Mi-2 (Hoplite) hel; 2 Tu-22 Blinder D, 100 L-39ZO, 12 Magister, 139 SF-260WL.
AD: SAM: 3 bdes, 2 bns: 30x4 Crotale, 72 SA-2, 2x2 SA-3.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-6 Acrid, R-550 Magic. ASM: Swatter ATGW (hel-borne).
(On order. MiG-25, MiG-23, ftrs; 25 EMB-121 Xingu, 50 SF-260M trg ac; Gazelle, 2 A-109 hel; Super 530 AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Chad: some 1,000; mech inf bn, MRL, ac, hel.

PARA-MILITARY: Islamic Pan-African Legion, some 7,000;

1 armd, 1 inf, 1 para/cdo bdes; some 75 T-54/-55 MBT, EE-9 MICV, BTR-50A60 APC(army inventory).

Customs/coastguard; 2 SAR-33 Lurssen-type FAC (SSM/SAM capable), 3 Benina, 3 Jihad patrol craft.

Muslim Youth. People's Cavalry Force; parade unit.

MOROCCO
GDP 1982: MD 90.09 bn ($14,958 bn).1983: 94.59 bn ($13,301 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 2.4%.
Inflation 1983: 12.5%. 1984: 12%.
Debt 1983: $12.0 bn. 1984: $13.6 bn.
Def budget 1984: MD 4.190 bn ($475,569 m). 1985: 5.246 bn ($504,074 m).
FMA* 1983: $75.0 m. 1984: $39.0 m. (* Excl substantial aid from Saudi Arabia.)

$1=dirham 6.023 (1982), 7.1113 (1983), 8.8105(1984), 10.4072 (1985).
Population: 22,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,612,000; 31^15: 1,323,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,482,000; 31-45: 1,501,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 149,000.

Terms of service: 18 months.

ARMY: 130,000.
3 mech inf bdes.
1 lt security bde.
1 para bde.
1 AA gp.
9 mech inf regts.
9 arty groups.
7 armd bns.
1 Royal Guard bn.
4 camel corps bns.
2 desert cav bns.
1 mountain bn.
4 cdo bns.
4 engr bns.
4 armd car sqns.
Tks: 120 M-48A5; lt: 70 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 20 EBR-75, 30 AMX-10RC, 162 AML-90, 250 Eland 90mm, 150 AML-245;

APC: 40 M-8, 350 M-113, 220 VAB, 70 UR-416, 70 Ratel-20, 56 M-3, Steyr 4K-7FA.
Arty: guns: D-44 85mm, 10 SU-100 100mm sp, 36 105mm It, 12 M-46 130mm, 40 AMX-F-3 SP 155mm; gun/how: 12 M-1937 152mm;

how: 60 M-101 towed, 22 Mk 61, 105mm, 20 M-114 155mm towed, 36 M-109 155mm SP;

MRL: 20 BM-21 122mm; mor: 300 60mm, 600 81mm, 70 82mm, 320 120mm.
ATK: RL: STRIM-89; RCL: M-40 106mm; guns: 20 M-56 90mm, 121 Kuerassier 105mm SP; ATGW: M-47 Dragon, Milan, BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 100 20mm, M-38/-39 37mm, S-60 57mm and KS-19 100mm towed, 40 M-63 Vulcan 20mm SP; SAM: SA-7, 30 M-730 Chaparral.
(On order: AML-90, 61 AMX-10RC armd cars; 126 VAB APC.)

NAVY: 6,000 incl 1,000 naval infantry.

Bases: Casablanca, Safi, Agadir, Kenitra, Tangier.
Frigates: 1 Descubierta with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM, 1x8 Aspide SAM.
FAC: 2 PR-72; (G): 4 Lazaga with 4 Exocet MM-38.
Patrol craft: 1 Sirius ex-MCMV, 3 other large, 13 coastal<.
Amph: 4: LST: 3 Batral. LCT: 1 EDIC-type.
1 naval inf bn.
(On order. 2 PR-72 FAC, 4 P-32 patrol vessels.)

AIR FORCE: 13,000; 105 combat ac.
FGA/recce: 5 sqns: 3 with 21 Mirage F-1E, 18 F-1C; 2 with 38 F-5 (5 A, 14 E, 3 B, 4 F, 12 RF-5A).
COIN/recce: 1 sqn with 22 Magister, 60 V-10 Bronco.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 15 C-130H, 3 KC-130H, 1 Gulfstream, 4 King Air, 10 Do-28D.
Hel: attack: 12 SA-342 Gazelle, 6 A-109; tpt (hy): 11 CH-47; (med): 27 SA-330 Puma, 33 AB-205A; (lt): 5 AB-206, 10 AB-212;
SAR: 4 HH-43B Husky.
Trg: 11 T-34C, 11 AS-202/18A Bravo, 28 SF-260M, 24 Alpha Jet.
AAM: AIM-9J Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
(On order 25 Gepal Mk IV trg ac; 12 SA-342 Gazelle, 19 AB-206 hel; 381 Maverick ASM.)

Forces Abroad: Equatorial Guinea: 300.

PARA-MILITARY: 31,000 incl Gendarmerie

Royale, Force Auxiliary and Mobile Intervention Corps: 2 Rallye ac; 5 Alouette II/III, 3 Lama, 6 Gazelle, 6 Pwwa, 6 A-109 hel.

OPPOSITION: Polisario: 21,000 (perhaps 4,000 'Regulars') org in bns, spt elms;

T-55 MBT, BMP-1 MICV, M-1931/37 122mm how, BM-21 122mm MRL, 120mm, 160mm mor, ZSU-23-2 23mm AA guns, SA-6, SA-7 SAM.

OMAN
Est GDP 1983: RO 2.620 bn ($7,585 bn).1984: 2.750 bn ($7,962 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.5%. 1984: 5.0%.
Inflation 1983: -2.2%. 1984: 1.5%.
Debt 1983: $1.1 bn. 1984: $1.2 bn.
Def budget* 1984: RO 677 m ($1,960 bn). 1985: 717 m ($2,076 bn). (*Excl development costs for civilian purposes.)

$1=rial 0.3454 (1982-5).
Population: 1,000,000-1,600,000.* (* Break Lurssen based on World Bank projections and total population of 1.2 m.)

Men: 18-30: 129,000; 31-45: 112,000.

Women: 18-30: 114,000; 31-45: 88,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 21,500.* (*Incl some 3,700 foreign personnel.)

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: National Volunteer Reserve Force.

ARMY: 16,500.
2 bde HQ.
1 Royal Guard bde.
1 armd regt (2 tk sqns, 1 SP arty bty).
2 lt fd arty regts, 2 med arty btys, 1 lt AA bty.
1 recce regt (2 armd car sqns).
8 inf 'regts'(bns).
1 special force regt.
1 sigs regt.
1 fd engr regt (2 sqns).
1 para regt.
Tks: 6 M-60A1, 27 Quayid Al Ardh (Chieftain); lt 30 Scorpion, 6 VBC-90.
AFV: MICV (VAB): 2 VCAC with Milan, 2 VD (AD; 20mm), 2 PC; APC: 6 VAB VCI, 15 AT-105 Saxon.
Arty: guns: 39 ROF lt 105mm, 12 M-1946 130mm; gun/how: 18 25-pdr (88mm); how: 12 FH-70, 12 M-109A2 155mm SP;

mor: 60mm, L-16 81mm, 12 M-304.2-in. (107mm), 12 120mm.
ATGW: 10 BGM-71A TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: 4 ZU-23-2 23mm; SAM: Blowpipe.

NAVY: 2,000.

Bases: Muscat, Raysut, Ghanam (Goat) Island; (Wadam Alwi, under construction).
1 Royal Yacht.
FAC (G): 4 Brooke Marine with Exocet SSM: 3 Province(2 with 2x4, 1with 2x3 MM-40), 1 with 2 MM-38.
Patrol craft: 4 inshore<
Amph: 2 log spt ships; LCI: 3; LCU: 2.
Trg ship: 1.

AIR FORCE: 3,000; 52 combat ac.
FGA: 2 sqns with 20 Jaguar S(O) Mk 1,4 T-2.
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with 12 Hunter FGA-6, 4 T-7.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 12 BAC-167 Strikemaster Mk82.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 with 3 BAC-111, 1 Mystere Falcon 20; 2 with 7 Defender/Islander, 15 Skyvan 3M, 3 C-130H.
Royal fit: 1 Gulfstream, 1 DC-8, 1 VC-10 tpts.
Hel: 2 sqns: tpt (med): 20 AB-205, 4 AB-212, 2 AS-332 Super Puma, 5 AB-214B; (lt): 3 AB-206.
Trg: 2 AS-202 Bravo.
AD: 2 sqns with 28 Rapier SAM.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
(On order 1 C-130H, 2 DHC-5D tpts; 6 Bell 214ST hel; 2 S-713 (3-D radar) systems, 28 Blindfire radars.)

PARA-MILITARY: tribal Home Guard (Firqat) 3,500.

Police Coastguard; 15 AT-105 APC, 12 coastal patrol, 9 spt craft<,

Air Wing: 1 Learjet, 2 Dornier 228-100, 2 Merlin IVA, 2 Buffalo ac, 5 AB-205, 3 AB-206 hel.

Musandam Security Force (Shikuk Tribal Militia) 85.

QATAR
GDP 1983: QR 23.37 bn ($6,421 bn). Est 1984: 21.03 bn ($5,778 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -15.5%. 1984: -10.0%.
Inflation 1983: 2.7%. 1984: 3.5%.
Def budget 1983/4: QR 604 m ($165,939 m).

$1=rial 3.6399 (1983/4).
Est population: 290,000.* (* Incl expatriates; indigenous est at 80,000.)

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 6,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 5,000.
1 Royal Guard regt.
1 tk bn.
3 inf bns.
1 arty bty.
1 SAM bty with Rapier.
Tks: 24 AMX-30.
AFV: recce: 10 Ferret; MICV: 30 AMX-10P; APC: 25 Saracen, 136 VAB, 8 Commando Mk 3.
Arty: gun/how: 8 25-pdr (88mm); how: 6 Mk F-3 155mm SP; mor: 81mm.
AD: SAM: Rapier, Blowpipe.

NAVY: 700 incl Marine Police.

Base: Doha.
FAC(G): 3 La Combattante IIIB with 8 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft: 6 Vosper Thornycroft 110-ft large, 41 coastal< (2 75-ft, 2 Tracker, 2 44-ft, 7 P-1200 type, 25 Spear, 2 Interceptor (SAR), 1 other).
Coast defence: 3 Exocet MM-40.

AIR FORCE: 300; 17 combat ac; 2 armed hel.
FGA: 5 Mirage F-1C, 3 Hunter FGA-6, 1 T-79, 8 Alpha Jet.
Tpt: 1 BN-2 Islander, 1 Boeing 727,2 707.
Hel: 2 SA-342 Gazelle, 9 Westland (2 Whirlwind, 4 Commando, 3 Lynx).
SAM: 5 Tigercat.
(On order 9 Mirage F-1C ftrs, SA-330 Puma hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: Police: 3 Lynx, 2 Gazelle hel.

SAUDI ARABIA
GDP 1983: SR 415.23 bn ($119,597 bn). 1984: 381.59 bn ($108,349 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.9%. 1984: -3%
Inflation 1983: 7.5%. 1984: 8.0%.
Debt 1984: $13.3 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: SR 79.9 bn ($22,687 bn). 1985/6: 64.085 bn ($17,777 bn).

$1=rial 3.4719 (1983), 3.5219 (1984), 3.605 (1985).
Est population: 8-12,000,000.* (*Based on World Bank projections for 1985 of 11.2 million.)

Men: 18-30: 1,394,000; 31-45: 1,201,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,052,000; 31-45: 741,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 62,500 (incl 10,000 National Guard).

Terms of service: conscription, males aged 18-35.

ARMY: 35,000.
3 armd bdes (1 more to form).
3 mech bdes.
1 inf bdes.
1 AB bde (2 para bns, 3 special forces coys).
1 Royal Guard regt (3 bns).
5 arty bns.
18 AA arty btys.
14 SAM btys: 12 with Improved HAWK (216 msls); 2 with 12 Shahine (48 msls) and AMX-30SA 30mm SP AA guns.
Tks: 300 AMX-30, 150 M-60A1 (converting to A3).
AFV: recce: 200 AML-60/-90; MICV: 350 AMX-10P, some BMR-600P; APC: 1,300 M-113, 30 EE-11 Urutu, Panhard M-3.
Arty: how: some 24 Model 56 105mm pack, 100 M-101/-102 105mm, 29 FH-70, 18 M-198 towed, 275 M-109 and GCT 155mm SP;

mor: 81mm, M-30 4.2-in. (107mm).
ATK: RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 106mm; ATGW: BGM-71A TOW (incl 200 VCC-1 SP), M-47 Dragon, HOT (incl some on AMX-10P).
AD: guns: 48 M-163 Vulcan 20mm, AMX-30SA 30mm, 200 35mm, M-42 40mm SP;

SAM: FIM-92A Stinger, FIM-43 Redeye, Shahine, MIM-23B Improved HAWK.
(On order 100 M-60A3 MBT; 60 AMX-10P, some 140 BMR-600, EE-11 Urutu APC; 24 M-198, 43 FH-70 155mm how;

some 400 JPz SK-105 SP ATK guns; ASTROS IIMLRS; TOW ATGW; Shahine, 800 Stinger SAM.)

NAVY: 3,500; 24 combat hel.

Bases: Western Fleet: Jiddah, Al Wajh, Yanbu. Eastern Fleet: Al Qatif, Ras Tanura, Al Dammam, Ras al Mishab.
2 Fleet HQ.
Frigates: 4 F-2000 with 8 Otomat SSM, 1x26 Crotale SAM, 1 AS-365 hel.
Corvettes: 4 PCG-1 (815 tons) with 2x4 RGM-84A Harpoon SSM.
FAC: (G): 9 PGG-1 (384 tons) with 2x2 Harpoon SSM; (T): 3 Jaguar (Lurssen).
Patrol craft: 1 large (100 tons).
MCMV: 4 MSC-322 coastal.
Amph: LST: 3; LCU: 4 US Type-1610; LCM: 8 Type 6 US; LCVP: 4.
Spt: 2 Durance log spt ships.
Hel: 24 AS-365N Dauphin 2 (4 SAR, 20 with AS-15TT ASM) (Air Force).
(On order 2 Atlantic II MR ac; Otomat coast defence SSM, AS-15TT ASM.)

AIR FORCE: 14,000; 205 combat ac.
FGA: 3 sqns with 65 F-5E.
Interceptor: 4 sqns: 1 with 15 Lightning F-53, 2 T-55; 3 (1 forming) with 62 F-15C.
AWACS: 4 E-3A Sentry.
OCU: 2 with 24 F-5F, 16 F-5B, 17 TF-15D.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 49 C-130E/H, 8 KC-130H, 2 C-140 Jetstar.
Hel: 2 sqns: 12 AB-206B, 14 AB-205, 10 AB-212.
Trg: 39 Strikemaster Mk 80.
AAM: Red Top, Firestreak, AIM-9J/L/P Sidewinder, AIM-7F Sparrow. ASM: Maverick.
AD: Air Defence Command (forming); to control msl, gun and radar elms.
(In reserve: 17 Lightning F-53/T-55.)
(On order. 9 F-15, 5 F-5E ftrs; 2 TF-15, 1 F-5F trainers; 10 RF-5E recce; 1 E-3A AWACS; 1 Boeing 747, 4 CN-235, 40 C-212-200 tpts;

8 Boeing KE-3A (707-320C) (6 tankers, 2 ECM ac); 22 AB-212, 8 KV-107 hel; 1,000 AIM-7F Sparrow, 3,000 AIM-9L/P Sidewinder AAM;

400 Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard (10,000 regular, est. 1-5,000 reserve):

Bde HQ; 4 all-arms, 16 regular inf, 24 irregular inf bns, 1 ceremonial cav sqn, spt units;

240 V-150 Commando APC, M-102 105mm how, 81mm mor, 106mm RCL, TOW ATGW, 20mm Vulcan, 90mm AA guns.

(On order 489 Commando incl V-300 APC, V-150 SP 20mm AA guns, SP TOW, 90mm armed AFV.)
Foreign contract military personnel: 10,000.
Ministry of Interior:

Counter-terrorist unit; hel.

Frontier Force and Coastguard 8,500; 8 BH-7, 16 SR-N6 hovercraft, 164 coastal, 300 inshore patrol craft.
General Civil Defence Administration units; 10 Kawasaki hel.

SUDAN
GDP 1982: £S 6.218 bn ($8,856 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -2.5%. 1984: -5.2%.
Inflation 1983: 31.2%. 1984: 35.0%.
Debt 1983: $5.7 bn. 1984: $9.0 bn.
Est def exp 1983/4: £S 250 m ($223,934 m). 1984/5: £S 350 m ($269,231 m).
FMA 1983: $45.0 m. 1984: $45.0 m.

$1=£S 0.7021 (1982/3), 1.1164 (1983/4), 1.3 (1984/5).
Est population: 23,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,346,000; 31-45: 1,644,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,264,000; 31-45: 1,623,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 56,600.

Terms of Service: voluntary (conscription legislated, not implemented).

ARMY: 53,000 (incl AD).
6 Regional Commands.
4 div HQ.
1 Republican Guard bde.
2 armd bdes.
7 inf bdes.
1 para bde.
3 arty regts.
1 engr regt.
Air Defence (3,000):

2 AA arty bdes.

1 SAM bde (3 btys) with SA-2.
Tks: 120 T-54/-55, some 30 Ch Type-59, 20 M-60A3; lt: 55 M-41, 78 Ch Type-62, some 50 Type-63.
AFV: recce: 6 AML-90, 48 Saladin, 55 Ferret, BRDM-1/-2; APC: 50 BTR-50/-152, 30 OT-62/-64, 35 V-150 Commando, 30 M-113, 40 Walid.
Arty: guns: 30 D-44 85mm, 55 25-pdr (88mm), 25 M-1944 100mm, Type-60 122mm, 36 M-46 and Ch 59-1 130mm, 11 Mk F-3 155mm;

how: 18 M-101 105mm pack, 64 M-1938/Type-54/D-30 122mm; MRL: Al Saqr-30 122mm; mor: 30 120mm.
ATK: guns: 20 D-48 85mm; ATGW: Swingfire.
AD: guns: M-167 towed, M-163 SP 20mm, ZU-23-2 23mm, 100 M-1939/Type-63 37mm, 80 L/60 40mm, KS-12 85mm, KS-19 100mm towed;

SAM: 20 SA-2, SA-7.
(On order 24 M-163A1 Vulcan 20mm SP AA guns.)

NAVY: 600.*

Base: Port Sudan.
Patrol craft: 13: 5 Yug large (1 Kraljevica, 4 PBR); 4 75-ton, 4 10-ton coastal.
Amph: LCT: 2 Yug DTK-221.
(On order 2 Barcelo FAC, 6 11-metre patrol boats.)

AIR FORCE: 3,000; 45 combat ac* (* Eqpt serviceability questionable.)
FGA/interceptor: 1 sqn with some 2 F-5E, 2 F-5F, 8 MiG-21.
FGA: 1 sqn with 8 Ch J-5, 6 Ch J-6, 10 MiG-17.
COIN: 1 sqn with 3 Strikemaster (forming).
MR: 2C-212.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-130H, 1 Mystere-Falcon, 3 Bandeirante.
Hel: 1 sqn with 15 IAR VSA-330 Puma, 10 BO-105, 5 Bell 212.
Trg: incl 3 Jet Provost Mk 55, 3 MiG-15UTI, 2 MiG-21U, 2 Ch JJ-5, 2 Ch JJ-6.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order, some 8 F-5E,6 Ch J-6 ftr, 7 Strikemaster Mk 90 (Jet Provost) COIN, 4 C-212 (1985/6), 2 C-130 tpt ac; 6 Bell 212 hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 3,000: National Guard 500: Border Guard: 2,500.

OPPOSITION: Southern People's Liberation Army (SPLA): est. 5,000 org in bns; mainly small arms; arty reported.

SYRIA
GDP 1982: £S 71.727 bn ($18,274 bn). 1983: £S 77.50 bn ($19,745 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.1%.
Inflation 1983: 7.5%. 1984: 20.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.60 bn. Est 1984: $3.50 bn.* (* Excl some $15 bn owed to USSR and eastern-bloc states.)
Def budget 1984: £S 12.60 bn ($3,210 bn). 1985: 13.0 bn ($3,312 bn).*

(*Between 1979 and 1983 the GCC and other Arab states provided some $1.9 bn p.a. in military aid. This seems to have been suspended.)

$1=£S 3.925 (1982/3/4/5).
Population: 11,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,239,000; 31-45: 664,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,136,000; 31-45: 644,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 402,500.

Terms of service: 30 months.
Reserves: 272,500. Army 270,000 active, Navy 2,500.
ARMY: 270,000 (135,000 conscripts, 55,000 reservists).
HQ: 2 corps.
5 armd divs (each 3 armd, 1 mech bdes; 1 is Presidential Guard).
3 mech divs (each 2 armd, 2 mech bdes).
1 special forces div.
2 indep mech bdes.
6 arty bdes.
8 para/cdo regts.
3 SSM regts: 1 each with Scud, FROG, SS-21.
10 SAM bns(30 btys) with SAM-6.
Coast Def: arty and msl bns.
(Reserves: 9 mech and inf bdes.)
Tks: 4,200: 1,800 T-54/-55, 1,300 T-62, 1,100 T-72.
AFV: recce/ATK: 800 BRDM-2; MICV: 600 BMP-1; APC: 1,600 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, OT-64.
Arty: guns: 40,000: D-44 85mm, M-1944 100mm (incl 36 T-34/100 SP), M-1931/-37/-38, ISU-122, M-1974 SP 122mm, M-46, SM-4-1 coastal 130mm,

ISU-152 SP 152mm, S-23 180mm; gun/how: M-1937 152mm; how: M-38, D-30, T-34/D-30 SP 122mm, D-1, M-1943, M-1973 SP 152mm;

MRL: BM-21 122mm, BM-14-16 140mm, BM-24 240mm; SSM: 18 FROG-7, 18 SS-21, 18 Scud-B; SS-C-2B Samlet coastal;

mor: 120mm, 160mm, 240mm.
ATK: guns: T-12 100mm; ATGW: 1,300 AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot and Milan.
AD: guns: 1,000 ZU-23-2 23mm, M-1939 37mm, S-60 57mm, M-1939/-44 85mm, KS-19 100mm towed, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 SP;

SAM: SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13 SAM.
AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: (60,000; Army comd).

22 AD bdes (63 SAM btys): 11(28 btys) with some 370 SA-2/-3; 2 (8 btys) with some 48 SA-5; 9 (27 btys) with some 240 SA-6, AA arty and radar.

NAVY: 2,500.

Bases: Latakia, Tartus, Minet el-Baida.
Frigates: 2 Petya I.
FAC: (G): 22 with SS-N-2A/C SSM: 6 Osa-I, 10 Osa-II; 6 Komar<; (T): 8 Sov P-4<.
Patrol craft: 7: 1 Fr CH large, 6 Sov Zhuk< coastal<
MCMV: 4 Sov: 1 T-43 ocean, 2 Vanya coastal, 1 Yevgenya inshore<.
Amph: LCT: 2 Polnocny.
(On order 1981: 4 Nanuchka II corvettes.)

AIR FORCE: 70,000; some 500 combat ac; some 100 armed hel.* (*Some aircraft believed to be in storage.)
FGA: 9 sqns: 4 with 85 MiG-17; 1 with 18 Su-7; 2 with 40 Su-20; 2 with 50 MiG-23BM Flogger F.
Recce: perhaps 10 MiG-25R.
Interceptor: 15 sqns: 2 with 30 MiG-25 Foxbat E; 10 with 180 MiG-21PF/MF, 3 with 70 MiG-23 Flogger E/G.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 5 An-24 Coke, 6 An-26 Curl, 4 Il-76 Candid, 6 Tu-134 Crusty, 2 Mystere-Falcon-20F.
Trg: incl 90 L-39, 60 L-29, 10 MiG-15UTI, 50 MBB-223 Flamingo.
Hel: attack: 40 Mi-24 Hind, 35 SA-342 Gazelle (ATK), perhaps 25 armed Mi-8;

tpt: 100 Mi-8, 30 Mi-17 (mod-8), 10 SA-342 Gazelle, 10 Mi-4 Hound, 10 Mi-2 Hoplite;

Navy-assigned (ASW): 3 Ka-25 Hormone, 20 Mi-14 Haze.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-6 Acrid, AA-7 Apex. ASM: AT-2 Swatter ATGW.
(On order: 12 SA-342 Gazelle hel; AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Lebanon 30,000 (3 divs-); 800 MBT.

PARA-MILITARY:

Ministry of Defence: Desert Guard (Frontier Force) 1,800.

Palestine Liberation Army 4,500: 3 bdes (in Syria/Lebanon, some Syrian officers, nominally under PLO);

90 T-54/-55 MBT; 105mm, 122mm, 152mm how; MRL; AT-3 Sagger ATGW; SA-7 SAM.

Ministry of Interior: Gendarmerie 8,000.

Ba'ath Party: Workers Militia (People's Army).

TUNISIA
GDP 1983: TD 5.520 bn ($8,136 bn). 1984: 6.235 bn ($8,027 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 4.5%. 1984: 5.5%.
Inflation 1983: 6.0%. 1984: 8.2%.
Debt 1983: $3.40 bn. 1984: $4.10 bn.
Def budget* 1984: TD 339.64 m ($437,230 m). 1985: 347.6 m ($402,036 m). (* Incl eqpt budget.)
FMA 1983: $90.0 m. 1984: $100.0 m.

$1=dinar 0.6785 (1983), 0.7768 (1984), 0.8646(1985).
Population: 7,150,000.

Men: 18-30: 888,000; 31-45: 466,000.

Women: 18-30: 857,000; 31-45: 516,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 35,100 (27,000 conscripts) (excl Gendarmerie).

Terms of service: 12 months selective.
ARMY: 30,000 (26,000 conscripts).
2 combined arms bdes (each with 1 armd, 2 mech inf bns).
1 Sahara bde.
1 para-cdo bde.
2 armd recce regts.
3 fd, 2 AA arty regts.
1 engr regt.
Tks: 14 M-48A5, 54 M-60A3; It: 40 AMX-13, 10 M-41.
AFV: recce: 20 Saladin, 30 EBR-75, 10 AML-60, EE-3 Jararaca, EE-9 Cascavel; APC: 50 M-113A1, 18 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: gun/how: 6 25-pdr (88mm); how: 48 M-101A1 towed, M-108 SP 105mm; 10 M-114A1, Model 50, 19 M-109 SP 155mm;

mor: 81mm (incl M-125 SP), 82mm, 107mm (12 M-106A2 SP).
ATK: RL: STRIM-89; guns: 54 JPz SK-105 105mm SP; ATGW: MGM-71A TOW (incl 20 M-113 SP), Milan, SS-11.
AD: guns: 45 M-1939/Type-55 37mm; SAM: RBS-70, 62 MIM-72 Chaparral.

NAVY: 2,600 (500 conscripts).

Bases: Tunis, Susa.
Frigate: 1 US Savage.
FAC: 2 Ch Shanghai-ll. (G): 6: 3 La Combattante HIM with 8 Exocet MM-40 SSM; 3 P-48 with 8 SS-12 SSM.
Patrol craft: 17: 5 large (1 Le Fougeux, 2 Adjutant ex-MCMV, 2 Vosper Thornycroft 103-ft); 12 coastal<.
(On order 2 Lurssen 23-metre FAC.)

AIR FORCE: 2,500 (500 conscripts); 20 combat aircraft.
FGA: 8 F-5E, 4 F-5F.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 MB-326K, 3 MB-326L.
Tpt: 2C-130H.
Liaison: 4 S-208M ac.
Trg: 17 SF-260, 7 MB-326B, 12 T-6, 12 Safir.
Hel: 1 wing with 7 Alouette II, 5 Alouette III, 4 UH-1H, 1 Puma, 18 AB-205, 6 Bell 205-A1, 6 AS-350B Ecureuil, 1 SA-365N Dauphin.
(On order: 2 F-5F trg ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie (Public Order Brigade) 3,500: 3 bns; 110 Fiat 6614 APC.

National Guard: 6,000.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
GDP 1982: Dh 108.90 bn ($29,665 bn). Est 1983: 101.3 bn ($27,595 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -7.0%. 1985: -6.5%
Inflation 1983: 0%. 1984: 2%.
Def budget 1984: Dh 6.855 bn ($1,867 bn). Est exp 1985: 7.50 bn ($2,043 bn).

$l=dirham 3.671 (1982-5).
Population: 1,400,000. Incl expatriates.

Men: 18-30: 248,000; 31-45: 315,000.

Women: 18-30: 88,000; 31-45: 75,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: *
(*The Union Defence Force and the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) were formally merged in 1979;

Abu Dhabi and Dubai still maintain a degree of independence. Perhaps a third of the force is made up of non-nationals.)
Regular. 43,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 40,000.
3 regional commands: Western (Abu Dhabi), Central (Dubai), Northern (Ras al Khaimah).
1 Royal Guard 'bde'.
1 armd bde.
1 mech inf bde.
2 inf bdes.
1 arty, 1 AD bde(each 3 bns).
Tks: 100 AMX-30, 36 OF-40 Mk 2 (Lion); lt: 60 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 90 AML-90, VBC-40; MICV: AMX-10P; APC: 30 AMX VCI, VCRTT, 300 Panhard M-3, VAB, 30 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: guns: 50 ROF lt 105mm, Mk F-3SP 155mm; how: M-56 105mm pack; mor: 81mm.
ATK: BCL: 84mm; ATGW : Vigilant.
AD: guns: M-3VDA 20mm SP, GCF-BM2 30mm; SAM: Rapier, Crotale, RBS-70.
(Store: 70 Saladin armd, 60 Ferret scout cars; 12 Saracen APC.)
(On order 20 Scorpion lt tks; 66 Urutu APC with TOW; 54 TOW ATGW; 42 Improved HAWK SAM; 343 msls.)

NAVY: 1,500.

Bases: Abu Dhabi: Dalma, Mina Zayed; Ajman; Dubai: Mina Razhid, Mina Jabal 'AH;Fujairah; Ras al Khaimah: Mina Sakr; Sharjah: Mina Khalid,

Khor Fakkan.
FAC(G): 6 Lurssen TNC-45 with 2x2 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft: 9: 6 Vosper Thornycroft large, 3 Keith Nelson coastal<.
Spt: 2 Cheverton tenders<.

AIR FORCE (incl Police Air Wing): 1,500; 42 combat ac, 7 armed hel.
Interceptor: 2 sqns: 24 Mirage 5AD,3 5RAD, 2 5DAD.
FGA: 1 sqn with 3 Alpha Jet.
COIN: 1 sqn with 10 MB-326KD/LD.
Tpt: incl 4 C-130H, 1 L-100-30, 1 Boeing 720-023B, 1 G-222, 4 C-212, 5 Islander, 9 DHC-5D, 1 Cessna 182.
Hel: incl 7 Alouette III with AS-II, 8 AB-205, 6 AB-206, 3 AB-212, 9 SA-330 Puma, 4 AS-332F Super Puma, 10 SA-342 Gazelle.
Trg: some 3 Hawk, 6 SF-260TP, 2 MB-339.
AAM: R-550 Magic. ASM: AS-11/-12.
(On order 38 Mirage 2000 ftrs (3 recce, 3 trg), 3 Alpha Jet FGA/trg, 1 G-222, 1 C-130H-30 tpt, 2 MB-339, some 24 Hawk (8 Mk 61, 16 Mk 63) trg ac;

30 A-129 Mangusta, 4 AS-332F Super Puma, Lynx hel; Skyguard AD system with twin 35mm guns.)

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard (Ministry of the Interior): 56 coastal patrol boats/craft.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (NORTH)
GDP 1982: YR 14.637 bn ($3,208 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 4.2%.
Inflation 1983: 5.0%. 1984: 6.0%
Debt 1983: $1.50 bn. 1984: $2.40 bn.
Def budget 1983: YR 2.879 bn ($599,817 m). Est def exp 1984: 3.10 bn ($579,255m).

$1=rial 4.5625 (1982), 4.7998 (1983), 5.3517 (1984).
Population: 8,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 755,000; 31-45: 402,000.

Women: 18-30: 867,000; 31-45: 647,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 36,550 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 3 years.
Reserves: Army: perhaps 40,000.

ARMY: 35,000 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts)..
1 armd bde.
1 mech, 5 inf bdes.
1 Special Forces bde.
1 para/cdo bde.
1 marine bde
1 central guard force.
3 arty bdes.
3 AA arty, 2 AD bns (1 with SA-2 SAM).
Tks: 100 T-34,500 T-54/-55, 64 M-60A1.
AFV: recce: 50 Saladin, Ferret; APC: 90 M-113, 300 BTR-40/-60/-152, Al Walid.
Arty: guns: 200 M-1942 76mm, 30 SU-100 100mm SP, M-1931/37 122mm; how: M-101 105mm, M-38 122mm, M-115 155mm;

MRL : 65 BM-21 122mm; mor: 200 82mm and 120mm.
ATK: RL LAW; RCL: M-20 75mm, 82mm; ATGW: 20 Vigilant, BGM-71A TOW, 24 M-47 Dragon.
AD: guns: 52 M-167, 20 M-163 Vulcan SP 20mm, ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 23mm, M-1939 37mm, S-60 57mm;

SAM: SA-2/-6/-9.

NAVY: 550.

Base: Hodeida.
FAC: (G): 2 Osa II with 4 SS-N-2B; (T): 4 Sov P-4<.
Patrol craft: 6<: 3 Sov(2 Zhuk<, 1 Poluchat);3 US Broadsword (may be non-operational).
MCMV: 2 Yevgenya inshore.
Amph: LCM: 4: 2 T-4, 2 Ondatra.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 76 combat ac*(* Some 15 ac in storage.)
Ftrs: 5 sqns: 2 with 40 MiG-2I; 1 with 10 MiG-17F; 1 with 11 F-5E; 1 with 15 Su-22.
Tpts: 2 C-130H, 2 C-47,2 Skyvan, 1 Il-14 Crate, 1 An-24 Coke, 3 An-26 Curl.
Trg: 4 F-5B, 4 MiG-15UTI.
Hel: 20 Mi-8, 6 AB-206, 5 AB-212, 2 Alouette.
AD: 1 regt with 12 SA-2 SAM.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AIM-9 Sidewinder.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of National Security Force 5,000. Tribal levies at least 20,000.

YEMEN: PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SOUTH)
Est GDP 1982: YD 318.8 m ($923 m). 1983: 326.8 m ($946 m).
GDP growth 1982: -2%. 1983: 1.5%.
Inflation 1982: 15%. 1983: 10%.
Est debt 1983: $1.26 bn. 1984: $1.50 bn.
Def exp 1981: YD 56.044 m ($162,258 m). 1982: 55.06 m ($159,409 m).

$1=dinar 0.3454 (1981-4).
Population: 2,250,000.

Men: 18-30: 220,400; 31-45: 127,200.

Women: 18-30: 230,600; 31-45: 158,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 27,500 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: Army: 45,000.

ARMY: 24,000 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
1 armd bde.
1 mech bdes.
10 inf 'bdes' (regts) (some being mechanized).
1 arty bde.
10 arty bns.
1 SSM bde with FROG-7 and Scud B.
2 SAM btys with SA-2/-3.
Tks: 450 T-54/-55/-62.
AFV: recce: BRDM-2; MICV: some 100 BMP-1; APC: 300 BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 350 D-44 85mm, M-46 and SM-4-1 coastal 130mm; how: M-38, D-30 122mm; MRL: BM-21 122mm, BM-25 250mm;

SSM: 12 FROG-7, 6 Scud B; mor: 120mm, 160mm.
AD: gun: 200 ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm, M-1939 37mm, S-60 57mm, KS-12 85mm; SAM: 6 SA-2, 3 SA-3, SA-6/-7.*

NAVY: 1,000.

Bases: Aden, Perim Island, Al Mukalla.
FAC: (G): 8 Sov Osa II with 4 SS-N-2B SSM; (T): 2 Sov P-6C
Patrol craft: 4: 2 Sov SO-1 large, 2 Zhuk<<
Amph: LST: 1 Sov Ropucha; LCT: 3 Sov Polnocny. LCA: 3 Sov T-4.

AIR FORCE: 2,500; 103 combat ac, some 15 armed hel.* (* Some eqpt believed in storage; some ac believed flown by Soviet and Cuban crews.)
FGA: 4 sqns: 2 with 30 MiG-17F; 1 with 12 MiG-21; 1 with 25 Su-20/-22.
Interceptor: 3 sqns with 36 MiG-21F.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 An-24.
Hel: 1 sqn with 15 Mi-24, 30 Mi-8.
SAM: 1 regt with 48 SA-2.
Trg: 3 MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AT-2 Sagger.

PARA-MILITARY: People's Militia 15,000.

Public Security Force 30,000 (increasing); 1 Tracker 2, 4 Spear, 1 Interceptor patrol craft.

Sub-Saharan Africa*

Bilateral External Agreements

The US has had mutual defence and assistance agreements with Ethiopia (1975), Ghana (1972), Kenya (1980), Liberia (1972), Mali (1972), Niger (1962), Senegal (1962) and Zaire (1972); most may now be in abeyance. Agreements with Somalia and Kenya allow limited US access to naval and air facilities; Somalia has received some military aid.

The Soviet Union has Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation with Angola (October 1976), Mozambique (March 1977) and Ethiopia (November 1978, ratified April 1979). Relations with the Congo Republic are close but no such agreement is known to exist. Military aid has been given to Angola (under additional Military Co-operation Agreements, including one signed in May 1983), Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia (1980). The Soviet Navy has facilities in the Dahlak Islands, Ethiopia. Reports of a Soviet facility in Sao Tome and Principe have been received.

China has military assistance agreements with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania, and provided aid to Mozambique and Zaire (under a 1982 sales credit).

Britain maintains overflying, training and defence agreements with Kenya, helps Zimbabwe form and train her forces, and heads a Commonwealth Training Team (Australia, Britain, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Tanzania) which is helping to rebuild the Ugandan defence forces.

France has signed defence agreements with Cameroon (February 1974), the Central African Republic (August 1960), the Comoro Islands (October 1978), Djibouti (June 1977, including permission to deploy forces), Gabon (August 1974), Ivory Coast (April 1961), Senegal (March 1974) and Togo (July 1963). Agreements with Chad have led temporarily to French military deployment and continued support. France has signed technical military assistance agreements with 23 countries, including the above.

Belgium has a military co-operation agreement with Zaire.

Spain has a military agreement with Equatorial Guinea (1981) and is providing training and some equipment.

Portugal signed a Protocol on Military Co-operation with Mozambique in April 1982.

Cuba has some 26,000 men in Angola, training the Angolan armed forces and assisting with internal security, and 5,000 in Ethiopia. Cuban, Soviet and East German advisers are present in a number of other African countries.

Some military links exist between Israel and both South Africa and Zaire, and between both Mozambique and Angola on the one hand, and East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania (1982) and Yugoslavia (1982) on the other. Hungary signed a Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia and with Mozambique in September 1980. North Korea signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Togo in October 1981 and supplied a 100-man training team to Zimbabwe (1981-84) and a 6-man team in 1985; reports persist of Korean teams in Angola and seven other countries (Benin, Congo, Malagasy, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia), and a 200-man training team is in Uganda. Ethiopia signed a Treaty of Friendship with Libya and South Yemen in 1981.

Multilateral Regional Agreements

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), constituted in May 1963 to include all internationally recognized independent African states except South Africa, has a Defence Commission - responsible for defence and security co-operation and the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members. In 1979 this approved in principle an African Intervention Force and ordered planning for its formation, funding and equipping. Little progress has been reported. It did agree in 1981 on an Inter-African Force for Chad, with troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire. OAU financing was inadequate; the Force was withdrawn in June 1982.

In 1961 the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo and Gabon formed the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa, with French help. Chad's present position in relation to the Council is unclear.

In May 1981 the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence Matters calling for a joint Defence Commission, comprising Defence Ministers and their Chiefs of Defence Staff, and a Defence Council of the Heads of State. It is intended to create a joint force, using assigned units of the national armies, which could serve as an intervention or peace-keeping force. Of the then 16 ECOWAS members (Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta), 12 have signed; Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali declined, and Mauritania signed only after the Protocol was amended to call for the withdrawal of foreign troops once ECOWAS could guarantee mutual defence.

Bilateral Regional Arrangements

Kenya signed a defence agreement with Ethiopia in November 1963 and a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in January 1979; Kenya and Somalia agreed in 1981 to control border incursions. Sierra Leone and Guinea signed a Defence Agreement in 1971 and a Mutual Defence Pact in August 1981. In December 1981 Senegal and The Gambia signed a confederation pact which united the two countries as Senegambia. Although they stated their intent to integrate their armed forces, the Protocols still have not been signed. Djibouti signed a Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia and with the Somali Republic in early 1981. Nigeria and Benin signed a military co-operation agreement in January 1983 providing for joint exercises and unspecified 'other things'. Mozambique trains Tanzanian and Zimbabwe troops; the agreement providing this facility is unknown. Tanzania provides instructors for Uganda under a defence pact signed in August 1981. Zaire trains Chadian forces. In March 1984 South Africa signed one agreement with Mozambique mutually to curb insurgency and another with Angola providing for disengagement by South African forces and mutual supervision of guerrilla activity. Angola and Zaire agreed a Treaty of Security and Defence in February 1985; each guarantees not to her its territory be used as a base for attacks on the other.

The only country in the area with an indigenous arms industry is South Africa, which builds equipment both under licence and of her own design.

Military Developments

South Africa remains the only African country capable of significant force projection operations against her neighbors. With the possible exception of Angola, none of her neighbors, singly or in concert, is capable of formal conventional operations against her. Angola, with Soviet-supplied equipment and with detachments of Cubans and other Soviet-oriented nations, is stretched to her limits containing the forces of UNITA and could not also defend against a major South African offensive. African national forces remain capable only of limited, short-term internal security operations. Ethiopian operations against the rebel elements gain more from the general drought-induced hardship than from military action.

Economic Factors

In common with the western hemisphere, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a general decline of GDP growth since 1981. In the previous two years its total GDP had showed a 4% growth rate, but during the following three years it declined to -0.2% (1983). There was an improvement in 1984, however, total GDP growing by 2.3%, and 3% growth is projected for 1985. With only a few exceptions, per capita living standards declined throughout the continent. High birth rates erode the moderate economic gains - often exceeding GDP growth (e.g., Kenya) - while the international economic climate has diminished the export capacity of Sub-Saharan countries, and the drought has seriously affected the agricultural sector (according to the World Bank, some countries have lost up to 80% of their crops).
Inflation is also a problem, but it has not reached the proportions seen in Latin America.

Only in two countries (Ghana and Zaire) is the rate over 100%, while in most others it ranges between 10% and 20%. External debt, however, has reached almost the same proportions as in Latin America; debt/GDP ratios for at least three countries have topped 100% (Ivory Coast 160%, Zaire 155%, Sudan 115%). In absolute terms South Africa and Nigeria lead the continent, with debt burdens of $33 bn and $23 bn respectively.

Страны Африки к югу от Сахары*

Двусторонние Внешние Соглашения

У США были соглашения о взаимной обороне и помощи с Эфиопией (1975), Ганой (1972), Кенией (1980), Либерией (1972), Мали (1972), Нигером (1962), Сенегалом (1962) и Заиром (1972); большинство из них может теперь быть в состоянии неопределенности. Соглашения с Сомали и Кенией позволяют ограничить доступ США к военно-морским и воздушным объектам; Сомали получила некоторую военную помощь.

Советский Союз имеет договоры о дружбе и сотрудничестве с Анголой (октябрь 1976 года), Мозамбиком (март 1977 года) и Эфиопией (ноябрь 1978 года, ратифицирован в апреле 1979 года). Отношения с Республикой Конго тесные, но известно, что такого соглашения не существует. Военная помощь была оказана Анголе (в соответствии с дополнительными соглашениями о военном сотрудничестве, в том числе подписанным в мае 1983 года), Эфиопии, Гвинее, Гвинее-Бисау, Мали, Мозамбику, Нигерии, Сомали, Уганде и Замбии (1980 год). Советский флот имеет объекты на островах Далак, Эфиопия. Получены сообщения о Советском объекте в Сан-Томе и Принсипи.

Китай заключил соглашения о военной помощи с Камеруном, Экваториальной Гвинеей, Гвинеей, Мали и Танзанией и оказал помощь Мозамбику и Заиру (в рамках кредита на продажу 1982 года).

Великобритания поддерживает соглашения с Кенией о пролете, подготовке и обороне, помогает Зимбабве формировать и обучать свои силы и возглавляет группу подготовки Содружества (Австралия, Великобритания, Гайана, Канада, Ямайка, Кения, Сьерра-Леоне и Танзания), которая помогает восстановить угандийские силы обороны.

Франция подписала оборонные соглашения с Камеруном (февраль 1974), Центрально-Африканской Республикой (август 1960), Коморскими островами (октябрь 1978), Джибути (июнь 1977 года, в том числе разрешение на развертывание сил), Габоном (август 1974), Кот д'Ивуаром (апрель 1961), Сенегалом (март 1974 года) и Того (июль 1963). Соглашения с Чадом привели к временному развертыванию французских вооруженных сил и дальнейшей поддержке. Франция подписала соглашения о технической военной помощи с 23 странами, включая вышеупомянутые.

Бельгия заключила с Заиром соглашение о военном сотрудничестве.

Испания заключила военное соглашение с Экваториальной Гвинеей (1981 год) и обеспечивает подготовку кадров и некоторое оборудование.

Португалия подписали Протокол о военном сотрудничестве с Мозамбиком в апреле 1982 года.

Куба имеет около 26 000 человек в Анголе, для обучения ангольских вооруженных сил и оказания помощи внутренней безопасности, и 5000 в Эфиопии. Кубинские, советские и восточногерманские советники присутствуют в ряде других африканских стран.

Некоторые военные связи существуют между Израилем и Южной Африкой и Заиром, а также между Мозамбиком и Анголой, с одной стороны, и Восточной Германией, Болгарией, Румынией (1982 год) и Югославией (1982 год) - с другой. Венгрия подписала договор о дружбе с Эфиопией и Мозамбиком в сентябре 1980 года. Северная Корея подписала договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве с Того в октябре 1981 года и предоставила Зимбабве (1981-1984 годы) учебную группу в составе 100 человек и группу в составе 6 человек в 1985 году; сообщается о корейских частях в Анголе и семи других странах (Бенин, Конго, Мадагаскар, Мозамбик, Сейшельские острова, Танзания, Замбия), и 200 человек для обучения в Уганде. Эфиопия заключила договор о дружбе с Ливией и Южным Йеменом в 1981 году.

Многосторонние Региональные Соглашения

Организация африканского единства (ОАЕ), учрежденная в мае 1963 года и включающая в себя все международно признанные независимые африканские государства, за исключением Южной Африки, имеет комиссию по обороне , отвечающую за сотрудничество в области обороны и безопасности и защиту суверенитета, территориальной целостности и независимости ее членов. В 1979 году он утвердил в принципе африканские силы вмешательства и распорядился о планировании их формирования, финансирования и оснащения. Сообщается о незначительном прогрессе. В 1981 году она договорилась о создании Межафриканских сил для Чада с войсками Нигерии, Сенегала и Заира. Финансирование ОАЕ было недостаточным; силы были выведены в июне 1982 года.

В 1961 году Габон, Конго, Центральноафриканская Республика и Чад сформировали при содействии Франции Совет обороны Экваториальной Африки. Нынешняя позиция Чада в отношении Совета неясна.

В мае 1981 года экономическое сообщество западноафриканских государств (ECOWAS) приняло протокол о взаимной помощи по вопросам обороны, предусматривающий создание совместной комиссии по вопросам обороны в составе министров обороны и начальников их штабов и Совета обороны глав государств. Предполагается создать совместные силы с использованием закрепленных за ними подразделений национальных армий, которые могли бы служить в качестве сил вмешательства или поддержания мира. Тогда из 16 участников ECOWAS (Бенин, Кабо-Верде, Гамбия, Гана, Гвинея, Гвинея-Бисау, Кот-д'Ивуар, Либерия, Мали, Мавритания, Нигер, Нигерия, Сенегал, Сьерра-Леоне, Того и Верхняя Вольта), 12 подписали; Кабо-Верде, Гвинеи-Бисау и Мали отказались, и Мавритания подписали только после того, как протокол был изменен призывает к выводу иностранных войск после ECOWAS может гарантировать взаимной обороне.

Двусторонние Региональные Соглашения

Кения подписала соглашение об обороне с Эфиопией в ноябре 1963 года и Договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве в январе 1979 года; Кения и Сомали договорились в 1981 году о контроле за вторжениями на границе. Сьерра-Леоне и Гвинея подписали соглашение об обороне в 1971 году и пакт о взаимной обороне в августе 1981 года. В декабре 1981 года Сенегал и Гамбия подписали пакт Конфедерации, который объединил обе страны в Сенегамбию. Хотя они заявили о своем намерении объединить свои вооруженные силы, протоколы до сих пор не подписаны. В начале 1981 года Джибути подписала договор о дружбе с Эфиопией и с Сомалийской Республикой. В январе 1983 года Нигерия и Бенин подписали соглашение о военном сотрудничестве, предусматривающее проведение совместных учений и неуказанных "других мероприятий". Мозамбик готовит войска Танзании и Зимбабве; соглашение о предоставлении этого объекта неизвестно. Танзания предоставляет Уганде инструкторов в соответствии с пактом об обороне, подписанным в августе 1981 года. Заир тренирует силы Чада. В марте 1984 года ЮАР подписала соглашение с Мозамбиком взаимно обуздать мятежников и еще с Анголой, предусматривающий разъединение южно-африканских сил и взаимного контроля партизанской деятельности. В феврале 1985 года Ангола и Заир заключили договор о безопасности и обороне; каждая из них гарантирует, что ее территория не будет использоваться в качестве базы для нападений на другую.

Единственной страной в этом районе, где имеется местная оружейная промышленность, является Южная Африка, которая производит вооружение как по лицензии, так и по собственной конструкции.

Военные события

ЮАР остается единственной африканской страной, способной проводить значительные операции против своих соседей. За возможным исключением Анголы, ни один из ее соседей поодиночке или сообща не способен проводить против нее официальные обычные операции. Ангола, снабженная советским вооружением и отрядами кубинцев и других стран, ориентированных на Советский Союз, напряжена до предела, имея против себя силы УНИТА, и не может также защищаться от крупного южноафриканского наступления. Африканские национальные силы по-прежнему способны проводить лишь ограниченные краткосрочные операции по обеспечению внутренней безопасности. Операции Эфиопии против повстанческих элементов выигрывают больше от общих трудностей, вызванных засухой, чем от военных действий.

Экономические факторы

Как и в Западном полушарии, в странах Африки к югу от Сахары с 1981 года наблюдается общее снижение темпов роста ВВП. В предыдущие два года ее совокупный ВВП рос на 4%, однако в последующие три года он снизился до -0,2% (1983 год). В 1984 году наблюдалось улучшение, однако общий рост ВВП составил 2,3%, а в 1985 году прогнозируется рост на 3%. За редким исключением, уровень жизни на душу населения на всем континенте снизился. Высокие показатели рождаемости подрывают умеренные экономические выгоды , зачастую превышающие темпы роста ВВП (например, Кения), в то время как международный экономический климат привел к снижению экспортного потенциала стран к югу от Сахары, а засуха серьезно сказалась на сельскохозяйственном секторе (по данным Всемирного банка, некоторые страны потеряли до 80% своих сельскохозяйственных культур).

Инфляция также является проблемой, но она не достигла тех масштабов, которые наблюдаются в Латинской Америке.

Только в двух странах (Гана и Заир) этот показатель превышает 100%, в то время как в большинстве других он колеблется между 10% и 20%. Внешний долг, однако, достиг почти тех же пропорций, что и в Латинской Америке; соотношение долга к ВВП по крайней мере для трех стран превысило 100% (Кот-Д'Ивуар 160%, Заир 155%, Судан 115%). В абсолютном выражении Южная Африка и Нигерия возглавляют континент с долговым бременем в $33 млрд и $23 млрд соответственно.

ANGOLA
Est GDP 1982: K 126.0 bn ($4,186 bn).
Est def exp 1982: K 23.50 bn ($780,731 m).

$1=kwanza 30.1 (1982), 30.214 (1983).
Population: 8,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 889,000; 31-45: 652,000.

Women: 18-30: 919,000: 31-45: 680,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 49,500 (perhaps 24,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.
Reserves: Militia: 50,000.

ARMY: 36,000 (perhaps 24,000 conscripts).
10 Military Regions.
5 div HQ.
2 mot inf bdes (each of 1 tk, 2 inf bns).
17 inf bdes.
4 AA arty bdes.
10 tk bns.
6 arty bns.
10 SAM btys.
Tks: 175 T-34, 200 T-54/-55, 90 T-62; lt: some 50 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 200 BRDM-1/-2, AML; APC: 255 BTR-60/-152.
Arty: guns/how: 250: incl 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm; mor: 460 82mm, 40 120mm; MRL: 50 BM-21 122mm.
ATK: RCL: 900 75mm, 82mm and 107mm; ATGW: Sagger.
AD: guns: 300+ ZPU-4 14.5mm, M-55 20mm, ZU-23-2, M-1939 23mm, 37mm, 70 S-60 57mm towed, 20 ZSU-23-4,40 ZSU-57-2 SP; SAM: SA-7.*

(* Delivery data incomplete; eqpt totals uncertain.)

NAVY: l,500.* (* Serviceability, especially non-Soviet equipment, uncertain.)

Bases: Luanda, Lobito, Mocamedes.
FAC: (G): 6 Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM; (T): 4 Sov Shershen.
Patrol craft: 12: 4 large Port Argos; 8 coastal<: 3 Sov (1 Zhuk<, 2 Poluchat), 5 Port (1 Jupiter, 4 Bellatrix).
Amph: LCT: 3 Sov Polnocny, 1 Port Alfange. LCA: 5 Sov T-4.

AIR FORCE: 2,000; some 141 combat ac, some 12 armed hel. (* Serviceability, especially non-Soviet equipment, uncertain.)
FGA: 4 sqns with 48 MiG-21MF, 20 MiG-17F, 5 Su-22, 25 MiG-23, incl 2 trg.
Interceptor: 3 sqns: 1 with (?12) MiG-19; 2 with 30 MiG-21bis.
MR: 1 F-27MPA.
Tpt: 2 sqns with 6 Noratlas, 3 C-47, 8 CASA C-212, 6 An-2, An-22, 16 An-26, 4 Turbo Porter, 8 Islander.
Hel: 2 sqns with 12 Mi-24 (?A), 40 Mi-8, 27 Alouette III, 27 SA-365N Dauphin, some 6 IAR-316B.
Trg: incl 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yak-11, 12 PC-7.
AD: 2 SAM bns; 11 radar units.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
SAM: 40 SA-3 Goa, 72 SA-6, 48 SA-8, SA-9.
Radar: EW: Tall King, Spoon Rest; search: Bar Lock, Flat Face, Squat Eye; height-finding: Side Net; msl comd: Low Blow (SA-3), Land Roll (SA-8);

AA arty: Flap Wheel, Fire Can, Gun Dish.
(On order: Su-22 FGA, An-26, 12 C-212 tpt ac; some 30 IAR-316B, 6 AS-341 Gazelle attack, 4 SA-365 Dauphin recce hel.)

Forces Abroad: Sao Tome: 200.

PARA-MILITARY:

Militia (People's Defence Organization, ODP) 50,000; 11+ 'bdes'; Border Guard (TGFA):

7,000; South West African People's Organization (SWAPO): 7,000. 'Popular Vigilance Brigades' reported; role unclear.
FOREIGN TROOPS:

Cuba 20,000 (plus 6,000 civilian instructors/advisers); 4-6 inf regts in field role, combat ac pilots, technicians, advisers.

E. Germany 500; advisers, technicians.

Bulgaria, 'Palestine', Portugal, other, 1,500; incl combat pilots, technicians.

USSR 700; advisers and technicians.

OPPOSITION:
UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola): some 18,000 'regulars' (1-2 years service), 23,000 militia (spt and log);

Eqpt: captured T-34/85 MBT, BM-21 122mm MRL, 76mm fd guns, 82mm, 120mm mor, 85mm RPG-7 RL, 75mm RCL, 12.7mm hy machine guns;

14.5mm and ZU-23-2 23mm AA guns, SAM-7; lt ac reported.
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola): (few hundred); small arms only.
FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave): (200-300); small arms only.

BENIN
GDP 1982: fr CFA 342.90 bn ($1.04 bn). 1983: 385.30 bn ($1.011 bn).
Debt 1983: $720.0 m. 1984: $800.0 m.
Def budget 1982: fr CFA 7.821 bn ($23,800 m).
Est def exp 1983: 9.500 bn ($24,930 m).

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983).
Population: 3,900,000.

Men: 18-30: 380,000; 31-45: 244,000.

Women: 18-30: 448,000; 31-45: 304,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 3,460.

Terms of service: conscription (selective), months.
ARMY: 3,200.* (* All services form part of the Army.)
3 inf bns.
1 para/cdo bn.
1 engr bn.
1 service bn.
1 armd sqn.
1 arty bty.
Tks: lt: 10 PT-76. AFV: recce: 7 M-8, 8 BRDM-2.
Arty: how: 4 M-101 105mm; mor: 60mm, 81mm.
NAVY: 100.*

Base: Cotonou.
Patrol boats: 3 Zhuk<
AIR FORCE: 160;* no combat ac or hel.
Ac: 2 C-47, 2 An-26, 1 F-27 Mk 600, 1 Falcon 20, 1 Aero Commander 500B, 1 Corvette 200 (VIP), 2 Broussard tpts; 1 Reims Cessna 337 lt.
Hel: 1 Alouette II, 2 AS-50B Ecureuil, 1 Bell 47G.
PARA-MILITARY: 2,000, Gendarmerie: 4 mobile coys, Public Security Force. People's Militia 1,500-2,000.

BOTSWANA
GDP 1982/3: P 1.022 bn ($955,842 m). 1983/4: 1.176 bn ($1,051 bn).
GDP growth 1982/3: 25.0%. 1983/4: 15.0%.
Inflation 1983: 10.3%. 1984: 7.4%.
Debt 1983: $250.0 m. Est 1984: $300.0 m.
Def budget 1982: P 28.5 m ($26,663 m). (*The National Development Plan 1979-85 allocates some P 72.0 m.)
FMA 1983: $50.0 m. 1984: $60.0 m.

$1=pula 1.0689 (1982/3), 1.1183 (1983/4).
Population: 980,000.

Men: 18-30: 95,000; 31-45: 55,000.

Women: 18-30: 120,000; 31-45: 74,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 3,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 2,850.* (* All services form part of the Army.)
1 inf bn gp (5 inf, 1 recce, 1 engr, 1 sigs, 1 log, 1 spt coys).
AFV: recce: 8 Shorland, 11 Cadillac Gage; APC: 30 BTR-60.
Arty: guns: 6 105mm It; how: 4 Model 56 105mm pack; mor: 10 81mm, 10 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 20 84mm Carl Gustav.
AD: SAM: some 60 SA-7.
AIR FORCE: 150;* 5 combat ac.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 BN-2 Defender.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 Skyvan 3M, 2 Islander.
Comms/trg: 1 sqn with 2 Cessna 152, 6 Bulldog 120.
PARA-MILITARY: 1,000 (Police mobile unit).

BURKINA FASO (UPPER VOLTA)
GDP 1982: fr CFA 347.0 bn ($1,056 bn). 1983: 429.4 bn ($1,127 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 2.2%. 1983: 4.5%.
Inflation 1983: 10.0%. 1984: 8.5%.
Est debt 1983: $400 m. 1984: $440 m.
Est def budget 1983: fr CFA 11.20 bn ($29,391 m). 1984: 12.50 bn ($28,607 m).

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 436.96 (1984).
Population: 6,900,000.

Men: 18-30: 711,000; 31-45: 399,000.

Women: 18-30: 690,000; 31-45: 555,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 4,000.

Terms of service: voluntary. People's Militia 2 years part time; men and women 20-35 (military and civic duties); 40,000 trained.
ARMY: 3,900.* (* All services form part of the Army.)
3 inf regts (bns): 1 with 2 inf coys, 1 recce sqn, 1 engr coy; 1 with 2 inf coys, 1 para coy, school;
1 Garrison coy, 1 AA bty. Honour Guard unit.
1 arty bty.
AFV: recce: 15 AML-60/-90, 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 Ferret; APC: 13 M-3.
Arty: how: M-101 105mm; MRL: Ch Type-63 107mm; mor: 60mm, 10 81mm.
ATK: RL: M-20 3.5-in (89mm); RCL: RPG-7, Ch Type-52 75mm.
AD: 30 14.5mm hy machine guns; SAM: SA-7.
AIR FORCE: 100;* no combat ac or hel.
Ac: 10: 2 C-47, 2 Nord 262 Fregate, 2 HS-748A/B, 1 Aero Commander 500B, 1 MH-1521M Broussard, 1 Cessna F-172N, 1 F-337E Super Sky master.
Hel: 3: 2 Alouette III, 1 Dauphin.
PARA-MILITARY: 2,100: Gendarmerie 650;* 6 coys (2 mobile). Republican Guard 1,200. Security Company (CRG) 250.

BURUNDI
GDP 1983: fr CFA 100.375 bn ($1,080 bn). 1984: 109.818 bn ($917,367 m).
GDP growth 1983: 1.1%. 1984: 0%.
Inflation 1983: 8.5%.1984: 14.3%.
Debt 1983: $290 m. 1984: $350 m.
Def exp 1983: fr CFA 4.50 bn ($48,413 m). 1984: 3.90 bn ($32,579 m).

$1=francs CFA 92.95 (1983), 119.71 (1984).
Population: 4,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 557,000; 31-45: 294,000.

Women: 18-30: 565,000; 31-45: 338.000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 5,200.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 5,000.* (* All services form part of the Army.)
2 inf bns.
1 para bn.
1 cdo bn.
1 armd car coy.
AFV: recce: 6 AML-60, 12 -90, Shorland; APC: 9 M-3, 20 BTR-40 Walid. Arty: mor: 18 82mm.
ATK: RL: Blindicide 83mm; RCL: 15 Ch Type-52 75mm. AD: guns: 15 quad 14.5mm.
NAVY: 50.*

Base: Bujumbura.
Patrol boats: 3 Lambro river( (2 in reserve).
AIR: 150;* 3 combat ac.
COIN: 3 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 DC-3, 3 Reims Cessna 150.
Trg: 3 SF-260C.
Hel: 2 Gazelle, 3 Alouette III.
PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie (1,500).

CAMEROON
GDP 1983/4: fr CFA 3,089 bn ($7,543 bn). Est 1984/5: 3,700 bn ($7,840 bn).
GDP growth 1983/4: 5.0%. 1984/5: 6.9%.
Inflation 1983/4: 16.0%. 1984/5: 13.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.50 bn. 1984: $2,750 bn.
Def budget 1983/4: fr CFA 43.211 bn ($105,504 m). 1984/5: 56.340 bn ($119.383m).
FMA 1983: $2.60 m. 1984: $5.10 m.

$1=francs CFA 409.5675 (1983/4), 471.925 (1984/5).
Population: 9,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 997,000; 31-45: 721,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,014,000; 31-45: 758,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 7,300.

Terms of service: voluntary (pre-military compulsory training programme in force).
ARMY: 6,600.
3 Military Regions; 7 Military Sectors: coy gps under command.
1 armd car bn.
1 para/cdo bn.
4 inf bns.
1 engr bn.
5 fd, 6 AA arty btys.
HQ regt, spt units.
AFV: recce: M-8, Ferret, 8 Commando (20mm gun); MICV: 12 Commando (90mm gun); APC: 29 Commando, M-3 half-track.
Arty: how: 6 75mm pack, 16 M-101 105mm; mor 60mm, 20 81mm, 16 120mm.
ATK: RL: 89mm ACL-STRIM; RCL: 13 Ch Type-52 57mm; 40 106mm; ATGW: Milan.
AD: suns: 18 Type-58 14.5mm, 18 twin 35mm, 18 Ch Type-63 37mm, 18 40mm.

NAVY: 350.

Bases: Douala, Port Gentil.
FAC(G): 1 P-48S La Combattante with 8 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
FAC: 3: 1 PR-48, 2 Ch Shanghai-ll.
Patrol craft: 3 coastal<.
Amph: LCM: 2; LCVP: 5; 9 lt assault/spt craft.

AIR FORCE: 350; 15 combat ac, 2 armed hel.
1 composite sqn.
1 Presidential fit.
FGA/COIN: 8 Alpha Jet, 4 Magister, 1 BN-2T Defender.
MR: 2 Do-128D-6.
Tpt: 3 C-47, 1 DHC-4, 4 DHC-5D, 3 C-130, 2 HS-748, 7 Broussard, 1 Boeing 727-200, 1 PC-6 Turbo Porter, 1 PC-7 Turbo Trainer.
Hel: 1 SA-330 Puma, 1 AS-332 Super Puma, 3 Alouette II/III, 4 Gazelle (2 with HOT ATGW), 1 SA-365 Dauphin II.

PARA-MILITARY: 4,000. Gendarmerie: 7 regional groups.

CAPE VERDE
Population: 366,000.

Men: 18-30: 40,000; 31-45: 9,000.

Women: 18-30: 46,000; 31-45: 17,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 1,185.

Terms of service: conscription (selective).
ARMY: 1,000 (Popular Militia).
4 inf coys.
Spt elms.
AFV: recce: 8 BRDM-2. Arty: mor 16 82mm, 8 120mm. ATK: Ri: 3.5-in (89mm).
NAVY: 160.

Base: Praia.
FAC: 2 Shershen.
Patrol craft: 1 Zhuk< coastal<.
(Misc: 1 Kamenka survey ship reported.)
AIR FORCE: 25; no combat ac.
Tpt: 2 An-26.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Est GDP 1983: fr CFA 139.0 bn ($364,762 m). 1984: 160.0 bn ($366,166 m).
GDP growth 1982: -5%. 1983: -2.3%.
Inflation 1983: 13.0%. 1984: 11.0%.
Debt 1983: $220.0 m. 1984: $300.0 m.
Def budget 1981: fr CFA 4.029 bn ($14,827 m).
Est exp 1982: 5.0 bn ($15,215 m).
FMA 1982: $10.0 m. Est 1983: $15.5 m.

$1=francs CFA 271.73 (1981), 328.62 (1982), 381.07(1983), 436.96(1984).
Population: 2,560,000.

Men: 18-30: 276,000; 31-45: 161,000.

Women: 18-30: 275,000; 31-45: 209,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,300.

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 2 years.
ARMY: 2,000.
1 regt HQ.
1 mech bn.
1 inf bn.
1 engr coy.
1 sigs coy ('bn').
1 tpt coy.
Tks: 4 T-55. AFV: recce: 22 BRDM-2, 10 Ferret;APC: 4 BTR-152. Arty: mor 81mm, 12 120mm. ATK: RCL: 14 106mm.
River patrol craft: 9<.
AIR FORCE: 300; 2 combat ac.
COIN: 2 Guerrier.
Tpt: 1 DC-4 (VIP), 4 DC-3/C-47, 1 Caravelle, 1 Corvette, 6 MH-1521 Broussard, 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster.
Hel: 1 Alouette II, 4 H-34 (S-58).
PARA-MILITARY: some 10,000.

Presidential Guard 500. Gendarmerie 700; 3 Regional Legions, 8 'bdes'. Republican Guard 700. Security Forces.

National Young Pioneers 8,000 (boys and girls 14-18); unarmed, some elementary drill and discipline.

CHAD
GDP 1982: fr CFA 181.0 bn ($550,788 m). 1983: 210.0 bn ($551,080 m).
Debt 1983: $130.0 m. 1984: $140.0 m.
Est def exp* 1983: fr CFA 20.0 bn ($52,484 m). 1984: 24.0 bn ($54,925 m).

(* Excl French military subventions. Total French costs in Chad est at French francs 1.2 bn.)
FMA 1983: $25 m. 1984: $5 m.

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 436.96(1984).
Population: 4,947,000

Men: 18-30: 531,000 31-45: 407,000

Women: 18-30: 539,000 31-45: 422,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 12,200 (not incl para-military; perhaps 6,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription. 3 years.

ARMY: over 12,000; comprises regular and rejoined rebel groups.
6 inf bns:
16 inf coys, 3 para coys.
1 recce sqn (Sahara).
2 recce tps (camel).
3 Nomad coys.
3 sigs coys.
Presidential Guard (400 men).
1 armd bn.
2 indep para coys.
2 arty btys.
1 tpt coy.
Numerous indep cdo (guerrilla) 'bns' (gps).
AFV: recce: 4 Panhard ERC-90, 10 AML-60, 16 -90.
Arty: guns: 6 M-1942 76mm, 6 105mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: 68mm, 89mm; RCL: 106mm, APILAS 112mm; ATGW: Milan 160mm.
AD: guns: 20mm, 30mm.

AIR FORCE: 200; 2 combat ac.
COIN: 2 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer (armed).
Tpt: 1 DC-4, 2 C-130A, 9 C-47, 1 Noratlas, 1 Caravelle 6R (VIP), 1 C-212, 2 PC-6, 2 Broussard; lt: 4 Reims Cessna 337.
Hel: 10 Alouette II/III, 4 Puma

PARA-MILITARY: 11,400.

Gendarmerie 1,800; 10 coys, 140 sub units.

National and Nomad Guards 3,900; 46 National, 15 Nomad sub units. 2 Security Companies 1,000: 17 sub units; 81mm mor.

Sureti (Police) 800.Village Militias 3,900.

OPPOSITION: 10,000.
North: Libyan-backed, mainly Arab. Government d'Union Nationale du Tchad (GUNT).

Forces Armies Populaires (FAP) ?3,000. Conseil Democratique de la Revolution (CDR) 200.

Forces Armies du Tchad (FAT) 5,000.

BMP MICV; BTR-60 APC; BM-21 MRL; 120mm, 2 CL-106mm mor;ZU-23-2 AA guns; SA-7 SAM; Libyan forces in spt incl tks, ac.
South: mainly African, may be combining into

Armee de Liberation (ANL). Front d'Action Commune (FAC) 300.

Front de Liberation du Tchad (Frolinat): rump only.

Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation du Tchad (MPLT) ?300.

Union Nationale Democratique 100.

Plus 7 other groups. Mainly small arms.

CONGO
Est GDP 1982: fr CFA 590.0 bn ($1.795 bn). 1983: 685.0 bn ($1,798 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.5%. 1984: 3.0%.
Inflation 1983: 13.0%. 1984: 10.0%.
Debt 1983: $1.50 bn. 1984: $1.60 bn.
Def budget 1984: fr CFA 21.596 bn ($49,423 m).st exp 1985: 25.0 bn ($52,794m).

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 436.96 (1984), 473.54 (1985).
Population: 1,745,000.

Men: 18-30: 195,000; 31-45: 110,000.

Women: 18-30: 199,000; 31-45: 129,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 8,700.

Terms of service: voluntary (2 years).
ARMY: 8,000.
1 armd bn (5 sqns).
2 inf bn gps(each lt tk tp, 76mm gun bty).
1 arty gp (how, MRL).
1 engr bn.
1 para/cdo bn.
Tks: 35 T-54/-55, 15 Ch T-59; lt: 14 Ch T-62, 3 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 25 BRDM-1/-2; APC: M-3, 30 BTR-50, 30 BTR-60, 44 BTR-152.
Arty: how: 6 M-116 75mm pack, 8 M-1942 76mm, 10 M-1944 100mm, 8 M-1938 122mm; MRL: 8 BM-21; mor: 82mm, 10 120mm.
ATK: guns: 5 57mm; RCL: 57mm.
AD: guns: 28 37mm.

(Some T-34 MBT in store).*

NAVY: 200.* (* Spares are short; much eqpt maybe non-operational.)

Base: Point Noire.
FAC(T): 7: 1 Sov Shershen, 3 Pirana HS, 3 Ch Shanghai.
Patrol craft: 9 river<: 5 ARCOR (3 13-metre Type 43,2 11.4-metre Type 38),4 Ch Yulin.
AIR FORCE: 500;21 combat ac*(* Spares are short; much eqpt maybe non-operational.)
FGA: 1 MiG-15, 20 MiG-17.
Tpt: 1 F-28, 5 An-24, 5 Il-14, 3 C-47, 1 Fregate, 2 Broussard.
Trg: 4 L-39.
Hel: 1 Puma, 4 Alouette II/III.
PARA-MILITARY: 6,100: Gendarmerie 1,400; 20 coys. People's Militia 4,700.

DJIBOUTI
Est GDP 1982: fr D 64.60 bn ($363,493 m). 1983: 65.90 bn ($370,808 m).
GDP growth 1983: 1.2%. 1984: 0.9%.
Inflation 1983: 1.4%. 1984: 1.8%.
Est debt 1983: $44.0 m. 1984: $47.0 m.
Est def exp 1983: fr D 4.70 bn ($26,446 m). 1984: 4.950 bn ($27,282 m).
FMA 1983: $1.60 m.* 1984: $2.10 m. (*Excl French military assistance.)

$1=Djibouti francs 177.72 (1982/3), 181.44 (1984).
Population: 394,000.

Men: 18-30: 39,000; 31-45: 27,000.

Women: 18-30: 37,000; 31-45: 26,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 4,500 incl 1,500 Gendarmerie. (Does not incl French garrison - see France, Forces Abroad.)

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 2,870.* (*All services form part of the Army.)
1 inf regt.
1 arty bn.
1 armd sqn.
1 AA bty (more to form).
1 spt bn.
1 border cdo bn.
1 para coy.
AFV: recce: 12 BRDM-2, 4 AML-60, 16 -90; APC: 12 BTR-60.
Arty: how: 24 105mm pack; mor: 81mm, 4 120mm.
ATK: RL: 89mm; RCL: 106mm.
AD: some 6 40mm.
NAVY: 30.*

Base: Djibouti.
Patrol boats: 1 Tecimar coastal<.
Amph: LCA: 3<.
AIR FORCE: 100;* no combat ac or hel.
Tpt: 1 Mystere 20 (VIP), 2 Noratlas; lt: 1 Cessna 206, 1 Rallye 235GT.
Hel: 1 Alouette II.
PARA-MILITARY: 1,500.* Gendarmerie: 1 bn.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Est GDP 1982: B 35.0 bn ($137,255 m). 1983: 20.0 bn ($80.0m).
Debt 1983: $103m. Est 1984: $110 m.

$1=bipkuele 255 (1982), 250(1983).
Population: 410,000.

Men: 18-30: 40,000; 31-45: 31,000.

Women: 18-30: 41,000; 31-45: 33,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,200.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 2,000.
1 inf bn(5 coys).
AFV: recce: 10 BRDM-2; AFC: 10 BTR-152. Arty: mor: 81mm.
NAVY: 150.

Bases: Malabo (Santa Isabel), Bata.
Patrol craft: 1P-6, 1 Poluchat.
AIR FORCE: 50; 2 combat ac.
FGA: 2 MiG-17.
Tpt: 1 Reims Cessna 337, 3 C-212, 1 Yak-40.
Hel: 2 Alouette III.
PARA-MILITARY: some 1,000. Guardia Civil: 2 coys.

ETHIOPIA
GDP 1982/3: EB 10.016 bn ($4,839 bn). 1983/4: 10.055 bn ($4,857 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 0%. 1983: 4.0%.
Inflation 1983: 0%. 1984: 8.4%.
Debt 1983: $1.20 bn.f 1984: $1.90 bn.* (* Excl military grants and aid from USSR and Eastern Europe (est at $2.5 bn).)
Est def budget 1982/3: EB950 m ($458,937 m).t Budget 1983/4: 1.044 bn ($504,155 m).*

(*Incl internal security budget, bu texcl military capital expenditure (est at $275 m for 1983/4).)

$1=birr 2.07(1982/3/4).
Population: 42,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 4,000,000; 31-45: 2,800,000.

Women: 18-30: 4,000,000; 31-45: 2,800,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 217,000.* (*Some 1,400 Soviet, 5,000 Cuban and 250 E.German technicians and advisers operate ac and hy eqpt.)

Terms of service: conscription, 30 months, incl police, border guard.
Reserves: All citizens 18-50 do 6 months trg. Assigned to Army, Police and Border Guard.

ARMY (incl People's Militia): 210,000.
22 inf divs (incl 3 mot, 4 mountain, 3 lt) with some 20 tk bns.
4 para/cdo bdes.
50 arty bns.
25 AD bns (incl 3 bns each of SA-2, SA-3 SAM).
Tks: 65 M-47, 40 T-34,800 T-54/-55, 30 T-62; lt 20 M-41.
AFV: recce: 150 BRDM-1/-2; MICV: 40 BMP-1; APC: some 30 M-113, 600 BTR-40/-60/-152, V-150 Commando.
Arty: gun/how: some 700 incl M-116 75mm pack, 40 M-101 105mm, 350 122mm (incl SP), M-1954 130mm, M-1955/D-20 152mm, 12 towed,

12 M-109 SP 155mm; mor: 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 100 M-38 120mm, 100 M-2/-30 4.2-in. (107mm), 120mm; MRL BM-21 122mm.
ATK: guns: M-1955 100mm; ATGW: Sagger.
AD: guns: ZU-23 23mm, 37mm towed, ZSU-23-4 23mm, M-1950, ZSU-57-2 57mm SP; SAM: 18 SA-2, 18 SA-3, SA-7.

NAVY: 3,000.11

Bases: Massawa, Assab.
Frigates: 2 Petya.
Patrol craft: 14: 7 large (1 Yug Kraljevica, 3 US PGM, 3 Swift ship), 7 coastal (4 Sewart, 1 Poluchat, 2 Zhuk<).
FAC: (G): 4 Sov Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2A; (T): 1 Sov Mol.
Amph: LSM: 2 Polnocny; LCVP: 4 T-4.
Trg: 1 US Barnegat.

AIR FORCE: 4,000;* perhaps 150 combat ac; some 30 armed hel.* (* War situtation makes equipment data suspect.)
FGA: 9 sqns: 1 with 10 MiG-17; 6 with 100 MiG-21; 1 with 35 MiG-23. Some of 16 F-5A/E/B held pre-1978 reported serviceable.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 10 An-12.
Trg: MiG-21U, 10 L-39 Albatros; some 4 SF-260TP.
Hel: incl 32 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 24 Mi-24, some Chetak (Alouette III).
(On order some 6 SF-260 ac, some 10 Chetak hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 169,000. Border Guard.

Mobile emergency police force (9,000).

OPPOSITION: Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) some 6,500 (14 'bdes').

Eritrean Liberation Front-People's Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF) some 5,000

(reported to be merging with ELF Revolutionary Council and ELF Revolutionary Committee to become Eritrean Liberation Front (unified organization)).

People's Liberation Front Revolutionary Guard (PLFRG) some 5,000; Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) some 12,000.

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) some 600; 12 gps.

Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 5,000.

Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).

Mainly small arms but captured eqpt incl T-54/55 tks; APC; 76mm, 85mm, 122mm, 130mm guns/how; 23mm, 37mm, 40mm AA guns.

GABON
GDP 1982: fr CFA 1,184 bn ($3,603 bn). 1983: 1,197 bn ($3,141 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -2.5%. 1983: -1.6%.
Inflation 1983: 10.0%. 1984: 7.0%.
Debt 1983: $875 m. 1984: $1.0 bn.
Def budget* 1983: fr CFA 27.846 bn ($73,073 m). 1984: 29.364 bn ($67,201 m). (* Incl internal security.)
Est FMA 1983: $ 100 m.

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 436.96(1984).
Population: 995,000.

Men: 18-30: 75,000; 31-45: 61,000.

Women: 18-30: 78,000; 31-45: 64,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,400.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 1,700.
Presidential Guard bn gp (1 recce/armd, 3 inf coys, arty, AA btys).
8 inf coys.
1 engr coy.
1 para/cdo coy.
1 service coy.
AFV: recce: 16 Cascavel, 24 AML-90, 12 EE-3 Jararaca; APC: 12 EE-11 Urutu, 6 Commando, M-3, 12 VXB-170.
Arty: how: 4 M-101 105mm; MRL: 140mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm; RCL: Armbrust 67mm, 106mm.
AD: guns: 24 ZU-23-2 23mm, 10 37mm, 2 40mm.

NAVY: 200.

Base: Port Gentil.
FAC (G): 1 Fr 150-ton with 4 SS-12 SSM.
FAC: 3: 1 118-ton Swift, 1 88 ton, 1 80-ton.
Patrol craft: 2< (1 Brazil Type V-3).
Amph: LST: 1; LCM: 3.
Tpt: 1 Batral lt.
(On order 2 P-400 patrol craft).

AIR FORCE: 500; 11 combat ac.
FGA: 9 Mirage 5GD, 1 DR.
MR: 1 EMB-111P1.
Tpt: 5 C-130 Hercules, 3 C-47, 1 DC-8-30, 4 EMB-110, 1 Gulfstream III (VIP), 1 Falcon, 1 YS-11A, 3 Nord 262, 4 Broussard;

lt: 2 Reims Cessna 337, 2 Magister, 4 T-34C.
Hel: 4 Puma, 3 Alouette III.
(On order 4 Beech T-34C1 lt tpt ac).

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard 2,800; 9 patrol craft. Gendarmerie 2,000; 3 'bdes', 11 coys.

Republican Guard. Rapid Intervention Force.

GHANA
GDP 1982: cedi 85.854 bn. 1983: 182.008 bn.
GDP growth 1982: -7.2%. 1983: 0.7%.
Inflation 1983: 125.0%. 1984: 40%.
Debt 1983: $1.9 bn. 1984: $2.0 bn.
Def budget 1982: cedi 587.30 m.
Est FMA 1983: $0.4 m. 1984: $0.3 m.

$1=cedi 2.7503 (1982).*
(* Official exchange rate: continuing economic crisis and multiple exchange rates make meaningful dollar conversions impossible.

Def exp for 1983/4 bfelieved around $80 m.)
Population: 12,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,456,000; 31-45: 833,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,438,000; 31-45: 939,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 15,100.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 12,500.
2 Command HQ:
2 bdes (6 inf bns and spt units).
1 recce bn.
3 border tps bns (were police/customs).
1 para bn.
1 mor bn.
1 fd engr bn.
1 sigs bn.
1 AB coy.
AFV: recce: 25 Saladin; APC: 100 MOWAG Piranha.
Arty: mor 50 81mm, 28 Tampella 120mm; RCL: 50 Carl Gustav 84mm; SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 1,200.

Bases: Sekondi, Tema.

2 Command HQ:
Corvettes: 2 Kromantse ASW.
FAC: 4: 2 FPB-57, 2 FPB-45.
Patrol craft: 6: 2 Dela, 2 Br Ford large; 2 Spear II coastal.

AIR FORCE: 1,400; 10 combat ac.
COIN: 1 sqn with 10 MB-326F/KB.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 Skyvan 3M.
Comms/liaison: 1 sqn with 5 F-27, 1 F-28.
Hel: 2 Alouette III, 2 Bell 212.
Trg: 1 sqn with 11 Bulldog, 8 SF-260TP.
Forces Abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 bn (709).

PARA-MILITARY: People's Militia. Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (National Civil Defence Force).

GUINEA
Est GDP 1982: sylis 35.50 bn ($1,598 bn). 1983: 36.30 bn ($1,551 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 0%. 1983: 1.0%.
Def exp 1982: sylis 1.850 bn ($83,251 m).* (* The USSR, Egypt and Libya have reportedly supplied military aid; value unknown.)

$1=sylis 22.222 (1982), 23.4 (1983).
Population: 5,700,000.

Men: 18-30: 663,000; 31-45: 373,000.

Women: 18-30: 645,000; 31-45: 504,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 9,900 (perhaps 7,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.
ARMY: 8,500.
1 armd bn.
5 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 cdo bn.
1 special force bn.
1 AD bn.
Tks: 45 T-34, 8 T-54; It: 20 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 25 BRDM-1/-2; APC: 40: 16 BTR-40, 10 BTR-50, 8 BTR-60, 6 BTR-152.
Arty: guns/how: 8 76mm, 6 85mm, 12 122mm; mor: 20 M-1938/43 120mm.
ATK: guns: 57mm.
AD: guns: 8 37mm, 12 57mm, 4 100mm; SAM: SA-7, SA-8, 24 SA-6.

NAVY: 600.

Bases: Conakry, Kakanda.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-U.
Patrol craft: 16: 1 T-58 ex-MCM, 2 Sov Shershen, 6 P-6; 7 coastal< incl 5 Sov (3 Poluchat, 2 MO-6).
Amph: LCU: 2.
(On order 1 Swiftship 65-foot, 2 26-foot patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 800; 6 combat ac.
FGA: 6 MiG-17F (serviceability questionable).
Tpt: 4 Il-14, 2 Il-18, 4 An-14, 2 An-24, 1 Yak-40; lt: 1 Reims Cessna F-337.
Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI, 5 Yak-18, 3 L-29, 2 C-l 19.
Hel: 1 Bell 47G, 1 Puma, 1 Gazelle, 1 UH-12B.
PARA-MILITARY: 9,000.

People's Militia: 7,000. Gendarmerie 1,000. Republican Guard 1,000.

GUINEA-BISSAU
Est GDP 1982: pG 9.20 bn ($228,884 m). 1983: 7.0 bn ($155,556 m).
Est def budget 1982: pG 375.0 m ($9,330 m).

$1=Guinea pesos 40.195 (1982), 45 (1983).
Population: 850,000.

Men: 18-30: 85,000; 31-45: 59,000.

Women: 18-30: 97,000; 31-45: 77,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 8,550 (incl Gendarmerie).

Terms of service: ? conscription (selective).

ARMY: 6,200.
1 armd bn (sqn).
5 inf bns.
1 recce sqn.
1 engr coy.
1 arty bn.
Tks: 10 T-34; lt: 20 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 10 BRDM-2; APC: 35 BTR-40/-60/-152, 20 Ch Type-56.
Arty: guns: 18 85mm, 122mm; mor: 8 120mm.
ATK: RL: 89mm; RCL: Ch Type-52 75mm.
AD: guns: 18 23mm, 10 57mm; SAM : SA-7.

NAVY: 275.* (*All services form part of the Army.)

Base: Bissau.
Patrol craft: 13: 1 Shershen large; 2 Ch Shantou, 1 Sov Poluchat, 9 other coastal<.
Amph: LCVP: 2 T-4.
(On order: 4 Bazan coastal patrol craft<.)

AIR FORCE: 75.* (*All services form part of the Army.)
Tpt: 2 Do-27, 2 Yak-40; lt: 1 Reims Cessna FTB-337.
Hel: 1 Alouette II, 2 Alouette III, 1 Mi-8.

PARA-MILITAR Y: Gendarmerie 2,000.*

IVORY COAST
GDP 1982: frCFA 2,484.0 bn ($7,559 bn). 1983: 2,497.7 bn ($6,554 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 1.8%.
Inflation 1983: 7.4%. 1984: 4.3%.
Debt 1983: $6.30 bn. 1984: $7.0 bn.
Def budget 1984: fr CFA 31.262 bn ($71,544 m).* (*Incl equipment cost.) 1985: 32.203 bn ($68,005 m)*.

(*Excl equipment costs and internal security budget.)
Est FMA 1983: $350 m. 1984: $500 m.

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 436.96 (1984), 473.54 (1985).
Population: 9,471,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,087,000; 31-45: 965,000.

Women: 18-30: 967,000; 31-45: 732,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 13,220 (incl full time para-military).

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 6 months.
Reserves: 12,000.

ARMY: 6,100.
4 Military Regions:
3 inf bns.
1 armd sqn (bn being formed).
1 arty bty (gp being formed).
1 AA arty bty.
1 engr coy.
1 HQ coy.
1 spt coy.
1 para coy.
Tks: lt 5 AMX-13. AFV: recce: 7 ERC-90; APC: 16 M-3.
Arty: how: 4 105mm; mor 81mm, 16 120mm. ATK: RL: 89mm STRIM.
AD: guns: 10 20mm, 5 40mm towed, 4 M-3 VDA 20mm SP.

NAVY: 690.

Base: Abidjan.
FAC(G): 2 Patra (4 Exocet MM-40).
Patrol craft: 8: 2 Vigilant (PR-48), 4 Ancor-26, 2-31 launches.
Amph: 1 Batralvsu, 13 assault boats.
Trg ship: 1.

AIR FORCE: 930; 6 combat ac.
FGA: 1 sqn with 6 Alpha Jet.
Tpt: 1 sqn with: ac: 3 F-27, 4 F-28, 6 F-33C Bonanza; hel: 3 SA-330 Puma, 2 Alouette III, 2 SA-365C Dauphin.
Liaison/vip: 1 fit with: ac: 1 F-28 Mk 4000, 1 Metro, 2 Gulfstream II/III; hel: 1 Puma.
Other: ac: 2 Reims Cessna F-337, 1 Cessna 421, 1 King Air, hel: 2 SA-365C Dauphin.

PARA-MILITARY: 7,800: Presidential Guard 1,100. Gendarmerie 4,400; 4 patrol boats.

Militia 1,500. Military Fire Service 800.

KENYA
GDP 1982: K sh 67.989 bn ($6,225 bn). 1983: 76.174 bn ($5,722 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.4%. 1984: 3.9%.
Inflation 1983: 20.0%. 1984: 10.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.40 bn. 1984: $2.70 bn.
Est def budget 1983/4: K sh 3.10 bn ($232,881 m). 1984/5: 3.50 bn ($242,819 m).
Est FMA 1983: $23 m. 1984: $25 m.

$1=shillings 10.9223 (1982), 13.3115 (1983), 14.414(1984).
Population: 19,100,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,048,000; 31-45: 1,176,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,117,000; 31-45: 1,265,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 13,650.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 13,000.
1 armd bde (2 armd bns).
2 inf bdes (1 with 2, 1 with 3 inf bns).
1 engr bde.
1 armd recce bn.
2 arty bns.
2 engr bns.
1 indep air cav bn.
5 inf bns (cadre).
1 para bn.
Air wing with 15 armed hel.
Tks: 76 Vickers Mk 3.
AFV: recce: 30 AML-60, 38 -90, 8 Shorland; APC: 50 UR-416, 12 Panhard M-3.
Arty: guns: 40 lt, 16 105mm pack; how: 12 M-109 155mm SP; mor: 20 81mm, 10 120mm.
ATK: Ki: 50 Carl Gustav 84mm, Wombat 120mm; ATGW: Milan, 8 Swing/Ire.
Avn (pre-1982 Air Force - now reformed under Army):
FGA: 9 F-5E, 2 F-5F; cow: 5 BAC-167 Strikemaster, 12 Hawk T-52;
tpt: 5 DHC-4 Caribou, 6 DHC-5D Buffalo, 7 Do-28D, 1 Nord 262, 1 Turbo Commander, 2 Navajo; trg: 14 Bulldog 103;
hel: 10 Puma, 2 Bell 47G, 32 Hughes (15 500 Scout, 15 500MD with TOW ATGW, 2 500D trg);
msls: Sidewinder AAM, Maverick ASM.

NAVY: 650.

Base: Mombasa.
FAC(G): 4 Brooke Marine (1 37.5-metre, 3 32.6-metre) with 4 Gabriel II SSM.
Patrol craft: 3 Vosper 31-metre (Simba) large.
(On order: 2 Province FAC(G); Gabriel SSM).

PARA-MILITARY: Police (General Service Unit) 1,800: Police Air Wing, 7 Cessna lt ac, 3 Bell hel.

LIBERIA
Est GDP 1983: $L870 m ($US 870 m). 1984: 920 m ($US920 m).
GDP growth 1983: 1.0%. 1984: 2.0%.
Inflation 1983: 3.3%. 1984: 2.0%.
Debt 1983: $US 1.20 bn. Est 1984: $US 1.40 bn.
Def budget 1983/4: $L 22.40 m ($US 22.40 m). Est 1984/5: $L 26.0 m ($US 26.0 m).
FMA 1983: $US 12.70 m. 1984: $US 12.80 m.

$US1=$L 1 (1983/4).
Population: 2,404,000.

Men: 18-30: 222,000; 31-45: 174,000.

Women: 18-30: 227,000; 31-45: 172,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 6,750.

Terms of service: voluntary; militia conscription authorized, not in force.
Reserves: 750,000 males 16-45.
ARMY: 6,300.
1 Executive Mansion Guard bn.
6 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 armd recce sqn.
1 service bn.
1 air recce bn (250).
AFV: recce: 12 M-3A1.
Arty: how: 75mm pack, 8 105mm; mor: 20 60mm, 10 81mm, 4.2-in. (107mm).
ATK: Ri: 3.5-in. (89mm); RCL: 57mm, 106mm.
Avn: MR: 1 Cessna 337; tpt: 2 C-47; lt ac: 13 Cessna (2 172,1 185, 1 207,9 337).

(On order 7 Arava: 3 recce, 4 tpt ac.)
NAVY (Coastguard): 450.

Bases: Monrovia, Bassa, Sinoe, Cape Palmas.
Patrol craft: 5: 3 Swed CG-27 50-ton, 2 Swiftships 38-ton.
PARA-MILITARY: National Police 2,000.

MADAGASCAR
GDP 1982: fr M 1,045.90 bn ($2,991 bn). Est 1983: 1,250.0 bn ($2,904 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.5%. 1984: 1.5%.
Inflation 1983: 19.0%. 1984: 10.0%.
Est debt 1983: $1.20 bn. Debt 1984: $1.40 bn.
Def budget 1984: fr M 31.730 bn ($55,029 m). 1985: 36.0 bn ($52,554 m).
FMA 1983: $100m. 1984: $150m.

$1=Malagasy francs 349.71 (1982), 430.45 (1983), 576.6 (1984), 685.01 (1985).
Population: 9,962,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,083,000; 31-45: 632,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,074,000; 31-45: 702,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 21,100.

Terms of service: national service (incl civil), 18 months.

ARMY: 20,000.
2 bn gps.
1 engr regt.
1 sigs regt.
1 service regt.
7 construction regts.
Tks: 12 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 8 M-8, (?20) M-3A1, 10 Ferret, (?35) BRDM-2; APC: (?30) M-3A1 half-track.
Arty: guns: 12 ZIS-3 76mm; how: 12 122mm; mor. 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm.
AD: guns: 50 ZPU-4 14.5mm.

NAVY: 600 (incl 120 marines).

Base: Diego-Suarez.
Patrol craft: 1 PR-48 large.
Amph: LSM: 1 Batram with 8 SS-12 SSM; LCM: 1 N.Korean Nampo.
1 marine coy+.

AIR FORCE: 500; 12 combat ac.
FGA: 1 sqn with 4 MiG-17, 8 MiG-21FL.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 HS-748 (VIP), 4 An-26, 2 Yak-40, 1 C-53D, 5 C-47, 1 Defender, An-12, 1 Aztec, 3 Cessna 337, 5 lt ac.
Hel: 1 sqn with 1 Bell 47, 3 Alouette Will, 2 Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 8,000, incl maritime police with 5 patrol craft.

MALAWI
GDP 1983: K 1.559 bn ($1,327 bn). 1984: 1.695 bn ($1,199 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 4.9%. 1984: 7.6%.
Inflation 1983: 13.5%. 1984: 19.0%.
Debt 1983: $720 m.1984: $900 m.
Def budget 1983: K 27.0 m ($22,983 m). Est 1984: 27.9 m ($19,740 m).
FMA 1983: $250 m. 1984: $250 m.

$l=kwacha 1.1748 (1983), 1.4134(1984).
Population: 6,833,000.

Men: 18-30: 656,000; 31-45: 479,000.

Women: 18-30: 713,000; 31-45: 524,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 5,250. (* All Services form part of the Army.)

Terms of service: voluntary, 7 years.
Reserves: Army: some 500; ex-soldiers have a 5-year obligation.
ARMY: 5,000.*
3 inf bns.
1 spt bn (incl 1 recce sqn).
AFV: recce: 10 Fox, 10 BRDM-2. Arty: guns: 9 105mm; mor: 81mm. ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm); RCL: 57mm. AD: SAM: 14 Blowpipe.
MARINE: 100.*

Base: Chilumba.
Patrol boats: 1 Fr21 metre, 1 Spear, 3 lake<.
AIR: 150;* no combat ac or hel.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 Do-27, 8 Do-28, 1 BN-2T ac.
Hel: 1 sqn with 3 Puma, 1 Alouette III.
(On order 1 AS-365, 1 AS-350 hel.)
PARA-MILITARY: 1,000; Police: 1 BN-2T Defender ac (border patrol).

MALI

GDP 1982: fr CFA 395.32 bn ($1,203 bn). 1983: 420.0 bn ($1,102 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 4.4%. 1983: 2.5%.
Debt 1983: $880.0 m. 1984: $1.10 bn.
Est def budget 1983: frCFA 16 bn ($41,988 m). 1984: 12 bn ($27,462 m).
FMA 1983: $100m. 1984: $150 m.

$1=francs CFA 328.61 (1982), 381.06 (1983), 436.96 (1984).
Population: 7,915,000.

Men: 18-30: 697,000; 31-45: 441,000.

Women: 18-30: 765,000; 31-45: 637,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 4,950. (* All Services form part of the Army.)

Terms of service: national service (incl civil), 2 years (selective).
ARMY: 4,600.*
1 tk bn.
3 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 para bn.
1 special force bn.
2 AA arty coys.
1 SAM bty.
Tks: 21 T-34; lt 12 Type 62.
AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-2; APC: 30 BTR-40, 10 BTR-152, 10 BTR-60.
Arty: guns: 6 85mm, 6 100mm, 8 D-30 122mm; MRL: 2 BM-21 122mm; mor: 81mm, 30 120mm.
AD: guns: 6 37mm, 6 57mm; SAM: 6 SA-3.* (*Eqpt serviceability questionable.)
NAVY: 50.*

Bases: Bamako, Mopti, Segou, Timbuktu.
Patrol craft: 3 river<.
AIR FORCE (Army Air Coy): 300;* 5 combat ac.
FGA: 5 MiG-17.
Tpt: 2 C-47, 3 An-2, 2 An-24, 2 An-26, 1 Corvette 200 (VIP).
Trg: 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yak-ll/-18.
Hel: 2 Mi-4, 1 Mi-8.
PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 5,800; 8 coys. Republican Guard 2,000. Militia 3,000. Civilian Defence Organization 1,500.

MAURITANIA
GDP 1981: OM 34.50 bn ($714,345 m). 1982: 37.60 bn ($726,303 m).
Inflation 1983: 7.0%. 1984: 1.0%.
Debt 1983: $1.20 bn. 1984: $1.40 bn.
Est def budget 1982: OM 3.50 bn ($67,608 m).
FMA 1983: $200 m. 1984: $250 m.

$1=ouguiyas 48.296 (1981), 51.769 (1982).
Population: 1,850,000.

Men: 18-30: 172,000; 31-45: 123,000.

Women: 18-30: 177,000; 31-45: 129,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 8,470.

Terms of service: voluntary; conscription (2 years) authorized.
ARMY: 8,000.
1 inf bn.
1 arty bn.
1 Camel Corps.
3 armd recce sqns.
1 AA bty.
1 engr coy.
1 para coy.
AFV: recce: 15 EBR-75 hy, 39 AML-60, 14 -90, 12 M-3A1; APC: 40 M-3 half-track.
Arty: mor: 81mm, 8 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm, 75mm, 106mm.
AD: guns: 14.5mm, ZU-23-2, 6 37mm; SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 320.

Bases: Port Etienne, Nouadhibou.
Patrol craft: 8: 1 Fr Patra-class, 3 Barcelo, 4<.

AIR FORCE: 150; 9 combat ac.

COIN: 5 Defender, 4 Cessna 337.

MR: 4 Piper Cheyenne.

Tpt: 1DHC-5D, 1 Caravelle, 2 Skyvan, 2 Islander.

PARA-MILITARY: 5,000.

Gendarmerie 2,500; 6 regional coys (Def Ministry). National Guard 1,400. Border Guard 100. Auxiliaries 1,000(Interior Ministry).

MOZAMBIQUE
GDP 1982: M 89.30 bn ($2,928 bn). Est 1983: 82.0 bn ($3,008 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 0%. 1983: -0.8%.
Debt 1983: $1.35 bn. Est 1984: $1.50 bn.
Est def exp 1982: M 6.20 bn ($203,279m).
Est FMA 1984: $1.8 m.* (* Western military aid only.)

$1=meticais 30.5(1982), 27.257 (1983).
Population: 12,324,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,464,000; 31-45: 1,023,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,532,000; 31-45: 1,076,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 15,800 (some 10,500 conscripts).* (*Cuban, East German and Soviet advisers reported.)

Terms of service: conscription (selective), 2 years (incl women).
ARMY: 14,000 (perhaps 75% conscripts).
1 tk bde (Presidential Guard).
7 inf bdes (each 1 tk, 3 inf, 2 mot, 2 arty, 1 AD bns, spt units).
2 indep mech bns.
7 AA arty bns.
Tks: 195 T-34, some 90 T-54/-55.
AFV: recce: 30 BRDM-1/-2; APC: 200 BTR-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 250 M-1942 76mm, M-1945 85mm, 24 M-1944 100mm, M-1938 122mm, 24 M-1946 130mm; how: M-101 105mm;

MRL: 30 BM-21 122mm; mor: 325 60mm, 82mm and 120mm.
ATK: Rd: 75mm, B-10 82mm, B-11 107mm; ATGW: Sagger.
AD: guns: 300 20mm, ZU-23 23mm, 37mm, 57mm towed and ZSU-57-2 SP; SAN: 10 SA-3, SA-7.*

NAVY: 800.* (*Eqpt serviceability questionable. Some in store.)

Bases: Maputo, Beira, Nacala, Pemba, Metangula.
Patrol craft: 26 coastal<: 6 Sov (5 Zhuk<, 1 Poluchat), 6 Port (1 Antares, 3 Jupiter, 2 Bellatrix), 4 Neth, 10 Indian.
Amph: LCT: 1 Port Alabarda 500-ton: LCU: 2 LDM-100.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; some 18 combat ac* (*Eqpt serviceability questionable. Some in store.)
FGA: 3 sqns with some 18 MiG-17.
Hel: 1 sqn with 4 Mi-8(some Mi-24 reported).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Tu-134, 4 An-26.
Trg: L-39, 7 Zlin, 3 MiG-15.

PARA-MILITARY: Border Guard 9,500: 4 bdes. Provincial, People's Militias, Local Militias (village self-defence force).
OPPOSITION: National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (MNR or Renamo): up to 15,000 reported, perhaps 6,000 trained, 3,000 reserve.

NIGER
GDP 1982: fr CFA 653.40 bn ($1,988 bn). 1983: 697.20 bn ($1,830bn).
GDP growth 1982: ^1.0%. 1983: -3.5%.
Inflation 1983: 0%. 1984: 8.5%.
Debt 1983: $950.0 m.
Def budget 1983: fr CFA 5.0 bn ($13,121 m). 1984: 4.5 bn ($10,297m).

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 437(1984).
Population: 6,180,000.

Men: 18-30: 670,000; 31-45: 466,000.

Women: 18-30: 685,000; 31-45: 479,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,220.

Terms of service: conscription (2 years), selective. !
ARMY: 2,150.
3 Military Districts.
2 armd recce sqns.
6 inf coys.
1 engr coy.
1 para coy.
1 log/spt coy.
AFV: recce: 10 M-8, 18 AML-90, 18 AML-60-7; APC: 14 M-3.
Arty: mor: 60mm, 81mm, 15 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm, 75mm.
AD: guns: 10 M-3 VDA 20mm SP.
AIR FORCE: 70; no combat ac or hel.
Tpt: 1 Boeing 737 (VIP), 2 C-47, 2 C-130H, 3 Do-28D, 1 Aero Commander 500, 1 Reims Cessna F-337.
PARA-MILITARY: some 2,550. Gendarmerie (?850); 5 groups. Presidential Guard (?200). Republican Guard (? 1,500).

Four Nomad patrol groups.

NIGERIA
GDP 1982: N 44.884 bn ($66,673 bn).Est 1983: 49.0 bn ($67,736 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -6.4%. 1984: -1.0%.
Inflation 1983: 38.0%. 1984: 44.0%.
Debt 1983: $18.50 bn. 1984: $20.0 bn.
Def budget* 1984: N 928.2 m ($1,215 bn). 1985: 975.7 m ($1,106 bn). (* Excl N 3.94 bn development plan.)

$1=naira 0.6732 (1982), 0.7234 (1983), 0.7642 (1984), 0.8825 (1985).
Population: 94,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 10,310,000; 31-45: 6,799,000.

Women: 18-30: 10,493,000; 31-45: 7,058,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 94,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: strength unknown; in all services.

ARMY: 80,000.
1 armd div (4 armd, 1 mech bdes).
1 composite div (incl 1 AB, 1 air portable, 1 amph bdes).
2 mech divs (each 3 mech bdes).
4 arty bdes 1 organic
4 engr bdes r to divs
4 recce bns (1 each)
1 Guards bde(1 armd recce, 3 inf bns).
Tks: 40 T-55, 36 Vickers Mk 3; It: 50 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 20 Saladin, 90 AML-90, 55 Fox, APC: 10 Saracen, 6 M-3 VPC, 4 AMX VTT, 26 Steyr 4K-7FA.
Arty: guns: 76mm, 200 D-30/-74 122mm, 30 M-46 130mm; how: 200 M-56 105mm; mor: 200 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm.
AD: guns: some 60 200mm, 40mm towed, 30 ZSU-23-4 SP; SAM: Blowpipe, 16 Roland.
(On order 36 Vickers Mk 3 MBT, 70 4K-7FA APC; 25 Bofors FH-77B 155mm, 25 Palmaria 155mm SP how; Swingfire ATGW; Blowpipe,

16 Roland SAM.)

NAVY: 5,000.

Bases: Apapa (Lagos; Western Command), Calabar (Eastern Command).
2 Commands:
Frigates: 2 ASW: 1 Meko 360H with 8 Otomat SSM, 1x8 Aspide SAM, 1 Lynx hel; 1 ex-Neth (trg).
Corvettes: 4: 2 Hippo (Vosper Thornycroft Mk 9) with 2 x 3 Seacat SAM; 2 Dorina Mk 3 (may not be operational).
FAC(G): 6: 3 Lurssen Type-57 with 4 Otomat SSM; 3 La Combattante III B with 2x2 Exocet MM-38.
Patrol craft: 9 large: 4 Makurdi, 4 Argun Gu, 1 Yan-Yan.
Amph: IST: 2 Type-502 (Crocodile); LCU: 2.
Hel: 3 Lynx Mk 89 MR/SAR.
(On order 2 Lerici MCMV.)

AIR FORCE: 9,000; 49 combat ac.
FGA/interceptor: 3 sqns: 1 with 16 Alpha Jet; 2 with 17 MiG-21MF (to be replaced); 14 Jaguar (12-5N, 2-BN).
SAR: 1 sqn with: ac: 2 F-27MPA MR; hel: 20 BO-105C/D.
Tpt: 2 sqns with 9 C-13OH-3O, 3 F-27,5 G-222, 1 Gulfstream III (VIP), 1 Super King Air.
Spt: 3 sqns with 13 Do-28D, some 14 Do-128-6.
Hel incl 14 Puma.
Trg: ac: 2 MiG-21U, P-149D, 12 MB-339, 4 Jaguar, 25 Bulldog, hel: 15 Hughes300.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order. 18 MiG-21 (12 MF, 6 U), 8 Alpha Jet FGA; some 4 Do-128-6 utility ac; 5 CH-47 Chinook hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard: 15 Abeokuta, 3 other patrol craft. Port Security Police 12,000.

Security and Civil Defence Corps (Ministry of Internal Affairs): Police: UR-416 APC, 4 hel, 68 small craft, 7 hovercraft (5 AV Tiger).

RWANDA
GDP 1982: fr R 134.40 bn ($1,448 bn).Est 1983: 141.5 bn ($1.50bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.0%. 1984: 2.9%.
Inflation 1983: 6.6%. 1984: 5.4%.
Est debt 1983: $250 m. 1984: $330 m.
Est def exp 1983: fr R 2.70 bn ($28,620 m). 1984: 3.0 bn ($29,949 m).

$1=Rwanda francs 92.84 (1982), 94.34 (1983), 100.17(1984).
Population: 5,560,000.

Men: 18-30: 705,000; 31-45: 341,000.

Women: 18-30: 699,000; 31-45: 395,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 5,150. (* All services form part of the Army.)

Terms ofservice: voluntary.
ARMY: 5,000.*
1 cdo bn.
1 recce sqn.
8 inf coys.
1 engr coy.
AFV: recce: 12 AML-60; APC: 16 M-3.
Arty: mor: 8 81mm. ATK: RL: Blindicide 83mm; guns: 6
AIR: 150; 4 combat ac *
COIN: 2 BN Defender, 2 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 Caravelle (VIP); 2 C-47, 2 Rallye 235G.
Liaison: hel: 6 SA-342L Gazelle, 2 Alouette III.
Trg: 1 CM-110 Magister.
PARA-MILITARY: 1,200.

SENEGAMBIA

Senegal and The Gambia signed and ratified a Confederation Pact in December 1981, which included plans to combine their forces. The exact nature and extent of the amalgamation is still unclear; the Gambian Army apparently functions as a Gendarmerie with civilian-manned marine and air elements. Senegal formed a new Gendarmerie in 1984.

In December 1983 a confederal defence budget of frCFA 3.451 bn was introduced.

SENEGAL
GDP 1982/3: fr CFA 840.60 bn ($2,833 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -3.3%. 1983: -14.0%.
Inflation 1983: 12.0%. 1984: 12.0%.
Debt 1983: $1.50 bn. 1984: $1.80 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: frCFA28.092 bn ($68,589 m). 1985/6: 28.380 bn ($59,932 m).
FMA 1983: $1.0 m. 1984: $3.50 m.

$1=francs CFA 296.683 (1982), 409.568 (1984), 473.54 (1985).
Population: 6,464,000.

Men: 18-30: 705,000; 31-45: 341,000.

Women: 18-30: 706,000; 31-45: 495,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 9,700.

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years selective.
ARMY: 8,500.
4 Military Zone HQ.
5 inf bns.
1 engr bn.
1 trg bn.
1 Presidential Guard (horsed).
1 recce sqn.
1 arty gp.
1 AA arty gp.
2 para coys.
3 construction coys.
AFV: recce: 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 AML-60, 27 -90; APC: some 40 Panhard M-3, 25 M-3 halftrack.
Arty: how: 6 M-116 75mm pack, 6 M-101 105mm; mor: 8 81mm, 8 120mm.
ATK: RL: STRIM-89; ATGW: Milan.
AD: guns: 21 M-693 20mm, 40mm.
NAVY: 700.

Base: Dakar.
Patrol craft: 8: 1 PR-2M, 3 P-48 large, 3 Interceptor, 1 Tracker coastal<.
Amph: LCT: 1; LCM: 2.
AIR FORCE: 500; 2 combat ac.
MR/SAR: 1 EMB-111 maritime Bandeirante, 1 DHC-6.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Boeing 727-200, 1 Caravelle (VIP); 5 C-47, 6 F-27-400M.
Trg: incl 6 Magister, 1 Reims Cessna F-337; lt: 6 Rallye 235G.
Hel: incl 1 Gazelle, 1 Puma, 2 Alouette II.
PARA-MILITARY: 6,800 Gendarmerie: 12 VXB-170 APC Customs: 17 coastal patrol craft (11 armed).

THE GAMBIA
GDP 1982/3: D 560.0 m ($226,180 m). 1983/4: 614.60 m ($208,778 m).

$1=dalasi 2.4759 (1982/3), 2.9438 (1983/4).
Population: 688,800.

Men: 18-30: 77,000; 31-45: 65,000.

Women: 18-30: 78,000; 31-45: 59,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 475.

Terms of service: voluntary; some compulsory conditions authorized.
GENDARMERIE: 400.
Recce: 8 Ferret. RL: 4 M-20 3.5-in. (89mm).
MARINE: 50.

Base: Banjul.
Patrol boats: 2 coastal: 1 31-ton Tracker, 1 17-ton Lance.
AIR: 25.

Tpt: 1 Skyvan 3M, 1 BN-2 Defender.

SEYCHELLES

GDP 1982: SR 965.1 m ($147.29 m). 1983: 1.020 bn ($150.72 m).
GDP growth 1982: -0.5%.
Inflation 1983: 6.0%. 1984: 3.2%.
Est def budget 1982: SR 42.25 m ($6.45 m). 1983: 58 m ($8.57 m).

$1=Seychelles rupees 6.5525 (1982), 6.7676 (1983).
Population: 67,800.

Men: 18-30: 9,000; 31-45: 4,800.

Women: 18-30: 9,000; 31-45: 3,800.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 1,200. (* All services form part of the Army.)

Terms of service: conscription: 2 years.
ARMY: 1,000.*
1 inf bn.
2 arty tps.
Spt coy.
AFV: recce: 6 BRDM-2, (?8)Shorland.
Arty: guns: 3 D-30/M-1963 122mm; ML: 4 BM-21; mor: 6 M-1937 82mm. RL: RPG-7. SAM: SA-7.
MARINE: 100.*

Base: Port Victoria.
Patrol craft: 1 lt FPB-42; 2 Zhuk<, 1 coastal<.
Amph: LCT: 1.
PARA-MILITARY: People's Militia 900.

SIERRA LEONE
GDP 1982/3: Le 1.605 bn ($1,271 bn). Est 1983/4: 2.65 bn($1.056 bn).
GDP growth 1982/3: -1.8%. 1983/4: 0: 5%.
Inflation 1983/4: 73.0%.
Debt 1983: $400.0 m.
Def budget 1982/3: Le 17.5 m ($13,860 m). 1983/4: 24 m ($9,562m).

$1=Leones 1.2626 (1982/3), 2.51(1983/4).
Population: 3,944,000.

Men: 18-30: 353,000; 31-45: 276,000.

Women: 18-30: 363,000; 31-45: 280,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 3,100.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 3,000.
2 inf bns.
2 arty btys.
1 engr sqn.
AFV: recce: 4 Saladin; *PC: 10 MOWAG Piranha.
Arty: guns/how: 10 25-pdr (88mm); mor: 60mm, 81mm.
ATK: RL: M-20 3.5-in; RCL: Carl Gustav 84mm.
AD: SAKSA-7.
NAVY: 100(coastguard).

Base: Freetown.
Patrol boat: 1 Tracker II<.
AIR: (civilian crew: ?4).
Hel: 1 BO-105 (VIP).
PARA-MILITARY: 800. State Security Division: 1 special forces bn.

SOMALI REPUBLIC

Est GDP 1982: S sh 16.5 bn ($1,535 bn). 1983: 20 bn ($1,267 bn).
Inflation 1983: 20.0%. 1984: 92.0%.
Est debt 1983: $1.20 bn. 1984: $1.60 bn.
Def budget 1983: S sh 1.933 bn ($122,437 m). 1984: 2.601 bn ($129,927 m).
Est FMA 1983: $35.0 m. 1984: $45.0 m.

$1=Somali shillings 10.7504 (1982), 15.7877 (1983), 20.019 (1984).
Population: 6,432,000.

Men: 18-30: 509,000; 31-45: 366,000.

Women: 18-30: 511,000; 31-45: 375,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 62,700.

Terms of service: conscription (males 18-40), 2 years selective.

ARMY: 60,000.
3 corps, 8 div HQ.
3 tk/mech bdes.
20 inf bdes.
1 cdo bde.
1 SAM bde.
30 fd, 1 AA arty bns.
Tks: 35 T-34, 45 T-54/-55, 100 M-47, 35 Centurion.
AFV: recce: 35 BRDM-2, 15 AML-90; APC: 65 BTR-40/-50/-60, 100 BTR-152, V-150 Commando, 24 M-113 with TOW, 300 Fiat 6614/6616.
Arty: guns/how: about 70 76mm, M-1945 85mm and M-1955 100mm, 60 M-1938 122mm, M-1946 130mm; mor: 81mm, 50 120mm.
ATK: RL: 300 STRIM-89; RCL: 106mm; ATGW: 100 Milan.
AD: guns: ZU-23, 5 ZSU-23-4 SP 23mm, M-1939 37mm, M-1950 57mm, M-1949 100mm; SAM: 40 SA-2, 10 SA-3, SA-7.f

NAVY: 700.* (*Spares are short and much eqpt is unserviceable.)

Bases: Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayu.
FAC: (G): 2 Ora-II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM; (T): 8: 4 Mol, 4 P-6G.
Patrol craft: 5 Poluchat large<.
Amph: LCT: 1 Polnocny, LCM: 4 T-4.

AIR FORCE: 2,000; 64 combat ac*(*Spares are short and much eqpt is unserviceable.)
FGA: 3 sqns with 9 MiG-17, 10 Hunter FGA-76, 2 T-77.
Ftr: 3 sqns with 7 MiG-21MF, 30 Ch J-6.
COIN: 1 sqn with 6 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 5 Islander, 2 An-24/-26, 2 C-47, 4 G-222,4 Piaggio P-166-DL3 recce/tpt.
Hel: 1 sqn with 4 Mi-4, 2 Mi-8, 1 AB-204, 4 AB-212 (2 vip).
Trg: incl 2 MiG-15UTI, 4 SF-260W.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order. SIAI S-211 COIN, 6 C-212 tpt ac; 4 Agusta Bell hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 29,500.

Police 8,000; 2 Do-28 ac. Border Guards 1,500. People's Militia 20,000.

SOUTH AFRICA
GDP 1983/4: R 89.333 bn ($77,816 bn). 1984/5: 104.765 bn ($64,495 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -3.2%. 1984: 4.7%.
Inflation 1983: 11%. 1984: 13.2%.
Debt 1983: $23.50 bn. Est 1984: $25.0 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: R 3.954 bn ($2,434 bn). 1985/6: 4.274 bn ($2,147 bn).* (* Excl intelligence and internal security force budget.)

$1=rand 1.148 (1983/4), 1.6244 (1984/5), 1.9904(1985).
Population: 29,000,000 (Black: 15,250,000; White: 4,600,000; Coloured: 2,800,000; Asian: 805,000; Homelands: 5,500,000).

Men: 18-30: 3,730,000; 31-45: 2,865,000.

Women: 18-30: 3,722,000; 31-45: 2,714,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 106,400 (64,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: 24 months. Reservists: 8 camps totalling up to 240 days, then commitment to age 65.
Reserves: 317,000. Army 140,000; Navy 2,000; Air 25,000.

After National Service, active reservists serve in the Citizen Force for 12 years, in which they spend 720 days in uniform.

They then serve 5 years in the Citizen Force Reserve (150,000) and may be allocated to the Commando Force,

where they serve 12 days a year up to age 55.

ARMY: 76,400. Regulars: 18,400 (12,000 White, 5,400 Black and Coloured, 1,000 women).

National Service: 58,000. Part-time Citizen Force and Commando.
11 territorial commands.
2 div HQ (1 armd, 1 mech inf*).
1 armd bde (2 tk, 1 mech inf bns).*
1 mech bde (1 armd car, 2 mot inf bns).*
3 mot bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 armd car bn).*
1 para bde (3 para bns).*
1 special recce regt.
9 fd, 3 med, 6 lt AA arty regts.*
1 AA missile regt (3 Crotale, 3 Tigercat btys).
15 fd engr sqns.*
3 sigs regts, 3 sigs sqns.

(* Cadre formations completing the 2 divs when brought to full strength on mobilization of Citizen Force.)
Tks: some 250 Centurion/Olifant.
AFV: recce: 1,600 Eland (90mm gun, 60mm mor); MICV: 1,500 Rate! (20mm/60mm/90mm gun);

APC: 1,500 incl Buffalo, Hippo, Rhino, Lynx (wheeled).
Arty: how: 30 25-pdr (88mm), 75 5.5-in. (140mm), 40 G-5 towed, (?10) G-6 SP 155mm, 20 Valkiri 127mm SP; mor: 81mm, 120 120mm.
ATK: HCL: 84mm, 106mm; guns: 6-pdr (57mm), 17-pdr (76mm), M-67 90mm; ATGW: SS-11, 120 ENTAC.
AD: guns: 20mm, 55 K-63 twin 35mm, 25 L/70 40mm, 15 3.7-in. (94mm); SAM: 20 Cactus (Crotale), 54 Tigercat.

NAVY: 9,000, incl 900 marines, 4,000 conscripts.

Bases: Simonstown, Durban.
Subs: 3 Daphne.
Frigates: 1 President (Br Type-12) ASW with 1 Wasp hel (trg).
FAC(G): 9 MOD (Minister of Defence) (Reshef (Saar-4)-type) with 6 Skorpioen (Gabriel-type) SSM.
Patrol craft: 4 Br Ford, 4 mod Ton, 1 other large; 30 Namacurra armed harbour.
MCMV: 6: 3 Br Ton minesweepers, 3 Ton minehunters.
1 fleet replenishment ship (with hel deck; 2 hel).
1 ocean (2 hel), 1 inshore hydrographic ships.
(On order 3 MOD, 3 Dvora-type FAC(G).)
MARINES: (900; 600 conscripts); 9 local harbour defence units.

AIR FORCE: 13,000 (2,000 conscripts); 356 combat ac (incl 93 with Citizen Force), some 16 armed hel.
3 Territorial Area Commands; Trg, Tactical Spt, Logistics Commands.
Bbrs: 2 sqns: 1 with 5 Canberra B(I)12, 3 T-4; 1 with 6 Buccaneer S-50.
FGA: 4 sqns with 20 Mirage F-1AZ, 82 MB-326M/K Impala I/II.
Interceptor/FGA/recce: 2 sqns: 1 AD with 20 Mirage IIICZ/EZ; 1 with 12 F-1CZ; 1 fit with 6 RZ/R2Z.
Hel: 7 sqns with 12 Super Frelon, 50 Puma, 80 Alouette III.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 with 7 C-130B, 9 Transall C-160Z; 1 with 4 HS-125 Mercurius, 1 Viscount 781; 1 with 12 C-47.
Liaison: 3 sqns with 15 AM-3C Bosbok, 25 C-4M Kudu, 20 Cessna 185.
Recce/MR: 2 sqns: 1 with some 8 C-47; 1 with 12 Piaggio P-166S-DL3MAR Albatross. Some C-130 have a MR role.
Trg: 1 sqn with C-47 and Albatross.
Attack/trg: 1 sqn with 24 Impala l/II.
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 10 Wasp HAS-1, 6 Alouette III.
Training Command (incl ocu):

6 schools: ac: 80 T-6G Harvard IIA/III, 40 Impala I/II, 25 Mirage III (some 10 EZ, some R2Z, some 10 D2Z), 12 C-47;

hel: 30 Alouette II/III.
Reserves: 93 Impala COIN ac 15 L-100(Hercules; civil freight ac).
AAM: R-530, R-550 Magic, Sidewinder, Kukri V-3 (Sidewinder-type). ASM: AS-20/30.
(On order: 4 Partenavia: 3 Spartacus (liaison/tpt), 1 Observer (patrol) ac).
Medical Corps: 8,000.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF): (21,000).

Conscription: 24 months (all race groups), selective, with Citizen Force (Reserve) commitment.
Four Area Commands:
26 Area Force units (similar to South African Commandos).

1 engr, 1 sigs bns.

1 mounted specialized unit.

lt inf bns.
Air 1 sqn lt ac (Citizen Force).
Mobile Reserve: 1 mot inf bde (3 mot inf bns, 1 armd car regt (bn), 1 arty regt, spt units). 1 mot, 4 lt inf bn Regulars,

rest Citizen Force, 3 trg units, 1 engr, 1 sigs bns.
Para-Military: Industrial Defence units.
PARA-MILITARY: Commandos 130,000; inf bn-type protective units in formations of 5+; 12 months initial, 19 days annual trg.

Air Commando 20,000; 13 sqns with private ac.

South African Police 35,500 (19,500 White, 16,000 Non-white), Police Reserves 20,000.

Coastguard to form; 7 MR ac planned.

OPPOSITION:
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) (6,000-8,500); possibly 7 field bns:

Tks: T-34/-54. APC: BTR. ATGW: RPG-7. SAM: SA-7.
African National Congress: perhaps 10,000 trained guerrillas.

TANZANIA
GDP 1981/2: T sh 47.853 bn ($5,534 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0%. 1984: 0.6%.
Inflation 1983: 26.0%. 1984: 36.0%.
Debt 1983: $1.80 bn. 1984: $2.10 bn.
Est def exp 1981/2: T sh 2.745 bn ($317.46 m). 1982/3: 3.0 bn ($307.31 m).

$1=shillings 8.6468 (1981/2), 9.762 (1982/3).
Population: 21,300,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,179,000; 31-45: 1,562,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,249,000; 31-45: 1,625,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 40,350 (perhaps 20,000 conscripts).

Terms of service: national service incl civil duties, 2 years.

ARMY: 38,500 (some 20,000 conscripts).
2 div HQ.
8 inf bdes.
1 tk bn.
2 fd arty bns, 2 AA arty bns (6 btys).
2 mor bns.
1 SAM bn with SA-3, SA-6.
2 ATK bns.
2 sigs bns.
Tks: 30 Ch Type-59; It: 30 Ch Type-62, 36 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-2; APC: 50 BTR-40/-152.
Arty: guns: 40 ZIS-3 and Ch Type-54 76mm, 200 122mm, 50 130mm; MRL: 50 BM-21 122mm; mor: 350 82mm and 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 540 Ch Type-52, US M-20 75mm.
AD: guns: 280 ZPU-2/-4 14.5mm, 40 ZU-23, 120 Ch Type-55 37mm; SAM : 9 SA-3, 12 SA-6, 40 SA-7.

NAVY: 850.

Bases: Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar.
FAC: 7 Ch Shanghai-ll.
Patrol craft: 12 coastal<: 1 GDR Schwalbe, 2 GDR MB-13 50-ton, 3 Ch Yulin, 2 N. Korean Nampo mod LCA; 4 Vosper Thornycroft 75-ft in Zanzibar.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 29 combat ac.
Ftr: 3 sqns with 11 Ch J-7, 15 J-6, 3 J-4.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 HS-125-700, 1 An-2, 3 HS-748, 6 DHC-5D.
Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI, 6 Piper Cherokee, 8 Cessna (6 310, 2 404).
Hel: 2 Bell 47G, 5 AB-205, 6 AB-206.
(On order An-26, An-32 tpt ac.)

Forces Abroad: Mozambique 200; trg team. Uganda 500.

PARA-MILITARY: Police Field Force 1,400. Police Marine Unit (100). Citizen's Militia; 50,000.

TOGO
GDP 1982: fr CFA 269.90 bn (821.313 m). 1983: 284.720 bn ($747,159 m).
GDP growth 1982: 1.0%. 1983: -2.5%.
Inflation 1983: 9.0%. 1984: -3.5%.
Est debt 1983: $805 m. 1984: $900 m.
Est def budget 1984: fr CFA 7.50 bn ($17,162 m). 1985: 8.20 bn ($17,316 m).

$1=francs CFA 328.62 (1982), 381.07 (1983), 437 (1984), 473.54 (1985)
Population: 2,900,000.

Men: 18-30: 275,600; 31-45: 191,400.

Women: 18-30: 333,000; 31-45: 226,600.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 5,110 (incl Gendarmerie). (* All services form part of the Army.)

Terms of service, conscription, 2 yrs (selective).
ARMY: 4,000.*
2 inf regts: 1 with 1 mech bn, 1 mot bn; 1 with 2 armd sqns, 3 inf coys; spt units (trg).
1 Presidential Guard regt: 2 bns (1 cdo), 2 coys.
1 para cdo regt: 3 coys.
1 spt regt.
1 fd arty bty.
2 AA arty btys.
1 log/tpt/engr bn.
Tks: 7 T-34, 2 T-54/-55.
AFV: recce: 6 M-8, 3 M-20, 3 AML-60, 7 -90, 36 EE-9 Cascavel; APC: 4 M-3A1, 30 UR-416.
Arty: guns: 4 HM-2 105mm; mor: 20 81/82mm.
ATK: RCL: 5 ZIS-2 57mm, 12 Ch Type-52/-56 75mm, 10 Ch Type-65 85mm.
AD: guns: 38 ZPU-4 14.5mm, 5 M-39 37mm.
NAVY: 100.*

Base: Lome.
Patrol craft: 2 coastal<.
AIR FORCE: 260;* some 11 combat ac.
COIN: 6 EMB-326GC Xavante.
COIN/trg: 5 Alpha Jet.
Tpt: 1 Boeing 727, 2 DHC-5D, 1 F-28-1000.
Trg: 3 TB-30 Epsilon; lt 2.
Hel: 1 SA-330 Puma, 2 SA-315 Lama.
PARA-MILITARY: 1,550: Gendarmerie 750;* 2 regional sections, 1 mobile sqn. Presidential Guard 800.

UGANDA
Est GDP 1982: U sh 451.2 bn ($5,361 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 8.2%. 1983: 5.0%.
Inflation 1983: 30.0%.
Debt 1983: $700 m.1984: $820 m.
Def budget 1981/2: U sh 8.045 bn ($95,595 m). Est 1982/3: 10.40 bn ($94,153 m).

$1=shillings 84.1575 (1981/2), 110.458 (1982/3).
Population: 14,700,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,487,000; 31-45: 1,011,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,524,000; 31-45: 1,027,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 18,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 18,000 (20,000 planned).
3 bde HQ.
Some 18 inf bns.
Tks: 10 T-34/-54/-55, 3 M-4. APC: 150 BTR-40/-152, OT-64 and Saracen.
Arty: guns: 60 76mm, 20 122mm. ATGW: 40 Sagger.
AD: guns: 40 23mm, 40mm; SAM: SA-7.* (*Serviceability doubtful.)
AIR: (100; part of Army).
Trg: 6 FFA AS-202 Bravo.
PARA-MILITARY: 23,000. Armed Police Special Force 3,000. People's Militia: perhaps 20,000.

OPPOSITION: Buganda National Resistance Army 6,000; captured small arms, some hy machine guns. At least two other minor groups.

ZAIRE
GDP 1982: Z 31.110 bn ($5,410 bn). 1983: 59.134 bn ($4,588 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 2.5%.
Inflation 1983: 100.0%. 1984: 14.5%.
Debt 1983: $5.40 bn. 1984: $5.80 bn.
Est def budget 1982: Z 850 m ($147,826 m). Def exp 1983: 1.80 bn ($139,654 m).
FMA 1983: $20.0 m.

$1=zaires 5.75 (1982), 12.889 (1983).
Population: 30,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 3,355,000; 31-45: 2,424,000.

Women: 18-30: 3,487,000; 31-45: 2,561,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 48,000 (incl Gendarmerie).

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 22,000.
3 Military Regions.
1 inf div:
1 armd bde.
2 inf bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 spt bn).
1 Special Forces div:
1 para bde (3 para bns, 1 spt bn).
1 special force (cdo/coin) bde.
1 Presidential Guard bde.
Tks: some 50 Ch Type-62.
AFV: recce: 95 AML-60, 60 AML-90, 40 M-3; APC: 12 M-113, 12 K-63, 60 M-3, 45 BTR-152.
Arty: guns/how: 60 75mm pack, 20 122mm, 8 130mm; mor: 82mm, 4.2-in. (107mm), (?100) 120mm.
ATK: RL: Blindicide 83mm, 107mm; RCL: 57mm, 75mm, 106mm.
AD: Guns: 57mm, 37mm, 40mm.

NAVY: 1,500 incl marines.

Bases: Banana, Matadi (coast), Kinshasa .(river), Kalemie (lake).
FAC: 4 Ch Shanghai II.
Patrol craft: 46(: 4 Huchuan hydrofoils, 6 Sewart, 6 Swift II, 1 other US, 29 Fr Arcoa.
MARINES: (600).

AIR FORCE: 2,500; 40 combat ac.
Ftr: 1 sqn with 8 Mirage 5M/5DM.
COIN: 3 sqns with 20 Reims Cessna FTB-337, 6 MB-326K, 6 AT-6G.
Tpt: 1 wing with 5 C-130H, 2 DC-6, 2 DHC-4A Caribou, 2 DHC-5 Buffalo, 8 C-47, 2 Mitsubishi MU-2J, 1 Falcon-20.
Hel: 1 sqn with 3 SA-319B Alouette III, 9 SA-330 Puma; 1 AS-332L Super Puma, 1 SA-321 Super Frelon (VIP).
Trg: incl 21 Cessna (9 310, 12 150), 8 MB-326GB, 9 SF-260MC.
(On order S-211 coin/trg, 4 F-27-500 tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 22,000 (to be 27,000 in 1986); 40 bns. Civil Guard.

ZAMBIA
GDP 1983: K 4.181 bn ($3,343 bn). 1984: 4.733 bn ($2,638 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -2.0%. 1984: -1.3%.
Inflation 1983: 20.0%. 1984: 20.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.60 bn. 1984: $2.80 bn.

$1=kwacha 1.2506(1983), 1.7944(1984).
Population: 6,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 683,000; 31-45: 417,000.

Women: 18-30: 721,000; 31-45: 485,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 16,200.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 15,000.
1 armd regt (incl 1 armd recce bn).
9 inf bns (3 Reserve).
3 arty btys, 2 AA arty btys.
1 engr bn, 2 sigs sqns.
Tks: 30 T-54/55 and Ch Type-59; lt: 50 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 60 BRDM-1/-2; APC: 13 BTR-60.
Arty: guns: 30 76mm, 35 130mm; how: 18 105mm pack, 25 122mm; MRL: 50 BM-21 122mm.
ATK: RCL: 12 M-18 57mm, Carl Gustav 84mm; ATGW: Sagger.
AD: guns: 50 M-75 triple 20mm, 40 37mm, 55 57mm, 16 85mm; SAM: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 1,200; 44 combat ac.
FGA: 2 sqns: 1 with 12 Ch J-6; 1 with 14 Sov MiG-21.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 18 MB-326GB.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with 10 Do-28; 1 with 6 DHC-2, 5 DHC-4, 6 DHC-5D; 1 VIP fit with 2 Yak-40, 1 HS-748.
Trg: incl 8 SF-260MZ, 20 Saab Safari, 2 Ch BT-3, 10 Jastreb/Galeb.
Hel: 1 sqn with 3 AB-205A, 3 AB-206, 2 AB-212, 20 Bell 47G, 11 Mi-8.
SAM: 1 bn; 3 btys: SA-3.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,200.

Police Mobile Unit (PMU) 700; 1 bn of 4 coys.

Police Para-Military Unit (PPMU) 500; 1 bn of 3 coys.

ZIMBABWE
GDP 1982/3: $Z 5.005 bn ($US 5.775 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -3.8%. 1984: 1.0%.
Inflation 1983: 32%. 1984: 25%.
Debt 1983: $US 2.5 bn. 1984: $US 2.85 bn.
Def budget* 1983/4: $Z 418 m ($US 381.631 m). 1984/5: 351.5 m ($US 238.953 m). (* Excl security forces budget.)

$US 1 = $Z 0.8666 (1982/3), 1.0953 (1983/4), 1.471 (1984/5).
Population: 8,500,000.

Men: 18-30: 860,000; 31-45: 467,000.

Women: 18-30: 867,000; 31-45: 520,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 42,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 41,000.
6 bde HQ (incl 1 Presidential Guard).
1 armd regt.
23 inf bns (incl 3 Guard, 1 cdo, 2 para).
1 arty regt.
1 AD regt (2 btys).
7 engr, 7 sigs sqns.
Tks: 3 T-34, 8 T-54, 20 Ch T-59.
AFV: recce: 90 EE-9 Cascavel (90mm gun), 28 AML-90 Eland, 4 Ferret, BRDM-2; APC: 15 BTR-152, 10 Type-531.
Arty: gun/how: 24 25-pdr (88mm), 18 M-56 105mm pack, 16 122mm; mor: 100 81mm, 4-10 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 12 107mm.
AD: guns: 14.5mm, 20mm, 23mm, 37mm: SAM: 8 SA-7.
(On order: 35 T-59 MBT).

AIR FORCE: 1,000; some 53 combat ac; perhaps
25 operational (est numbers in brackets).
Bbrs: 1 sqn with 5 Canberra B-2,2 T-4 (0).
FGA: 2 sqns: 1 with 10 Hunter FGA-9 (10); 1 with 12 Ch J-7 (forming).
Ftr: 1 sqn with 7 Hawk T-54 (3).
COIN/recce: 1 sqn with 17 Cessna 337 (0-2) Lynx(3).
Trg/recce/liaison: 2 sqns with 12 SF-260W/C/B Genet, 5 SF-260TP (?10 in all).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-212-200 (VIP) (2), 12 C-47 (6), 6 Islander (6).
Hel: 2 sqns with 12 Alouette II/III, 8 Bell/AB 205A (4) , 4 AB-412 (VIP) (4).
Security: 2 sqns.
(On order 6 SF-260 coin/trg ac.)

Forces Abroad: Mozambique: 2,500; 2 bns.

PARA-MILITARY: 26,000: Zimbabwe Republic Police Force, incl Air Wing, 15,000. Police Support Unit 2,000. National Militia 9,000.

Asia and Australia

CHINA

Chinese defence policy has long maintained a balance, at times uneasy, between two concepts: nuclear force to deter strategic attack and People's War- mass mobilization of the population to deter or repel conventional invasion. Despite changes in the political leadership, there remain many supporters of the strategic concept that mass manpower is still the primary deterrent. The need to modernize the forces has been recognized. Attempts are being made to retire older officers, and programmes to re-equip and reorganize the forces are slowly being implemented.

The conventional arms inventory of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), technically much less advanced than that of wealthier nations, is being gradually updated by replacing Soviet and Soviet-type equipment with indigenous designs and some Western technology. China has obtained computers and radars and is negotiating the purchase from various countries of a wide range of military equipment. Britain has sold aircraft engines, artillery and fire control equipment and radar. France has sold helicopters and radar. The United States has agreed to sell helicopters. Despite the period of economic readjustment which led to a succession of cuts in the defence budget since 1980, this year's budget shows a small increase (which will certainly be swallowed by inflation). Thus the pace of modernization will continue to be quite slow, although much is being done to make the forces more professional and efficient - through reorganization, better training and scrapping of civil production quotas. The PLA is also benefiting from the general modernization of Chinese industry.

Nuclear Weapons

The research programme continues. Two nuclear tests were recorded in 1984, and the total number of tests since 1964 is now 29.

Two types of ICBM are deployed, one (DF-5) with a range of some 13,000 km, the other some 7,000 km. No indication has been received of the deployment of multiple warheads, but a missile has been successfully used (and thus tested) as a launcher for three space research satellites. Estimates of the ranges of the IRBM and MRBM have been revised Lurssenward to 2,700 km and 1,100 km respectively. China's first SSBN is the Xia class with 12 CSS-NX-4 SLBM - a variant of the DF-3 IRBM- the range of which is reproted to be of the order of 2,200-3,000 km (probably the lower figure). Four more SSBM are said to be under construction, some - perhaps the Daqingyu class - being reported to have 16 launch tubes. Some 3 Han-class nuclear-powered submarines with six missile tubes are now in service; the cruise missile they are said to carry, has been tested to a reported range of 1,600 km. So far all ballistic missiles have been liquid-fuelled. Solid propellants, being developed, are reported to have powered the 1980 ICBM test vehicle and may power the DF-5 ICBM. The Strategic Rocket Units are manned by the Second Artillery, which is directly controlled by the Ministry of Defence. There are unconfirmed reports of tactical nuclear munitions (artillery, rockets, mines). If such munitions are available, fighter aircraft could be used for tactical delivery, and for longer ranges some of the 120 H-6 medium bombers, with a combat radius of up to 3,000 km, may be nuclear capable.

Conventional Forces

The PLA embraces all arms and services, including naval and air elements. Essentially a defensive force, the PLA continues to lack facilities and logistic support for protracted large scale operations at any significant distance outside Chinese borders. China has been organized in 11 Military Regions (MR) with 28 Military Districts (MD). These will be reduced to 7 by combining Lanzhou and Urumqi (West and North-West areas), Chengdu and Kunming (South and South-West), Wuhan and Jinan, and Nanjing and Fuzhou (Centre and East). Some internal reorganization will also occur. The field army's Main Force (MF) divisions are commanded by the Ministry of National Defence, although command is being transferred to the MR in which they are stationed and which are already responsible for their administration. They are available for operations in any region. Extensive reorganization of the Local Forces (LF), Border and Internal Defence forces and para-military units intended to defend their own Provinces continues to take place. An overall strength reduction is planned. The field army strength is already declining as transfers to the regional forces continue. Artillery, engineer and railway units are controlled by the Ministry of National Defence. Infantry units account for most of the ground-force manpower and 118 of the some 138 MF line divisions; there are only 13 armoured divisions.

The naval and air elements of the PLA have only about one-fifth of the total manpower, compared with about a quarter for their counterparts in the Soviet Union, but naval strength is increasing. The naval force is organized in three fleets, two of them controlled by the Northern Naval Region. The naval air arm is shore-based, and there is an independent Coast Defence Force. The naval component remains essentially a coastal defence force, incapable of long range force projection. The air component is organized into 8 Regions and 3 minor geographic commands; combat organization is similar to the Soviet system, with air armies of divisions of three regiments each with some 45 aircraft. It, too, remains essentially a force with limited defence capabilities.

Major weapons systems include Type-59 MBT, Type-60/-63 amphibious and Type-62 light tanks and Type-531 APC; modified R- and W-class medium-range diesel submarines, SSM destroyers, frigates, fast patrol boats, amphibious transports and landing craft; J-6/-7 and Q-5 fighters, SA-2-type SAM. Production rates for this equipment are, at best, broad estimates only. Actual rates may be considerably lower than many such estimates suggest.

Bilateral Agreements

There is a mutual defence agreement with North Korea, dating from 1961, and an agreement to provide free military aid. There are friendship and non-aggression pacts with Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal (1960) and Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge). Chinese military equipment and logistic support have been offered to a number of countries. Major recipients include Albania, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and Tanzania.

Gross National Product and Defence Expenditure

Official Chinese sources claim a GNP figure of 989.4 bn yuan for 1982 and 1,105.2 bn for 1983, an increase of 11.7%. National income is reported by the IMF to be 467.3 bn yuan for 1983 and an estimated 523.4 bn for 1984. (GNP figures include the service and other sectors.) Western estimates of GNP have varied greatly, from $309 bn to $362 bn yuan (and even to over 600 bn yuan) for 1984, and it is difficult to choose from a range of figures, variously defined and calculated.

Since 1981 the Chinese government has released official defence budget figures. In 1984 the defence budget amounted to 17.870 bn yuan (but actual expenditures were subsequently reported as 18.073 bn yuan), while the budget for 1985 amounts to 18.670 bn yuan. Using the official current exchange rate for 1984, the defence outlays would amount to $7,790 bn, which according to western accounting principals is unrealistic. China, like all socialist economies, excludes a number of items, notably pay and allowances for the troops, as well as RD&E costs. Moreover, the Chinese defence forces are undergoing considerable technological modernization, especially in hardware, much of which is being obtained from western countries at high costs. As Chinese budgetary practices are not known in detail, the official budget figures must be considered as an indicator of proportion, rather than a measurement of actual costs.

КИТАЙ

Оборонная политика Китая долгое время поддерживала баланс, порой непростой, между двумя понятиями: ядерная сила для сдерживания стратегического нападения и народная война - массовая мобилизация населения для сдерживания или отражения вторжения обычными силами. Несмотря на изменения в политическом руководстве, остается много сторонников стратегической концепции того, что массовая живая сила по-прежнему является основным сдерживающим фактором. Была признана необходимость модернизации сил. Предпринимаются попытки отправить в отставку старших офицеров, и медленно осуществляются программы перевооружения и реорганизации сил.

Обычные вооружения Народно-освободительной армии (НОАК), технически гораздо менее совершенные, чем у более богатых стран, постепенно обновляются путем замены советского вооружения местными конструкциями и некоторыми западными технологиями. Китай приобрел компьютеры и радары и ведет переговоры о закупке у различных стран широкого спектра военной техники. Великобритания продала авиационные двигатели, артиллерийское и противопожарное оборудование и радары. Франция продала вертолеты и радары. США согласилась продать вертолеты. Несмотря на период экономической перестройки, которая привела к последовательному сокращению оборонного бюджета с 1980 года, бюджет этого года показывает небольшой рост (который, безусловно, будет поглощен инфляцией). Таким образом, темпы модернизации будут оставаться довольно медленными, хотя многое делается для того, чтобы сделать силы более профессиональными и эффективными - за счет реорганизации, лучшей подготовки кадров и отмены квот на гражданское производство. НОАК также выигрывает от общей модернизации китайской промышленности.

Ядерное оружие

Исследовательская программа продолжается. В 1984 году было зарегистрировано два ядерных испытания, а общее число испытаний с 1964 года составляет 29.

Развернуты два типа МБР: один (DF-5) с дальностью действия около 13 000 км, другой - около 7 000 км. Никаких указаний на развертывание нескольких боеголовок получено не было, однако ракета была успешно использована (и, таким образом, испытана) в качестве носителя для трех спутников космических исследований. Оценки дальности БРСД и БРСД были пересмотрены в сторону понижения до 2700 км и 1100 км соответственно. Первая китайская ПЛАРБ класса Xia с 12 БРПЛ CSS-NX-4 - вариант БРСД DF-3 дальность которой составляет порядка 2,200-3,000 км (вероятно, нижняя цифра). Еще четыре ПЛАРБ, как говорят, находятся в стадии строительства, некоторые - возможно, класса Daqingyu - сообщается, имеют 16 пусковых труб. В настоящее время на вооружении находятся около 3 атомных подводных лодок типа Han с шестью ракетными установками; крылатая ракета, которую, как утверждается, они несут, была испытана на дальности 1600 км. До сих пор все баллистические ракеты были жидкостными. Сообщается, что разрабатываемые твердотопливные реактивные двигатели испытаны на МБР в 1980 года и могут быть на МБР DF-5. Ракетные подразделения Стратегического Назначения названы Второй артиллерией, которая находится под непосредственным контролем Министерства обороны. Имеются неподтвержденные сообщения о тактических ядерных боеприпасах (артиллерия, ракеты, мины). При наличии таких боеприпасов истребители могли бы использоваться для тактической доставки, а на более дальних дистанциях некоторые из 120 средних бомбардировщиков Н-6 с боевым радиусом до 3000 км могут быть ядерными.

Обычные вооруженные силы

НОАК включает все виды, включая военно-морские и воздушные элементы. По существу, являясь оборонительными силами, НОАК по-прежнему испытывает нехватку средств и материально-технической поддержки для длительных крупномасштабных операций на любом значительном расстоянии за пределами китайских границ. Китай разделен на 11 военных регионов (MR) с 28 военными округами (MD). Они будут сокращены до 7 путем объединения Ланьчжоу и Урумчжи (Западный и Северо-Западный районы), Чэнду и Куньмин (Юго-Запад), Ухань, Цзинань, Нанкин, Фучжоу и и (центр и Восток). Произойдет также некоторая внутренняя реорганизация. Дивизии основных сил полевой армии (MF) находятся под командованием Министерства национальной обороны, хотя командование переходит к MR, в котором они дислоцируются и которые уже отвечают за их управление. Они доступны для действий в любом регионе. Продолжается широкомасштабная реорганизация местных сил (LF), пограничных и внутренних сил обороны и воинских подразделений, призванных защищать свои провинции. Планируется общее сокращение численности. Полевые силы армии уже сокращаются и перевод их в региональные силы продолжается. Артиллерийские, инженерные и железнодорожные подразделения контролируются Министерством национальной обороны. Пехотные подразделения составляют большую часть личного состава сухопутных войск и на 118 из примерно 138 линейных дивизий MF; имеется лишь 13 бронетанковых дивизий.

Военно-морские и военно-воздушные элементы НОАК имеют лишь около одной пятой общей численности личного состава по сравнению с примерно четвертью их коллег в Советском Союзе, однако численность военно-морских сил увеличивается. Военно-морские силы организованы в три флота, два из которых контролируются Северным Военно-морским регионом. Военно-воздушные силы флота базируются на берегу, и существуют независимые силы береговой обороны. Военно-морской компонент остается по существу силами береговой обороны, неспособными к дальним действиям. Воздушный компонент состоит из 8 региональных и 3 второстепенных географических командований; боевая организация похожа на советскую систему, с воздушными армиями из дивизий по три полка каждой с около 45 самолетов в полку. Они также остаются по существу силами с ограниченными возможностями обороны.

Основные системы вооружения включают Тип-59 ОБТ, Тип-60/-63 амфибии, Тип-62 легкие танки и тип-531 БТР; модифицированные R - и W-класса средние дизельные подводные лодки, ракетные эсминцы, фрегаты, быстроходные патрульные катера, десантные транспорты и десантные суда; J-6/-7 и Q-5 истребители и SA-2-типа ЗРК. Темпы производства этого оборудования в лучшем случае являются лишь общими оценками. Фактические могут быть значительно ниже, чем предполагают многие такие оценки.

Двусторонние соглашения

Есть договор о взаимной обороне с Северной Кореей, начиная с 1961 года и соглашение о предоставлении бесплатной военной помощи. Существуют договоры о дружбе и ненападении с Афганистаном, Бирмой, Непалом (1960 год) и Кампучией ("Красные Кхмеры"). Ряду стран была предложена китайская военная техника и материально-техническая поддержка. Основными получателями помощи являются Албания, Египет, Ирак, Пакистан и Танзания.

Валовой национальный продукт и расходы на оборону

Официальные китайские источники утверждают, что показатель ВНП составляет 989,4 млрд юаней за 1982 год и 1,105.2 млрд за 1983 год, рост на 11,7%. По данным МВФ, национальный доход составил 467,3 млрд. юаней в 1983 году и 523,4 млрд. юаней в 1984 году. (ВНП включает обслуживание и другие отрасли.) Западные оценки ВНП сильно варьировались, от $309 млрд до $362 млрд юаней (и даже более 600 млрд юаней) за 1984 год, и трудно выбрать из ряда цифр, по-разному определенных и рассчитанных.

С 1981 года китайское правительство публикует официальные цифры оборонного бюджета. В 1984 году оборонный бюджет составлял 17,870 млрд. юаней (однако фактические расходы впоследствии были зарегистрированы как 18,073 млрд. юаней), а бюджет 1985 года - 18,670 млрд. юаней. При использовании официального текущего обменного курса на 1984 год расходы на оборону составят 7 790 млрд. долл. США, что, по мнению западных бухгалтерских директоров, нереально. Китай, как и все социалистические страны, исключает ряд статей, в частности, выплаты и надбавки военнослужащим, а также расходы на НИОКР. Кроме того, китайские силы обороны проходят значительную технологическую модернизацию, особенно в области техники, большая часть которой поступает из западных стран с большими затратами. Поскольку китайская бюджетная практика не известна в деталях, официальные бюджетные показатели должны рассматриваться как показатель пропорциональности, а не как показатель фактических расходов.

CHINA
Debt 1983: $4.7 bn. 1984: $8.7 bn.
Def budget: see note above.

$1=yuan 1.8925 (1982), 1.9757 (1983), 2.320 (1984).
Population: 1,055,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 131,600,000; 31-45: 101,950,000.

Women: 18-30: 125,250,000; 31-45: 192,600,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: some 3,900,000 (perhaps 2,345,000 conscripts) (being reduced).

Terms of Service: selective conscription; Army, Marines 3 years; Navy/Air 4 years.

Technical volunteers can serve 8-12 more years to maximum age 35. Reserve obligation to age 45.
Reserves: 75,377,000. Army 75,000,000; Navy 144,000; Marines: (33,000); Air (AD) 200,000; See also Para-military.

STRATEGIC FORCES:
Offensive (Strategic Rocket Units):
(a) Missiles: org in 6 (perhaps 7) divs, regts and bns; org varies by msl type.
ICBM: 6:

2 DF-5 (Dong Feng; = East Wind) (CSS-3), range 12,900 km, 5-MT warhead;

4 DF-4 (CSS-3), range 7,000 km, 3MT.
IRBM: 60 DF-3 (CSS-2), range 2,700 km, 2 MT.
MRBM: 50 DF-2 (CSS-1), range 1,100 km, 20 KT. (2-MT warhead reported, probably shorter range.)
(b) Subs:

2 Xia (Daqingyu) SSBN with 12 HY-2 (CSSNX-4; mod DF-3, range est in 2,200-3,000 km range - possibly 1x2MT warhead; in development,

may be two types).
(On order 74 SSBN; some may have 16 launch tubes).
Defensive:
(a) Tracking stations: Xinjiang (covers central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border) and a limited ship borne anti-ship capability.
(b) Phased-array radar complex. Ballistic missile early warning.
(c) Air Force AD system: over 4,000 naval and air force fighters, about 100 Honggi-2 HQ-2J (Red Flag; SA-2-type) SAM units and over

16,000 AA guns; capable of limited defence of key urban and industrial areas, military installations and weapons complexes.
(d) A civil defence shelter/evacuation/local defence system in Beijing and other key cities.

ARMY: * 2,973,000 (perhaps 2,040,000 conscripts) (25% reduction now under way).

(* The term 'People's Liberation Army' comprises all services;the Ground, Naval and Air components of the PCA are listed separately for purposes

of comparison.)
Main Forces (Field Army):
11 Military Regions (will be 7), 27 Military Districts, 1 indep MD, 3 Garrison Comds.
Some 35 Armies (46,300 men), each normally of 3 divs, 1 arty regt and spt tps (some have 1 indep tk regt, some have 1 arty, 1 AA regts), comprising:

13 armd divs.

118 inf divs (some being mech).

Some 17 field arty divs.

16 AA arty divs.

Some indep arty, AA regts.

Some 21 sigs, cw regts; 20 indep recce, engr, sigs, chemical bns (Army tps).

50 indep engr regts.
Local Forces (29 provinces; being reorganized, may be into Reserve).

73 divs (70 LF (border/internal defence), 3 garrison district). .

140 indep regts.
Tks: 11,450: Sov IS-2 hy (trg), T-34 (trg), T-54, Ch Type-59, T-69 (mod Type-59), T-69 II; lt Type-62, Type-60/-63 amph.
APC: Type 501 (Sov BMP-1), 2,800 Type 531, Type-55/-56 (BTR-40/-152)/-63, Type 77-1/-2 (Sov BTR-50PK amph); wheeled type reported.
Arty: 12,800: guns: Type-56 85mm, Type-73 100mm (fd/ATK); Type-60 122mm, Type-59/-59-l 130mm towed, ISU-122/-152 SP (trg?),

Type-66 152mm towed; how: Type-54 122mm, Type-54 152mm towed, Type-54-1 122mm SP (Type-31 chassis).

MRL: 4,500 Type-63 12x107mm (being replaced by 122mm), Type-81 40x122mm, Type-81 24x122mm minelayer;

Type-63 19x130mm (incl Type-81 SP), BM-13-16 16 x 132mm, BM-416 16x140mm,

10x180mm Type-74/-79 10x305mm minelayers, and 10x320mm;

mor: 14,000 Type-53/-67 82mm, Type-71 100mm, Type-55 120mm and Type-56 160mm.
ATK: grenade launchers: Type-56, -69 40mm, Type-69-1, -70-1 62mm; RCL: Type-36 57mm, Type-52 75mm, Type-65 82mm, Type-75 105mm SP;

RL: Type-51 90mm; guns: Type-55 57mm, Type-54 76mm; ATGW: Hongqian 73 (Red Arrow;Sagger-type), Saclos (Milan-type).
AD: guns: 15,000: Type-54, -77 12.7mm; Types-75, 75-1 towed, Types-56, -58, -80 SP 14.5mm; Type-55, Type-63 twin SP 37mm; Type-59 57mm,

Type-56 85mm, Type-59 100mm; SAM: SA-7 type.
(On order: TOW ATGW, Improved Hawk SAM).
DEPLOYMENT:

Excl arty and engrs, MF and LF divs may be:
North-East: Shenyang MR (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning MD): (1 msl), 4 armd, 19 inf; 13 LF.*
North: Beijing MR (Beijing, Tienjiang Garrison District Comds; Hebei, Nei Monggol, Shanxi MD): (1 msl+), 4 armd, 25 inf; 1 AB (Air Force); 13LF.
West: Uriimqi MR (Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, (North and South Xinjiang MD): (2 msl+), 1 armd, 13 inf; 9 LF* (absorbing Lanzhou MR).
South-West: Kunming MR (Sichuan, Xizang: (1 msl), 8 inf; 4 LF) (Guizhou, Yunnan MD: (1 msl), 15 inf; 4 LF*) (absorbing Chengdu MR).
South: Guangzhou MR (Guangdong, Hunan, Guanxi, Hubei (?3 inf; 2 LF), Hainan (MDequivalent)) Saxia MD to form (?14 inf; 10LF*).
Centre: Jinan MR (Henan, Shandong MD): 2 armd, 10 inf, 3 AB(Air Force); 6 LF.
East: Nanjing MR (Shanghai District; Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang MD): 1 armd, 16 inf; 14 LF (absorbing Fuzhou MR).

(* There are 2-3 divs worth of border tps in theseMR.)

NAVY: f 350,000 incl Naval Air and Coast Defence (some 115,000 conscripts); 3 SSN, 107 diesel attack subs, 44 major surface combat ships.

Bases: see Deployment and Bases below.
Subs: SSN: 3 Han;

diesel: 107: 1 Type-200 (Sov G-class SSG; trials), 84 Type-033 (Sov R-class), 20 W-class IV/V (5 in reserve), 2 Ming (mod R-class) trg.
Destroyers: GW: 16:

12 O-51 Luda (Kotlin-type) with 2x3 HY-2 (Hai Ying=Sea Eagle; Styx-type) SSM;

4 Anshan (ex-Sov Gordy) with 2x2 HY-2.
Frigates: 28: 23 GW (17 O-37 Jianghu with 2x2 HY-2, 2 Jiangdong , 1 with 2x2 SAM; 4 Chengdu (ex-Sov Riga) with 1x2 HY-2);

5 Jiangnan (Riga-type).
Patrol: escorts: 14: 9 ex-Jap, 1 ex-Br, 1 ex-Aus, 3 Ch;

craft: 60 large (40 Hainan, 20 Kronshtadt),

some 145 coastal/river (30 Beihai, 40 Huangpu, 40 Yulin, some Yingkou (with Militia)); Haiju coastal ASW vessel coming into service.
FAC: 350: 315 Shanghai I/II/III/IV/V, 3 Haikou, 30 Shantou, 2 Shandongi (hydrofoils).
FAC(G): 232 with HY-2: 120 Osa/Huangfen (4 msls), 1 Hola, 110 Hegu(, 1 Homa hydrofoil (2 msls).
FAC(T)<: 250: 140 Huchwan I/II hydrofoils, 60 P-6, 50 P-4 (? reserve).
MCMV: 23 T-43 ocean, 2 coastal minesweepers.
Amph: assault tpt: 1 Qiong Sha;

LST: 21: 7 Yukan/Zoushan, 13 Shan (ex-US 1-511, -542) (Chang-Ming reported);

LSM: 32: 14 Hua (ex-US LSM-1), 14 Yuling, 4 Yudao; LSI: 6 Min (ex-US LSI2);

LCU: 309: 300 Yunnan, 9 LCT (5/6 ex-Br/US); LCM: 140 (ex-Br/US); hovercraft (LCAC): Dagu, Payi, Type-722 Jingsah types.
Spt: 10 sub (incl 1 repair), 6 other spt, 10 supply ships, 23 tankers.
(On order (tentative): 3 Han SSN; 9 R-class SS; 4 Luda DDG; 6 Jianghu (4 mod), 2 Jiangdong FFG; Huangfen, Hegu FAC; 2 Qiongsha assault tpts,

2 Yukan LST.)
Coastal Defence Forces: (38,000): Indep arty regts deployed near naval bases, offshore islands, and other vulnerable points.

Guns: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm.

SSM: HY-2 ('CSS-N-2') land- based SSM.
MARINES (Naval Infantry): 86,500 (30,000 conscripts).

9 regts (3 cadre divs):

4 inf, 3 tk, 3 arty bns; spt elms.

Special recce units.
Reserves: On mobilization to total 8 divs (24 inf, 8 tk, 8 arty regts), 2 indep tk regts: 120,000 men.

3 ground force divs are also assigned for amph duties.
Tks: 600 T-59; lt: T-60/-63, PT-76. APC: K-63, LVT. Arty: how: Type-54 122mm; BRL: Type-63.
DEPLOYMENT AND BASES:
Northern Naval Region:
North Fleet: about 500 vessels (over half <), incl 1 sub flotilla (2 sqns); from the Yalu River to south of Lianyungang.

Qingdao (HQ), Liida, Liishun, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan. Marines: 1 cadre div.
East Fleet: about 750 vessels (about 4000 with air, AD and coastal missile units; from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan.

Ningbo (HQ), Zhoushan, Taohua Dao, Heimen, Wenzhou, Fuzhou. Marines: 1 cadre div.
South Sea Fleet: about 600 vessels (some half <), incl 2 sub flotillas (25 subs), 200 FAC, amph; from Dongshan to Vietnamese frontier.

Zhanjiang (HQ), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai. Marines: 1 cadre div.
Some 800 ocean-going vessels, fishing trawlers and several thousand junks; some are mod and could augment existing limited sealift capacity.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (34,000); about 800 shorebased combat ac, org in 3 bbr, 6 fir divs, incl

some 50 H(Hong; = bbr)-6, about 130 H-5 and Il-28 torpedo-carrying and lt bbrs;

some 600 ftrs, incl J(Jian; = ftr)-2 (MiG-15)/-5/-6/-7;

H-5 recce, 8 ex-Sov Be-6 Madge MR/ASW ac;

50 Z(Zhi; =hel)-5, 12 SA-321 Super Frelon ASW hel;

some 60 lt tpt ac;

JJ-5/-6 trg ac. Naval fighters are integrated into the national AD system.

AIR FORCE: * 490,000, incl strategic forces and 220,000 AD personnel (160,000 conscripts); some 5,300 combat ac*.

(* Many Chinese aricraft designs stem from Soviet types. Using Chinese terms, H-5 = Il-28, H-6 = Tu-16, J-5 = MiG-17, J-6 = Mig-19,

Q-5 = MiG-19, J-7 = MiG-21, J-8 = MiG-23, Y-5 =An-2, Y-7 = An-24, Y-8 = An-12 ac; Z-5 = Mi-4, Z-6 = Mi-8 hel.

In export models the J is generally read as F.)
8 Military Air Regions, 3 minor regional comds, HQ Beijing; combat elms org in Armies of varying numbers of air divs

(each with 3 regts of 3 sqns of 3 fits of 4-5 ac, 1 maintenance unit, some tpt and trg ac). Tpt ac in regts only.
Med bbrs: 120 H-6 (some may be nuclear capable), some reported with 2xS-60 antiship msls.
Lt bbrs: some 500 H-5.
FGA: some 500 J-4 and Q(Qiang= attack)-5.
Ftrs: some 4,000, incl 400 J-5, some 60 regts with about 3,000 J-6/B/D/E, 200 J-7, 30 J-8.
Recce: some 190: 60 J-2/-4/-5, 90 JZ-6, 40 HZ-5 ac.
Tpts: some 550 incl some 300 Y(Yun = tpt)-5/An-2, some 10 Y-7 (An-24), Y-8 (An-12), some 75 ex-Sov Li-2, Il-14, Il-18 (to be retired), 18 Trident.

(These could be supplemented by some 400 ac, incl some 150 hy tpts, from Civil Aviation Administration).
Hel: 400: incl Z-5/-6, Z-9 (SA-365N Dauphin), Alouette III, SA-321 Super Frelon, 4 Bell 214-ST, 1 Sikorsky S-70 (being delivered).
Trainers: 1,500 (some OCU) incl CJ-5/-6, MiG-15UTI, JJ-4/-5/-6, HJ-5.
AAM: PL-2 Atoll-typs.
AB tps: 1 corps of 3 divs, 1 indep div; 82mm, 120mm mor, 82mm RCL, 37mm AA guns.
AA arty: 20 divs; 16,000 57mm, 85mm and 100mm guns; 28 indep AD regts (100 SAM units with HQ-2, -2J (CSA-1) SAM).
(On order: 23 Sikorsky S-70, 4 S-76, 6 Super Puma hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: some 12,000,000.
Militia (Ministry of Defence). Basic Militia: some 4.3 million; men and women aged 18-28 who have had, or will have, military service,

grouped in the Armed Militia; serve with the Regulars for 30-40 days per year; org into about 75 cadre divisions and 2,000 regts, a Naval (Maritime)

Militia with armed trawlers and a major AD component.
Ordinary Militia: up to 6 million (ages 18-35), incl the Urban Militia, receive some basic training but are generally unarmed. Some play a local AD role;

all support the security forces.
People's Armed Police Force (Ministry of Security): ex-soldiers and personnel transferred from some 4 LF divs; Internal Defence divs and 30 indep regts; border security, patrol and internal security duties; small arms; Shanghai II FAC, Hainan patrol craft.

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES AND AUSTRALASIA

Bilateral Agreements

The United States has mutual co-operation and security treaties with Japan (1951, I960), the Republic of Korea (1954) and the Philippines (1951, 1983); military co-operation agreements with Australia (1951, 1963, 1974 and 1980); and a military aid agreement with Thailand. Arms supply and production arrangements with Taiwan subsist under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The US also provides continuing military aid to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. There are major US bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines (agreement renewed 1983), and air (B-52) and naval refuelling facilities in north and west Australia respectively.

In 1965 Britain separated the Chagos Archipelago (which included Diego Garcia) from Mauritius, paying $3 million compensation, and, together with three smaller groups, established it as the British Indian Ocean Territory. A small British naval contingent was deployed on Diego Garcia. Agreements in 1966, 1972 and 1976 have provided for the development of a major US naval and air support facility with an indefinite tenure. The three small groups have since been turned over to the Seychelles.

Britain has a Defence Agreement with Sri Lanka (1974) and one with Brunei which provides the latter with Gurkha troops and the British forces with a training area.

The Soviet Union has Treaties of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with Afghanistan (1978), India (1971), Mongolia (1966), North Korea (1961) and Vietnam (1978). She concluded a Stationing of Forсes Agreement with Afghanistan in April 1980. An agreement with India in December 1982 provides for collaboration on design and manufacture of naval vessels; other and subsequent co-production arrangements exist. Bulgaria has Friendship Treaties with Cambodia (1960), Laos (1979), Mongolia (1967) and Vietnam (1979), as have Czechoslovakia with Laos and Vietnam (1980) and Afghanistan (1981), Hungary with Afghanistan (1982), and East Germany with Vietnam (1977), Kampuchea (1980) and Afghanistan (1982).

The People's Republic of China has Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaties with Afghanistan, Burma and Nepal (all 1960), and a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea (1961).

Cuba and Vietnam signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation on 5 October 1982. Libya and North Korea signed a Treaty of Alliance or Friendship and Co-operation in November 1982, which permits exchanges of military data, specialists and supplies. North Korea and Tanzania have an agreement covering aspects of defence and security.

Australia has an agreement and subsidiary arrangements for the development of and assistance to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, and has loaned it some 135 personnel. Under a number of arrangements she has supplied defence equipment to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and most of the smaller Pacific island states.

In July 1977 Vietnam and Laos signed a series of agreements which contained military provisions and a border pact, and which may have covered the stationing of Vietnamese troops in Laos. A similar series of agreements seems to have been negotiated between Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea in February 1979 and December 1982.

Multilateral Agreements

In 1951 Australia, New Zealand and the United States signed a tripartite treaty (ANZUS), which came into effect on 29 April 1952 and is of indefinite duration. Each agrees to 'act to meet the common danger' in the event of attacks on either metropolitan or island territory of any one of them, or on their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. In early 1985 protests by New Zealand over visits of US warships with nuclear weapons were interpreted by the US as being contrary to the spirit of ANZUS. Thus the nature of the treaty is in doubt. US-New Zealand links are in abeyance, although those between Australia and New Zealand continue. US-Australian links remain close.

The Manila Pact, signed on 8 September 1954 by Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States, remains in force, though France and Pakistan subsequently withdrew, and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), set up to implement it, was disbanded in 1977. The Pact calls for action by each Party to meet the common danger posed by armed aggression, and for consultation if any other threat is posed to the territory, sovereignty or political independence of any Party. Since 1962 the US commitment to Thailand has been based on this Pact.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), set up in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and joined by Brunei in 1984, is intended to foster regional economic development, not military co-operation. Under the rubric of the promotion of regional peace and security it is concerned with the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. It supports the Kampuchean resistance movements politically, but reported arms transfers to the rebels are believed to result from national, rather than multilateral, initiatives.

Five-Power Defence Arrangements (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Britain), relating to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, came into effect on 1 November 1971. In the event of any externally organized or supported armed attack or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken, jointly or separately. Britain withdrew her forces in March 1976, but New Zealand troops remain in Singapore, as do Australian air units in Malaysia arid Singapore, with a small army component attached. Australian and New Zealand naval units visit Malaysia and Singapore regularly.

Economic Factors

After showing exceptionally low growth rates in 1982, the Asian economies recovered well in 1983 and continued this momentum throughout 1984 and early 1985. Regional average growth in real GNP/GDP amounted to just under 5%, compared with just above 4% in the previous year (1-2% in 3982). Taiwan led the region with a growth rate of almost 11%, followed by Singapore (8.2%), Korea (7.6%) and Malaysia (7.3%). Most of the others hovered around 5%, but the Philippines declined by a massive 5.5%. Almost all states were able to contain their inflation rates, with the exception of the Philippines which doubled hers to nearly 51%. The Philippines also led in gross external debt, with some $26 bn, or 80% of GDP, followed by New Zealand (64%), Malaysia (57%) and Korea and Sri Lanka (both 56%). Of the two principal Communist economies, North Korea continued to achieve a satisfactory performance (GDP growth estimated at some 4%), while Vietnam has had to face continuous serious economic decline, forcing her into greater economic dependency on the Soviet Union.

The ASEAN countries, while not a military alliance, appear to be moving towards an ever closer relationship. Not only do they share common objectives but economic necessity will force them into sharing economic resources. Moreover, the United States is exerting increasing pressure on them to increase their collective defence commitment, although she is mitigating that pressure by increasing her military aid and credits to Thailand.

Military Developments

The Afghan Resistance continues to mount hit-and-run attacks throughout the country with some success, though it still lacks the modern, sophisticated missile weapons needed to counter Soviet armour and aircraft. The Government armed forces, weakened by purges and desertion, have not yet been rebuilt, though they do add weight to Soviet operations. The Soviet command has done much to eliminate civilian support for the rebels in the countryside by systematically destroying the towns and crops, and it has developed effective close air support and mobile tactics to defend vulnerable points. Its present strength appears adequate to enable it to control the areas which it currently dominates without serious reinforcement. The military, economic and political costs of the war are not considered to be onerous enough to force an early withdrawal.

Pakistan - squeezed by the potential threat of attack from Afghanistan for supporting and housing the rebels, by greatly superior Indian strength, and by financial contraints - is slowly modernizing her air force. India continues to enhance her quantitative and qualitative superiority over any possible combination of opponents. While the variety of sources of her new equipment may complicate the supply of spares, self-sufficiency is increasing.

The Burmese Government's border area campaigns against the many private armies continue, but at a relatively unsophisticated level. Greater success against these groups would seem to demand more manpower and materiel. No major arms purchases have been noted.

Malaysia's military procurement programme seems to have slowed. Her forces will require time to absorb the items now delivered, and economic considerations should curtail future purchases. Her armed forces strength has dropped by about 12%, but the Reserve structure has been rationalized. Singapore, similarly, is receiving outstanding orders only, with no new significant purchases reported. Indonesia, the second-largest regional power, is producing aircraft and helicopters under licence; her forces remain largely capable only of internal security operations. The Indonesian armed forces are being reorganized to improve the efficiency of the chain of commond. KOSTRAD will form the core of the Army's field organization. Non-KOSTRAD forces, assigned to the Military province Commands (KOREM) will provide a quick-reaction internal security force. This reorganization is to be complete by April 1986; some of our entries, which assume the situation as of 1 July 1985, may be a little premature.

Vietnam's dry-weather success over the Kampuchean rebels seems largely to have broken their capability for conventional operations, forcing them back to guerilla tactics; though troublesome these can more readily be contained, and Vietnam shows no sign of a major withdrawal. Cambodia's own forces are still not able to mount more than local security operations, and Vietnam's continued presence in Cambodia has forced Thailand to seek significant supplies from the US.

Taiwan's forces appear sufficiently strong to dissuade any major assault against her main island, but she is still some way from self-suffiency. The armed forces of the Philippines are deeply committed to containing the widespread and growing internal security threat and have little reserve capacity.

The Japanese Government is attempting to develop its Self-Defence Forces in order to play a greater role in regional defence, but this concept is still politically controversial. Earlier procurement plans have suffered from delays, often because of under-funding. Pressure to remain below the ' 1 % of GNP ceiling' on defence expenditure will continue. On the other hand, US pressure on the Japanese government to increase its defence expenditure appears to be increasing.

The opposing forces in the Korean Peninsula are roughly equivalent. Neither is capable of a successful major offensive against the other without significant foreign assistance. North Korea has been undergoing a major reorganization, presumably to make better use of her relatively new range of armoured, mechanized and self-propelled artillery equipment. Some of the infantry divisions have been mechanized. A shift in responsibilities from Regular to Reserve units in the rear areas appears to be under way. There has been a reported increase in personnel strength of some 55,000, or perhaps 7% overall.

Sri Lanka's forces have been engaged in a massive Internal Security campaign to contain and isolate Tamil separatists. This has been costly, in both lives and materiel, representing a potentially heavy economic burden.

ДРУГИЕ АЗИАТСКИЕ СТРАНЫ И АВСТРАЛИЯ

Двусторонние соглашения

Соединенные Штаты имеют договоры о взаимном сотрудничестве и безопасности с Японией (1951, I960), Республикой Корея (1954) и Филиппинами (1951, 1983); соглашения о военном сотрудничестве с Австралией (1951, 1963, 1974 и 1980); и соглашение о военной помощи с Таиландом. Соглашения о поставках и производстве оружия с Тайванем действуют в соответствии с Законом о тайваньских отношениях 1979 года. США также оказывают постоянную военную помощь Индонезии, Южной Корее, Малайзии, Пакистану, Филиппинам и Таиланду. Основные американские базы находятся в Японии, Южной Корее и на Филиппинах (соглашение продлено в 1983 году), а воздушные (B-52) и военно-морские заправочные комплексы - в Северной и Западной Австралии соответственно.

В 1965 году Британия отделила архипелаг Чагос (в который входил Диего-Гарсия) от Маврикия, выплатив компенсацию в размере 3 млн. долл. США, и вместе с тремя меньшими группами островов сделала его британской территорией в Индийском океане. Небольшой британский военно-морской контингент был развернут на Диего-Гарсии. Соглашения 1966, 1972 и 1976 годов предусматривали создание крупного объекта военно-морской и воздушной поддержки США с бессрочным сроком действия. Три маленькие группы на Сейшелах.

У Великобритании есть соглашение об обороне со Шри-Ланкой (1974 год) и соглашение с Брунеем, которое предоставляет последним гуркхские войска и британские силы с учебным районом.

СССР заключила договоры о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи с Афганистаном (1978), Индией (1971), Монголией (1966), Северной Кореей (1961) и Вьетнамом (1978). Он заключил соглашения о размещении сил с Афганистаном в апреле 1980 года. Соглашение с Индией, заключенное в декабре 1982 года, предусматривает сотрудничество в области проектирования и изготовления морских судов; существуют другие и последующие договоренности о совместном производстве. Болгария имеет договоры дружбы с Камбоджей (1960), Лаосом (1979), Монголией (1967) и Вьетнамом (1979), Чехословакия с Лаосом и Вьетнамом (1980) и Афганистаном (1981), Венгрии с Афганистаном (1982), и Восточная Германия с Вьетнамом (1977), Кампучией (1980) и Афганистаном (1982).

Китайская Народная Республика имеет договоры о дружбе и ненападении с Афганистаном, Бирмой и Непалом (все 1960 год) и Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи с Северной Кореей (1961 год).

5 октября 1982 года Куба и Вьетнам подписали Договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве. Ливия и Северная Корея подписали в ноябре 1982 года Договор о союзничестве или дружбе и сотрудничестве, который разрешает обмен военными данными, специалистами и поставками. Северная Корея и Танзания имеют соглашение, охватывающее аспекты обороны и безопасности.

Австралия заключила соглашение и дополнительные соглашения о создании Сил обороны Папуа-Новой Гвинеи и оказании им помощи и предоставила в их распоряжение около 135 военнослужащих. В рамках ряда соглашений она поставляла оборонную технику Филиппинам, Малайзии, Сингапуру, Таиланду, Индонезии и большинству малых островных государств Тихого океана.

В июле 1977 года Вьетнам и Лаос подписали ряд соглашений, которые содержали военные положения и пограничный пакт и которые, возможно, охватывали размещение вьетнамских войск в Лаосе. Аналогичная серия соглашений, как представляется, была заключена между Вьетнамом и режимом Хэн Самрина в Кампучии в феврале 1979 года и декабре 1982 года.

Многосторонние договоренности

В 1951 году Австралия, Новая Зеландия и Соединенные Штаты подписали трехсторонний договор (ANZUS), который вступил в силу 29 апреля 1952 года и действует бессрочно. Каждый согласится действовать для достижения общих интересах в случае нападения на метрополию или островную территорию любой из них, или их вооруженные силы, морские или воздушные суда в Тихом океане. В начале 1985 года протесты Новой Зеландии за визиты американских военных кораблей с ядерным оружием были истолкованы США как противоречащие духу ANZUS. Таким образом, характер договора вызывает сомнения. Связи между США и Новой Зеландией приостановлены, хотя между Австралией и Новой Зеландией они продолжаются. Американо-австралийские связи остаются тесными.

Манильский пакт, подписанный 8 сентября 1954 года Австралией, Великобританией, Новой Зеландией, Пакистаном, Соединенными Штатами, Таиландом, Филиппинами и Францией, остается в силе, хотя впоследствии Франция и Пакистан вышли из него, а Организация Договора о Юго-Восточной Азии (СЕАТО), созданная для его осуществления, была распущена в 1977 году. Пакт призывает каждую из сторон принять меры для устранения общей угрозы, создаваемой вооруженной агрессией, и провести консультации, если какая-либо другая угроза угрожает территории, суверенитету или политической независимости любой из сторон. С 1962 года обязательства США перед Таиландом основываются на этом пакте.

Ассоциация государств Юго-Восточной Азии (АСЕАН), созданная в 1967 году Индонезией, Малайзией, Филиппинами, Сингапуром и Таиландом и к которой в 1984 году присоединился Бруней, призвана содействовать региональному экономическому развитию, а не военному сотрудничеству. В рамках деятельности по содействию региональному миру и безопасности она обеспокоена присутствием Вьетнама в Кампучии. Она оказывает политическую поддержку Кампучийским движениям сопротивления, однако сообщения о поставках оружия повстанцам, как считается, являются результатом национальных, а не многосторонних инициатив.

Соглашения об обороне пяти держав (Австралия, Малайзия, Новая Зеландия, Сингапур и Великобритания), касающиеся обороны Малайзии и Сингапура, вступили в силу 1 ноября 1971 года. В случае любого организованного извне или поддерживаемого вооруженного нападения или угрозы нападения на Малайзию или Сингапур пять правительств проведут совместные консультации с целью принятия решения о том, какие меры следует принять совместно или по отдельности. Великобритания вывела свои войска в марте 1976 года, но новозеландские войска остаются в Сингапуре, как и австралийские воздушные подразделения в Малайзии и Сингапуре, с небольшим армейским компонентом. Военно-морские силы Австралии и Новой Зеландии регулярно посещают Малайзию и Сингапур.

Экономические аспекты

После исключительно низких темпов роста в 1982 году азиатские экономики хорошо восстановились в 1983 году и сохраняли этот импульс на протяжении 1984 года и начала 1985 года. Средний региональный рост реального ВНП/ВВП составил чуть менее 5% по сравнению с чуть более 4% в предыдущем году (1-2% в 1982 году). Тайвань возглавил регион с темпами роста почти 11%, за ним следуют Сингапур (8,2%), Корея (7,6%) и Малайзия (7,3%). Большинство других колебалось около 5%, но у Филиппин сократились на 5,5%. Почти все государства смогли сдержать свои темпы инфляции, за исключением Филиппин, которые удвоили ее почти до 51%. Филиппины также лидировали по валовому внешнему долгу - около $ 26 млрд, или 80% ВВП, за ними следовали Новая Зеландия (64%), Малайзия (57%) и Корея и Шри-Ланка (56%). Из двух основных коммунистических экономик Северная Корея продолжала добиваться удовлетворительных показателей (рост ВВП оценивается примерно в 4%), в то время как Вьетнам столкнулся с постоянным серьезным экономическим спадом, поставив его в большую экономическую зависимость от Советского Союза.

Страны АСЕАН, хотя и не являются военным союзом, как представляется, продвигаются к еще более тесным отношениям. У них не только общие цели, но и экономическая необходимость вынудит их к совместному использованию экономических ресурсов. Кроме того, Соединенные Штаты оказывают на них все большее давление с целью повышения их приверженности делу коллективной обороны, хотя она смягчает это давление, увеличивая свою военную помощь и кредиты Таиланду.

Военные события

Афганское Сопротивление продолжает с некоторым успехом наносить удары по всей стране, хотя ему по-прежнему не хватает современного ракетного оружия, необходимого для противодействия советской бронетехнике и авиации. Правительственные вооруженные силы, ослабленные чистками и дезертирством, еще не восстановлены, хотя они и добавляют вес Советским операциям. Советское командование многое сделало для ликвидации гражданской поддержки повстанцев в сельской местности, систематически уничтожая города и посевы, и разработало эффективную тесную авиационную поддержку и мобильную тактику защиты уязвимых точек. Ее нынешняя численность представляется достаточной для того, чтобы она могла контролировать районы, в которых она в настоящее время доминирует, без серьезного подкрепления. Военные, экономические и политические издержки войны не считаются настолько обременительными, чтобы вынудить к скорейшему выводу войск.

Пакистан - зажатый между потенциальной угрозой нападения из Афганистана для поддержки и размещения повстанцев, и значительно превосходящей силой Индии и финансовыми препятствиями - медленно модернизирует свои ВВС. Индия продолжает усиливать свое количественное и качественное превосходство над любой возможной комбинацией противников. В то время как разнообразие источников ее нового оборудования может затруднить поставку запасных частей, самодостаточность растет.

Пограничные кампании бирманского правительства против многочисленных частных армий продолжаются, но на относительно простом уровне. Больших успехов в отношении этих групп, казалось бы, требуют больше сил и средств. Крупных закупок оружия отмечено не было.

Программа военных закупок Малайзии, как представляется, замедлилась. Ее силам потребуется время, чтобы освоить уже поставленные, а экономические соображения должны ограничить будущие закупки. Численность ее вооруженных сил сократилась примерно на 12%, но структура резерва была рационализирована. Сингапур также получает только непогашенные заказы, при этом о новых значительных закупках не сообщается. Индонезия, вторая по величине региональная держава, производит самолеты и вертолеты по лицензии; ее силы по-прежнему в основном способны осуществлять только операции по обеспечению внутренней безопасности. Индонезийские вооруженные силы реорганизуются для повышения эффективности цепочки общин. КОСТРАД будет составлять ядро полевой организации армии. Не KOSTRAD сил, назначенные для команд военной провинции (КОРЭМ) обеспечит быструю реакцию внутренних сил безопасности. Эта реорганизация должна быть завершена к апрелю 1986 года; некоторые из наших записей, которые предполагают ситуацию по состоянию на 1 июля 1985 года, могут быть несколько преждевременными.

Успех Вьетнама в сухую погоду над Кампучийскими повстанцами, по-видимому, в значительной степени подорвал их способность к обычным операциям, заставив их вернуться к партизанской тактике; хотя и неприятные, они могут быть более легко сдержаны, и Вьетнам не показывает признаков ухода. Собственные силы Камбоджи по-прежнему не в состоянии провести больше, чем местные операции по обеспечению безопасности, а продолжающееся присутствие Вьетнама в Камбодже вынудило Таиланд искать значительные поставки из США.

Силы Тайваня кажутся достаточно сильными, чтобы отразить любое крупное нападение на ее главный остров, но она все еще находится в далеке роде от самодостаточности. Вооруженные силы Филиппин глубоко привержены сдерживанию широко распространенной и растущей угрозы внутренней безопасности и располагают небольшим резервным потенциалом.

Японское правительство пытается развивать свои силы самообороны, с тем чтобы играть более значительную роль в региональной обороне, однако эта концепция по-прежнему является политически спорной. Ранее планы закупок страдали от задержек, часто из-за недостаточного финансирования. Бремя оборонных расходов остается ниже 1 % от ВНП и это будет продолжаться. С другой стороны, давление США на японское правительство с целью увеличения расходов на оборону, похоже, растет.

Противостоящие силы на Корейском полуострове примерно равны. Ни один из них не способен на успешное крупное наступление против другого без значительной иностранной помощи. Северная Корея переживает серьезную реорганизацию, по-видимому, для того, чтобы лучше использовать свой относительно новый ассортимент бронетанковой, механизированной и самоходной артиллерийской техники. Часть пехотных дивизий была механизирована. Как представляется, происходит переход от регулярных подразделений к резервным подразделениям в тыловых районах. Согласно сообщениям, численность персонала увеличилась примерно на 55 000 человек, или, возможно, на 7% в целом.

Силы Шри-Ланки проводят широкомасштабную кампанию по обеспечению внутренней безопасности в целях сдерживания и изоляции тамильских сепаратистов. Это было дорогостоящим, как в живых, так и в материальных средствах, что представляет собой потенциально тяжелое экономическое бремя.

AFGHANISTAN
Est GNP 1981/2: Afs 137.0 bn ($2,708 bn). 1982//3: 145.0 bn ($2.866 bn)
Est debt 1983: 3>1.5 bn.
Est def exp 1983: Afs 15.0 bn ($296,443 m). 1984: 10.60 bn ($209,486 m).*
FMA: see note* *Total Soviet military assistance since 1980 not known. US,

Western, friendly Islamic states' assistance to Afghan rebels est $600 m 1979-84, $200-280 m 1985.

$1=afghams 50.6 (1981-5).
Est population: 14-17,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,010,000; 31-45: 1,388,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,915,000; 31-45: 1,328,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 47,000.

Terms of service: Males 15-55: volunteers 2 years, conscription 3 years+, non-combatants 4 years.
Reserves: No formal force identified; call-up from ex-servicemen, Youth League and regional tribes from age 20 to age 40.

ARMY: 40,000 (mostly conscripts).*

(*Actual strength suspect. Divs reported to average. 2,500 (about quarter strength). Desertion is common.'

The Soviet High Command in Afghanistan (see USSR entry for Soviet forces deployed) effectively controls the Afghan forces;

it is not possible to differentiate between Soviet and Afghan holdings of identical equipment.

Some 5,000 Cuban and Czech advisers have been reported with the Afghan Air Force.)
3 corps HQ.
11 inf div (uder strength bdes).
3 armd div
1 mech inf bde.
2 mountain inf regts.
1 arty bde with 3 arty regts.
1 cdo bde: 3 cdo regts (bns; 1 para).
Tks: 50 T-34, 300 T-54/-55, 100 T-62; lt: 60 PT-76.
AFV: MICV: 40 BMP-1. APC: 400 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 900 76mm, M-1944 100mm; how: M-30 122mm, D-1 152mm; MRL: 50 BM-13-16 132mm; mor: 82mm, 100 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: SPG-9 73mm, 82mm; guns: 76mm, 100mm.
AD: guns: 350 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm towed, 20 ZSU-23-4 SP.

AIR FORCE: 7,000 (incl AD Comd); perhaps 150 combat ac, some 30 armed hel.f
Lt bbrs: 3 sqns with some 20 Il-28.
FGA: 10 sqns: 4 with some 50 MiG-17, 3 with 40 MiG-21 Fishbed, 2 with 25 Su-7B Fitter A, 1 with 12 Su-17 Fitter C.
OCU: 1: MiG-15UTI/-17/-19/-21/-23U, I1-18U.
Attack hel: 2 sqns: some 30 Mi-24 (10 more nonoperational, more reported being delivered.
Tpt: ac: 3 sqns: 1 VIP with 1 I1-18D, 12 An-14 Clod; 2 with some 10 An-2, 15 An-26, An-30; hel: 1 regt (3 sqns) with some 12 Mi-4, up to 30 Mi-8.
Flying school: Yak-18, L-39C.
AD: 1 div: 2 SAM bdes (each 3 bns) with 120 SA-2, 115 SA-3; 1 AA bde (2 bns) with 37mm, 85mm, 100mm guns; 1 radar bde (3 bns).

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie (Sarandoy 'Defence of the Revolution'): 30,000; Border Force: largely ex-military to age 55 org in provincial regts.

Ministry of Interior Khad (secret police).

Regional militias incl, 'Revolution Defence Groups' (Civil Defence), Pioneers, Afghan Communist Party Guards, Khalqi Youth, tribal.

OPPOSITION: Perhaps 90,000 guerrillas (possibly 20,000 intermittently active) supported by about 110,000 'reserves' in some

37 exile political groups (7 active). Eqpt: small arms,

T-55 MBT; BMP MICV, BTR-60 APC; D-30 122mm how; AGS-17 30mm grenade launchers; 2-in. (51mm),-60mm, M-41 82mm mor;

RPG-7 RL; SPG-9, 3 75mm, 82mm RCL; 12.7mm, 14.5mm AA machine guns, ATK mines; SA-7 SAM.

AUSTRALIA
GDP 1982/3: $A 159.23 bn ($US 149.428 bn). 1983/4: $A 173.95 bn ($US 157.663 bn).
GDP growth 1982/3: -1.2%. 1983/4: 5.7%.
Inflation 1982/3: 11.5%. 1983/4: 6.9%.
Debt 1983: $US 38.0 bn. 1984: $US 43.0 bn.
Def exp 1983/4: $A 5.540 bn ($US 5.021 bn). Budget 1984/5: 6.252 bn ($US 4.836 bn).

$US1=$A 1.0656 (1982/3), 1.1033 (1983/4), 1.2927(1984/5).
Population: 15,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,740,000; 31-45: 1,670,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,656,000; 31-45: 1,586,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 70,731.

Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves: 31,518. Army: 29,021, Navy 1,220, Air 1,277.

ARMY: 32,029.
1 inf div with 3 bdes of 2 inf bns.
1 armd regt (3 sqns).
2 cav regts.
4 arty regts (1 med, 2 fd, 1 AD); 1 locating bty.
1 fd engr, 1 construction, 1 fd survey regts.
5 sigs regts.
1 Special Air Service regt.
3 tpt regts (one air support).
Army Aviation:

1 regt (2 recce, 1 comd spt, 1 utility sqns).

1 avn school + base workshop bn.
Tks: 103 Leopard 1A3.
AFV: MICV: 63 M-113 with 76mm gun (48 with Scorpion, 15 with Saladin turret); APC: 727 M-113.
Arty: how: 227 105mm, 36 M-198 155mm.
ATK: RCL: 51 M-40 106mm; ATGW: 12 Milan.
AD: SAM: Redeye, 20 Rapier launchers.
Avn: ac: 14 Turbo-Porter, 13 Nomad; hel: 47 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa.
Marine: 36 watercraft, 87 LARC-5 amph craft.
(On order 59 105mm lt guns, 60 RBS-70 SAM launchers, 150 msls.)

NAVY: 16,025 (incl Fleet Air Arm).

Bases: Sydney, Melbourne, Jervis Bay, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Cockburn Sound.
Subs: 6 Oxley (Oberon).
Destroyers: 3 Perth (US Adams) ASW with Standard SAM, 2 Ikara ASW.
Frigates: 10: 4 Adelaide (FFG-7) with 1 Harpoon SSM, 1 Standard SAM, 2 AS-350 hel;

6 River with 1x 4 Seacat SAM/SSM, 1 Ikara ASW.
Patrol craft: 23: 15 PCF-420 Freemantle, 8 Attack (5 reserve).
Minehunter: 1 mod Br Ton coastal.
Amph: LCT: 6 (1 Reserve).
Spt: 1 hy amph tpt ship; 1 destroyer tender with 1 Wessex hel; 2 trg ships (1 Daring destroyer, 1 ex-ocean ferry); 1 fleet tanker.
FLEET AIR ARM: (1,083); 2 combat ac 8 combat hel.
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 8 Sea King Mk 50; 2 HS-748E ac.
Utility/SAR: 1 hel sqn with 10 Wessex 31B; 1 composite sqn with 4 UH-1B, 4 Bell 206B, 6 AS-350B Squirrel hel, 2 HS-748 ac..
Trg: 1 sqn with 2 Wessex 31B hel.
(On order 2 FFG-7 frigates, 2 MCM catamarans; Harpoon SSM, 8 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel.)

AIR FORCE: 22,677; some 138 combat ac.

FGA/recce: 2 sqns: 16 F-111C, 4 F-111A, 4 RF-111C.
Interceptor/FGA: 3 sqns: 58 Mirage IIIO/D.
MR: 2 sqns: 1 with 6 P-3B Orion (out Aug 1985); 1 with some 12 P-3C.
OCU: 1 with some 4 A-21 (F/A18), 18 Mirage IIIO/D, 10 MB-326H.
Forward air control: 1 fit with 6 CA-25 Winjeel.
Tpt: 6 sqns: 2 with 24 C-130E/H; 1 with 4 Boeing 707-338C (to be tanker ac); 1 with 4 CC-08 (C-7A Caribou) ac, 4 UH-1B hel;

1 with 17 CC-08; 1 with 2 BAC-111, 2 HS-748, 3 Mystere 20.
Tpt: 1 med hel sqn with 8 CH-47 Chinook.
Utility: 2 hel sqns: 31 UH-1B/H Iroquois, 5 AS-350 Squirrel.
Trainers incl 81 MB-326H (72 being uprated), 8 HS-748T2,48 CT-4/4A Air-trainer.
AAM: Sidewinder, R-530.
(4 Chinook hel in reserve.)
(On order some 71 F/A-18 FGA/interceptor/trg, some 8 P-3C MR, 69 A-10 Wamira trg ac; R-550 Magic AAM; Harpoon ASM.)

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO): 110; 8 UH-1H hel. Malaysia/Singapore; 1 sqn with 20 Mirage IIIO, 1 fit with CC-08 ac.

Papua New Guinea 135; trg/spt unit: 2 engr units, 106 advisers.

Indian Ocean; 2 destroyers, 1 amph. Trg gps in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore.

PARA-MILITARY: Bureau of Customs; 10 Searchmaster MRac.

BANGLADESH
GDP 1982/3: Tk 287.13 bn ($12,086 bn). 1983/4: 316.14 bn ($12,672).
GDP growth 1983/4: 4.5%. 1984/5: 3.8%.
Inflation 1983/4: 8.0%. 1984/5: 12.0%.
Est debt 1983: $4.0 bn. 1984: $4.4 bn.
Est def exp 1984/5: Tk 7.050 bn ($273,359 m). Budget 1985/6: 5.011 bn ($185,593 m).
Est FMA 1983: $0.3 m. 1984: $0.5 m.

$1=Tk 23.7578 (1982/3), 24.9485 (1983/4), 25.7903 (1984/5), 27.0 (1985).
Population: 102,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 11,855,000; 31-45: 8,149,000.

Women: 18-30: 10,991,000; 31-45: 7,683,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 91,300.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 30,000 (Bangladesh Rifles).

ARMY: 81,800.
5 inf div HQ.
13 inf bdes.
2 armd regts.
6 arty regts.
6 engr bns.
Tks: 20 Ch Type-59, 30 T-54/-55; lt: 6 M-24 Chaffee.
Arty: guns/how: 30 Model 56 pack, 50 M-101 105mm, 5 25-pdr (88mm), 20 Type-54 122mm; mor: 81mm, 50 Type-53 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 30 106mm; guns: 6-pdr (57mm), Ch Type-54 76mm.

NAVY: 6,500.* (* Spares are short; some eqpt unserviceable.)

Bases: Chittagong (HQ), Dacca, Khulna, Chalna.
Frigates: 3 Br (1 Type 61,2 Type 41).
FAC: (G): 4 O-24 (Ch Hegu) with 2 HY-2 SSM; (P): 4 Ch Hainan; (T) 12<: 8 Ch Shanghai II, 4Type-123K(P-4).
Patrol craft: 6 large: 2 Singapore Meghna, 2 Ind Akshay, 1 Jap Akaqi, 1 Bishkali (River).
Patrol boats: 5 Pabna (Kacha) river<.
Misc: 1 trg, 1 barracks, 1 log spt ships, 1 repair vessel, 2 O-69 coastal survey craft.
(On order 4 Hainan FAC(P).)

AIR FORCE: 3,000: 23 combat ac.
FGA: 2 sqns with 18 Ch J-6.
Interceptor: 1 sqn with 3 MiG-21MF, 2 MiG-21U.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 An-24, 4 An-26; (1 Yak-40, 1 DC-6).*
Hel: 1 sqn with 7 Bell 212, 2 206L, 6 Mi-8 Hip, 4 Alouette III.
Trg: 12 Ch CJ-6, 6 CM-170 Magister, 4 MiG-15UTI Midget.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

PARA-MILITARY: 55,000. Bangladesh Rifles 30,000 (border guard). Armed Police: 5,000 Ansars (Security guards) 20,000.

BRUNEI
GDP 1983: SB 8.940 bn ($US 4.158 bn). 1984: 9.20 bn ($US 4.253 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.0%. 1984: 3.0%.
Est def exp 1983: $B 550.00 m ($US 255.814m). 1984: 650.0 m ($US 300.509 m).

$US 1=$B 2.15 (1983), 2.163 (1984).
Population: 240,000.

Men: 18-30: 31,400; 31-45: 26,800.

Women: 18-30: 23,400; 31-45: 15,400.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 4,050.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 3,400.* (*All services part of Army; Navy, Air Force shown separately only for comparison.)
2 inf bns.
1 armd recce sqn.
1 AD bty: 8 dets with Rapier.
1 engr sqn.
1 sigs sqn.
Tks: lt 16 Scorpion. AFV: recce: 2 Sultan; APC: 24 Sankey AT 104. Arty: mor. 16 81mm. AD: SAM: 12 Rapier/Blindfire.
NAVY: (450).*

Base: Muara.
FAC(G): 3 Waspada each with 2 Exocet MM-38 SSM.
Patrol craft <: 3 Perwira coastal, 3 Rotork.
Amph<: 2 Loadmaster landing craft, 24 inf assault boats.
1 special boat sqn.
AIR FORCE: (200); 6 combat ac*
COIN: 1 sqn with 6 Saab 105CB.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Bell 212.
Composite sqn: 2 SF-260 ac, 3 Bell 206A/B hel.
VIP fit: 1 BO-105, 1 Bell 212, 1 S-76 hel.
Misc hel: 2 Bell 212, 1 206A.
(On order 1 AUH-76 (S-76) armed hel.)
PARA-MILITARY: Royal Brunei Police elms (1,750); Gurkha Reserve Unit (900).

BURMA
GDP 1983: K 49.730 bn (S6.130 bn). 1984: 52.816 bn($6.171 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.6%. 1984: 6.3%.
Inflation 1983: 10.0%. 1984: 15.0%.
Debt 1983: $2.3 bn. 1984: $2.6 bn.
Est def exp 1983/4: K 1.900 bn ($234,209 m). 1984/5: 2.100 bn ($245,379 m).
FMA 1983: $1.2 m. 1984: $1.4 m.

$1=kyats 8.1124 (1983/4), 8.5582 (1984/5).
Population: 39,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 4,196,000; 31-45: 2,759,000.

Women: 18-30: 4,208,000; 31-45: 2,850,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 186,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 170,000.
8 Regional, 1 Garrison, commands.
6 lt inf div HQ (under central control, 3 with 3 Tactical Operational Comds = bdes; 10 bns).
16 Tactical Operational Comds (bdes).
85 inf bns (25 indep).
2 armd bns.
4 arty bns.
1 AA bty.
Tks: 24 Comet.
AFV: recce: 40 Humber, 45 Ferret.
Arty: guns: 50 25-pdr (88mm); guns/how: 5.5-in. (140mm); how: 120 76mm, 80 M-101 105mm; mor: 80 120mm.
ATK: RCL: Carl Gustav 84mm; guns: 50 6-pdr (57mm) and 17-pdr (76.2mm).
AD: guns: 10 40mm.*

NAVY: 7,000 incl Marines.

Bases: Bassein, Mergui, Moulmein, Seikyi, Sinmalaik, Sittwe.
Corvettes: 4: 2 US (1 PCE-827, 1 Admirable), 2 Nawarat.
Gunboats: 36: (150.
Patrol craft: 46 river<
Amph: LCU: 1 US; LCM: 8 US, 1 spt vessel.
MARINES: (800): 1 bn.

AIR FORCE: 9,000; 22 combat ac* (* Spares are short; some eqpt unserviceable.)
COIN: 2 sqns: 16 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer, 6 AT-33A.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 F-27F, 5 FH-227, 7 PC-6/-6A, 5 DHC-3D.
Liaison fit: 6 Cessna 180, 1 Cessna 550.
Hel: 4 sqns: 20 Bell 205/206, 10 Alouette III.
Trg: incl 16 SF-260MB, 9 T-37C.

PARA-MILITARY: 73,000. People's Police Force (38,000); People's Militia (35,000). Fishery Dept: 15 patrol boats (3 Osprey, 12<).

OPPOSITION:

Burmese Communist Party: 12,000 regulars; 8,000 militia.

Kayan New Land Party: perhaps 100.

Karen National Liberation Army: some 4,000; 5 bdes, 3 indep bns.

Shan State Army: some 3,500.

Shan United Revolutionary Army: 900-1,200.

Shan United Army: 4,000.

Palaung State Liberation Army: some 500.

Pa-O National Army: some 500.

Wa National Army: some 300.

Kachin Independence Army: 5,000; 4 bdes.

Karenni Army: perhaps 600; 4 'bdes'.

Mon State Army: two groups: one some 500;

other perhaps 200.

Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front (Karen linked) absorbed Ommat Liberation and Rohingya Patriotic Fronts.

FIJI
GDP 1983: $F 1.168 bn ($US 1.149 bn). Est 1984: 1.231 bn($US 1.139 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.9%. 1984: 1.5%.
Inflation 1983: 7.0%. 1984: 5.3%.
Debt 1983: $432.4 m. 1984: $450.0 m.
Est def exp 1984: $F 14.900 m ($US 13.782 m). 1985: 15.900 m ($US 13.429 m).

$US 1 = $F 1.0161 (1983), 1.0811 (1984), 1.184(1985).
Population: 700,000.

Men: 18-30: 85,000; 31-45: 59,000.

Women: 18-30: 84,000; 31-45: 59,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 2,670.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 300; 1 inf bn.
ARMY: 2,500.
3 inf bns (1 reserve).
1 engr coy.
Spt units.
Mor: 12 81mm.
NAVY: 170.

Base: Suva.
MCMV: 3 US Bluebird coastal minesweepers.
Misc: 2 marine survey vessels, 1 research vessel.
Forces Abroad: 1,126: 2 inf bns. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (626); Egypt (Sinai MFO) (500).

INDIA
GDP 1982: Rs 1,635.8 bn ($169,891 bn). 1983: 1,957.4 bn ($189,766 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.8%. 1984: 4.0%.
Inflation 1983: 12.5%. 1984: 5.2%.
Debt 1983: $25.0 bn. 1984: $29.0 bn.
Est def exp 1984/5: Rs 82.100 bn ($6,907 bn). Budget 1985/6: 76.860 bn ($6,126 bn).

$1=rupees 9.6285 (1982/3), 10.3148 (1983/4), 11.8868 (1984/5), 12.546 (1985).
Population: 759,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 86,666,000; 31-45: 64,121,000.

Women: 18-30: 80,614,000; 31-45: 61,321,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 1,260,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: Army 200,000. Territorial Army 50,000. Air Force (Regular, Air Defence, Auxiliary) known to exist, strengths unknown.

ARMY: 1,100,000.
5 Regional Commands.
8 corps HQ.
2 armd divs.
1 mech div.
19 inf divs.
10 mountain divs.
7 indep armd bdes.
10 indep inf bdes.
1 mountain bde.
1 para bde.
8 indep arty bdes.
3 indep engr bdes.
Tks: 700 T-54/-55, 300 T-72, 1,500 Vijayanta, lt: 150 PT-76.
AFV: Mid: 350 BMP-1; APC: 500 OT-62/-64, BTR-60.
Arty: guns: Yug M-48 76mm, 25-pdr (88mm) (retiring), 100 100mm, 200 105mm (incl Abbot SP), 550 M-46 130mm (some SP),

5.5-in. (140mm) (retiring), S-23 180mm; how: 75/24 75mm mountain, 105mm (incl M-56 pack), D-20 152mm;

mor. 81mm, 500 120mm, 20 160mm; SSM: FROG-7.
ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, M-40 106mm; guns: 6-pdr (57mm). ATGW: SS-11-B1, Milan, AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 20mm, ZSU-23-4 23mm SP, L40/60, L40/70 40mm; 500 3.7-in. (94mm);

SAM: 180 SA-6, SA-7,48 SA-8A, SA-9,40 Tigercat.
(On order Arjun, 1,600 T-72M MBT, BRDM recce, BMP-1/-2, BMD MICV, 105mm Mk-II gun, SA-8 SAM).

NAVY: 47,000, incl naval air force.

Bases: Western Fleet: Bombay, Goa. Southern Fleet: Cochin. Eastern Fleet: Vishakapatnam, Port Blair.
Subs: 8 Sov F-class.
Carriers: 1 Br Majestic (capacity 18 attack, 4 ASW ac/hel).
Cruiser: 1 Br Fiji (trg).
Destroyers: 3 Sov Kashin II GW with 4 Styx SSM, 2x2 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 hel.
Frigates: 23: 2 Godavari with 2 Styx SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM, 2 Sea King hel;

6 Leander (4 with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 2 with 1x4, 1 hel);

2 Br Whitby with 3 Styx SSM, 1 Alouette hel;

10 Sov Petya II; 3 Br Leopard (trg).
Corvettes: 3 Sov Nanuchka with 4 SS-N-2 SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 14: 6 Sov Osa-I, 8 Osa-II with 4 Styx SSM.
Patrol craft: 8: 2 Osa-I, 1 Abhay, 5 SDB-2 large.
MCMV: 19: 6 Sov Natya ocean; 4 Br Ham, 6 Sov Yevgenya<, 3 Indian^ inshore hunters.
Amph: LST: 2 (1 Br); LCT: 7 (6 Sov, 1 Polish Polnocny); LCU: 4.
(On order 4 Sov F-class, 2 Type-1500 subs, 2 Kashin GW destroyers, 2 Godavari (mod Leander) FFG, 2 Nanuchka corvettes, 5 Polnocny LCT,

1 survey ship, Exocet SSM.)
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000); some 36 combat ac, 26 combat hel.
Attack: 1 sqn with 15 Sea Hawk FGA-6 (being retired), 8 Sea Harrier FRS Mk-51 (2 T-60 trg) (10 ac in carrier).
ASW: 1 ac sqn with 5 Alize 1050 (4 in carrier); 5 hel sqns with 5 Ka-25 Hormone A (in Kashin), 10 Sea King, 11 Alouette III (frigates).
MR: 2 sqns: 5 L-1049 Super Constellation, 3 Il-38 May.
Comms: 1 sqn with 18 PBN Defender (?2MR).
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 10 Alouette III.
Trg: 2 sqns: 7 HJT-16 Kiran, 2 Sea Hawk FB-5, 10 BN-2 Islander ac; 4 Hughes 300 hel.
Other ac incl: 5 Alize 1050, 4 Sea King.
(On order 10 Sea Harrier Mk 51, 1 T-60; 3 Tu-142M Bear MR ac; 12 Sea King Mk 42B, 18 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel;

Sea Eagle SSM; Exocet AM-39 ASM.)

AIR FORCE: 113,000; 846 combat ac; some 60 armed hel.
5 Air Commands.
Bbrs: 3 sqns (1 maritime role): 35 Canberra B(I)58/B(I)12 (to be replaced), 18 Jaguar.
FGA: 12 sqns: 2 (1 forming) with some 7 Mirage 2000H; 1 with some 10 Hunter F-56A (Jaguar to replace); 2 with 50 Jaguar GR-1, 6 T-2;
3 with 40 Su-7BM (to retire, 1 sqn with MiG-27 to form 1985); 1 with 50 HF-24 Marut (MiG-23BN to replace); 3 with 90 MiG-23BN Flogger H.
AD: 20 sqns: 2 with 40 MiG-23MF Flogger B; 14 with 260 MiG-21/FL/PFMA/-MF/bis; 4 with 92 Ajeet.
Recce: 2 sqns: 1 with 8 Canberra PR-57, 4 HS-748; 1 with 7 MiG-25R, 1 MiG-25U.
Tpt: ac: 11 sqns: 5 with 95 An-32; 2 with 30 An-12B; 2 with 20 DHC-3; 1 with 16 DHC-4; 2 with 28 HS-748, 2 Boeing 737-248 (leased), 3 Il-76 Candid;

hel: 6 sqns with 72 Mi-8.
Comms: 1 HQ sqn with 7 HS-748M.
Liaison fits and dets: 16 HS-748, C-47.
Liaison: 7 hel sqns: 3 with 100 SA-316B Chetak (Alouette III); 4 with 60 SA-315B Cheetah (Lama); some with 4 AS-11B ATGW.
Trg Comd: 3 trg and conversion sqns with 11 Canberra T-4/-13/-67, 25 Hunter F-56/T-66, 40 MiG-21/U, 16 Su-7/U; 13 MiG-23UM Flogger C/L;

5 MiG-27 Flogger D/J, 5 Jaguar, 60 HT-2, 83 HJT-16 Kiran, 15 Marut Mk IT, some 20 HPT-32 (replacing HT-2), 44 TS-11 Iskra, 27 HS-748 ac;

20 Chetak hel.
AAM: R-23R/T Apex, R-60 Aphid, R-550 Magic, AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AS-30; AS-11B (ATGW).
SAM: 30 bns: 180 Dvina V75SM/VK (SA-2), SA-3.
Air Defence Ground Environment System.
(On order some 40 MiG-29, some 33 Mirage 2000H, 31 Jaguar (to be locally assembled), some 165 MiG-27M, MiG-21bis ftrs;

69 An-32, some 17 Il-76, 3 Do-228 tpts; 90 Kiran Mk 2, some 120 HPT-32 trg ac;

Mi-17, 10 Mi-26 Halo, 45 Chetak hel; R-23R Apex, R-60 Aphid AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Border Security Force 85,000; small arms, some lt arty, tpt/liaison air spt. 175,000 in other orgs incl Assam Rifles.

Coastguard 2,000; 2 Br Type 14 frigates, patrol vessels (2 P-957 offshore, 2 SDB-2 fast, 17 inshore),

2 air sqns with 2 F-27, 5 Defender ac, 4 Chetak hel.

(On order 4 offshore, 3 inshore defence patrol vessels, 9 lt tpt ac, 6 hel.)

INDONESIA
GDP 1983: Rp 71,215 bn ($72,419 bn). Est 1984: 76,300 bn ($72,705 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 4.2%. 1984: 4.4%.
Inflation 1983: 12.0%. 1984: 9.0%.
Debt 1983: $26.0 bn. 1984: $31.0 bn.
Est def exp 1983/4: Rp 2,485 bn ($2,527 bn). 1984/5: 2,540 bn ($2,420 bn).
Est FMA 1983: $37.0 m. 1984: $58.0 m.

$1=rupiahs 983.375 (1983/4), 1049.45 (1984/5).
Population: 161,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 17,858,000; 31-45: 12,535,000.

Women: 18-30: 18,394,000; 31-45: 13,244,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 278,050.

Terms of service: conscription, 2 years selective.
Reserves: Army (planned): cadre units; numbers, strengths unknown, obligation to age 45 for officers.

ARMY: 216,000.
10 Military Area Commands, (reorg 1985/6).
2 inf divs (KOSTRAD).
1 armd cav bde (3 cav bns, spt units).
3 inf bdes (9 bns).
2 AB inf bdes (6 bns).
2 fd arty regts (6 bns).
1 AA arty regt (3 bns).
1 fd engr regt (2 bns).
4 special warfare gps.
7 indep cav bns, 1 cav det.
63 indep inf bns (under Military Province Commands (KOREM)).
4 indep AB inf bns.
8 indep fd arty bns.
7 indep AA arty bns; 4 indep btys.
4 construction engr bns.
Fd engrs: 6 indep bns; 10 indep dets.
Army Avn: 1 composite sqn; 1 hel sqn.
Tks: lt some 111 AMX-13, 41 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 56 Saladin, 58 Ferret; MICV: 200 AMX-VCI; Are: 56 Saracen, 60 V-150 Commando, 80 BTR-40, 24 BTR-152.
Arty: guns/how: some 30 M-1938 76mm pack, 170 105mm; mor: 480 81/82mm, M-43 120mm;
ATK: RL: 480 M-67 90mm, M-40 106mm.
AD: guns: 20 20mm, 90 M-l 40mm, 200 57mm; SAM: RBS-70.
Avn: 8 NC-212 Aviocar, 2 Aero Commander 680, 1 Beech Super-18 ac; 16 Bell 205, 4 Alouette III, 16 BO-105 hel.
Amph: LST: 1; LCU: 20 300-ton.
Marine spt: 14 tpts.
(On order: some 82 AMX-13 lt tks; 6 Bell 212, Super Puma hel; Rapier SAM.)
DEPLOYMENT: E. Timor 15,000; 20 inf bns.

NAVY: 36,950 incl naval air and marines.

Bases: Surabaya, Tanjung Priok (Jakarta), Bitung (Celebes); (Teluk Rantai, near Lampung, Sumatra, planned).
2 Fleets (being org 1985).
Subs: 2 Cakra (Type-1300).
Frigates: 13: 4 GW with Exocet MM-38 SSM;

3 Fatahillah (1 with 1 Wasp hel); 1 Hadjar Dew Antara (Yug; 1 hel).

4 US Jones, 1 Pattimore (?now non-operational).
Patrol vessels: 24: 3 Pandorong (Sov Kronshtadt), 4 Layang (Yug Kraljevica), 2 Andale, 8 Sibarau (Aus Attack), 1 Hui (US PC-461),

6 Samadar (Aus Carpentaria) coastal<, 1 Jetfoil 429 hydrofoil.
FAC: 4 Andau (Lurssen PB-57); (G): 4 PSMM-5 Mandau (Dagger) with 4 Exocet SSM; (T): 4: 2 Lurssen TNC-45, 2 Beruang (FRG).
Minesweepers: 2 Pulau Rani (Sov T-43) ocean.
Comd/spt ships: 2.
Amph: LST: 18 incl 2 comd (with up to 3 hel); LCU: 6; LCM: 28.

(3 LST, 22 LCU, 2-4 tpt/cargo in Military Sealift Command.)
Spt: 11: 2 cargo ships, 4 tankers (3 harbour), 2 tpts, 1 repair, 1 hospital, 1 trg ship.
NAVAL AIR: (1,000); combat: 19 ac, 14 hel.
ASW: 10 Wasp, 4 AS-322 Super Puma hel.
MR: 13 N-24B Nomad, 6 N-24L.
Other: ac: incl 6 C-47, 6 NC-212, 3 Aero Commander, hel: 2 AS-332F Super Puma, 1 Alouette II, 4 BO-105.
MARINES: (12,000).

5 regts: 2 inf (each 6 bns), 1 combat spt, 1 admin spt, 1 trg.
Tks: lt 30 PT-76. AFV: MICV: 40 AMX-10 PAC-90; APC: 57 incl 25 AMX-10P, BTR-50P.
Arty: how: 40 M-38 122mm; nu BM-14 140mm. AD: guns: 40mm, 57mm.
(On order 1 Type-1300 sub, 3 Tribal frigates (1985), 8 PB-57 FAC, 2 Lerici, 1 Alkmaar MCMV, 5 Jetfoil 429 patrol boats*;

18 NC-235 tpt ac; some 20 AS-332F Super Puma hel*.) (* May be for Coastguard.)

AIR FORCE: 25,100; 68 combat aircraft.
2 Air Operations Areas:
FGA: 2 sqns: 27 A-4E, 2 TA-4H Skyhawk.
Interceptors: 1 sqn with 11 F-5E, 4 F-5F.
COIN: 1 sqn with 15 OV-10F.
MR: 1 sqn with 1 C-130H-MP, 3 Boeing 737-200, 5 HU-16.
Tpt: 4 sqns: 2 with 21 C-130B/H/HS, 1 L-100-30; 2 with 1 C-140 Jetstar, 7 C-47, 1 SC-7 Skyvan, 1 F-28, 8 F-27, 2 NC-212A4, 1 Boeing 707,

12 Cessna 207/401/402.
Hel: 3 sqns: 1 with 9 S-58 (UH-34T); 2 with 5 Bell 204B, 12 SA-330L Puma, 12 Hughes 500; 6 NBO-105 (with Forestry).
Trg: 3 sqns: 16 Hawk T-53, 24 T-34C1, 20 AS-202 Bravo ac; 12 Bell 47G hel.

Quick Reaction Forces:
5 COIN bns.
Spt vessels: 6: 600-ton Ro-Ro cargo ships.

(On order 8 NC-212-200, 32 NC-235, 3 Transall C-160 tpt ac; (N)BO-105, SA-332 Super Puma, Bell 412, BK-117 hel.)

Other HQ:
KOSTRAD = Strategic Reserve Command: (16,500-19,000 men); main national force under direct control of the Commander of the Armed Forces;

2 divs, cav bde, special force gps, spt arms and services.
KOPKAMTIB = Command for the Restoration of Order and Security; no forces assigned.
KOPPASSANDHA = Special Forces Command: 4,000; 4 special para/cdo gps.

PARA-MILITARY: Police mobile bde* org in coys: 12,000; 2 BO-105 hel. Militia, about 70,000. Coastguard; many small patrol boats.

Customs; 12 28-metre, 8 57-metre Lurssen patrol boats (12 FPB-38 on order). Civil Defence Force (millions registered).

Maritime Security Agency: 6 patrol boats. Police Patrol craft incl 15 armed DKN 140-ton.

Sea Communications (Transport Ministry): 9 SAR craft.

(* Part of Department of Defence and Security.)

OPPOSITION: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETLIN): some 700; small arms.

Free Papua Movement (OPM): perhaps 100 armed.

JAPAN
GDP 1982: yen 264,798 bn ($1,061 bn). 1983: 274,919 bn ($1,163 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 3.4%. 1984: 5.7%.
Inflation 1983: 1.9%. 1984: 2.8%.
Debt 1983: $112.0 bn. 1984: $115.0 bn.
Def exp 1984/5: yen 2,934.6 bn ($12,018 bn). 1985/6: 3,137.0 bn ($12,471 bn). * (*Salary increases of 3.4% will raise defence outlay.)

$1=yen 249.638 (1982/3), 236.328 (1983/4), 244.193 (1984/5), 251.54 (1985).
Population: 121,800,000.

Men: 18-30: 10,859,000; 31-45: 14,420,000

Women: 18-30: 10,515,000; 31-45: 14,367,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 243,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: Army 43,000; Navy 600.

ARMY: 155,000.
5 Army HQ (Regional Commands).
1 armd div.
12 inf divs (5 at 7,000, 7 at 9,000 men each).
2 composite bdes.
1 AB bde.
1 arty bde, 2 arty gps; 8 SAM gps (each of 4 btys).
1 sigs bde.
5 engr bdes.
Avn: 1 hel bde: 24 sqns. 2 ATK hel platoons forming.
Tks: some 530 Type 61 (retiring), some 540 Type 74 (increasing).
AFV: APC: 430 Type 60, 120 Type 73.
Arty: guns/how: 330 105mm (incl some 20 Type 74), some 340 155mm SP (incl 180 Type 75), 80 203mm (incl some 20 SP);

MRL: some 60 Type 75 130mm SP; SSM: 50 Type 30; mor: 780 81mm, 560 107mm (some SP).
ATK: RCL: 1,840 75mm, Carl Gustav 84mm, 106mm (incl Type 60 SP); ATGW: 220 Type 64, some 40 Type 79.
AD: guns: 100 35mm twin, 37mm, 40mm (incl M-42 SP), 75mm; SAM: some 10 Type 81 Tan, 70 HAWK, 130 Improved HAWK.
Avn: ac: 32: 21 LR-1, 2 TL-I, 9 L-19; hel: 390: 10 AH-1S, 60 KV-107, 80 UH-1H, 60 UH-1B, 30 TH-55, 150 OH-6J/D.
(On order 60 Type 74 MBT; 15 Type 73 APC; 13 Type 75, 38 FH-70 (176 planned) 155mm, 24 M-110A2 203mm SP how; 12 Type 79 hy ATGW;

223 84mm RCL; 61 Stinger, 10 Type 81 Tan launchers; 16 AH-1S ATK, 9 OH-6D lt, 4 UH-1H, 2 CH-47 tpt hel.)

NAVY: 44,000 (including naval air).

Bases: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato.
Subs: 14: 6 Yushio, 7 Uzushio, 1 Asashio (to retire).
Destroyers: 31: 2 Shirane with Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x8 ASROC, 3 ASW hel;

2 Haruna with 1x8 ASROC, 3 ASW hel;

7 Hatsuyuki with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Sea Sparrow, 1x8 ASROC, 1 ASW hel;

3 Tachikaze with Tartar/Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;

1 Amatsukaze with 1 Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;

4 Takatsuki with 1x8 ASROC;

6 Yamagumo (2 to be modernized) with 1x8 ASROC;

3 Minegumo with 1x8 ASROC; 1 Akizuki;

2 Ayanami.
Frigates: 18: 3 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM (2 Yubari, 1 Ishikari); 11 Chikugo with 1x8 ASROC; 4 Isuzu.
Patrol craft: 11: 2 Mizutori large; 9 coastal<
FAC(T): 5 35-metre.
MCMV: 47: 3 spt ships, 32 coastal minesweepers (13 Hatsushima, 19 Takami), 6 Nanago boats, 6 diving tenders.
Trg/spt: 36: 1 Katori, 5 Ayanami, 3 Mizutori, 1 Azuma, 3 Murasame, 2 Umitaka, 1 Akizuki; 1 Chigoda sub depot, 2 sub rescue; 20 other.
Amph: LST: 6 (3 Miura, 3 Atsumi); LSU: 2.
NAVAL AIR ARM: (12,000); combat: 84 ac, 64 hel.
6 Air Wings.
MR: 7 sqns: 2 sqns with 16 P-3C (2 more (30 ac) to form); 55 P-2J, 13PS-1.
ASW: 6 hel sqns with 57 HSS-2/2A/B Sea King.
Test: 1 sqn with 2 P-3C,3 P-2J ac; 3 HSS-2A, 2 -Bhel.
SAR: 7 fits: 8 US-1/1A ac, 14 S-61A/2 hel.
Trg: 5 sqns: incl OCU with 19 P-2J, 6 YS-11T, 20 TC-90, 4 B-65, 32 KM-2 ac; 10 HSS-2, 6 OH-6J/D, 3 Bell 47G hel.
(On order 3 Yushio subs; 2 Hatakaze (Type 171), 9 Hatsuyuki DDG; 2 Hatsushima MCMV; 1 combat spt ship;

22 P-3C, 1 Learjet 36 (U-36A), 1 TC-90 ac; 12 HSS-2B, 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW, 1 S-61A, 2 OH-6D, 2 US-1A hel.)

AIR FORCE: 44,000; some 270 combat ac.
6 combat air wings; 1 combat air gp; 1 recce sqn.
FGA: 3 sqns: 50 F-1.
Interceptors: 10 sqns: 3 with some 60 F-15J/DJ (1 more forming 1985); 6 with 110 F-4EJ; 1 with 30 F-104J.
Recce: 1 sqn with 10 RF-4EJ, EWng gp with 6E-2C.
Aggressor trg: 1 sqn with 5 T-2, 6 T-33.
Tpt: 1 tactical wing: 3 sqns: 20 C-l, 10 YS-11, 4 C-130H.
SAR: 1 wing (9 dets) with MU-2 ac, 29V-107 hel.
Test: 1 wing with 20 F-4EJ, 2 F-15J, F-104J/DJ, 2 T-l, 10T-2, 2 T-3, T-33A, C-1, 2 C-130H.
Air traffic control/weather: 1 wing with YS-11, MU-2J, T-33A.
Trg: 5 wings: 10 sqns: 40 T-1A/B, 60 T-2, 40 T-3, 50 T-33A.
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder.

Air Defence:
Aircraft control and warning: 3 wings and 1 group; 28 radar sites.
SAM: 6 gps: 19 sqns: 180 Nike-J (Patriot to replace).

1 Air fd Def sqn: 20mm Vulcan AA gun, Type 81 Tan, Stinger SAM.
(On order 53 F-15J-/DJ, 7 F-l ftrs, 2 C-130H tpt ac; 1 CH-47 Chinook, 3 KV-107 hel;

4 Type 81 Tan SAM launchers, 2 btys Patriot SAM (24 btys planned).)

PARA-MILITARY: 20,000: Coast Guard; 43 large (6 with 1 hel), 47 med, 19 small, 221 coastal patrol vessels; 98 misc service, 83 tender/trg vessels;

1 C-130HMP, 5 YS-11 A, 2 Skyvan, 15 King Air, 1 Cessna U-206G ac; 29 Bell 212, 4206B, 2 Hughes 269S hel.

(On order 1 large, 2 medium, 1 coastal patrol craft).

KAMPUCHEA/CAMBODIA
Est population: 6-7,000,000. (*No reliable data since April 1975 available.)
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: some 35,000.

Terms of service, conscription, 18 months minimum.
ARMY: some 35,000.
4 inf divs.
3 indep inf bdes.
1 armd regt.
Some 50 indep units incl cav (recce), arty, AD, pioneer.
Tks: 10 T-54/-55; lt: 10 PT-76.
AFV: APC: V-100, M-113, BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: how: M-1942 76mm, M-1938 122mm; MRL: Type-63 107mm, BM-13-16 132mm, BM-14-16 140mm; mor: 82mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: B-10 82mm, B-11 107mm.
AD: guns: M-1938 37mm, M-1950 57mm.
Avn: hel: 6 Mi-8, 2 Mi-24.
(On order tks, arty, ships, ac, Mi-8 hel reported; details unknown.)
Provincial Forces: HQ; bn, coy district and sub district units: numbers of units, strengths, eqpt unknown.

PARA-MILITARY: Militia, Regional Armed Forces/Self Defence forces (org in coys), People's Police force: strengths, eqpt unknown.

OPPOSITION: Coalition of Democratic Kampuchea:

Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), some 35,000 orgin bdes ('divs') and bns.

Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), some 18,000 (plus perhaps 5,000 unarmed reserves);

small arms, incl 12.7mm machine guns, 60mm, 82mm mor, RPG-7 RL, DK-75mm mor, RCL.

Armie Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS), perhaps 7,000.

Though formally merged, the three forces largely operate independently.

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)
Est GDP 1983: won 36.020 bn ($38,319 bn). 1984: 37.570 bn ($39 968 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 4.8%. 1983: 4.3%.
Inflation 1983: 5.0%. 1984: 2%.
Debt 1983: $3.30 bn.
Def budget 1984: won 3.841 bn ($4,086 bn). 1985: $3,944 bn ($4,196bn).

$1=won 0.94 (1982/3/4/5).
Population: 20,100,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,412,000; 31-45: 1,619,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,460,000; 31-45: 1,608,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 838,000.

Terms of service: Army, Navy 5 (?10) years; Air Force 3-4 years.
Reserves: Army 500,000, Navy 40,000, Air Force (reserves believed to exist).

Mobilization claimed 12 hours; up to 5,000,000 have some Reserve/Militia commitment. See Para Military.
ARMY: 750,000.
HQ: 3 mech, 8 all-arms corps (major re-org reported).
2 armd divs.
5 mot and mech inf divs.
24 inf divs.
7 indep armd bdes.
9 indep inf bdes (5-8 bns: up to 8,500 men).
22 special ops bdes incl 3 cdo, 4 recce, 1 river crossing regts, 3 amph, 5 AB bns (80,000).
('Bureau of Reconnaissance Special Forces').
Arty Command:

Fd: 2 hy arty, 2 mor regts; 6 SSM bns.

AD: 2 AA divs; 7 AA regts.
Reserve: 23 inf divs.
Tks: 300 T-34, 2,800 T-54/-55/-62, 175 Type-59; lt: 100 Type-63, 50 Type-62.
AFV: recce: 140 BA-64; MICV: BMP-1; APC: 1,100 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, Ch Type-531.
Arty: 4,650: guns: M-1942 76mm; D-44, Type-56 85mm; M-1944 100mm; A-19, M-1931/-17, D-74, Type-60 122mm; M-46, Type -59 130mm;

gun/how: M-1937 152mm towed; how: Type-54, M-30 122mm; D-20, ML-20, M-1938 152mm.

MRL: 2,000 Type-63 107mm, BM-21 122mm; Type-63 130mm, RPU-14, BM-14-16 140mm, BMD-20 200mm and BM-24 240mm;

SSM: 54 FROG-5/-7; mor: 11,000 82mm, 120mm, 160mm and 240mm.
ATK: RCL: 1,500 B-10 82mm, 1,000 B-11 107mm; guns: M-1942 45mm, M-1943 57mm, Type-52 75mm, D-48 85mm towed, 800 SU-76 and SU-100 SP;

ATGW: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 8,000 23mm, Type-55, M-1939 37mm, Type-59, 85mm, 100mm towed, ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP; SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 35,000.

Bases: East Coast: Wonsan, Cha-ho, Chongjin, Kimchaek, Toejo. West Coast: Nampo, Haeju, Pipaqwan, Sagwan-ri.
2 Fleet HQ.
Subs: 20: 4 Sov W-class; 4 Ch, 12 local-built Type-033/R-class).
Frigates: 4 Najin: (2 may be in reserve).
FAC: (G): 30: 6 Soju, 10 Osa-I (4 Styx SSM), 8 Komar, 6 Sohung (2 Styx SSM);

(T): 152: 47 Sov (3 Shershen, 34 P-6<, 10 P-4<), 105< (?9 Sinpo, 15 Iwon, 6 An Ju, 75 Ku Song/Sin Hung).
FAC: 163: 11 Shanghai II, 4 Chodo, 4 K-48, some 144( (20 Sov MO-IV, 8 Shantou, 66 Chaho, 40 Chong-Jin (Chong-Ju-class reported); ?10 Sinpo).
Patrol craft: 32 large: 15 SO-1 (6 Sov), 2 Sov Tral, 3 Sariwan, 6 Ch Hainan, 6 Taechong; 30 coastal(: 10 Sov KM-4, 20 misc).
Amph: LSM: 6 Hantae; LCU: 9 Hanchon, 90 Nampo assault/landing craft; LCM: 15;<
Coast defence: 2 msl regts: Samlet in 6 sites; M-1931/-37 122mm, SM-4-1 130mm, M-1937 152mm guns.
(On order. Sohung, Soja FAC(G), patrol craft, Hantae LSM).

AIR FORCE: 53,000; some 800 combat ac.
Bbrs: 3 lt sqns with 80 Il-28.
FGA: 10 sqns: 1 with 20 Su-7; 6 with some 280 MiG-15/-17; 3 with some 100 MiG-19/Q-5.
Interceptors: 12 sqns: 160 MiG-21, some 60 MiG-19.
Tpt: perhaps 25 sqns: 250 An-2, 10 An-24, 5 Il-14,4 Il-18, 2 Tu-I54B, 1 Il-62.
Hel: 170 incl 40 Mi-4, 20 Mi-8, 80 Hughes 300, -500 (some 60 reported to be armed).
Trg: incl 4 Mig-23, 120 Yak-18, 100 MiG-15UTI/-19UTI/-21U, Il-28, 30 Ch CJ-6.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
SAM: 4 bdes (12 bns, 40 btys) with 800 SA-2 in 45 sites.
(On order: some 32 MiG-23.)

Forces Abroad: Iran (300); 11 African countries incl Angola (1,000), Madagascar (100); Seychelles (40); Uganda (200).

PARA-MILITARY: Security forces and border guards: 38,000.

Workers-Farmers Red Guards (militia); some 3 m. Youth Red Guard: some 700,000.

Instruction force (Reserve Military units): ex-Regular and selected Militia staff/trg cadre.

HQ (corps equivalent) in each of 9 Provinces and 3 towns; bde HQ in towns; bns, coys/platoons at village, farm, factory, etc.,

some with small arms, mor to 120mm, some AA arty.

KOREA: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH)
GDP 1982: won 59,603 bn ($76,833 bn). 1984: 67,071 bn ($83,217 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 9.5%. 1984: 7.6%.
Inflation 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 2.4%.
Debt 1983: $43.0 bn. 1984: $45.0 bn. .
Def budget 1984: won 3,622 bn ($4,494 bn). Exp 1985: 3,825 bn ($4,402 bn). Est budget 1986: 4,500 bn ($5,028 bn).
FMA 1983: $187 m. 1984: $232 m.

$1=won 775.75 (1983), 805.98 (1984), 868.92 (1985).
Population: 42,224,000.

Men: 18-30: 5,685,000; 31-45: 3,818,000.

Women: 18-30: 5,318,000; 31-45: 3,672,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 598,000.

Terms of service: all Services, 30-36 months.
Reserves: Army: Regular Reserves 1,400,000, Homeland Reserve Defence Force 3,300,000. Navy 7,000, Marines 60,000, Air 55,000.

ARMY: 520,000.
HQ: 3 Army (1 Reserve), 5 Corps (each 4 divs).

2 mech inf divs (each 3 bdes: 3 mech inf, 3 mot, 3 tk, 1 recce bns; 1 fd artybde).

19 inf divs (each 3 inf regts, 1 recce, 1 tk, 1 engr bn, artygp).
7 Special Warfare bdes.
2 AA arty bdes.
2 SSM bns with Honest John.
2 SAM bdes: 3 HAWK bns (24 sites), 2 Nike Hercules bns (10 sites).
1 army aviation bde.
Reserves: 1 Army HQ, 23 inf divs.
Tks: 350 M-47, 850 M-48(incl 180 A5).
APC: 450 M-113, 250 Fiat 6614.
Arty: 3,000: guns: M-53 155mm, M-107 175mm sp; how: M-101 105mm, M-114 towed, 100 M-109A2 SP 155mm, M-115 towed 203mm.

MRL: 130mm; SSM: 12 Honest John; mor: 5,300 81mm and 107mm.
ATK: guns: 8 M-18 76mm, 50 M-36 90mm; RL: LAW; RCL: 57mm, 75mm, 106mm; ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: 500 incl 60 Vulcan 20mm, 35mm, 80 40mm; SAM: 110 HAWK, 100 Nike Hercules.
Avn: ac: 14 O-2A; hel: 100 UH-1B, 150 Hughes 500MD Defender (50 with TOW).
(On order Stinger ATGW.)

NAVY: 23,000.

Bases: Chinhae (HQ), Cheju, Inchon, Mokpo, Mukho, Pukpyong, Pohang, Pusan.
5 Command HQ.
Destroyers: 11: 7 Gearing (5 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Alouette III hel; 2 with 8 ASROC; 2 Sumner with 2x4 Harpoon, 1 Alouette III hel; 2 Fletcher.
Frigates: 7: 2 Ulsan with 2x4 Harpoon; 5 US (2 Lawrence, 3 Crosley).
Corvettes: 7: 4 Dongnae HDP-1000), 3 HDP-600 (Sea Whale).
FAC(G): 11: 8 PSMM-5 (3 with 2x2 Standard SSM (ARM), 5 with 2x2 Harpoon); 1 Asheville with 2x2 Standard; 2 Wildcat with 2 Exocet MM-38.
Patrol craft: 84: large: 52: 8 Cape, 42 Gireogi, 2 other; coastal: 32: 30 Schoolboy l/II/Sea Hawk<, 2 other.
Minesweepers: 1US LSM.
Amph: LST: 8; LSM: 9 (1 fire spt); LCU: 6; LCM: 9.
Spt ships: 2 supply, 6 tankers.
ASW: 2 sqns: 1 ac with 22 S-2A/F; 1 hel with 10 Hughes 500MD; 12 fits with Alouette III.
(On order: 2 frigates, 4 HDP-1000, 3 PCL-827 corvettes, 20 FAC(G) (7 types), 75 Harpoon SSM.)

MARINES: 22,000.

2 divs, 1 bde.
Tks: 40 M-47. APC: LVTP-7. How: 105mm, 109mm.

(On order. 40 LVTP-7.)

AIR FORCE: 33,000; some 451 combat ac.
7 combat, 2 tpt wings.
FGA: 18 sqns with 260 F-5A/B/E/F.
AD: 4 sqns with 65 F-4D/E.
COIN: 1 sqn with 16 OV-10G.
Recce: 1 sqn: 10 RF-5A.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 UH-1H, 20 UH-1B/H.
Tpt: 5 sqns: 10 C-54, 16 C-123J/K, Aero Commander, 2 HS-748, 6 C-130H.
Trg: incl 20 T-28D, 33 T-33A, 39 T-37C, 20 T-41D, 35 F-5B,63 F-5F, perhaps 6 F-16.
AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow.
(On order, some 30 F-16A, 6 F-16B; 4 F-4E, 36 F-5E, 30 F-5F ftrs; 24 OV-10 Bronco COIN; 25 T-27 Tucano trg ac; Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Civilian Defence Corps (to age 50) 3,500,000. Student Homeland Defence Corps (Schools) 600,000.

Hydrographic Service; 3 MCMV. Coastguard; 25 ocean, many small craft, 9 Hughes 500D hel.

LAOS
Est GDP 1982: kip 5.00 bn ($500 m). 1983: 5.20 bn ($520 m).
Est FMA 1982: $100 m.

$1=kip 10(1982-5).
Est population: 3,700,000.

Men: 18-30: 328,000; 31-45: 294,000.

Women: 18-30: 348,000; 31-45: 323,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 53,700.

Terms of service: conscription, 18 months min.
ARMY: 50,000.
Military Regions: 4.
4 inf divs.
1 arty div.
7 indep inf regts.
1 engr regt.
2 construction regts, indep construction bns.
5 arty, 9 AA arty bns.
65 indep inf coys.
1 lt ac liaison fit.
Tks: 30 T-34/-54/-55; lt: 25 PT-76. APC: 48 BTR-60.
Arty: guns: M-46 130mm; how: 80 M-116 75mm, M-1942 76mm, M-101 105mm, M-1938 and D-30 122mm; mor: 81mm, 82mm, 107mm (4.2-in.).
ATK: RCL: M-18/A1 57mm, 107mm.
AD: guns: ZSU-23-4 23mm SP; M-1939 37mm; M-1950, ZSU-57-2 SP 57mm; SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 1,700.
Patrol craft <: 20 river most ex-Vietnamese, incl Sov Shmel.
(Perhaps 20 more vessels incl 3 LCM, 6 tpts< in reserve).

AIR FORCE: 2,000; 20 combat ac.
FGA: 1 sqn with some 20 MiG-21.
Tpt: 1 sqn: 2 Yak-40, 5 An-24, 2 An-26, 6 An-2.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Mi-8, 2 Mi-6.
Trg: MiG-21UTI.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

PARA-MILITARY: Militia, Self-Defence forces.

MALAYSIA
GDP 1983: ringgits 67.979 bn ($29,285 bn). 1984: 76.40 bn ($32,599 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 6.0%. 1984: 7.3%.
Inflation 1983: 3.8%. 1984: 4.0%.
Debt 1983: $13.30 bn. 1984: $15.80 bn.
Def budget 1984: ringgits 4.630 bn ($1,976 bn).
Est exp 1984: 4.200 bn ($1,792 bn). Est budget 1985: 4.050 bn ($1,624 bn).* (* All figures incl internal security budget/expenditure.)

$1=ringgits 2.3213 (1983), 2.3436 (1984), 2.4945 (1985).
Population: 16,300,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,007,000; 31-45: 1,247,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,962,000; 31-45: 1,286,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 110,000.

Terms of service: voluntary
Reserves: 46,400. Army 45,000, Navy 800, Air 600.

ARMY: 90,000.
1 corps, 4 div HQ.
9 inf bdes, consisting of 36 inf bns (1 APC), 4 cav, 4 fd arty, 1 AA arty, 5 sigs, 5 engr regts; admin units.
1 Special Service regt (3 bns).
Tks: lt: 26 Scorpion (90mm).
AFV: reece: some 64 SIBMAS, 140 AML, 60 Ferret; APC: AT-105, 200 V-100/-150 Commando, 25 Stormer, 460 Condor.
Arty: how: 92 Model 56 pack, 22 M-102A1 105mm; mor: 81mm.
ATK: RL: M-20 89mm; Rd: 150 106mm, 5 120mm; ATGW: SS-11.
AD: guns: 70 12.7mm, 35 40mm.

NAVY: 9,000.

Bases: Lumut, Tanjong Gelang, Kuantan (HQ Naval Region), Labuan, Sungei Aute (Sarawak), Woodlands (Singapore; trg base).
Frigates: 3: 2 Kasturi (FS-1500) with 4 Exocet MM-38, 1 hel; 1 Yarrow with 1x4 Seacat SAM).
FAC: 6 Jerong; (G): 12: 8 Handalan (Spica-M); 4 Perdana (La Combattante II) with 4 or 2 Exocet MM-38 SSM.
Patrol craft: 20 large: 2 Kedah,A Sabah, 14 Kris, 9 '25-metre'.
Minesweepers: 6: 4 Lerici, 2 Br Ton coastal.
Amph: LST: 2 US 511-1152, 29 small vessels.
Spt: 3 Sakti comd/comms/cargo ships.
(Naval Air Wing to form 1985/6.)
(On order. 2 1,300-ton patrol vessels.)

AIR FORCE: 11,000; 42 combat ac.
2 Air Regions, 1 Spt Command.
FGA: 3 sqns (1 forming): some 20 A-4PTM (being delivered), 13 F-5E, 4 F-5F, 2 RF-5E.
MR: 1 sqn with 3 PC-130H.
Tpt: 5 sqns: ac: 3: 1 with 6 C-130H; 2 with 2 HS-125, 2 F-28, 12 Cessna 402B; hel: 2 with 36 S-61A-4.
Liaison: 4 sqns: ac: 2 with 14 DHC-4A; hel: 2 with 22 SA-316B Alouette III.
Trg: 3 sqns: ac: 12 MB-339, 40 PC-7; hel: 7 Bell 47,2 Alouette.
AAM: Sidewinder.
(On order some 20 A-4PTM FGA/trg (plus 20 for spares; delivery 1985), 4 NC-212 Aviocar tpt ac; Super Sidewinder AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:

Polic Field Force 18,000; 21 bns (incl 2 Aboriginal); Shorland armd cars, SB-301 APC, 210 patrol boats<, 4 Cessna 206 ac.

Area Security Units (Home Guard): 3,100 men in 89 units.

Border Scouts (in Sabah, Sarawak) 1,200.

People's Volunteer Corps (RELA) over 350,000.

OPPOSITION: 1,450. Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) (1,000); CPM Marxist and Leninist faction (450).

MONGOLIA

Est GDP 1983: tugrik 6.39 bn ($1,936 bn). 1984: 6.65 bn($ 1.985 bn).
Def budget 1983: tugrik 725.5 m ($219,848 m). 1984: 763.8 m ($228,000 m).
Est FMA 1982: $600 m.

$1=tugrik 3.3 (1983), 3.35 (1984).
Population: 1,900,000.

Men: 18-30: 211,000; 31-45: 149,000.

Women: 18-30: 212,000; 31-45: 148,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 36,500.

Terms of service: 3 years, authorized, actual service may only be 2.
Reserves: Army 40,000.
ARMY: 33,000.
4 inf divs.
Tks: 650 T-54/-55/-62.
AFV: recce: BRDM-2; MICV: BMP; APC: 70 BTR-60/-152.
Arty: guns: ZIS-3 76mm, 650 100mm incl SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm; gun/how: M-1937 152mm; how: 152mm.
ATGW: AT-1.
AD: guns: 37mm, 57mm.

AIR FORCE: 3,500 (100 pilots); Soviet technicians; 12 combat ac. (Operates civil air line.)
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 12 MiG-21.
Tpt: min 2 sqns: 20 An-2, 19 -24, 1 -26, 3 Il-14.
Hel: 1 sqn with Mi-8, 10 Mi-4.
Trg: Yak-11/-18, 3 PZL-104 Wilga utility.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of Public Security (15,000): Militia (Police), internal security troops, frontier guards; BTR-40/-152 APC.

NEPAL
GDP 1982/3: NR 33.621 bn ($2,203 bn). Est 1983/4: 35.600 bn ($2,001 bn).
GDP growth 1982/3: -1.6%. 1983/4: 6.0%.
Inflation 1983: 14.0%. 1984: 6.7%.
Debt 1983: $350.00 m. Est 1984: $390.00 m.
Def budget 1983/4: NR 463.40 m ($30,366 m). Est 1984: 530.0 m ($29,792 m).

$1=rupees 13.7955 (1982/3), 15.2603 (1983/4), 17.7898(1984/5).
Population: 16,500,000.

Men 18-30: 1,798,000; 31-45: 1,263,000.

Women 18-30: 1,700,000; 31-45: 1,265,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 25,000.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 25,000.
1 Palace Guard bde: incl 1 cav sqn, 1 garrison bn.
5 inf bdes: incl AB bn.
1 spt bde: 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 sigs bn.
1 log bde: incl 1 tpt bn, 1 air sqn (1 ac, 1 hel fits).
Tks: lt (?16) AMX-13 (?operational). Recce: 25 Ferret.
Arty: how: 6 75mm pack, 4 3.7-in. (94mm) mountain; mor: 4 4.2-in. (107mm), 18 120mm.
AD: guns: 2 40mm.
Avn: ac: 2 Skyvan, 1 HS-748, 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter, hel: 6 Chetak (Alouette III), 2 Puma.
Forces abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 inf bn (666).
PARA-MILITARY: Police force 22,000.

NEW ZEALAND
GDP 1982/3: $NZ 32.368 bn ($US 23.609 bn). 1983/4: 34.935 bn ($US 22.956 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.2%. 1984: 3.1%.
Inflation 1983: 9.0%. 1984: 5.0%.
Debt 1983: $US 11.5 bn. 1984: $US 14.0 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: $NZ 773.10 m ($US 408.745 m). 1985/6: 884.87 m ($399,869 m).
FMA 1983: $US 1.216 m. 1984: $1,216 m.

$US 1 = $NZ 1.371 (1982/3), 1.5218 (1983/4), 1.8914 (1984/5), 2.2129 (1985).
Population: 3,300,000.

Men: 18-30: 380,000; 31-45: 294,000.

Women: 18-30: 348,000; 31-45: 323,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 12,443.

Terms of service: voluntary, supplemented by Territorial Army service: 7 weeks basic, 20 days per year.
Reserves 9,553. Regular 2,915: Army 1,370, Navy 755, Air 790. Territorial 6,638: Army 5,963, Navy 462, Air 213.

ARMY: 5,431.
2 inf bns.
1 arty bty.
1 lt armd sqn.
Territorials: 6 inf bns, 4 fd, 1 med arty btys, 1 recce, 1 APC, 1 ATK sqns.
Tks: lt: 26 Scorpion. APC: 72 M-113.
Arty: guns: 10 5.5-in. (140mm); how: 41 105mm (incl pack); mor: 71 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 22 106mm.

NAVY: 2,687.

Base: Auckland.
Frigates: 4 Leander with 1 Wasp hel, Seacat SAM (1 with 2x4 SAM, 3 with 1x4; 1 with 2x4 Ikara ASW).
Patrol craft: 8: 4 Lake, 4 inshore (Reserves).
Survey vessels: 3.
Oceanographic vessel: 1.
Hel: 7 Wasp (see Air Force).

AIR FORCE: 4,325; 44 combat ac.
Ops Gp:
FGA: 2 sqns: 17 A-4K, 5 TA-4K Skyhawk.
MR: 1 sqn with 6 P-3B Orion.
COIN: 1 with 16 BAC-167 Strikemaster.
Tpt: 3 sqns: ac: 2 with 5 C-130H, 2 Boeing 727-100C; hel: 1 with 6 Sioux, 12 UH-1D/H, 7 Wasp (Navy-assigned).
Comms: 1 sqn with 6 Andover, 3 Cessna 421C.
Support Gp:
Trg wing: 4 Airtourer, 15 CT-4 Airtrainer, 3 F-27 Friendship ac; 3 Sioux hel.

Forces Abroad: Singapore: 1 inf bn with log spt, 1 spt hel unit (3 UH-1). Egypt (Sinai MFO): 35; 2 UH-1 hel.

PAKISTAN
GDP 1982/3: Rs 363.83 bn ($28,648 bn). 1983/4: 419.80 bn ($31,151 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 6.5%. 1984: 5.3%.
Inflation 1983: 10.1%. 1984: 5.0%.
Debt 1983: $10.50 bn. 1984: $12.70 bn.
Def budget 1984/5: Rs 27.80 bn ($1,835 bn). Est 1985/6: 32.90 bn ($2,059 bn).
FMA 1983/4: $300.0 m. 1984/5: $325.0 m.

$1=rupees 12.6998 (1982/3), 13.4763

(1983/4), 15.1515 (1984/5), 15.979 (1985).
Population: 95,225,000.* (* Excl Afghan refugees.)

Men: 18-30: 11,310,000; 31-45: 6,990,000.

Women: 18-30: 10,170,000; 31-45: 6,350,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 482,800.

Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves: 513,000. Army 500,000 (obligation to ages 45 (men) or 50 (officers); active liability for 8 years after service), Navy 5,000, Air 8,000.
ARMY: 450,000.
7 Corps HQ; 1 Field Command.
2 armd divs.
16 inf divs.
8 arty bdes/bde equivalent.
3 AA arty bdes.
6 armd recce regts.
4 indep armd bdes.
8 indep inf bdes.
7 SAM btys: 6 with 6 Crotale (each 4 msls); 1 with 6 CSA-1 (SA-2).
1 special services group.
Tks: 405 M-47/-48 (incl A5), 51 T-54/-55, 1,050 Type-59.
APC: 500 M-113, 45 UR-416.
Arty: guns: some 1,000 25-pdr (88mm), Type-59 100mm, 130mm, 5.5-in. (140mm) and 155mm;

how: M-116 75mm pack, 105mm incl pack, 12 M-7 SP, 75 M-l98 towed, 100 M-109A2 SP 155mm, M-115 and 40 M-110A2 SP 203mm;

MRL: 122mm; mor: 107mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: 75mm, 3.5-in. (89mm); RCL: Type 52 75mm, 106mm; ATGW: Cobra, 200 TOW.
AD: guns: 14.5mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm; SAM: 100 Stinger 6 Crotale; 6 CSA-1.
AVIATION:

Liaison: ac: 1 sqn with 45 Mashshaq (Saab-91 Safari); hel: 4 sqns.

Observation: indep fits: ac: 45 O-1E, Cessna 421, 50 Mashshaq (Saab Safari), Turbo Commander, Queen Air,

hel: some 2 AH-1S Cobra with TOW, 16 Mi-8, 35 Puma, 23 Alouette III, 13 Bell 47G.
(On order: 65 M-48A5 MBT; M-113 APC; TOW ATGW launchers (incl 24 M-901 Improved TOW SP, 1,000 msls);

some 10 AH-1S hel; 144 RBS-70 SAM launchers, 400 msls.

NAVY: 15,200 (incl Naval Air).

Base: Karachi.
Subs: 11: 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne, 5 SX-404 midget.
Destroyers: 8: 1 Br County with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Alouette hel;

6 US Gearing with 1x8 ASROC ASW (being mod to 3x2 Harpoon SSM); 1 Br Battle.
FAC: 16 Ch: 12 Shanghai-W;4 Huchwan hydrofoil<; (G): 8 Ch: 4 Huangfen (4 HY-2 SSM), 4 Huku (2 HY-2).
Patrol craft: 24: 4 Ch Hainan, 1 Town, 1 Spear, 18 MC-55 coastal.
MCMV: 3 US Adjutant and MSC-268 coastal.
Spt: 2 tankers (I ocean, 1 coastal), 1 Br Dido cruiser (cadet trg/AA ship; non-operational).
(On orden 3 Type-21 frigates; 16 RGM-84 Harpoon SSM).
NAVAL AIR: 3 combat ac, 6 combat hel.
ASW/MR: 1 sqn of 3 Atlantic with AM-39 ASM.
ASW/SAR: 2 hel sqns: 6 Sea King ASW with AM-39, 4 Alouette III.
Comms: 1 F-27 ac (Air Force).
ASM: AM-39 Exocet.

AIR FORCE: 17,600; 375 combat ac.
FGA: 8 sqns: 1 with 17 Mirage IIIEP; 4 with 50 Mirage 5PA3; 3 with 41 Ch Q-5.
Interceptor/FGA: 11 sqns: 9 with 170 Ch J-6; 2 with some 30 F-16.
Recce: 1 sqn with 13 Mirage IIIRP.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with 13 C-130B/E, 1 L-100; 1 with 1 Mystere-Falcon 20, 1 F-27-200 (with Navy), 1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 HH-43B, 4 Alouette III.
Utility: 1 hel sqn: 4 Super Frelon, 12 Bell 47G.
Trg: 1 sqn with 20 T-33A, 4 MiG-15UTI; other ac incl 2 Mirage 5DPA2, 3 Mirage IIIDP, 2 J-6, 35 T-37C, 45 Ch JJ-5 (MiG-17U), 12 Ch CJ-6,

24 Reims Cessna FTB-337.
AAM: Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Magic.
(On order 10 F-16, some 100 Ch Q-5 FGA, 500 AIM-9L Sidewinder.)

Forces Abroad: 30,000 contract personnel. Saudi Arabia (20,000), Jordan, Libya, Oman, UAE.

PARA-MILITARY: 164,000: National Guard (75,000): Mujahid Force; Janbaz Force; National Cadet corps; Women Guards; Frontier Corps (65,000);

Pakistan Rangers (15,000); Coast Guard (2,000); Northern Light Infantry (7,000).

PAPUA NEW GUINEA
GDP 1983: K 1.998 bn ($2,395 bn). 1984: 1.913 bn ($2,139 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 0.9%.
Inflation 1983: 8.5%. 1984: 8.0%.
Debt 1983: $1.09 bn. 1984: $1.15 bn.
Def exp 1984: K 29.375 m ($32,851 m). 1985: 31.228 m ($30,239 m).
FMA 1983: $13.00 m. 1984: $14.50 m.

$1=kina 0.8341 (1983), 0.8942 (1984), 1.0327 (1985).
Population: 3,450,000.

Men: 18-30: 383,000; 31-45: 271,000.

Women: 18-30: 356,000; 31-45: 243,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 3,232.

Terms of service: voluntary.
ARMY: 2,846.
2 inf bns.
1 engr bn.
1 sigs sqn.
Log units.
NAVY: 300.

Bases: Port Moresby, Lombrum.
Patrol craft: 5 Attack large.
Amph: 2 310-ton landing craft.

(On order, patrol vessels).
AIR FORCE: 86.
Tpt: 1 sqn with N-22B Nomad Missionmaster, 3 IAI Arava, 6 C-47.
PARA-MILITARY: 4,600 Police (Border Patrol).

PHILIPPINES
GDP 1983: P 384.5 bn ($34,600 bn). 1984: 548.47 bn ($32,844 bn)
GDP growth 1983: 1.3%. 1984: -5.5%.
Inflation 1983: 26.1%. 1984: 51.0%.
Debt 1983: $25.00 bn. 1984: $26.50 bn.
Def budget 1984: P 8.420 bn ($504,222 m). 1985: 7.800 bn ($422,078 m).
FMA 1983: $55.00 m. 1984: $62.00 m.

$1=pesos 11.1127 (1983), 16.699 (1984), 18.480(1985).
Population: 55,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 6,629,000; 31-45: 4,420,000.

Women: 18-30: 6,430,000; 31-45: 4,346,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 114,800 (plus 42,000 Para-Military).

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 48,000; Army 20,000 (obligation to age 49), some 75,000 more have commitments; Navy 12,000; Air 16,000 (to age 49).

ARMY: 70,000.
5 inf divs.
1 ranger regt (5 scout ranger, 1 mountain bns).
2 engr bdes.
1 lt armd regt.
4 arty regts.
1 military police bde (3 bns).
Tks: lt: 28 Scorpion.
AFV: MICV: 45; APC: 80 M-113, 20 Chaimite, 100 V-150.
Arty: how: 200 105mm (incl pack), 12 M-114 155mm; mor: 81mm, 107mm.
ATK: RCL: M-20 75mm, M-67 90mm, M-40 106mm.

NAVY: 28,000 (9,600 marines, 2,000 Coast Guard).

Base: Sangley Point/Cavite, Zamboanga.
Frigates: 7: 4 Casco, 1 Savage, 2 Cannon.
Corvettes: 10: 2 Auk, 7 PCE-827, 1 Admirable.
Patrol craft: 12 large: 1 command ship, 4 Katgitingan, 5 PGM-39/-71,2 US PC-461.
Amph: 3 spt, 24 LST, 4 LSM, 61 LCM, 7 LCVP, 3 LCU.
SAR: 1 sqn with 5 Islander ac, 5 BO-105 hel.
Spt: 1 Presidential yacht, 3 repair ships, 1 spt ship, 2 tankers.
Marines: 3 bdes (8 bns); 30 LVTP-5, 55 LVTP-7 APC, 150 105mm how, 4.2-in. (107mm) mor.
(On order: 2 ex-US destroyers, 3 PSMM-5 FAC(G), 6 Kagitingan, 50 patrol boats (some for Coastguard).

AIR FORCE: 16,800; combat: 64 ac, 17 hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 22 F-8H.
AD: 1 sqn with 19 F-5A, 3 F-5B.
COIN: ac: 3 sqns: 1 with 16 SF-260 WP; 2 with 20 T-28D; hel: 1 wing with 62 UH-1H, 17 S-76.
Presidential tpt: 1 sqn with: ac: 1 Boeing 707, 1 BAC-111, 1 YS-11, 1 F-28; hel: 1 S-62A, 2 UH-1N, 1 Puma, 2 S-70AS.
Tpt: 5 sqns: ac: 1 with 4 C-130H; 1 with 5 C-47, 8 F-27, 3 F-27MR; 1 with 12 Nomad; 1 with 12 Islander, hel: 1 with 11 BO-105.
Liaison: 1 sqn with O-1E, 1 Cessna U-17A/B.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with 1 T/RT-33A, 12 T-41D; 1 with 30 SF-260MP, 16 WP; 1 with 10 T-34A.
Weather: 1 sqn with 3 Cessna 210.
AAM: Sidewinder.

PARA-MILITARY: (Ministry of Defence) 42,000. Philippine Constabulary (40,000); 13 coys, 180 provincial coys.

Coast Guard (2,000); some 65 patrol craft incl 3 large SAR, 2 lt ac; by law part of armed forces.

Civil Home Defence Force 70,000. 18 inf bns (Army Reserve Comd).

OPPOSITION: Moro National Liberation Army 1,000.

New People's Army (Maoist) 10-12,000 (perhaps 7,000 armed); inf bns (300 men), small arms.

SINGAPORE
GDP 1982/3: $S 31.946 bn ($US 14.959 bn). 1983/4: 35.171 bn ($US 16.570 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 7.9%. 1984: 8.2%.
Inflation 1983: 1.4%. 1984: 0.9%.
Debt 1984: $2.0 bn.
Def exp 1984/5: $S 1.855 bn ($US 857.328 m).
Budget 1984/5: 2.263 bn ($US 1.046 bn). 1985/6: 2.156 bn ($US 969.904 m).

$1=$S 2.1355 (1982/3), 2.1226 (1983/4), 2.1637 (1984/5), 2.2229 (1985).
Population: 2,600,000.

Men: 18-30: 364,000; 31-45: 297,000.

Women: 13-30: 343,800; 31-45: 288,200.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 55,500, (34,800 conscripts).

Terms of service: conscription; 24 to 30 months.
Reserves: Army 150,000; annual trg to age 40 for men, 50 for officers. Navy (exists, ?4,500), Air Force (exists, ?7,500).

ARMY: 45,000 (30,000 conscripts).
1 div HQ.
1 armd bde (1 recce, 1 tk, 2 APC bns).
3 inf bdes (each 3 inf bns).
6 arty bns.
1 cdo bn.
6 engr, 3 sigs bns.
Reserves: 2 div, 6 inf bde HQ; 18 inf, 1 cdo, 9 arty, 6 engr, 2 sigs bns.
Tks: lt: 270 AMX-13. APC: 720 M-113, 280 V-100/-150/-200 Commando.
Arty: how: 60 155mm; mor: 60mm, 81mm, 50 120mm (some SP in M-113).
ATK: RL: 89mm; RCL: Carl Gustav 84mm, 90 106mm.
AD: guns: 20mm, 35mm, L-70 40mm.

NAVY: 4,500 (1,800 conscripts).

Base: Pulau Brani (Singapore).
FAC(G): 6 TNC-45 with 5 Gabriel II SSM each.
FAC: 6 VosperA/B.
Patrol craft: 12 Swift coastal.
Minesweepers: 2 US Redwing coastal.
Amph: 6 US 511-1152 LST (1 in reserve), 8 landing craft<.
Trg: 1 ship.

AIR FORCE: 6,000 (3,000 conscripts); 164 combat ac.
FGA: 3 sqns: 2 (1 more to form) with 40 A-4S/SI, 6 TA-4S Skyhawk, 1 with 21 Hunter FGA-74.
AD: 1 sqn with 23 F-5E, 3 F-5F.
Recce: 1 sqn with 7 Hunter FR-74S, 4 T-75S, 2 E-2C Hawkeye MR.
COIN: 3 sqns: 1 with 18 BAG-167; 1 with 20 T-33A; 1 with some 20 SIAI S-211.
Tpt/SAR: 1 sqn with 8 C-130B/H.
Trg: 11 SF-260W, 12 SF-260MS.
Hel: 2 sqns: 36 UH-1B/H, 3 AB-212, 6 AS-350B Ecureuil, 6 AS-332 Super Puma.
SAM: 4 sqns: 1 with 28 Bloodhound 2; 1 with 10 Rapier, 1 with 6 Improved HAWK; 1 with Bofors RBS-70.
AAM: AIM-9J/P Sidewinder.
(On order 8 F-16, 70 A-4SI (being rebuilt), some 10 SIAI S-211, 2 E-2C ac; 16 AS-332 Super Puma hel (local production);

Rapier/Blindfire SAM; 200 AGM-65 Maverick ASM.)

Forces Abroad: Brunei: (500); trg school.

PARA-MILITARY: Police/marine police 7,500; 49 patrol craft. Gurkha guard units. People's Defence Force, some 30,000.

SRI LANKA (CEYLON)
GDP 1983: Rs 121.664 bn ($5,171 bn). 1984: 151.575 bn ($5,959 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.1%. 1984: 1.0%.
Inflation 1983: 21.4%. 1984: 9.5%.
Debt 1983: $2.6 bn. 1984: $3.1 bn.
Def budget 1984: Rs 2.60 bn ($102,209 m). 1985: 3.60 bn* ($131,396 m). (* Excl some Rs 2 bn for development of defence infrastucture.)

$1=rupees 23.529 (1983), 25.438 (1984), 27.398 (1985).
Population: 16,200,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,047,000; 31-45: 1,346,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,028,000; 31-45: 1,344,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 37,660 incl active Reservists.
Regular. 21,560.

Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 16,100. Army 14,000, Navy 1,000. Air 1,100.

ARMY: 30,000 incl active Reservists.
5 'Task Forces' (inf bdes: 5 regular, 6 reserve bns).
2 recce regts (bns) (1 reserve).
2 fd arty (1 reserve), 1 AA regts.
1 fd engr, 1 engr plant regts.
1 sigs bn.
1 Special Forces bn (Task Force).
Support services: log units.
AFV: recce: 18 Saladin, 15 Ferret, 12 Daimler Dingo; APC: 10 BTR-152.
Arty: guns: 16 Yug M-48 76mm, 30 Type-56 85mm; mor: 12 82mm, 12 4.2-in. (107mm).
ATK: RCL: M-60 82mm.
AD: guns: 24 40mm, 24 3.7-in. (94mm).

NAVY: 3,960.

Bases: Trincomalee, Karainagar, Colombo, Tangalla, Kalpitiya.
Patrol craft: large: 2 Jayesagara 40-metre; coastal: 28: 11 Pradeepa, 17 other<.
FAC: 7 Sooraya (Ch Shanghai-II).
(On order 3 Jayesagara large, 12 coastal
AIR FORCE: 3,700; 2 combat hel.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 HS-748, 2 DC-3, 2 Riley Heron, 1 DH Heron, 3 Cessna 337, 1 Beechcraft, 1 Cessna 421C.
Hel: 1 sqn with 8 Bell 206, 2 212 attack, 2 SA-365.
Trg: incl 6 Cessna 150/152, 5 Chipmunk, 3 Dove.
Reserves: Air Force Regt, 3 sqns; Airfield Construction Regt, 1 sqn.
(In storage: 2 Jet Provost Mk 51 ac.)
(On order 12 SF-260TP trg ac, 4 Bell 212 hel).

PARA-MILITARY: Police Force 14,500. Volunteer Force 5,000. Home Guard.

OPPOSITION: Eelam National Liberation Front (EPNF): 4 gps:

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).

Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization.

Eelam Revolution Organization.
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT).
Est 2,000 activists, perhaps 6,000 supporters/reserves; small arms, RPG-7 RL, SA-7 SAM.

TAIWAN
GDP 1983/4: $NT 2,085 bn ($US 50.120 bn). 1984/5: 2,328 bn ($US 56.056 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 9.0%. 1984: 10.9%.
Inflation 1983: -1.2%. 1984: 1.7%:
Est debt 1983: $9.0 bn. 1984: $8.5 bn.
Def budget (off.) 1984/5: $NT 141.9 bn ($US 3.417 bn). 1985/6: 161.257 bn ($US 3.948 bn).*

(* Estimates of likely actual expenditure run up to $NT 185 bn for 1984/5 and $NT 205 bn for 1985/6.)

$1=$NT 41.00 (1982/3), 41.60 (1983/4), 41.53 (1984/5), 40.85 (1985).
Population: 19,890,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,518,000; 31-45: 1,813,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,410,000; 31-45: 1,738,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 444,000.

Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: 1,470,000. Army: 1,300,000 have some Reserve obligation. Navy 45,000 Marines 35,000, Air 90,000.

ARMY: 290,000.
3 Army, 6 Corps, 1 Special Force HQ.
12 hy inf divs.
6 1t inf divs.
6 mech bdes.
2 AB bdes.
4 tk gps.
20 fd arty bns.
5 SAM bns: 2 with Nike Hercules, 3 with HAWK.
6 army aviation sqns.
9 Reserve divs (cadre).
Tks: 309 M-48; lt 325 M-24 (90mm gun), 795 M-41.
AFV: recce: M-8; APC: M-3 half-track, 1,100 M-113, 150 V-150 Commando.
Arty: guns/how: 390 M-59 155mm; how: 350 M-116 75mm pack, 550 M-101 (T-64) 105mm, 90 M-114 (T-65) 155mm, 10 M-115 203mm towed,

225 M-108 105mm, 250 M-109A1 155mm, 150 M-110 203mm SP;

MRL: Rung Feng (Worker Bee) 65mm, (VI) 45x117mm, (III/IV) 40x126mm towed and SP;

SSM: Hsiung Feng (Drone Bee =Gabriel-type) coastal defence SSM, Ching Feng (GreenBee =Lance-type) SSM/SAM; mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 500 106mm; guns: 150M-1876mm SP; ATGW: Kun Wu (Fire God= TOW-type), TOW (some SP).
AD: guns: 300 40mm (incl M-42 SP); SAM: 400 Nike Hercules, 800 HAWK, 20 Chaparral.
Avn: hel: 118UH-1H, 2 KH-4, 7 CH-34.
(On order 75 M-60 MBT, 164 M-113 APC(incl variants); 1,000 TOW, Kun Wu ATGW; 16 launchers, 766 MIM-72F Chaparral msls;

370 Improved HAWK, Skyarrow I (Patriot-type) SAM.)
DEPLOYMENT: Quemoy 55,000, Matsu 18,000.

NAVY: 38,000.

Bases: Tsoying, Makung (Pescadores), Keelung.
Subs: 2 Guppy-II.
Destroyers: 27:

14 Gearing (3 may be nonoperational) with 1 hel (fitting 3 Hsiung Feng (HF) SSM, 10 with 1x8 ASROC;

1 radar picket with 3 HF;

8 Sumner (1 with 1x3, 2 with 2x3 HF);

4 Fletcher with 1x2 Sea Chaparral SAM.
Frigates: 9: 3 Lawrence, 6 Crosley.
Corvettes: 3 Auk.
FAC(G): 33 with HF SSM: 3 Lung Chiang (PSMM-5) with 4x1, 30 Tzu Chiang (mod Dvora) with 2x1.
Patrol craft: 28 coastal.
MCMV: 14 Adjutant and MSC-268/-269 coastal.
Amph: LPD: 1; LSD: 2; LST: 22 (1 comd); isn: 4; LCU: 22; LCM: some 250; LCVP: 100; other 25.
Spt: 1 repair ship, 3 tpts, 7 tankers.
Hel: 1 sqn with 12 Hughes Defender 500MD.
(On order 2 mod Zwaardvis subs; 3 Lung Chiang, 4 Tzu Chiang FAC(G); 10 ASW hel;

ASROC ASW; 170 Standard SM-1, 284 Improved Sea ChaparralSAM.)

MARINES: 39,000.
3 divs.
APC: LVT-4/-5. Arty: how: 105mm, 155mm; RCL: 106mm.

AIR FORCE: 77,000; 567 combat ac, 12 armed hel.
5 combat wings.
FGA: 13 sqns: 226F-5E, 30 F-5F, 42 F-100A/D, 80 F-104G.
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 19 F-104A.
Recce: 1 sqn with 8 RF-104G.
MR: 1 sqn with 9 S-2A, 20 S-2E.
SAR: 1 sqn with 8 HU-16B ac, 10 UH-1H hel.
Tpt: 6 sqns: 20 C-47, 5 C-54, 1 C-118B, 40 C-119, 10 C-123, 1 Boeing 720B, 4 727-100.
Hel: 2 sqns: 7 UH-19, 10 Bell 47G.
OCU: 82 F-5A/B, 30 F/TF-104G, 6 F-104D, 15 F-100F.
Trg: incl 55 PL-IB Chien Shou, 50 T-CH-1, 32 T-33/-38, 10 T-28, AT-3.
AAM: Sidewinder, Shafrir. ASM: Bullpup, AGM-65A Maverick.
(On order 39 F-104G, 27 TF-104G, 60 F-5E/F ftr, 12 C-130H tpt, 42 Beech T-34C Mentor, 50 AT-TC3 trg ac; Sparrow AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Taiwan Garrison Comd, 25,000. Customs Service (Ministry of Finance) 5 ocean armed, 11 inshore patrol craft.

THAILAND
GDP 1983: baht 924.25 bn ($40,185 bn).1984: 991.75 bn ($43,120 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 5.8%. 1984: 6.0%.
Inflation 1983: 3.8%. 1984: 0.9%.
Debt 1983: $13.0 bn. 1984: $14.7 bn.
Def budget* 1984/5: baht 39.377 bn ($1,712 bn). 1985/6: 38.809 bn ($1,411 bn). (* Excl Internal Security Budget and proposed F-16A purchase.)
FMA 1983: $76.0 m. 1984: $94.0 m.

$1=baht 23.00 (1983/4), 23.00 (1984/5), 27.513(1985).
Population: 51,765,000.

Men: 18-30: 6,507,000; 31-45: 4,503,000.

Women: 18-30: 6,322,000; 31-45: 4,399,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 235,300.

Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: 500,000.

ARMY: 160,000 (80,000 conscripts).
4 Regions; 4 Army HQ.
1 cav div (2 cav, 1 arty regts).
1 armd div (1 tk, 1 cav, 1 mech regts).
7 inf divs (5 with 1 tk bn).
2 special forces divs.
1 Royal Guard.
1 arty div, 1 AA div (2 AA arty regts).
11 engr bns.
8 indep inf bns.
4 recce coys.
Avn: 3 airmobile coys, some hel fits.
Reserves: 4 div HQ.
Tks: 190 M-48A5; 200 M-41 (most in reserve), lt: 144 Scorpion, M-24.
AFV: recce: 56 Cascavel, 32 Shorland Mk 3; APC: 450 M-113, M-3A1 half-track, 280 V-150 Commando, 20 Saracen.
Arty: how: 300 M-116 75mm pack, M-101/-101 mod 105mm, 110 M-114, 62 M-198 155mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: M-72 LAW; RCL: 57mm, M-20 75mm, 215 106mm; ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
AD: guns: 24 M-163 Vulcan 20mm, 80 M-1/L-70/M-42 SP 40mm; SAM: Redeye.
Avn: ac (tpt): 4 C-47, 1 King Air, (lt): 2 Short 330-UTT, 80 O-1, 13U-17A, 1 Beech 99; (trg): 23 T-41A;

hel: 76 UH-1B/H, 3 OH-13H, 3 OH-58A, 11 TH-55A, 2 Bell 214ST.
(On order 16 M-60A3 MBT; Kittikhachorn 105mm MRL; Blowpipe SAM; Short 330-UTT tpt ac; 4 UH-60A hel.)

NAVY: 32,200 (some conscripts) incl naval air and marines.

Bases: Bangkok, Sattahip, Songkla, Phangnga.
Frigates: 6: 1 Br Yarrow-type with 1x4 Seacat SAM; 2 Topi (PF-103); 2 Tahchin (US Tacomdy, 1 Cannon (trg).
FAC(G): 7: 3 Ratcharit (Breda BMB-230) with 4 Exocet SSM; 4 Prabrarapak (TNC-45) with 5 Gabriel SSM.
FAC: 3 Chonburi (Breda MV-400).
Patrol craft: 94: 23 large (4 Sattahip (PSMM-5), 6 Sarasin (PC-461), 10 T-11 (PGM-71), 3 T-81 (Cape);31 coastal; 40 riverC
MCMV: 4 Ladya (US Bluebird) coastal, 5 boats(, 1spt ship.
Amph: LST: 5; LSM: 3; LSIL-351: 2; LCG: 1; LCU: 10; LCM (all US): 26; LCA: 1; LCVP: 12.
Trg ships: 3: 2 Br (1 Algerine, 1 Flower<, 1 Maeklong.
Spt ships: 2 tpts, 1 tanker.
NAVAL AIR: (900); some 28 combat ac.
MR/ASW: 1 sqn with 10 S-2F.
MR/SAR: 1 sqn with 4 F-27MPA, 2 CL-215, 5 C-47.
MR/COIN: 5 N-24 Nomad Searchmaster, 2 Cessna 337.
Trg/SAR: 1 hel sqn with 11 UH-1H/N.
Observation: 1 sqn with 13 U-17, 10 O-1A, 7 O-2.
MARINES: (13,000).
1 bde: 2 inf, 1 arty regts; 1 amph assault bn.
APC: 40 LVTP-7. Arty: guns/how: 24 GC-45 155mm. Spt weapons.
(On order: 2 Type-1400 subs, 1 Descubierta frigate, 3 PFMM-16 corvettes, 2 Sattahip, 3 coastal patrol craft; 2 minehunters, 4 Lurssen minesweepers,

1 LST; Aspide SAM; Harpoon SSM; 10 Exocet MM-39 coast defence msls; 12 Stingray torpedoes; 3 F-27MPA MR ac; 21 LVT-7A1 APC.)

AIR FORCE: 43,100 (conscripts); 183 combat ac.
FGA: 1 sqn with 13 F-5A/B.
AD: 2 sqns: 34 F-5E, 5 F-5F.
COIN: 7 sqns: 1 with 22 T-28D; 2 with 25 OV-10C; 1 with 13 A-37B; 1 with 25 AU-23A Peacemaker, 1 with 14 AC-47; 1 with 14 T-33A, 3 RT-33.
Recce: 1 sqn with 4 RF-5A, 6 RC-47D, 3 Arava 201, 1 Queen Air 65, 1 Cessna 340.
Tpt: 3 sqns incl Royal fit: 1 with 10 C-47, 2 Merlin IVA; 2 with 10 C-123B, 3 C-130H; 8 HS-748; 1 Boeing 737-200,

20 N-22B Nomad Missionmaster.
Liaison: 3 sqns: 4 U-10, 30 O-1.
Hel: 2 sqns: 18 CH-34C, 27 UH-1H, 2 Bell 412.
Trg: incl 10 T-37B, 6 O-1A, 9 T-41A, 16 SF-260MT, 23 CT-4, some 4 V-400/-600 Fantrainer.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
Airfield defence troops: 4 bns; Blowpipe SAM.
(On order 8 F-16A, 4 -16B FGA, 8 F-5E, 2 RF-2E, 6 RC-47, 2 Merlin IVA, 4 N-24 Nomad, 6 HS-748, 1 C-130H-30 tpt, some 29 V-400,

14 V-600 Fantrainer trg ac;. 4 UH-60 hel; Stingray torpedoes; AIM-9P AAM; Blowpipe SAM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Thahan Phran 14,000: volunteer irregular force; 32 regts, 196 indep coys, to be 6th Army Region Border Guard.

Volunteer Defence Corps 33,000. Marine Police 1,700; 14 patrol craft.

Police Aviation 500; 3 Skyvan, 1 Sherpa, 1 Short 330-UTT, 8 PC-6, 2 DHC-4, 1Do-28,2 Cessna 310, 1 Airtourer, 1 CT-4 ac;

27 Bell 205, 13 206, 1 S-62, 6 HH-12, 1 KH-4 hel.

Border Patrol Police 20,000. Special Action Force 3,800. Rangers 13,000. Village Scouts.

National Defence Volunteers. 20 V-150 Commando APC, 1 Coastguard cutter. (On order 7 Nomad ac.)

OPPOSITION: Communist Party of Malaya: some 1,500.

Communist Party of Thailand: perhaps 500. Thai People's Revolutionary Movement: some 250.

VIETNAM
Est GNP 1984: $10-16 bn.
Est debt 1983: $5.5 bn.
Population: 60,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 7,721,000; 31-45: 3,647,000.

Women: 18-30: 7,549,000; 31-45: 4,362,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 1,027,000.

Terms of service: 3 years, specialists 4 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years.
Reserves (all services): 'Tactical Rear Force' 500,000: semi-mobilized first-line quick reinforcement org.Militia Self Defence 2,500,000.

ARMY: 1,000,000.
16 Corps HQ.
1 armd div.
65 inf divs.*
(* Incl Forces Abroad. Inf div strengths vary by geographic location, composition and role between 5,000 and 15,000, but 10,500 is 'average'.)
10 marine bdes.
8 engr, 16 economy construction divs.*
(* Men beyond normal military age; unit strength about 3,000 each, fully armed, with military and economic role; most in northern Vietnam.)
5 fd arty divs (some-10 regts).
4 indep engr bdes.
10 indep armd regts.
Tks: 1,600 T-34/-54/-55/-62, Type-59; lt 450 PT-76 and Type-60/63.
AFV: recce: BRDM-1/-2; APC: 1,500 BTR-50/-60, BMP, Ch Type-55/-56, Type-531, 1,200 M-113.
Arty: guns: 300 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 200 130mm, M-107 SP 175mm;

how: 75mm pack M-101/-102 105mm, 122mm, 100 152mm, M-114 155mm, 90 SU-76, SU-100, ISU-122;

MRL: Type-63 107mm, BM-21 122mm, BM-14-16 140mm; mor: 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 107mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: Type-36 57mm, 75mm, 82mm, Type-51 88mm, 90mm, 107mm.
AD: guns: 3,000 23mm, 30mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, Type-63 37mm, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 SP; SAM: SA-7/-9.*

NAVY: 12,000.* (* Much US eqpt is probably inoperable.)

Bases: Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Haiphong, Hanoi, Ha Tou, Ho Chi Minh City.

Kampuchea: Kompong Som.
Frigates: 8: 6 Sov Petya II, 2 US (1 Barnegat (may have 2 Styx SSM), 1 Savage).
FAC: 22: 8 Shanghai, 14 Swatow, (G): 8 Sov Osa-U with Styx SSM; (T): 26: 12 Shershen, 8 P-4G, 3 P-6G, (?3) Turya hydrofoil.
Patrol craft: 54: 6 SO-1, 10 US PGM-59/-71 large; 1 Poluchat, 1 Zhuk<, 2 PO-2 coastal, 20 Swift, 8 P-4<.
Amph: LST: 7: 3 US 510-1152, 4 Sov Polnocny, LCM: 20.
Perhaps some 1,300 ex-US, South Vietnamese naval vessels, naval and civilian junks and coasters could augment this force.

AIR FORCE: 15,000; some 270 combat ac, 65 combat hel (plus many in store).
4 Air Divs.
FGA: 1 regt with 25 MiG-21MF, 45 Su-20/- 22.
Ftrs: 4 regts with 200 MiG-21bis/F/PF.
Tpt: 3 regts: some 135 ac incl 20 An-2, 10 Li-2, 12 An-24, An-12, 50 An-26, 2 An-30, 6 Tu-134, 11 Yak-40, 7 Il-14, 2 Il-18.
(2 C-130, 1 DC-3, 4 DC-4, 2 DC-6, 2 Boeing 707, 7 U-17 may not now be serviceable.)
Hel: 1 div (3 regts): 200 hel incl 15 Mi-6, 36 Mi-8, 30 Mi-24, 17 Ka-25, 45 UH-1 (few serviceable).
Trg: 3 regts: 60 ac incl L-29, L-39, MiG-21; Mi-8, Mi-24 hel.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
Air Defence Force: 60,000: 4 AA divs (30,000; 1,000 85mm, 100mm and 130mm towed guns).

20 SAM regts (20,000; some 60 sites with SA-2/-3).

6 radar bdes (10,000; 100 sites).

Forces Abroad (numbers fluctuate):

Laos 40,000 (3 inf divs and spt tps).

Kampuchea/Cambodia 160,000 (2 Front HQ, 12 army divs + spt tps (1 Corps HQ, 5 divs - some 20,000 tps,

Thai border area), naval base, fighter ac incl MiG-21).

PARA-MILITARY: Border Defence Forces 60,000. Peoples Regional Force (militia) 500,000;

1 regt HQ at each provincial capital, local inf coys, small arms. Some Northern regts org in divs. Some AA eqpt.
People's Self Defence Force: (1,000,000): Two components: Urban; Rural (People's militia):

local coy-sized units in towns, some mobile police function and support. Small arms.

Latin America

Continental Treaties and Agreements

The Act of Chapultepec.

Signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the US, Uruguay and Venezuela in March and April 1945, this Act declared that if any aggression across boundaries established by treaty occurs, or threatens, the signatories will consult to agree upon measures up to and including the use of armed force to prevent or repel it.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Treaty of Rio).

Signed in September 1947 by all parties to the Act of Chapultepec plus El Salvador and Trinidad and Tobago but except Ecuador and Nicaragua, this Treaty expands the Act, constrains signatories to settle disputes among themselves peacefully and provides for collective self-defence should any member be subjected to external attack. It came into force on 3 December 1948 and has been invoked some twelve times since. Cuba withdrew in March 1960.

The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Dated April 1948, the Charter embraces declarations based upon the Treaty of Rio. The members of the OAS- the signatories to the Act of Chapultepec plus Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Jamaica, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago - are bound to settle internal disputes peacefully and take collective action in the event of external attack upon any signatory. It has a Permanent Council empowered to call meetings of the Foreign Ministers to deal with emergencies. Each member has one vote in each OAS agency. After 1965/6 an Inter-American Defence Board was formed to co-ordinate planning for a Permanent Peace Keeping Force.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty).

This was signed in February 1967 by 25 Latin American countries, 24 of which have ratified it (Argentina has not). Brazil and Chile will not implement it until all other Latin American states have done so. Cuba and Guyana have not signed it. The Treaty therefore is not in force for those five countries. Britain and the Netherlands have ratified it for the territories within the Treaty area for which they are internationally responsible and, with France and the US, have signed Protocol I (which commits states outside the region to accept, for their territories within it, the Treaty restrictions regarding the emplacement or storage of nuclear weapons); Britain, China, France, the USSR and the US have signed Protocol II (an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty). An Agency was set up to monitor compliance.

Regional Agreements

The 1903 treaty with the Republic of Panama, granting the United States virtual sovereign rights over the Canal Zone in perpetuity, was renegotiated, and the resulting 1977 Treaties came into force in October 1979. About 40% of the former Canal Zone will remain under US control until 31 December 1999. Defence of the Canal will be the joint responsibility of both nations, with Panama assuming an increasing role until the total accession of the Canal to her sovereignty. The US has guaranteed the area's neutrality after 2000. On 13 June 1984 Peru agreed to train Panama's naval forces.

Belize (British Honduras) became independent on 21 September 1981. Britain agreed to leave troops as protection and to train the Belizean defence forces 'for an appropriate time'. The US also provides aid and training. Under the 'Commonwealth Pact', if a threat to Belize's independence occurs, Britain, Barbados, Bahamas, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago will meet and consult.

The Central American Defence Council (CONDECA) was formed in 1965 by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama to contain subversion. In November 1981 El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras agreed an informal alliance against Cuba, Nicaragua and domestic guerrilla movements in each member country. The US provides assistance to Honduran based rebels against Nicaragua and to the Government against rebels in El Salvador. A similar regional grouping, the Central American Democratic Community (Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador; observers: Colombia, the US and Venezuela) agreed in January 1982 to provide mutual aid in case of external aggression. Argentina and Peru reportedly entered into a military pact in late 1982. A security agreement signed in October 1982 by Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent was joined by St Kitts-Nevis on 8 February, 1984. Grenada reportedly will join.

The US has had a bilateral agreement with Cuba for jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo Bay since 1934. In 1960 she stated that it could be modified or abrogated only by mutual agreement and that she had no intention of giving such an agreement. She has also leased 2.3 square miles from Bermuda for a naval and air base since 1941.

The US, which has bilateral military sales arrangements at varying levels with most countries of the region, concluded a status-of-forces agreement with Antigua in 1977/8. The USSR has no known formal defence agreements with any of the states in the area.

Cuba and Vietnam signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in October 1982. Cuba and the USSR supplied arms to Grenada before October 1983 and to Nicaragua. Most countries in the region, however, obtain their major equipments from Western, rather than Communist, countries. Belize signed a training agreement with Canada in June 1985.

Argentina and Brazil are designing and manufacturing for export their own military equipment. Brazil has sold hers to the Middle East (Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia), Africa (Zambia), and Belgium and Canada, as well as Latin America, and has a training agreement with Suriname (1983). Chile is assembling Mirage 50 aircraft and light AFV under licence and reportedly has made some transfers to Paraguay.

Economic Factors

After two years of drastic decline in their total GDP (-1.5% in 1982, and -3.2% in 1983), Latin American countries in general have been able to see a slight increase, namely 2.4% in 1984. The Inter-American Development Bank, however, reported that per capita living standard is still only that of 1980. Moreover, while some countries have succeeded in reversing their GDP decline (notably Brazil with a 5.9% increase, Chile and Peru with 4% and Argentina with 2.5%) most others attained only zero growth, and Bolivia showed a GDP reduction of 7.6%. Inflation and debt, the most serious problems for the region, have also not been brought under control - indeed for many states they have become worse. Latin America witnessed inflationary increases overall, ranging from 140% to over 180%, with Bolivia registering over 2000%, Argentina 800% and Brazil 230% (only Mexico managed to halve inflation from 100% to about 50%.
Debts have also increased. Only three states (Venezuela, Jamaica, and Trinidad) were able to reduce their debt structure, while all others saw an increase of between 5% and 12%. In terms of debt/GNP ratio, Jamaica leads with 158%, followed by Cost Rica (129%), Chile (106%) and Peru (95%). Most others range between 50% and 80%. This general economic malaise is reflected in a real decrease in defence expenditures (e.g. Argentina and Peru), with most states reducing their equipment budgets. Only Central America has shown substantial increases in defence outlays.

Military Developments

Despite the agreement between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel, there remain a number of long-standing disagreements over territory. None of the Latin American states, however, has sufficient military capability to engage in major combat with its neighbours. Almost all the regimes face varying degrees of threat from dissident forces within their society. Most of these threats can be, and are, contained by the para-military forces. The armies in general mainly constitute a mobile force to support the civil authority.

The Central American region is the exception. Rebel groups, based in neighboring countries, pose a threat to the stability of Nicaragua and El Salvador. Because Honduras and Costa Rica are safe havens for elements hostile to the Nicaraguan regime, they face a potential threat from Nicaraguan security forces, particularly in their immediate border areas. Arms imports into Nicaragua have given her forces a greater combat capability than her neighbours, but reinforcement and external supplies would be needed in any major conflict. Guatemala's claim to a portion of Belize is unlikely to lead to military hostilities - in part because of the presence of British forces, in part because of US pressure, and in part because of the political costs of such an operation.

Cuba, the largest military power in the region except the US, is not believed to have received significant military imports over the past year. She remains capable mainly of conventional defensive operations, although, given her political and ideological position, she could support clandestine guerrilla groups almost anywhere in Latin America.

Латинская Америка

Континентальные договоры и соглашения

Акт Чапультепека.

Подписали Аргентина, Боливия, Бразилия, Чили, Колумбия, Коста-Рика, Куба, Доминиканская Республика, Эквадор, Гватемала, Гаити, Гондурас, Мексика, Никарагуа, Панама, Парагвай, Перу, США, Уругвае и Венесуэле в марте и апреле 1945 года, этот акт заявил, что при любой агрессии в границах, установленных договором, наступающей или угрожающей, подписавшие его стороны будут консультироваться, чтобы согласовать меры, вплоть до применения вооруженной силы для предотвращения или отражения.

Межамериканский договор о взаимной помощи (договор Рио).

Подписанный в сентябре 1947 года всеми участниками акта Чапультепек плюс Сальвадор и Тринидад и Тобаго, но за исключением Эквадора и Никарагуа, этот договор расширяет действие закона, принуждает подписавшие стороны урегулировать споры между собой мирным путем и предусматривает коллективную самооборону в случае, если какой-либо член подвергнется внешнему нападению. Он вступил в силу 3 декабря 1948 года и с тех пор применялся примерно двенадцать раз. Куба вышла в марте 1960 года.

Устав Организации Американских Государств (ОАГ).

От апреля 1948 года Устав охватывает декларацией на основании договора Рио. Члены ОАГ - стороны, подписавшие акт Чапультепека, а также Антигуа и Барбуда, Барбадос, Доминика, Гренада, Сент-Китс-Невис, Сент-Винсент, Суринам, Тринидад и Тобаго, Сальвадор, Ямайка и Ямайка обязаны урегулировать внутренние споры мирным путем и принять коллективные меры в случае внешнего нападения на любую из подписавших его сторон. Он имеет постоянный совет, уполномоченный созывать заседания министров иностранных дел для рассмотрения чрезвычайных ситуаций. Каждый член имеет один голос в ОАГ. После 1965/6 года был создан Межамериканский Совет обороны для координации планирования постоянных сил по поддержанию мира.

Договор по запрещению ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке (договор Тлателолко).

Он был подписан в феврале 1967 года 25 латиноамериканскими странами, 24 из которых ратифицировали его (Аргентина не ратифицировала). Бразилия и Чили не будут осуществлять его до тех пор, пока все другие латиноамериканские государства не сделают этого. Куба и Гайана его не подписали. Поэтому договор не действует для этих пяти стран. Великобритания и Нидерланды ратифицировали его для территорий в районе действия договора, за которые они несут международную ответственность, а Франция и США, подписали протокол I (которая обязывает государства за пределами региона, принять, на своей территории в ее пределах, договорных ограничений в отношении размещения или хранения ядерного оружия); Великобритания, Китай, Франция, СССР и США подписали протокол II (обязательство не применять и не угрожать применением ядерного оружия против участников Договора). Было создано Агентство по контролю за соблюдением.

Региональные соглашения

Договор 1903 года с Республикой Панама, предоставляющий Соединенным Штатам фактические суверенные права в отношении зоны канала на бессрочной основе, был пересмотрен, и в результате в октябре 1979 года вступили в силу договоры 1977 года. Около 40% бывшей зоны канала будет оставаться под контролем США до 31 декабря 1999 года. Защита канала будет совместной обязанностью обеих стран, при этом Панама будет играть все более активную роль вплоть до полного присоединения канала к своему суверенитету. США гарантировали нейтралитет региона после 2000 года. 13 июня 1984 года Перу согласилась обучать панамские военно-морские силы.

Белиз (Британский Гондурас) стал независимым 21 сентября 1981 года. Британия согласилась оставить войска в качестве защиты и подготовить белизские силы обороны "на соответствующее время". США также предоставляют помощь и обучение. В соответствии с "пактом Содружества" в случае возникновения угрозы независимости Белиза Великобритания, Барбадос, Багамские острова, Гайана, Канада, Тринидад и Тобаго и Ямайка будут встречаться и консультироваться.

Центральноамериканский Совет обороны (CONDECA) был сформирован в 1965 году Гватемалой, Гондурасом, Панамой и Сальвадором для сдерживания подрывной деятельности. В ноябре 1981 года Гватемала, Гондурас и Сальвадор заключили неофициальный союз против Кубы, Никарагуа и внутренних партизанских движений в каждой из стран-членов. США оказывает помощь повстанцам базирующимся в Гондурасе против Никарагуа и правительству против повстанцев в Сальвадоре. Аналогичная региональная группа - центральноамериканское демократическое сообщество (Гондурас, Коста-Рика и Сальвадор; наблюдатели: Колумбия, США и Венесуэла) договорились в январе 1982 года об оказании взаимной помощи в случае внешней агрессии. Как сообщается, Аргентина и Перу заключили военный пакт в конце 1982 года. 8 февраля 1984 года к соглашению об обеспечении безопасности, подписанному в октябре 1982 года Антигуа, Барбадосом, Доминикой, Сент-Люсией и Сент-Винсентом, присоединился Сент-Китс-Невис. Гренада, как сообщается, присоединится.

С 1934 года США заключили двустороннее соглашение с Кубой о юрисдикции и контроле над заливом Гуантанамо. В 1960 году они заявили, что оно может быть изменено или отменено только по взаимному согласию и что они не намерена давать такое согласие. Они также арендовали 2,3 квадратных миль Бермудских островов для военно-морской и воздушной базы с 1941 года.

США, которые имеют двусторонние соглашения о военных продажах на различных уровнях с большинством стран региона, заключили соглашение о статусе сил с Антигуа в 1977/8 годах. СССР не имеет известных официальных оборонных соглашений ни с одним из государств региона.

Куба и Вьетнам подписали 25-летний договор о дружбе и сотрудничестве в октябре 1982 года. Куба и СССР поставляли оружие Гренаде до октября 1983 года и Никарагуа. Однако большинство стран региона получают основное оборудование из западных, а не коммунистических стран. Белиз подписал соглашение о подготовке кадров с Канадой в июне 1985 года.

Аргентина и Бразилия разрабатывают и производят на экспорт собственную военную технику. Бразилия продала свое оружие Ближнему Востоку (Алжир, Ирак, Ливия, Тунис), Африке (Замбия), Бельгии и Канаде, а также Латинской Америке и заключила соглашение о подготовке кадров с Суринамом (1983 год). Чили осуществляет сборку самолетов Mirage 50 и легких БМП по лицензии и, как сообщается, осуществила некоторые поставки в Парагвай.

Экономические факторы

После двух лет резкого сокращения их общего ВВП (-1,5% в 1982 году и -3,2% в 1983 году) латиноамериканские страны в целом смогли увидеть небольшой рост, а именно 2,4% в 1984 году. Однако Межамериканский банк развития сообщил, что уровень жизни на душу населения по-прежнему соответствует уровню 1980 года. Более того, в то время как некоторым странам удалось обратить вспять процесс снижения ВВП (в частности, Бразилии с увеличением на 5,9%, Чили и Перу с 4% и Аргентине с 2,5%), большинство других стран достигли лишь нулевого роста, а Боливия продемонстрировала снижение ВВП на 7,6%. Инфляция и задолженность, наиболее серьезные проблемы для региона, также не были взяты под контроль - действительно, для многих государств они стали еще хуже. В Латинской Америке инфляционный рост составил от 140% до более 180%, в Боливии - более 2000%, Аргентине-800% и Бразилии-230% (только Мексике удалось вдвое снизить инфляцию со 100% до примерно 50%).

Долги также увеличились. Только три государства (Венесуэла, Ямайка и Тринидад) смогли сократить свою структуру долга, в то время как во всех других наблюдался рост от 5% до 12%. По соотношению долг/ВНП Ямайка лидирует со 158%, за ней следуют Коста-Рика (129%), Чили (106%) и Перу (95%). Большинство другие колеблются между 50% и 80%. Это общее экономическое недомогание находит свое отражение в реальном сокращении расходов на оборону (например, Аргентина и Перу), при этом большинство государств сокращают свои бюджеты на вооружение. Только Центральная Америка продемонстрировала значительное увеличение расходов на оборону.

Военные события

Несмотря на соглашение между Аргентиной и Чили по проливу Бигль, по-прежнему существует ряд давних разногласий в отношении территории. Однако ни одно из латиноамериканских государств не обладает достаточным военным потенциалом для ведения крупных боевых действий со своими соседями. Почти все режимы сталкиваются с различной степенью угрозы со стороны диссидентских сил в их обществе. Большинство этих угроз могут сдерживаться и сдерживаются полувоенными силами. Армии в целом представляют собой главным образом мобильные силы для поддержки гражданской власти.

Исключением является Центральноамериканский регион. Повстанческие группы, базирующиеся в соседних странах, создают угрозу стабильности Никарагуа и Сальвадора. Поскольку Гондурас и Коста-Рика являются убежищами для элементов, враждебных Никарагуанскому режиму, они сталкиваются с потенциальной угрозой со стороны никарагуанских сил безопасности, особенно в их ближайших приграничных районах. Импорт оружия в Никарагуа дал ее силам больший боевой потенциал, чем ее соседям, однако в любом крупном конфликте потребуется подкрепление и внешние поставки. Претензии Гватемалы на часть Белиза вряд ли приведут к военным действиям - отчасти из-за присутствия британских сил, отчасти из-за давления США, а отчасти из-за политических издержек такой операции.

Считается, что Куба, крупнейшая военная держава в регионе, за исключением США, за последний год не получила значительного военного импорта. Она по-прежнему способна проводить в основном обычные оборонительные операции, хотя, учитывая ее политическую и идеологическую позицию, она могла бы поддерживать подпольные партизанские группы практически в любой точке Латинской Америки.

ARGENTINA
GDP 1982: pA 150.499 bn ($58,063 bn). Est 1983: pA 730.0 bn ($69,326 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 2.8%. 1984: 3.1%.
Inflation 1983: 433%. 1984: 700%.
Debt 1983: $44.5 bn. 1984: $45.5 bn.
Def budget 1983: pA 134.548 bn ($12,778 bn). 1984: 181.0 bn ($2,676 bn).*

(* Excl $1,621 bn (1983), $660 m (1984) for frontier, maritime and air security budget.)

$1=pesos 2.592 (1982), 10.53 (1983), 67.649 (1984).
Population: 29,940,000.

Men: 18-30: 2,990,000; 30-45: 2,840,000.

Women: 18-30: 2,930,000; 30-45: 2,800,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 108,000 (61,000 conscripts).

Terms of Service: Army 6-12 months, Air Force 1 year, Navy 14 months; some conscripts may serve less.
Reserves: 377,000: Army 250,000 (National Guard 200,000, Territorial Guard 50,000), Navy 77,000, Air 50,000.

ARMY: 55,000 (35,000 conscripts).
HQ: 4 army corps, 5 Military Region, 1 Garrison. Many units cadres only.
2 armd cav bdes (each 2 armd cav, 1 tk regts, 1 arty bn).
3 mech, 2 mot inf bdes (each 3 regts, plus armd cav sqn, engr, arty bns).
2 mountain inf bdes (each 3 inf, 1 arty, 1 engr bns, 1 recce det).
2 jungle bdes (3 lt inf, 1 arty (mor) bns).
1 AB bde (3 AB bns, 1 arty gp).
16 arty bns (12 with bdes).
1 Presidential Guard tk regt.
1 indep mech inf regt.
1 AB trg regt.
5 AD bns.
1 indep engr gp (regt), 5 indep engr bns.
5 log bns.
1 aviation bn (5 dets), 1 spt coy.
Tks: 100 M-4 Sherman, 130 TAM; lt 50 M-41, 60 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: Panhard ERC-90; MICV: 300 AMX VTP, some 150 TAM VCPT; APC: 85 M-3, 125 M-113, 80 MOWAG Grenadier (Roland), 5 BDX.
Arty: guns: 20 M-2A1/M-101 105mm, 18 M-59 155mm towed; how: 180 105mm incl M-56 pack; 70 M-114 towed, 24 Mk F3, 6 M-109 SP 155mm;

MRL.: SALM-Pampera 105mm; SAPBA-1 127mm; mor: 81mm, 200 120mm (some SP in GCTM MICV).
ATK: guns: 227 Kuerassier 105mm SP; RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 105mm; RL: M-65 89mm; ATGW: SS-11/-12, Cobra, Mathogo, Mamba.
AD: guns: Rh 202 twin HSS-669 20mm, HS-83/4 30mm, K-63 35mm, 40mm, 50 M-1A1 90mm (trg); SAM: Tigercat, Blowpipe, Roland, SAM-7.
Avn: ac: 3 G-222, 3 DHC-6, 5 Turbo-Commander 690A, 2 Turbo-Porter, 5 Merlin IIIA, 2 Queen Air, 1 Sabreliner,

49 Cessna (15 182, 20 U-17A/B, 7 207, 2 Citation, 5 T-41);

hel: 9 A-109, 31 Bell (7 206, 18 UH-1H, 2 47G, 4 212), 6 FH-1100, 1 CH-47C, 6 SA-315B Lama, 14 SA-330 Puma,

some 12 AS-332B Super Puma.
(On order: 85 TAM MBT; RAM V-2 MICV; 25 155mm SP how conversion kits; 198 Kuerassier SP ATK;

some 12 AS-332B Super Puma (being delivered), 9 A-l09 hel.)

NAVY: 36,000 (16,000 conscripts), incl naval air force and marines.

Bases: Buenos Aires, Rio Santiago, Puerto Belgrano, Mar del Plata, Ushuaia.
Subs: 4: 2 Type 1200, 2 TR-1700.
Carrier: 1 Br Colossus (up to 12 Super Etendardl A-4, 6 S-2 ac; 4 SH-3DH, 1 S-61D hel).
Destroyers: 6:

4 Meko 360H-2 with 2x4 Exocet MM-40 SSM, 1x8 Aspide multi-role msls, 2 AB-212 hel;

2 Type 42 with 4 Exoce MM-38, 1x2 Sea Dart SAM, 1 hel.
Corvettes with Exocet SSM: 6: 3 Espora (Meko 140) with 4 MM-40, 1 hel; 3 Fr A-69 with 4 MM-38.
Patrol ships: 5: 2 US Cherokee, 2 King (1 trg), 1 US Sotoyomo.
Patrol vessel: 1 large.
FAC: (G): 2 TNC-45; (T): 2 US Higginsi (may not now be operational); (P): 4 Dabur.
MCMV: 6 Br Ton coastal minesweepers/hunters.
Amph: 1 LST, some LCVP, 4 LCM.
Spt: tankers: 3: 1 14,000-, 1 6,000-, 1 1,600-ton.
Arty: some 10 coast defence batteries: 12 M-1898 87mm, 16 M-3 155mm, 12 280mm guns.
(On order 5 TR-1700 subs, 3 Espora corvettes.)
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (3,000); 54 combat ac, 24 combat,hel.
Attack: 3 sqns with 28 A-4Q, 14 Super Etendard.
MR/ASW: 2 sqns: 1 with 6 S-2E; 1 with 6 L-188E Electra.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with 4 SH-3D/H, 1 S-61D Sea King, 10 AB-212, 9 A-103 (Alouette III).
Tpt: 2 sqns with 8 Super King Air 200/220, 3 L-188A Electra, 1 HS-125, 3 F-28/3000 ac; 3 S-61D hel.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 3 S-2A, 5 B-80 Queen Air, 3 PC-6 (Antarctic fit).
Trg: 3 sqns: 11 EMB-326GB Xavante; 6 MB-326B, 5 MB-339A; 11 T-34C.
(Store: some A-4Q, 1 C-45, 5 MB-339A, 12 T-28 ac; 6 Hughes 500, 1 WG-13 Sea Lynx hel).
ASM: 20 Exocet AM-39E/H, ASM-2 Martin Pescador (Kingfisher).
(On order 16 A-4 attack ac.)
MARINES: (10,000).
Fleet Forces: 2:

1 inf regt (2 bns, 1 amph recce gp, 1 fd arty bn,

1 hy mor, 1ATK, 1engr coys.)

1 inf regt (2 bns).
Amph spt force: 1:

1 amph veh bn.

1 AA regt.

1 sigs bn.

1 service/log bn.
6 indep inf (security) coys.
AFV: recce: 12 Panhard ERC-90 Lynx; APC: 15 LVT-3/-4, 19 LVTP-7, 15 LARC-5, 6 MOWAG Roland, 24 Panhard VCR/TT.
Arty: how: 40 M-101 105 mm; mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 75mm, 90mm, M-1968 105mm; ATGW: 20 Bantam.
AD: guns: 20mm, 30mm, 35mm; SAM: 7 Tigercat.

AIR FORCE: 17,000 (10,000 conscripts); combat: 157 ac, 18 hel, 6 more may be armed.
9 airbdes (1 more forming).
AD Command (4 bdes):

FGA/interceptor: 4 sqns: 2 (1 OCU) with 15 Mirage IIIEA, 22 Mirage IIICJ; 2 with 9 Mirage 5P, 27 Dagger (Nesher).
Air Operations Command (8 bdes):

Bbr: 1 sqn with 6 Canberra B-62,2 T-64.

FGA: 3 sqns with 31 A-4P Skyhawk.

COIN: 4 sqns: 2 ac with 45 IA-58A Pucara; 2 hel with 12 Hughes 500M (369HM), 6 UH-1H.

SAR: 1 sqn with 5 Lama.

Tpt: 5 sqns with ac: 4 Boeing 707, 8 C-130E/H, 1 KC-130H, 3 Learjet 35A, 4 C-47, 13 F-27, 5 F-28, 5 DHC-6, 14 IA-50 Guarani II, 2 Merlin IVA;

hel: 2 S-58T (VIP), 12 AS-332B Super Puma.
Antarctic: 1 sqn with ac: 1 DHC-6, 1 LC-47; hel: 2 S-61R/NR, 4 UH-19, 2 CH-47C (SAR); 15 Bell (3 UH-1D, 4 47G, 8 212).
Comms: 1 sqn with 13 Shrike Commander.
Air Training Command:

24 Paris, 12 EMB-326GB Xavante, 48 T-34C, some IA-63 Pampa.
(Store: 37 A-4P FGA, 70 IA-58 Pucara COIN).
AAM: R-530. ASM: AS-11/-12, ASM-2 Martin Pescador.
(On order. 2 C-130, 16 Turbo-Commander tpts; some 12 IA-63 Pampa, 10 MB-339 trg ac; 12 AS-332B Super Puma hel.)

PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Defence): 21,000.
Gendarmerie (mainly frontier duties) 12,000: 3 Regional HQ; org in groups (agrupaciones), sqns, 'gps' (platoons), sections,

recce: Shorland (to replace with RAM V-2); APC: 40 M-113; ac: 22 lt; hel: 3.
Naval Prefecture (coastguard) 9,000;

Patrol craft: 20 large (5 Halcon with 1 hel; 1 more on order), 19 coastal; ac: 5 SC-7 Skyvan; hel: 6 Hughes 500M Defender, 3 Puma.

BAHAMAS
GDP 1982: $B 1.449 bn ($US 1.449 bn). Est 1983: 1.537 bn ($US 1.537 bn).
GDP growth 1982: 2.0%. 1983: 1.5%.
Inflation 1983: 4.1%. 1984: 3.9%.
Debt 1983: SUS 246.40 m. 1984: $US 250 m.
Def exp 1984: $B 8.6 m ($US 8.6 m). Budget 1985: 10.6 m ($US 10.6 m).
FMA 1985: $US 5.4 m.

$US1=$B 1(1982/3/4/5).
Population: 233,000.

Men: 18-30: 24,000; 30-45: 19,600.

Women: 18-30: 26,200; 30-45: 20,400.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Para-Military):
Regular: 496.

Terms of Service: voluntary.
Coastguard: 496.
1 103-ft, 5 60-ft Vosper Thornycroft, 4 30-ft patrol craft, 2 supply vessels.
(On order 3 Protector-class fast patrol boats).

BELIZE

GDP 1982: $BZ 332.3 m ($US 166.15 m). 1983: 351.7 m($US 175.85 m).
GDP growth 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 1.3%.
Inflation 1983: 2.0%. 1984: 6.0%.
Debt 1983: SUS 55.70 m. Est 1984: $US 60.0 m.
Est def budget 1983: $BZ 6.50 m (SUS 3.250 m). 1984: 7.20 m (SUS 3.60 m).
FMA 1984: SUS 0.5 m. 1985: SUS 0.5 m.

$US 1=$B 1(1982/3/4/5).
Population: 160,000.

Men: 18-30: 16,600; 31-45: 6,000.

Women: 18-30: 16,600; 31-45: 9,000.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 610.

Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves (militia): Army (300).
ARMY: 555.

1 inf bn (three Regular, three Reserve coys).

Mor: 10 81mm.
MARINE: 40.
Patrol boats: 4 fast: 2 Souter 20-metre, 2 12-metre Brooke.
AIR: 15.
MR/tpt: 2 BN-2B Defender.

BOLIVIA
GDP 1982: pB 398.5 bn ($6,245 bn). 1983: 1,515.8 bn ($6,597 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -10%. 1983: -7.6%.
Inflation 1983: 330%. 1984: 2,200%.
Debt 1983: $3.85 bn. 1984: $4.2 bn.
Def exp 1983: pB 45.0 bn ($195.84 m). 1984: 500.0 bn ($229.97 m).
FMA 1984: $3.0 m. 1985: $6.0 m.

$1=pesos 63.81 (1982), 229.78 (1983), 2174.21 (1984).
Population: 6,350,000.

Men: 18-30: 670,000; 31-45: 467,000.

Women: 18-30: 691,000; 31-45: 498,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 27,600 (some 16,800 conscripts).

Terms of Service: 12 months, selective.

ARMY: 20,000 (some 15,000 conscripts).
HQ: 6 Military Regions.
Army HQ control:
2 armd bns.
1 mech inf regt.
1 Presidential Guard regt.
1 Military Police bn.
9 divs (5 cadre).
6 cav regts (horsed).
1 mech inf regt (2 bns).
12 inf regts (2 mountain), each with 2 bns.
4 arty regts (incl AA).
2 ranger regts.
1 para bn.
1 armd bn.
6 engr bns.
AFV: recce: 24 EE-9 Cascavel; APC: 60 M-113, 15 V-100 Commando, 24 MOWAG Roland, 24 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: guns: 26 75mm; how: 6 M-116 75mm pack, 6 M-101 105mm; mor: 60mm, 45 81mm.
ATK guns: 36 JPz-SK Kuerassier 105mm SP.
AD guns: M-1A1 37mm.

NAVY: 3,600 (incl 600 marines) (perhaps 1,800 conscripts).

Bases: Riberalta, Tiquina, Puerto Busch, Puerto Horquilla, Puerto Villaroel, Trinidad, Puerto Suarez.
4 Naval Districts; each 1 Flotilla.
Patrol craft: 37 lake and river (360 incl 2 ex-US PBRII (clinic) launches, 2 hospital.
Ac: 1 Cessna 206G.
1 marine bn (600; coy+ in each District).

AIR FORCE: 4,000; 14 combat ac, 9 armed hel.
Ftr/trg: 1 sqn with 10 T-33A/N, 2 F-86F.
COIN: 5 AT-6G.
Special ops: 1 gp with 9 Hughes 500 armed hel.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 8 SA-315B Gaviao (Lama).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Electra, 1 L-100-30, 1 C-130H, 1 Sabreliner, 2 Learjet, 2 Arava, 1 CV-440, 3 CV-580, 8 C-47, 3 King Air,

4 F-27 (?operational, 2 U-3A (Cessna 310).
Utility: ac incl 1 Turbo-Porter, 27 Cessna (3 172K, 3 Turbo-Centurion, 8 185/U-17A, 9 206C/G, 2 414, 2 421); hel: 1 UH-1H, 2 Bell 212.
Trg ac incl 2 T-41D, 18 T-23 Uirapuru, 3 SF-260M, 24 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer.
1 para bn.
1 airbase defence regt (Bofors L/40mm AAguns).
(On order 18 T-33A (status unclear).)

BRAZIL
GDP 1982: Cr$ 50,815 bn ($283,076 bn). 1983: 121,055 bn ($209,786 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -4.0%. 1984: 4.0%.
Inflation 1983: 211%. 1984: 223%.
Debt 1983: $92.8 bn. 1984: $105.0 bn.
Def budget 1983: Cr$ 753.20 bn ($1,305 bn). 1984: 1,950.233 bn ($1,055 bn).

$1=cruzeiros 179.51 (1982), 577.04 (1983), 1848.03 (1984).
Population: 136,000,000.

Men: 18-30: 16,450,000; 31-45: 11,650,000.

Women: 18-30: 16,370,000; 31-45: 11,670,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 276,000 (137,700 conscripts).

Terms of Service: 12 months.
Reserves: Trained first-line 1,115,000; 400,000 subject to immediate recall. Second-line (limited trg) 225,000; state military police schools, centres.

Para-Military (q.v.) 220,000.

ARMY: 183,000 (to be 296,000); (135,500 conscripts).
HQ: 5 army, 1 regional comd, 12 military region; 8 div.
1 armd bde.
6 mech cav bdes.
9 armd inf bdes.
21 motor inf bdes (2 indep).
2 AB bdes (6 bns) (1 indep).
1 AA arty bde (indep).
10 arty regts(2 hy, 1 AB).
4 coast arty gps, and 3 btys.
8 AA arty gps (5 hy).
2 Special Forces bns; 5 'jungle' inf bns (2 indep).
2 engr gps: 9 bns (to be increased to 34 bns).
Tks: lt some 190 M-3, some 100 X-1A, 70 X-1A2 (M-3 mod); 315 M-41B.
AFV: recce: 196 EE-9 Cascavel, 29 M-8; APC: 170 EE-11 Urutu, 22 M-59, some 600 M-113.
Arty: guns: some 240 57mm to 12-in. (304.8mm); coast incl 26 Mk 5 6-in. (152mm); how 420 105mm, 150 M-114 155mm towed,

some 60 M-7/-108 105mm SP; mor: 81mm, 4.2-in. (107mm), 120mm; MRL: SS-06 108mm, SS-40 180mm, SS-60 300mm incl SP.
ATK: HCL: 240 M-18A1 57mm, M-20 75mm, 106mm; RL: 3.5-in. (89mm); ATGW: 300 Cobra.
AD: guns: M-55 quad 12.7mm, 30 35mm, 30 40mm, some 180 57mm, M-2A1 90mm; SAM: 4 Roland II.
(On order EE-T1 Osorio MBT; GH N-45 155mm gun/how (some to be SP), SS-60 (FGT-X40) 300mm MRL, TOW ATGW, M-55 mod quad 12.7mm.)

NAVY: 48,000 (2,200 conscripts) incl naval air and marines.

Bases: Rio de Janeiro, Aratu (Sao Salvador, Bahia Province), Val-de-Caes (Belem, Para), Rio Grande do Sul), Natal (Rio Grande do Norte);

River: Ladario (Mato Grosso), Rio Negro (Amazonas).

Naval Districts: 7 (1 Comd).
Subs: 7: 3 Oberon, 4 US Guppy II/III.
Carrier: 1 Br Colossus (capacity 20 ac: 7-8 S-2E ASW ac; 4 SH-3D Sea King hel).
Destroyers: 10:

5 Sumner (1 with 1x4 Seacat SAM, 4 with 1 Wasp hel);

2 Gearing with ASROC ASW, 1 Wasp hel;

3 Fletcher.
Frigates: 6 Niteroi with 2x3 Seacat SAM , 1 Lynx hel; 2 GP with 2x2 Exocet SSM; 4 ASW with Ikara.
Corvettes: 9 Imperial Marinheiro.
River ships: patrol: 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira, 3 Roraima; monitor 1 with 1x3-in. (76mm), 2x40mm, 2x47mm, 6 x 20mm guns.
Patrol craft: large: 6 Piratini.
MCMV: 6 Aratu (Schutze-type) minesweepers.
Amph: LST: 2 US; ten: 3; LCM: 3 US 1610, 28 landing craft.
Spt: 6 trg ships (3<); 1 fleet support; 2 river tankers; 1 repair, 1 spt ships; 5 ocean, 19 harbour tugs; 20 tpts (2 river), 8 survey ships,

6 survey launches, 2 hospital ships.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (600); 16 combat hel.
ASW: 2 hel sqns with 4 SH-3D, 4 ASH-3H Sea King, 8 WG-13 Sea Lynx.
Utility: 1 hel sqn with 6 Wasp HAS-1, 12 AS-350B Esquilo (Ecureuil).
Trg: 1 hel sqn with 17 Bell Jetranger II.
MARINES: (14,500).
Fleet Force: 1 amph div (1 comd, 3 inf, 1 special operations bns, 1 arty gp, 1 service bn).
Reinforcement Comd: 5 bns incl 1 engr, supply.
Internal Security Force: 6 regional, 1 special operations gps.
AFV: recce: 6 EE-9 Mk IV Cascavel; APC: 30 M-113, 5 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: how: 8 M-102 105mm, 8 M-114 155mm; MRL: SS-06 108mm. ATK: RL: M-20 3.5-in. (89mm); RCL: M-40 106mm.
AD: guns: 8 M-l 40mm towed.
(On order 3 Type 1400 subs, 4 Jacari corvettes; 1 log spt, 1 trg ship; 12 Exocet AM-39 SSM; 60 Tigerfish torpedoes;

15 AS-332 Super Puma (AM-39 ASM), 4 SH-3D Sea King hel; 12 LVTP-7A1 APC).

AIR FORCE: 45,000; 166 combat ac.
AD Command: 1 Gp (13 combat ac):

Interceptors: 2 sqns with 12 F-103E (Mirage IIIEBR), 1 F-103D (Mirage IIIDBR).
Tactical Command: 10 Gps (104 combat ac).

FGA: 2 sqns with 31 F-5E, 4 F-5F.

COIN: 2 sqns with 50 AT-26 (EMB-326) Xavante.

Recce: 2 sqns with 8 RC-95 Bandeirante, 11 RT-26 Xavante.

Liaison: 6 sqns: 1 ac with 27 EMB-C-42; 5 hel with 28 UH-1H; 6 SA-330L Puma, Bell 47.
Maritime Command: 4 Gps (49 combat ac).

ASW (afloat): 1 sqn with 8 S-2E; 7 S-2A (trg).

MR/SAR: 4 sqns with ac 5 RC-130E, 14 EMB-110B Bandeirante (C-95), 15 EMB-111 Bandeirante (P-95); hel: UH-1H armd, SH-1H.
Transport Command: 4 Gps (6 sqns), 7 regional indep sqns:

Hy: 2 sqns: 1 with 10 C-130E/H; 1 with 2 KC-130H.

Med/lt: 2 sqns: 1 with 12 C-91 (HS-748); 1 with 12 C-95A/B (EMB-110 Bandeirante).

Tac: 1 sqn with 12 C-l 15 (DHC-5 Buffalo).

VIP: 1 sqn with 2 VC-96 (Boeing 737), 1 VC-91 (Viscount), 11 VC/VU-93 (HS-125), EMB-121 YU-9(Xingu).

Indep sqns: 7 with 7 C-l 15, 68 C-95/A/B, VU-9.
Training Command:

Ac: 80 T-25 Universal (being replaced), some 88 T-27, 50 AT-26, some EMB-110, 5 EMB-C-42/U-42; hel: 16 Bell 47 (H-13J), 8 UH-1D.

Calibration unit: 1 with 2 HS-125 (EC-93, U-93), 2 C-95A, 4 EC-95.
AAM: R-530, Piranha (MAA-1).
(On order 79 AMX, 12 EMB-120 Brasilia tpts, 100 YT-17 (A-123) Tangard, some 30 T-27 Tucano (EMB-312) trg ac;

10 AS-332 Super Puma, 15 AS-350 Ecureuil, some 32 UH-1H hel; Piranha AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Some 220,000 Public Security Forces in state, military police orgs (State Militias) under Army control and considered an Army Reserve.

CHILE
GDP 1982: pC 1,239.1 bn ($24,340 bn). 1983: 1,557.7 bn ($19,757 bn).
GDP growth 1983: -0.7%. 1984: 5.5%.
Inflation 1983: 23.1%. 1984: 23.0%.
Debt 1983: $15.0 bn. 1984: $20.4 bn.
Est def exp 1983: pC 130.0 bn ($1,649 bn). 1984: 160.0 bn ($1,622 bn).

$1=pesos 50.909 (1982), 78.842 (1983), 98.656(1984).
Population: 12,100,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,483,000; 31-45: 1,162,000."

Women: 18-30: 1,460,000; 31-45: 1,177,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular. 101,000 (32,000 conscripts).

Terms of Service: 2 years (Army and Navy only).
Reserves: 100,000 active; all able-bodied citizens have a Reserve obligation to age 45.
ARMY: 57,000 (30,000 conscripts).
HQ: 6 div (under strength).
1 armd regt.
10 armd car regts.
24 inf regts (17 mot, 7 mountain (1 indep); 8 reinforced with recce unit and arty gp).
8 arty regts and 3 indep arty gps.
1 engr regt and 6 bns.
1 hel-borne ranger unit.
6 cdo bns.
Army Aviation:

1 hel regt (under a div comd).

1 composite gp with 1 log bn and spt unit.
Tks: 150 M-4A3, 21 AMX-30; lt: 15 M-3, 50 M-41.
AFV: recce: 200 EE-9 Cascavel; APC: 60 M-113, 150 Cardoen/MOWAG Piranha, 250 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: how: 124 105mm, 12 Mk F3 155mm SP; mor: M-1 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: M-18 57mm, 106mm; ATGW: Milan/Mamba.
AD: SAM: 50 Blowpipe.
Avn: tpt 6 C-212, 1 Citation, 8 Piper Dakota 236, 3 Navajo; trg: 18 Cessna R-172 Hawk XP;

hel: 11 SA-330FL Puma, 1 AS-332 Super Puma, 10 SA-315B Lama, 2 AB-206B.

NAVY: 29,000 (2,000 conscripts), incl naval air and marines.

Bases: Talcahuano, Valparaiso, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, Puerto Williams, Iquique.
2 Naval Districts: 3 Naval Zones.
Subs: 2 Type 1300, 2 Oberon.
Cruisers: 2 Br County with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM, 1x2 Seaslug, 2x2 Seacat SAM, 1 hel.
Destroyers: 4: 2 Almirante with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM, 2x4 Seacat SAM; 2 US Sumner with 1 hel.
Frigates: 2 Leander with 4 Exocet MM-38 SSM, 1x4 Seacat SAM, 1 hel.
FAC: (G): 2 Saar-IV with 6 Gabriel SSM; (T): 4 Lurssen-type.
Patrol craft: large: 4: 2 Sotoyomo, 1 Cherokee, 1 PC-1638; coastal: 6.
Amph: 3 Batral, 2 Orompello lt LST.
Spt: 3 tankers, 5 tpts, 1 sub spt vessel.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (500); 6 combat ac.
MR: 1 sqn with 6 EMB-11 IN maritime Bandeirante.
Utility: 1 sqn with 3 EMB-1 ION Bandeirante, 4 C-212A.
Hel: 1 sqn with 8 Alouette III, 4 SH-57 (Bell 206A).
Trg: 1 sqn with 10 Pilatus PC-7.
MARINES: (5,000).
4 gps: each 2 inf bns, 1 cdo coy, 1 coast, 1 AA arty btys.
1 amph bn.
AFV: APC: MOWAG Roland, 30 LVTP-5.
Arty: how: 16 105mm, 35 155mm; coast guns: 16 GPFM-3 155mm; mor: 50 60mm, 50 81mm.
AD: guns: 20 37mm; SAM: Crotale.

AIR FORCE: 15,000; 101 combat ac.
4 Air Bdes: 4 combat wings and 2 gps; each wing incl comms fit with ac/hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 32 Hunter F-71/FGA-9, 13 F-5E, 3 F-5F.
COIN: 2 sqns with 29 A-37B.
Ftr/recce: 1 sqn with 11 Mirage 50FC, 9 C-101 Aviojet.
Recce: 2 photo sqns with 2 Canberra PR-9, 2 Learjet 35-A.
Tpt: 1 sqn with ac: 1 707-351C, 2 C-130H, 99A, 1 King Air 90; hel: 2 SA-315B Lama, 1 Bell 47.
Utility/liason fits: ac incl: 17 DHC-6, 3 Twin Bonanza; hel: 3 S-55T, 4 Lama.
Trg: 1 wing, 3 flying schools with ac: 4 Hunter T-72, 30 T-34A, 25 T-37B/C, 8 T-41A, some 26 Piper T-35A/B Pilldn, 5 JT-3 Halcon (C-101),

10 Cessna 180, 10 Piper Dakota 236; hel: 6 UH-1H, 3 Bell 212.
AAM: AIM-9L Sidewinder, Shafrir. ASM: AGM-65B Maverick, AS-11/-12.
AD: 1 regt (5 gps) with guns: S-639/-665 20mm, GAI-CO1 twin 20mm, 36 35mm, K-63 twin 35mm;

SAM: Blowpipe, 12 Cactus (Crotale); radar 4 sqns.
(On order 3 Mirage 50 ftrs (status unclear), 21 C-101BB COIN, 2 EMB-120 tpts, Dakota, some 56 T-35A, -35B Pilldan trg ac; 3 Super Puma hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: Carabmeros: 25,000. Coastguard: 10 Anchova patrol craft, 13 SAR craft, 3 service launches.

COLOMBIA
GDP 1982: PC 2,497.3 bn ($38,969 bn). 1983: 3,036.7 bn ($38,510 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 1.5%. 1984: 3%.
Inflation 1983: 17.0%. 1984: 18.3%.
Debt 1983: $8.1 bn. 1984: $9.0 bn.
Def exp 1984: pC 43.0 bn ($426,515 m). Est budget 1985: 39.0 bn ($286,870 m).
FMA 1983: $0.7 m. 1984: $25.0 m.

$1=pesos 64.085 (1982), 78.854 (1983), 100.817(1984), 135.95(1985).
Population: 20,120,000.

Men: 18-30: 3,644,000; 31-45: 2,385,000.

Women: 18-30: 3,620,000; 31-45: 2,350,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 66,200 (25,900+ conscripts).

Terms of Service: 2 years (all services).
Reserves: 116,600. Army 100,000, Navy 15,000, Air 1,600.

ARMY: 53,000 (24,000 conscripts).
11 inf bdes ('Regional Bdes'): 6 with 3 inf, 1 arty, 1 engr gp, 1 mech or horsed cav gp; 4 with 2 inf bns only; 1 forming.
1 trg bde, incl Presidential Guard (mech bn).
1 indep mech gp.
1 Ranger, 1 para, 1 AA bns.
Tks: 12 M-3A1.
AFV: recce: 45 M-8, 120 EE-9 Cascavel; APC: 50 M-113, 76 EE-11 Urutu, 45 M-3A2 half-track.
Arty: how: 48 M-101 105mm; mor: 100 81mm, 148 107mm.
AD: guns: 30 M-1A1 40mm.

NAVY: 9,000 (incl 2,500 marines) (some conscripts).

Bases: Cartagena, Buenaventura; Riven Puerto Leguizamo, Puerto Orocue, Malaga (building).
Subs: 2 Type 1200, 2 SX-506 midget (reserve).
Frigates: 4 FS-1500 with 8 Exocel MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft: 5 large: 4 US Cherokee, 1 Abnaki; 2 coastal, 8 river<.
Gunboats: 6: 2 Asheville, 3 Arauca, 1 Barranquilla.
Spt: 1 tanker, 4 tpts.
MARINES: 2 bns, 3 indep coys, cdo units.

No hy eqpt.
NAVAL AIR: forming.

Recce: 4 A-37B.

Hel: 4 fits with BO-105.

AIR FORCE: 4,200 (some 1,900 conscripts); 49 combat ac, 17 armed hel.
Combat Command:

FGA: 2 sqns with 9 Mirage 5COA, 2 5COR, 1 5COD.

COIN: ac: 1 sqn with 12 AT-33A, 22 A-37B/D; hel: 1 sqn with 10 Hughes 500C (OH-6A Cayuse).

Recce: 1 sqn with ac: 3 RT-33A; he!: 7 Hughes 300C, 10 Hughes 500C.
Military Air Transport Command:

Ac: 1 sqn with C-130E, 2 C-130H, 4 C-54, 12 C-47, 8 HS-748, 2 Arava, 2 F-28, 10 DHC-2, 1 Aero Commander 560A, 12 PC-6 Turbo-Porter.

Hel: 1 sqn with 19 UH-1B/H, 13 Bell 205.
Training and Spt Command:

Ac: 9 T-37C, 20 T-41D, 3 RT-33, 12 T-33A, 25 T-34A/B.

Het 5 Bell 47 (OH-13 Sioux), 2 Hughes 300C.
AD: 3 Skyguard/Sparrow system sites.
AAM: R-530.

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO) 500.

PARA-MILITARY: National Police Force 50,000; 1 HS-748 ac, 30 hel;

Coastguard: 9 craft (5<) (On order: Bell hel: 2 212,2 412.)

OPPOSITION:
(1) Revolutionary Workers' Party: 6 Groups (M-19, National Liberation Army (ELN), Popular Liberation Army (ELP),

Free Fatherland, Quintin Lame (Indian), Ricardo Franco Front).
(2) Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).

COSTA RICA

GDP 1982: C 97.002 bn ($2,593 bn). Est 1983: 105.0 bn ($2,555 bn).
GDP growth 1982: -4.5%. 1983: 2.0%.
Inflation 1983: 15%. 1984: 30%.
Debt 1983: $4.0 bn. 1984: $4.1 bn.
Def budget 1983: C 1.15 bn ($27,985 m).* Est exp 1984: 900 m ($20,210 m).* (* Figures for Public Security and Civil Guard.)
FMA 1984: $9.1 m. Est 1985: $9.0 m.

$1=colones 37.407 (1982), 41.094 (1983), 44.533 (1984).
Population: 2,550,000.

Men: 18-30: 336,000; 31-45: 214,000.

Women: 18-30: 325,000; 31-45: 212,000.
TOTAL SECURITY FORCES (Para-Military):
Regular. 8,000.
Civil Guard: 4,500.

Presidential Guard: 1 bn, 7 coys.

1 COIN bn (forming).
Eqpt: 1 UR-416 APC, 81mm mor, 90mm RL, M-203 grenade launchers;
patrol craft: 1 Swiftships 105-ft fast, 4 65-ft coastal <, 8 18-ft inshore<;
ac: 1 Cessna 180, 1 U-17A, 6 Piper, hel: 1 FH-1100 (VIP), 2 S-58ET, 3 Hughes (1 500E, 2 269C), 2 Bell UH-1B.
(To get M-113 APC; 3 Swift patrol craft, 5 river patrol vessels <; 2 T-41, 2 Cessna 206, 1 C-212 Aviocar ac; 2 Hughes 500E hel.)
RESERVES: incl Air element; 30 lt ac and hel.
Rural Guard (Ministry of Government and Police): 3,500. Small arms only.
Numerous private armed guard units.

CUBA
GNP 1982: pC 12.251 bn ($15.49 bn). 1983: 13.35 bn ($15.76 bn).
GDP growth 1983: 4.5%. 1984: 7.4%.
Debt 1983: $3.30 bn. 1984: $3.50 bn.
Def budget 1984: pC 1.167 bn ($1,357 bn). 1985: 1.471 bn ($1,577 bn).
FMA: see note.* (*The economy is heavily subsidized through Soviet aid, est at $4 bn in 1983; exact military subvention unknown.)

$1=pesos 0.791 (1982), 0.8471 (1983), 0.8602 (1984), 0.933 (1985).
Population: 10,150,000.

Men: 18-30: 1,253,000; 31-45: 977,000.

Women: 18-30: 1,200,000; 31-45: 953,000.

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 161,500(99,500 conscripts).

Terms of service: 3 years.
Reserves: 7165,000. Army: 135,000 Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Regular and Reserve units; Navy 712,000, Air 718,000.

TABLES AND ANALYSES

4. NATO DEFENCE OUTLAYS (1980-83) MEASURED BY DIFFERENT YARDSTICKS

This table demonstrates the differing assessments of NATO defence outlays that result from applying to the same base figures the methodologies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the US Department of Defense (DoD).

The base figures are the first set of figures in the top row.They are member countries' defence expenditures (according to the NATO definition) expressed in local currency at current market prices. These figures have been converted to constant 1980 prices using an IMF GDP deflator (IISS methodology) or an IMF consumer price deflator (SIPRI methodology) to give the other sets offiguresinthe top row.

The first set of figures in the middle rowis calculated by converting the base figures into dollars at the prevailing exchange rates. The IISS and SIPRI figures in the middle row result from converting the relevant figures in the top row at 1980 exchange rates.

The first set of figures in the bottom row results from the ACDA methodology, which applies to the base figures both an IMF GDP deflator and a US price deflator, 'in order to account for national differences in the behaviour of prices', and then converts the result into constant dolars. The final set of figures was produced by the DoD, which has not indicated its methodology.

4. РАСХОДЫ НАТО НА ОБОРОНУ (1980-83 ГОДЫ), ИЗМЕРЯЕМЫЕ РАЗЛИЧНЫМИ ПОКАЗАТЕЛЯМИ

В этой таблице представлены различные оценки оборонных ведомств НАТО, полученные в результате применения к этим базовым показателям методологии Международного института государственных исследований (IISS), Стокгольмского Международного института по исследованию проблем мира (SIPRI), агентства США по контролю над вооружениями и разоружению (ACDA) и Министерства обороны США (DoD).

Базовые цифры-первые цифры в верхнем ряду.Это оборонные расходы стран-членов (согласно определению НАТО), выраженные в местной валюте по текущим рыночным ценам. Эти цифры были пересчитаны в постоянные цены 1980 года с использованием дефлятора ВВП МВФ (методология IISS) или дефлятора потребительских цен МВФ (методология SIPRI), чтобы дать другие наборы данных в верхнем ряду.

Первый набор цифр в среднем ряду рассчитывается путем конвертации базовых цифр в доллары по обменным курсам. МИСИ и СИПРИ в среднем ряду в результате преобразования цифры в верхнем ряду по курсу 1980.

Первый набор цифр в нижней строке является результатом методологии ACDA, которая применяется к базовым цифрам как дефлятор ВВП МВФ, так и дефлятор цен США, "чтобы учесть национальные различия в поведении цен", а затем преобразует результат в постоянные доллары. Окончательный набор цифр был подготовлен МО, которое не указало свою методологию.

Estimating the Soviet-US Strategic Balance

The strategic nuclear systems deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union can be compared using a wide variety of measures. Perhaps most commonly, such comparisons are expressed in terms of the basic characteristics of the forces in peacetime - such as the number of delivery systems available to each side, or the number of warheads which those systems can deliver. Alternatively, analysts can attempt to assess the military potential inherent in nuclear systems by estimating, for example, missile throw-weight and bomber payload, the total destructive power ('yield') of each side's strategic nuclear weapons, or the effectiveness of strategic nuclear weapons against specific kinds of targets. A number of these measures are described below.

However, its is important to note at the outset that no single measurement can give a full representation of the strategic nuclear balance. One measure may be useful for some purposes but not for others, and there is considerable debate among analysts as to which measures should be given greatest weight in assessing the overall balance. Moreover, many of these measures are often either themselves subject to considerable uncertainties (e.g., weapon yield) or else very sensitive to predicted performance (deliverable warheads) or to other assumptions which are also highly uncertain (e.g., effectiveness against particular classes of targets). Finally, all these estimates are in any case essentially static measures of the balance; they provide alternative indices of the potential of strategic nuclear forces in peacetime, but they cannot portray how these forces might interact in the event of war. Nor can these measures necessarily be applied in the same way to the specific purposes of arms control. (In the US-Soviet SALT II Treaty, for example, verification considerations required 'counting rules' which assumed the all missiles of a given type carried the maximum number of warheads with which any missile of that type had been tested.)

Delivery Systems and Deliverable Weapons

The most straightforward means of measuring the strategic nuclear balance is to count the total number of delivery systems - ICBM, SLBM and long-range bombers - available to the two sides. However, this measure alone is of limited relevance, for it neglects the fact that almost all delivery systems can now carry several (and, in some cases, a varying number of) warheads which can be directed against separate targets. It is more relevant, therefore, to assess the numbers of separately-targetable warheads that each system can carry. However, ICBM and SLBM are frequently deployed (particularly by the USSR) in a number of modifications, in order to provide a degree of employment flexibility in terms of yield, accuracy, operational range and numbers of warheads. To take an extreme case, the Soviet SS-18 deployed in four (and perhaps shortly five) modifications which carry warheads ranging from 1x20 MT to 10x50 KT.

Because it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely which missiles embody which modifications, total numbers of warheads on missiles (and consequently their total yields) cannot be estimated with precision. Similarly, the force loadings of aircraft (i.e., the numbers and yields of gravity bombs, and the numbers and yields of stand-off air-to-surface missiles) cannot be precisely stated, beyond the fact that there is a maximum payload a given aircraft can carry over its operational range. Plans for specific force loadings for specific targets can also be changed. Here we have assessed probable operational loadings.

Measuring Destructive Power

A second general approach to measuring the balance seeks to assess the military potential inherent in the nuclear systems of the two sides. The crudest method is to assess bomber payload and missile throw-weight to reach a rough measure of the total destructive power available in a strategic force. This takes no account of the sub-division of available payload and throw weight into separately-targetable weapons, but it does give a measure of the total weight of nuclear ordnance that could be delivered against an opponent. It also takes little account of technological developments. For example, miniaturizing warheads and increasing their accuracy can significantly augment the destructive effects of any given payload. Nor do estimates of payload and throw-weight relate the destructive power of nuclear weapons to potential targets. To do so, it is necessary not only to distinguish between 'area' targets (such as cities and major military concentrations), on the one hand, and 'point' targets (such as hardened missile sites, command-and-control centres, etc.), on the other, but also to account for the effects of yield and accuracy.

A crude measurement of capability against area targets is aggregate warhead yield, expressed in megatons. But destructive power does not grow proportionately with a simple increase in yield; a 10-MT weapon is not ten times as destructive as a 1-MT weapon. Hence, a more accurate indicator is 'equivalent megatonnage' (EMT), which for a given warhead is usually expressed as the two-thirds power of its explosive yield, or Y2^- (Thus the EMT of a 200-KT warhead is (0.2)%, or 0.34.) However, EMTmay overstate the effectiveness of very large weapons, because the area of potential destruction is likely to exceed the area of the target to be destroyed.

In the case of point targets, one must relate the predicted level of destruction (normally blast overpressure, measured in pounds per square inch above atmospheric pressure) to the degree of protection ('hardness') of the target. Here the accuracy of delivery systems and their warheads becomes critical. One widely-used measure of weapon capability against point targets is 'counter-military potential' (CMP). Accuracy is taken into account by the use of the formula

CEP (circular error probable) being the radius of circle within which half of the warheads are expected to fall. Because it varies inversely with the square of CEP, CMP is critically dependent not only on predicted system accuracy but also on the precision with which this accuracy can be assessed. As CEPS become very low, the CNPS of particular weapons systems tend towards infinity. If the CMPS for such' systems are aggregated with those of less accurate systems, the point target kill capability of the whole force may be exaggerated.

Of all the characteristics of strategic nuclear weapons systems, accuracy is one of the hardest to predict. It can at best be only an estimate derived from the observation of a number of test firings. But this estimate is bound to be subject to major uncertainties. The number of tests conducted for a specific model is not statistically large; tests are not carried out over the operational trajectories of the delivery systems; when observing tests it can be difficult to determine the precise point of aim, and thus to measure deviation; and meteorological conditions in the impact area can also cause significant deviations. While it is clear that the trend of delivery technologies has been towards greater accuracy, the uncertainty in assessing accuracy may be quite high. Since accuracies are squared in the equation above, it becomes obvious how tentative any assessment of CMP must be.

However, even if EMT and CMP could be precisely determined and then aggregated for entire strategic forces, they would not be wholly effective instruments for measuring the balance of these forces. Such forces are targeted against a mix of area and point targets, and these yardsticks would only be valid it an entire force were to be applied exclusively to either area targets (in the case of EMT) or point targets (in the case of CMP). Thus, both EMT and CMP would be uncertain measures even if warhead numbers, yields and accuracies were known precisely for both sides (though the uncertainties of EMT are significantly less than those of CMP).

For these reasons, there is no single, fully satisfactory way of comparing the strategic nuclear forces of the US and the USSR. Numbers ofwarheads and bombs loaded on the delivery systems (particularly, but not only, aircraft) are subject to major uncertainties. The alternative method - relating delivery systems to specific targets - depends critically on factors of performance and accuracy which cannot be measured with precision. It is important to recognize these shortcomings in any evaluation of the strategic nuclear balance between the US and the USSR and to understand that all such evaluations rely on many assumptions to provide a basis for assessment.

In the following two tables - the first comparing the number of deliverable warheads available to either side, the second the equivalent megatonnage (EMT) - the Institute provides its assessment on the basis of certain assumptions about warhead loadings, numbers, ranges and yields. These assumptions are made clear in the notes to the accompanying Tables. The sign ~ is used to show approximation. Subject to the qualifications and uncertainties noted above, what these Tables suggest is an approximate superiority in deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads of about 1.20: 1 on the part of the strategic forces of the Soviet Union over those of the United States. When bomber-delivered weapons (including SRAM) are added, the US warhead total rises to about 10,174 and the Soviet total (due to the much smaller size of the Soviet strategic bomber force) to about 9,887. Our estimates of total EMT, on the other hand, suggest a Soviet advantage of over 2.39: 1 in ICBM and SLBM, and of roughly 1.61: 1 when bomber-delivered weapons are included.

For the tables accompanying this essay, seeoverleaf.

Оценка советско-американского стратегического баланса

Стратегические ядерные системы, развернутые Соединенными Штатами и Советским Союзом, можно сравнить с помощью самых различных способов. Возможно, чаще всего такие сравнения выражаются в терминах основных характеристик сил в мирное время - таких, как количество систем доставки, имеющихся в распоряжении каждой стороны, или количество боеголовок, которые эти системы могут доставить. В качестве альтернативы аналитики могут попытаться оценить военный потенциал, присущий ядерным системам, путем оценки, например, веса ракет и полезной нагрузки бомбардировщиков, общей разрушительной силы ("выхода") стратегических ядерных вооружений каждой стороны или эффективности стратегических ядерных вооружений против конкретных видов целей. Ряд этих мер описан ниже.

Однако важно с самого начала отметить, что ни одно измерение не может дать полного представления о стратегическом ядерном балансе. Одна мера может быть полезна для одних целей, но не для других, и среди аналитиков широко обсуждается вопрос о том, каким мерам следует уделять наибольшее внимание при оценке общего баланса. Кроме того, оценки многих из этих мер зачастую либо сами по себе подвержены значительной неопределенности (например, доставляемые боеголовки, совокупный выход), либо весьма чувствительны к прогнозируемой эффективности или к другим предположениям, которые также весьма неопределенны (например, эффективность в отношении конкретных классов целей). Наконец, все эти оценки в любом случае являются по существу статическими показателями баланса; они дают альтернативные показатели потенциала стратегических ядерных сил в мирное время, но не могут показать, как эти силы могут взаимодействовать в случае войны. Эти меры не могут также применяться аналогичным образом к конкретным целям контроля над вооружениями. (Например, в советско-американском договоре о ОСВ II соображения проверки требовали "правил подсчета", которые предполагали, что все ракеты данного типа имеют максимальное количество боеголовок, с которыми была испытана любая ракета этого типа.)

Системы доставки и доставляемое оружие

Наиболее простым средством измерения стратегического ядерного баланса является подсчет общего числа систем доставки - МБР, БРПЛ и дальних бомбардировщиков, - имеющихся в распоряжении обеих сторон. Однако сама по себе эта мера имеет ограниченное значение, поскольку она игнорирует тот факт, что почти все системы доставки в настоящее время могут нести несколько (а в некоторых случаях и различное число) боеголовок, которые могут быть направлены против отдельных целей. Поэтому более уместно оценить количество отдельно нацеливаемых боеголовок, которые может нести каждая система. Однако МБР и БРПЛ часто развертываются с рядом модификаций, с тем чтобы обеспечить определенную гибкость в плане производительности, точности, дальности действия и количества боеголовок. В крайнем случае, Советский SS-18 развернут в четырех (и, возможно, вскоре пяти) модификациях, которые несут боеголовки в диапазоне от 1х20 МТ до 10x50 КТ.

Поскольку часто бывает трудно, если не невозможно, точно определить, какие ракеты содержат какие модификации, общее количество боеголовок на ракетах (и, следовательно, их суммарный выход) не может быть оценено точно. Точно так же нельзя точно определить боевые нагрузки самолетов (т.е. количество и мощность свободнопадающих бомб, а также количество и мощность ракет класса "воздух-поверхность"), кроме того факта, что существует максимальная полезная нагрузка, которую данный самолет может нести в пределах своей эксплуатационной дальности. Планы конкретных боевых нагрузок для конкретных целей также могут быть изменены. Здесь мы оценили возможные эксплуатационные нагрузки

Измерение Разрушительной Мощности

Второй общий подход к измерению баланса направлен на оценку военного потенциала, присущего ядерным системам обеих сторон. Самый грубый метод заключается в оценке полезной нагрузки бомбардировщика и забрасываемой массы ракеты для достижения приблизительной оценки общей разрушительной силы, имеющейся в стратегических силах. При этом не учитывается подраздел имеющегося полезного груза и забрасываемого веса на отдельные виды оружия, но зато дается мера общего веса ядерных боеприпасов, которые могли бы быть выставлены против противника. Он также мало учитывает технологические достижения. Например, миниатюризация боеголовок и повышение их точности могут значительно усилить разрушительное воздействие полезной нагрузки. Оценки полезной нагрузки и забрасываемой массы также не соотносят разрушительную силу ядерного оружия с потенциальными целями. Для этого необходимо не только проводить различие между "площадными" целями (такими, как города и крупные военные концентрации), с одной стороны, и "точечными" целями (такими, как укрепленные ракетные комплексы, командно-контрольные центры и т.д.), с другой стороны, но также для учета влияния мощности и точности.

Грубым измерением потенциала против площадных целей является совокупная мощьность боеголовок, выраженный в мегатоннах. Но разрушительная сила не растет пропорционально с простым увеличением мощности; 10-МТ оружие не в десять раз разрушительнее 1-МТ оружия. Следовательно, более точным показателем является "эквивалентный мегатоннаж" (ЕМТ), который для данной боеголовки обычно выражается как мощность в две трети ее взрывной мощности, или Y 2/3. (Таким образом, ЕМТ в 200-кт БЧ (0.2)^2/3, или 0,34.) Однако ЕМТ может преувеличить эффективность очень крупного оружия, поскольку площадь потенциального уничтожения, вероятно, превысит площадь уничтожаемой цели.

В случае точечных целей необходимо соотнести прогнозируемый уровень разрушения (обычно избыточное давление взрыва, измеренное в фунтах на квадратный дюйм выше атмосферного давления) со степенью защиты ("твердостью") цели. Здесь точность систем доставки и их боеголовок становится критической. Один широко используемый показатель способности оружие против точечных целей является контр-силовой потенциал (СМР). Точность учитывается при использовании формулы

СЕР (КВО - круговое вероятное отклонение) - радиус круга, в пределах которого половина боеголовок пададет. Поскольку он изменяется обратно пропорционально квадрату CEP, CMP критически зависит не только от точности прогнозируемой системы, но и от точности, с которой эта точность может быть оценена. По мере того, как уровень CEP становится очень низким, CMP конкретных оружейных систем стремятся к бесконечности. Если CMPS для таких систем агрегируются с менее точными системами, то возможность уничтожения точечной цели всей силы может быть преувеличена.

Из всех характеристик систем стратегических ядерных вооружений точность предсказать труднее всего. В лучшем случае это может быть лишь оценка, полученная в результате наблюдения за рядом испытательных стрельб. Однако эта оценка неизбежно будет подвержена значительной неопределенности. Число испытаний, проводимых для конкретной модели, не является статистически большим; испытания не проводятся по эксплуатационным траекториям систем доставки; при наблюдении испытаний может быть трудно определить точную точку прицеливания и, таким образом, измерить отклонение; а метеоусловия в зоне воздействия также могут вызвать значительные отклонения. Хотя очевидно, что тенденция технологий доставки была направлена на повышение точности, неопределенность в оценке точности может достигать +-50%. Поскольку в приведенном выше уравнении точность возведена в квадрат, становится очевидным, насколько предварительной должна быть любая оценка CMP.

Однако, даже если ЕМТ и CMP можно было бы точно определить и затем агрегировать для всех стратегических сил, они не были бы полностью эффективными инструментами для измерения баланса этих сил. Такие силы нацелены на сочетание площадных и точечных целей, и эти критерии будут действительны только в том случае, если целые силы будут применяться исключительно к площадным целям (в случае EMT) или точечным целям (в случае CMP). Таким образом, и ЕМТ, и CMP были бы неопределенными мерами, даже если бы количество, мощность и точность боеголовок были точно известны обеим сторонам (хотя неопределенности ЕМТ значительно меньше, чем неопределенности СМР).

По этим причинам не существует единого, полностью удовлетворительного способа сравнения стратегических ядерных сил США и СССР. Число боеголовок и бомб, загружаемых в системы доставки (особенно, но не только, в самолеты) , является предметом серьезной неопределенности. Альтернативный метод - увязка систем доставки с конкретными целями - в решающей степени зависит от факторов эффективности и точности, которые невозможно измерить с точностью. Важно признавать эти недостатки при любой оценке стратегического ядерного баланса между США и СССР и понимать, что все подобные оценки опираются на многие допущения, закладывающие основу для оценки.

В следующих двух таблицах - в первой, сравнивая количество доставляемых боеголовок, имеющихся у обеих сторон, во-второй, эквивалентный мегатноонаж (ЭМТ) - институт осуществляет оценку на основе определенных предположений о нагрузках БЧ, числе, дальности и мощности. Эти предположения четко изложены в примечаниях к прилагаемым таблицам. Знак ~ показывает приближение. С учетом вышеизложенных оговорок и неопределенностей в этих таблицах предлагается приблизительное равенство между стратегическими силами Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов в развернутых боеголовках МБР и БРПЛ - около 7000. Когда учитываются бомбардировщики доставляющие оружие (включая SRAM), общее количество американского увеличивается примерно до 9300, а советского (из-за гораздо меньшего размера советских стратегических бомбардировочных сил) - до около 7300. С другой стороны, наши оценки общей ЭМТ предполагают советское преимущество более чем 2,65:1 в МБР и БРПЛ и примерно 1,6: 1, когда включено оружие, доставляемое бомбардировщиками.

The East-West Conventional Balance in Europe

Assessing the conventional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact using comparisons of manpower, combat units or equipment contains quite a large margin of uncertainty. There are a number of characteristics which it is almost impossible to evaluate: the quality of units or equipment, geographical advantages, doctrine, military technology, deployment, training, logistic support, morale, leadership, tactical initiative, terrain, weather, political will and alliance cohesion. Such comparisons must in any case be set within the wider political and strategic contexts including the nuclear balance, world-wide force deployments, the reinforcement potential of both sides and, most important, the relative strengths of the respective navies and long-range tactical and support air forces.

One cannot foretell the form and scope of any hostilities, their duration, their management or their results. Recent conflicts have shown that the expenditure of materiel can run well above even the highest previous estimates. The impact of this factor on the ability to sustain combat, on the theatre logistics arrangements, or on the national infrastructures cannot be estimated. Yet all these factors have a bearing on the employment of the forces in Europe, on their reinforcement and on the resources needed to supply them.

Direct comparisons between items of military equipment, are also difficult. It is possible to compare, for example, the numbers of tanks of each side, but the tanks in the respective Alliances are obviously not necessarily equivalent in terms of battle-worthiness. Some are old and unmodernized: others are modern and sophisticated. The former may not move as fast, take such advantage of the terrain, fire with the same chance of a first-round hit, resist hits or communicate with each other so well. Moreover, although the tank is still highly regarded as perhaps one of the best anti-tank weapons, other and very efficient tank-killers exist - such as armed helicopters, modern ground-attack aircraft, vehicle-mounted guided anti-tank weapons and mines. In short, there are many static and dynamic factors which must be considered if a true comparison of forces is to be made.

Bearing those considerations in mind, therefore, the question of numerical balance will be reviewed in the table accompanying this essay using a number of different static indicators under the headings of Manpower, Divisions or Divisional equivalents, Ground Forces equipment, Naval units, Naval and maritimeassociated aircraft and Land Attack and Fighter aircraft. Totals are given for NATO in Central and Northern Europe (taken together) and in Southern Europe, for the United States Forces in Europe or in sea areas adjacent to Europe and, by category, for NATO as a whole. Compared with these totals will be the equivalents for the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, for the Soviet Union's forces opposed to NATO and the totals for each category.

Defining the Combat Zone

One of the central problems for analysis is whether to compare forces at a very high level of aggregation (i.e., Alliance totals) or to attempt to define more realistic interactions (i.e., by fronts). Yet it has to be acknowledged that quite large elements of the forces of both sides are not necessarily committed at the outset to specific combat zones. A substantial degree of flexibility to switch these at will exists, especially with Soviet reserve forces. The Northern and Central European sectors are shown here as one entity, yet this is inevitably an incomplete notion. The Norwegian land forces, for example, have deployed a major element of their active field forces to protect the northern approaches to the country, against which the Soviet forces in the northern Leningrad Military District pose a substantial potential threat (and plan to reinforce the far north in war). The Norwegian Navy must assign its larger vessels to support the Atlantic coastal flank of the forces in northern Norway, but the Soviet Baltic Fleet poses a threat to southern Norway, forcing the Navy to attend also to that area. The Norwegian Air Force has to be prepared to support both sectors. The West German province of Schleswig-Holstein, although also part of NATO's Northern Command, must anticipate attack both from the direction of East Germany and from the Sea.

NATO's Southern Flank Commander has to be prepared to defend three widely separated fronts, each with its own peculiar tactical and supply requirements. Italy must contest any Pact threat from Central Europe. Greece and Turkey must between them defend Thrace and the Aegean Sea and their air space, while Turkey must also defend her eastern border in the Caucasus.

Manpower

The total number of men in uniform for all countries is given. Yet many of those in the armed forces of th'e super-powers may well be committed outside the NATO area. The totals for those forces available for combat and actually located in Europe include, for NATO, French and Canadian forces in Germany but not Spanish forces. For the USSR, those in the Kola Peninsula opposite Norway are included, as are those in the Trans-Caucasus MD facing Turkey.

In the event of hostilities erupting, or threatening to erupt, the standing forces in combat zones could be augmented quite quickly. This can be done either by moving standing forces to Europe or by mobilizing the reserves, either for combat in place or to be moved to Europe by those outside powers. Again, of the total reserves in these states, not all would be available for deployment in the European threatre or could necessarily be mobilized and moved in time to affect the outcome of hostilities.

Mobilization

The rate at which nations can mobilize will depend upon the system adopted, staff procedures and competence, distances and the transport facilities available. The rate at which nations will mobilize will depend on the warning received, on political will, on the ability to make decisions and put them into effect, and on how far enemy action obstructs mobilization. The Warsaw Pact countries have maintained reserves based upon conscripts who have completed their period of obligatory service. Those who have been released less than five years would probably be available for immediate service; after more than five years the men would need refresher training. The Soviet Union, in particular, uses the Military District organization for recalling and placing reservists into skeleton formations ('category 2' and 'category 3' divisions) for war. A fourth category, divisions with obsolescent equipment and older reserves, may be mobilized in some Districts. The links between the central USSR and/the borders are more than adequate for rapid movement towards potential battlefronts, so long as they stay free from attack. The limitations of Soviet internal communications might make it difficult to switch divisions from one part of the USSR to another.

Within Europe many countries can mobilize in place. In the case of Britain, movement to the mainland of Europe is less easy and is liable to interdiction. Those countries which must move reinforcements across the Atlantic clearly face the possibility of serious interruption. Finally, the United States, Britain and Canada do not have a large pool of trained reserve manpower comparable to that available to other nations which have universal conscription.

Formations

The normal measure of force comparison is the division, defined as the smallest force capable of independent combat action, generally an allarms force with its own logistics support. In all cases the term 'tank' includes tank and armoured; 'mech' includes mechanized, motorized and motor rifle divisions; 'other' includes airborne, air portable, air assault, mountain, amphibious and light infantry divisions. These distinctions are sometimes hard to make, and recategorization is not uncommon. Not all national armies field divisional organizations in peacetime. To simplify the presentation, three brigades (nine battalions of armour, infantry or a mix) are considered to be a divisional equivalent - setting aside provision of support elements, including artillery, field engineers and logistics support units, etc. The first category in the Table shows divisions actually in place in Europe and manned in peacetime. For NATO they include, besides forces of the Continental states adjacent to the NATO fronts, Britain's BAOR, Canadian units, France's Third Corps and the US Army in Europe. For the Soviet Union, this would include the formations in the Kola and those in the Trans-Caucasus in addition to those already in Eastern Europe and the European USSR.

Because of the difficulties of establishing the precise level of combat readiness of the reinforcement formations, the former categories 'divisions manned and available for immediate frontal reinforcement' and 'extra divisions available on mobilizing first-line reserves' have been combined: Category 2 and 3 in the Byelorussian and Carpathian MDSfor the Western theatre, Kiev and Odessa MDS for the South-western theatre, and North Caucassus MD for the Southern theatre. Secondary reinforcement would include the category 3 divisions and those cadre or 'shadow' formations in the above MDS, equivalent to the existing organization. Not included in these figures are territorial defence or Home Guard units. Unlike previous years, we now attempt to calculate the force augmentation provided by major support arms units under Corps/ Army, Army or Army Group/Front control. Details of this support are contained in the 'Deployment' section of the USSR's country entry and in the table of Soviet Army Organization and Equipment which follows this essay. These considerations have again resulted in significant changes in estimates of divisional readiness and deployment categories compared with earlier editions of The Military Balance. These estimates of necessity have had to be arbitrary.

Equipment

Equipment holdings can be broken Lurssen into categories. The complicating factors are that total holdings of equipment do not necessarily match the sum of what appears to be held on divisional establishments. There are significant variations in those establishments (generally stemming from location and role), and there are equipment reserves, the holdings of non-divisional units and stockpiles to add. Not all equipment will be in theatre at the outbreak of hostilities. Soviet formations moving from the Western USSR will be expected to take their full unit inventories. These may be larger (and the equipment more modern) than those of divisions in other areas. Some American reinforcing formations, on the other hand, plan to equip themselves from stockpiles in Europe. For these reasons, the Table includes for each side only the total holdings of equipment known or estimated to be in Europe.

Naval Forces

In the case of NATO we show the numbers of vessels presumed to be in the Eastern Atlantic, Channel, North Sea and Mediterranean. For the Warsaw Pact, we include the Soviet Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, together with nonSoviet Pact vessels in the Baltic and Black Seas. Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean are drawn from the Black Sea Fleet or, in the case of submarines, from the Northern Fleet. As with ground force equipment, there are great disparities within categories, both with respect to capability and age. Classification of naval or maritime aircraft by. type conforms to the nomenclature used in the country entries. The figures include both land- and sea-based aircraft with a clear maritime role in the above sea areas.

Air Force

Assessment of land attack aircraft, fighters and armed helicopters requires assumptions to be made similar to those for ground forces. US aircraft figures are for those based in Europe and do not take account of possible reinforcements from the continental US; the Soviet estimates show aircraft deployed in the territories of the Pact allies, together with a possible reinforcement of air units from the Western MDS. The bomber figures given here are for all medium-range bombers, regardless of whether or not they might be reserved for nuclear delivery. The number of multi-role aircraft on both sides obviously complicates any listing by mission categories. Ground attack aircraft (FGA) often have at least a limited self-defence capability but function primarily in the former role. National terminologies generally separate the standard combatzone air-superiority fighter and the interceptor, usually making the distinction organizationally as well. The Soviet air organization also appears in the 'Deployment' section of the USSR's country entry. There are still a number of ambiguities about roles.

Commonality and Technology

The accompanying Table shows that the Warsaw Pact enjoys numerical advantage in virtually all categories of weapons shown, the notable exceptions being AA guns, most larger naval vessel types and most naval aircraft. What is not shown by these figures is a primary advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact, namely that the weapons in service, and the tactical doctrines for their use, are generally common throughout the Pact; even so, because of differing rates of equipment modernization there is a considerable (even surprising) variety of equipment in service within the Pact. NATO suffers from doctrines by no means identical and from a very wide variety of everything from weapon systems to support vehicles, with consequent duplication of supply systems and some considerable difficulties of interoperability.

The question of technological superiority is impossible to answer without the test of combat. In general, however, Soviet equipment is thought to be rugged, relatively immune to mishandling and fairly reliable. Crew comfort and safety standards are significantly lower than those demanded in the West. While these factors may not be detrimental to efficiency over the short term, under the stress of combat the accident rate could rise and efficiency decline rather severely.

Logistics

NATO's logistic system is based almost entirely on national supply lines, and the difficulties are compounded by lack of standardization between nations and by lack of central co-ordination. In these respects it is markedly inferior to that of the Warsaw Pact. Certain NATO countries, too, still lack sufficient spares and ammunition although determined attempts to remedy this situation ('sustainability') are being made. Some Pact nations may also suffer from shortages, but the fact that their equipment is generally standardized would enable them to restock more quickly. The Soviet logistic system, which uses a mix of rail, road and pipeline, has been greatly improved in recent years.

Air Power

Warsaw Pact doctrine has long envisaged the use of surface-to-surface missiles to deliver highexplosive, nuclear and chemical warheads against targets deep in enemy rear areas. Replacement systems are certainly more accurate and may be more reliable. In addition, the rising Soviet inventory of modern fighter-bombers poses an increasingly significant long-range threat. The Pact's defence against air attack combines a large number of interceptors with an impressive array of surface-to-air missiles and artillery. While advanced electronic countermeasures could probably go some way to nullifying these defences, NATO air forces nevertheless face an increasingly formidable task in maintaining close air support for NATO ground forces on the European battlefield. Since NATO depends on its air forces to counter the apparent numerical superiority in Pact ground force numbers, their ability to penetrate Pact air defences could be a critical factor. Of particular concern is that NATO has yet to adopt a common IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system and could lose aircraft to friendly air defence fire for some years to come. However NATO probably still enjoys a narrowing margin of overall electronic superiority, and may enjoy somewhat greater flexibility in command and control in combat conditions.

The Warsaw Pact continues to enjoy the benefits of standardized aircraft servicing and handling facilities. Although its aircraft generally cannot operate from unimproved runways, there are a very large number of modern airfields available to the Pact with hardened aircraft shelters. NATO, on the other hand, still suffers from too few airfields and too many types of aircraft, although considerable improvements have been made in interoperability, in preparing airfields to receive aircraft from outside the theatre (the co-located operating base (COB) concept) and in providing shelter and protection for aircraft and personnel.

Summary

The numerical balance, although generally in favour of the Warsaw Pact (particularly in equipment) appears to have stabilized over the past year. At the same time, however the West has largely lost the technological edge in conventional equipment which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers. Because of the presence in the equation of so many unknown and unknowable factors, one cannot necessarily conclude that NATO would suffer defeat in war, nor that the Warsaw Pact would see its advantage as being sufficient to risk an attack, but one can conclude that there is still sufficient danger in the trend to require remedies in the Western Alliance, particularly as manpower shortages become a problem by the end of the 1980s. One can also conclude that any significant raising of the nuclear threshold through NATO acquisition of markedly greater conventional capabilities would appear to be out of reach. The ratio of forces, while no worse, is certainly no better than before.

Our conclusion remains that the conventional overall balance is still such as to make general military aggression a highly risky undertaking for either side. Though possession of the initiative in war will always permit an aggressor to achieve a local advantage in numbers sufficient to allow him to believe that he might achieve limited tactical successes in some areas, there would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory. The consequences for an attacker would still be quite unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, incalculable.

Неядерный баланс Восток-Запад в Европе

Оценка обычного баланса между НАТО и Варшавским договором с использованием сравнений живой силы, боевых единиц или техники содержит довольно большой запас неопределенности. Существует ряд характеристик, которые практически невозможно оценить: качество подразделений или техники, географические преимущества, доктрина, военная техника, развертывание, подготовка, материально-техническое обеспечение, боевой дух, руководство, тактическая инициатива, рельеф местности, погода, политическая воля и сплоченность альянса. В любом случае такие сопоставления должны проводиться в более широком политическом и стратегическом контексте, включая ядерный баланс, развертывание сил во всем мире, потенциал укрепления обеих сторон и, что наиболее важно, относительную мощь соответствующих военно-морских сил и тактических сил дальнего радиуса действия и военно-воздушных сил поддержки.

Невозможно предсказать форму и масштабы любых военных действий, их продолжительность, управление ими или их результаты. Недавние локальные конфликты показали, что расходы материальных средств, как правило, намного превышают даже самые высокие предыдущие оценки. Влияние этого фактора на способность вести боевые действия, на материально-техническое обеспечение театра военных действий или на национальную инфраструктуру оценить невозможно. Все эти факторы оказывают влияние на использование сил в Европе, на их усиление и на ресурсы, необходимые для их предоставления.

Прямые сравнения между предметами военной техники также затруднены. Можно сравнить, например, количество танков каждой из сторон, но танки в соответствующих альянсах явно не эквивалентны с точки зрения боеспособности. Некоторые из них старые и немодернизированные, другие современные и совершенные. Первые не могут двигаться быстро, использовать преимущества местности, стрелять с высоким шансом на попадание с первого выстрела, хорошо сопротивляться огню или хорошо общаться друг с другом. Кроме того, хотя танк по-прежнему высоко ценится как, возможно, одно из лучших противотанковых средств, существуют и другие весьма эффективные средства уничтожения танков, такие, как вооруженные вертолеты, современные штурмовики, установленные на транспортных средствах управляемые противотанковые вооружения и мины. Короче говоря, есть много статических и динамических факторов, которые необходимо учитывать, чтобы провести истинное сравнение сил.

Принимая эти соображения, таким образом, вопрос численного равновесия рассматриваются в таблице, сопровождающей это сочинение, используя ряд статических показателей в рубриках живой силы, подразделений (включая выделенные эквиваленты), наземных сил, вооружения, морских частей, морских самолетов, и наземных штурмовиков и истребителей. Итоговые данные приводятся для НАТО в Центральной и Северной Европе (вместе взятых) и Южной Европе, для сил США в Европе или в прилегающих к Европе морских районах и, по категориям, для НАТО в целом. Для сравнения с этими итогами даны эквиваленты для стран Варшавского договора, для сил Советского Союза, противостоящих НАТО, и итоги для каждой категории.

Определение зоны боевых действий

Одна из центральных проблем для анализа заключается в том, следует ли сравнивать силы на очень высоком уровне (т. е. общие итоги Альянсов) или попытаться определить более реалистичные взаимодействия (т. е. фронты). Следует признать, что довольно крупные элементы сил обеих сторон не обязательно с самого начала направляются в конкретные зоны боевых действий. Существует значительная гибкость, особенно советских резервных сил, изменяемых по желанию. Северный и Центральноевропейский секторы показаны здесь как единое целое, но это неизбежно неполное понятие. Норвежские сухопутные войска, например, развернули основной элемент своих активных полевых сил для защиты северных подступов к стране, против которых советские войска в Северном Ленинградском военном округе представляют существенную потенциальную угрозу (и имеют планы усиления Крайнего Севера в условиях войны). Норвежский военно-морской флот должен назначить свои более крупные суда для поддержки Атлантического прибрежного фланга сил в Северной Норвегии, но Советский Балтийский флот представляет угрозу для Южной Норвегии, заставляя флот также охранять этот район. Норвежские ВВС должны быть готовы поддержать оба сектора. Западногерманская провинция Шлезвиг-Гольштейн, хотя и является частью Северного командования НАТО, должна ожидать нападения как со стороны Восточной Германии, так и с моря.

Командующий южным флангом НАТО должен быть готов защищать три широко разделенных фронта, каждый со своими специфическими тактическими и снабженческими потребностями. Италия должна противостоять любой угрозе пакта со стороны Центральной Европы. Греция и Турция должны совместно защищать Фракию и Эгейское море и их воздушное пространство, в то время как Турция также должна защищать свою восточную границу на Кавказе.

Личный состав

Приведено общее количество военных по всем странам. Тем не менее, многие из тех, кто находится в Вооруженных силах сверхдержав, вполне могут быть задействованы за пределами зоны НАТО. Итоговые силы для борьбы и фактически расположенные в Европе, включают, НАТО, французские и канадские войска в Германии, но не включают испанцев. Для СССР, те, что на Кольском полуострове против Норвегии, а те, которые в Закавказском ВО против Турции. В случае возникновения боевых действий или угрозы их возникновения зоны боевых действий могут быть расширены. Это можно было бы сделать либо путем переброски постоянных сил в Европу, либо путем мобилизации резервов, либо для ведения боевых действий, либо для переброски в Европу этих внешних держав. Опять же, не все общие резервы в этих государствах будут доступны для развертывания на европейском театре действий или могут быть в обязательном порядке мобилизованы и своевременно перемещены, с тем чтобы повлиять на исход военных действий.

Мобилизация

Темпы мобилизации стран будут зависеть от принятой системы, процедур и компетентности персонала, расстояний и имеющихся транспортных средств. Темпы мобилизации государств будут зависеть от полученного предупреждения, политической воли, способности принимать решения и претворять их в жизнь, а также от того, насколько действия противника препятствуют мобилизации. Страны Варшавского договора сохранили резервы, основанные на призывниках, прошедших обязательную службу. Те, кто был уволен менее пяти лет назад, вероятно, будут доступны для немедленного использования; по прошествии более пяти лет мужчины должны будут пройти переподготовку.

Советский Союз, в частности, использует организацию военного округа для призыва и расстановки резервистов в каркасные формирования (дивизии "категория 2" и "категория 3") для ведения войны.

Связи между центральным СССР и границами более чем достаточны для быстрого продвижения к потенциальным фронтам, пока они остаются свободными от нападения. Ограничения советских внутренних коммуникаций могут затруднить переход дивизий из одной части СССР в другую.

В Европе многие страны могут мобилизоваться. В случае Великобритании переброска на материковую часть Европы является менее легким и может быть воспрещено. Те страны, которые должны перебросить подкрепления через Атлантику, явно сталкиваются с возможностью серьезного прерывания. Наконец, Соединенные Штаты, Великобритания и Канада не имеют резерва подготовленных кадров, сопоставимого с резервом, имеющимся в распоряжении других стран, имеющих всеобщий призыв.

Формирования

Нормальным мерилом сравнения сил является дивизия, определяемая как наименьшая сила, способная к самостоятельным боевым действиям, - как правило, все вооруженные силы с собственной материально-технической поддержкой. Во всех случаях термин "Tank" включает танковые и бронетанковые дивизии; "Mech" включает механизированные, мотострелковые и мотострелковые дивизии; "Other" включает воздушно-десантные, воздушно-десантные, штурмовые, горные, десантные и легкие пехотные дивизии. Не все национальные армии действуют полевыми дивизионными организациями в мирное время. Для упрощения представления три бригады (девять батальонов бронетанковый, пехотный или смешанный) рассматриваются в качестве дивизионного эквивалента , за исключением вспомогательных подразделений, включая артиллерию, полевых инженеров и подразделения материально-технического обеспечения и т.д. Первая категория в таблице показывает существующие в Европе и укомплектованные в мирное время подразделения. Для НАТО они включают, помимо сил континентальных государств, прилегающих к фронтам НАТО, британская BAOR, канадские войска, третий корпус Франции и армию США в Европе. Для Советского Союза включены формирования на Кольском полуострове и около половины в Закавказье, в дополнение к тем, которые уже находятся в Восточной Европе.

Дивизии, предназначенные для усиления до мобилизации, перечислены отдельно. Так же как и те потенциальные дивизии, которые должны быть мобилизованы из резервов и направлены в Европу в качестве последующих сил. В случае Советского Союза к формациям для первоначального усиления относятся дивизии Западного и Южного театров Советского Союза, две дивизии 1-й категории в Белоруссии и дивизии 2-й категории в Ленинградском, Прибалтийском, Белорусском, Закарпатском и Северо-Кавказском округах. Вторичные подкрепление будет включать дивизий 3 категории и эти кадровые или "теневые" формирования военных округов - эквивалент существующей организации плюс формирования в глубинных округах, Киевском и Одесском, и, скорее всего, кадровые 'теневые' формирования. В эти цифры не включены подразделения территориальной обороны/ополчения, и не было предпринято попыток рассчитать увеличение сил, обеспечиваемое подразделениями вспомогательного оружия звеньев корпуса/армия, армии или группы армий/фронта. В предыдущие годы произошли некоторые существенные изменения в категориях готовности и развертывания дивизий, что отчасти объясняется реорганизацией и отчасти различными предположениями о состоянии готовности. Эти предположения, по необходимости произвольные.

Вооружение

Запасы вооружения можно разбить на категории. Усложняющие факторы, что общий фонд вооружения не обязательно соответствует сумме в дивизионных учреждениях (есть вооружение резервов, не дивизионных частей и складов, которые добавлены), и не все оборудование будет на театре после начала военных действий. Ожидается, что советские формирования, двигающиеся из западной части СССР, возьмут свои полные запасы. Некоторые американские формирования, с другой стороны, планируют вооружиться из запасов в Европе. По этим причинам в таблицу для каждой стороны включены только общие запасы и запасы укрепляющих формирований Варшавского договора.

Морские силы

В случае НАТО мы показываем количество кораблей, предположительно находящихся в Восточной Атлантике, Ла-манше, Северном море и Средиземном море. Для Варшавского договора, мы включаем советские Северный, Балтийский и Черноморский флоты, вместе с несоветскими судами договора в Балтийском и Черном морях. Советские военно-морские силы в Средиземном море привлекаются из Черноморского флота или, в случае подводных лодок, из Северного флота. Как и в случае с наземным вооружением, существуют большие различия между категориями как в плане возможностей, так и в плане возраста. Классификация по типу военно-морского судна или морского самолета соответствует номенклатуре, используемой в записях страны. Эти цифры включают как наземные, так и палубные самолеты с четкой морской ролью в морских районах.

Воздушные силы

Оценка наземных ударных самолетов, истребителей и вооруженных вертолетов требует предположений, аналогичных тем, которые делаются для наземных сил. Цифры для американских самолетов представляют собой базирующиеся в Европе и не учитывают возможные подкрепления из континентальной части США; советские оценки показывают самолеты, развернутые на территориях союзников по пакту, вместе с возможным усилением авиационных подразделений из западных округов. Число бомбардировщиков приведенный здесь для всех средних бомбардировщиков, независимо от того, могут ли они быть зарезервированы для доставки ядерного оружия. Количество многоцелевых самолетов с обеих сторон, включение в перечень любых миссий. Штурмовики часто обладают по меньшей мере ограниченным потенциалом самообороны, но функционируют главным образом в прежнем качестве. Национальные терминологии различают истребитель превосходства в воздухе и перехватчик, но как правило, различия в организационном плане.

Общность и технология

Прилагаемая таблица показывает, что Варшавский договор обладает численным преимуществом практически во всех категориях оружия, за исключением большинства типов морских судов и морских самолетов. Однако эти цифры не свидетельствуют о том, что Варшавский договор обладает главным преимуществом , а именно о том, что оружие, находящееся на вооружении, и тактические доктрины его применения являются общими для всего пакта. НАТО страдает от доктрин, отнюдь не идентичных в разных странах, и от широкого спектра всего, от систем вооружения до вспомогательных транспортных средств, с последующим дублированием систем снабжения и некоторыми значительными трудностями оперативной совместимости. На вопрос о технологическом превосходстве невозможно ответить без испытания боем.

В целом, однако, советское оборудование считается прочным, относительно невосприимчивым к неправильному обращению и достаточно надежным. Уровень комфорта и безопасности экипажа значительно ниже, чем на Западе. Хотя в краткосрочной перспективе эти факторы могут и не сказываться на эффективности, в условиях боевых действий аварийность может возрасти, а эффективность значительно снизиться.

Логистика

Материально-техническая система НАТО почти полностью основана на национальных линиях снабжения, и трудности усугубляются отсутствием стандартизации между странами и Центральной координации. В этом отношении они заметно уступают Варшавскому договору. Некоторые страны НАТО также по-прежнему испытывают нехватку запасных частей и боеприпасов, хотя в последнее время предпринимаются попытки исправить эту ситуацию. Некоторые страны ОВД также могут испытывать нехватку, но тот факт, что их оборудование стандартизировано, позволит им быстрее пополнять запасы. Советская логистическая система, в которой используется сочетание железнодорожного, автомобильного и трубопроводного транспорта, в последние годы значительно улучшилась.

Авиация

Доктрина Варшавского договора уже давно предусматривает использование ракет класса "земля-земля" для доставки обычных, ядерных и химических боеголовок к целям, расположенных глубоко в тылу противника. Кроме того, растущая советская номенклатура современных истребителей-бомбардировщиков представляет собой все более серьезную угрозу дальнего радиуса действия. Защита ОВД от воздушного нападения сочетает в себе большое число перехватчиков с впечатляющим набором ракет класса "земля-воздух" и артиллерии. Хотя новейшие электронные контрмеры, вероятно, могли бы каким-то образом свести на нет эту оборону, военно-воздушные силы НАТО, тем не менее, сталкиваются со все более сложной задачей поддержания тесной воздушной поддержки наземных сил НАТО на европейском поле боя. Поскольку НАТО зависит от своих военно-воздушных сил в борьбе с очевидным численным превосходством в численности сухопутных сил ОВД, их способность проникать через ПВО пакта может быть критическим фактором. Особую озабоченность вызывает то, что НАТО еще не приняла общую систему идентификации свой-чужой и может терять самолеты от дружественного огня ПВО.

Тем не менее, они, вероятно, все еще пользуются сужающимся пределом общего электронного превосходства и могут обладать несколько большей гибкостью в командовании и управлении в боевых условиях.

Варшавский договор по-прежнему пользуется преимуществами стандартизированного обслуживания самолетов. Хотя его самолеты, как правило, не могут работать с неосвоенных взлетно-посадочных полос, существует очень большое количество современных аэродромов с защищенными укрытиями. С другой стороны, НАТО по-прежнему страдает от слишком малого числа аэродромов и слишком большого числа типов самолетов, хотя в плане оперативной совместимости и укрепления аэродромов были достигнуты значительные улучшения, были достигнуты значительные улучшения в плане оперативной совместимости, подготовки аэродромов к приему самолетов за пределами театра действий (концепция совместной оперативной базы (ССБ)) и укрепления ее аэродромов.

Резюме

Численный баланс - особенно в области вооружения - продолжает постепенно смещаться в пользу Востока. В то же время Запад в значительной степени утратил технологическое превосходство в обычном вооружении, что раньше позволяло НАТО верить, что качество может заменить количество. Из-за наличия в уравнении такого множества неизвестных и непознаваемых факторов, не обязательно заключать, ни что НАТО будет терпеть поражение в войне, ни в том, что Варшавский договор бы посчитает свое преимущество достаточным, чтобы рискнуть напасть, но можно сделать вывод, что есть еще достаточно серьезная угроза в тренде требовать средства защиты в западном альянсе, в частности, дефицит личного становится проблемой в конце 1980-х годов.

Наш вывод такой, что обычный общий баланс по-прежнему, что делает общую военную агрессию весьма рискованным мероприятием. Хотя тактические передислокации, безусловно, могут обеспечить локальное преимущество в количестве, достаточном для того, чтобы позволить нападающему полагать, что он может достичь ограниченных тактических успехов в некоторых районах, по-прежнему будет недостаточно общих сил с обеих сторон, чтобы гарантировать победу. Последствия для нападающего по-прежнему были бы несколько непредсказуемыми, а риски - особенно ядерной эскалации - неисчислимы.

Airliners: Potential for Airlift Augmentation

This table lists civil aircraft types held by NATO countries (including France) and Warsaw Pact countries, which could be used to augment those countries' military airlift capability. The criteria used are: for cargo aircraft, a maximum payload of 15 tonnes or more; for passenger aircraft, a maximum payload of some 10 tonnes or more, including accommodation for at least 84 passengers (equivalent to 50 troops with personal equipment and platoon weapons). For US aircraft, we have also used a minimum range criterion of 4,500 km (necessary for non-stop trans-oceanic flights).

Авиалайнеры: потенциал для увеличения воздушных перевозок

В этой таблице перечислены типы гражданских самолетов, находящихся в распоряжении стран НАТО (включая Францию) и стран Варшавского договора, которые могут быть использованы для увеличения военного потенциала этих стран в области воздушных перевозок. Критериев используются: для грузовых воздушных судов, максимальной грузоподъемностью 15 тонн или более; для пассажирских самолетов, максимальную полезную нагрузку в 10 тонн или более, включая размещение не менее 84 пассажиров (эквивалентно 50 военнослужащих средствами индивидуальной и взвод оружия). Для американских самолетов мы также использовали критерий минимальной дальности полета 4500 км (необходимый для беспосадочных трансокеанских полетов).

Economic Trends and Defence Expenditure

After the serious world-wide recession in 1982, when real GNP growth declined to the lowest point in a decade, 1983 and 1984 showed substantial improvement. In 1982 the industrial countries showed a GDP decline of -0.2%, and the developing world a low 1.6% growth, but the industrial world achieved 4.9% growth and the developing countries 3.7% in 1984. Of the developing world, Asia led with 6.4%, while the others (Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa) registered growth rates between 2.2% and 2.5%. Most of the OAPEC states - as well as some other developing world oil producers - continued to lose revenues as oil exports decreased, oil prices fell, and the US dollar rose to an unprecedented level.

Despite a moderate recovery, serious problems remained unresolved: high unemployment in most western industrial states and in many developing countries; increasingly higher fiscal deficits, especially in the oil producing states;
Inflationary pressures and hyper-inflation in Latin America and Israel. The debt burden continues to be a financial and also a political nightmare, not only for many third-world countries but also for some industrial states (e.g., Belgium and Israel).

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have been able to reduce their combined gross convertible currency debt, currently estimated at $80 billion, from its 1982 level of $92 billion. Poland, although able to reduce her debt structure somewhat, will continue to face problems for some time. Hungary is beginning to experience debt problems. NMP growth continued to increase, however, although not necessarily meeting the growth target. In 1984 Romania led with NMP growth of 7.7%, while the Soviet Union, Hungary and Czechoslovakia trailed with some 3%; East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria showed increases of 5.5%, 5.0% and 4.6%.

Defence Spending and the Arms Trade

The heavy debt burden and deficit financing in most African and Latin American countries is reflected in a decrease in arms purchases and new orders during 1983 and 1984. In some countries, however, expenditure has gone up as a result of either regional security problems - Central America, the Iran-Iraq conflict (and thus the adjacent Gulf states) - or the increase in tension in East-West relations. In some cases a reduction in defence outlays simply reflects inability to pay the high cost of new technology, and the states affected are either deferring replacement purchases or seeking alternative sources of supply.

While a reduction of defence outlays does not imply a contraction of the respective military establishments, it does mean a shift in priorities. Until the mid-1970s the principal suppliers were industrial states - western or eastern. Since then arms producers of intermediate technology have appeared - Brazil, Pakistan, Israel and Egypt among others - who offer high-quality items at lower financial cost and with fewer political strings than either Western or Eastern bloc suppliers. Another principal reason is that many countries (e.g., Iraq and Brazil) are now engaging in countertrade and barter agreements which do not appear in the defence budget accounts. If recent reports are to be believed, even Saudi Arabia and Britain have entered similar arrangements.

The decrease in arms purchases is also due to the fact that in almost all areas of the world arms imports accelerated after 1978 and reached their peak in 1981/2; with the completion of these purchase programmes, import requirements have fallen substantially. The major exceptions to this pattern include the Gulf states (which, despite falling revenues, have had to continue to build up their defence capabilities - especially in the sector of C3I), Singapore and Malaysia (which are rapidly expanding their air and naval forces) and Argentina (which had to replace her losses after the Falklands conflict). According to some estimates, the Gulf states have continued to import defence equipment worth in the region of $22-25 billion in 1984 (compared with figures for Africa of about $5 billion, for Latin America of about $3.0 billion, for the Far East of about $3.5 billion, and for South Asia of some $1.5 billion). Another priority shift has been towards the area of internal security, as reflected by substantial increases in spending on that sector in numerous countries.

The United States and NATO

After a decline in real defence spending in the post-Vietnam period, both the Carter Administration and subsequently (and especially) the Reagan Administration embarked on defence spending increases amounting to an average of about 9% per annum since 1980 (for FY 1985 an increase of 13% in real terms was planned, but Congress reduced it to 5% growth for FY 1986). Congress has shown that it is unwilling to support the Administration unreservedly, and a levelling off of the rate of increase can be anticipated. However, the money committed forward for long-lead items (Total Obligational Authority, or TOA - see p. 4) is considerable, and it seems fairly certain that the US budget will not decline in real terms. European economic and social problems and rising public resistance to defence expenditure increases - in view of cutbacks elsewhere (especially in the Social Security sector) - will make it difficult for governments, whatever their political complexion, to persuade their legislatures to vote more funds (Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal are particular examples of this problem). Even West Germany will not be able to meet the 3% annual increase in real terms which was agreed by NATO Ministers in 1978. She is committed only to a nominal 3.8% per annum increase over the next few years, and, if Inflation approaches that figure, real growth will be close to zero. The British government is committed to a 3% annual real increase 'in addition to the Falkland costs' on average until 1986, but thereafter little or no real growth is foreseen. France has launched a five-year defence plan which totals fr 830,000 million, but this will represent less than 2.1% real annual growth, and in any case almost a third of the funding is allocated to the nuclear programme. The rest of NATO Europe has fallen short of the increase agreed in 1978, and will certainly fall short of the 1983-8 NATO force goals agreed in 1982.

However, some countries, and some individual military services, are- expected to achieve substantial real increases. The Italian and Spanish Navies, for example, are expanding rapidly. All the Turkish Armed Forces are expected to be modernized quite rapidly, by virtue of substantial military aid from the US and West Germany. In almost all NATO member states C3I is given a high priority. Also, the NATO infrastructure fund has been increased from $4.72 billion (1980-84) to $7.85 billion (1985-90), again with a heavy emphasis on development of C3I.

The continuing debate between the US and NATO Europe over 'burden-sharing' (especially in the context of the Air Land Battle concept and SDI) is further complicated not only by the present economic situation (and the different economic problems within the Alliance) but also by different defence strategy perceptions, as well as national political and economic priorities. But in terms of defence expenditure allocation (burden-sharing) within the Alliance, the picture is not as one-sided as elements within US Administration often argue. In 1982, NATO Europe spent some $94.9 billion. By its own definition the United States allocated approximately $108 billion, out of a total expenditure of $196.4 billion, to the defence of Europe. This relatively small differential has of course increased during the last three years, and the unusual strength of the dollar during 1984 and 1985 further affected this trend.

Warsaw Pact

While it is difficult to calculate the real cost of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact defence expenditure, the availability of Romanian, Hungarian and Polish consumer price indices makes it possible broadly to estimate real defence expenditure trends. On the basis of this data it appears that between 1975 and 1982 Warsaw Pact defence expenditure increased by an average of 3.6% per annum in 1975 prices. Poland appears to have undertaken a major increase in military outlays over the two years from 1982 to 1984 (some 36%, based on 1979 prices), while East Germany has sustained an average increase of 6-7% per annum (1975 prices). Romania, her defence budget frozen at the 1982 level, showed a decrease of about 1.1%, in 1983, and only a marginal increase in 1984.

The Middle East

The continuing Gulf War (the cost of which can only be estimated), the continuing conflict in north-west Africa and the crisis between Libya and neighbouring countries, have forced most states in this region to continue to import arms in substantial quantities, despite falling oil revenues.

The Middle Eastern and North African countries spent about $82.0 billion on the military sector in 1984, an increase of approximately of $10 billion over 1983. Of this, 35% was spent by the Gulf Co-operation Council (a drop of 4% over 1983); 18% by Egypt, Israel, Syria and the Lebanon; and 42% by Iran and Iraq.

The present political situation in the Gulf states has caused them to raise their internal security budgets considerably. The construction of a sophisticated air defence system and the development of a massive C3I system at an estimated cost of $15-16 billion, and the development of similar systems in other Gulf states, have forced them to maintain high defence outlays. The GCC countries also give Iraq financial support, hitherto estimated at $35-40 billion, but possibly as high as $45 billion, since 1980. During 1984, however", this support seems to have tapered off. It is only this aid, plus large credits from France (estimated at $6-8 billion), the USSR (no estimate possible) and Brazil (which supplies arms via substantial countertrade and barter agreements) that enables Iraq to continue the war.

The Palestinian conflict consumed at least $13 billion in 1983, but this appears to have been reduced during 1984. Israel's inflation (approaching 1,000% in mid-1985) makes it impossible to calculate real defence costs, nor is it possible to estimate the real value of Soviet military aid to Syria. US military assistance to Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon totalled over $3.2 billion (48% of total US military aid).

Sub-Saharan Africa

There appears to have been no real increase in defence outlays in the continent since 1981, although reliable information for many countries is difficult to obtain. Available evidence suggests that the defence expenditures for the continent totalled about $7.5 billion, compared with $8.9 billion in 1983.

In most smaller countries the largest shares of the total security budgets (possibly as high as 40%) are allocated to internal security, paramilitary and border security forces. Moreover, in some countries the internal security budgets appear to be actually higher than those for the military sector. The greatest military expenditures are those of Nigeria and South Africa (although in the former case the most reliable statistics are available only up to 1981), and in 1984 these two accounted for about 40% of all Sub-Saharan defence expenditure. Nigeria's defence budget increased considerably in 1982, mostly due to the purchase of 18 Jaguar aircraft and the substantial and continuing expansion of the military infrastructure. South Africa increased her defence budget by 7% for 1984 (and 8.1% for 1985) but much of the cost for internal security and other security-related activities (as well as for research and development) is hidden in other departmental budgets. Ethiopia's defence outlays appear to be the third highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, but much, if not all, of her equipment costs are regarded as being subsidized by the Soviet Union. Real defence outlays are therefore considerably smaller. For Mozambique and Angola, only estimates are available.

Asia

The Asian countries' defence outlays continued to grow. During 1983 defence expenditure growth averaged 7.1% for the region, while in 1984 it reached 8%, raising outlays from $43.9 billion in 1983 to $46.8 billion in nominal terms. (The expenditures of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, for which no data is available, are excluded here.) In real terms (i.e. 1980 prices) only the Philippines and Malaysia reduced their outlays, the former by a drastic 35%. Regional security problems in South Asia, on the ThaiKampuchean and Chinese-Vietnamese borders continue. Pakistan is to receive $1.6 billion in military aid over the next few years; US military aid to Thailand has doubled during the past three years and is scheduled to increase further; India has placed large military orders with the USSR and elsewhere; and Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore continue to modernize their naval and air forces.

Japan continues to be under US pressure to increase her defence outlay above 1% of GNP (it is at present 0.999%). During the summer of 1985 several cabinet ministers appear to have agreed to remove the 1% ceiling, and the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) was offered a 7% increase (in contrast to a general budget increase of 1.47%). The JDA is preparing a new five-year defence plan; emphasis will be on the defence of the strategic sea ' lanes and air space.

Latin America

Calculating military expenditures for many Latin American countries is particularly difficult. Not only does hyper-inflation in some cases make it virtually impossible to determine the figures in local currency, but frequent devaluations also make dollar comparisons almost meaningless.

Calculated in 1980 prices, Latin American defence spending reached its peak during 1982/3, registering an increase of 60% since 1980. Since then, regional defence outlays appear to have dropped by about 15%. Individual states, however, and particularly Central American states, have continued to increase their expenditures. Argentina has had to replace her losses caused by the Falkland crises at an estimated cost of over $2 billion (the new government has, however, drastically reduced defence expenditure, from a high of 30-40% of the total budget in 1982 to 13%). Brazil has expanded her military manpower by 10%; however, she is to a great extent self-sufficient for her equipment requirements. Peru, one of the poorest Latin American states, has ordered 26 Mirage 2000 at an estimated cost of some $800-900 million, despite severe economic problems.

Central American states have increased their defence outlays substantially, and probably even more than present information indicates. Moreover, US military assistance to Central America has doubled between 1983 and 1984, from about $150 million to $310 million (excluding assistance to the guerilla forces known as 'Contras' operating against Nicaragua)

Экономические тенденции и расходы на оборону

После серьезного мирового спада в 1982 году, когда реальный рост ВНП снизился до самого низкого уровня за десятилетие, 1983 и 1984 годы показали существенное улучшение. В 1982 году в промышленно развитых странах показатель ВВП упал на -0.2%, а в развивающихся странах с низким ростом на 1,6%, а в промышленности достигнут рост на 4,9% и развивающихся стран 3.7% в 1984 году. Из развивающихся стран Азия лидировала с 6,4%, в то время как другие (Латинская Америка, Ближний Восток и Африка) зарегистрировали темпы роста от 2,2% до 2,5%. Большинство государств-членов ОАПЕК , а также некоторые другие развивающиеся мировые производители нефти продолжали терять доходы, поскольку экспорт нефти сократился, цены на нефть упали, а доллар США вырос до беспрецедентного уровня.

Несмотря на умеренный подъем, серьезные проблемы остаются нерешенными: высокий уровень безработицы в большинстве западных промышленных государств и во многих развивающихся странах; все более высокий бюджетный дефицит, особенно в нефтедобывающих государствах;

Инфляционное давление и гиперинфляция в Латинской Америке и Израиле. Долговое бремя по-прежнему является финансовым и политическим кошмаром не только для многих стран третьего мира, но и для некоторых промышленно развитых государств (например, Бельгии и Израиля).

Восточная Европа и Советский Союз смогли сократить свой совокупный валовой конвертируемый валютный долг, который в настоящее время оценивается в 80 млрд. долл. США, с уровня 1982 года в 92 млрд. долл. Польша, хотя и в состоянии несколько сократить свою долговую структуру, еще некоторое время будет сталкиваться с проблемами. Венгрия начинает испытывать проблемы с задолженностью. Тем не менее, рост NMP продолжал расти, хотя и не обязательно соответствовал целевому показателю роста. В 1984 году Румыния лидировала с ростом NMP на 7,7%, в то время как Советский Союз, Венгрия и Чехословакия уступали примерно 3%; Восточная Германия, Польша и Болгария показали рост на 5,5%, 5,0% и 4,6%.

Оборонные расходы и торговля оружием

Тяжелое долговое бремя и дефицит финансирования в большинстве африканских и латиноамериканских стран находят свое отражение в сокращении закупок оружия и новых заказов в 1983 и 1984 годах. Однако в некоторых странах расходы возросли в результате либо региональных проблем безопасности - Центральной Америки, ирано-иракского конфликта (и, следовательно, соседних государств Персидского залива), либо роста напряженности в отношениях между Востоком и Западом. В некоторых случаях сокращение расходов на оборону просто отражает неспособность оплатить высокую стоимость новой технологии, и затронутые государства либо откладывают закупки на замену, либо ищут альтернативные источники поставок.

Хотя сокращение расходов на оборону не означает сокращения соответствующих военных учреждений, оно означает изменение приоритетов. До середины 1970-х годов основными поставщиками были промышленные государства - западные или восточные. С тех пор появились производители оружия промежуточной технологии - в частности, Бразилия, Пакистан, Израиль и Египет, - которые предлагают высококачественные товары по более низкой финансовой стоимости и с меньшими политическими условиями, чем поставщики западного или Восточного блока. Еще одна основная причина заключается в том, что многие страны (например, Ирак и Бразилия) в настоящее время заключают соглашения о встречной торговле и бартере, которые не фигурируют в счетах оборонного бюджета. Если верить последним сообщениям, даже Саудовская Аравия и Великобритания заключили аналогичные соглашения.

Сокращение закупок оружия объясняется также тем, что почти во всех районах мира импорт оружия ускорился после 1978 года и достиг своего пика в 1981/2 годах; по завершении этих программ закупок потребности в импорте существенно сократились. Основные исключения из этой схемы включают государства Персидского залива (которые, несмотря на снижение доходов, вынуждены были продолжать наращивать свой оборонный потенциал - особенно в секторе C3I), Сингапур и Малайзия (которые быстро расширяют свои военно-воздушные и военно-морские силы) и Аргентина (которой пришлось возместить свои потери после Фолклендского конфликта). По некоторым оценкам, страны Персидского Залива продолжают экспорт военной техники на сумму в $22-25 млрд. В 1984 году (по сравнению с показателями за Африку около $5 млрд, в Латинской Америке около $3,0 млрд, Дальнего Востока около $3,5 млрд, а Южной Азии около $1,5 млрд). Еще один приоритет-переход к области внутренней безопасности, о чем свидетельствует существенное увеличение расходов на этот сектор во многих странах.

Соединенные Штаты и НАТО

После снижения реальных расходов на оборону в пост-вьетнамский период, при администрации Картера и впоследствии (и особенно) администрация Рейгана, оборонные расходы увеличиваются на сумму в среднем около 9% годовых, начиная с 1980 года (по итогам 1985 увеличившись на 13% в реальном выражении было запланировано, но Конгресс их снизил до 5% роста по итогам 1986). Конгресс показал, что он не желает безоговорочно поддерживать администрацию, и можно ожидать выравнивания темпов роста. Однако деньги, выделенные вперед по долгосрочным статьям (общий объем обязательств, или TOA - см. 4) является значительным, и кажется довольно уверенным, что бюджет США не сократится в реальном выражении. Европейские экономические и социальные проблемы и растущее сопротивление общественности увеличению расходов на оборону - ввиду сокращения расходов в других странах (особенно в секторе социального обеспечения) - затруднят правительствам, независимо от их политической комплекции, убедить свои законодательные органы голосовать за больший объем средств (Бельгия, Нидерланды, Дания и Португалия являются конкретными примерами этой проблемы). Даже Западная Германия не сможет удовлетворить 3%-ное ежегодное увеличение в реальном выражении, которое было согласовано министрами НАТО в 1978 году. Она привержена лишь номинальному увеличению на 3,8% в год в течение следующих нескольких лет, и, если инфляция приблизится к этому показателю, реальный рост будет близок к нулю. Британское правительство намерено ежегодно на 3% увеличивать реальные расходы "в дополнение к Фолклендским расходам" в среднем до 1986 года, но после этого практически никакого реального роста не предвидится. Франция приступила к осуществлению пятилетнего плана обороны на общую сумму 830 000 млн. франков, однако реальный ежегодный прирост составит менее 2,1%, и в любом случае почти треть средств выделяется на ядерную программу. Остальные страны НАТО в Европе пока не оправдывают повышение договоренное в 1978 году, и, безусловно, не достигнут в 1983-8 цели усиления НАТО как договорились в 1982 году.

Однако ожидается, что некоторые страны и отдельные военные службы достигнут существенного реального роста. Итальянские и испанские военно-морские силы, например, быстро расширяются. Ожидается, что все турецкие вооруженные силы будут достаточно быстро модернизированы благодаря существенной военной помощи со стороны США и Западной Германии. Почти во всех государствах членах НАТО C3I является приоритетным. Кроме того, Фонд инфраструктуры НАТО был увеличен с 4,72 млрд. долл. США (1980-84 годы) до 7,85 млрд. долл. США (1985-90 годы), опять же с большим упором на развитие C3I.

Продолжающиеся дебаты между США и НАТО в Европе по поводу "распределения бремени" (особенно в контексте концепции воздушно-наземной операции и СОИ) еще больше осложняются не только нынешней экономической ситуацией (и различными экономическими проблемами в Североатлантическом союзе), но и различными представлениями о стратегии обороны, а также национальными политическими и экономическими приоритетами. Но с точки зрения распределения оборонных расходов (распределения бремени) внутри Североатлантического союза картина не такая односторонняя, как часто утверждают элементы американской администрации. В 1982 году Европа потратила 94,9 миллиарда долларов. По собственному определению Соединенных Штатов выделено около 108 миллиардов долларов, из общей суммы расходов 196.4 млрд. долл., в защиту Европы. Эта относительно небольшая разница, конечно, увеличилась в течение последних трех лет, и необычная сила доллара в 1984 и 1985 годах еще больше повлияла на эту тенденцию.

Варшавский договор

Хотя трудно рассчитать реальную стоимость расходов на оборону в рамках несоветского Варшавского договора, наличие румынских, венгерских и польских индексов потребительских цен позволяет в целом оценить реальные тенденции в области оборонных расходов. На основе этих данных представляется, что в период с 1975 по 1982 год оборонные расходы Варшавского договора увеличивались в среднем на 3,6% в год в ценах 1975 года. Польша, как представляется, в течение двух лет с 1982 по 1984 год существенно увеличила военные расходы (примерно на 36% в ценах 1979 года), в то время как Восточная Германия в среднем увеличивала их на 6-7% в год (цены 1975 года). Румыния, ее оборонный бюджет, замороженный на уровне 1982 года, показал снижение примерно на 1,1% в 1983 году и лишь незначительное увеличение в 1984 году.

Ближний Восток

Продолжающаяся война в Персидском заливе (стоимость которой можно только оценить), продолжающийся конфликт в Северо-Западной Африке и кризис между Ливией и соседними странами вынудили большинство государств этого региона продолжать импортировать оружие в значительных количествах, несмотря на падение доходов от нефти.

В 1984 году страны Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки израсходовали на военный сектор около 82,0 млрд. долл. США, т.е. увеличились на 10 млрд. долл. Из них 35% было израсходовано Советом сотрудничества стран Залива (снижение на 4% по сравнению с 1983 годом); 18% - Египтом, Израилем, Сирией и Ливаном; и 42% - Ираном и Ираком.

Нынешняя политическая ситуация в государствах Персидского залива привела к значительному увеличению их бюджетов в области внутренней безопасности. Строительство сложной системы противовоздушной обороны и разработка массивной системы C3I, сметная стоимость которой составляет 15-16 млрд. долл. США, а также разработка аналогичных систем в других государствах залива вынудили их сохранять высокие расходы на оборону. Страны ССЗ также оказывают Ираку финансовую поддержку, которая до сих пор оценивалась в 35-40 млрд. долл. США, но, возможно, достигает 45 млрд. долл. США, начиная с 1980 года. Однако в 1984 году эта поддержка, похоже, уменьшилась. Только эта помощь, а также крупные кредиты Франции (оцениваемые в 6-8 миллиардов долларов), СССР (оценка невозможна) и Бразилии (которая поставляет оружие через значительные контртрейдерские и бартерные соглашения) позволяют Ираку продолжать войну.

Палестинский конфликт, потреблял в 1983 году не менее 13 миллиардов долларов, но это, кажется, было сокращено в 1984 году. Инфляция в Израиле (приближающаяся к 1000% в середине 1985 года) делает невозможным подсчет реальных расходов на оборону, равно как и оценку реальной стоимости советской военной помощи Сирии. Военная помощь США Египту, Израилю, Иордании и Ливану составила более $3,2 млрд (48% от общего объема военной помощи США).

Страны Африки к югу от Сахары

Как представляется, с 1981 года на континенте не произошло реального увеличения расходов на оборону, хотя достоверную информацию для многих стран получить трудно. Имеющиеся данные свидетельствуют о том, что расходы на оборону континента составили около 7,5 млрд. долл. США по сравнению с 8,9 млрд. долл. США в 1983 году.

В большинстве малых стран наибольшая доля от общего объема бюджетов в области безопасности (возможно, до 40%) приходится на внутреннюю безопасность, полувоенные формирования и пограничные силы безопасности. Кроме того, в некоторых странах бюджеты внутренней безопасности, как представляется, фактически выше, чем бюджеты военного сектора. Наибольшие военные расходы приходятся на Нигерию и Южную Африку (хотя в первом случае наиболее достоверные статистические данные имеются только до 1981 года), а в 1984 году на эти две страны приходилось около 40% всех оборонных расходов к югу от Сахары. Оборонный бюджет Нигерии значительно увеличился в 1982 году, в основном за счет приобретения 18 самолетов Jaguar и существенного и продолжающегося расширения военной инфраструктуры. Южная Африка увеличила свой оборонный бюджет на 7% в 1984 году (и на 8,1% в 1985 году), но большая часть расходов на внутреннюю безопасность и другие связанные с безопасностью мероприятия (а также на научные исследования и разработки) скрыта в бюджетах других департаментов. Расходы на оборону Эфиопии являются третьими по величине в Африке к югу от Сахары, но многое, если не все, в ее стоимости оборудования считаются дотационными от СССР. Поэтому реальные расходы на оборону значительно меньше. По Мозамбику и Анголе имеются лишь оценочные данные.

Азия

Оборонные расходы азиатских стран продолжали расти. В 1983 году рост расходов на оборону составил в среднем 7,1% для региона, в то время как в 1984 году он достиг 8%, увеличив расходы с $ 43,9 млрд в 1983 году до $46,8 млрд в номинальном выражении. (Расходы Вьетнама, Кампучии и Лаоса, по которым отсутствуют какие-либо данные, здесь исключены.) В реальном выражении (т.е. в ценах 1980 года) только Филиппины и Малайзия сократили свои расходы, причем первые резко сократились на 35%. Продолжаются проблемы региональной безопасности в Южной Азии, на границах Тай-кампучийской и Китайско-вьетнамской. В ближайшие несколько лет Пакистан получит военную помощь в размере 1,6 млрд. долл. США; за последние три года военная помощь США Таиланду удвоилась и должна увеличиться; Индия разместила крупные военные заказы в СССР и других странах; а Индонезия, Малайзия и Сингапур продолжают модернизировать свои военно-морские и воздушные силы.

Япония продолжает находиться под давлением США, чтобы увеличить свои расходы на оборону выше 1% ВНП (в настоящее время 0,999%). В течение лета 1985 года несколько министров кабинета, по-видимому, согласились снять 1%-ный потолок, и японскому оборонному агентству (JDA) было предложено увеличение на 7% (в отличие от общего увеличения бюджета на 1,47%). JDA готовит новый пятилетний план обороны; акцент будет сделан на обороне стратегических морских путей и воздушного пространства.

Латинская Америка

Особенно трудно подсчитать военные расходы для многих латиноамериканских стран. Гиперинфляция в некоторых случаях не только делает практически невозможным определение показателей в местной валюте, но и частые девальвации также делают долларовое сравнение почти бессмысленным.

Рассчитанные в ценах 1980 года, латиноамериканские расходы на оборону достигли своего пика в 1982/3, увеличившись на 60% с 1980 года. С тех пор расходы на региональную оборону сократились примерно на 15%. Однако отдельные государства, и особенно Центральноамериканские государства, продолжали увеличивать свои расходы. Аргентине пришлось возместить свои потери, вызванные Фолклендским кризисом, по оценкам, в размере более 2 млрд. долл. США (однако новое правительство резко сократило расходы на оборону с 30-40% от общего бюджета в 1982 году до 13%). Бразилия увеличила численность своего военного персонала на 10%; однако она в значительной степени самодостаточна для удовлетворения своих потребностей в вооружении. Перу, одно из беднейших латиноамериканских государств, заказало 26 Mirage-2000" на сумму примерно 800-900 млн. долл. США, несмотря на серьезные экономические проблемы.

Центральноамериканские государства существенно увеличили свои расходы на оборону и, возможно, даже больше, чем свидетельствует нынешняя информация. Кроме того, военная помощь США Центральной Америке удвоилась в период 1983-1984 годов с примерно 150 млн. до 310 млн. долл. США (без учета помощи партизанским силам, известным как "контрас", действующим против Никарагуа)

Комментарии: 44, последний от 11/10/2021.
Размещен: 09/03/2019, изменен: 25/10/2020. 939k. Статистика.
Справочник: История, Foreign+Translat

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