Темежников Евгений Александрович: другие произведения.

The Military Balance 1987

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THE MILITARY BALANCE 1987

ВОЕННЫЙ БАЛАНС 1987

   The Military Balance 1986
   The Military Balance 1988

ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ


How to use The Military Balance / Как пользоваться Военным Балансом
USA / США: USA
Soviet Union / Советский Союз: Soviet Union
Warsaw Pact / Варшавский Договор
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Rumania
NATO / НАТО
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, FRG, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.
Europe / Европа
Albania, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia.
Middle East / Ближний Восток
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somali, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen North, Yemen South.
Africa / Африка
Angola, Benin, Bostwana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambiqe, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegambia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zair, Zambia, Zimbabve.
China / Китай: China
Asia & Australia / Азия и Тихий океан
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Cambodia, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippine, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam.
Latin America / Латинская Америка
Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican, Ecuador, Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua , Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Tables
Analyses
Strategic Nuclear Balance / Стратегический Ядерный Баланс
Balance in Europe / Баланс в Европе
Government Expenditure
Economic Trends / Экономические тенденции
WP & NATO command & Control Structures
EUROPE Short-range Nuclear Missile and Theatre Strike Aircraft Coverage

HOW TO USE THE MILITARY BALANCE

  
   The Military Balance is updated each year to provide a timely, quantitative assessment of the military forces and defence expenditures of over 140 countries. This volume contains such data as at 1 July 1987.
   General Arrangement
   It will be seen from the Table of Contents which precedes this preface that there are three main sections in The Military Balance. The first groups the national entries regionally: the USA, the USSR, Europe (the Warsaw Pact, NATO, Other European Countries), the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Australasia (China, Other Asian and Pacific Countries), and Latin America. (The Country Index on p. 10 gives the page references of individual national entries.) Each group is preceded by a short introduction describing significant changes in the defence postures and economic positions of the countries concerned and their international treaties, agreements and military aid arrangements. Inclusion of a particular political entity, or of a military organization connected to it, in no way implies legal recognition for, or IISS approval of, such entities.
   The second section contains tables providing comparative information on nuclear delivery systems globally and setting out the geographical distribution of sub-strategic nuclear systems subject to current or foreseeable arms-control negotiations. Other tables provide data on major identified arms procurement contracts world-wide, military manpower levels, and defence expenditures over the years since 1955.
   In a third, analytical, section there is an essay and summary table estimating the strategic nuclear balance according to the rules established by the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties. A second essay examines the problems and pitfalls of attempting to assess the conventional 'balance' between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in the context of a possible conflict in Europe and describes a number of approaches, together with their advantages and limitations. An accompanying table provides aggregated figures for both sides' holdings of key force elements in three areas relevant to conventional arms-control negotiations - the MBFR zone, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the world at large. A further table gives data to assist in making a qualitative comparison of tank forces. Economic studies in this section present graphs of trends in the defence expenditure of the NATO countries, Japan and Sweden from 1973 to 1986, and a discussion of global defence spending and arms trade patterns.
   A loose insert is again included with this year's edition of The Military Balance. One side bears a map of the coverage achievable by shorter-range nuclear ballistic missile systems and theatre strike aircraft from within peacetime boundaries (this complements both the tables on nuclear delivery systems and the insert map of strategic and long-range INF missile coverage that was carried in last year's edition). The other side bears diagrams of the higher-level command-and-control linkages of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
   National Entries
   Information on each country is given in a format as standard as the available information permits: economic data (GDP, growth, debt, inflation, defence budget and rate of exchange); population; military manpower, terms of service, Reserve strengths; the individual armed services; and para-military forces. Footnotes will be found at the end of each national entry, rather than at the foot of the page.
   Economic and Demographic Data
   Economic data: We provide GDP figures but use GNP and NMP when necessary (GDP equals GNP minus net income from abroad; NMP equals GNP minus non-earning state services). GDP figures are quoted at current market prices (at factor cost for East European and some other countries). Where available, published sources are used, but we estimate figures when data is incomplete; such estimates are marked 'e'. GDP/GNP growth rates cited are real growth in real terms. Inflation rates are based on available consumer price indices and refer to annual averages.
   Wherever possible the UN System of National Accounts, based on the latest available International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS), has been used. For Eastern Europe, data from Economic Survey of Europe in 1986-87 (New York: UN, 1987) and the World Economic Outlook (Washington DC: IMF, 1987) is used. Estimates for the USSR's GNP are based on commercial banking estimates; East European GDP/GNP figures at factor cost are derived from GNP. China's GDP/GNP is given by the IMF.
   Defence Expenditure: We quote the latest defence expenditure or budget data available as at 1 July 1987. Where possible, capital equipment budgets/expenditures have been added to recurrent/administrative costs. Figures may vary from previous years, often because of changes made by the governments themselves; in such cases, the figures given in more recent editions of The Military Balance should be more accurate than those in earlier editions. There is often wide variation between sources, but our experience has shown that data from the central banks is generally the most comprehensive and reliable. Some countries include internal and border security force expenditures in their defence budgets.
   The NATO countries use a 'standard definition' of defence expenditure which includes all spending on regular military forces, military aid (including equipment and training) to other nations, military pensions, host government expenses for NATO tenant forces, NATO infrastructure and civilian staff costs; but excludes spending on para-military forces (e.g., gendarmerie). Estimates showing the variation of opinion on Soviet expenditure are cited in the introduction to that country's entry. Foreign military aid figures are based on published data or, in some cases, estimates.
   Currency Conversion Rates: National currency figures have been converted into US dollars to permit comparisons. The rate is averaged for the national financial year (for 1987-8 figures, the mid-1987 rate is used). Wherever possible, exchange rates are taken from IFS, though they may not be applicable to commercial transactions. High inflation rates in some countries and dollar distortions affect conversions. For the USSR no adequate conversion ratio of roubles to dollars is available. For those East European countries which are not members of the IMF, and Hungary and Romania (which are), the conversion rates used are calculated by the method described in T.P. Alton, 'Economic Growth and Resource Allocation in Eastern Europe', Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe, Joint Economic Committee, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington DC: USGPO, 1974). In addition, we have used as a general guide Paul Marer, Dollar GNPs of the USSR and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP for the World Bank, 1985).
   Population: Total populations and the proportions of the population of military age are taken from the latest census data available in World Population Projections 1984 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1984) and 1985 Demographic Yearbook (New York: UN, 1987) and calculated trends and projections.
   Military Data
   Military Formation Strengths: The table below gives the approximate average establishment strength of the major military formations in selected countries. The manning and structure of formations may vary.
   []
   Divisional strengths cover organic units only. Support and service units outside the divisional structure may be included separately where known. The forces of Soviet allies and other Soviet supported countries have organizations similar to those of the Soviet Union. NATO formations and squadrons not included in the table above have similar totals to those of Germany unless otherwise stated in the text. Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Iranian regular forces have tended to follow American military organization, while Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore broadly use British patterns.
   Manpower. The 'Active' total comprises all personnel on full-time duty, including conscripts, long-term assignments from the Reserves and para-military elements when so required by the national authority. The terms of service are given for conscripts where known. The 'Reserve' component entry includes all personnel, whether in formed units or not, who are committed to serve as ancillary or mobilization forces. The mobilization strength would normally be the total of the full-time and reserve strengths. However, some national reserve service obligations last almost a lifetime; in these cases our strength estimates of militarily effective reservists are based on the terms of service and the number of conscripts completing their training each year, multiplied by five (on the assumption that, after five years, medical and combat training standards decline sharply).
   Organization: Expressed in broad terms, data is intended to give the composition of the major Army formations down to and including battalion level; minor sub-units are shown only in the forces of smaller nations. Naval and Air operational groupings are given where known. We do not generally show logistic units, ancillary Naval vessels (such as tugs), or Air Force ground support equipment.
   Para-Military: Many countries maintain organizations whose training and equipment goes beyond those required for civil police duties. Their constitution and control suggests that they may be usable in support, or in lieu, of regular military forces. Precise definitions as to what are or are not para-military forces are not always possible, and some degree of latitude must be allowed. When internal opposition forces appear to pose a significant threat to internal security of a state, they are shown separately after national para-military forces.
   Equipment: Holdings (by type and number) are shown by function. These represent the operational inventories. Where known, equipment in store is listed separately. Occasionally it is possible to list equipment in the Reserves; elsewhere the totals shown are held to include items assigned to the Reserves.
   We do not include small arms or their ammunition. In general, we do not include air defence artillery or automatic weapons with calibres of less than 14.5mm. Inventory totals for missile systems (e.g., SSM, SAM, ATGW, etc.) relate to launchers and not missiles; however, 'on order' figures, where shown, will include missiles as such.
   Naval vessels are listed according to the national designation of their function, even though hull size, primary armament and mission could lead to a different categorization in another fleet. Where appropriate, major missile systems are listed.
   Air Force squadron aircraft strengths vary; attempts have been made to separate total holdings from reported establishment strengths. When major equipment obtained from one foreign source may be confused with that from others, we list the country of origin.
   On Order. Major equipment being purchased either domestically or abroad is listed with the Services concerned. (Navy, Naval Air and Marine orders are generally combined.) These orders may be outstanding over several years; deliveries, particularly of larger equipment, are often slow. Arms purchase agreements reported during the year ending 1 July 1987 are recorded in Table 3 in Section 2, with details of contract dates, prices and delivery dates added where known.
   Estimates: Forecasts are made only where clear evidence indicates that changes in organization or inventory are taking place or are imminent. Estimates of strengths or holdings are denoted by the use of 'e'.
   Equipment listings are intended to show what is operational: a total generally well below total inventory figures. In general, 'some' means 'up to' and 'about' means 'the total could be slightly higher than given. For some categories a total figure is given. Where possible, quantities of individual items are also given. A standard system of punctuation has been developed for such entries to assist comprehension of detail. Equipment inventories are difficult to assess, and we welcome informed amendments.
   Abbreviations and Definitions
   Space and tight production schedules force us to use abbreviations. These are taken from NATO sources and are commonly used in military circles. An alphabetical list of them can be found on a fold-out sheet on p. 244. Punctuation is not used, and the abbreviation may have both singular or plural meanings, e.g., 'elm' = 'element' or 'elements'. Mathematical symbols are used in three instances: '(-)' means part of a unit is detached; '(+)' means the unit is reinforced;'('means that a vessel is under 100 tons displacement. Abbreviations of national names (e.g., 'Ch' = 'Chinese'), are used to denote equipment sources. With regard to financial abbreviations, the $ sign refers to US dollars except where otherwise stated; the term billion (bn) equals 1,000 million (m). 'Combat aircraft' are those normally equipped and configured to deliver ordnance (bomber (bbr), fighter-bomber, fighter-ground-attack (FGA), strike (nuclear), interceptor, fighter (ftr), counter-insurgency (COIN) and armed trainer), reconnaissance (recce) aircraft (including maritime), armed helicopters (including ASW) and those aircraft in operational conversion units (OCU) assumed to be available at short notice for operations. Some helicopters used for troop transport in battle areas may be armed, and some flexibility in identification must be accepted. Aircraft are listed in national inventories by their abbreviated designations and (where helpful) names only (e.g. MiG-21 Fishbed), except where inclusion of the full manufacturer's name is necessary to avoid confusion. A list relating designators to manufacturer's names will be found on pp. 241-5.
  
   WARNING
   The Military Balance is an assessment of the numerical personnel strengths and equipment holdings of the world's armed forces. It is in no way an assessment of their capabilities. It does not evaluate the quality of units or equipment, nor the impact of geography, doctrine, military technology, deployment, training, logistic support, morale, leadership, tactical or strategic initiative, terrain, weather, political will or support from alliance partners.
   Nor is the Institute in any position to evaluate and compare directly the performance of items of equipment. Those who wish to do so can use the data provided to construct their own force comparisons on a bilateral or regional basis. As the essay on pp. 226-31 makes clear, however, such comparisons are replete with difficulties. They are extremely sensitive to a wide range of assumptions, including what forces to include from what countries, whether and at what rates such forces can be assembled and brought to bear in a possible conflict, and their combat effectiveness. A number of factors are very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, and the outcomes of such comparisons can at best be only an approximation. They cannot predict the results of engagements or operations.
   The Military Balance provides the actual numbers of nuclear and conventional forces and weapons as we know them, not the number that would be assumed for verification purposes in arms-control agreements (except in the sole case of the Soviet-American nuclear strategic balance table on p. 225).
   What all this points to is that great care must be taken in assembling the data presented here for specific purposes. We provide an up-to-date and detailed catalogue of military forces in as many dimensions as possible and in a way which we hope will be generally useful. We make no judgments here about quality or effectiveness or the political purposes underlying the aggregation of power.
   The data presented each year in The Military Balance reflect judgments based on information available to the Director and staff of the Institute at the time the book is compiled. Information in subsequent volumes may differ from previous editions for a variety of reasons, principally as a result of substantive changes in national forces (e.g. procurement of new equipment, loss or retirement of old). In other cases entries may differ from year to year as a result of our reassessment of the evidence supporting past entries. Inevitably, over the course of time we come to believe that some information presented in earlier versions is erroneous, or insufficiently supported by reliable evidence. Hence, it is not always possible to construct valid time series comparisons from information given in successive editions.
   Errata
   The Military Balance included, for the first time, a list of emendations to the entries in the previous edition, designed to correct significant typographical or editorial errors. We are investigating customers' views on the utility of this. Meanwhile, in this year's edition changes of significance are generally speaking identified in the introduction to each regional group of national entries, together with an indication of whether such ammendments reflect corrections or revisions of earlier estimates or genuine changes in force structure or equipment holdings.
   Conclusion
   The Institute owes no allegiance whatever to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organization. Our assessments are our own, based on the material available to us from a wide variety of sources. The co-operation of nearly all governments has been sought and, in many cases, received. Not all countries have been equally co-operative, and some of the figures have necessarily been estimated. We take pains to ensure that these estimates are as professional and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a considerable debt to a number of its own members and consultants who have helped in compiling and checking material. The Director and the staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the facts and judgments contained in this study. We would welcome comments and suggestions on the data presented in The Military Balance, since we seek to make it as comprehensive and accurate as possible.
   Readers may use items of information from The Military Balance as required, without reference to the Institute, on condition that the Institute is cited as the source in any published work. However, reproduction of all major portions of the work must be approved in writing by the Institute prior to publication.
   September 1987
  

КАК ПОЛЬЗОВАТЬСЯ ВОЕННЫМ БАЛАНСОМ

  
   Военный баланс обновляется каждый год для обеспечения своевременной количественной оценки военных сил и расходов на оборону более чем 140 стран. В этом томе содержатся такие данные по состоянию на 1 июля 1987 года.
   Общие положения
   Из оглавления, предшествующего этому предисловию, видно, что в военном балансе имеются три основных раздела. В первом выложены национальные справки по регионам: США, СССР, Европа (Варшавский договор, НАТО, другие европейские страны), Ближний Восток и Северная Африка, Африка к югу от Сахары, Азия и Австралия (Китай, другие страны Азии и Тихого океана) и Латинская Америка. (Индекс страны на стр. 10 приводятся ссылки на страницы отдельных национальных позиций.) Каждой группе предшествует краткое введение, в котором описываются значительные изменения в оборонных позициях и экономических позициях соответствующих стран и их международных договорах, и соглашениях о военной помощи. Включение конкретного политического образования или связанной с ним военной организации никоим образом не подразумевает юридического признания или одобрения IISS таких образований.
   Во втором разделе содержатся таблицы, содержащие сравнительную информацию о системах ядерных носителей в глобальном масштабе и описывающие географическое распределение суб-стратегических ядерных систем, подлежащих текущим или прогнозируемым переговорам по контролю над вооружениями. В других таблицах приводятся данные об основных выявленных контрактах на закупку оружия во всем мире, численности военного персонала и расходах на оборону за период с 1955 года.
   В третьем, аналитическом, разделе содержится эссе и сводная таблица с оценкой стратегического ядерного баланса в соответствии с правилами, установленными договорами об ограничении стратегических вооружений. Во втором эссе рассматриваются проблемы и подводные камни попыток оценить обычный "баланс" между силами НАТО и Варшавского договора в контексте возможного конфликта в Европе и описывается ряд подходов, а также их преимущества и ограничения. В прилагаемой таблице приводятся сводные данные о наличии у обеих сторон ключевых силовых элементов в трех областях, имеющих отношение к переговорам по контролю над обычными вооружениями, - в зоне МБФР, Европе от Атлантики до Урала и во всем мире. В следующей таблице приводятся данные, которые помогут провести качественное сравнение танковых сил. В настоящем разделе представлены графики динамики оборонных расходов стран НАТО, Японии и Швеции в период с 1973 по 1986 год, а также обсуждение глобальных оборонных расходов и моделей торговли оружием.
   Свободная вставка снова включена в издание военного баланса этого года. С одной стороны имеется карта охвата, достижимых с помощью систем ядерных баллистических ракет малой дальности и ударных самолетов театра военных действий в пределах границ мирного времени (это дополняет как таблицы по системам ядерной доставки, так и вставную карту стратегического и Дальнего охвата ракетами РСМД, которая была представлена в прошлогоднем издании). На другой стороне - диаграммы командно-контрольных связей более высокого уровня НАТО и Варшавского договора.
   Национальные справки
   Информация по каждой стране приводится в стандартном формате, насколько это позволяет имеющаяся информация: экономические данные (ВВП, его рост, задолженность, инфляция, оборонный бюджет и обменный курс); численность населения; численность военнослужащих, условия службы, численность резерва; отдельные вооруженные силы; и полувоенные силы. Сноски будут находиться в конце каждой национальной записи, а не в конце страницы.
   Экономические и демографические данные
   Экономические данные: мы приводим данные о ВВП, но при необходимости используем ВНП и НМП (ВВП равен ВНП минус чистый доход из-за рубежа; НМП равен ВНП минус не приносящие доход государственные услуги). Данные по ВВП приводятся в текущих рыночных ценах (по фактической стоимости для стран Восточной Европы и некоторых других стран). Там, где это возможно, используются опубликованные источники, но мы оцениваем цифры, когда данные являются неполными; такие оценки помечаются буквой "e". Приведенные темпы роста ВВП/ВНП представляют собой реальный рост в реальном выражении. Темпы инфляции основаны на имеющихся индексах потребительских цен и относятся к среднегодовым показателям.
   Везде, где это возможно, использовалась система национальных счетов ООН, основанная на последней имеющейся международной финансовой статистике (МФС) Международного валютного фонда (МВФ). Для Восточной Европы используются данные экономического обзора Европы 1986-1987 годов (Нью-Йорк: ООН, 1987 год) и "World Economic Outlook" (Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: МВФ, 1987 год). Оценки ВНП СССР основаны на расчетах коммерческих банков; показатели ВВП/ВНП Восточной Европы по факторным затратам рассчитаны на основе ВНП. ВВП/ВНП Китая определяется МВФ.
   Расходы на оборону: мы приводим последние данные о расходах на оборону или бюджете по состоянию на 1 июля 1987 года. Там, где это возможно, бюджеты/расходы на капитальное оборудование были добавлены к текущим/административным расходам. Цифры могут отличаться от данных за предыдущие годы, часто в силу изменений, внесенных самими правительствами; в таких случаях цифры, приведенные в более поздних изданиях "военного баланса", должны быть более точными, чем в предыдущих изданиях. Между источниками часто существуют большие различия, но наш опыт показывает, что данные центральных банков, как правило, являются наиболее полными и надежными. Некоторые страны включают расходы на внутренние и пограничные силы безопасности в свои оборонные бюджеты.
   Страны НАТО используют "стандартное определение" расходов на оборону, которое включает в себя все расходы на регулярные вооруженные силы, военную помощь (включая оборудование и подготовку) другим странам, военные пенсии, расходы правительства принимающей страны на войска-арендаторы НАТО, инфраструктуру НАТО и расходы на гражданский персонал; но исключает расходы на полувоенные силы (например, жандармерию). Оценки, показывающие различия во мнениях о советских расходах, приводятся во введении к вступлению этой страны. Данные об иностранной военной помощи основаны на опубликованных данных или, в некоторых случаях, оценках.
   Курсы пересчета валют: данные в национальной валюте были пересчитаны в доллары США для проведения сопоставлений. Ставка усредняется по национальному финансовому году (для 1987-1988 годов используется ставка середины 1987 года). Там, где это возможно, обменные курсы берутся из МФС, хотя они могут быть неприменимы к коммерческим сделкам. Высокие темпы инфляции в некоторых странах и долларовые диспропорции влияют на конверсию. Для СССР не существует адекватного коэффициента пересчета рублей в доллары. Для тех восточноевропейских стран, которые не являются членами МВФ, а также Венгрии и Румынии (которые являются), используемые коэффициенты пересчета рассчитываются по методу, описанному в T. P. Alton, "Экономический рост и распределение ресурсов в Восточной Европе", переориентация и торговые отношения экономик Восточной Европы, Объединенный экономический комитет, 93-й конгресс, 2-я сессия (Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: USGPO, 1974). Кроме того, мы использовали в качестве общего руководства Paul Marer, Dollar GNPs СССР и Восточной Европы (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP for The World Bank, 1985).
   Население: общая численность населения и доля населения призывного возраста взяты из последних данных переписи населения, имеющихся в мировых демографических прогнозах 1984 года (Вашингтон, округ Колумбия: Всемирный банк, 1984 год) и демографическом ежегоднике 1985 года (Нью-Йорк: ООН, 1987 год), и рассчитанных тенденций и прогнозов.
   Военные Данные
   Численность воинских формирований: в таблице ниже приводится примерная средняя численность основных воинских формирований в отдельных странах. Численность и структура соединений могут различаться.
   []
а. Численность полка, которая является эквивалентным формированием в командных структурах США, СССР и Китая. (ермин "полк" может также обозначать подразделение размером с батальон, особенно в странах Западной Европы. Термин "группа", часто используемый в латиноамериканских странах, является неточным и может применяться к усиленному батальону или бригаде с недостаточной численностью ББМ и/или артиллерии.)
b. Эти танковые силы советских дивизий в Восточной Европе; у других советских дивизий их меньше.
c. Пехотная дивизия.
d. Численность военного времени составляет 16 300 человек.
   Силы дивизий охватывают только органические подразделения. Вспомогательные и обслуживающие подразделения, не входящие в структуру дивизии, могут включаться отдельно, если это известно. Силы советских союзников и других поддерживаемых СССР стран имеют организации, аналогичные Советскому Союзу. Соединения и эскадрильи НАТО, не включенные в приведенную выше таблицу, имеют общие показатели, аналогичные показателям Германии, если в тексте не указано иное. Пакистан, Филиппины, Таиланд, Япония, Южная Корея, Тайвань и иранские регулярные силы, как правило, следуют американской военной организации, в то время как Австралия, Новая Зеландия, Малайзия и Сингапур широко используют британские модели.
   Личный состав. "Действующая" общая численность включает весь персонал, служащий полный рабочий день, включая призывников, долгосрочные назначения из резервов и полувоенных элементов, когда это требуется национальным органом. Условия службы приводятся для призывников там, где они известны. "Резервный" компонент включает весь персонал, будь то в составе сформированных подразделений или нет, который призван служить вспомогательными или мобилизационными силами. Мобилизационная численность, как правило, представляет собой общую численность штатных и резервных сил. Однако некоторые обязательства Национальной резервной службы длятся почти всю жизнь; в этих случаях наши оценки численности эффективных в военном отношении резервистов основываются на сроках службы и количестве призывников, ежегодно проходящих обучение, умноженном на пять (исходя из предположения, что через пять лет стандарты медицинской и боевой подготовки резко снизятся).
   Организация: выраженные в общих чертах данные предназначены для того, чтобы дать состав основных армейских формирований вплоть до батальонного уровня включительно; незначительные подразделения показаны только в силах малых государств. Военно-морские и воздушные оперативные группировки приводятся там, где это известно. Мы обычно не показываем логистические подразделения, вспомогательные морские суда (такие как буксиры) или наземное оборудование поддержки ВВС.
   Полу-военные: Во многих странах существуют организации, подготовка и оснащение которых выходят за рамки тех, которые требуются для выполнения функций гражданской полиции. Их конституция и контроль предполагают, что они могут использоваться для поддержки регулярных вооруженных сил или вместо них. Точные определения того, что является или не является полувоенными силами, не всегда возможны, и необходимо допускать определенную степень свободы. В тех случаях, когда внутренние оппозиционные силы, как представляется, представляют значительную угрозу внутренней безопасности государства, они показаны отдельно после национальных полувоенных сил.
   Вооружение: запасы (по типу и номеру) показаны по функциям. Они представляют собой оперативные запасы. Где известно, вооружение на складах, оно указано отдельно. Иногда перечислено оборудование в резерве; в других местах показанные общие суммы проводятся для включения предметов, отнесенных к резервам.
   Мы не включаем стрелковое оружие или боеприпасы к нему. В общем, мы не включаем системы противовоздушной обороны, артиллерии и автоматического оружия с калибром менее 14.5 мм. Итоговые данные инвентаризации для ракетных систем (например, БР, ЗРК, ПТРК и т. д.) относятся к пусковым установкам, а не к ракетам; однако цифры "по порядку", где показано, будут включать ракеты как таковые.
   Морские суда перечислены в соответствии с национальным обозначением их функций, хотя размер корпуса, основное вооружение и миссия могут привести к другой классификации в другом флоте. В соответствующих случаях перечисляются основные ракетные системы.
   Численность самолетов эскадрилий ВВС различна; предпринимались попытки отделить общие запасы от численного состава, о котором сообщается. Когда основное вооружение, полученное из одного иностранного источника, можно спутать с оборудованием, полученным из других источников, мы приводим страну происхождения.
   Заказы. Основное вооружение, приобретаемое внутри страны или за рубежом, перечисляется вместе с соответствующими видами ВС. (Военно-морской флот, морская авиация и морские заказы, как правило, объединены.) Эти заказы могут оставаться невыполненными в течение нескольких лет; поставки, особенно более крупного оборудования, часто происходят медленно. Соглашения о закупках оружия, о которых сообщалось в течение года, закончившегося 1 июля 1987 года, отражены в таблице 3 Раздела 2 с указанием, где это известно, дат контрактов, цен и сроков поставки.
   Оценки: прогнозы делаются только в тех случаях, когда имеются четкие доказательства того, что изменения в организации или инвентарных запасах происходят или неизбежны. Оценки сил или запасов обозначаются с помощью "e".
   Списки вооружения предназначены для того, чтобы показать, что является оперативным: общее число, как правило, значительно ниже общих инвентарных данных. В общем, "some" означает "до" и "up to"означает" общее может быть немного выше, чем дано. Для некоторых категорий приводится общая цифра. Там, где это возможно, также приводятся количества отдельных типов. Для таких записей была разработана стандартная система пунктуации, чтобы облегчить понимание деталей. Запасы вооружения трудно оценить, и мы приветствуем обоснованные поправки.
   Сокращения и определения
   Обширные и плотные данные вынуждают нас использовать сокращения. Они взяты из источников НАТО и обычно используются в военных кругах. Алфавитный список их можно найти на раскладном листе на стр. 244. Пунктуация не используется, и аббревиатура может иметь как единственное, так и множественное значение, например, "elm" = "element" или "elements". Математические символы используются в трех случаях: "(-) "означает, что часть блока отсоединена; "(+) "означает, что блок усилен; "<"означает, что судно имеет водоизмещение менее 100 тонн. Для обозначения источников оборудования используются сокращения национальных названий (например, "Ch" = "китайский"). Что касается финансовых сокращений, то знак "$"означает доллары США, за исключением случаев, когда указано иное; термин "миллиард" (bn) равен 1 000 млн. 'Combat aircraft' это то, что обычно укомплектованы, и настроены, чтобы доставлять боеприпасы (бомбардировщики (bbr), истребители-бомбардировщики, истребители-штурмовики (FGA), ударные (ядерные), перехватчики, истребители (ftr), противоповстанческие (COIN) и вооруженные учебные), разведчики (recce) самолеты (включая морские), боевые вертолеты (в том числе ПЛО) и учебно-боевые самолеты (OCU) предполагается, можно привлекать на короткий срок для операции. Некоторые вертолеты, используемые для перевозки войск в районах боевых действий, могут быть вооружены, и необходимо проявлять определенную гибкость при идентификации. Самолеты, включаются в национальные кадастры только по их сокращенным обозначениям и (в тех случаях, когда это целесообразно) названиям (например, МиГ-21 Fishbed), за исключением тех случаев, когда во избежание путаницы необходимо включить полное название завода-изготовителя. С перечнем, касающимся наименований изготовителей, можно ознакомиться на стр. 241-5.
  
   ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЕ
   Военный баланс - это оценка численности личного состава и запасов техники Вооруженных сил мира. Это никоим образом не оценка их возможностей. Он не оценивает ни качество подразделений или техники, ни влияние географии, доктрины, военной технологии, развертывания, подготовки, материально-технической поддержки, морального духа, руководства, тактической или стратегической инициативы, местности, погоды, политической воли или поддержки со стороны партнеров по альянсу.
   Институт также не в состоянии непосредственно оценивать и сравнивать показатели работы вооружения. Желающие могут использовать представленные данные для построения собственных сопоставлений сил на двусторонней или региональной основе. На стр. 226-31, однако, такие сравнения изобилуют трудностями. Они чрезвычайно чувствительны к широкому спектру предположений, включая то, какие силы включать из каких стран, могут ли и какими темпами такие силы быть собраны и задействованы в возможном конфликте, и их боеспособность. Ряд факторов очень трудно, если не невозможно, определить количественно, и результаты таких сопоставлений могут быть в лучшем случае лишь приблизительными. Они не могут предсказать результаты сражений или операций.
   Военный баланс приводит фактическую численность ядерных и обычных вооруженных сил и вооружений в том виде, в каком мы их знаем, а не число, которое было бы принято для целей проверки в соглашениях о контроле над вооружениями (за исключением единственного случая советско-американской таблицы ядерного стратегического баланса на стр. 225).
   Все это указывает на то, что при сборе данных, представленных здесь для конкретных целей, необходимо проявлять большую осторожность. Мы предоставляем обновленный и подробный каталог вооруженных сил в максимально возможном количестве измерений, который, как мы надеемся, будет в целом полезен. Мы не делаем здесь никаких суждений о качестве или эффективности или политических целях, лежащих в основе объединения власти.
   Данные, ежегодно представляемые в Военном Балансе, отражают суждения, основанные на информации, имеющейся у директора и сотрудников института на момент составления книги. Информация в последующих томах может отличаться от информации в предыдущих изданиях по ряду причин, главным образом в результате существенных изменений в национальных силах (например, закупка нового оборудования, утрата или вывод старого). В других случаях записи могут отличаться из года в год в результате переоценки доказательств, подтверждающих прошлые записи. С течением времени мы неизбежно приходим к убеждению, что некоторая информация, представленная в более ранних версиях, ошибочна или недостаточно подкреплена надежными доказательствами. Следовательно, не всегда возможно построить достоверные сравнения временных рядов из информации, приведенной в последующих изданиях.
   Опечатки
   Военный баланс впервые включал перечень исправлений к позициям в предыдущем издании, предназначенных для исправления значительных типографских или редакционных ошибок. Мы изучаем мнения клиентов о полезности этого. Между тем, в издании этого года изменения значения, как правило, определяются во введении к каждой региональной группе национальных позиций вместе с указанием того, отражают ли такие поправки исправления или пересмотр более ранних оценок или подлинные изменения в структуре сил или запасов вооружения.
   Выводы
   Институт не имеет никаких обязательств перед каким-либо правительством, группой правительств или какой-либо политической или иной организацией. Наши оценки являются нашими собственными, основанными на материалах, имеющихся в нашем распоряжении из самых различных источников. Почти ко всем правительствам мы обратились с просьбой о сотрудничестве, и во многих случаях оно было получено. Не все страны в равной степени сотрудничают друг с другом, поэтому некоторые цифры оценочные. Мы прилагаем все усилия для обеспечения того, чтобы эти оценки были как можно более профессиональными и свободными от предвзятости. Институт в большом долгу перед рядом своих собственных членов и консультантов, которые помогли в сборе и проверке материалов. Директора и сотрудники Института несут полную ответственность за факты и суждения, содержащиеся в данном исследовании. Мы хотели бы получить комментарии и предложения по данным, представленным в военном балансе, поскольку мы стремимся сделать их как можно более всеобъемлющими и точными.
   Читатели могут использовать информацию из военного баланса по мере необходимости, без ссылки на институт, при условии, что Институт цитируется в качестве источника в любой опубликованной работе. Однако воспроизведение всех основных частей работы должно быть одобрено институтом в письменном виде до публикации.
   Сентября 1987 года


COUNTRIES AND PRINCIPAL PACTS


The United States

   Strategic and Non-strategic Nuclear Systems
   The United States' strategic force modernization programme continued during the past year. The Titan ICBM has now been phased out, and 23 MX missiles have been deployed in Minuteman III silos (though not all of them are yet fully operational). In all, the US plans to deploy 50 MX in fixed silos by December 1988; whether more will be deployed depends on Congressional approval for the Administration's plan to base a further 50 on rail cars (which could be dispersed from garrisons upon warning).
   B-1 deployment continues, with 54 aircraft now delivered, but problems associated with the bomber's electronic countermeasures, terrain-following and other systems have drastically limited the number fully available for alert. Conversion of B-52 bombers to ALCM carriers also continues, and there are now 144 B-52G and H equipped to carry the AGM-86B ALCM. When conversion of the 131st B-52 was completed in November 1986, the United States exceeded the SALT II limits for MIRV-equipped ICBM and bombers with ALCM.
   The number of SSBN and SLBM is unchanged, but flight-testing of the Trident II D-5 missile has begun. First deployment of the new SLBM is planned on the next (ninth) Ohio-class SSBN, scheduled to begin sea trials next year.
   The United States has now completed the construction of the Pave Paws SLBM early warning system, with new facilities in Georgia and Texas, and is proceeding to upgrade the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System with large phased-array radars (the installation at Thule in Greenland is to be completed this year, while work is scheduled to begin at Fylingdales Moor in the United Kingdom). The slow process of modernizing US continental air defence forces continues. The last F-106 in the active Air Force have been retired (2 squadrons remain in the Air National Guard), but the ANG has not yet begun to receive its planned F-15 for the air defence mission.
   The United States resumed military satellite launches in February (more than a year's hiatus having followed the accident to the Space Shuttle and unsuccessful launches of Titan and Delta rockets), but lack of launch vehicles continues to hamper the programme. Orders have been placed for new Titan 4 and Delta 2 launchers to meet requirements, because the Shuttle is not expected to resume operations until mid-1988.
   GLCM deployment in Europe reached 256 (out of a planned 464), with 96 in the United Kingdom, 64 in West Germany, 80 in Italy and 16 in Belgium.
   Conventional Forces
   The US Army entry shows 4,500 M-1 Abrams tanks - an apparent slight reduction from last year's figure which is due to an over-optimistic assessment in last year's edition of the new tank's rate of delivery. A more accurate assessment of the total US tank inventory last year would be around 12,800, increasing to 13,300 this year. The M-60A1 tank has been phased out of US Army service and should not have been included in last year's entry. The significant reduction from last year's entry for Lance SSM and Dragon and TOW ATGW is due to a re-evaluation of information. Conventional force modernization programmes include Patriot surface-to-air missiles and attack helicopters (145 additional AH-IS Cobra; some 190 AH-64A Apache).
   The US Navy continues its force expansion with an increase from 222 to 237 principal surface combatants (1 Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, 5 CG-47 Ticonderoga cruisers and 3 FFG-7 Perry and 6 FF-1052 Knox frigates) and has also added 1 new Los Angeles-class SSN. Deployment of the LCAC amphibious assault craft has begun, with nine now in the inventory. The entry for sealift forces has been extensively revised; figures are therefore not necessarily comparable to those in last year's edition.
   The Navy and Marines continue to add F/A-18 aircraft, and the type has now replaced the F-4 on the Midway-class carriers. (This year's edition shows the planned changed composition of carrier air wings which is gradually to be introduced.) There are also two more F-14 squadrons. Overall, Naval Aviation shows an increase of 26 F/A-18,48 F-14,22 P-3 maritime reconnaissance and 89 A-6 attack aircraft, although the total number of combat aircraft has declined slightly to just over 1,700. Anti-submarine warfare helicopter modernization features the delivery of 25 additional SH-60B LAMPS III. The Marines have added 36 F/A-18, but the total of Marine combat aircraft has declined by 157, with reductions in F-4, A-4 and A-6 numbers. This year's entry combines Regular and Reserve air data.
   The Marine Corps inventory of the versatile Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) has increased by nearly 300, and 144 M-101 105mm howitzers remain in the inventory.
   The US Air Force has added some 30 F-15 and nearly 150 F-16, while retiring some 200 F-4 fighters. This Service is now beginning the transition in production from the F-15D to the F-15E two-seat, long-range interdiction fighter. The apparent reduction in F-111 numbers reflects a re-evaluation of data. The first 16 C-5B strategic airlift transports have been delivered (a total of 50 are planned by early 1989), as have 6 more KC-10A tanker/transport aircraft.
   In fulfilment of a law enacted by the Congress last year, the US has reorganized its Special Operations Forces, and also established a new position in the Department of Defense: Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. A new Special Operations Command (with headquarters at MacDill AFB in Florida) includes the Army Special Forces and Rangers, Air Force Special Operations Forces and the three Services' special warfare schools; Navy SEAL units, attached to fleet commands, will not come under the new command. (The US Readiness Command, previously based at MacDill, is being deactivated, and its missions distributed to other units.)
   For the purpose of showing the composition of special forces units, this edition continues to list special forces under the entries for the individual services with which they are associated.
   US Defence Budget
   The persistence of large budget deficits (see Table I) continues to dominate the policy debate in the United States, as President Reagan and the Democrat-controlled US Congress confront each other over spending and tax priorities, with the US defence budget caught firmly in the crossfire. After a period of rapid growth in the Administration's early years, defence spending levelled off, and in Fiscal Year (FY) 1988 the US will experience its third consecutive year of real decline in defence budget authority (see Table II).
   Congress sought to solve the deficit problem in 1985 by enacting the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings plan, which provided for automatic spending cuts if Congress and the President could not agree on a programme to reduce the deficit by yearly increments, reaching a balanced budget in 1991. But in July 1986 the US Supreme Court ruled this legislation unconstitutional, and, although the President and Congress have pledged to try to meet the target voluntarily, the effort has failed, and the FY 1987 deficit is running at more than $29.2 billion above the $144-billion ceiling mandated by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
   For FY 1988 President Reagan proposed a budget of $1,024.3 billion. By Administration calculations, this would have produced a deficit of $107.8 billion, but costing by the Congressional budget office calculated the deficit at $180 billion. The President's request of $312 billion for defence - a 3% real increase over FY 1987 - was much more modest than those of previous years. Nonetheless, the Democrats' victory in the 1986 Congressional elections (which allowed them to regain control of the Senate, lost in 1980) ensured that the President's plan would meet a difficult reception. After months of debate and negotiation, Congress adopted a Budget Resolution providing for $1,167.9 billion in budget authority ($1,055.5 billion in outlays) and a deficit of $133.8 billion. For defence, the Resolution provided $296.0 billion in budget authority ($289.5 billion in outlays) - a real decline in spending. However, in an effort to induce the President to accept an increase in taxes, the Congressional plan proposed to raise defence spending by a further $7 billion if he would agree to a $64-billion tax increase. Even with the additional sums, though, defence is destined to face real reductions of 2% in FY 1988, 4% in FY 1989 and 6% in FY 1990.
  
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   The impasse between President and Congress over taxes, and the internal debate in the Senate over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, have blocked action on the FY 1988 defence budget, leaving in doubt the level of total defence spending as well as the levels for individual military programmes. As a result, the effort by Congress to improve the stability of defence planning by enacting a two-year defence authorization has been thrown into jeopardy.
   As the November 1988 US Presidential election approaches, the future of key defence programmes hangs in the balance, with Democrats and Republicans sparring over issues such as SDI, the proposed rail garrison basing mode for MX, the Midgetman small mobile ICBM and conventional defence improvements. The prospect of continuing real reductions in defence spending will force Congress and the President to face difficult choices on how to scale down the Administration's ambitious procurement programme. In the short run, Congress is likely to follow its traditional pattern of reducing quantities purchased and prolonging procurement schedules, rather than cancelling major programmes. Even so, the impact of past defence budget cuts is beginning to be felt in the force structure - for example, the Air Force has formally abandoned its goal of 40 air wings (it now plans 37) and the Army faces the prospect of a significant reduction in its planned purchase of several helicopter types (see Strategic Survey 1986-1987, pp. 79-84).
   Foreign Aid
   The continuing pressure of the deficit has had a profound impact on the US foreign-aid programme. Although foreign aid takes up a relatively small part of the US budget, it has been controversial in the Congress - particularly in recent years, when politically popular domestic social welfare programmes have been cut back to meet fiscal constraints. The Reagan Administration had succeeded in expanding foreign aid (from $11 billion in 1980 to $16.6 billion in budget authority - $14.1 billion in outlays - in FY 1986), and particularly its Security Assistance component, but last year Congress not only rejected the Administration's proposed $1-billion increase but actually reduced funding to $13.4 billion. Over half this aid goes to a few countries (Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Pakistan), and - because aid to Israel and Egypt is essentially immune from cuts - the reductions for most other countries have been of the order of 30-50%. These cuts have complicated negotiations for the renewal of US basing rights in countries such as Turkey, Greece, Spain and some others, and have made it more difficult to provide economic assistance to allies facing economic crises (e.g. the Philippines). The Budget Resolution for FY 1988, which allocated $6.7 billion, ensures that the problem of mediating between conflicting demands for economic and military assistance will continue.

Соединенные Штаты Америки


   Стратегические и нестратегические ядерные системы
   В течение прошедшего года продолжалась программа модернизации стратегических сил Соединенных Штатов. МБР Titan в настоящее время поэтапно выведена из эксплуатации, и 23 ракеты MX были развернуты в шахтах Minuteman III (хотя не все из них еще полностью функционируют). В целом, США планируют развернуть 50 MX в стационарных шахтах к декабрю 1988 года; будет ли развернуто больше, зависит от одобрения Конгрессом плана администрации разместить еще 50 на железнодорожных платформах (которые могут быть рассредоточены из гарнизонов по предупреждению).
   Развертывание B-1 продолжается, в настоящее время поставлено 54 самолета, но проблемы, связанные с электронным противодействием бомбардировщика, слежением за местностью и другими системами, резко ограничили число полностью доступных по тревоге. Продолжается также конвертация бомбардировщиков В-52 в носители КРВБ, и в настоящее время имеется 144 B-52G и H, оснащенных для несения AGM-86B ALCM. Когда в ноябре 1986 года была завершена конвертация 131-го В-52, Соединенные Штаты превысили лимиты ОСВ II для МБР, оснащенных MIRV, и бомбардировщиков с КРВБ.
   Количество ПЛАРБ и БРПЛ не изменилось, но начались летные испытания ракеты Trident II D-5. Первое развертывание новой БРПЛ планируется на следующей (девятой) ПЛАРБ типа Ohio, которая должна начать морские испытания в следующем году.
   В настоящее время Соединенные Штаты завершили строительство системы раннего предупреждения Pave Paws SLBM с новыми установками в Джорджии и Техасе и приступают к модернизации системы раннего предупреждения о баллистических ракетах с большими радиолокаторами с фазированной решеткой (установка в Туле в Гренландии должна быть завершена в этом году, а работы планируется начать в Файлингдейлс Мур в Соединенном Королевстве). Медленный процесс модернизации континентальных сил ПВО США продолжается. Последние F-106 в действующих ВВС были выведены (2 эскадрильи остаются в составе ВВС Национальной гвардии), но АНГ еще не начали получать свои запланированные F-15 для миссии ПВО.
   В феврале Соединенные Штаты возобновили запуски военных спутников (после аварии Space Shuttle и неудачных запусков ракет Titan 4 и Delta 2 более чем годичный перерыв), однако отсутствие ракет-носителей по-прежнему препятствует осуществлению программы. Были размещены заказы на новые пусковые установки Titan 4 и Delta 2 для удовлетворения потребностей, поскольку Shuttle, как ожидается, не возобновит работу до середины 1988 года.
   Развертывание GLCM в Европе достигло 256 (из запланированных 464), 96 - в Соединенном Королевстве, 64 - в Западной Германии, 80 - в Италии и 16 - в Бельгии.
   Обычные вооруженные силы
   Поступление в армию США 4,500 танков M-1 Abrams - кажущееся небольшое сокращение от прошлогоднего показателя, которое связано с чрезмерно оптимистичной оценкой в прошлогоднем издании скорости поставки нового танка. Более точная оценка общего объема танков в США в прошлом году составила бы около 12 800 единиц, увеличившись до 13 300 единиц в этом году. Танк М-60А1 был поэтапно выведен из армии США и не должен был быть включен в прошлогодний ввод. Значительное сокращение по сравнению с прошлогодним вводом для тактических ракет Lance и ПТРК Dragon и TOW связано с переоценкой информации. Программы модернизации обычных вооруженных сил включают ракеты класса "земля-воздух" Patriot и ударные вертолеты (145 дополнительных AH-1S Cobra; около 190 AH-64A Apache).
   ВМС США продолжают расширение своих сил с увеличением с 222 до 237 надводных боевых кораблей основных классов (1 атомный авианосец типа Nimitz, 5 крейсеров CG-47 Ticonderoga и 3 фрегата FFG-7 Perry и 6 фрегатов FF-1052 Knox), а также добавили 1 новую ПЛА типаа Los Angeles. Началось развертывание десантно-штурмового катера LCAC, в настоящее время в строю девять. Положение о силах морской перевозки было тщательно пересмотрено; поэтому цифры необязательно сопоставимы с данными, приведенными в прошлогоднем издании.
   Военно-Морской Флот и морская пехота продолжают получать самолеты F/A-18, и этот тип теперь заменил F-4 на авианосцах среднего класса. (В этом году издание показывает планируемый измененный состав Воздушных крыльев авианосцев, который будет постепенно вводиться.) Есть еще две эскадрильи F-14. В целом морская авиация увеличилась на 26 F/A-18, 48 F-14, 22 P-3 морских разведчиков и 89 A-6 штурмовиков, хотя общее количество боевых самолетов несколько сократилось до чуть более 1700. Модернизация противолодочного боевого вертолета предусматривает поставку 25 дополнительных ламп SH-60B LAMPS III. Морская пехота получила 36 F / A-18, но общее количество боевых самолетов морской пехоты сократилось на 157, с сокращением F-4, A-4 и A-6. В этом году объединены регулярные и резервные данные о воздушных силах.
   В Корпусе морской пехоты количество универсальной легкой бронированной машины (LAV) увеличился почти на 300, и 144 гаубицы М-101 105 мм остаются на вооружении.
   ВВС США получили около 30 F-15 и почти 150 F-16, а также сократили около 200 истребителей F-4. В настоящее время начинается переход в производстве с F-15D на F-15E двухместный истребитель дальнего перехвата. Очевидное сокращение числа F-111 отражает переоценку данных. Были поставлены первые 16 стратегических транспортных самолетов C-5B (в общей сложности 50 планируется к началу 1989 года), а также еще 6 танкеров/транспортных самолетов KC-10A.
   Во исполнение закона, принятого Конгрессом в прошлом году, США реорганизовали свои силы специальных операций, а также создали новую должность в Министерстве обороны: помощника секретаря по специальным операциям и конфликтам низкой интенсивности. Новое командование специальных операций (со штаб-квартирой в MACDILL AFB во Флориде) включает армейских спецназовцев и рейнджеров, Силы Специальных Операций ВВС и специальные военные школы трех служб; подразделения морских котиков, прикрепленные к командованиям флота, не будут подчиняться новому командованию. (Команда готовности США, ранее базировавшаяся в Макдилле, деактивируется, а ее миссии распределяются между другими подразделениями.)
   Для того чтобы показать состав подразделений специальных сил, в настоящем издании продолжается перечисление специальных сил по позициям для отдельных служб, с которыми они связаны.
   Оборонный бюджет США
   Сохранение большого бюджетного дефицита (см. таблицу I) продолжает доминировать в политических дебатах в Соединенных Штатах, поскольку президент Рейган и контролируемый демократами Конгресс США противостоят друг другу по расходам и налоговым приоритетам, а оборонный бюджет США прочно попал под перекрестный огонь. После периода быстрого роста в первые годы правления администрации расходы на оборону выровнялись, и в 1988 финансовом году США третий год подряд будут испытывать реальное снижение полномочий в оборонном бюджете (см. таблицу II).
   Конгресс стремился решить проблему дефицита в 1985 году, приняв план Грэмма-Радмана-Холлингса, который предусматривал автоматическое сокращение расходов, если Конгресс и президент не могли договориться о программе сокращения дефицита ежегодными приращениями, достигнув сбалансированного бюджета в 1991 году. Но в июле 1986 года Верховный суд США признал этот закон неконституционным, и, хотя президент и Конгресс обязались попытаться достичь этой цели добровольно, усилия не увенчались успехом, и дефицит 1987 финансового года превысил установленный законом Грэмма-Радмана-Холлингса потолок в 144 миллиарда долларов.
   По итогам 1988 президент Рейган предложил бюджет в $1,024.3 миллиардов. По расчетам администрации, это привело бы к дефициту в размере $107,8 млрд, но бюджетное управление Конгресса подсчитало дефицит в $180 млрд. Просьба президента о выделении 312 миллиардов долларов на оборону - реальный рост на 3% по сравнению с 1987 годом - была гораздо скромнее, чем в предыдущие годы. Тем не менее победа демократов на выборах в Конгресс 1986 года (позволившая им восстановить контроль над Сенатом, потерянным в 1980 году) гарантировала, что план президента встретит трудный прием. После нескольких месяцев дебатов и переговоров конгресс принял бюджетную резолюцию, предусматривающую 1167 долл. США. 9 млрд бюджетных полномочий ($1,055.5 млрд в расходах) и дефицит в размере $ 133,8 млрд. Для обороны резолюция предусматривала $ 296,0 млрд бюджетных полномочий ($289,5 млрд расходов) - реальное сокращение расходов. Однако, пытаясь убедить президента согласиться на увеличение налогов, Конгресс предложил увеличить расходы на оборону еще на 7 миллиардов долларов, если он согласится на увеличение налогов на 64 миллиарда долларов. Однако даже с учетом дополнительных сумм обороне суждено столкнуться с реальным сокращением на 2% в 1988 финансовом году, 4% в 1989 финансовом году и 6% в 1990 финансовом году.
   Табл.
   Тупик в отношениях между президентом и Конгрессом по поводу налогов и внутренние дебаты в Сенате по поводу толкования договора по ПРО заблокировали принятие мер по оборонному бюджету 1988 финансового года, оставив под сомнением уровень общих расходов на оборону, а также уровни для отдельных военных программ. В результате усилия Конгресса по повышению стабильности оборонного планирования путем принятия двухлетнего оборонного разрешения оказались под угрозой.
   По мере приближения президентских выборов в США в ноябре 1988 года будущее ключевых оборонных программ висит на волоске, а демократы и республиканцы спорят по таким вопросам, как СОИ, предлагаемый режим железнодорожного базирования для MX, малая мобильная МБР Midgetman и улучшение обычной обороны. Перспектива дальнейшего реального сокращения расходов на оборону вынудит Конгресс и президента принять трудное решение о том, как сократить масштаб амбициозной программы закупок администрации. В краткосрочной перспективе Конгресс, скорее всего, будет следовать своей традиционной схеме сокращения закупаемых количеств и продления сроков закупок, а не отмены основных программ. Несмотря на это, влияние прошлых сокращений оборонного бюджета начинает ощущаться в структуре сил - например, ВВС формально отказались от своей цели 40 авиакрыльев (теперь планирует 37), и армия сталкивается с перспективой значительного сокращения запланированных закупок нескольких типов вертолетов (см. стратегический обзор 1986-1987, стр. 79-84).
   Иностранная помощь
   Продолжающееся давление дефицита оказало глубокое влияние на программу внешней помощи США. Хотя иностранная помощь занимает относительно небольшую часть бюджета США, она вызывает споры в Конгрессе - особенно в последние годы, когда политически популярные внутренние программы социального обеспечения были сокращены для удовлетворения финансовых ограничений. Администрация Рейгана преуспела в расширении иностранной помощи (с $11 млрд в 1980 году до $16,6 млрд в бюджетных полномочиях - $14,1 млрд в расходах - в 1986 финансовом году), и особенно ее компонента помощи безопасности, но в прошлом году Конгресс не только отклонил предложенное администрацией увеличение на $1 млрд, но фактически сократил финансирование до $ 13,4 млрд. Более половины этой помощи идет в несколько стран (Египет, Израиль, Турция и Пакистан), и - поскольку помощь Израилю и Египту по существу невосприимчива к сокращениям - сокращения для большинства других стран были порядка 30-50%. Эти сокращения осложнили переговоры о возобновлении прав США на базирование в таких странах, как Турция, Греция, Испания и некоторые другие, и затруднили оказание экономической помощи союзникам, столкнувшимся с экономическими кризисами (например, Филиппины). Бюджетная резолюция по итогам 1988 года, в котором выделено 6,7 млрд долларов США, гарантирует, что проблема посредничества между конфликтующими требованиями к экономической и военной помощи будет продолжаться.
  
   THE UNTIED STATES
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TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 2,158,000 (203,000 women).
Terms of Service, voluntary.
Reserves: Active Reserves: 1,152,700.
National Guard: 559,000; Army 446,000; Air 113,000.
Reserve: 593,700: Army 310,000; Navy 142,000; Marines 42,000; Air Force 79,000; Coast Guard 20,700.
Individual Ready Reserves: 500,240. Army 319,000; Navy 85,000; Marines 2,000; Air Force 39,000; Coast Guard 5,240.
Standby Reserves: 83,213. Army 2,000; Navy 11,500; Marines 43,600; Air 25,300; Coast Guard 813.
Duties pre-assigned on mobilization.
Retired: some 120,000 ex-Army would be available for recall.
Civilians: 1,038,000 (to reduce to 1,024,000).

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: f
(1) Offensive
(a) Navy: 640 SLBM in 36 SSBN.
SSBN (incl 6 on refit):
   8 SSBN-726 Ohio with 24 UGM-93A Trident I/C-4 (192 msls)
   12 SSBN-640 Franklin: 6 with 16 Trident I/C-4 (96 msls); 6 with 16 UGM-73A PoseidonC-3 (96 msls):
   8 SSBN-627 Madison: 6 with 16 Trident I/C-4 (96 msls); 2 with 16 Poseidon C-3 (32 msls)
   8 Lafayette with 16 Poseidon C-3 (128 msls)
   (On order: 6 Ohio SSBN; 21 Trident II/D-5 SLBM).
(b) Strategic Air Command (SAC) (104,000):
   2 Air Forces. 12 divs (1 trg/spt).
ICBM: 1,000. 6 strategic msl wings (20 sqns); sqn has 5 launch control centres.
   3 wings (9 sqns) with 450 Minuteman II (LGM-30F).
   3 wings (11 sqns (1 reforming)) with 527 Minuteman III (LGM-30G) (3 MIRV).
   1 sqn with 23 Peacekeeper(MX; LGM-118A) (10 MIRV); in mod Minuteman silos.
Aircraft: some 412 combat ac (eqpt: see p. 22); 18 bomb wings (12 B-52, 3 B-1B, 2 FB-111, 1 trg).
Bbrs: 373.
   Long-range: 317.
   3 wings (3 sqns plus 1 trg) with 54 B-1B.
   4 wings (6 sqns) with 96 B-52H (46 with AGM-86B ALCM).
   10 wings (10 bbr sqns) with 167 B-52G: 6 sqns (98 ac) with ALCM/SRAM. Will be replaced with B-1B in the 1990s.
   4 sqns (69 ac) with Harpoon or bombs. (2 sqns (30 ac) operational in conventional role).
   Medium-range: 56 (5 more in rotating reserve).
   2 wings: 5 sqns (1 trg) with FB-111A (to transfer to TAC in the 1990s).
Recce: 68. 3 wings: 6 sqns:
   1 with 10 SR-71A, 1 SR-71B (trg), 11 T-38A (trg).
   1 with 11 U-2, -2CT (trg).
   2 with 13 TR-1A, 2 TR-1B (trg).
   2 with 20 RC-135.
Comd: 25: 6 sqns:
   1 with 4 E-4B.
   5 with 21 EC-135.
Tanker: 696: 6 wings: 1 gp: 54 sqns (1 trg):
   31 Regular with 511 KC-135.
   2 Regular with 57 KC-10A tanker/tpt.
   13 Air National Guard sqns (with 104 KC-135).
   3 Air Force Reserve sqns (with 24 KC-135).
   3 KC-10 Reserve Associate sqns (no ac).

(2) Defensive:
US Air Force Space Command: (HQ; Colorado Springs, Colorado).
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a combined US-Cdn org (HQ: Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado USA).
Warning Systems:
1. ICBM, SLBM, satellites:
(a) Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS):
(i) Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC). NORAD Combat Operation HQ, Cheyenne Mountain.
   Tracking, identification, cataloguing of all space objects; command, control and communications to all space-associated commands and agencies;
   surveillance, protection, countering of satellites.
(ii) Satellites. Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS). 1 each over Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; DSP infra-red surveillance and warning system.
   Control and tracking stations at Guam, Pine Gap and Nurrungar (Australia) (to get 6 mobile ground terminals).
   Will also control Global Positioning System, navigational satellite system, MILSTAR strategic and tactical satellite comms system and Defense
   Meteorological Satellite System.
(iii) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). USAF 474N system: 3 stations:
   Clear, Alaska (AN/FPS-50, AN/FPS-92);
   Thule, Greenland (2-faced phased array, -49A);
   Fylingdales Moor, UK (AN/FPS-50, -49, will be upgraded).
   12 radars detect and track satellites, ICBM and IRBM. 4,800-km range.
(iv) Spacetrack. USAF 496L system. FPS-17 detection, FPS-79 tracking radars at Pirinclik (Turkey); Cobra Dane, Shemya;
   FPS-85, BMEWS at Clear, Thule and Fylingdales;
   optical tracking systems in New Mexico, California, at St Margarets (NB, Canada), Choejong-San (S. Korea), San Vito (Italy), Maui (Hawaii).
(v) Cobra Dane. Phased-array radar system at Shemya, Aleutians: 120 arc, range to 46,000 km (against space targets), augments BMEWS in Alaska.
   (Cobra Judy, a Pacific-based, ship borne phased-array radar (SPQ-11), supplements Shemya and research programmes,
   but is not part of SPADATS and has no early-warning function. Cobra Ball, a RC-135 airborne system, supports both.
(vi) Pacific Radar Barrier (PACBAR). Detection and tracking radars: 1 site at San Miguel, Philippines, 1 at Kwajalein Atoll, third to be selected.
(vii) Alternate Space Defense Center. 1 FPS-85 station in Florida. Linked to Spacetrack and NAVSPASUR (see below) through NORAD HQ;
   also to identify and track fractional-orbit bombardment systems (FOBS). (To be retired when Pave Paws completed.)
(b) USN Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR). 9 field stations in south-east US (3 transmitting, 6 receiving sites and civilian agencies).
(c) Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS). 1 north-facing phased-array system (130 arc, 2,800-km range) at Grand Forks ND.
   Identifies and tracks individual re-entry vehicles, incl SLBM, in Central US, Arctic Ocean areas.
   (Was Army Safeguard system support; to be enhanced.)
(d) Miscellanous radars. US Army: Kwajalein Atoll (Pacific).
   USAF: Ascension Island (Atlantic), Antigua (Caribbean), Kaena Point (Hawaii); MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Westford, Mass.
(e) Integrated Operational Nuclear Detonation Detection System (IONDS).
   Detects and assesses nuclear detonations; linked to 18 NAVSTAR global positioning system satellites (8 now in service; 18 by 1990).
   Nuclear test ban monitoring and intelligence collection, potential damage assessment.
(f) Under development: Ground-based Electro Optical Deep Space Surveillance system (GEODSS):
   White Sands NM, Taegu (S. Korea) and Maui (Hawaii), Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean); 1 more planned for Portugal.
2. SLBM:
Pave Paws system. 1 phased-array radar (AN/FPS-115) each in Massachusetts, Georgia, Texas and California; 5,500-km range.
3. Intermittent programmed recce and ELINT satellites incl:
(a) USAF: KH-8 (Close Look), 80-220-mile orbit, photographic film return. KH-9 Big Bird replaced by KH-11: 160-400-mile polar orbit, digital imagery.
   KH-12 (Ikon).
(b) USN: Ocean Surveillance (OSUS). 4 satellites to detect ships by infra-red and radar.
(c) ELINT: Rhyolite, Ferret, Argus/Chalet, Magnum/Aquacade.
4. Air Defence: (aircraft, cruise missile):
(a) Over-the-horizon-backscatter (OTH-B) radar system. Range 900 km (min) to 3,300 km; all-altitude capability planned.
   One system (3 sites: transmit, receive, control) in Maine, arc of cover under evaluation; 1 planned for Oregon/N. California, south central US.
(b) North Warning System: 13 Seek Igloo AN/FPS-117 automated (minimally attended radar (MAR)) systems in Alaska.
(c) DEW line: 31 radars in Alaska, Canada (13) and Greenland roughly along the 70RN parallel from Point Lay, Alaska to Greenland;
   being upgraded, along with North Warning System; to be supplemented by 39 auxiliary unmanned short-range radars (110-150 km).
(d) US Air Force operates and maintains 2 additional radars in Iceland being upgraded as the North Atlantic Defence System.
(e) Tactical Air Command (TAC):
(i) US-Cdn Joint Surveillance System (JSS).
   4 Region Operations Control Centers (ROCC): 2 in US (1 in Alaska), 2 in Canada. 4 Sector Operation Control Centres (SOCC), all in US.
(ii) Radars. 61 in US (14 in Alaska), 24 in Canada: for co-ordination/control with Federal Aviation Authority facilities of military and civil air traffic,
   surveillance and tracking of objects in high- and medium-altitude trans-polar flight.
(iii) Aircraft: 294 (AD).
(a) Regular: 102: 1 Air Force, 4 air divs:
   3 (CONUS) sqns with 54 F-15 (8 AAM).
   2 (Alaska) sqns with 30 F-15.
   1 (Iceland) sqn with 18 F-15 (See Forces Abroad).
(b) Air National Guard (ANG): 192: 11 sqns:
   7 with 126 F-4C/D (8 AAM).
   2 with 36 F-16A.
   2 with 30 F-106, (4 AAM).
(c) Tactical Air Force augmentation: ac on call from Navy, Marine Corps and Air Forces.
AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow.

ARMY: 774,104 (76,000 women).
7 Army HQ, 6 Corps HQ (1 AB).
4 armd divs (6 tk, 5 mech inf, 4 sp arty, 1 AD, 1 armd cav bns; 1 avn bde; spt units)4
6 mech divs (5 tk, 6 mech inf, 4 sp arty, 1 AD, 1 armd cav bns; 1 avn bde; spt units)4
2 inf divs (1 high-tech motor inf (trials))4
4 lt inf divs, 12 bdes: (10,220 men); 2 with 3 regular, 1 with 2 regular and 1 ARNG, 1 with 2 regular and 1 reserve bdes.
1 air assault div: 3 bdes (each 3 bns), 3 arty bns, avn gp (4 bns: 1 attack, 3 tpt) (to reorg)
1 AB div: 3 bdes (each 3 para bns), reorg. 1 tk, 4 arty, 1 armed hel bns, 1 air cav sqn (to reorg)
1 indep armd bde (2 tk, 1 mech inf, 1 SP med arty bns).
1 indep mech bde (1 tk, 2 mech inf, 1 SP med arty bns).
2 indep inf bdes (3 inf, 1 lt arty bns, 1 tk coy+).
1 air cav bde (2 attack, 1 air cav bns).
3 armd cav regts.
9 arty bdes.
5 AA arty bdes.
Special Operations Command (8,600) (see also Air Force Special Ops):
   4 Special Forces gps (plus 2 National Guard, 2 Reserve) each 3 bns.
   2 Special Ops avn bns.
   Delta Force, attack hel and tpt gp.
   1 Ranger inf regt (3 bns).
   4 Psychological Warfare gps (13 bns).
   1 Civil Affairs bn.
4 Pershing II SSM bns (4 bns with 144 launchers, 1 school bty with 6 launchers).
8 Lance SSM bns (each 6 launchers).
4 Patriot SAM bns: each 6 btys each of 8 launchers, 4 msls, each with radars; planned total 13 Ґ bns (81 btys).
Army Avn:
   1 Gp (4 bns; 60 attack, 200 tpt and utility hel).
   1 air assault bde: corps avn (UH-1, CH-47)bns.
(Org still developing: planned to comprise 32 Regular, 2 National Guard attack hel bns, plus tac, tpt bns.)
Equipment:
MBT: some 13,300: 1,450 M-48A5, 7,352 M-60A3, 4,500 M-1/M-1A1 Abrams.
AFV: some 26,800.
   MICV: some 3,600 M-2/-3 Bradley.
   APC: some 23,200, incl 4,500 M-577, 1,900 M-901 with TOW, 16,800 M-113 (some with mor, TOW).
Arty: how: 5,740: 105mm (?1,100): (?300) M-101, (?800) M-102;
   155mm: 3,660: 220 M-114, 1,000 M-198, 2,440 M-109 SP;
   203mm: 1,046 M-110A1/A2 SP.
   MRL: 227mm: some 300 MLRS.
   Mor: 6,030: 81mm: 3,670; 107mm: 2,360.
   SSM: 150 Pershing II, 50 Lance launchers.
ATK: RCL: 3,560 90mm and 106mm.
   ATGW: some 680 Hellfire, 5,400 TOW, 6,000 Dragon launchers.
AD: guns: 20mm: 220 M-167 Vulcan towed, 380 M-163 SP; 40mm: 500 M-42 SP.
   SAM: Redeye, FIM-92A Stinger, 580 M-54 and M-48 SP Chaparral, 36 Roland SP, Nike Hercules, Improved HAWK,
   192 Patriot launchers, 8 Rapier.
Amph: combat spt craft: 268.
Avn: ac: some 581 incl 98 OV-1C/D, 40 RV-1 (OV-1 mod) 40 RU-21, 4 Short-330, 19 C-7 (DHC-4), 130 C-12D, 37 U-3, 50 U-8, 6 UV-18A (DHC-6),
   100 U-21A; 6 T-41, 51 T-42.
   hel: some 8,651 (1,395 attack hel) incl some 1,135 AH-1S, some 260 AH-64A Apache,
   3,600 UH-1 (being replaced), 920 UH-60A (40 to be EH-60A ECM on conversion), 436 CH-47A/B/C, 61 -D, 70 CH-54 Tarhe,
   369 OH-6A, 1,800 OH-58A/D.
   (trg): ac: incl about 50 T-42. hel: 250 TH-55A.
AAM: MIM-92A Stinger (hel-mounted).
(On order (authorized and funded): 790 M-1 Abrams MBT (total 7,467 planned); 716 M-2/-3 Bradley MICV (total 6,882 planned), 64 M-119 105mm how; 450 M-252 81mm mor; 12,000 TOW, RBS-56 ATGW, 136,000 Swedish AT-4 84mm ATK RL; Stinger (incl POST optical seeker), Rapier, 113 Roland, 122 Chaparral, Improved HAWK (?500 msls), 12 Patriot SAM launchers, 560 msls; 6 RC-12D, 2 C-20 tpt ac; 8 CH/MH-53, some 144 AH-64A, 78 UH-60, 48 CH-47D, 11 EH-60D Quickfix, 44 OH-58D hel; 7 LCU, 4 LSV 282 assault boats.)

DEPLOYMENT: See consolidated entry below.

RESERVES:
(i) Army National Guard (ARNG): 446,000 (22,500 women); 3,285 units; capable after mobilization of manning
   10 divs (2 armd, 2 mech, 5 inf, 1 lt inf);
   18 indep bdes (?3 armd, 6 mech, 9 inf (3 lt) (incl 4 'Roundout' (1 armd, 2 mech, 1 lt inf) with Regular Army divs));
   4 armd cav regts; 1 inf gp (Arctic recce, 5 scout/mech bns);
   20 fd arty bde HQ;
   2 Special Forces gps (6 bns).
   Indep bns: 5 tk, 2 mech, 1 mountain inf, 50 arty, 4 ATK (TOW), 9 AD (1 Roland, 2 Chaparral SAM, 6 M-42 40mm AA arty), 62 engr, 23 sigs, 141 spt.
   760 minor units to fill regular formations/trg units.
   105 air units, 150 sections; 2,580 ac.
(ii) Army Reserve: 310,000 (46,500 women); 3,410 units;
   12 trg divs, 3 trg bdes (1 cav, 1 fd arty, 1 military police).
   Indep combat bdes: 1 mech, 2 inf (incl 1 lt inf 'Roundout');
   67 indep bns, incl 1 tk, 2 inf, 15 arty, 53 engr. 2 Special Forces gps (6 bns:);
   3,225 coys and dets incl 130 indep air units and sections with 566 ac.

NAVY: 583,800 (46,800 women): 4 Fleets:
96 attack subs, 237 principal surface combatants. A further 9 SSN, 19 major surface combat ships are in inactive reserve and storage.
Subs, attack: 96 (incl 10 on refit):
   92 nuclear (SSN):
   36 SSN-688 Los Angeles, all with 4 Harpoon SSM (4 with 12 Tomahawk SLCM; 14 with SUBROC ASW).
   35 SSN-637 Sturgeon with 4 Harpoon, SUBROC (4 with 8 Tomahawk).
   13 SSN-594 Permit with 4 Harpoon, SUBROC.
   1 SSN-685 Lipscomb with SUBROC.
   1 SSN-671 Narwhal with 4 Harpoon.
   4 SSN-585 Skipjack (1 to retire in 1987).
   2 SSN-578 Skate (1 to retire in 1987).
   4 diesel (SS): 3 SS-580 Barbel.
   1 SS-576 Darter.
SSN, other roles: 5:
   2 Sturgeon deep SAR spt.
   2 SSN-608 Allen tpt.
   1 SSN-597 Tullibee.
Principal Surface Combatants: 237.
Aircraft carriers: 15 (incl 3 on refit).
   Nuclear (CVN): 5:
   4 CVN-68 Nimitz (91,400 tons).
   1 CVN-65 Enterprise (89,600 tons).
Conventional (cv): 10 (1 on long refit):
   3 CV-63 Kitty Hawk (78/80,800 tons).
   1 CV-67 Kennedy (82,000 tons).
   4 CV-59 Forrestal (76/79,000 tons).
   2 CV-41 Midway (51/62,000 tons).
All with 1 Air Wing (average 86 ac):
   2 ftr sqns (21 F-14A, 3 RF-14 recce; or (Midway-class) F/A-18.
   3 attack sqns: 2 lt with 24 F/A-18 or A-7E. 1 med with 10 A-6E.
   2 ASW sqns: 1 with 10 S-3A ac; 1 with 6 SH-3H hel.
   1 ECM sqn with 4 EA-6BProwler.
   1 AEW sqn with 4 E-2C; 4 KA-6D tankers.
From 1988, air wings will gradually change to:
   2 ftr sqns (with 20 F-14/RF-14 recce; or (Midway-class) 24 F/A-18).
   4 attack sqns: 2 lt with 20 F/A-18 or A-7E. 2 med with 20 A-6E.
   2 ASW sqns: 1 with 10 S-3A ac; 1 with 6 SH-3H hel.
   1 ECM sqn with 5 EA-6B.
   1 AEW sqn with 5 E-2C.
Battleships (BBG): 3 BB-61 Iowa with 4x4 Harpoon, 8x4 Tomahawk SLCM.
Cruisers: 36 (incl 3 on refit), all with 2x4 Harpoon SSM:
   CGN (nuclear powered): 9:
   4 CGN-38 Virginia with 2x4 Tomahawk SLCM, 2x2 Standard SM-2, BK-1 or -2 or Standard MR/ASROC SAM/ASW, 1 SH-2F hel
   (to get SH-60B LAMPS hel).
   2 CGN-36 California with 2 Standard MR SAM, 1x8 ASROC ASW.
   1 CGN-35 Truxtun with 1x2 Standard ER/ASROC, 1 SH-2F hel.
   1 CGN-9 Long Beach with 2x4 Tomahawk SLCM, 2x2 Standard ER/Terrier SAM, 1x8 ASROC.
   1 CGN-25 Bainbridge with 2x2 Standard ER(SM-1), 1x 8ASROC.
   CG: 27:
   9 CG-47 Ticonderoga (Aegis) with 2 SH-2F LAMPS I or III hel:
   5 with 2x4 Tomahawk SLCM, 2x2 Standard ER (SM-2)/ASROC;
   4 with Harpoon and Standard SM-2/ Tomahawk vertical launch system (VLS) SLCM/SAM (1 trials).
   9 CG-26 Belknap with 1x2 Standard ER, 1 SH-2D LAMPS hel.
   9 CG-16 Leahy with 2x2 Standard ER/'Terrier.
Destroyers: 68:
   GW (DDG): 37:
   4 DDG-993 Kidd with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 2x2 Standard E R SAM, 2x8 ASROC ASW, 2 SH-2F LAMPS I hel.
   10 DDG-37 Farragut (all with 1x2 Standard ER (SM-1) SAM, 1x8 ASROC ASW; 8 with 2x4 Harpoon SSM).
   23 DDG-2 Adams (all with 1x8 ASROC ASW; 18 with 1x4 Harpoon SSM; 13 with 1x2 Tartar SSM; 7 with 1 Tartar SAM;
   3 with Harpoon and RGM-66D/E Standard ARM).
   ASW (DD): 31 Spruance (incl 5 in refit, 10 more in reserve, 1 in NRF (q.v.)), all with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM,
   1x8 ASROC ASW, 1 SH-3 Sea King or 2 SH-2D LAMPS I hel. 4 with 1x2 Tomahawk SLCM (despite weapon fit, still officially DD, not DDG).
Frigates: 115:
   GW (FFG): 56 (incl 1 on refit):
   50 FFG-7 Perry (12 in NRF (q.v.), 1 on refit) with 1 Harpoon/Standard, 2 SH-2/-60B hel.
   6 FFG-1 Brooke with 1 Tartar/Standard, 1x8 ASROC, 1 SH-2D hel.
   Gun (FF): 59 (incl 8 on refit) with 1x8 ASROC:
   46 FF-1052 Knox (7 in NRF (q.v.)) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM (30 with Sea Sparrow Mk 5 BPDMS, 1 with Sea Sparrow Mk 29 SAM); 2 SH-2F hel.
   10 FF-1040 Garcia.
   1 FF-1098 Glover.
   2 FF-1037 Bronstein.
Minor Surface Combatants: some 100.
Patrol craft: some 91:
   GW hydrofoils: 6 PHM-1 Pegasus with 2x4 Harpoon.
   Inshore/river: some 85 PB-, PCF-, PBR- and ATC- Series (in Reserve).
MCMV (Reserve trg): 10:
   3 MSO-422 Aggressive ocean minesweepers.
   7 inshore boats (MSB).
Amph Forces: 60 ships, 66 craft.
Ships: 60:
   Comd (LCC): 2 Blue Ridge.
   LHA: 5 LHA-1 Tarawa with 4 LCU and mix of AV-8B ac or 12 CH-46, 4 CH-53, 3 UH-1N, 4 AH-1T hel; Mastiff drones.
   LPH: 7 LPH-2 Iwo Jima (mix of AV-8B, 4 OV-10 ac or 2 CH-46, 10 CH-53, 1 UH-1N hel).
   LPD: 13: 11 LPD-4 Austin, 2 LPD-1 Raleigh.
   LSD: 10: 2 LSD-41 Whidbey, 5 LSD-36 Anchorage, 3 LSD-28 Thomaston.
   LST: 18 LST-1179 Newport.
   LKA (amph cargo ships): 5 LKA-113 Charleston.
Craft: 66.
   LCAC: 9. 1 assault craft unit with 6 LCAC (each 60-ton: 1 MBT capacity), 2nd forming with 3; each to get 45 LCAC.
   LCU: 53 Type 1610, 4 Type 1466 (NRF).
   Many smaller (LCM-5/-6, 22 'Mini'), numerous misc LCVP, 2 experimental LCAC; others with US Army.
Special Operations Forces (2,100):
2 Navy Special Warfare Groups (4 units):
   6 Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams.
   2 SEAL delivery veh teams.
   2 Special Boat sqns (6 units).
   2 lt assault sqns (Navy Reserve).
   3 amph tpt subs (2 SSN-608).
4 Civil Affairs gps (Marine Corps Reserve).
Active Auxiliary ships: 84:
   12 ammunition (AE-21/-23/-25), 7 stores (AFS), 4 underway replenishment (AOE), 14 oilers (AO-5/-177, AOR),
   9 destroyer tenders (AD), 12 sub tenders (AS/AGDS), 3 repair (AR/AR4), 19 salvage/rescue (ARS/ASR/ATS),
   2 comd (AGF, 1 carrier (trg; no ac assigned), 1 research sub (AGSS).
Military Sealift Command: 123:
(1) Strategic Mobility: 65:
(a) 2 Ro-Ro vehicle carriers (AKR); 5 cargo, 1 container (AK); 22 tankers/tug-tank barges; 8 fast sealift ships (TAKR); 2 hospital ships (TAH).
(b) Afloat pre-positioning: 7 cargo (AK), 1 ultra-heavy semi-submersible, 4 tankers (AOT), 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (TAKR).
   1 sqn each: Atlantic, Western Pacific, Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), each sqn spt 1 Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).
(2) Fleet Auxiliary Force:37:
   1 ammunition ship (AE), 4 stores (AFS/AF), 13 tankers (AO), 10 ocean surveillance (TAGOS), 2 fleet missile re-supply (AK), 7 tugs (ATF).
(3) Special Mission: 21:
   4 range instrumentation (AGM/AGIS) 4 ocean, 1 under-sea research (AGOR), 3 cable repair (ARC), 1 test support (AG), 8 survey ships (AGS).
Maritime Administration: Strategic Sealift: 218:
(1) Ready Reserve Force (RRF): 85: incl 74 cargo, (incl 17 vehicle), 8 gasoline tankers (AOG), 1 passenger ship (AP); 3 crane (TACS)
(2) National Defense Reserve Fleet (NRF): sea lift only: 133
   26 dry cargo, 10 tankers, 97 'victory' cargo.
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NRF): combat: 43:
   1 DD-945 Hull, 12 FFG-7, 7 FF-1052, 16 MSO-509, 2 LST, 4 LCU, 3 salvage.
Auxiliary Strategic Sealift: 307.
   167 civilian US-flag dry cargo and 1,140 tankers/tug barges (of which 17 cargo and 89 tankers are under naval control) are potentially
   available on mobilization to augment previous marine lift holdings.
Ships on refit (incl Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)) incl
   6 SSBN (5 more planned to 1988), 10 SSN, 1 battleship (BB) (1988), 3 CV, 3 CGN, 5 DDG, 5 DD, 1 FFG, 8 FF, 1 LPH, 1 LPD-4, 3 LST.
Ships in inactive reserve and storage incl 9 SSN, 4 CV (2 attack carriers (CVA), 2 ASW (CVS-12)), 2 cruisers, 3 DDG-3, 10 DD-931,
   5 LSD-28, 3 LST-1173, 2 repair, 1 sub tender, 1 oiler, 3 ATF, 1 hospital ship.
Msls:
   ASW, nuclear: RUR-5 ASROC, UUM-44 SUBROC.
   SSM: RGM-66D Standard ARM, RGM-66E Standard ARM (ASROC launcher), RGM-84 Harpoon, BGM-109B Tomahawk SLCM.
   SAM: RIM-7E-5, RIM-7M Sea Sparrow, RIM-24 Tartar, RIM-2 Terrier, RIM-66A/B Standard-1 (SM-1) MR,
   RIM-66C Standard-2 MR (Aegis), RIM-67A Standard ER (SM-1), RIM-67B Standard-2 (SM-2) ER.
   (MR = medium range, ER = extended range.)
(On order (authorized and funded): 5 SSBN, 22 SSN-688, 3 CVN, 14 CG-47, 2 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke, 1 FFG(1988), 11 MCM-1, 1 MHC-1 (mod Lerici), 2 landing helicopter dock ship (LHD-1), 4 LSD, 14 landing craft, 27 LCAC, 2 Seafox special warfare craft, 2 TAO-187 fleet oilers, 3 surveillance, 24 supply, 4 salvage ships; 249 Tomahawk, 347 Harpoon SSM, 1,100 Standard SAM, 27 Phalanx, 321 Sea Sparrow AD systems.)

NAVAL AVIATION: 13 attack carrier air wings.
Ftr: 24 sqns with F-14A.
FGA: 42 sqns:
   16 med with A-6E, KA-6D (tanker).
   14 1t with A-7E.
   12 with F/A-18A.
ELINT: 2 sqns with EA-3, EP-3.
EWng: 12 sqns with EA-6B.
MR: 37 (13 Reserve) land-based sqns with P-3B, P-3C, P-3C III.
ASW: 12 sqns with S-3A.
AEW: 14 sqns with E-2C.
Comd: 2 sqns with EC-130Q (TACAMO).
Misc: 14 spt sqns with C-130F, LC-130F/R, EC-130G/Q, C-2A, CT-39, C-131, UC-12B ac; and hel (see below).
Trg: 5 "Aggressor" sqns with F-21A Kfir, F-5E/F, T-38, A-4, (F-16N being delivered).
   18 trg sqns: 2 with F/A-18B, 16 with T-2B/C, T-34C, T-39, T-44 ac; and hel (see below).
OCU: 17:
   4 ftr/strike (2 with F-14, 2 with F-18).
   4 attack with TA-7C, A-7E, A-6.
   3 EWng with EA-6B, EA-3.
   2 MR with P-3B/C.
   2 AEW with E-2B/C.
   2 ASW with S-3A.
Hel:
ASW: 25 sqns:
   5 with SH-60B (LAMPS MkIII).
   6 with SH-2F (LAMPS MkI).
   14 with SH-3H.
MCM: 2 sqns with RH-53D.
OCU: 9 with SH-2/-3/-60B, UH-1, CH-46, CH-53.
Misc: 6 spt sqns with SH-3, 4 with CH-46, 1 with CH-53E.
Trg: 2 sqns with TH-57A/B/C.
Equipment: combat: some 1,701 ac; some 313 hel.
Aircraft:
   F-14A Tomcat: 348 (252 ftr, 36 recce, 60 OCU).
   F/A-18 Hornet: 222 (144 FGA, 45 OCU,33 -B trg).
   F-5E/T-38 Talon: 12.
   F-21A Kfir: 12 ("Aggressor" trg).
   A-4/TA-4F/J Skyhawk: 18 (OCU/trg).
   A-6 Intruder: 319: -E: 212 (FGA, OCU); EA-6B Prowler: 63 (EWng); KA-6D: 44 (tanker).
   A-7E Corsair: 210 (FGA); TA-7C(OCU).
   E-2C Hawkeye: 70: 56 (AEW); -B/C: 14 (OCU).
   EA-3 Skywarrior: 21 (ELINT).
   P-3 Orion: 397: -A-B/-C/-CIII: 345 (MR); 40 (OCU); EP-3: 12 (ELINT).
   S-3A Viking: 140 (110 ASW, 30 OCU).
   C-130 Hercules: 28: -Q: 15 (comd); -F/LC-130F/R: 13 (misc).
   CT-39: 9 (misc). C-117 (C-47): 4 (misc). C-9B (DC-9): 27 (tpt). UC-12A: 38 (misc).
   T-2B/C: 178 (trg). US-3: 6 (tpt). T-34C: 334 (trg). T-44: 46 (trg).
Helicopters:
   RH-53D Sea Stallion: 21 (MCM).
   SH-60B Sea Hawk: 84 (ASW).
   SH-2F Sea Sprite: 104 (ASW, OCU).
   SH-3D/H Sea King: 104 (ASW, OCU; 26 more being delivered.
   CH-46: Sea Knight: 88 (tpt, OCU) being updated.
Missiles:
AAM: AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-54A/C Phoenix, AIM-9 Sidewinder.
ASM: AG M-78D Standard ARM, AGM-45 Shrike, AGM-88A HARM (anti-radiation); AGM-84 Harpoon.
(On order (authorized and funded): 18 F-14C/N, F-16N ftrs, 11 A-6E attack, 6 E-2C AEW, 9 P-3C MR, 12 EA-6B ECM, 8 C-2A tpt, 15 T-47A Citation (on lease); 12 F-21A (Kfir) ftr/trg, 12 T-45A Goshawk (BAe Hawk) trg; 2 C-130Q comd ac; 6 SH-2F, 17 MH-53 MCM (being delivered), 17 SH-60B, 9 HH-60H
combat rescue hel; 187 Harpoon SSM; 265 AIM-54C Phoenix, 1,695 AGM-65F Maverick, 825 HARM ASM; 1,551 AIM-7 Sparrow, 2,120 AIM-9 Sidewinder AAM.)
DEPLOYMENT: See consolidated entry below.
RESERVES:
Training ships: 54 (assigned from active fleet):
   1 DD, 12 FFG-7, 6 FF-1052, 18 ocean minesweepers (MSO), 2 LST, 3 salvage ships.
   11 MCM 'craft of opportunity' harbour protection vessels authorized.
Aviation: 23,000; 400+ ac.
2 carrier wings: 16 sqns:
   6 attack (4 with 48 A-7E; 2 with 24 F/A-18).
   4 ftr with F-14.
   2 AEW with 12 E-2C.
   2 ECM with EA-6A/B.
   2 tanker with KA-3B.
2 MR wings: 13 sqns with 117 P-3A/B/C.
1 tac spt wing: 14 sqns:
   2 composite with TA-4J.
   12 spt (11 with C-9B (DC-9), 1 with C-131 (Convair CV-580)).
1 hel wing: 8 sqns:
   4 ASW (1 with SH-3D, 3 with SH-2F).
   2 lt attack with 16 AH-1J.
   1 SAR with HH-3.
   1 MCM sqn with RH-53D.
   2 combat spt sqns to form.
(To form: aircrew augmentation units: 2 for 18 F-14, 2 for 13 A-6E, 2 for 12 E-2C, 1 for 2 KA-3, 2 for 10 SH-3H).
Special Operations Forces:
   6 NAVSPECWAR gp dets.
   2 NAVSPECWAR task gps.
   1 SEAL det.
   2 special boat sqns.
   4 special boat units.
   1 engineer spt unit.
   2 lt attack hel sqns.
Miscellaneous units:
   Naval Construction: 1 bde: 9 regts, 17 bns.
   4 construction spt, 4 maintenance units; 13 cargo handling bns, 8 MCM COOP (craft of opportunity), 2 ordnance disposal (EOD) units, 2,300 other units.

MARINE CORPS: 199,600 (9,700 women).
3 divs, each of 9 inf, 1 recce, 1 tk, 1 engr, 1 amph, 1 AD (forming), 3 arty bns.
2 bns Marine Corps Security Force to form (to be deployed 1 each in Atlantic and Pacific).
Equipment:
Tks: 716 M-60A1.
AFV: APC: some 1,300 AAV-7A1/LVT-7A1 (all roles),
   some 758 lt armd vehicles (LAV) incl 422 LAV-25 (25mm gun), LAV-M (mor), LAV-AT (TOW), spt incl LAV-L (logistic).
amph: 4 LCAC.
Arty: guns: 175mm SP (to be replaced). how: 105mm: 144 M-101A1. 155mm: 210 M-198/M-114 towed, 75 M-109A3 SP; 203mm: 25 M-110A2 SP.
Mor: 81mm: 216 (some LAV-M SP).
ATK: ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
AD: SAM: Redeye, Stinger.

AVIATION: 3 active air wings (27,000).
Ftr: 12 sqns:
   4 with F-4 (being replaced).
   8 with F/A-18.
FGA: 13 sqns:
   8 lt (4 with AV-8B; 4 with A-4).
   5 med with A-6.
Recce: 1 sqn with 21 RF-4.
ECM: 1 sqn with 15 EA-6B.
Forward air control: 2 sqns with OV-10.
Comd: 2 sqns with OA-4/TA-4.
Tanker: 3 sqns with KC-130 Hercules.
Trg: 7 sqns + 2 elms, incl 1 adversary sqn with F-21 Kfir.
Hel: 30 sqns:
attack: 3 with AH-1.
tpt: 15 med with CH-46, 9 hy with CH-53.
utility: 3 with UH-1E/N.
Equipment: combat: 472 ac, 84 armed hel.
Aircraft:
F-4 Phantom: 81: -N/S: 60 (ftr); RF-4B: 21 (recce).
F/A-18 Hornet: 96 (FGA).
AV-8B/C Harrier. 73 (57 FGA, 16 trg).
A-4 Skyhawk: 116: -E/F/M: 86 (FGA, trg); OA-4M: 24 (comd); TA-4F: 6 (trg).
A-6 Intruder: 69: -E: 54 FGA; EA-6A/B Prowler. 15 (ECM).
OV-10A/D Bronco: 37: 35 (forward air control), 2 (trg).
F-21 Kfir: 13 (trg).
KC-130F/R: 42: 36 (tanker) 6 (trg).
Helicopters:
AH-1 J/T/W Sea Cobra: 84: 72 (attack), 12 (trg).
UH-1E/N (Bell 204, 212): 80: 72 (tpt), 8 (trg).
CH-46E: 200 (180 assault, 20 trg).
CH-53: 172: -A/D: 96 (assault), 28 (trg). -E: 48 (heavy lift).
Missiles:
SAM: 3 bns with Improved HAWK; 3 low altitude AD (LAAD) bns forming with Stinger.
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder.
ASM: Maverick.
(On order (authorized and funded): 240 LVT-7A1; M-109 SP 155mm how; 180 Mk-19 40mm grenade launchers; SMA W 83mm RL; TOW-2 ATGW; 9,359 Stinger SAM. 71 F/A-18, 6 EA-6B, 210 AV-8B ftr, 16 A-6E attack, 2 KC-130T tanker ac, some 22 AH-1T, 45 CH-53E, 118 MV-22 Osprey hel; 2,375 AGM-65E Maverick, 512 Sidearm ASM.)
DEPLOYMENT: see consolidated entry below.

RESERVES: 43,000 (1,446 women).
Equipment listed with Regular units.
1 Marine div: 3 inf, 1 arty regts; 22 combat and spt bns.
1 air wing: 104 combat ac, 8 combat hel.
Ftr: 3 sqns with 30 F-4S.
FGA: 5 sqns with 62 A-4E/M.
EWng: 1 sqn with 4 EA-6A.
Forward air control: 1 sqn with 18 OV-10A.
Tanker: 2 tkr/tpt sqns with 17 KC-130F Hercules.
Hel:
Attack: 1 sqn with 8 AH-1J.
Assault: tpt: 3 sqns (2 med with 24 CH-46C/D, 1 hy with 18 CH-53A). utility: 3 sqns with 24 UH-1E.
SAM: 1 bn with HAWK; 1 bty with Stinger.
Spt: 23 units.

Coast Guard (by law a branch of the Armed Forces; in peacetime under the Department of Transportation):
Budget 1985: BA$2,564 bn, outlay $2,539 bn.
   1986: BA$2.199 bn, outlay $2,453 bn.
Strength: 38,837 (2,374 women).
243 cutters (incl 14 high-endurance (2,600-3,000 tons; 12 with hel deck), 34 med-endurance (1,000+ tons; 5 more ordered)), 5 ocean icebreakers,
   8 icebreaking tugs (1 more ordered), 93 patrol craft (11 more ordered), 3 SES, 28 ocean buoy tenders, 93 other vessels;
some 2,000 small craft; 560 shore installations;
   70 ac (2 E-2C Hawkeye, 41 HU-25A (Dassault Falcon-Gardiari), 25 HC-130H (Hercules), 1 VC-4A (Gulfstream I), 1 VC-11A (Gulfstream II));
   126 hel (22 HH-65A, 37 HH-3F Pelican, 67 HH-52A (Sikorsky S-62; to be replaced by 96 HH-65A (AS-365G Dolphin 2)).
(On order: 5 HH-60J MRR (medium-range recovery) hel).

Coast Guard Reserve: 20,830. Selected: 15,590; Ready 5,240; Standby 813; Retired 2,000.
194 port security units in 48 ports, 65 general spt units, 63 reserve gps, 85 small craft.
Coast Guard Auxiliary. 35,500 civilian volunteer force; augments regular force in emergencies.

AIR FORCE: 606,800 (69,000 women); some 4,885 combat ac.
Strategic: (organization: see p. 15).
Tactical: 25 active combat wings, comprising 79 sqns (sqn may be 18 or 24 ac).
Ftr: 41 sqns (also have FGA commitment):
   17 with F-15.
   24 with F-16.
FGA: 38 sqns:
   8 with F-4.
   10 with F-111.
   14 with A-10.
   6 Wild Weasel (1 trg) with F-4.
Recce: 7 sqns (2 trg) with RF-4C.
EWng: 1 Airborne Warning and Control wing; 7 sqns:
   4 AWACS (1 trg) with E-3.
   3 EWng with EC-130, EC-135, EF-111.
Forward air control: 9 tac air control sqns:
   8 with OV-10/O-2.
   1 with CH-3 hel.
Special Ops (4,100): 1 wing; 5 sqns:
   3 with MC-130/EC-130.
   1 with AC-130.
   1 with MH-53 hel.
   1 det with UH-1N hel.
   2 Reserve gps.
OCU: 18: 1 with F-111; 1 with F-16; 7 with F-4; 1 with F-5; 2 with F-15; 3 with A-10; 1 with RF-4.
Trg: 4 aggressor sqns with F-5E/T-38.
   30 trg sqns with F-16, T-37, T-38, T-39, T-41, T-43, UV-18 (DHC-6), Schweizer 2-37, C-5, C-12, C-130, C-141 ac
   and UH-60, HH-3, HH-53, U/TH-1 hel.
Tpt: 31 sqns:
   17 strategic: 4 with C-5; 13 with C-141.
   12 tac airlift with C-130.
   Units with KC-10, C-135, C-137, C-140, C-9, C-12, C-20, C-21, C-23, CT-39.
SAR: 6 sqns (inc SAC msl spt) with HC-130 ac, HH-3, HH-53, UH-1, UH-60 hel.
Medical: 3 medical evacuation sqns with C-9 (DC-9).
Weather recce: 2 sqns with WC-130, WC-135.
Trials/weapons trg units with F-4, F-5, F-15, F-16, T-38, C-141 ac, UH-1 hel.
Tac missiles: 4 wings with BGM-109G GLCM.
Equipment:
Strategic: some 412 combat ac.
Aircraft:
   B-52 Stratofortress: 263: -G: 167 (98 with ALCM, 69 with Harpoon); -H: 96 strike (46 with ALCM). A number will be out of service undergoing mod.
   B-1B: 54 (strike).
   FB-111A: 61 (56 strike, trg; 5 reserve).
   SR-71A/B Blackbird: 11 (recce).
   U-2CT/R: 13 (11 recce, 2 trg).
   TR-1: 15: -A: 13 (recce); -B: 2 (trg).
   E-4 (Boeing 747): 4 (comd/control): -A: 1;-B: 3.
   C-135 (Boeing 707): 698: RC-135: 20 (surveillance, comd/control); EC-135: 39 (comd/control);
   KC-135R: 639 (tankers; (511 Regular, 104 Air National Guard, 24 Air Force Reserve)) (see Tactical, below).
   KC-10A (DC-10): 57 tkr/tpt.
Tactical: 4,473 combat ac, 44 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   F-4 Phantom: 1,010 (incl 466 (FGA), 150 (OCU)); -G: 72 (Wild Weasel); RF-4C: 322.
   F-15 Eagle: 786 (incl 40 OCU, 54 AD).
   F-16 Falcon: 1,124 (incl 29 OCU, 65 trials).
   F-111: 292: -A/D/E/F: 216 (56 bbr, 160 FGA); -A: 40 (OCU); EF-111A: 36 (ECM).
   F-5: 101 (trg).
   A-7D/K Corsair: 368 (FGA).
   A-10A Thunderbolt: 653 (460 FGA, 105 OCU, 98 reserve).
   E-3A Sentry: 34 (AEW, 24 to convert to -3B).
   OA-37B Dragonfly: 86 (forward air control).
   OV-10 Bronco/O-2A Skymaster: 145 (forward air control).
   C-9A/C (DC-9) Nightingale: 17 (medical).
   C-141B Starlifter: 250 (218 strategic tpt, 16 trg, 16 with reserves).
   C-5 Galaxy: 89: -A: 73 (67 strategic tpt, 6 trg. (15 with Reserves)); -B: 16.
   C-130 Hercules: 746 (296 Reserves) incl: 494 (tpt, incl 288 Reserves); 30 (OCU, incl 8 Reserves); AC-130H: 9 (special);
   EC-130E/H: 15 (ECM, 4 special); HC-130H/N/P: 53 (48 SAR, 5 trg); MC-130E/H: 11 (special); WC-130E/H: 12 (weather recce).
   C-135 (Boeing 707): 9: EC-135K: 2 (EWng); WC-135B: 7 (weather recce).
   C-137 (Boeing 707): 7: -B: 3 (707-153, VIP tpt); -C: 4 (707-320B, VIP tpt).
   MiG-21: 24 (trg). MiG-23: 4 (trg). C-12: 80 (liaison). C-18 (Boeing 707-323C): 8.
   C-20A (Gulfstream): 8 (tpt). C-21A (Learjet): 79. C-22 (Boeing 727): 5 (tpt). C-23A (Sherpa): 18 (tpt).
   T-37B: 608 (trg). CT-39 (Sabreliner): 14 (tpt). T-39: 4 (trg). T-38: 812 (trg). T-41A/C: 100 (trg). T-43A: 18 (trg).
   Boeing 737A: 15 (trg). UV-18A (Twin Otter): 2 (trg). Schweizer 2-37: 8 (trg).
Helicopters:
   HH-3: 46 (SAR, trg).
   CH-3: 28 (forward air control, special).
   MH-53: 31: -H Pave Low. 8 (special); -J: 23 (converted HH-53B/C).
   UH-1: 68: incl -N (Bell 212): 3 (special); -H (Bell 205): 23 (missile site spt).
   UH-60A: 9 (SAR).
Missiles:
   AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow.
   ASM: perhaps 1,170 AGM-69A SRAM, 1,380 AGM-86B ALCM; Maverick; Shrike; HARM.
   GLCM: BGM-109G.
(On order (authorized and funded; all branches): some 21 MX ICBM, B-1B bbrs (100 planned), 3 TR-1A recce (1 -1B trg), KC-10A tankers, 2 C-25A (Boeing 747), 180 F-16 (incl 60 -D), 48 F-15 ftrs, 34 C-5B; 24 MC-130H Combat Talon, 1 C-20B Gulfstream lt tpt; BGM-109 GLCM; HARM, AGM-65D Maverick ASM.)

DEPLOYMENT: See consolidated entry below.

RESERVES:
(i) Air National Guard (ANG): 107,900: 24 wings, 67 gps, 88 sqns (56 tac); 952 combat ac.
Ftr: 11 AD interceptor sqns; 192 ac (see p. 16).
FGA: 33 sqns.
   2 with 25 F-16;
   12 with 188 F-4C/D/E (1 OCU with 20 -C); 1 Wild Weasel with 12 F-4G;
   13 with 270 A-7D/K (1 OCU with A-7, F-16);
   5 with 96 A-10A.
Recce: 6 sqns with 108 RF-4C.
ECM: 1 sqn with 8 EC-130.
Forward air control: 3 sqns with 53 OA-37B.
Tpt: 19 sqns:
   17 tac (Military Airlift Command; MAC) with 168 C-130A/B/E/H;
   2 strategic: 1 with 7 C-5; 1 with 8 C-141B.
Tanker: 13 sqns with 104 KC-135.
SAR: 2 sqns with 8 HC-130 ac, 11 HH-3E hel.
Trg: ac incl 4 T-39, 40 T-33, 4 T-43A.

(ii) Air Force Reserve: 74,800. 19 wings, 57 sqns (36 with ac); 220 combat ac.
FGA: 11 sqns (Tactical Air Comd; TAC):
   2 with 36 F-16;
   5 with 102 F-4D;
   4 with 72 A-10.
Tpt: 16 sqns (MAC):
   14 tac with 120 C-130A/B/E/H;
   2 strategic: 1 with 8 C-5A; 1 with 8 C-141B.
Tanker: 3 sqns: 3 (SAC) with 24 KC-135.
Special: 2 sqns (MAC): 1 with 10 AC-130A ac, 1 with 6 CH-3E hel.
Weather: 1 sqn with 4 WC-130.
SAR: 3 sqns with 14 HC-130H ac, 8 HH-3E, 8 UH-1H/N hel.
Associate: 21 sqns (personnel only):
   MAC: 4 sqns for C-5, 13 for C-141, 1 aero medical for C-9.
   SAC: 3 sqns for KC-10.
   Non-flying spt units: 172.
(iii) Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF): 368 commercial ac (numbers fluctuate):
321 long-range:
   247 passenger (Boeing 747, L-1011, DC-8/-10),
   74 cargo (Boeing 707, 747, DC-8/-10).
47 short-range (Boeing 727, DC-9).

STRATEGIC RESERVE:
Planned Force Structure:
(a) 3 corps HQ, all CONUS-based active units.
(b) Initial reinforcement, Europe: 1 corps HQ, 2 armd, 3 mech divs, 1 armd cav regt.ї
(c) US Central Command (USCENTCOM): (1,100): forces, incl naval and air, apportioned for planning purposes.
   Full deployment could involve 307,600 assigned from existing units and support elements on mobilization.
HQ: 1 army; 1 corps (131,000): 1 mech (-), 3 inf, 1 AB, 1 air assault divs, 1 air cav bde, special forces, Rangers.
Naval Force: 1 (112,300 incl 70,000 Marines): 3 carrier battle gps, 1 surface action gp, 3 amph ready gps (3-5 amph ships), 5ASW patrol sqns,
   17 prepositioned depot ships.
Marine Force: l'/3 Amph Forces (MAF: 50,000: 1 div, 1 air wing, 1 Force service spt gp),
   1 Marine Amph Bde (MAB: 16,000: 1 regt landing team, 1 air gp, 1 bde service spt gp).
Air Force: 1 (33,000): 1 div: 2 bbr wings (4 sqns) B-52H, 9 wings and 2 gps tac fighters, 3 wings and 1 gp strategic recce, 1 tac recce wing,
   1 airborne warning and control div, strategic and SAR, tac airlift, 1 refuelling sqn (KC-135A/KC-10A).

DEPLOYMENT:

ARMY:
(i) Continental United States (CONUS); 5 Army, 3 corps HQ. 2 armd, 4 mech, 3 inf (incl 2 lt), 1 AB, 1 air mobile divs.
(a) Alaska (7,650): 1 lt inf div (plus 1 Army National Guard inf gp (5 Scout bns)).
(b) Panama (9,330): 1 inf bde (6,500).
(c) Honduras (1,000).
(ii) Hawaii (18,900): WESTCOM: 1 lt inf div (3 Regular bdes), 1 lt inf bde (National Guard),
(iii) Abroad: Europe: 217,100.
(a) Germany 204,700: 1 army, 2 corps HQ; 2 armd, 2 mech divs; 1 armd, 1 mech bdes; 2 armd cav regts; 7 fd arty bdes, 4 indep arty gps;
   9 SSM bns, 3 with 108 Pershing II, 6 with 36 Lance, 30 AD btys with HAWK, 3 bns with Patriot SAM (each 6 btys each 8 quad msls); 5,000 MBT.//
(b) West Berlin: 4,300. HQ elms, 1 inf bde.
(c) Greece: 470.
(d) Italy: 3,950.
(e) Netherlands: 930.
(f) Turkey: 1,200.
(g) Belgium: 1,160.
(h) Other: 390.
(iv) Pacific: 32,150.
(a) South Korea 29,100: 1 army HQ; 1 inf div (13,900); 1 SSM bty with Lance.
(b) Japan 2,400: 1 corps HQ; base and spt personnel,
(v) Middle East: Egypt: 1,200.
(vi) Caribbean/Latin America: 6,730.

NAVY:
Bases; average strength of major combat ships, incl ships on refit:
(i) Atlantic/Mediterranean: SSBN: 28 Cruisers: 13 SSN/SS: 55 Destroyers: 39 Carriers: 8 Frigates: 53 Battleships: 1 Amph: 29
(a) Atlantic (Second Fleet): 28 SSBN, 51 SSN/SS, 7 carriers, 93 principal surface combatants, 24 amph.
(b) Mediterranean (20,100): Sixth Fleet: typically up to 4 SSN, 1 carrier, 9 surface combatants, 9 spt ships;
   1 Amph Ready Gp (3-5 ships 1 MAU),** 1 Maritime pre-positioning sqn (MPS): 4 depot ships.
Bases: CONUS: Norfolk (HQ), Mayport, Roosevelt Roads (Puerto Rico), Charleston, New London, Newport, New York (Brooklyn), Boston,
   New Orleans, Kings Bay; Panama (600).
Bases: abroad: Cuba (Guantdnamo Bay) 2,100; Bermuda 1,500; Iceland (Keflavik) 1,700; United Kingdom (Holy Loch (10 SSBN) and other) 2,300.
   Other NATO-assigned personnel 14,850: Italy (Gaeta (HQ), Naples, Sigonella, La Maddalena) 5,250. Spain (Rota) 4,500. Portugal (Lajes, Azores),
(ii) Pacific/Indian Ocean: SSBN: 8, SSN/SS: 40, Carriers: 6, Battleships: 2, Cruisers: 18, Destroyers: 29, Frigates: 47, Amph: 32
(a) Eastern Pacific (Third Fleet):
   Bases: Pearl Harbor (HQ), San Francisco, Alameda, San Diego, Long Beach, Bangor, Bremerton, Adak (Alaska).
   8 Ohio SSBN, some 25 SSN, 4 carriers, 1 battleship, 67 principal surface combatants, 21 amph, 30 spt.
(b) Western Pacific (42,100), Seventh Fleet:
   Bases: Japan (Yokosuka; HQ), (Sasebo) 8,100. Philippines (Subic Bay) 5,900; Guam, Midway 4,900 incl Marine det; Australia some 600.
   Some 15 SSN and SS: 2 carriers (1 hel), 23 surface combatants, 9 amph (1 MAU embarked), 8 spt ships; 1 MPS: 6 ships.
(c) Indian Ocean; dets from Seventh/Second Fleets 11,000:
   Base. Diego Garcia (1,700).
   1 carrier battle gp (6 surface combatants); 5 MPS (eqpt for one MAB).
(d) Middle East Force (Persian Gulf/Bahrain):
   1 comd ship, usually 4 destroyers/frigates; temporary deployment; 1 cruiser and 4 escorts in July.

MARINES:
(i) CONUS: 2 Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) (1 East coast, 1 West coast (44,000)) each with 1 div of 3 regts, tk, assault amph, engr, recce bns;
   70 tks (to be 58), 108 155mm how (18 SP), 208 amph, 147 LAV; 1 air wing: 40 AV-8/A-4, 20 A-6E attack, 48 F-4/F/A-18 FGA ac, 1 spt gp.**
(ii) Panama: 155.
(iii) Abroad: 42,500.
(a) Caribbean: Cuba (Guantdnamo Bay) 435; 1 reinforced marine coy.
(b) Europe: 1,300.
(c) Middle East (afloat: Mediterranean (6th Fleet): 1,900; 1 MAU*).
(d) Pacific:
(i) Okinawa (HQ): 38,150; 1 MAF (1 div (1 MAB) 23,000, 1 air wing (Japan, Hawaii), 1 log spt gp).
(ii) Hawaii: 1 MAB, service spt gp, ac gp.
(iii) Philippines (7th Fleet): 1,200; 1 MAU deployed intermittently.
(e) Indian Ocean: 660; 1 MAU deployed intermittently.

AIR FORCE
(i) CONUS:
(a) Tactical Air Command (TAC; incl AD ac) (104,412): 2 Air Forces; 12 air divs;
   28 wings (15 tac air): 36 combat sqns (30 ftr, 3 tac recce, 3 tac air control); 6 tac trg sqns.
(b) Alaskan Air Command (10,830): 1 ftr wing (AD: 2 sqns with F-15), 1 sqn (TAC) with 2 E-3 AWACS, 1 composite wing (1 sqn with A-10, 1 with O-2A),
   1 control (warning) gp, 13 radars (being modernized), 2 combat spt gps, 1 strategic recce wing; 1 air base gp, 2 sqns.
(c) Military Airlift Command (MAC) (78,055): 3 Air Forces; 2 airlift divs;
   28 wings (5 tac, 8 strategic, 1 military airlift spt, 3 air base, 1 SAR, 1 SAR/weather recce, 1 medical, 1 special ops, 6 weather, 1 trg);
   19 gps (2 tac, 3 strategic, 3 military airlift, 1 spt, 9 air base, 1 airlift/trg). Ac deployed as required, world-wide.
(d) Spt Elm Comds (171,500): Comms, Log, Systems, Trg, Electronic Security.
(e) Panama: (2,100) A-7, C-130 ac.
(ii) Europe 92,700: US Air Force, Europe (USAFE); 3 Air Forces, 2 Air Divs, 9 tac ftr, 2 tac recce, 4 tac msl wings; airlift spt.
   Some 735 combat ac, 256 GLCM.
(a) Belgium 1,500.
   1 tactical msl wing, 16 GLCM.
(b) United Kingdom 27,500; 292 combat ac, 96 GLCM. 1 Air Force HQ:
   5 tac ftr wings; 16 sqns (7 with 140 F-111E/F, 1 with 12 EF-111 Raven, 6 with 108 A-10, 1 with 19 F-5E, 1 with 13 TR-1A).
   1 tac tpt wing with 16 C-130 (MAC); 4 EC-135H(SAC).
   1 SAR sqn with 5 HC-130, 5 HH-53.
   1 tactical missile wing, 96 GLCM.
   2 Air Base Gps.
(c) Germany 41,100: 324 combat ac, 64 GLCM. 1 Air Force HQ: 2 Air Divs.
   4 tac ftr wings: 11 sqns (7 with 168 F-16A/B, 1 with 24 F-4G; 3 with 72 F-15C/D).
   1 tac recce wing, 1 sqn with 18 RF-4C.
   1 tac msl wing (64 GLCM).
   1 electronic combat, 2 combat spt, 1 tac air control wings and 1 gp of 3 sqns (2 with 42 OV-10A ac, 1 with 7 CH-53C hel).
   1 tpt wing (MAC) 4 sqns (incl 18 C-23A Sherpa, 16 C-130E).
   1 special operations sqn (MAC) with 4 MC-130E.
   2 Air Base Gps.
(d) Netherlands 2,000: 24 combat ac.
   1 tac ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D.
(e) Spain 7,200: 1 Air Force HQ: 72 combat ac.
   1 tac wing of 3 sqns with 72 F-16A/B.
   1 ftr trg wing (no ac assigned).
   1 Air Base Gp.
   1 SAR det (MAC) with 3 UH-1N hel.
   (1 TAC fighter wing (F-4E) in US on call as reinforcements.)
(f) Italy 5,800: 1 tac, 1 air base gps, 1 tac msl wing (80 GLCM).
(g) Greece 2,700: 2 air base gps.
(h) Turkey 3,800: HQ, 1 tac, 1 air base gps.
(i) Other areas: 3,100:
   Iceland (TAC, 1,300): 1 AD sqn with 18 F-15, 1-3 E-3 AWACS. 1 SAR det (MAC) with 3 HH-3.
   Lajes (Azores) MAC/7SAC: 1,800.
(ii) Pacific: Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): 37,000: Hawaii; 2 Air Force HQ: 3 air divs; 5 tac ftr wings and 2 indep ftr sqns; 1 tac control gp;
   2 air base wings and 1 indep sqn assigned as follows:
(a) Hawaii: 1 air div, 1 air base, 1 weather wing (attached from MAC), 1 AWACS sqn, 1 tac tpt sqn. Army National Guard AD direction centre.
   ANG: 1 AD sqn with F-15 (8 AAM).
(b) Japan 16,200: 1 Air Force HQ: 1 div: 92 combat ac.
   2 wings (3 sqns) with 72 F-15C/D, 2 F-16, 18 RF-4C, UH-1E/F hel.
   1 sqn (TAC) with 3 E-3 AWACS ac.
   1 tac tpt gp with 16 C-130 ac.
   1 strategic wing with KC-135 tankers.
   1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 4 HC-130 ac, 5 HH-3 hel.
   See Korea, below.
(c) Korea 11,200: 1 div: 2 wings: 168 combat ac.
   5 sqns (2 with 24 F-4E, 4 with 96 F-16, 1 with 24 A-10).
   1 tac control gp with 24 OA-37.
   1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 6 HH-3.
(d) Philippines 9,300: 1 Air Force HQ: 1 div: ?48 combat ac.
   1 wing: 2 ftr sqns (1 with F-4E, 1 with F-4E/G); 1 special operations sqn (MAC) with 4 MC-130E.
   1 tac airlift wing (MAC) with 16 C-130 ac.
   1 SAR sqn (MAC) with 5 C/HH-3 hel.
   1 trg gp with 15 F-5E, T-33, T-39A).
(e) Guam 4,200: 1 SAC Air Div HQ: 15 combat ac.
   1 strategic bbr wing with 1 B-52 sqn.
   1 refuelling wing with KC-135.
   1 tpt sqn, 1 weather sqn (MAC).
(f) Australia: 250.

SUMMARY:

Forces Abroad: 525,600, incl 64,400 afloat,
(i) By Area.
Europe 354,000 (27,200 afloat).
Pacific/Far East 143,800 (33,000 afloat).
Caribbean/Latin America 19,300 (incl Bermuda 1,600); Cuba (Guantdnamo Bay) 2,500; Honduras garrison 120; Puerto Rico 3,600; Panama 9,300 (900 afloat).
Middle East/N. Africa 7,000 (3,000 afloat): Sinai (MFO) 1,100; Egypt 1,300; Saudi Arabia 390 (USAF: 4 E-3A, 3 KC-135, 1 KC-10, spt staff);
   Diego Garcia 1,300.
Other areas 1,500 (300 afloat),
(ii) By Service:
   ARMY: (260,300).
   NAVY: (92,000) (56,500 afloat).
   MARINES: (38,200) (7,900 afloat).
   AIR FORCE: (135,100).

PARA-MILITARY:
Civil Air Patrol (CAP): 68,522 (27,454 cadets); HQ, 8 geographical regions, 52wings,1,881 units, 579 CAP ac plus 8,465 private ac.
Roles: (a) emergency services, SAR, disaster relief, civil defence, communications take over (b) aerospace education, (c) cadet trg, motivation.
State Militias: 11,500: volunteer groups org as cadre military units, lightly armed and equipped,
   active in Alabama, California, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, S. Carolina, Tennessee,
   Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washington, and in Puerto Rico. The other 34states report varying degrees of interest and support.
   Intended to provide personnel for Home Guard, internal security and disaster relief assistance in support of, or replacement for,
   Army National Guard or Civil police forces.

* Figures are for Total Obligational Authority. Budget Authority and Outlay figures ($ bn) are:
[]
t Manpower incl in Army, Navy and Air Force totals.
f 1 National Guard or Reserve bde is incorporated in each of 1 armd, 2 mech and 2 inf divs.
ї 1 armd, 3 mech divs, 1 armd cav regt have hy eqpt stockpiled in FRG. Storage facilities for 2 more divs being built.
// Incl those stockpiled for the Strategic Reserve formations. The armd and mech bdes are from the divs in the US earmarked to reinforce 7th Army.
І A divisional force would total some 55,000 men, 156 combat ac, 24 attack hel, 70 tks, 208 APC, 120 how to 203mm. Marine divs, air wings and spt forces when deployed are called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). For operations, org is 3 MAGTF based on the div.
A Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) varies in size from less than 1 div to more than 2; with an aircraft wing or wings.
A Marine Amphibious Bde (MAB) is 3-5inf, 1 arty bns, tk coy, spt tps incl air, 16,950 personnel. It might comprise a regimental landing team with 17 MBT, 83 AFV, 30 155mm and 6 203mm how; a Marine Aircraft Group with up to 54 attack ac, 68 assault hel; a support group.
Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) are light combat forces, comprising 1,900 marines, 490 Underwater Demolition (UDT) and Sea-Air-Land teams (SEALS) and 100 Naval spt personnel, capable of establishing and defending a bridgehead for a brief period unsupported. Based on a marine inf bn with specialist and log spt elms, MAU hy eqpt incl 5 tks, 8 155mm how, 12 LVCP-7, composite air sqn (incl hel), 4 CH-53 hy, 12 CH-46 med and assault, 4 AH-IT attack and 2 UH-IN utility hel. 6 AV-8 VSTOL attack ac could spt. This force is lifted in 3-5 amph ships.
Only 1 MAU in Mediterranean and 1 in Pacific are regularly constituted.

The Soviet Union

  
   Strategic Forces
   Modernization of both SLBM and ICBM forces continues. A third SS-N-23-equipped Delta IV submarine has joined the fleet, which will shortly also be reinforced by a fourth Delta IV and a fifth Typhoon-class boat. Two SS-N-6-equipped Yankee I boats have been retired, thus keeping the force within SALT II limits. The replacement programme is progressively enhancing the range and warhead numbers of the SLBM deployed in advanced boats (each SS-N-23 missile delivers 10 MIRV to a maximum range of 8,300 km, in place of the 3 warheads to 3,000 km achievable with the SS-N-6).
   With the continuing deployment of the new SS-25 single-warhead mobile ICBM, some of the older SS-11 have been retired (probably the mod 1 version), but the result has been a small increase in the overall number of ICBM. The SS-X-24 Scalpel (a mobile ICBM with 10 warheads) is now in production, and reports suggest that deliveries have begun. To remain within the SALT II limits, the USSR will need to retire older MIRV-equipped missiles as it deploys the SS-X-24.
   The overall size of the Soviet long-range bomber force has not changed significantly, showing an increase of some 10 Tu-95 Bear H (which carry up to 8 AS-15 ALCM). The Mya-4 Bison inventory seems to have been reduced by five, but this could be solely an adjustment of earlier estimates. The progressive move from bomb to ALCM delivery does, however, give the Soviet bomber force greater operational flexibility.
   There has been no change in the IRBM/MRBM inventory. There has been an increase of about 10% in the medium-range bomber force, made up of an additional 20 Tu-26 Backfire, 32 Tu-16 Badger G and some 5 Tu-22 Blinder. No changes have been noted in the support elements, reconnaissance, ECM or tankers.
   General-Purpose Forces
   The evidence for the existence of two 'Unified Army Corps', one in the Belorussian Military District of the Western USSR and one in the Far East, is now sufficiently persuasive to warrant their inclusion. However, there is still not enough detailed knowledge of them to permit us to describe their organization or role with certainty. The indications are, however, that these Corps each equate to about two divisions. They may be experimental organizations; equally they could constitute the nucleus of Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG) for the Western and Far Eastern Theatres (TVD). Overall, we show increases of one in the number of tank divisions and of eight in the motor rifle divisions. Some of these probably reflect only an increased degree of readiness for some of the 'second generation' or 'shadow' divisions reported in previous editions. Two additional artillery divisions are also listed; this apparent increase probably reflects an underestimate in previous years, rather than the creation of new formations.
   Equipment estimates show a significant increase in the number of T-80 MBT (which can carry reactive armour), in MICV and APC, and in BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles. Older vehicles are no doubt being replaced, but detailed estimates by type are not possible. Estimates of the numbers of SSM continue to be difficult, with the added complication that evidence on the rates of production and introduction of replacements for the older types is limited and contradictory. Overall, refinement of our estimates has led to a small reduction in the total number of short-range SSM launchers (FROG, SS-21, Scud, SS-23) from that shown last year: to some 1,380 from some 1,440. Within this revised total inventory we have attempted to break down quantities between FROG and its SS-21 successor, and likewise between Scud and SS-23; these figures are unavoidably tentative but reflect our belief that in last year's edition we substantially overestimated both the numbers of SS-23 in service and their rate of introduction. Numbers of launchers for the 900-km range SS-12 mod remain unchanged at 130. Army air defence systems are being modernized, with the SA-4 and SA-6 gradually being replaced by the SA-11 (a quad-mounted weapon), the SA-7 being replaced by the SA-14 Gremlin and SA-16, and SA-9 by the SA-13 Gopher. The SA-10 Grumble-has a theatre as well as a strategic role, and perhaps 500 of these have now been deployed. There are two versions of the SA-12: the SA-12A Gladiator, which is being introduced at Front and Army levels, and the SA-X-12B Giant, which has not yet been deployed but may have some ATBM capability.
   In the combat helicopter field, production of the Mi-8 Hip E continues; some 480 may now be in service: an increase of 330. The 1986 estimates for the Mi-24 may have been overgenerous; a holding of 1,080 is probably more accurate.
   The Air Defence Troops (VPVO) structure is still undergoing change. So far as its air component is concerned, it is still not entirely clear exactly what aircraft have been assigned to the interceptor role and how many are assigned to air-superiority tasks within the Air Forces of the Groups of Forces and the Military Districts. This allocation will affect the strength figures of each, and data for both Services must therefore be used with care. The AD missile components show some change. Around Moscow only 16 of the elderly Galosh remain, but 16 of the SH-04 modified Galosh are now deployed in silos in four complexes. As yet the shorter-range SH-08 Gazelle has not been seen in the field. These strategic defence missiles are complemented by the new SA-10, some 480 of which may now be deployed in 40 complexes in the Moscow area, with others in the Far East.
   Of particular interest in both the VPVO and Air Force fighter roles is the rapid introduction of the MiG-29 Fulcrum and the MiG-31 Foxhound A, holdings of which show increases over the past 12 months of some 250 and 50 respectively. These are very high-performance aircraft with long combat radius and a look-down, shoot-down capability, and thus pose a significant threat to the US B-1 - and especially B-52 - bomber fleets. The slower deployment of the Su-27 argues that it is a less successful design. Some 140 additional Su-24 Fencer and 70 Su-25 Frogfoot provide enhanced support for the ground forces.
   The Navy has added four more cruise-missile submarines, three nuclear-powered (one Oscar, one Charlie and one Echo II) and one diesel (Juliet); the Oscar carries 24 SS-N-19 Shipwreck, the Charlie eight SS-N-7 and the Echo and Juliet each eight SS-N-3a. An additional six nuclear attack submarines have also entered service: one more Akula, two Victor I, one Victor III and two Echo I conversions. The SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 cruise missiles are still not yet in service but are reported to be on sea trials. In the surface fleet, the fourth Kiev carrier is now in service and may be deployed to the Northern Fleet. Production of the Yak-38 Forger V/STOL aircraft has kept pace and could be sufficient to provide two squadrons per carrier. In addition, the Soviet Navy now musters an additional Slava cruiser, a seventh Sovremennyy missile destroyer and an eighth Udaloy ASW destroyer, but three fewer Kotlin destroyers (one of them the SAM-equipped version). Some small increases have taken place in the minor combatant vessels and an addition of four Ropucha and three Polnocny landing ships.
   There have been some minor changes in our analysis of Soviet deployments. As usual, we welcome comment. In this regard, we would draw attention to our revised presentation of aggregated data on NATO and Warsaw Pact force deployments which appears in the Analysis Section on pp. 231-2.
   In summary, we see continued modernization of the three major components of the Strategic Forces. Some increases in the Ground Forces formations are noted, but these may be more apparent than real. A steady introduction of new ground force equipment continues, leading to some increases in total numbers, since the superseded equipment tends to remain in the inventory. In the air inventories we also note steady equipment updates but face continued uncertainty as to the allocation of fighter aircraft between the Air Defence Force and the Air Force proper. The Navy shows steady but slow improvement, but no apparent indication of the major replacement of older vessels which that Service must shortly face. In no category of weapon systems have we seen a major technological breakthrough, although the increasing number of tanks capable of fitting reactive armour represents a substantial and continuing advance in their inherent protection. Increased sophistication, with all its costs and benefits, continues to be displayed, and the technological gap between East and West continues to narrow.
   Defence Expenditure
   There has been very little reliable new information on Soviet defence expenditure over the past year. The following paragraphs therefore largely reproduce the comprehensive analysis of Soviet economic developments and military budgeting provided in The Military Balance 1986-1987.
   From 1981 to 1984 defence spending in the Soviet Union, as officially announced by the government, was frozen at 17.054 billion roubles ($23,065 billion),1 but in September 1984 an 11.8% increase in defence spending for 1985 to 19.063 billion roubles ($22,257 billion) was announced. The Soviet leadership did not, however, reveal which military programmes required additional funds, and this largest annual increase in defence spending announced in 25 years was interpreted as a response to recent increases in American defence expenditure. In 1986 the level of official defence spending was again frozen at 19.063 billion roubles - a measure which, in combination with the 1986 arms-control offers, appeared to reflect not only the USSR's new foreign-policy approach but also an economic signal that its defence burden must not increase. At the end of 1986, however, the Finance Minister announced a new record defence budget of 20.6 billion roubles ($30.37 billion) for 1987.
   []
  
   Nearly all Western observers believe that the one-line official Soviet defence figures underestimate actual expenditure by a factor of ten or more, and that the USSR has consistently outspent the US for the last decade. US Secretary of Defense Weinberger even claimed, before the Senate Budget Committee in January 1987, that Soviet defence costs account for 16-17% of Soviet GNP, which in equivalent US dollar terms would amount to $700 billion. Most experts outside the US government believe that actual Soviet military spending lies between 10% and 17% of GDP (the UK Ministry of Defence estimates it at 13-15% of GDP). The majority of estimates, or 'time-series', assume stable, persistent growth in total defence expenditure in the range of 2-4% per year since the mid-1970s. Recent American and British estimates suggest that total annual defence expenditure growth was running at 4-5% before 1976, slowed to 2% in the period 1976-82, but rose again to 3-5% from 1982 to 1985 (the UK MoD estimates 3%). Some unclassified defence expenditure estimates are listed in Table I.
   There is widespread disagreement as to which programmes should be included in the definition of Soviet defence expenditure. Many Western observers believe that the USSR includes the civilian space programme, internal security forces, military construction troops and civil defence in its concept of 'national defence'. But estimates based on that wider definition (which are not included in Table I) are not comparable to definitions of Western defence expenditures, and they tend to indicate unrealistically high Soviet defence expenditure levels.
   Western sovietologists use two basic methodologies to calculate Soviet defence outlays. Some non-government analysts examine the published budget documents and add estimated military-related expenditures in non-defence line items. Most analysts (including those of the US CIA, the US DIA and the UK MoD) individually estimate Soviet procurement, RDT&E, O&M and personnel costs in either roubles or dollars and then convert to the other currency. Roubles are used to indicate the defence burden on the Soviet economy, and dollars make it possible to draw comparisons with American programmes.
   The methodologies underlying these government estimates are rarely made public. Both the CIA and DIA collect raw data and have developed indirect economic analyses in order to calculate the costs to the USSR of producing materiel for defence items in both dollar and in rouble terms. For procurement, they estimate production runs and the level of spending in dollars that would be needed to produce a similar weapon in the West. There are obvious difficulties with this method. Production statistics must be based primarily on intelligence estimates, and many gaps in information exist. Information is lacking on weapons exports as well as the structure of reserve stocks. Production cost estimates cannot accurately reflect true procurement spending patterns, because resource costs and dollar/rouble conversions are difficult to quantify and, more importantly, Soviet procurement objectives appear to be set in real unit terms without a strict requirement for money prices to coincide with the real costs of goods and services.
   While costing Soviet defence outlays is fraught with difficulty, equipment production indices are more easily available and less controversial. According to official CIA statistics, production of military machinery fell on average by roughly 3-4% per annum during 1980-85, with a trough in 1981-2 and a return to positive growth in 1984-5. CIA preliminary figures for 1986 imply a continued recovery of military machinery production with a 1985-6 growth rate of some 5-6%. ('Military machinery' includes durables with purely military uses - e.g. weapons - but excludes dual-use items such as bulldozers and trucks.) This estimate of significantly negative growth for the early 1980s appears to reflect a recent revision in the CIA's estimates of military procurement. However, the basis for this apparent revision, and hence its significance, are unclear, because the method used by the CIA to calculate this index of Soviet military production is not stated. 2
   Manpower costs have reportedly grown at 2% per year for the last ten years. Estimates of manpower costs are derived from known military salary rates, rank structure and ration scales. These are fairly reliable; but it is difficult to estimate manpower-support costs. Soviet R&D accounts are, in the CIA's words, 'the least reliable', and estimates are roughly derived from Soviet budgetary allocations to science. The Academy of Sciences administers - and presumably funds - military R&D, with planning, development and production steered by complex interdepartmental liaison between the Ministry of Defence, GOSPLAN, the Academy of Sciences, the Council of Ministers and the production ministries. RDT&E programmes are thought to be on the scale of American efforts, including space-based defence and ground-based ABM technology. O&M accounts are usually estimated as a function of procurement and manpower estimates; precise fuel and maintenance costs are unavailable. Estimated O&M costs have grown 3-4% annually since 1976. But the published data for RDT&E and O&M accounts is minimal.
   The difficulties surrounding estimates of exchange rates have been examined in previous editions of The Military Balance. Most observers believe that current methodologies are tainted by an element of institutional bias, a tendency to assume mirroring micro-economic phenomena, limited understanding of the Soviet budgeting process and Soviet military industrial policy, and the limited number of Soviet studies programmes outside the intelligence community. 3
   Since the CIA first released its estimates of Soviet defence spending in 1974, it has revised its methodology on three occasions, and these revisions have caused some confusion in the media. In 1976 it re-evaluated the costs of production as estimated in roubles, as a result of new information indicating that the Soviet defence industries were much less efficient than previously assumed. Hence, the rouble cost - rather than quantity - was the basis of the revision, and as a result, the rouble defence expenditure estimate was doubled. (CIA dollar estimates were not affected by this first change.) The second revision, in 1983, was part of a continuing re-evaluation of the Agency's 1979-81 estimates, which had previously suggested that Soviet defence spending was growing at a rate of 4-5% annually. The CIA revised its methodology, having decided that the rate of equipment acquisition was lower than expected. As a result, both the dollar and rouble spending estimates were revised downwards to reflect a growth rate of 2% annually. Thirdly, in 1986, the CIA updated its price base from 1970 to 1982 price levels. The new pricing system does not fundamentally alter the Agency's estimates of Soviet defence spending: the only difference is that military spending in 1982 prices represents a greater share of the economy (15-17%) than it did in 1970 prices (13-16%). The new estimate of the defence burden is compatible with DIA analyses and suggests that inflation in the military sector is greater than in the general economy. This phenomenon is consistent with Western experience.
   DIA dollar and rouble estimates are stated in current, rather than constant, currency terms. The DIA believes that Soviet defence spending roughly doubled between 1970 and 1981, and its latest reports suggest that Soviet defence spending has increased by about 5% annually since 1983. Both CIA and DIA caution that any estimate of currency spending will be subject to revision, and that there is an approximate five-year lag before current estimates can be fully confirmed and evaluated.
   Both DIA and CIA agree that the Soviet budget for procurement increased annually by 1% between 1975 and 1981. The DIA's procurement estimate, which is based on pricing 250 major weapons systems, lead it to conclude (in contrast to the CIA estimates quoted above) that spending on procurement increased by 3-5% annually over the period 1981-6. The CIA estimates seek to measure total procurement, and they suggest that recent procurement resources are stagnant. According to these latest estimates, American spending on procurement overtook Soviet procurement spending in 1984. Some observers have noted with a touch of irony that, on this basis, and despite major (but narrowing) technology differences between Soviet and American systems, the Soviet Union appears to have managed to produce more than twice as much as the United States, despite a much smaller rate of procurement growth.
   Defence and the Soviet Economy under Gorbachev
   General Secretary Gorbachev came to power inheriting a number of strengths in the world's second largest economy: output in petroleum and iron ore extraction, steel and cement production and the machine tools sector, all exceed American levels. He has stepped up the worker productivity campaign begun by his predecessors in an attempt to stimulate the economy. He has replaced a number of economic ministers, including the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the chiefs of the construction, service and machine-building sectors. In the summer of 1987 he also replaced Sergei Afanasyev, Head of the Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building; this was probably due to the continuing failure to met the out put target. Many of his new economic managers have been recruited from the defence sector, including Ryzhkov, the present Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
   In 1986 the Soviet Union showed 4.2% GNP growth (NMP growth: 5.5%), compared to 1.2% (1.8%) in 1985, despite a winter no better than that of 1985 which caused major transport and production bottlenecks. Industrial output in 1986 was satisfactory, with a 4.9% growth rate (3.9% in 1985) and an upward surge of 5.1% in agriculture after two years of stagnation. Nevertheless, consumer shortages persisted; in fact, consumer goods output actually fell, despite Gorbachev's calls for greater labour productivity.
   Gorbachev's short-term measures are intended to be followed by an ambitious plan to replace one-third of the capital stock by 1990. Over 200 billion roubles in capital investment for 'modernizing and technically re-equipping production' have been committed for the period 1986-90. Gorbachev has also hinted at some organizational changes, though none of these is widespread, nor for the moment poses a challenge to major bureaucratic interests.
   Gorbachev's first Five Year Plan (1986-90) calls for 3.5% annual growth in National Income (a measure similar to GNP used by Soviet economists). A 7-8% growth rate in the machine-building sector (focused primarily on the electronics, computer and machine tool industries) is intended to boost total industrial output by 4.5% each year. Ryzhkov announced major investment increases for the energy and machine-building sectors, while agriculture and consumer investment were not to be neglected; most of the planned increases in fixed investment were scheduled for 1986, during which year a 30% increase in investment in civilian machinery and energy was planned. It is uncertain whether this rate was achieved, but, even if it was, it is unlikely that these rates could be sustained for very long. In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster the leadership may be forced to spend even more than planned on its nuclear energy programme, at a time when much reduced oil prices have cut foreign earnings.
   The Soviet leadership, therefore, appears to face two key problems. In the first place, some reallocation of resources from the military to the civilian sector is likely to be necessary, but will need to be so handled as to avoid precipitating an adverse reaction from the military. Secondly, there is an urgent need to accelerate the introduction of 'modern technology'. This would, it is hoped, satisfy not only the civilian sector but also the military, since the latter has a vested interest in modernization. However, most Western experts are agreed that it will be impossible for the USSR to catch up with the West in some key technologies, so that large-scale investment and imports may not by themselves provide the necessary solutions to these problems.
   In the near term (until 1990) the lack of investment is not expected to restrict defence production, according to several American and European studies. According to a study released by the Joint Economic Committee, 'in view of the immense sunk costs for plant and installed equipment in the defence production facilities, and the fact that these cannot be readily converted to civilian use, the industrial modernization goals are unlikely significantly to impede the completion of the major deployments of strategic weapons that the Soviets have programmed through the 1980s'. Full-scale production lines are producing the newest generation of Soviet weapons systems, including T-80 tanks, cruise missiles, Su-27 fighters, Blackjack bombers, and SS-25 ICBM.
   The Soviet military appears to support Gorbachev's economic plans because it will ultimately benefit from any technological advances. Indeed, the Deputy Minister for military procurement went so far as to complain that the poor performance of the civilian economy is a threat to military procurement objectives. Since it appears that increased investment allocations will only marginally affect defence over the next few years, the USSR seems well placed to continue its vigorous military modernization programme until the end of the decade by means of qualitative change, without major new investment, while simultaneously expanding and improving the civilian sector.
   The leadership's reform goals, while in many ways adopted far too late, may in the short run alleviate the economy's shortcomings. In the long term, however, there are signs which suggest that the reforms may achieve at best only limited success, especially in the performance of heavy industry, unless they are accompanied by significant structural changes. Essentially, industrial reform in the Soviet Union is unlikely to go further than the changes introduced in Hungary in the early 1980s, and the very poor performance of Hungarian industry since those reforms has demonstrated beyond doubt that far more radical measures (especially relating to management, bureaucracy and incentives) are necessary. If he is to achieve genuine and lasting success, Gorbachev may have to opt for far-reaching decentralization measures - and, since these would necessitate overcoming the inertia of the existing organizational structure, they could have profound political implications.

1 All rouble/dollar conversions are at the official exchange rate.
2 The above analysis was provided by Mark Schaffer, a doctoral candidate in Economics at the London School of Economics. Growth figures derived from CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1986 (Washington DC: CIA, 1986), p.71, and CIA/DIA, 'Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Status Report' (mimeo), March 1987, Fig.4 and Table A-1, and using the CIA statement that one quarter of total machinery output in recent years has gone to the military.
3 For further background see R. Kaufman, S.Rosefielde, H. Schaeffer, in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the USA Hearings (annual); also previous editions of The Military Balance.

For further details please refer to: R. E.Foelber, Estimates of Soviet Defense Expenditures: Methodological Issues and Policy Implications (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1985); M. Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1986); R. Hutchings, The Soviet Budget (Albany, NY:State University of New York Press, 1983); Joint Economic Committee (CIA and DIA presentation), The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader (Washington DC:JEC, 1986); R. Kaufman 'Causes of the Slowdown in Soviet Defence', Soviet Economy, vol. I, no. 1, 1985; R. Kaufman, 'Industrial Modernization and Defense in the Soviet Union' (unpublished paper presented to the NATO Colloquium, April 1982); and previous editions of The Military Balance.

Советский Союз


   Стратегические силы
   Продолжается модернизация как сил БРПЛ, так и сил МБР. К флоту присоединилась третья подводная лодка Delta IV, оснащенная SS-N-23, которая вскоре будет также усилена четвертой лодкой Delta IV и пятой лодкой типа Typhoon. Две лодки Yankee I оснащенные SS-N-6 были выведены, таким образом, удерживая силы в пределах ОСВ II. Программа замены постепенно увеличивает дальность и количество боеголовок БРПЛ, развернутых на передовых лодках (каждая ракета SS-N-23 доставляет 10 MIRV на максимальную дальность 8300 км вместо 3 боеголовок до 3000 км, доставляемых SS-N-6).
   С продолжением развертывания новой мобильной МБР с одной боеголовкой SS-25 некоторые из старых SS-11 были выведены (вероятно, версия мод 1), но результатом стало небольшое увеличение общего количества МБР. SS-X-24 Scalpel (мобильная МБР с 10 боеголовками) в настоящее время находится в производстве, и предполагают, что поставки начались. Чтобы оставаться в пределах ОСВ II, СССР должен будет вывести старые ракеты, оснащенные MIRV, по мере развертывания SS-X-24.
   Общая численность советских бомбардировщиков большой дальности существенно не изменилась, показав увеличение примерно на 10 Ту-95 Bear H (которые несут до 8 КРВБ AS-15). Число M-4 Bison, по-видимому, была сокращено на пять, но это может быть только корректировка более ранних оценок. Однако постепенный переход от бомб к КРВБ дает Советским бомбардировочным силам большую оперативную гибкость.
   Не было никаких изменений в числе БРПД/БРСД. Произошло увеличение примерно на 10% бомбардировочных сил средней дальности, составленных из 20 дополнительных Ту-26 Backfire, 32 Ту-16 и около 5 Ту-22. Никаких изменений не было отмечено в элементах поддержки, разведывательных подразделениях, РЭБ или танкерах.
   Силы Общего Назначения
   Доказательства существования двух "единых армейских корпусов", одного в Белорусском военном округе Западного СССР и одного на Дальнем Востоке, сегодня достаточно убедительны, чтобы оправдать их включение. Однако до сих пор нет достаточно подробных сведений о них, чтобы мы могли с уверенностью описать их организацию или роль. Однако имеются указания на то, что каждый из этих корпусов приравнивается примерно к двум дивизиям. Они могут быть экспериментальными организациями; в равной степени они могут составлять ядро оперативных маневренных групп (ОМГ) Западного и Дальневосточного театров (ТВД). В целом мы показываем увеличение на одну танковую дивизию и на восемь мотострелковых дивизий. Некоторые из них, вероятно, отражают лишь возросшую степень готовности некоторых из "второго эшелона" или "теневых" дивизий, о которых сообщалось в предыдущих изданиях. Также перечислены две дополнительные артиллерийские дивизии; это очевидное увеличение, вероятно, отражает недооценку в предыдущие годы, а не создание новых соединений.
   Оценки оснащенности свидетельствуют о значительном увеличении количества основных танков Т-80 (которые могут нести реактивную броню), БМП и БТР, а также в разведывательных машинах БРДМ-2. Старые транспортные средства, несомненно, заменяются, но подробные оценки по типам невозможны. Оценки численности тактических ракет по-прежнему сопряжены с трудностями, которые усугубляются тем, что данные о темпах производства и внедрения замены более старых типов являются ограниченными и противоречивыми. В целом, уточнение наших оценок привело к небольшому сокращению общего числа пусковых установок ракет малой дальности (FROG, SS-21, Scud, SS-23) по сравнению с прошлым годом: примерно до 1380 с примерно 1440. В рамках этого пересмотренного общего перечня мы попытались разделить количества между FROG и ее преемником SS-21, а также между Scud и SS-23; эти цифры неизбежно являются предварительными, но отражают наше убеждение в том, что в прошлогоднем издании мы существенно переоценили как количество SS-23 в эксплуатации, так и темп их внедрения. Количество пусковых установок для 900-километровой дальности SS-12 mod остается неизменным на уровне 130. Армейские системы ПВО модернизируются, при этом SA-4 и SA-6 постепенно заменяются SA-11 (четырех-ракетные установки), SA-7 заменяется SA-14 Gremlin и SA-16, а SA-9 на SA-13 Gopher. SA-10 Grumble применяется на театре действий, а также в стратегической роли, и, возможно, 500 из них уже развернуты. Есть две версии SA-12: SA-12A Gladiator, который внедряется на фронте и в армии, и SA-X-12B Giant, который еще не развернут, но может иметь некоторые возможности ПРО.
   Из вертолетов поля боя продолжается производство Ми-8 Hip E; в настоящее время на вооружении может находиться около 480: увеличение на 330. Оценки 1986 года для Ми-24, возможно, были чрезмерно щедрыми; содержание 1080, вероятно, более точно.
   Структура войск ПВО по-прежнему претерпевает изменения. Что касается его воздушной составляющей, то до сих пор не совсем ясно, какие именно самолеты были назначены на роль перехватчиков и сколько назначено на задачи превосходства в воздухе в составе группировок ВВС войск и военных округов. Это распределение повлияет на показатели численности каждого из них, и поэтому данные для обеих служб должны использоваться с осторожностью. Компоненты зенитных ракет имеют некоторые изменения. Вокруг Москвы осталось только 16 старых Galosh, но 16 модифицированных Galosh SH-04 сейчас развернуты в шахтах в четырех комплексах. Пока что Gazelle малой дальности SH-08 в поле не замечена. Эти стратегические оборонительные ракеты дополняются новыми SA-10, около 480 из которых теперь могут быть развернуты в 40 комплексах в Подмосковье, а другие - на Дальнем Востоке.
   Особый интерес как для Войск ПВО, так и для ВВС представляет быстрое внедрение МиГ-29 Fulcrum и МиГ-31 Foxhound A, численность которых за последние 12 месяцев увеличились примерно на 250 и 50 соответственно. Это очень высокоэффективные самолеты с большими боевыми радиусами и способностью к перехвату, и, таким образом, представляют значительную угрозу для американской бомбардировочной авиации B-1, и особенно B-52. Более медленное развертывание Су-27 показывает, что это менее удачная конструкция. Около 140 дополнительных Су-24 Fencer и 70 Су-25 Frogfoot обеспечивают усиленную поддержку наземных сил.
   ВМФ имеет четыре типа подводных лодок с крылатыми ракетами, три атомные (Oscar, Charlie и Echo II) и один дизельный (Juliet); Oscar несет 24 SS-N-19 Shipwreck, Charlie 8 SS-N-7 и Echo и Juliet каждая 8 SS-N-3a (Это ошибка Juliet - 4 ракеты -ЕТ). Еще шесть ударных атомных подводных лодок также поступили на вооружение: еще одна Akula, две Victor I, Victor III и две Echo I переделанных. Крылатые ракеты SS-NX-21 и SS-NX-24 еще не введены в эксплуатацию, но, как сообщается, проходят испытания на море. В надводном флоте четвертый авианосец Kiev сейчас на вооружении и может быть развернут на Северном флоте. Производство самолетов ВВП Як-38 Forger шло в ногу и могло быть достаточным для обеспечения двух эскадрилий на авианосец. Кроме того, Советский флот теперь строит дополнительный крейсер Слава, седьмой ракетный эсминец Современный и восьмой эсминец ПЛО Удалой, но на три меньше эсминцев Kotlin (один из них оснащенный ЗРК). Некоторые небольшие увеличения произошли в мелких боевых судах и четырех Ropucha, а также три десантных корабля Polnocny.
   В нашем анализе Советского развертывания произошли некоторые незначительные изменения. Как обычно, мы приветствуем комментарии. В этой связи мы хотели бы обратить внимание на наше пересмотренное представление агрегированных данных о развертывании сил НАТО и Варшавского договора, которое приводится в аналитическом разделе на стр. 231-2.
   В целом, мы видим продолжение модернизации трех основных компонентов стратегических сил. Отмечается некоторое увеличение формирований Сухопутных войск, но это может быть скорее видимым, чем реальным. Продолжается неуклонное внедрение новой техники сухопутных сил, что приводит к некоторому увеличению ее общего числа, поскольку замененное оборудование, как правило, остается в складских запасах. В перечне воздушных средств мы также отмечаем неуклонное обновление оборудования, но сталкиваемся с сохраняющейся неопределенностью в отношении распределения истребителей между силами ПВО и ВВС. Военно-Морской Флот неуклонно, но медленно совершенствуется, но нет явных признаков серьезной замены старых судов, с которыми эта служба должна вскоре столкнуться. Ни в одной категории оружейных систем мы не видели крупного технологического прорыва, хотя увеличение числа танков, способных устанавливать реактивную броню, представляет собой существенный и непрерывный прогресс в их внутренней защите. Все более изощренный подход со всеми его издержками и преимуществами продолжает проявляться, а технологический разрыв между Востоком и Западом продолжает сокращаться.
   Оборонные расходы
   За последний год было получено очень мало достоверной новой информации о советских оборонных расходах. Поэтому нижеследующие пункты в значительной степени воспроизводят всеобъемлющий анализ советских экономических событий и военного бюджета, представленный в военном балансе 1986-1987 годов.
   С 1981 по 1984 год расходы на оборону в Советском Союзе, как официально объявило правительство, были заморожены на уровне 17,054 млрд рублей ($23,065 млрд) 1, но в сентябре 1984 года было объявлено об увеличении расходов на оборону на 11,8% за 1985 год до 19,063 млрд рублей ($22,257 млрд). Советское руководство, однако, не указало, какие военные программы требуют дополнительных средств, и это крупнейшее ежегодное увеличение оборонных расходов, объявленное за 25 лет, было истолковано как ответ на недавнее увеличение американских оборонных расходов. В 1986 году уровень официальных оборонных расходов был вновь заморожен на уровне 19,063 млрд рублей - мера, которая в сочетании с предложениями 1986 года по контролю над вооружениями, казалось, отражала не только новый внешнеполитический подход СССР, но и экономический сигнал о том, что его оборонное бремя не должно увеличиваться. Однако в конце 1986 года министр финансов объявил новый рекордный оборонный бюджет 1987 года - 20,6 млрд рублей (30,37 млрд долларов).
   []
   Почти все западные наблюдатели считают, что однострочные официальные данные советской обороны занижают фактические расходы в десять и более раз и что СССР последовательно опережает США в течение последнего десятилетия. Министр обороны США Уайнбергер даже заявил в январе 1987 года в бюджетном комитете Сената, что советские расходы на оборону составляют 16-17% Советского ВНП, что в эквивалентном долларовом выражении составит 700 миллиардов долларов. Большинство экспертов вне правительства США считают, что фактические военные расходы СССР составляют от 10% до 17% ВВП (министерство обороны Великобритании оценивает их в 13-15% ВВП). Большинство оценок, или "временных рядов", предполагают стабильный, устойчивый рост общих расходов на оборону в диапазоне 2-4% в год с середины 1970-х годов. По последним американским и британским оценкам, общий ежегодный рост оборонных расходов до 1976 года составлял 4-5%, замедлился до 2% в период 1976-1982 годов, но снова вырос до 3-5% С 1982 по 1985 год (по оценкам Министерства обороны Великобритании - 3%). Некоторые несекретные сметы расходов на оборону приводятся в таблице I.
   Широко распространены разногласия относительно того, какие программы следует включать в определение советских расходов на оборону. Многие западные наблюдатели считают, что СССР включает в понятие "национальная оборона" гражданскую космическую программу, силы внутренней безопасности, военно-строительные войска и гражданскую оборону. Но оценки, основанные на этом более широком определении (которые не включены в таблицу I), не сопоставимы с определениями западных оборонных расходов, и они, как правило, указывают на нереально высокие уровни советских оборонных расходов.
   Западные советологи используют две основные методологии для расчета советских оборонных расходов. Некоторые неправительственные аналитики изучают опубликованные бюджетные документы и включают сметные военные расходы в статьи, не связанные с обороной. Большинство аналитиков (в том числе из ЦРУ США, РУМО США и Великобритании) индивидуально оценивают советские закупки, RDT&E, O&M и расходы на персонал в рублях или долларах, а затем конвертируют в другую валюту. Рубли используются для обозначения оборонной нагрузки на советскую экономику, а доллары позволяют проводить сравнения с американскими программами.
   Методологии, лежащие в основе этих правительственных оценок, редко предаются гласности. Как ЦРУ, так и РУМО собирают исходные данные и проводят косвенный экономический анализ для расчета затрат СССР на производство материальных средств для оборонных объектов как в долларовом, так и в рублевом выражении. Для закупок они оценивают объемы производства и уровень расходов в долларах, которые потребуются для производства аналогичного оружия на Западе. С этим методом возникают очевидные трудности. Статистика производства должна основываться главным образом на оценках разведывательных данных, и в ней существует много пробелов. Отсутствует информация об экспорте оружия, а также о структуре резервных запасов. Оценки производственных затрат не могут точно отражать истинную структуру расходов на закупки, поскольку затраты на ресурсы и пересчет в доллары/рубли трудно поддаются количественной оценке и, что более важно, советские цели закупок, как представляется, устанавливаются в реальных единицах без строгого требования, чтобы денежные цены совпадали с реальными затратами на товары и услуги.
   В то время как затраты на советскую оборону сопряжены с трудностями, индексы производства оборудования более доступны и менее противоречивы. Согласно официальной статистике ЦРУ, производство военной техники падало в среднем примерно на 3-4% в год в 1980-85 годах, с падением в 1981-2 годах и возвратом к положительному росту в 1984-5 годах. Предварительные данные ЦРУ за 1986 год предполагают продолжение восстановления производства военной техники с темпом роста 1985-1986 годов в 5-6%. ("Военная техника" включает в себя предметы длительного пользования чисто военного назначения, например оружия, но не исключает двойного назначения, такие как бульдозеры и грузовики.) Эта оценка значительного отрицательного роста в начале 1980-х годов, по-видимому, отражает недавний пересмотр оценок военных закупок ЦРУ. Однако основания для этого кажущегося пересмотра, а следовательно и его значение, неясны, поскольку метод, используемый ЦРУ для расчета этого индекса советского военного производства, не указан. 2
   Сообщается, что расходы на личный состав выросли на 2% в год за последние десять лет. Оценки расходов на личный состав составлены на основе известных ставок окладов военнослужащих, структуры званий и шкал пайков. Они достаточно надежны, но трудно оценить затраты на поддержку личного состава. Советские отчеты о НИОКР являются, по словам ЦРУ, "наименее надежными", а оценки примерно основаны на советских бюджетных ассигнованиях на науку. Академия наук руководит военными НИОКР и, по-видимому, финансирует их, при этом планирование, разработка и производство осуществляются на основе сложных межведомственных связей между Министерством обороны, Госпланом, Академией наук, Советом Министров и производственными министерствами. Считается, что программы RDT&E соответствуют масштабам американских усилий, включая космическую оборону и наземную технологию ПРО. Счета НИОКР обычно оцениваются в зависимости от оценок закупок и численности персонала; точные расходы на топливо и техническое обслуживание отсутствуют. Оценочные затраты на O&M выросли на 3-4% ежегодно с 1976 года. Но опубликованные данные для учетных записей RDT&E и O&M минимальны.
   Трудности, связанные с расчетами обменных курсов, рассматривались в предыдущих изданиях Военного баланса. Большинство наблюдателей считают, что современные методологии запятнаны элементом институциональной предвзятости, тенденцией предполагать зеркальное отражение микроэкономических явлений, ограниченным пониманием Советского бюджетного процесса и советской военно-промышленной политики, а также ограниченным числом советских исследовательских программ за пределами разведывательного сообщества. 3
   С тех пор как ЦРУ впервые опубликовало свои оценки советских расходов на оборону в 1974 году, оно трижды пересматривало свою методологию, и эти изменения вызвали некоторую путаницу в средствах массовой информации. В 1976 году была произведена переоценка себестоимости продукции в рублях на основе новой информации, свидетельствующей о том, что советская оборонная промышленность оказалась гораздо менее эффективной, чем предполагалось ранее. Таким образом, в основу пересмотра легла не количественная, а рублевая стоимость, в результате чего рублевая смета оборонных расходов была удвоена. (На долларовые оценки ЦРУ это первое изменение не повлияло.) Второй пересмотр в 1983 году был частью продолжающейся переоценки оценок агентства за 1979-1981 годы, в которых ранее предполагалось, что советские расходы на оборону растут со скоростью 4-5% в год. ЦРУ пересмотрело свою методологию, решив, что темпы приобретения оборудования ниже, чем ожидалось. В результате как долларовые, так и рублевые оценки расходов были пересмотрены в сторону понижения, чтобы отразить темпы роста 2% в год. В-третьих, в 1986 году ЦРУ обновило свою ценовую базу с 1970 по 1982 год. Новая система ценообразования принципиально не меняет оценки агентством советских оборонных расходов: разница лишь в том, что военные расходы в ценах 1982 года составляют большую долю экономики (15-17%), чем в ценах 1970 года (13-16%). Новая оценка оборонной нагрузки совместима с анализом РУМО и предполагает, что инфляция в военном секторе выше, чем в общей экономике. Это явление согласуется с западным опытом.
   Оценки РУМО в долларах и рублях представлены в текущем, а не в постоянном валютном выражении. РУМО считает, что советские оборонные расходы примерно удвоились между 1970 и 1981 годами, и его последние отчеты показывают, что советские оборонные расходы увеличивались примерно на 5% ежегодно с 1983 года. Как ЦРУ, так и РУМО предупреждают, что любая оценка валютных расходов будет подвергнута пересмотру и что существует приблизительная пятилетняя задержка, прежде чем текущие оценки могут быть полностью подтверждены и оценены.
   И РУМО, и ЦРУ сходятся во мнении, что советский бюджет на закупки ежегодно увеличивался на 1% между 1975 и 1981 годами. Оценка закупок РУМО, которая основана на оценке 250 основных систем вооружений, приводит его к выводу (в отличие от приведенных выше оценок ЦРУ), что расходы на закупки увеличивались на 3-5% ежегодно за период 1981-1966 годов. Оценки ЦРУ направлены на измерение общего объема закупок, и они предполагают, что в последнее время закупочные ресурсы стагнируют. Согласно последним оценкам, в 1984 году американские расходы на закупки превзошли советские. Некоторые наблюдатели с некоторой иронией отмечают, что на этой основе, несмотря на значительные (но сужающиеся) технологические различия между Советской и американской системами, Советскому Союзу, по-видимому, удалось произвести более чем в два раза больше, чем США, несмотря на гораздо меньшие темпы роста закупок.
   Оборона и советская экономика при Горбачеве
   Генеральный секретарь Горбачев пришел к власти, унаследовав ряд сильных сторон второй по величине экономики в мире: производство нефти и железной руды, производство стали и цемента, станкостроение - все это превышает американский уровень. Он активизировал кампанию по повышению производительности труда, начатую его предшественниками в попытке стимулировать экономику. Он сменил ряд министров экономики, в том числе председателя Совета Министров и руководителей секторов строительства, обслуживания и машиностроения. Летом 1987 года он также сменил Сергея Афанасьева, руководителя Министерства тяжелого и транспортного машиностроения, что, вероятно, было связано с продолжающимся невыполнением поставленной задачи. Многие из его новых экономических руководителей были набраны из оборонного сектора, включая нынешнего председателя Совета Министров Рыжкова.
   В 1986 году Советский Союз продемонстрировал рост ВНП на 4,2% (рост НМП: 5,5%) по сравнению с 1,2% (1,8%) в 1985 году, несмотря на зиму не лучше, чем в 1985 году, которая вызвала серьезные транспортные и производственные узкие места. Объем промышленного производства в 1986 году был удовлетворительным: темпы роста составили 4,9% (3,9% в 1985 году), а в сельском хозяйстве после двух лет стагнации - 5,1%. Тем не менее, дефицит потребительских товаров сохранялся; фактически, производство потребительских товаров фактически упало, несмотря на призывы Горбачева к повышению производительности труда.
   За краткосрочными мерами Горбачева должен последовать амбициозный план по замене одной трети капитала к 1990 году. За период 1986-1990 годов на "модернизацию и техническое перевооружение производства" было выделено свыше 200 млрд рублей капиталовложений. Горбачев также намекнул на некоторые организационные изменения, хотя ни одно из них не является широко распространенным и не бросает вызов основным бюрократическим интересам.
   Первый пятилетний план Горбачева (1986-1990 годы) предусматривает ежегодный рост национального дохода на 3,5% (показатель, аналогичный ВНП, используемый советскими экономистами). Темпы роста 7-8% в машиностроительном секторе (ориентированном прежде всего на электронику, вычислительную технику и станкостроение) призваны ежегодно увеличивать общий объем промышленного производства на 4,5%. Рыжков объявил о значительном увеличении инвестиций в энергетику и машиностроение, при этом нельзя было пренебрегать сельским хозяйством и потребительскими инвестициями; большая часть запланированного увеличения инвестиций в основной капитал была запланирована на 1986 год, в течение которого планировалось увеличить инвестиции в гражданскую технику и энергетику на 30%. Неясно, был ли достигнут этот показатель, но даже если бы он и был достигнут, маловероятно, что эти показатели могли бы сохраняться в течение длительного времени. После Чернобыльской катастрофы руководство, возможно, будет вынуждено потратить даже больше, чем планировалось, на свою ядерно-энергетическую программу, в то время как значительно сниженные цены на нефть сократили иностранные доходы.
   Таким образом, советское руководство сталкивается с двумя ключевыми проблемами. Во-первых, вероятно, потребуется некоторое перераспределение ресурсов из военного сектора в Гражданский, однако это необходимо будет сделать таким образом, чтобы избежать негативной реакции со стороны военных. Во-вторых, необходимо в срочном порядке ускорить внедрение "современных технологий". Следует надеяться, что это удовлетворит не только гражданский сектор, но и военный, поскольку последний кровно заинтересован в модернизации. Однако большинство западных экспертов сходятся во мнении, что СССР не сможет догнать Запад в некоторых ключевых технологиях, так что масштабные инвестиции и импорт могут сами по себе не обеспечить необходимых решений этих проблем.
   В ближайшей перспективе (до 1990 года), согласно ряду американских и европейских исследований, отсутствие инвестиций не должно ограничивать оборонное производство. Согласно исследованию, опубликованному Объединенным экономическим комитетом, "ввиду огромных затрат на установку оборудования на объектах оборонного производства и того факта, что они не могут быть легко преобразованы в гражданское использование, цели промышленной модернизации вряд ли существенно помешают завершению крупных развертываний стратегических вооружений, которые советы запрограммировали до 1980-х годов". Полномасштабные производственные линии выпускают новейшее поколение советских систем вооружения, включая танки Т-80, крылатые ракеты, истребители Су-27, бомбардировщики Blackjack и МБР SS-25.
   Советские военные, похоже, поддерживают экономические планы Горбачева, потому что в конечном счете выиграют от любых технологических достижений. Действительно, заместитель министра по военным закупкам зашел так далеко, что стал жаловаться на то, что плохие показатели гражданской экономики представляют угрозу для целей военных закупок. Поскольку, как представляется, увеличение инвестиционных ассигнований лишь незначительно скажется на обороне в течение следующих нескольких лет, СССР, как представляется, имеет все возможности для продолжения своей энергичной программы военной модернизации до конца десятилетия путем качественных изменений без крупных новых инвестиций при одновременном расширении и улучшении гражданского сектора.
   Цели реформы руководства, хотя во многих отношениях и принятые слишком поздно, могут в краткосрочной перспективе смягчить недостатки экономики. Однако в долгосрочной перспективе имеются признаки, свидетельствующие о том, что реформы могут привести в лучшем случае к ограниченному успеху, особенно в тяжелой промышленности, если они не будут сопровождаться значительными структурными изменениями. По существу, промышленная реформа в Советском Союзе вряд ли пойдет дальше изменений, введенных в Венгрии в начале 1980-х годов, и очень низкая производительность венгерской промышленности после этих реформ, несомненно, продемонстрировала, что необходимы гораздо более радикальные меры (особенно в отношении управления, бюрократии и стимулов). Для достижения подлинного и прочного успеха Горбачеву, возможно, придется выбрать далеко идущие меры децентрализации, а поскольку они потребуют преодоления инерции существующей организационной структуры, они могут иметь глубокие политические последствия.

   THE SOVIET UNION
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 5,226,600 (perhaps 2,667,000 conscripts).*
Terms of Service: Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF)/Army/Air Defence (AD)/Air Force/Naval Infantry: 2 years; Navy/Border Guards: 3 years;
   then discharged into Reserves. Women with medical and other special skills may volunteer.
Reserves: total 6,207,000 with conscript service within last 5 years:
   SNF ~540,000; Army 3,500,000; AD 768,000; Air Force 699,000; Navy 700,000.
   Males have a Reserve obligation to age 50; total: some 55,000,000.
   (Regular retirees could add to the above totals.)

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES COMMAND:
298,000 (plus 112,500 assigned from Air and Navy). (70-75% conscripts ?217,000); under direct operational control of the Supreme High Command (VGK).
(a) Sea-launched msls (SLBM): (Navy: 17,000).
   967 in 76 subs (928 SLBM, 61 subs come under SALT; 39 SLBM (theatre), 15 subs are outside it).
SSBN: 62:
   4 Typhoon with 20 SS-N-20 Sturgeon (1 more launched) (80 msls).
   3 D-IV with 16 SS-N-23 Skiff (1 more launched) (48 msls).
   14 D-III with 16 SS-N-18 Stingray (224 msls).
   4 D-1I with 16 SS-N-8 Sawfly (64 msls).
   18 D-I with 12 SS-N-8 (216 msls).
   1 Y-II with 12 SS-N-17 Snipe (12 msls).
   17 Y-I with 16 SS-N-6 Serb (272 msls).
   1 H-III with 6 SS-N-8.
SSB: 14:
   1 G-III with 6 SS-N-8.
   13 G-II with 3 SS-N-5 Sark (39 non-SALT theatre msls).
(b) Ground-launched msls: 298,000:
6 rocket armies, org in divs, regts, bns and btys of 1 msl launcher; 28 'fields', 300 launch control HQ,3 msl test centres.
ICBM: 1,418.t
   SS-11 Sego: 440 mod 1, mods 2/3 (at some 8 fields; SS-25 is replacing). f
   SS-13 Savage: 60 (at 1 field, SS-25 may replace).
   SS-17 Spanker. (?RS-16): 150 (at 2 fields; mod 3, 4 MIRV) f
   SS-18 Satan: (RS-20): 308 (at 6 fields; mostly mod 4, 10 MIRV).
   SS-19 Stiletto: (RS-18) 360 (at 4 fields; mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV) f
   (SS-24 Scalpel: some deployment may be in progress, operational status uncertain; rail-mobile, 10 MIRV.)
   SS-25 Sickle, some 100: mobile, single-warhead msl replacing SS-11 and may replace SS-13;
   3 sites in Urals/western USSR, in groups of 9 on former SS-7 sites, 20+ bases, each for 9 msls, reported under conversion. f
IRBM/MRBM: 553: 382 in western, rest in central and eastern USSR.
   SS-20 Saber. 441 mobile IRBM (3 MIRV) (270 within range of Europe, 162 in Far East, 9 in Central Asia)); 9 launchers in each operating base;
   upgraded version reported under test. ї
   SS-4 Sandal: 112 MRBM in western USSR (being retired).
(c) Air-launched: (95,000 Air Force personnel).
STRATEGIC AVIATION: 5 Armies; about 1,765 combat ac.
   1 Army (Moscow) for intercontinental roles, 4 in TVDs for theatre spt.
   Western TVD: 2 armies (Smolensk, Legnica);
   South-Western TVD: 1 army (Vinnitsa);
   Far East TVD: 1 army (Irkutsk).
Bbrs: 1,182.
   long-range: 165:
   150 Tu-95 Bear A/B/C/G/H (some 80 B/C/G have AS-3/-4 ASM, some 50 H have up to 8 AS-15 ALCM);
   15 Mya-4 Bison.
   (Blackjack strategic bomber under development.)
   medium-range: 567:
   160 Tu-26 Backfire B/C (AS-4 ASM);
   272 Tu-16 Badger,
   135 Tu-22 Blinder A/B.
   Short-range: 450 Su-24 Fencer.
Recce: Strategic: 108: 4 Tu-95 Bear E, 15 Tu-16 Badger F;
   tactical: 40 MiG-25 Foxbat B/D, 24 MiG-31 Foxhound, 25 Su-24 Fencer D.
Ftrs (base defence): 315+: 180 MiG-23 Flogger B/G, 135 MiG-21 Fishbed, Su-27 Flanker A reported.
ECM: 160: 100 Tu-16 Badger H/J/K, 60 Yak-28 BrewerE.
Tankers: 50: 30 Mya-4 Bison A, 20 Tu-16 Badger. Midas (I1-76 mod) being introduced.
ASM: AS-3 Kangaroo, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt, AS-6 Kingfish.
ALCM: AS-15.
(On order: Blackjack, Tu-26 Backfire bbrs, Tu-95 Bear H (ALCM mod), AS-15 ALCM.)

GROUND FORCES: 2,000,000 (perhaps 1,400,000 conscripts).
5 Major Theatres (TVD), 1 Strategic Reserve Theatre. 16 Military Districts.
Front and Army tps:
   2 Unified Army Corps (?each 2 divs).
   Some 10 air assault bdes (each 4 inf bns (2 with BMD); arty, SAM, ATK; spt tps).
   18 arty divs, Front: No standard org: perhaps 3-4 bdes (11 bns):
   3 bns each 24 152mm guns, 3 each 24 152mm gun/how, 3 each 24 220mm MRL, 1 of 12 203mm how and 1 of 12 240mm mor (nuc).
   Arty bdes, Army: No standard org: perhaps 4 bns: 1 of 24 152mm guns, 1 of 24 152mm gun/how, 2 each of 24 152mm SP guns.
   Tk, arty, SSM, ATK, AD (SAM and arty), engr bdes; sigs, electronic warfare, hy tk tpt regts; NBC defence, CW bns; spt services.
   Special forces (Spetsnaz): 27-30,000: 16 bdes, 3 regts (org in 6-8-man teams).
   Army Avn: regts and sqns assigned to division and above; some 20 attack regts with 60+ Mi-8 and Mi-24 armed hel.
52 tk divs (Type: 3 tk, 1 motor rifle, 1 arty, 1 SAM regts; 1 SSM, 1 MRL bns; spt units).
150 motor rifle divs (Type: 3 motor rifle, 1 tk, 1 arty, 1 SAM regts; 1 SSM, 1 ATK, 1 MRL bns; spt units).
7 AB divs (each 3 para, 1 arty regts; 1 AA bn).
[Divs have 3 categories of combat readiness; the first two are considered to be combat-capable, the third and the mobilization divs are reinforcements.
   Category 1, full strength on 24 hours notice, eqpt complete;
   Category 2, 50-75% strength, complete with fighting vehicles, full manning planned to take 3 days, fully operational in 30 days;
   Category 3, active cadre (some 20% strength), combat eqpt possibly complete, older models, planned to be fully manned in 1 week
   and retrained in less than 60 days.
   To man these Cat 2 and 3 divs would require some 2,100,000 men.
   Some 5 'Second Generation' divs, with 5% manning, using additional key personnel assigned from the active divs with older model eqpt,
   could be mobilized from reservists and retrained after some months.
   For a broad assessment of the 209 divs by categories see p. 39 below.]
Ministry of Defence tps (all Services):
HQ tps.
Military commissariats (some 4,200).
Rear Services (finance, justice, log, maintenance, medical, procurement, repair, supplies, transportation, veterinary).
Troops of Civil Defence: (150,000 permanent staff, 16,000,000+ on mobilization).
   Nationwide programme down to city/rural/industrial level, incl some 75 comd posts within 120 km of Moscow, 1,500 hardened deep shelters;
   accommodation for at least 175,000 officials, and local urban hardened shelters for essential work-force and some of the general population.
Equipment:
MBT: some 53,300: some 19,500 T-54/-55, 13,700 T-62, some 9,300 T-64-A/-B, 8,500 T-72/L-M and 2,300 T-80 (most fitted for deep fording).
   lt: 1,200 PT-76.
AFV: some 64,700 (plus 20,000 reserve):
   recce: 7,500: incl 5,700 BRDM-2, many with ATGW.
   MICV: some 28,500: some 26,000 BMP-1 (73mm gun/AT-3 ATGW), BMP-2 (30mm gun/AT-5 ATGW); some 2,500 BMD (AB).
   APC: some 29,700: some 26,000 BTR-50P/-60P/-70/-80/-152; 2,900 MT-LB.
Arty: 29,000 (some 5,000 SP):
   guns: 122mm: D-74; 130mm: M-46; 152mm: ?l,500 M-1976, ?2,100 2S5 SP; 180mm: 7180 S23 towed; 203mm: ?200 2S7 (M-1975) SP.
   guns/how: 120mm: 2S9 (M-1981) SP; 152mm: 7500 M-1937, ?2,000 D-20 (M-1955) towed, 3,500+ 2S3 (M-1973) SP.
   how: 122mm: M-1938/D-30, 2S1 (M-1974) SP.
   MRL: 6,900: 122mm: BM-21 (1964), RM-70 (M-1972) 40-tube; M-1975 12-tube; M-1976 36-tube;
   140mm: BM-14-16, RPU-14 16 tube; BM-14-17 17-tube; 220mm: BM-27 (M-1977) 16-tube; 240mm: BM-24 12-tube.
   Mor: 82mm; 10,800 120mm, 160mm and 200 240mm 2S4 (M-1975) SP.
   SSM (nuclear-capable): some 1,510 launchers (units organic to formations), incl some
   650 FROG, 130 SS-21 Scarab, 580 Scud B, up to 20 SS-23 Spider, 130 SS-12 (mod).
   GLCM: SSC-X-4 (mod AS-15) ?1987 deployment.
ATK: RL: 73mm: RPG-16/-18; 82mm: RPG-7. RCL: 73mm: SPG-9.
   guns: 7,250: 57mm: ASU-57 SP; 76mm; 85mm: D-44/SD-44, ASU-85 SP; 100mm: T-12/-12A/M-55 towed.
   ATGW: AT-2 Swatter, AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel, AT-6 Spiral.
AD: guns: 12,000: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 30mm: (incl ZSU-30-6 trials); 37mm; 57mm: S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm; 100mm: KS-19; 130mm.
   SAM: about 5,000 crew-served field mobile systems; (some 440 units):
   SA-4 A/B Ganef (twin): 1,400: (Army/Front weapon, being replaced by SA-11 and SA-12A).
   SA-6 Gainful (triple): 850: (at div, SA-11 replacing).
   SA-7 Grail (man-portable): perhaps 20,000 (unit weapon, being replaced by SA-14 and SA-16).
   SA-8 Gecko (2 twin or 2 triple): some 800 (at div).
   SA-9 Gaskin (2 twin): 500 (at regt).
   SA-10 Grumble (quad): Theatre/Strategic: Total 960+; perhaps 500 tactical being deployed.
   SA-10b mobile.
   SA-11 Gadfly (quad): 180 (at div).
   SA-12A Gladiator (replacing SA-4).
   SA-13 Gopher (2 twin): 800 (replacing SA-9).
   SA-14 Gremlin 1,400 (replacing SA-7).
   SA-16 (replacing SA-7).
   SA-X-12B Giant under development (SAM/?ATBM role).
radar:
   (i) surveillance: Long Track (SA-4/-6), P-50 Bar Lock.
   (ii) height-finder: Thin Skin.
   (iii) missile control: Flat Face (SA-4/-6/-8), Pat Hand (SA-4), Straight Flush (SA-6), Land Roll (SA-8).
   (iv) AA arty fire control: Gun Dish (ZSU-23-4), Fire Can (57mm, 85mm), Whiff, Fire Wheel (57mm, 130mm).
Avn: some 4,613 hel:
   armed: some 1,560+: 480 Mi-8 Hip E, 1,080 Mi-24 Hind. Mi-28 Havoc reported,
   tpt: some 2,138: some 1,400 Mi-8 Hip C, 250 Mi-17 Hip H (assault); 470 Mi-6 Hook; 18 Mi-26 Halo A (hy).
   EWng/ECM: 175 Mi-8 Hip J/K.
   general-purpose: some 740: 690 Mi-2 Hoplite, 25 Mi-4 Hound; 725 Mi-8 Hip D/G (comms).

AIR DEFENCE TROOPS (VPVO): 520,000 (70-75% conscripts: ~377,000).
5 Air Defence District Commands: Air regts and indep sqns; ADregts; 14 specialist schools.
ABM: 32 launchers.
   ABM-1B Galosh: 16: range 320+ km, warheads nuclear, 3 MT. 4 firing complexes around Moscow.
   SH-04 mod Galosh exoatmospheric: 16.
   (SH-08 Gazelle supersonic endoatmospheric being developed.)
Aircraft: (Aviation of Air Defence - APVO):
Interceptors: 1,760+: incl
   420 MiG-23 Flogger B/G (6 AAM); 305 MiG-25 Foxbat E (4 AAM); 100+ MiG-31 Foxhound A (4 AA-9); 240 Su-15 Flagon E/F (2 AAM);
   Su-27 Flanker, 65 Yak-28P Firebar (2 AA-5); 80 Tu-28P Fiddler B (4 AA-5).
Airborne Warning and Control: 7 Tu-126 Moss; 4 I1-76 Mainstay (replacing Tu-126).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-3 Anab, AA-5 Ash, A-6 Acrid, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, AA-9, AA-10.
SAM: strategic role; some 9,000+ launchers in some 1,200 sites:
   SA-1 Guild: 2,200 (being replaced by SA-10).
   SA-2 Guideline: 2,675 (SA-10 may be replacing);
   SA-3 Goa: 1,135 (2 or 4 launcher rails, over 300 sites, low- to med-altitude intercept).
   SA-5 Gammon: 2,030 launchers (130 complexes, long-range intercept);
   SA-10 Grumble: some 960 quad (theatre/strategic role: some 80 complexes (20 more building); 40 with a strategic role near Moscow); some in Far East;
   SA-10b (see also Army AD above) mobile reported deployed.
   SA-X-12B Giant under development SAM/?ATBM role.
Warning Systems: 10,000, incl satellites and EWng and ground control intercept radars.
Satellites:
   9 with highly elliptical semi-synchronous orbits (anti-ICBM/SLBM launch detection capability).
   Others incl 9 EWng, 6 ELINT, 2-4 recce, 1 launch detection.
Radars:
Over-the-horizon (backscatter) OTH(B): 3:
   2 near Kiev and Komsomolsk (Ukraine), targeted on the US and polar areas;
   1 near Nikolayev-na-Amur, targeted on China.
Long-range early-warning:
(a)ABM-associated:
(1) 9 phased-array systems at Baranovichi, Skrunda (Belorussia), Mukachevo (Ukraine), Olnegorsk (?Kola), Krasnoyarsk (under construction),
   Lyaki (Caucasus), Sary-shagan (Kazakhstan), Pechora (Urals), Mishelevka (Irkutsk).
(2) 11 Hen House-series;range 6,000 km, 6 locations covering approaches from the west and south-west, north-east and south-east and (partially) south
   Linked to intermediate-range Dog House (range 2,800 km), Cat House and Try Add msl control radar.
(3) Engagement, guidance, battle management: 1 Pillbox phased array at Pushkino (Moscow); Flat Twin, Pawn Shop (Ga/osfc/SH-04/SH-08).
(b) AD-associated: Tall King, few hundred, range 600 km (SA-5); P-12 Spoon Rest, 275 km (SA-2).
Air surveillance systems: 7,000+:
(1) Search, surveillance, target acquisition (2,000; 1,300 sites):
   Back Trap; P-15 Flat Face/Squat Eye, 200 km (SA-3); P-35 Bar Lock, P-80 Back Net, 320 km (SA-5).
(2) Height Finder: Cake-series (e.g., Rock Cake), 200 km; Side Net, 180 km; Odd Pair, Odd Group.
(3) Missile control: Yo-Yo (SA-1); Fan Song A to E (SA-2); Low Blow (SA-3); Square Pair (SA-5); Flap Lid (SA-10).
(4) Civilian air control equipment.

AIR FORCE: 454,000 (70-75% conscripts: ?330,00). Strategic (95,000; p. 34) Military Transport Aviation (VTA (44,000)).
Air Forces of the Soviet Union: 16 MD and Groups of Forces Air Forces (315,000).
Combat: some 4,920 ac.
Forces' strengths vary, mostly org in divs of 3 regts of 3 sqns, total 135 ac. Regt roles incl AD, interdiction, recce, tac air spt; div roles may be mixed.
FGA: 2,460: 135 MiG-21 Fishbed L, 1,035 MiG-27 FloggerD/J, 45 Su-7 Fitter A, 630 Su-17 Fitter D/H/K,
   345 Su-24 Fencer (450 more with Strategic Air), 270 Su-25 Frogfoot.
Ftrs: 2,000+: 345 MiG-21 J/K/L/N, 1,140 MiG-23 Flogger B/G, 180 MiG-25 Foxbat A/E, 290+ MiG-29 Fulcrum, 45 MiG-31 Foxhound.
Recce: 390+: 150 MiG-25 Foxbat B/D, 50 MiG-21 Fishbed H, 65 Yak-28 Brewer D, 125 Su-17 Fitter H/K, Su-24 Fencer D.
ECM: ac: 70 Yak-28 Brewer E.
Trg: some 2,000.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, AA-9, AA-10, AA-11.
ASM: AS-7 Kerry, AS-10.

MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION (VTA): (40,000); 5 divs, each 3 regts, each 30 ac; some indep regts.
Eqpt: 610 ac: 210 An-12 Cub, 340 I1-76M/MD Candid B (replacing Cub), 55 An-22 Cock, 5 An-124 Condor (in service 1987).
Additional ac (VTA augmentation force): Tpt ac in comds other than VTA: org in indep regts and sqns: 1,400:
   Tu-134 Crusty, Tu-154 Careless, An-12 Cub, An-24 Coke, An-26 Curl, I1-14 Crate.
Civilian Aeroflot fleet: 1,600 med-and long-range passenger ac, incl some 200 Cub and Candid.

NAVY: 477,000 (some 72% conscripts 7343,000), incl Strategic (s 17,000), Naval Air Force (70,000), Naval Infantry (18,000),
   Coastal Artillery and Rocket Troops (13,000), central staffs and directorates (26,000).
Subs: 360 (15 more under conversion):
Cruise missile: 67:
   nuclear (SSGN): 51.
   1 Y-class (test) with 12 SS-NX-24 SLCM.
   4 O-class with 24 SS-N-19 Shipwreck.
   1 P-class with 10 SS-N-9 Siren.
   17 C-class: 11 C-I with 8 SS-N-7; 6 C-II with 8 SS-N-9 Siren.
   28 E-II: some 18 with 8 SS-N-3a Shaddock mod; some 10 with 8 SS-N-12 Sandbox.
   diesel (SSG): 16: J-class with 4 SS-N-3a.
Attack: 200:
   nuclear (SSN): 76: 2 Akula, 6 A, 12 N, 1 M (?research/development), 1 S, 16 V-I, 7 V-II, 21 V-III, 5 E-I, 1 Y, 4 H.
   Apart from the older N and E, most SSN probably carry SS-N-16 and/or SS-N-15 ASW torpedo nuclear weapons,
   and some may be intended to carry SS-NX-21 SLCM.
   diesel (SS): 124: 11 K (replacing F and some W), 18 T, 45 F, 4 R, 45 W, 1 Z.
Other roles: 86 (15 more converting),
   comms (SSQ): 1 H-II nuc (SSQN); 3 G-I diesel.
   research (SSA): 1 U, 1 X nuc (SSAN); 1 L, 1 G-V (SLBM).
   trg (SST): 4 B.
   rescue: 2 I.
   Converting to other roles incl SSN: 15: 13 Y-I, 2 H-II ex-SSBN.
   Reserve: 72: 14 F, 3 Z, 55 W.
The new naval cruise msls, SS-NX-21 and SS-NX-24 are now on sea trials.
Principal Surface Combatants: 274.
(See also 'additional in Reserve' and KGB (Para-Military)).
Carriers: 6:
   4 Kiev (37,000-ton) with ac: 13 Yak-38 Forger A/B V/STOL; hel: 16 Kamov Ka-25 Hormone A/Ka-27 Helix A ASW,
   Hormone B/Helix B target acquisition, Hormone C/Helix SAR; SSM: 4x2 SS-N-12 Sandbox;
   SAM: 2x2 SA-N-3 and 2x2 SA-N-4 (or (in 2) 12 SA-N-9); ASW: 1x2 SUW-N-1 (FRAS-1).
   2 Moskva (17,000-ton) with 18 Hormone A hel, 2x2 SA-N-3 SAM, 1x2 SUW-N-1 (FRAS-1)ASW.
Cruisers: 37:
   CGN: 2 Kirov with 20 SS-N-19 SSM, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1x2 SS-N-14 Silex ASW: 1 with 12 SA-N-6 SAM; 16 SA-N-9 SAM, 3 Ka-25 Hormone B hel.
   CG: 27:
   2 Slava (surface warfare/ASW) with 8x2 SS-N-12 Sandbox SSM, 8 SA-N-6, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1 Ka-27 hel;
   7 Kara (ASW) with 2x4 SS-N-14 ASW, 2x2 SA-N-3, 2x2 SA-N-4 SAM (1 trials with 1x6 SA-N-6 replacing twin SA-N-3), 1 Ka-25 Hormone A hel;
   10 Kresta-II (ASW) with 2x4 SS-N-14 ASW, 2x2 SA-N-3 SAM, 1 Ka-25 Hormone A hel;
   4 Kresta-I (surface warfare) with 2x2 SS-N-3b Shaddock SSM, 2x2 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 Hormone B hel;
   4 Kynda (surface warfare) with 2x4 SS-N-3b Shaddock, 1x2 SA-N-1 SAM.
   CL (lt): 8 Sverdlov (2 comd with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM, 1 Ka-25 hel).
Destroyers: 63:
   DDG: 49:
   Surface warfare: 16:
   7 Sovremennyy with 2x4 SS-N-22 SSM, 2 SA-N-7 SAM, 1 Ka-25 Hormone B hel;
   6 mod Kashin with 4 SS-N-2C Styx SSM, 2x2 SA-N-1.
   3 mod Kildin with 4 SS-N-2C Styx SSM.
   ASW: 33:
   8 Udaloy with 2x4 SS-N-14 ASW, 8 SA-N-9 SAM, 2 Ka-27A Helix A hel;
   13 Kashin: 12 with 2x2 SA-N-1, 1 with 1 SA-N-7 (trials);
   6 Kanin with 1x2 SA-N-1;
   6 SAM Kotlin with 1x2 SA-N-1.
   DD: 14: 8 Kotlin, 5 Skory, 1 Kildin.
Escorts: 168:
   FFG: 32: 21 Krivak-I, 11 -II, all with 1x4 SS-N-14, 2x2 SA-N-4.
   FF: 34: 1 Koni, 33 Riga.
   FFL (corvettes): 102: 52 Grisha-I, -III, -V all with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM; 18 Mirka-I, -II; 32 Petya.
Additional in reserve: 4 Sverdlov CL (1 with 1 twin SA-N-2 SAM); 2 Kanin, 1 SAM Kotlin DDG; 10 Kotlin, 6 Skory DD; 10 Riga FL; 8 Petya FFL.
Minor Surface Combatants: 757.
Patrol combatants: 382:
FLG (GW patrol boats): 51:
   Tarantul: 23: 2 -I, 18 -II (all with 2x2 SS-N-2c), 3 -III with 2x2 SS-N-22.
   Nanuchka: 28-I and -II with 2x3 SS-N-9 (Siren), 1x2 SA-N-4.
FAC: 219:
   FAC(G): 80 Osa (50 -I, 30 -II), all with 4 SS-N-2).
   FAC(T): 90: 25 Pauk with 1x4 SA-N-5 (some KGB); 55 Poti, 10 Shershen.
   FAC(hydrofoil): 47:
   missile: 17: 1 Sarancha with 2x2 SS-N-9, 1x2 SA-N-4; 16 Matka with 2 SS-N-2C.
   torpedo: 30 Turya.
   research: 2: 1 Slepen, 1 Babochka hydrofoil.
Patrol: 112:
   ships: 7: 3 T-58, 4 T-43;
   large craft: 12 SO-1 (some KGB);
   river: 95: 15 Yaz, 80 Shmel;
Radar pickets: 10: 3 T-58, 7 T-43/PGR.
Mine warfare: 365:
Minelayers: 3 Alesha.
MCMV: ocean: 117: 35 Natya-I, -II, 45 Yurka, 35 T-43, 2 Andryusha (?trials);
   coastal: 178: 60 Sonya, 3 Zhenya, 5 Sasha, 65 Vanya, 45 Evgenya;
   inshore: 67: 10 Ilyusha, 5 Olya, 20 TR-40, 30 K-8, 2 Pomornik surface effect ships (SES).
Additional in reserve: 5 T-43 patrol, 5 Sasha MCMV .
Amph: 190+.
   Ships: 84:
   LPD: 2 Ivan Rogov with 1x2 SA-N-4, 4x4 SA-N-5, 2-3 Ka-27 hel.
   LST: 37: 23 Ropucha, some with 4x4 SA-N-5; 14 Alligator, some with 3x2, 1 with 2x2 SA-N-5.
   LSM: 45 Polnocny (3 types: one with 2x4 SA-N-5; others (incl 9 type C) with 4x4 SA-N-5).
   Craft: LCU: 30: 1L5 Vydra, 15 S M B-1. LCM: Ondatra.
Surface Effect Ships (SES): 75:
   20 250-ton Aist, 1 105-ton Tsaplya, 20 Lebed, 2 Utenok, 31 Gus. 1 Orlan, 'wing-in-ground effect' (WIG) experimental.
(Additional amph vessels could be provided by merchant fleet.)
Principal auxiliary ships: 382:
   Tankers: 74+: 28 replenishment, 32 spt, 14 special liquid; numerous harbour.
   Spt vessels: 308: 16 msl spt, 7 range instrumentation, 8 supply, 86 cargo, 18 submarine tenders, 40 repair, 2 hospital, 21 submarine rescue,
   28 salvage/rescue, 10 trg, 7 icebreakers, 65 barrack ships.
Merchant fleet (auxiliary/augmentation): 2,500 ocean-going vessels (17 in Arctic service), incl
   90 ramp-fitted and roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO), some with rails for rail road cars, 3 roll-on/float-off (RO-FLO);
   7 float-on/float-off (FLO-FLO) barge carriers. 78 passenger liners. 55 icebreakers (4 nuc). 500 coastal and river ships.
Fishing fleet: many with more than normally sophisticated electronic eqpt; crews often incl naval reservists.
Intelligence collection vessels (AGI): 63: 42 with SA-N-5 or -8 SAM.
Research: some 506: 41 naval, some 75 civilian oceanographic, some 100 naval survey; some 210 fishery, 19 civilian survey, some 50 geological,
   11 space-associated vessels.
(On order 3-4 Typhoon, 2 D-IV SSBN; O-class SSGN; Akula, S-class SSN; K-class SS; 2 65,000-ton carriers (1 71988); 2 Kirov CGN, 2 Slava CG (1 ?1988); 5 Sovremenny, 3 Udaloy DDG; Krivak-III FFG, Grisha-V FFL; Tarantul, Nanuchka FLG; Pauk FAC(T); Sonya, Pelikan coastal MCMV; Ropucha LST; Pomornik, Tsaplya SES; Balzam, 2 Vishnya AGI, 1 nuclear-powered 32,000-ton barge-carrier, 9 RO-RO, 9 ramp-fitted spt merchant ships; 4 nuc icebreakers.)

NAVAL AVIATION: 70,000; some 984 combat ac, some 335 armed hel.
Four Fleet Air Forces; org in air divs, each with 2-3 regts of HQ elements and 2 bns of 9-10 ac each; recce, ASW, tpt/utility org in indep regts or sqns.
Bbrs: some 390 ac:
   6 regts of some 130 Tu-26 Backfire B/C (AS-4 ASM);
   7 regts of some 230 Tu-16 Badger C/G/G-mod (AS-5/-6 ASM);
   2 regts of 30 Tu-22 Blinder B.
FGA: some 195:
   100 Yak-38 Forger A/B V/STOL (in carriers);
   15 Su-17 Fitter C.
   ?20 Su-24 Fencer (maritime attack).
ASW: 219 ac, some 295 hel:
   ac: 65 Tu-142 Bear F, 59 11-38 May, 95 Be-12 Mail.
   hel: 100 Mi-14 Haze A, 115 Ka-25 Hormone A, 80 Ka-27 Helix A.
MR/ECM: 180 ac, 25 hel:
   ac: 50 Tu-16 Badger D/E/F/K (MR), 55 K/J (ECM), 10 Tu-22 Blinder C, 50 Tu-95 Bear D, 15 An-12 Cub C/D.
   hel: 25 Ka-25 Hormone B.
MCM: 15 Mi-14 Haze B.
Tankers: 70 Tu-16 Badger.
Tpt/trg: 365 ac, 100 hel.
   ac: incl An-12 Cub A, An-26 Curl, I1-14 Crate, I1-18 Cool, An-4 Coke, I1-76 Candid;
   hel: 100 Mi-6/-8 Hook/Hip.
ASM: AS-2 Kipper, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt, AS-6 Kingfish, AS-7 Kerry.

NAVAL INFANTRY (Marines): (some 18,000).
1 div (7,000: 3 inf, 1 tk, 1 arty regts).
3 indep bdes (type: 3,000: 3 inf, 1 tk (1 med, 3 lt tk coys), arty, MRL bns;
   with 10 MBT, 31 lt tks, ?90 APC, 18 how, 18 MRL, 6 SP ATK, 4 AA guns, 4 SP SAM.)
4 fleet Special Forces (Spetsnaz) bdes: 2-3 underwater, 1 para bns, spt elms.
Indep spt units: 61.
Equipment:
Tks: 150 T-54/-55, some T-72; lt: 150 PT-76.
AFV: 1,075: recce: 30 BRDM-2/Sagger ATGW. APC: 1,045: BTR-60P/PA/PB.
Arty: how: 72 2S1 (M-1974) 122mm SP. MRL: 90 BM-14 17-tube 140mm or BM-21 40-tube 122mm.
Mor: 82mm, 42 120mm.
ATGW: 40 AT-3/-5.
AD: guns: 40 ZSU-23-4 SP. SAM: 60 SA-7, 20 SA-9, MT-LB/SA-13 SP.
Amph vessels: in Naval inventory incl Aist, Lebed, Gus SES.

COASTAL ARTILLERY AND ROCKET TROOPS: (13,000).
1 coastal arty div (role: protects approaches to naval bases and major ports).
Equipment:
Arty: guns: incl SM-4-1 130mm.
SSM: ?100 SS-C-1b Sepal (similar to SS-N-3), SS-C-3.

DEPLOYMENT (all Services):
   Soviet strategic planning envisages three major Strategic Theatres (GTVD: Western, Southern, Far Eastern), comprising 5 regional Theatres (TVD: North-Western, Western, South-Western, Southern, Far Eastern); perhaps 4 associated Oceanic Theatres (OTVD: Atlantic, Arctic, Indian, Pacific); 3 Sea Theatres (Baltic, Black Sea and Mediterranean); and a Central Reserve. Forces within these Theatres are centrally controlled and co-ordinated, integrating all the elements assigned to the operational mission.
   The deployments shown for strategic SLBM, ICBM and strategic bomber forces and for AB divs reflect their physical location, but control of them is exercised centrally by the Supreme High Command.
   A possible assignment, of necessity speculative, of known active forces excl KGB follows. Eqpt strength estimates are based on typical organizational establishments.
   The 30 tk and motor rifle divs and 1 arty div in the four Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe (see Deployment below), the 7 AB divs and the 10 air assault bdes all are at Cat 1. Perhaps 17 of the 89 divs in the West, Central and South-West European USSR are in Cat 1 or 2. Of the remaining 83 divs in the
Far Eastern and Southern USSR, 60% are likely to be Category 3.
   Tk divs in Eastern Europe have up to 328 MBT, motor rifle divs up to 271; holdings elsewhere may be lower.
   Full mobilized deployment, incl non-Soviet Warsaw Pact troops, could total as many as 15 Fronts (each with 2 to 5 armies, plus tactical (= Frontal) aviation and support forces), 27 all-arms or tank armies, 12 Army Corps (incl 2 'Unified').
   []

WESTERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD): (HQ Kiev): 3 subordinate continental theatres (TVD), 2 oceanic theatres (OTVD).

NORTH-WESTERN TVD (with Arctic OTVD): (HQ Petrozavodsk):
Strategic Forces (under central command):
   SLBM: 580: Northern Fleet: 38 subs (SLBM numbers in parentheses):
   4 Typhoon (80); 9 D-I (108); 4 D-II (64); 7 D-III (112); 3 D-IV (48); 8 Y-I (128); 1 Y-II (12); 1 H-III (6); 1 G-III (6).
   ICBM: Plesetsk test Cfentre.
   Bbrs: nil.
Air Defence Forces:
   EWng systems: major site near Kovdov, W. Kola, detailed deployments unknown.
AD District: (HQ Arkhangelsk; incl Kola Peninsula):
   Ftrs: 180+: 2 regts MiG-23 Flogger, MiG-25 Foxbat; 2 regts MiG-31 Foxhound, Su-15 Flagon; Su-27 Flanker.
   AEW: 6 Tupolev Tu-126 Moss, 4 I1-76 Mainstay (replacing Tu-126).
   SAM: over 100 complexes: SA-2/-3/-5/-10.
Ground Forces: Leningrad MD (HQ Leningrad):
   11 motor rifle, 1 AB divs, plus 1 arty div and 1 air assault bde.
   Mobilization could field 2 all-arms armies with 2,000 MBT; 2,100 arty, MRL, hy mor; 36 FROG/SS-21, 54 Scud, 12 SS-12 (mod) SSM;
   Hel: 20 Mi-24 Hind attack; 20 Mi-8 Hip C assault; 10 Hip J ECM; 90 Mi-8 Hip, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hoplite tpt.
Tactical Aviation: Leningrad MD Air Force (HQ Leningrad): 165 combat ac.
   FGA: 3 regts (135 ac) MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-27 Flogger, Su-17 Fitter.
   Recce: 30: MiG-21/-25; Su-17 Fitter H.
   Tpt: 30 ac.
Navy: Northern Fleet (HQ Severomorsk): (126,000).
   Bases: Kola Inlet, Motovskiy Gulf, Gremikha, Polyarny.
   Subs: 126: 36 SSGN/SSG, 90 SSN/SS incl 2 K. (5-6 normally deployed to Mediterranean.)
   Principal surface combatants: 73: 1 carrier, 12 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 17 frigates, 25 corvettes; dets to Mediterranean sqn.
   (See South-Western TVD below.)
   Minor surface combatants: 47.
   MCMV: 64.
   Amph: 15 ships.
   Auxiliaries: 120 principal.
Naval Aviation: combat: 227 ac, 85 hel.
   Bbrs: 50 Tu-16 Badger A/C/E.
   Ftr/FGA: 27 Yak-38 Forger.
   ASW: 160: ac: 80: Tu-142 Bear F, I1-38 May, Be-12 Mail; hel: 64: (afloat): Ka-25 Hormone; Ka-27 Helix; (ashore): Ka-25.
   Recce/MR/ECM: ac: Tu-16 Badger, Tu-95 Bear, An-12 Cub; hel: 5 Ka-25 Hormone.
   MCM hel: 16 Mi-14 Haze B, Ka-27 Helix B.
   Tankers/tpt: 20 ac incl Tu-16.
Naval Infantry: Bde: 1: 5 bns: 3,000.

WESTERN TVD (with Atlantic OTVD): (HQ Legnica):
Strategic Forces (msls and ac under central command):
   SLBM: 18: Baltic Fleet: 6 G-II SSB.
   ICBM: 90: SS-19 (1 field; ?theatre role).
   IRBM: 180: SS-20 (4 fields).
   MRBM: 112: SS-4.
   Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ: Legnica): 225 Su-24 Fencer strike.
Air Defence Forces:
   EWng systems: 2 OTH(B) near Minsk, 1 major complex near Tallinn; details unknown.
   Ftrs: See Tactical Aviation (MDs).
   SAM: 6,500 SA-2/-3/-5/-10; 175 complexes and sites.
Ground Forces (HQ Legnica): 3 Groups of Soviet Forces, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian MDs;
   63 divs (31 tk, 30 motor rifle, 2 AB), plus 6 arty divs, 4 air assault bdes.
Europe: 3 Gps of Forces, 8 Army HQ; 13 tk, 13 motor rifle divs.
East Germany (GSFG) (HQ Zossen-Wunsdorf): (380,000): 1 Gp, 5 Army HQ; 10 tk, 9 motor rifle plus 1 arty divs; 1 air assault,
   1 SS-12 (mod), 2 Scud/SS-23, 5 arty bdes;
   5 attack hel regts: some 100 Mi-8 Hip C/E; some 250 Mi-24 Hind D/E attack/assault; 25 Mi-8 Hip ECM, some 20 tpts.
Poland (NGF) (HQ Legnica): (40,000): 1 Gp, 1 Army HQ; 1 tk, 1 motor rifle divs; 1 Scud; 1 attack hel regt: 120 Mi-8 Hip C/E, Mi-24 Hind D/E.
Czechoslovakia (CGF) (HQ Milovice): (80,000): 1 Gp, 2 Army HQ; 2 tk, 3 motor rifle divs; 1 air assault bn; 1 SS-12 (mod), 2 Scud, 1 arty bdes;
   2 attack hel regts: 100 Mi-8 Hip D/E, Mi-24 Hind D/E.
Soviet Union: 3 Army HQ; 1 Unified Army Corps HQ; 18 tk, 17 motor rifle, 2 AB.
   Baltic MD (HQ: Kaliningrad): 3 tk, 7 motor rifle, 2 AB plus 2 arty divs, 1 air assault bde: 100 Mi-8 Hip/-24 Hind.
   Belorussian MD (HQ Minsk): 1 Unified Army Corps HQ; 11 tk, 2 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs, 1 air assault, 1 SS-23 bdes; 150 Mi-8 Hip/-24 Hind.
   Carpathian MD (HQ Lvov): 3 Army HQ, 4 tk, 8 motor rifle, plus 2 arty divs, 1 air assault bde; 70 Mi-8 Hip E, Mi-24 Hind.
Mobilization of the divs in the TVD could produce five Fronts, 13-14 Armies (which would also command the 31 + non-Soviet Warsaw Pact formations)
   and 1 Army Corps.
Equipment: up to 19,500 MBT; 14,000 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 114 FROG, 130 SS-21, 256 Scud/SS-23, 48 SS-12 (mod) SSM; 2,200 SAM;
   some 1,825 combat hel, perhaps 420 armed.
Tactical Aviation: some 1,755 combat ac.
East Germany: Air Forces of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (HQ ZossenWunsdorf): some 685 combat ac.
   FGA: 315 Su-17 Fitter D/H/K, Su-24 Fencer, Su-25 Frogfoot, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
   Ftrs: 300: MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-25 Foxbat E, MiG-23 Flogger B/G, MiG-29 Fulcrum.
   Recce: 50 Su-17 Fitter H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D. ECM: 20 Yak-28 Brewer. Tpt: some 40 ac.
Poland: Air Forces of the Northern Group of Forces (HQ Legnica): no combat ac.
   Tpt: 10 ac.
Czechoslovakia: Air Forces of the Central Group of Forces (HQ Lvov): 105 combat ac.
   FGA: 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
   Ftrs: 45 MiG-23 Flogger B.
   Recce: 15 Su-17 Fitter H. Tpt: 5 ac.
Baltic MD Air Force (HQ Kaliningrad): some 260 combat ac.
   FGA: 90: 2 regts: MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-27 Flogger.
   Ftrs: 135 MiG-23 Flogger.
   Recce: 20: Su-17 Fitter. ECM: 15. Tpt: 5 ac.
Belorussian MD Air Force (HQ Minsk): 355 combat ac.
   FGA: 135: Su-17 Fitter, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
   Ftrs: 170 MiG-21 Fishbed; MiG-23 Flogger B/G; MiG-29 Fulcrum.
   Recce: 50 MiG-21 Fishbed H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D.
   Tpt: n.a.
Carpathian MD Air Force (HQ Vinnitsa): 350 combat ac.
   FGA: 180: 4 regts with MiG-27 Flogger, Su-17 Fitter.
   Ftrs: 120: 3 regts MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-23 Flogger/MiG-29 Fulcrum.
   Recce: 30. ECM: 20. Tpt: 25 ac.
Navy: Baltic Fleet (HQ Kaliningrad): 87,000.
   Bases: Kronshtadt, Paldiski, Liepaya, Baltiysk, Riga.
   (Probably has dual role: (a) to support Soviet operations in Central Europe by sea control and amph operations against the German/Danish coasts;
   (b) to support a North-Western TVD operation against Scandinavia.)
   Subs: 33: 3 SSG, 30 SS.
   Principal surface combatants: 47: 2 cruisers; 14 destroyers; 14 frigates; 17 corvettes.
   Minor surface combatants: 100.
   MCMV: 115.
   Amph: 20 ships; craft incl 2 Pomornic SES.
   Auxiliaries: 45 principal.
Naval Aviation: combat: some 185 ac, 40 hel.
   Bbrs: 85: 40 Tu-26 Backfire, 30 Tu-16 Badger A/C/G, 15 Tu-22 Blinder A.
   FGA: 50: 2 regts: 1 with 30 Su-17 Fitter C, 1 with ?20 Su-24 Fencer.
   ASW: ac: 10 I1-38 May, 10 Be-12G Mail hel: 30: Ka-25 Hormone, Ka-27 Helix, Mi-14 Haze.
   EW/recce: ac: 35 incl Tu-16 Badger, Tu-22 Blinder, An-12 Cub; hel: 5 Ka-25 Hormone.
   MCM hel: 5 Mi-14 Haze B.
   Tkr/tpt/trg: 65 ac incl Tu-16 Badger, 20 hel.
Naval Infantry: Bde: 1: 5 bns; 3,000.
Coast Defence: SSM: 3 regts: 6 bns: some 100 SS-C-1b Sepal. Arty: 11 bns: some 72 130mm guns.
  
SOUTH-WESTERN TVD (HQ Vinnitsa).
Strategic Forces:
   SLBM: nil.
   ICBM: (90) SS-19 (l field).
   Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ Vinnitsa): 225 Su-24 Fencer.
Air Defence Forces:
   Ftrs: 150.
   SAM: 120 SA-2/-3/-5/-10 sites.
Ground Forces (HQ Vinnitsa): 1 Group of Forces, 2 MDs; 29 divs (10 tk, 18 motor rifle, 1 AB), plus 3 arty divs, 2 air assault bdes.
Hungary (SGF) (HQ Budapest): (65,000): 1 Army HQ: 2 tk, 2 motor rifle divs, 1 air assault bde: 80 Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind E.
Kiev MD (HQ Kiev): 8 tk, 8 motor rifle plus 2 arty divs; 40 Mi-8 Hip E hel.
Odessa MD (HQ Odessa): 8 motor rifle, 1 AB, plus 1 arty divs, 1 air assault bde: 100 Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind assault/attack; some Mi-2 Hoplite, Mi-6 Hook tpt hel.
Mobilization of all these forces (with the 4 tk and 21 motor rifle divs of Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) could produce 4 Fronts,
   each of some 5 all-arms Armies.
Equipment (Soviet): up to 7,000 MBT; 5,900 arty, MRL, mor over 120mm; 104 FROG/SS-21, 110 Scud, 12 SS-12 (mod) SSM; 500 SAM;
   175 armed, perhaps 160 other hel.
Tactical Aviation (HQ Vinnitsa): some 520 combat ac.
Hungary: Air Forces of the Southern Group of Forces (HQ Budapest): 240 combat ac.
   FGA: 90: 2 regts: Su-17 Fitter, Su-24 Fencer.
   Ftrs: 135: 3 regts: MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger (MiG-29 Fulcrum being introduced).
   Recce: 10: Su-17 Fitter K. ECM: 5 ac. Tpt: 20 ac.
Kiev MD Air Force (HQ Kiev): some 90 combat ac.
   FGA: 45 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
   Ftrs: 45 MiG-23 Flogger G.
   Tpt: 5.
Odessa MD Air Force (HQ Odessa): 190 combat ac.
   FGA: 45: 1 regt MiG-27 Flogger.
   Ftrs: 135: MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger B/G.
   Recce: 10 Su-17 Fitter H. Tpt: some.
Navy: (Black Sea Fleet; incl Caspian Flotilla) (HQ Sevastopol): (97,000).
   Bases: Sevastopol, Balaclava, Poti, Odessa.
   (Fleet primary mission probably to support operations in Thrace in conjunction with Mediterranean Sqn; secondary role, sea control off Turkish coast.)
   Subs: 32: 2 SSG, 30 SS.
   Principal surface combatants: 72: 1 attack, 2 ASW hel carriers, 9 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 13 frigates, 29 corvettes (4 in Caspian).
   Minor surface combatants: 95 (5 in Caspian).
   MCMV: 90 (25 in Caspian).
   Amph: 28 ships (3 in Caspian).
   Auxiliaries: 77 principal (7 in Caspian).
Naval Aviation: combat: some 242 ac; 100 hel.
   Bbrs: 115: 2 regts Tu-22M Backfire, 2 regts Tu-16 Badger C/G; 1 regt Tu-22 Blinder A.
   FGA: 60: afloat: Yak-38 Forger, ashore: Su-17 Fitter.
   ASW: ac: (?50): 25 Be-12 Mail. hel: 90: Ka-25 Hormone A, Ka-27 Helix; Mi-14 Haze A.
   MR/recce/EW: ac: 42: Tu-22 Blinder, Tu-16 Badger,An-12 Cub. hel: 5 Ka-25 Hormone B.
   MCM hel: 5 Mi-14 Haze B.
   Tkr: 7 Tu-16 Badger.
   Tpt/trg: 103 ac, 30 hel.
Naval Infantry: Bde: 1: 5 bns: 3,000.
(Mediterranean Squadron (HQ afloat): elms of Northern and Black Sea Fleets; average composition:
Subs: 5-6.
Principal surface combatants: 7-8: 2 cruisers, 2-3 destroyers, 3 frigates.
MCMV: 2.
Auxiliaries: 22; AGI: 2.)

SOUTHERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD) (HQ Tashkent) (also may be called 'Near Eastern'):

SOUTHERN TVD (HQ Tashkent): North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus, Turkestan MDs, Afghanistan).
Strategic Forces (under central control):
   IRBM: 45 SS-20 (l field).
Air Defence Forces:
   EWng: phased-array radar system: 1 site: Lyaki (Trans-Caucasus).
   AD area (see MD Air Forces, below).
Ground Forces: 3 MDS: 30 divs (1 tk, 27 motor rifle, 2 AB) plus 1 arty div; 2 indep motor rifle, 1 air assault bdes.
North Caucasus MD (HQ Rostov): 1 tk, 7 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs.
Trans-Caucasus MD (HQ Tbilisi): 11 motor rifle, 1 AB divs. 620 hel incl 150 Mi-24 Hind/Mi-8 Hip, 20 Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hoplite.
Turkestan MD (HQ Tashkent): 6 motor rifle divs.
Afghanistan (HQ Kabul): (116,000): 1 Army HQ, 3 motor rifle, 1 AB divs; 2 motor rifle, 1 air assault bdes.
   All Cat 1 units but may lack SSM, AD elms and their spt.
   Some 270 combat hel: 140 Mi-24 Hind (?and Mi-28 Havoc), 130 Mi-8 Hip assault/tpt, Mi-6 Hook, Mi-2 Hoplite.
Mobilization could put 2-3 Fronts, perhaps 9 all-arms armies, in the field.
Equipment: perhaps 5,400 MBT; 5,600 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 115 FROG, 75 Scud SSM; 1,100 SAM, some 400 combat hel.
Tactical Aviation (HQ Tashkent): 670 combat ac.
Trans-Caucasus MD Air Force (HQ Tbilisi): 525 combat ac.
   FGA: 360: 8 regts: Su-17 Fitter, MiG-27 Flogger D/J, Su-24 Fencer, Su-25 Frogfoot.
   Ftrs: 135: 3 regts: MiG-23 Flogger B/G, MiG-29 Fulcrum.
   Recce: 30: 1 regt: Su-17 Fitter H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D. Tpt: 20 ac.
Turkestan MD Air Force (HQ Tashkent):
Afghanistan: 1 Air Army (HQ Kabul (Bagram)): 145 combat ac.
   FGA: 90 Su-25 Frogfoot.
   Ftrs: 45 MiG-23 Flogger B/G.
   Recce: 10 Su-17 Fitter. Tpt: VTA and Aeroflot ac from USSR in spt.
Navy: (Caspian Flotilla) (HQ Baku): (4000).
   Principal combatants: 4 frigates/corvettes.
   Minor combatants: 5.
   MCMV: 25.
   Amph: 3 ships.
   Auxiliaries: 7 principal.

CENTRAL RESERVE (HQ MOSCOW):
Strategic Forces (under central command):
   ICBM: some 681: SS-11 (53 msls), SS-13 (?converting to SS-25; 1 field, 60 msls), SS-17 (1 field, e 100 msls), SS-18 (2 fields, e 188 msls),
   SS-19 (2 fields, 180 msls), SS-25 (3 fields, some 100 msls).
   IRBM: 45 SS-20 (1 field).
   Bbrs: 535: 2 Air Armies:
   (HQ Moscow): 165: 4 divs: 15 Mya-4 Bison, 150 Te-95 Bear.
   (HQ Smolensk): 370: 100 Tu-26 Backfire, (?100) Tu-22 Blinder, 140 Tu-16 Badger, perhaps 1 bn (30 ac) Su-24 Fencer (theatre).
   Recce/ECM: 137: Tu-16 Badger F/H/J/K, Su-24 Fencer E, Yak-28 Brewer E.
   Tpt: 90 ac.
Air Defence Forces:
   EWng systems: major sites near Pechora, Pushkino; detailed deployments unknown.
   AD Area: (HQ Moscow).
   Ftrs: 440: 10 regts: MiG-25 Foxbat, Mig-29 Fulcrum, MiG-31 Foxhound, MiG-23 Flogger, Su-15 Flagon, Su-27 Flanker, Tu-28 Fiddler.
   ABM: Moscow complexes: 4 with 16 Galosh, 16 SH-04 mod Galosh; 5 new missile sites reported under construction.
   SAM: 135 SA-2/-3/-5, 40 SA-10 complexes and sites.
Ground Forces: 3 MDs; 20 divs (3 tk, 16 motor rifle, 1 AB) plus 1 arty div.
   Further 6 AB divs are centrally controlled, though deployed within other TVDs as shown.
Moscow MD (HQ Moscow): 2 tk, 7 motor rifle, 1 AB, plus 1 arty divs; 80 Mi-8 Hip and Mi-24 Hind hel (?50 armed).
Ural MD (HQ Sverdlovsk): 1 tk, 5 motor rifle divs.
Volga MD(HQ Kuybyshev): 4 motor rifle divs.
On mobilization could field 4,500 MBT; 4,000 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 56 FROG, 25 Scud, 18 SS-12 SSM.
Tactical Aviation (no tac ac assigned to Ural or Volga MDs.)
Moscow MD Air Force (HQ Moscow): 150 combat ac.
   FGA: 45: 1 regt Su-17 Fitter.
   Ftrs: 90: 2 regts MiG-23 Flogger, MiG-29 Fulcrum.
   Recce: 15 ac. Tpt: some 20

FAR EASTERN STRATEGIC THEATRE (GTVD) (HQ Irkutsk): (with Pacific, Indian Ocean OTVDs):

FAR EASTERN TVD (HQ Irkutsk):
Central Asian, Siberian, Trartsbaykal, Far Eastern MDs, Mongolia.
Strategic Forces (under central command):
   SLBM: 385: Pacific Fleet: 32 subs: 9 D-I (108), 7 D-III (112), 9 Y-I (144), 7 G-II (21).
   ICBM: (?387): SS-11 (4 fields, ?260 msls, could have theatre role), SS-18 (4 fields, ?120msls).
   IRBM: 171: SS-20 (4 fields, 19 sites).
   Bbrs: 1 Air Army (HQ Irkutsk): perhaps 170: 40 Tu-26 Backfire, (?30) Tu-22 Blinder, 100 Tu-16 Badger.
   Spt: perhaps 64 recce/ECM: ?4 Tu-95 Bear E, 15 Tu-16 Badger F; 45 Tu-16 Badger H/J/K.
   Tkrs: some 9 Tu-16 Badger A.
Air Defence Forces:
   EWng systems: 40 in areas: Kamchatka, Nikolayev-na-Amur, Mishelevka, Abalakova, Sary-shagan.
   AD areas: 3: 1 in Transbaykal, 2 in Far East MDs (see MD Air Forces, below).
   Interceptors: 550.
   SAM: 215 SA-2/-3/-5, 10 SA-10 complexes and sites.
Ground Forces: 4 MDs, 1 Unified Army Corps HQ: 56 divs (7 tk, 48 motor rifle, 1 coastal defence) plus 5 arty divs; 2 air assault bdes.
Central Asian MD (HQ Alma Ata): 1 tk, 7 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs, 1 air assault bde; 145 hel incl 70 Mi-8, Mi-24.
Siberian MD (HQ Novosibirsk): 6 motor rifle plus 1 arty divs.
Transbaykal MD (HQ Chita): 2 tk, 11 motor rifle, plus 1 arty divs; 225 hel incl Mi-8 Hip, Mi-24 Hind.
Far Eastern MD (HQ Khabarovsk): 2 tk, 22 motor rifle, 1 coastal defence, plus 2 arty divs, 1 air assault bde; some 670 hel.
Mongolia (HQ Ulan Bator): 1 Army HQ, 2 tk, 2 motor rifle divs. All are at Cat 1. (See also Forces Abroad, below.)
Mobilization could put 4 Fronts, perhaps 12 Armies (4 tk), into the field.
Equipment: perhaps 14,900 MBT; 13,200 arty, MRL, mor larger than 120mm; 225 FROG, 80+ Scud, 40 SS-12 (mod) SSM; 1,200 SAM, some 1,100 hel.
Tactical Aviation (HQ Irkutsk): (150,000): some 1,390 combat ac.
Central Asian MD Air Force (HQ Novosibirsk, incl Siberian MD): 410 combat ac.
   FGA: 225: 90 MiG-27 Flogger D/J, 135 Su-24 Fencer.
   Ftrs: 135: 90 MiG-21 Fishbed, 45 MiG-23 Flogger.
   Recce: 50 MiG-25 Foxbat B/D. Tpt: 100 ac.
Transbaykal MD Air Force (HQ Chita, incl Mongolia): 390 combat ac.
   FGA: 270: 2 divs, MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
   Ftrs: 90: 2 regts: MiG-25 Foxbat A/E, MiG-23 Flogger.
   Recce: 30: Su-17 Fitter H, Yak-28 Brewer D, MiG-25 Foxbat.
Far-Eastern MD Air Force (HQ Khabarovsk): control centres: Petropavlovsk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; some 590 combat ac.
   FGA: 360: 8 regts: MiG-21 Fishbed L, MiG-27 Flogger D/J, Su-25 Frogfoot, Su-7 Fitter A, Su-17 Fitter D/H/K.
   Ftrs: 180: MiG-23 Flogger, MiG-25 Foxbat A, Mig-29 Fulcrum, MiG-31 Foxhound.
   Recce: 40: Yak-28 Brewer D, MiG-21 Fishbed H, MiG-25 Foxbat B/D. ECM: 10 Yak-28 Brewer E.
Navy (Pacific Fleet) (HQ Vladivostok): (159,000).
   Bases: Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, Sovyetskaya Gavan.
   Subs: 76: 26 SSGN/SSG, 50 SSN/SS.
   Principal surface combatants: 82: 2 carriers, 14 cruisers incl 1 Kirov, 13 destroyers incl 1 Sovremenny, 1 Udaloy, 22 frigates, 31 corvettes.
   Minor surface combatants: 140.
   MCMV: 96.
   Amph: 21 ships (incl 2 Rogov LPD).
   Auxiliaries: 135 principal.
Regular deployments:
   To the Indian Ocean and South Yemen (Aden, Socotra) and Ethiopia (Dahlak Is, Asmara): average 0-1 subs, 1-2 principal, 1-2 minor surface combatants,
   1 amph, 6-8 spt ships.
   To Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay) and the South China Sea: average 2-4 subs, 3-4 principal surface combatants, 3-4 minor surface combatants,
   0-1 amph, 9-12 spt vessels.
Naval Air (Pacific Fleet Air Force) (HQ Sovetskaya Gavan): combat: some 320 ac, some 110 hel.
   Bbrs: 110: 1 regt Tu-26 Backfire, 3 regts Tu-16 Badger A/C/G.
   FGA: 70: (afloat): 4 bns Yak-38 Forger A/B; (ashore): Su-17 Fitter C.
   ASW: 170: ac: 80: Tu-142 Bear, I1-38 Mar, Be-12 Mail. hel: 90 (afloat): 2 bns Ka-25 Hormone A; (ashore): 1 bn Ka-27 Helix, 2 bns Mi-14 Haze.
   MR/recce/EW: ac: 60: Tu-16 Badger, Tu-95 Bear, An-12 Cub B; hel: 10: Ka-25 Hormone B.
   Tkr: 15 Tu-16 Badger.
   MCM hel: 5 Mi-14 Haze B.
   Attack hel: 5 Ka-27 Helix B.
   Tpt/trg: 65 ac, 20 hel.
Naval Infantry: 1 Div HQ, 3 inf, 1 tk and 1 arty regts: 7,000.

FORCES ABROAD:
Afghanistan (Southern GTVD): 116,000 (some 10,000 MVD, KGB).
Mongolia (Far Eastern GTVD): e 55,000 (reducing).
Vietnam: (2,500); naval base (as above); composite air unit: 6 Tu-95/-142 Bear, 16 Tu-16 Badger D/K MR or ASW, 1 sqn of MiG-23 Flogger ftr ac,
   AA, SAM, electronic monitoring station.
Other: Algeria 1,000; Angola 1,500, plus 6 ships, MR ac; Congo 100; Cuba some 8,000 (1 bde (2,800), advisers (?3,100) plus some 2,100 ELINT technicians);
   Ethiopia 1,700 (plus, dry-dock, 11-38 ac, naval inf det); India 200; Iraq 600; Kampuchea 200; Laos 500; Libya 2,000; Mali 200; Mozambique 850;
   Nicaragua 50; Peru 115; Syria 4,000; N.Yemen 1,000; Africa (remainder) 900.

PARA-MILITARY: 570,000.
KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennov Bezopasnosti): 230,000 (70-75% conscripts:'?167,000):
border tps (incl Maritime Border Guards, 23,000), Kremlin Guard; Special Guard; Special Sigs unit (40,000 tps).
Equipment: tks, SP guns, AFV, ac and ships (3 Krivak-III (2x2 SA-N-4 SAM), 15 Grisha-II/III, 1 Purga frigates; 15 Pauk FAC(T); 110 Stenka FAC(P);
   10 Muravey, 4 Pchela hydrofoils; 30 Zhuk, some SO-1, 10 T-58, 12 T-43 patrol craft; some 10 river monitors; 8 Susanin ice-breakers (6 armed));
   12 Sorum, some Okhtensky armed tugs).
MVD (Ministerstvo Vrutrennikh Del): 340,000: internal security tps; some 30 divs with tks and AFV. By law part of armed forces of USSR.
DOSAAF (Dobrovalnoe Obshchestovo Sodeistviya Armii, Aviastii I Flotu) (part-time military, air, naval training organization; 5 million are
   instructors/activists); 330,000+ units: flight training, shooting, parachuting and 140 hours of pre-military training for those aged 15 and
   over in schools, colleges and workers' centres.
Young Pioneers (ages 8-15), some trg.

* Excl KGB, MVD(570,000), but incl some 1,477,000 railroad, construction, labour, comd and general spt tps not otherwise listed.
? Figures may fluctuate slightly during conversion.
? SS-11, SS-17, SS-19 and perhaps SS-25 have variable range capability, enabling them to be used for theatre support.
ї Reload capability has been reported.
// The information given here updates that shown on the insert map carried in this edition of The Military Balance.

The Alliances and Europe


THE WARSAW PACT


   Military Developments
   Though some individual non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries appear to show major changes in strength, these reflect revised assessments rather than significant increases or decreases in force size. Most show changes in equipment indicating a continuous slow process of modernization. However there remains a considerable 'generation gap' between the Soviet Union's own equipment in Eastern Europe and that of the forces of its European allies.
   East Germany has apparently introduced the AT-5 Spandrel anti-tank missile mounted on the BMP-2. There has been some modernization of the Navy, including the provision of 6 new Ohre-class depot ships. There are now three Rostock-class frigates in service and perhaps three more, as well as at least one corvette, on order. Czechoslovakia has doubled its inventory of Su-25 Frogfoot close-support aircraft and has introduced the Su-22 to its ageing reconnaissance element. There has been a significant modernization of the helicopter fleet. Older types appear to be retiring. In the Polish entry our reappraisal of the para-military entry has resulted in a major increase in total strength which hides the slight drop in the Army strength. Reports suggest that the Army's airborne and amphibious assault formations are brigades not divisions. The Polish Army has received a significant number of T-72 tanks. The Navy has added 1 new Orzel (Kilo-class) submarine (the first delivery to an East European country), and it is possible that one more is to be delivered. A new Kaszub-class frigate is in service, with perhaps 3 more on order; we have yet to ascertain its characteristics. The elderly Wish torpedo boats have finally been retired, and a new Marabut medium landing craft has been introduced. Polish Naval Aviation has added one squadron of MiG-21s and one of 15 Mi-14 ASW helicopters, thereby joining Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic in improving its ASW capability. The Air Force seems to be replacing its elderly Su-7s with Su-22s, and the MiG-17s also appear to be phasing out. There may also be an additional squadron of Mi-24 armed helicopters.
   Turning to the Southern Flank, revised estimates for Bulgaria show increases in personnel and tanks and a more significant increase in Scud SSM numbers. Its older naval vessels appear to be increasingly difficult to keep operational. The Air Force appears to be reducing its MiG-17 inventory, but there may now be a full squadron of Frogfoot. Reconnaissance elements now include both the MiG-25 and the Su-22. Hungary shows a slight increase in T-72 tanks. Romania may have slightly reduced its Army numbers, but no other significant developments are apparent.
   Economic Trends
   The Warsaw Pact economies seemed to perform well in 1986, with an average NMP growth of 4.7% (though only 0.5 % for Hungary). The GDR's estimated NMP (GNP minus services) also fell short of its 4.5% growth target. Only Poland continues to show a high inflation rate (20%); according to official figures Hungary's rate was 5% (although, unofficially, inflation is above 20%). Industrial production also showed considerable improvements, with growth rates averaging nearly 5% in 1986. Again, only Hungary failed to meet its targets. Agricultural growth was uneven, ranging from zero in the GDR. to 13% in Romania.
   However, other indicators, such as trade balances and energy supply, show a different picture. Eastern Europe's trade fell by some 15%, or $17 billion, in 1986. Hungary again produced the poorest figures, with a massive $1.4-billion hard-currency current account deficit (compared with a $453-million deficit in 1985 and a surplus of $329 million in 1984). But even the GDR suffered a 4% export decline. Poland seems to have been doing relatively well, with a 15% ($3.5-billion) increase in hard-currency exports.
   Poland's debt has increased again, however, reaching almost $36 billion by mid-1987 (in part due to the fall of the zloty against the dollar). In contrast, Bulgaria's debt is probably the lowest of all the CMEA countries, estimated at some $1.8 billion. Hungary's net outstanding foreign debt amounted to some $8.5 billion (some $15 billion gross) in mid-1987. Czechoslovakia's debt is estimated at some $4 billion, while Romania reports a debt of some $7 billion.
   These economic difficulties have been attributed to the unusually severe winter of 1986/7. This is true for the agricultural and energy sectors, but many Eastern economists have also pointed, reluctantly, to some of the structural defects of the economic system. Even the most conservative Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria, has been cautiously edging towards currency and trade reforms, and Todor Zhivkov, President of the State Council, sharply criticized the economy in 1987, urging drastic reforms including re-establishment of private property. Hungary's Prime Minister, Karoly Grosz, is also moving towards sweeping economic reforms, especially to deal with the country's notorious industrial inefficiency. In the aftermath of the internal struggles with the Solidarity Movement and the accompanying economic misery, Poland, too, had already instituted some economic reforms (predating Gorbachev's transformations), and in the spring of 1987 economists were debating further 'radical reforms'. In the past year Poland also joined the IMF. Czechoslovakia, likewise, announced 'far-reaching social and economic changes' in the summer of 1987. The GDR and Romania, however, still show resistance towards economic reform. These complexities appear to be reflected also in the defence sector. Since 1980 only the GDR has showed a consistent average annual defence expenditure increase of 6% (7.6% in 1986/7), while Poland, Romania and Hungary have showed significant military expenditure reductions in real terms. Since 1985, however, substantial increases have been implemented by all Warsaw Pact countries - except Bulgaria, for which only Western defence estimates exist, and Romania, which opted (by plebiscite) for defence expenditure reductions. Between 1985 and 1987 Poland's budget rose by some 9%, that of the GDR by some 6%, and Hungary's by about 8%. The reasons for these increases are unclear, since the defence capabilities of the countries in question have not yet shown any improvement to match the enlarged budgets. The figures may reflect the usual time lag in turning investment into hardware; or the USSR may have asked some of its allies to bear a greater share of the Warsaw Pact defence burden; equally, the changes could simply reflect altered budgetary practices, rather than genuinely increased expenditures.
   Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members have succeeded in capturing some of the Soviet arms market, as well as increasing exports to the third-world market. In 1985/6 Bulgaria and Romania doubled their arms exports, and the East "European countries overall increased theirs by some 40%, to about $800 million.

ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР

   Военное развитие
   Хотя некоторые отдельные страны Варшавского договора, не являющиеся советскими, как представляется, демонстрируют значительные изменения в численности, они отражают пересмотренные оценки, а не значительное увеличение или уменьшение численности сил. Большинство показывают изменения в вооружении, указывающие на непрерывный медленный процесс модернизации. Однако между техникой Советского Союза в Восточной Европе и силами его европейских союзников сохраняется значительный "разрыв поколений".
   Восточная Германия, по-видимому, ввела противотанковую ракету AT-5 Spandrel, установленную на БМП-2. Была проведена некоторая модернизация военно-морского флота, в том числе предоставление 6 новых кораблей типа Ohre. Сейчас на вооружении три фрегата типа Rostock и, возможно, еще три, а также, по крайней мере, один корвет. Чехословакия удвоила свои запасы самолетов ближней поддержки Су-25 и ввела Су-22 в свой стареющий разведывательный элемент. Проведена значительная модернизация вертолетного парка. Старые типы, похоже, снимаются. В случае с Польшей наша переоценка полу-военного контингента привела к значительному увеличению общей численности, Что скрывает небольшое снижение численности армии. Согласно сообщениям, воздушно-десантные и десантно-штурмовые соединения армии являются бригадами, а не дивизиями. Польская армия получила значительное количество танков Т-72. Военно-морской флот добавил 1 новую подводную лодку Orzel (Kilo-class) (первая поставка в восточноевропейскую страну), и возможно, что еще одна будет поставлена. Новый фрегат типа Kaszub находится в эксплуатации, возможно, еще 3 на заказ; нам еще предстоит установить его характеристики. Старые торпедные катера Wish, наконец, были отправлены на слом, и был введен новый средний десантный корабль Marabut. Польская военно-морская авиация добавила одну эскадрилью МиГ-21 и один из 15 вертолетов Ми-14, тем самым присоединившись к Болгарии и Германской Демократической Республике в улучшении ее потенциала в области противолодочной обороны. ВВС, по-видимому, заменяют свои старые Су-7 на Су-22, а МиГ-17, похоже, также прекращают свое существование. Также может появиться дополнительная эскадрилья вооруженных вертолетов Ми-24.
   Что касается южного фланга, то пересмотренная смета для Болгарии свидетельствует об увеличении численности личного состава и танков и о более значительном увеличении численности ракет Scud. Старые военно-морские суда оказываются все труднее сохранять в строю. ВВС, похоже, сокращают свои МиГ-17, но теперь может быть полная эскадрилья Frogfoot. Разведывательные элементы теперь включают как МиГ-25, так и Су-22. Венгрия демонстрирует незначительное увеличение танков Т-72. Румыния, возможно, несколько сократила численность своей армии, но никаких других значительных изменений не наблюдается.
   Экономические тенденции
   В 1986 году экономика стран Варшавского договора, казалось, работала хорошо, со средним ростом NMP в 4,7% (хотя только 0,5% для Венгрии). Оценочный НВП ГДР (ВНП минус услуги) также не достиг целевого показателя роста на 4,5%. Только Польша продолжает демонстрировать высокий уровень инфляции (20%); по официальным данным показатель Венгрии составил 5% (хотя, неофициально, инфляция выше 20%). Значительно улучшилось и промышленное производство, темпы роста которого в 1986 году составили в среднем почти 5%. Опять же, только Венгрия не смогла достичь своих целей. Рост сельского хозяйства был неравномерным, начиная с нуля в ГДР. до 13% в Румынии.
   Однако другие показатели, такие, как торговый баланс и энергоснабжение, показывают иную картину. В 1986 году товарооборот Восточной Европы сократился примерно на 15%, или на $17 миллиардов. Венгрия вновь представила самые бедные данные с огромным дефицитом текущего счета в твердой валюте в размере $1,4 (по сравнению с дефицитом в размере $453 млн. в 1985 году и профицитом в размере $329 млн. США в 1984 году). Но даже в ГДР экспорт сократился на 4%. Польша, похоже, добилась относительно хороших результатов, увеличив экспорт твердой валюты на 15% ($3,5).
   Однако долг Польши снова увеличился, достигнув почти 36 миллиардов долларов к середине 1987 года (частично из-за падения злотого по отношению к доллару). В отличие от этого, долг Болгарии, вероятно, самый низкий из всех стран СЭВ, оцениваемый примерно в $1,8 млрд. Чистый непогашенный внешний долг Венгрии в середине 1987 года составил около 8,5 млрд. долл. Долг Чехословакии оценивается примерно в 4 миллиарда долларов, в то время как долг Румынии составляет около 7 миллиардов долларов.
   Эти экономические трудности объясняются необычно суровой зимой 1986/7 года. Это верно для сельскохозяйственного и энергетического секторов, но многие восточные экономисты также неохотно указывают на некоторые структурные дефекты экономической системы. Даже самый консервативный член Варшавского договора, Болгария, осторожно продвигается к валютным и торговым реформам, а Тодор Живков, председатель Государственного Совета, резко критиковал экономику в 1987 году, призывая к радикальным реформам, включая восстановление частной собственности. Премьер-министр Венгрии Кароли Грош также продвигается к радикальным экономическим реформам, особенно для решения проблемы печально известной промышленной неэффективности страны. После внутренней борьбы с движением "Солидарность" и сопутствующей ей экономической нищеты Польша также уже провела некоторые экономические реформы (предшествовавшие Горбачевским преобразованиям), и весной 1987 года экономисты обсуждали дальнейшие "радикальные реформы". В прошлом году Польша также присоединилась к МВФ. Чехословакия также объявила о "далеко идущих социальных и экономических изменениях" летом 1987 года. Однако ГДР и Румыния по-прежнему сопротивляются экономическим реформам. Эти сложности, как представляется, находят свое отражение и в оборонном секторе. С 1980 года только ГДР демонстрировала последовательное среднегодовое увеличение оборонных расходов на 6% (7,6% в 1986/7 году), в то время как Польша, Румыния и Венгрия продемонстрировали значительное сокращение военных расходов в реальном выражении. Однако с 1985 года все страны Варшавского договора осуществили существенное увеличение расходов - за исключением Болгарии, по которой существуют только западные оценки оборонных расходов, и Румынии, которая выбрала (путем плебисцита) сокращение расходов на оборону. С 1985 по 1987 год бюджет Польши вырос примерно на 9%, ГДР - примерно на 6%, А Венгрии примерно на 8%. Причины такого увеличения не ясны, поскольку оборонный потенциал соответствующих стран еще не продемонстрировал каких-либо улучшений в соответствии с увеличенными бюджетами. Цифры могут отражать обычный временной лаг в превращении инвестиций в оборудование; или СССР, возможно, попросил некоторых своих союзников взять на себя большую долю оборонного бремени Варшавского договора; в равной степени изменения могли бы просто отражать измененную бюджетную практику, а не подлинно увеличенные расходы.
   Членам Варшавского договора удалось захватить часть советского рынка оружия, а также увеличить экспорт на рынок стран третьего мира. В 1985/6 годах Болгария и Румыния удвоили свой экспорт оружия, а восточноевропейские страны в целом увеличили его примерно на 40%, до 800 млн. долл.

   BULGARIA
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TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 152,800 (94,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: Army and Air Force 2 years, Navy 3 years.
Reserves: 216,500. Army 182,500 (500,000 more have a reserve liability); Navy (to age 55, officers 60 or 65) 14,000; Air (to age 60) 20,000 (AD 15,000).

ARMY: 110,000 (70,000 conscripts).
3 Military Districts/Army HQ:
8 motor rifle divs (3 at Cat 3 = cadre).
5 tk bdes.
4 SSM bdes with Scud.
3 arty regts.
3 AA arty regts.
1 SAM bde.
1 para regt.
Special commando coys.
Equipment:
Tks: 2,100: 400 T-34, 1,500 T-54/-55, some 200 T-72. (Many T-34/-54/-55 in store.)
AFV: recce: 350 BRDM-1/-2. MICV: some 60 BMP-1. APC: 1,000 BTR-50/-60, 35 OT-62, MT-LB.
Arty: 1,700: 85mm: some D-44 and SD-44 SP; 100mm: M-1944; 122mm: 700 M-1931, 100 M-1938 (M-30), D-30, M-1974 (2S1) SP.
   130mm: M-46. 152mm: M-1937, M-55/D-20, M-1973 (2S3) SP.
   MRL: 122mm: 100 BM-21; 130mm: M-51.
   SSM: 40 FROG-7, 48 Scud.
   Mor: 82mm, 350 120mm and 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm: 150 SPG-9. guns: 76mm: 100 M-1942; 100mm: T-12. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP).
AD: guns: 500: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 57mm: S-60; 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19 towed. SAM: 50 SA-4/-6; SA-13.

NAVY: 8,800 (6,000 conscripts).
Bases:coastal: Varna (HQ), Burgas, Sozopol; Danube: Vidin (HQ), Atiya, Balchik.
Subs: 4 R-class.
Frigates: 3 Riga.
Corvettes: 3 Poti ASW.
FAC(G): 6: 3 Osa-I, 3 Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2A/B/C SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 6 SO-1 (? unserviceable); 6 Shershen (?operational); coastal; 5 Zhuk.
MCMV: ocean: 2 T-43; coastal: 9: 3 Sonya, 6 Vanya; inshore: 22<: 4 Yevgenya, 18 PO-2 (?unserviceable).
Amph: LCU: 19 Vydra; LCA: 4 MFP D-3.
Spt: 1 spt, 3 coastal tankers.

Naval Aviation: (200); 12 armed hel.
Hel: 2 sqns: 1 ASW with 12 Mil Mi-14; 1 SAR with 2 Mi-2, 6 Mi-4.

Coastal arty: (2,100): 2 regts, 20 btys:
   guns: 100mm: ?150; 130mm: SM-4-1.
   SSM: SS-C-1b Sepal.

Naval Guard: (500): 3 coys.

AIR FORCE: 34,000 (18,000 conscripts); some 270 combat ac, some 35 armed hel.
2 air divisions: 7 combat regts:
FGA: 2 regts (6 sqns) with 25 MiG-17, 45 MiG-23BM, 15 Su-25.
Interceptor/ftr: 4 regts with some 35 MiG-23 FloggerB/G; 120 MiG-21PFM.
Recce: 1 regt with 30 MiG-17/-21/-25, Su-22.
Tpt: 1 regt with 5 An-12, 5 I1-14, 4 An-24, 2 Tu-134, 9 An-2.
Hel: 1 regt with 10 Mi-2, 30 Mi-4/-8, 35 Mi-24 (attack).
Trg: incl 30 MiG-15UTI, L-39, 80 L-29, Yak-11/-18.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll, AA-7 Apex. ASM: AS-7 Kerry.
1 para regt.
1 AD div: (?4,500): 3 zones:
30 SAM sites; some 280 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Interior border guards: 15,000; 16 regts.
Security police: 7,500.
People's Territorial Militia: 150,000.
'Voluntary Organization for Co-operation in National Defence'.

* Incl police and internal security budget. Defence expenditures estimated, since budgets have not been available for over ten years.

   CZECHOSLOVAKIA
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TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 201,000 (118,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: Army and Air Force 2 years, Border Troops and Militia 27 months.
Reserves: 280,000. Army 270,000 (295,000 more with liability to age 50 (men) or 60 (officers)); Air Force 10,000.

ARMY: 145,000 (100,000 conscripts).
2 Military Districts; 1 Army HQ.
5 tk divs (1 at Cat 1, 2 each Cats 2/3).
5 motor rifle divs (3 at Cat 1, 1 each Cats 2/3).
1 arty div: 2 arty, 3 Scud SSM bdes, 2 ATK regts (6 bns).
1 AB regt.
6 engr bdes.
Civil Defence Troops (2,000): 5 regts.
Equipment:
Tks: 3,500: 3,000 T-54/-55, 500 T-72.
AFV: recce: 1,250: OT-65A, BRDM. MICV: 1,100 BVP-1 (BMP-1), 50 BMP-2. APC: 2,500: OT-62A/B, OT-64A/C, OT-810.
Arty: 690: 122mm: 100 M-1931/37, 250 D-30/M-30, 690: M-1974 (2S1) SP; 130mm: 75 M-46.
   152mm: 90 M-1937, 175 DANA (M-77) (Tatra 813 truck-mounted) SP.
   MRL: 320: 122mm: 200 RM-70; 130mm: 120 M-51.
   SSM: 40 FROG, 4 SS-21, 27 Scud.
   Mor: ?12 240mm M-240.
ATK: grenade launchers: 112mm: P-27. RCL: 82mm: 100. guns: 100mm: 250 M-53.
   ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (on BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel.
AD: guns: 575: 30mm: M-53/59 SP. 57mm: S-60. SAM: 175: SA-4/-6/-7/-8/-9/-13.

AIR FORCE: 56,000 (18,000 conscripts); 465 combat ac, 40 armed hel.
2 air armies: 4 air divs: 14 combat regts.
FGA: 4 regts: 1 with 50 Su-7BM/U; 1 with 40 MiG-23M; 1 with 30 MiG-21/-21U; 1 with 25 Su-25 Frogfoot.
Interceptor: 6 regts with 275 MiG-21/-21U/-23 (about half AD, half battlefield spt).
Recce: 1 regt with 20 MiG-21RF, 10 Su-22, 15 L-29.
Tpt: 2 regts with 2 An-12, 6 An-24, 40 I1-14 (replacing with An-26), 1 Tu-134, 2 L-410M.
Hel: 1 regt: 3 indep sqns: attack: 40 Mi-24. assault tpt (med): 65 Mi-8, 60 Mi-4. (lt): 55 Mi-2, 20 Mi-1.
Trg: L-29, 24 L-39, Z-526.
Liaison ac incl Z-43.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
AD: Comd HQ: 3 divs: 6 SAM regts: some 40 sites; 250 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Troops: 11,000; 7 bdes (each 3 bns), BVP-1, OT-62/-64 AFV, ATK weapons.
Militia: 120,000; mor, ATK, AA weapons.
'Association for Co-operation with the Army'.

* Incl police and security budget.

   GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
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TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 176,000 (94,500 conscripts).
Terms of service. Army, Air Force 18 months; Navy (sea-going) 36 months.
Reserves: 390,000. Army 330,000, up to 6 months call-up per year to total 24 months (250,000 more have Reserve commitment to 50 (men) or 60 (officers));
   Navy 30,000; Air 30,000.

ARMY: 120,000 (71,500 conscripts).
2 Military Districts, 2 Army HQ:
2 tk divs.
4 motor rifle divs.
(All divs Cat 1.)
2 SSM bdes with Scud.
2 arty regts.
9 AD regts: 2 with SA-4; 5 with SA-6; 1 with SA-8 SAM; 1 with AA arty.
1 amph regt.
1 sigs bde.
1 Special Forces bde (8 bns).
1 Propaganda unit.
3 engr regts (incl road, rail).
2 pontoon bridge regts.
2 ATK bns.
1 AB bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 3,000: about 1,500 T-54/-55, 300 T-72 (1,200 more (incl T-34) in storage).
AFV: recce: 1,000 BRDM-1/-2. MICV: 950 BMP-1/-2.
   APC: 2,150: 1,000 BTR-60P/-152, 300 BTR-70, 150 MT-LB (700 more (incl BTR-50P/-152) in storage).
Arty: 760: 122mm: 300 D-30, 20 M-1938 (M-30), 180 M-1974 (2S1) SP; 130mm: 60 M-46. 152mm: 100 M-1973 (2S3) SP, 100 D-20.
   MRL: 198: 122mm: 189 Czech RM-70; 240mm: 9 BM-24.
   SSM: 20 FROG-7, 4 SS-21, 24 Scud B.
   Mor: 82mm; 120mm: 250.
ATK: guns: 100mm: 100T-12. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot, AT-5 Spandrel (incl BMP-2 SP).
AD: guns: 23mm: ZU-23, 96 ZSU-23-4 SP; 57mm: ZSU-57-2. SAM: 270: SA-4/-6/-7/-8/-/9.

NAVY: 16,000 (8,000 conscripts) incl Coastal
Border Bde.
Bases: Peenemiinde, Warnemiinde, Dransk-Bug, Sassnitz, Wolgast, Tarnewitz, Barhoft, Stralsund.
Frigates: 3 Rostock (Koni) with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 21: 16 Parchim I with 2x4 SA-N-5 SAM; 5 Tarantul I with 4 SS-N-8 SSM.
FAC(G): 10 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2A SSM.
FAC(T): 27: 12 Shershen; 15 Libelle( (1 unarmed, trials).
MCMV: 24 Kondor-II coastal.
Amph: LST: 12 Frosch I (some have 2 40x122mm MRL); 7 civil Ro-Ro could augment.
Intelligence vessels (AGI): 3: 2 mod Kondor-I, 1 mod Darss-class.
Spt: 6 Darss-class spt, 5 supply ships, 4 spt tankers, 2 Frosch II lt tpts, 6 Ohre-class depot ships, 3 Kondor-II trg vessels.

Naval Aviation: (1,000); (increasing); 13 armed hel.
Hel: 1 sqn with 20 Mi-8T tpt (8 Mi-8 Hip C SAR), 13 Mi-14PL Haze A ASW.

Coastal Border Bde (GBK; 4,000) administered by Frontier tps:
   12 beach patrol bns, 3 afloat 'divs': 8 boat gps (recce); ?5 btys coastal arty, ?3 btys SS-C-3;
   ?65 vessels incl 10 Bremse, 18 Kondor-I; some 30 harbour/river patrol craft; ?30 152mm guns; ?18 SS-C-3 Shaddock SSM.
(On order: 3 FF (Koni-class), 1 corvette (?Tarantul I).)

AIR FORCE: 40,000 (15,000 conscripts); 334 combat ac, 66 armed hel.
2 air divs:
FGA: 2 regts: 5 sqns: 2 with 24 MiG-23MF; 3 with 40 Su-22.
Recce: 1 sqn with 15 MiG-21.
Tpt: 1 regt: 3 sqns: 18 An-26, 15 Tu-134, An-2/-14/-26B, some 6L-410.
Hel: 3 regts: 9 sqns: 3 attack with 30 Mi-24; 3 assault/tpt with 36 armed Mi-8; 3 tpt with some 45 Mi-8.

AD Command: (26,000):
2 AD districts: air: 6 regts:
   15 sqns with 205 MiG-21 F/MF/PF/U;
   3 sqns with 50 MiG-23.
SAM: 7 regts: some 30 sites with 205 SA-2/-3.
radar: 2 regts.
Trg: incl Yak-11, L-39, Z-226, MiG-15UTI, MiG-21U.
Liaison: ac incl Z-43.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AT-3 SaggerATGW.

Forces Abroad: Algeria 250, Angola 500, Ethiopia 550, Guinea 125, Iraq 160, Libya 400, Mozambique 100, S. Yemen 75, Syria 210,
   Zambia (some instructors reported).

PARA-MILITARY: 84,000 Regulars, perhaps 1 million in an emergency.
Ministry of Defence. Frontier Troops (49,000):
   6 sectors incl coast, 2 'commandos' (Polish, Czech borders), 1 coast bde, 18 border, 1 arty, 1 MRL, 1 special, 6 trg regts, 1 boat section:
   Equipment:
   Arty: 85mm: 50 D-44; 122mm: 36. 130mm: 18. MRL: 122mm.
   Patrol craft: 24.
Ministry for State Security: 1 Guard regt (Berlin): (5,000): 6 motor rifle, 1 arty, 1 trg bns;
   PSZH-IV APC, 120mm mor, 85mm, 100mm ATK, ZU-23 AA guns, hel.
Ministry of Interior. People's Police Alert Units: (12,000); 21 bns; BTR-40/-152 APC, 82mm mor.
Transport Police (8,500): 16 coys; small arms, RPG-7 RL.
Workers' Militia: 3,000 Regulars, 500,000 potential; 15,000 combat groups; AFV incl SK-1 APC, 82mm mor, 76mm ATK, 23mm, 37mm AA guns.
Civil Defence: 15,000; 14 bns; light weapons.
Society for Sport and Technology (youth aged 16-18): 450,000, 75% active; 1 central, 14 regional subordinate district gps, some 15,000 units;
   small arms; trg ac (civil).

* Incl DMO, 5.385 bn (1986), 5.757 bn (1987) for internal, border security and justice administration.

   HUNGARY
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TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 106,000 (58,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: Army (incl Border Guard) 18 months; Air Force 24 months.
Reserves: 135,000 (Army and Navy); Air: 8,000 (to age 55).

ARMY: 84,000 (50,000 conscripts) incl Danube Flotilla.
1 Army, 1 Corps HQ.
1 tk div (at Cat 2).
5 motor rifle divs (3 at Cat 2, 2 at 3).
1 arty bde, 1 SSM bde with Scud.
1 AA arty, 4 SAM regts (1 indep with SA-4, 3 with SA-6 in divs).
1 AB bn.
Equipment:
Tks: some 1,200 T-54/-55, 100+ T-72. lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: recce: ~750: some 350 BRDM-2, 400 FUG-65 (OT-65). MICV: 350 BMP-1. APC: 1,000 PSzH-IV (FUG-70).
Arty: 485: gun/how: 152mm: 100 D-20, 20 M-1973 (2S3) SP. how: 122mm: 225 M-1938, 90 M-1974 (2S1) SP 152mm: 50 M-1943 (D-1).
   MRL: 122mm: 50BM-21.
   SSM: 24 FROG-7, 9 Scud.
   Mor: 82mm: 300; 120mm: 100 M-43.
ATK: RCL: 73mm: 125 SPG-9. guns: 85mm: 100 D-44; 100mm: 50 T-12. ATGW: 100 AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), 100 AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 23mm: 50 ZSU-23-4 SP; 57mm: 150 S-60. SAM: 30 SA-4, 60 SA-6, 350 SA-7, 50 SA-9.

Danube Flotilla (700);
   26 25-ton minelayers/sweepers, 10 Nestin, 26 other river MCMV, 15 10-ton patrol craft, 5 small LCU, small tp tpts, river icebreakers.

AIR FORCE: 22,000 (8,000 conscripts); some 160 combat ac, 30 armed hel.
1 air div:
AD: 3 ftr regts (9 interceptor sqns) with 120 MiG-21F/PF/bis/U, 10MiG-23M.
FGA: 1 sqn with 15 Su-25.
Recce: 1 sqn with 15 Su-22.
Tpt: 1 regt (2 sqns) with 24 An-24/-26, 2 I1-14.
Hel: 1 regt (3 sqns) with 30 Mi-24, 25 Mi-8, 25 Ka-26 (trg/civil duties), 15 Mi-2.
Trg: incl L-29, MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
AD: 1 div: 3 SAM regts, some 20 sites: 120 SA-2/-3.

PARA-MILITARY:
Border guards: 16,000 (11,000 conscripts);
11 districts.
Part-time Worker's Militia: 60,000.

   POLAND
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 394,000 (231,000 conscripts) incl
Territorial Defence troops (see Para-Military).
Terms of service: Army, internal security forces, Air Force 2 years; Navy, special services, afloat 3 years, ashore 2 years.
Reserves: 491,000: Army some 430,000; Navy some 30,000 (to age 50); Air Force some 31,000 (to age 60).

ARMY: 230,000 (168,000 conscripts).
3 Military Districts:
5 tk divs ((all at Cat 1) each 3 tk, 1 motor rifle, 1 arty regts).
8 motor rifle divs ((3 at Cat 1, 5 at Cat 3), each 1 tk, 3 motor rifle, 1 arty regts).
1 AB bde ((Cat 1) 3 assault regts, 1 tk, 1 arty bns).
1 amph assault bde (Cat 1).
5 arty bdes (each 4 bns).
3 ATK regts.
4 SSM bdes with Scud.
1 AD bde with SA-4; 8 AD regts: 6 with SA-6,
2 with SA-8 SAM.
Equipment:
Tks: 3,400 T-54/-55, 270 T-72. lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: 4,300: recce: 800 FUG/BRDM-2. MICV: 1,000 BMP-1.
   APC: 2,100 OT-64A (SKOT-A), SKOT-2AP, OT-64C, OT-64C (SKOT-2A), 400 OT-62A (TOPAS), OT-62B (TOPAS-2A).
Arty: ?2,100: 122mm: some 400 M-1931/37; 850 M-1938 towed, M-1974 (2S1) SP; 130mm: M-46. 152mm: 230 ML-20, D-1, 145 M-1943.
   MRL: 360: 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14, (?30) WP-8.
   SSM: 56 FROG-3/-5/-7, 32 Scud B.
   Mor: 82mm: 750; 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm. guns: 100mm: some 70 T-12. ATGW: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot.
AD: guns: 800: 23mm: ZU-23, 150 ZSU-23-4 SP; 57mm: S-60. SAM: SA-7, 250 SA-4/-6/-8/-9.

NAVY: 19,000 (6,000 conscripts).
Bases: Gdynia, Hel, Swinoujscie, Kolobrzeg, Ustka; Gdansk (border/coastguard).
Subs: 4: 1 Orzel (K-class), 3 W-class.
Corvettes: 4:
   1 Kaszub (no detail);
   3 Tarantul I with 1x2 SS-N-2C SSM, 1x4 SA-N-5 SAM.
FAC(G): 12 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2A SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 8 Obluze.
MCMV: ocean: 23: 12 Krogulec, 11 T-43; coastal: 7: 5 Notec, 2 Leniwka.
Amph: LCT: 23 Polnocny, LCM: 4 Marabut; LCA: 15 Eichstaden.
Intelligence vessels (AGI): 2 mod Moma.
Radar picket: 1 T-43.
Spt: 7 tankers.

Naval Aviation: 1 div (2,300); 67 combat ac, 15 armed hel.
Ftr: 1 sqn with 12 MiG-21.
Attack: 1 regt: 2 sqns with 40 MiG-17.
recce: 1 sqn with 10 I1-28, 5 MiG-17.
ASW: hel: 15 Mi-14.
Hel: 1 regt: 3 sqns with 10 Mi-2, 20 Mi-4, 5 Mi-8.

Coast Defence: 4,100: arty: ?6 bns; SSM: ?3 bns; engrs: reported.
Equipment: (?M-1937) 152mm gun/how, AT-3 Sagger ATGW, SS-C-2B SSM.
(On order: 3 Kaszub, 2 Tarantul I corvettes; Notek MCMV

AIR FORCE: 80,000 (30,000 conscripts). 665 combat ac, 30+ armed hel.
6 air divs (incl AD):
FGA: 230: 3 divs: 6 regts: 18 sqns with 3 with some 30 Su-7/-7U; 2 with some 40 Su-20; 7 with some 80 Su-22; 6 with 80 MiG-17.
Interceptors: 4 divs: 11 regts: 33 sqns with 400 MiG-21/U/-23.
Recce: 3 sqns with 35 MiG-21RF.
Tpt: 2 regts with 9 An-2, An-12, 12 An-26, 12 I1-14.
Comms/liaison: 1 sqn with 2 Tu-134A, 6 Yak-40, I1-18.
Hel: 3 regts with 120 Mi-2, 25 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 30 Mi-24 (attack).
Trg: 300 ac: TS-8 Biesl-11 Iskra, MiG-15/-21UTI, Su-7U, Orlik.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll.
Air Defence Command: (48,000).
SAM: 10 regts with 300 SA-2/-3.
(On order: PZL-130 Orlik trg ac.)

Forces Abroad: Syria (UNDOF): 157.
PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence: Troops of Territorial Defence, construction troops: 65,000 (27,000 conscripts); tks, AFV, ATK guns.
Ministry of Interior troops and border/coastguard: 22,000: 3 Provincial Commands: 8 bdes; some 70 patrol craft incl
   5 Obluze, 5 Gdansk, 11 Pilica, 2 KP-131, 12 Wisloka.
Zomo (Police anti-riot units): 28,000.
'League for National Defence' (Citizen's Militia): some 200,000 active.

   RUMANIA
   []
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 179,500 (107,500 conscripts).
Terms of service: Army, Air Force 16 months; Navy 24 months.
Reserves: 556,000+ (with service in last 5 years). Army 500,000+; Navy 11,000; Air 45,000.

ARMY: 140,000 (95,000 conscripts).
4 Army Areas:
2 tk divs (1 at Cat 1, 1 at Cat 2).
8 motor rifle divs (1 Cat 1, 3 Cat 2, 4 Cat 3).
3 mountain bdes/regts.
2 arty bdes; 4 arty regts.
1 ATK bde (5 regts).
2 AA bdes; 2 AA arty, 3 AD (SA-6 SAM) regts.
2 Scud SSM bdes.
2 ABregts.
Equipment:
Tks: e 1,430: 200 T-34, 1,000 T-54/-55, some 200 M-77, 30 T-72.
AFV: recce: 325 BRDM-1/-2. APC: 3,000 BTR-50/-60 and TAB-72, TAB-77.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 50 M-1942, 75 SU-76 SP; 85mm: 50 D-44; 100mm: M-1944, 175 SU-100; 122mm: M-1931/37.
   guns/how: 150: 152mm: M-1937, D-20. how: 600: 122mm: M-1938, D-30; 152mm: M-1938.
   MRL: 325: 122mm: 175 BM-21/RO; 130mm: 15 OM-51 (ZIL).
   SSM: 30 FROG-3, 15 Scud.
   Mor: 82mm: 700; 120mm: 200.
ATK: RCL: 73mm; 76mm and 82mm: 260. guns: 57mm: M-1943.
ATGW: 120: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP).
AD: guns: 30mm: 300; 37mm; 57mm: 250; 85mm; 100mm. SAM: 60 SA-6/-7.

NAVY: 7,500 (2,500 conscripts).
Bases: coastal: Mangalia, Constanta; Danube: Braila, Giurgiu, Sulina, Tulcea.
Black Sea Fleet, Danube Sqn, Coastal Defence.
Destroyer: 1 Muntenia (Kashin-type DDG) with 4x2 S S-N-2C SSM, 7x4 SA-8 SAM, 2 hel.
Frigates: 3 Tetal (Koni-type).
Corvettes: 3 Poti ASW.
FAC(G): 6 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2 SSM.
FAC(P/ASW): 27 Ch Shanghai.
FAC(T): 40: 12 Epitrop, 22 Ch Huchwan< hydrofoils, 6 Sov P-4<.
Patrol craft, large: 3 Kronshtadt; river: 41: 1 Brutar, 18 VB-76 monitors; 8 VG-10 40-ton, 9 SM-165 22-ton, 5 SD-200 patrol vessels.
MCMV: 47:
   minesweepers: 45: coastal: 4 GDR M-40 Democratia; inshore: 41<: 12 Sov T-301 (7 in reserve), 29 VD-141;
   minelayer spt ships: 2 Cosar.
Spt: 2 Croiton 3,500-ton with 2x4 SA-N-5 SAM, 1 hel.
LCU: 3 Braila.
SAR hel: 4 Mi-4.

Coastal Defence (2,000): HQ Constanta.
4 sectors:
10 coastal arty btys with some 100 130mm, 150mm and 152mm guns; 1 SSM bn with SS-C-2B Samlet, observer post tps, radar, naval engineers.
Some 8 btys of AA arty reported; eqpt unknown. Would get 1 regt of naval inf on mobilization.
(On order: 1 Muntenia-class DDG.)

AIR FORCE: 32,000 (10,000 conscripts); 368 combat ac, no armed hel.
3 air divs (incl AD): 7 combat regts:
FGA: 6 sqns: 90 MiG-17, some 30 IAR-93.
Interceptor: 14 sqns: 3 with 45 MiG-23; 11 with 185 MiG-21F/PF/U.
Recce: 1 sqn with 18 I1-28.
Tpt: 1 regt with 4 I1-14, 3 I1-18, 2 I1-62, 11 An-24, 8 An-26, 4 Li-2, 1 Boeing 707.
Hel: 1 regt with 10 Mi-4, 15 Mi-8, 55 IAR-316B (Alouette III), 40 IAR-330 (Puma).
Trg: 40 L-29, 20 MiG-15UTI, 20 L-39, 10 IAR-28MAU.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
AD: 1 div: 20 SAM sites with 135 SA-2.
(On order: some 125 IAR-93B FGA ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Border guards: ~15,000; 12 bdes.
Ministry of Defence security troops: ~20,000; AFV, ATK guns.
Local Defence: some 250,000 Patriotic Guard (perhaps 12,000 full time).
Youth Homeland Defence: 650,000.
'Voluntary Sports Association'.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY


   Readers will note a change in presentation. The entry formerly entitled 'Britain', now appears as 'United Kingdom' at the end of this Section.
   Military Developments
   As in previous years, there have been some relatively minor changes in the personnel strengths of the national armed forces. For Greece and Turkey no new personnel strength data has been received, and 1986 figures have been repeated. Equipment inventories of the NATO countries continue to reflect gradual modernization but relatively little growth.
   Organizational changes in the Italian and Spanish Armies have produced revisions; the Spanish restructuring is still in progress, and data has to be used with caution. The Norwegian entry has also been extensively revised, but the close interconnection between the military and the civilian contingency preparedness system which is central to Norway's defence posture cannot be fully reflected. Finally, though the anti-terrorist campaign in south-eastern Turkey is known to have called reinforcements to that region, the impact of this diversion on the Turkish forces' normal deployments could not be established.
   To summarize significant changes in individual national armed forces: Belgium's conscripts now serve two more months both at home and in Germany. Its Reserve figures reflect total numbers, rather than merely the Active Reserves listed in previous years, and we have included an estimate of those with active service during the past five years. There has been a small decline in the numbers of most armoured vehicles; a major exception is the AIFV-B MICV inventory, now up some 200% over 1986. The M-109 155mm SP howitzer upgrading programme continues. There are now two squadrons of F-16 FGA aircraft in service.
   Canada has redeployed one of its DDH-280 to the Pacific, reflecting increased naval requirements there, and we include a more complete listing for auxiliary vessels. The introduction of the CF-18 continues, with some compensating reduction in the CF-116 (F-5) inventory. The decision to augment the forces in Europe is being implemented.
   Denmark has recorded a redefinition of the status of its reserves; there is a slight reduction in Reserve strength. The Standing Force, however, has increased in strength by 18%. The major Army equipment development is the incorporation of the TOW anti-tank weapon on the M-113 APC. Last year's Air entry mistakenly showed four F-16 FGA squadrons through inadvertent double-counting with the Draken FGA squadron in a combined FGA/AD role. The F-16 inventory total has therefore reduced by 16 aircraft. The expected two new Improved HAWK batteries were not formed.
   France now has two squadrons of 15 Mirage IVP fitted for the ASMP nuclear ASM in service, an increase of seven aircraft over last year. In the 'pre-strategic' air role, plans are in hand for 85 Mirage 2000N to be fitted for the ASMP. The French Army is upgrading its AMX-30 tank to the B2 standard; a slight increase in total inventory is reported. AMX-13 light tank numbers are down significantly; increases in the AMX-10RC and AMX-1OP/PC MICV inventories provide compensating replacements. A similar shift from the AMX-13 VTT in favour of the VAB APC is also seen. Army Aviation appears to be phasing out the Alouette in favour of the SA-341/-342 Gazelle. The Navy now has its third Rubis SSN on pre-acceptance trials; the class will end with the fourth boat, and construction has begun on an enlarged version, the Amethyste class. Three more P-400 fast attack craft and a fifth Batral assault ship have joined the fleet. In French Naval Aviation, the Super Etendard carrier strike aircraft are also to get ASMP. French forces in Chad were doubled (to some 2,500 troops) over the year.
   The Federal Republic of Germany shows a slight decline in overall armed forces strength, with the Army most affected (down 8.5%), principally in the field army. The early versions of the M-48 MBT have been withdrawn; 1,300 Leopard 1 are to be upgraded to A5 standard, and the Leopard 2 inventory now stands at 1,800: a rise of some 300. The new M-577 APC command vehicle now appears in the inventory, with some 220 believed to have been NATO 55 delivered. The Bundeswehr also has a marine component, now listed. Because of delays in research and development, production of the Navy's RAM-ASMD air-defence system (planned for the Lutjens destroyers, Bremen frigates and the Type 148 fast attack craft) has not yet begun. This joint US/German system is intended to counter ship borne missiles as well as aircraft. German Naval Air now has all its Tornado, deployed in three squadrons. Its F-104 are no longer in service. The Air Force also shows a reduction in the F-104, more than offset by deliveries of Tornado and of Alpha Jet light FGA aircraft.
   The figures for the Greek tank inventory have been reviewed in the light of recent evidence. Gross totals are unaffected, but there are a number of minor internal changes. The Italian Navy has won its battle for fixed-wing aircraft aboard the new carrier Garibaldi; these will be the Anglo-American AV-8B. The Italian Air Force continues to replace its F-104 with Tornado. Similarly, the Netherlands is replacing the F-5; since the replacement F-16 are already in the inventory the result is a drop in overall combat aircraft strength of about 22 aircraft. Norway is mounting the TOW on an M-113 APC, and the resulting NM-142 is now entering service.
   Portugal is updating its tank force with a 50% increase in the M-48 inventory. Spain, too, is modernizing its tank force, with some of the older types now being withdrawn. The Spanish Navy has a second carrier, which will be in full service in 1988, and a twelfth frigate has joined the fleet. The Air Force now has 24 F-18. Turkish Army improvements still await equipment on order. The Navy has retired one of its older US destroyers. The Air Force has disbanded six of its FGA squadrons, putting over 80 of its F/TF-104 aircraft in reserve, and has formed an additional F-5 reconnaissance squadron.
   The British Army is now progressively introducing the new MCV-80 Warrior MICV. The Navy has received its fourth Trafalgar-class SSN, but one Oberon and one Porpoise diesel submarine have been retired, with a second Porpoise to follow. A County-class guided missile destroyer has been sold. One new Type-22 frigate has joined the fleet, and three more are to follow in 1987/8, but four Leander and one Rothesay have been retired. Deliveries of another batch of the FRS-1 version of the Sea Harrier have begun, and modifications to the FRS-2 standard are in hand. Seven more Sea King have been modified to the AEW role and the Wasp and Wessex helicopters are being retired. The Air Force has an additional 40 Tornado, including the Air Defence version. Boeing E-3, rather than Nimrod, aircraft are now on order to perform the AEW function. With the Falklands and Hong Kong garrisons being reduced, overall Forces Abroad totals are down. Additional ships have, however, been deployed in the Indian Ocean in response to recent events in the Persian Gulf.
   Economic Developments
   NATO Europe continued to enjoy modest GDP growth, averaging 2.9% in 1986 (2.3% in 1985). Portugal, Turkey (7.8%) and Norway achieved growth rates of over 4%; Greece (0.4%), the Netherlands and Belgium trailed with rates below 2%; for the remaining NATO members growth was between 2% and 3%. United States' growth continued to be disappointing for a second year, running at only 2.5% (2.7% in 1985).
   With the exception of Greece and Norway, whose inflation rates rose to 23% and 7.1% respectively, NATO members were able to reduce inflation substantially. This success was in part due to the continuing decline of international oil prices and very low prices for other key commodities, but it also reflected the ability to exploit excess capacity in the manufacturing sector.
   Some Western countries face increasing government debt and interest payments. Among European NATO members, Turkey, Portugal and Norway have debt/GDP ratios of 55%. Denmark follows with 45%, Canada and Greece show 34%-35%, and ratios for the others are all under 20%. The principal causes of these substantial debts are the high oil prices of the late 1970s, the recession of the early 1980s (and accompanying unemployment in Western Europe and North America), and increasing military outlays in the first half of the 1980s. A further contributing factor has been the high social welfare costs incurred by Western governments (see The Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 232-3). Increased debt servicing costs are likely to have an adverse impact on defence budgets.
   Although the NATO states agreed in 1979 to increase their defence outlays by 3% annually in real terms, few were able to comply with this. Only Canada, Britain, Greece, Italy, Norway and the US managed at times to exceed the 1979 goals; some nations, on the other hand, reduced their expenditures substantially. Overall, half of NATO's members were able to increase their defence outlays until 1985, when NATO Europe achieved an average increase of about 1%. By 1986, however, even Norway and Greece (until recently well above the 3% target) reduced their budgets by 5% and 8% respectively. The major Alliance partners, too, have had to rein in their expenditures. Under congressional pressure, growth in the US defence budget was slowed to less than 5%; UK defence budget growth is now barely above 1%; and the FRG has announced a freeze if not a decline in defence expenditures. Portugal and Turkey are, however, raising their outlays by over 10%.
   It is unlikely, given low economic growth, and generally declining population numbers (and thus a low labour pool), that NATO's most advanced industrial members will be able to take a larger share of the Alliance's financial burden. Indeed, it appears that the Mediterranean members will be best able (and generally most need) to modernize their defence establishments. However, this will in turn require even greater military aid, largely in materiel terms, from other members, such as the FRG and the US.
   Overall, for the foreseeable future, defence spending in European NATO appears destined at best to maintain a plateau in real terms; indeed a measure of decline cannot be ruled out. Given the general tendency for defence equipment costs to rise at rates exceeding inflation, even static real-terms outlays are likely to make it difficult to sustain existing force structures and equipment quantities.

ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ СЕВЕРОАТЛАНТИЧЕСКОГО ДОГОВОРА


   Читатели заметят изменения в презентации. Запись, ранее называвшаяся "Британия", теперь появляется как "Соединенное Королевство" в конце этого раздела.
   Военное развитие
   Как и в предыдущие годы, произошли некоторые относительно незначительные изменения в численности личного состава национальных вооруженных сил. По Греции и Турции новых данных о численности персонала получено не было, и данные за 1986 год были повторены. Запасы оборудования стран НАТО продолжают отражать постепенную модернизацию, но относительно небольшой рост.
   Организационные изменения в итальянской и испанской армиях привели к пересмотру; перестройка в Испании все еще продолжается, и данные должны использоваться с осторожностью. Норвежская позиция также была тщательно пересмотрена, однако тесная взаимосвязь между военной и гражданской системами обеспечения готовности к чрезвычайным ситуациям, которая занимает центральное место в системе обороны Норвегии, не может быть полностью отражена. Наконец, хотя известно, что антитеррористическая кампания на юго-востоке Турции вызвала подкрепления в этот регион, воздействие этой диверсии на нормальное развертывание турецких сил установить не удалось.
   Подводя итог существенным изменениям в отдельных национальных вооруженных силах: бельгийские призывники теперь служат еще два месяца как дома, так и в Германии. Данные о резервах отражают общее количество, а не только активные резервы, перечисленные в предыдущие годы, и мы включили оценку тех, кто активно работал в течение последних пяти лет. Число бронетранспортеров несколько сократилось; одним из основных исключений является БМП AIFV-B, который в настоящее время возрос примерно на 200% по сравнению с 1986 годом. Продолжается программа модернизации самоходных гаубиц М-109 155мм. В настоящее время на вооружении находятся две эскадрильи самолетов F-16.
   Канада передислоцировала один из своих DDH-280 в Тихий океан, что отражает возросшие там военно-морские потребности, и мы включили в него более полный перечень вспомогательных судов. Продолжается внедрение CF-18 с некоторым компенсирующим сокращением запасов CF-116 (F-5). Решение о наращивании сил в Европе реализуется.
   Дания сообщила о пересмотре статуса своих резервов; отмечается некоторое сокращение их численности. Постоянной силы, однако, имеет повышенную прочность на 18%. Основной разработкой армейской техники является установка буксирного противотанкового вооружения на БТР М-113. В прошлом году ВВС ошибочно показали четыре эскадрильи F-16 FGA из-за непреднамеренного двойного счета с эскадрильей Draken в комбинированной роли FGA/AD. Таким образом, общий объем запасов F-16 сократился на 16 самолетов. Ожидаемые две новые усовершенствованные батареи HAWK не были сформированы.
   Франция сейчас имеет две эскадрильи из 15 Mirage IVP, оснащенных для ядерных КР ASMP в эксплуатации, увеличение на семь самолетов по сравнению с прошлым годом. В предварительном стратегических воздушно роли планов для 85 Mirage 2000Н быть приспособленным для ASMP. Французская армия модернизирует свой танк AMX-30 до стандарта B2; сообщается о незначительном увеличении общего числа. Количество легких танков AMX-13 значительно сократилось; увеличение числа БМП AMX-10RC и AMX-10P/PC обеспечивает компенсирующие замены. Аналогичный сдвиг от AMX-13 VTT в пользу VAB APC также наблюдается. Армейская авиация, по-видимому, постепенно сворачивает Alouette в пользу Gazelle SA-341/-342. В настоящее время в Военно-Морском Флоте третья ПЛА Rubis на предприемных испытаниях; класс завершится четвертой лодкой, и началось строительство расширенной версии, типа Amethyste. К флоту присоединились еще три быстроходных ударных корабля P-400 и пятый штурмовой корабль Batral. Во французской военно-морской авиации, палубные ударные самолеты Super Etendard также должны получить ASMP. В течение года французские силы в Чаде были удвоены (примерно до 2500 военнослужащих).
   Федеративная Республика Германия демонстрирует небольшое снижение общей численности Вооруженных сил, при этом больше всего пострадала армия (на 8,5%), главным образом полевая. Ранние версии M-48 MBT были изъяты; 1300 Leopard 1 должны быть обновлены до стандарта A5, а число Leopard 2 в настоящее время составляет 1800: увеличение примерно на 300. Новая командная машина БТР М-577 теперь фигурирует в описи, и около 220, как полагают, были поставлены. В Бундесвере также имеется морской компонент, который теперь включен в перечень. Из-за задержек с научными исследованиями и разработками производство системы ПВО ВМС RAM-ASMD (запланированное для эсминцев Lutjens, фрегатов Bremen и быстроходных ударных катеров типа 148) еще не началось. Эта совместная система США и Германии предназначена для противодействия корабельным ракетам, а также самолетам. Немецкая военно-морская авиация теперь имеет Tornado, развернутые в трех эскадрильях. Его F-104 больше не находятся в эксплуатации. ВВС также сокращают F-104, более чем компенсируя поставками самолетов Tornado и легких штурмовиков Alpha Jet.
   Данные по греческому перечню танков были пересмотрены в свете последних данных. Общие итоги остаются неизменными, но есть ряд незначительных внутренних изменений. Итальянский флот выбрал самолеты на борту нового авианосца Garibaldi, это будет англо-американский AV-8B. Итальянские ВВС продолжают заменять свои F-104 на Tornado. Аналогичным образом, Нидерланды заменяют F-5; поскольку замена F-16 уже идет, результатом является снижение общей боевой силы примерно на 22 самолета. Норвегия устанавливает TOW на БТР М-113, и NM-142 в настоящее время поступает на вооружение.
   Португалия обновляет свои танковые силы с увеличением числа М-48 на 50%. Испания также модернизирует свои танковые силы, при этом некоторые из старых типов в настоящее время выводятся. У испанского флота есть второй авианосец, который будет в составе в 1988 году, и двенадцатый фрегат присоединился к флоту. В ВВС сейчас 24 F-18. Улучшения турецкой армии все еще ждут оборудования по заказу. Флот снял один из своих старых американских эсминцев. ВВС распустили шесть эскадрилий, оставив в резерве более 80 самолетов F/TF-104, и сформировали дополнительную разведывательную эскадрилью F-5.
   В настоящее время британская армия постепенно внедряет новую БМП MCV-80 Warrior. Военно-морской флот получил свой четвертую ПЛА типа Trafalgar, но одна дизельная подводная лодка Oberon и Porpoise были выведены, а вторая-вслед за ними. Ракетный эсминец типа County продан. Один новый фрегат типа 22 присоединился к флоту, и еще три должны последовать в 1987/8, но четыре Leander и один Rothesay были выведены. Начались поставки еще одной партии версии Sea Harrier FRS-1, а также модификации стандарта FRS-2. Еще семь Sea King были переведены на новую роль, и вертолеты Wasp и Wessex выводятся. ВВС имеет дополнительные 40 Tornado, в том числе воздушная версия обороны. Boeing E-3, а не Nimrod, теперь должны выполнять функцию ДРЛО. С сокращением гарнизонов Фолклендских островов и Гонконга общие силы за рубежом сократились. Однако в связи с недавними событиями в Персидском заливе в Индийском океане были развернуты дополнительные суда.
   Экономические процессы
   В Европе НАТО продолжался умеренный рост ВВП, составивший в 1986 году в среднем 2,9% (в 1985 году-2,3%). Португалия, Турция (7,8%) и Норвегия достигли темпов роста более 4%; Греция (0,4%), Нидерланды и Бельгия следовали с темпами ниже 2%; для остальных членов НАТО рост был между 2% и 3%. Второй год рост в Соединенных Штатах продолжал разочаровывать, составляя всего 2,5% (2,7% в 1985 году).
   За исключением Греции и Норвегии, чьи темпы инфляции выросли до 23% и 7,1% соответственно, члены НАТО смогли существенно снизить инфляцию. Этот успех отчасти объясняется продолжающимся снижением международных цен на нефть и очень низкими ценами на другие ключевые сырьевые товары, но он также отражает способность использовать избыточные мощности в обрабатывающем секторе.
   Некоторые западные страны сталкиваются с ростом государственного долга и процентных платежей. Среди европейских членов НАТО, Турция, Португалия и Норвегия имеют соотношение долг/ВВП 55%. Дания следует с 45%, Канада и Греция показывают 34% -35%, а коэффициенты для остальных-менее 20%. Основными причинами этих значительных долгов являются высокие цены на нефть конца 1970-х годов, рецессия начала 1980-х годов (и сопутствующая безработица в Западной Европе и Северной Америке) и увеличение военных расходов в первой половине 1980-х годов. Еще одним фактором, способствовавшим этому, были высокие расходы на социальное обеспечение, понесенные западными правительствами (см. Увеличение расходов на обслуживание долга, вероятно, негативно скажется на оборонных бюджетах.
   Хотя в 1979 году государства НАТО согласились ежегодно увеличивать расходы на оборону на 3% в реальном выражении, немногие смогли выполнить это. Только Канаде, Великобритании, Греции, Италии, Норвегии и США удалось в разы превысить цели 1979 года; некоторые страны, с другой стороны, существенно сократили свои расходы. В целом, половина членов НАТО смогли увеличить свои расходы на оборону до 1985 года, когда Европа НАТО достигла среднего увеличения примерно на 1%. Однако к 1986 году даже Норвегия и Греция (до недавнего времени значительно превышавшие целевой показатель в 3%) сократили свои бюджеты на 5% и 8% соответственно. Основные партнеры по Альянсу также были вынуждены сдерживать свои расходы. Под давлением Конгресса рост оборонного бюджета США замедлился до менее чем 5%; рост оборонного бюджета Великобритании сейчас едва превышает 1%; и ФРГ объявила о замораживании, если не о снижении оборонных расходов. Португалия и Турция, однако, увеличивают свои расходы более чем на 10%.
   Маловероятно, что с учетом низкого экономического роста и в целом снижения численности населения (и, следовательно, низкой численности рабочей силы) наиболее развитые промышленные члены НАТО смогут взять на себя большую долю финансового бремени Североатлантического союза. Действительно, представляется, что средиземноморские государства-члены смогут (и, как правило, больше всего нуждаются) модернизировать свои оборонительные сооружения. Однако, это в свою очередь потребует еще большей военной помощи, в основном в материальном плане, от других членов, таких, как ФРГ и США.
   В целом, в обозримом будущем расходы на оборону в Европейском НАТО, как представляется, в лучшем случае обречены на сохранение в реальном выражении; действительно, нельзя исключать некоторую степень снижения. С учетом общей тенденции к росту расходов на оборонное оборудование темпами, превышающими темпы инфляции, даже статические расходы в реальном выражении, вероятно, затруднят поддержание существующих силовых структур и количества техники.
  
   BELGIUM
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 90,800 (3,460 women, 29,510 conscripts).
Terms of service: 10 months in Germany or 12 months home service.
Reserves: e 145,000 (service in past 5 years).
Total Reserve Status: 411,606. Army 309,811; Medical Service 46,922, to age 45; Navy 12,024; Air 42,849.

ARMY: 67,500 (incl separate Medical Service; 25,400 conscripts).
1 Corps HQ, 2 Div HQ.
1 armd bde (2 tk, 2 mech inf, 1 SP arty bns, spt units).
3 mech inf bdes (each 1 tk, 2 mech inf, 1 SP arty bn, 1 ATK coy, spt units).
1 para-cdo regt (3 para-cdo bns, armd recce and spt units).
2 recce bns.
2 mot inf bns (territorial def).
4 arty bns (3 SP).
1 SSM bn: 2 btys, each with 2 Lance.
4 AD bns: 2 SAM with 36 Improved HAWK; 2 AA, each with 27 Gepard.
4 engr bns (2 fd, 1 bridge, 1 eqpt).
4 lt avn sqns.
RESERVES: some on immediate recall status; 1 mech, 1 mot inf bdes; combat, combat spt, log spt tps. Territorial defence: 11 mot inf regts, 4 mot inf bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 320 Leopard 1; lt: 118 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 140 Scimitar. MICV: 478 AIFV-B. APC: 970 incl 390 M-113, 260 Spartan, AMX-VCI, M-75 (to Reserves).
Arty: how: 155mm: 168: 40 M-1O9A3, 120 M-109A2 SP; 203mm: 8 M-110 SP (being upgraded to A2);
   SSM: 5 Lance (1 reserve).
ATK: guns: 72 JPK-90mm SP. ATGW: 420 Milan (some veh-mounted), 36 Striker AFV with Swingfire.
AD: guns: 20mm: 24; 35mm: 54 Gepard SP.
   SAM: 36 Improved HAWK.
Avn: ac: 12 Islander, hel: 64 SA-318 Alouette II.

NAVY: 4,500 (1,140 conscripts).
Bases: Kallo, Ostend, Zeebrugge.
Frigates: 4 E-71 each with 4 MM-38 Exoset SSM, 1x8 Sea SparrowSAM.
MCMV: 27: ocean: 10: 6 US Aggressive, 4 Aster (Flower tripartite); coastal: 6 US Adjutant; inshore: 11 Herstal.
Patrol craft, river: 2.
Auxiliaries: log spt/comd ships: 2. other: 6 (+1 survey vessel).
Hel: 3 SA-316 Alouette III
(On order: 6 Flower (ocean) MCMV.)

AIR FORCE: 18,800 (2,970 conscripts).
FGA: 5 sqns: 3 with Mirage 5BA/BD; 2 with F-16A7B.
AD: 2 ac sqns with F-16A/B;
   4 SAM sqns with Nike Hercules (modernized);
   1 NADGE command reporting centre, associated radar.
Recce: 1 sqn with Mirage 5BR.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with 12 C-130H Hercules; 1 with 2 Boeing 727QC, 3 HS-748, 5 Merlin IIIA, 2 Mystere-Falcon 20.
Liaison: 1 fit with CM-170 Magister.
Trg: 4 sqns: 2 with Alpha Jet; 1 with Alpha Jet, Magister. 1 with SF-260.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 48.
Equipment: 141 combat ac (plus 29 in store), no armed hel.
Aircraft:
Mirage: 69: 5BA/BD: 50 (FGA). 5BR: 19 (recce).
F-16: 72 (101): -A: 53 (27 FGA, 26 AD), plus 29 in store. -B: 19 (9 FGA, 10 AD).
C-130: 12 (tpt).
Boeing 727: 2 (tpt). HS-748: 3 (tpt). Merlin IIIA: 5 (tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20: 2 (tpt). CM-170: 18 (liaison). SF-260: 30 (trg). Alpha Jet: 31 (trg).
Helicopters:
Sea King: 5 (SAR).
Missiles:
SAM: 36 Nike Hercules (to be withdrawn 1989-90).
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.
(On order: 44 F-16A/B ftr ac.)

Forces Abroad: Germany: 25,000; 1 corps HQ, 1 div HQ, 1 armd, 1 mech inf bdes; 2 recce, 2 tk, 3 arty, 1 SSM, 2 Gepard AA, 2 SAM, 3 engr bns,
   240 MBT; 3 aviation sqns; 4 Nike SAM sqns.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 15,900; 62 FN, 4 RM/62F armd cars, 5 Alouette II, 3 Puma hel.

   CANADA
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 84,600 (planned 90,000 by 1989; 7,740 women). t
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 21,300. Army (Militia) 15,500; Navy 3,300; Air 950. Comms 1,570; (Total planned to increase to 40,000 by 1989.)
Commands: f
   Mobile Command (about 18,000 land and air).
   Maritime Command (MARCOM; about 15,000).
   Air Command (23,000).
   Communications Command (3,300).
   Canadian Forces Training System (4,500).

ARMY (Land Forces): 22,500. f
2 bde gps: each 1 armd regt, 3 mech inf bns, 1 arty (2 close spt, 1 AD btys), 1 engr regts, spt units.
1 mech bde gp: 1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bns, 1 arty, 1 engr regts, spt units.
1 special service force (4,000): 1 armd regt, 1 inf bn, 1 AB, 1 arty, 1 engr regts, 1 spt unit.
(Reserves): 131 combat arms and spt units.
Equipment:
Tks: 114 Leopard C-1.
AFV: recce: 174 Lynx, 195 Cougar. APC: 961 M-113, 269 Grizzly.
Arty: how: 105mm: 12 model 44 (L-5) pack, 190 towed; 155mm: 50 M-109 SP. Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 787 Carl Gustav. ATGW: 149 TOW.
AD: guns: 40mm: 57 L-40/60. SAM: 111 Blowpipe.
(On order: TOW-2 ATGW; 30 Oerlikon twin 35mm with Skyguard radar AD/ATK system (ADATS).)

NAVY (Maritime Forces): 10,000.f
Subs: 3 Oberon.
Escorts: 23 ASW:
   4 helicopter destroyers DDH-280 (to convert to AD/ASW), each with 2x4 Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 CH-124 Sikorsky Sea King hel.
   2 Annapolis DDH each with 1 Sea King hel.
   6 St Laurent DDH each with 1 Sea King hel.
   4 Improved Restigouche with ASROC.
   4 Mackenzie.
   3 Restigouche: 1 trg, 2 reserve.
Replenishment spt ships: 3, each with 3 Sea King hel.
Auxiliaries (civilian-manned): 24: 1 tanker, 3 oceanographic research, 1 diving spt, 19 tugs (2 ocean, 5 coastal<, 12 harbour).
Trg: 21: 6 coastal, 5 gate, 1 yacht(, 9 small.
(On order: 6 Halifax ASW destroyers (DDH-330); 36 RGM-84D Harpoon ASM; Sea Sparrow SAM; radar.)
DEPLOYMENT AND BASES:
Atlantic: Halifax; 3 subs, 3 DDH-280 (from mid-1987), 1 Improved Restigouche, 2 Annapolis, 6 St Laurent,
   1 Restigouche (in reserve, non-operational) escorts, 2 replenishment spt ships,
   2 ac sqns each with 7 Aurora, 1 ac sqn with 6 Tracker, 3 ASW hel sqns with 32 Sea King ASW.
Pacific: Esquimalt; 1 DDH-280 (from mid-1987), 3 Improved Restigouche, 4 Mackenzie (trg); 2 Restigouche (in reserve, non-operational);
1 replenishment spt ship, 6 patrol vessels (trg); 2 MR ac sqns (1 with 4 Aurora, 1 with 3 Tracker).

AIR FORCE: 23,050. f
Canadian Air Group (CAG):
Ftr: 3 sqns with CF-18 (F/A-18 Hornet).
Fighter Group:
FGA: 3 sqns: 2 with CF-116/-116D (F-5A/D) (1 NATO-assigned); to get CF-18 from 1987.
   1 trg sqn with CF-18D.
AD: 2 sqns with CF-18 (trg sqn to augment).
ECM: 1 trg sqn with CC-144 (CL-601), CC-117 (Mystere-Falcon 20), CT-133 (T-33), CF-101 (Voodoo).
EWng: 13 North.Warning System sites, supplemented by 39 short-range radar sites;
Region Operational Control Centre (ROCC).
   1 space tracking and identification site.
Maritime Air Group:
MR: 6 sqns: 4 (1 trg) with CP-140 Aurora (P-3 mod); 2 (1 reserve) with CP-121 Tracker.
ASW: 3 hel sqns (1 trg) with CH-124 Sea King, some afloat.
Liaison: 2 utility sqns with T-33, CP-121 ac; CH-135 (Bell 212) hel.
Tactical Air Group (TAG):
Tac hel: 6 sqns with CH-135, CH-136 (OH-58) Kiowa, CH-147 (CH-47) Chinook.
Air Transport Group:
Tpt: 6 sqns: 4 (1 trg) with CC-130E/H Hercules. 1 with CC-137 (Boeing 707).
   1 with CC-109 Cosmopolitan (Convair 440), CC-132 (DHC-7R Ranger), CC-144 Challenger (Canadair 600/601).
SAR: 5 tpt/SAR sqns with CC-130, CC-129 (DC-3), CC-115 (DHC-5 Buffalo), CC-138 (DHC-6 Twin Otter) ac; CH-113/-113A (BV-107) Labrador, CH-135 hel.
Liaison hel: 4 base hel flights with CH-118 (Bell 205), CH-135.
Training Group:
Trg: 3 flying schools with CT-133, CT-134 (T-34) Musketeer, CT-114 (CL-41) Tutor, CC-129 (C-47) ac; CH-139 (Bell 206) hel.
   1 demonstration unit with CT-114.
Equipment: 171 combat ac; 32 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   CF-116 (F-5): 29. -A: 12 (10 FGA, 2 trials); -D: 17 (FGA).
   CF-18 A/B (F/A-18A/B): 109 (78 FGA, 31 trg).
   CF-101: 2 (1 ECM, 1 trg).
   CP-140: 18 (MR).
   CP-121: 29 (15 MR, 3 liaison, 4 reserve, 7 in storage).
   CC-130E/H: 28 (tpt). CC-137: 5 (tpt). CC-109: 7 (tpt). CC-117: 7 (EW trg). CC-144: 8 (tpt). CC-132: 1 (tpt). CC-138: 8 (tpt). CC-115: 11 (tpt).
   T-33: 9 (liaison). CT-133: 17 (trg). CT-114: 111 (trg). CT-134: 20 (trg). CC-129: 2 (trg).
Helicopters:
   CH-124: 35 (32 ASW afloat, 3 reserve). CH-135: 38 (31 tac, 5 tpt, 2 liaison). CH-136: 36 (tac). CH-147: 7 (tac).
   CH-113: 13 (tpt). CH-118: 9 (tpt). CH-139: 14 (trg).
(On order: 29 CF-18 (20 F-18A, 7 -B) ftrs, 3 CC-144 (CL-601 Challenger) EW/trg/test, 6 DHC-8 (2 CC-142 tpt, 4 CT-142 trg); Sidewinder, SparrowAAM.)

Forces Abroad:
Europe:
1 mech bde gp (4,400); 1 armd, 2 inf, 1 arty bns, engr regt, hel sqn, log/adm bn.
   59 Leopard 1 MBT, 363 M-113 APC/recce, 59 Lynx comd/recce, 24 M-109 155mm SP how, 40 TOW ATGW, 42 40mm AA guns, 31 Blowpipe SAM,
   12 CH-136 Kiowa hel.
   (1,415 reinforcements in Canada).
1 Air Group: (2,700). 3 FGA sqns with 36 CF-18. 1det; 1 CC-132 and 4 CT-133 liaison ac.
UN duty: Cyprus (UNFICYP): 515. Syria/Israel (UNDOF): 226. Other Middle East (UNTSO): 20. Egypt (MFO): 136.

PARA-MILITARY:
Coast Guard: 6,560 (civilian-manned); 1 arctic, 7 large, 5 med, 2 lt icebreakers, 44 SAR vessels, 27 tenders, 2 DHC-7R ac, 37 hel, 5 hovercraft.
Canadian Rangers: 620;Ranger cadets: some 600 (component of Militia).

* Canadian fiscal year is 1April-31 March. NATO data refer to calendar year.
t The Canadian Armed Forces were unified in 1968. Of the total strength, some 29,000 are not identified by service.
f Mobile Command commands land combat forces, and Maritime Command all naval forces. Air Command commands allair forces, but Maritime Command has operational control of maritime air forces. Mobile Command hasoperational control of TAG. HQ4 ATAF in Europe has operational control of CAG.

   DENMARK
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 29,300 (8,380 conscripts, 800women).
Terms of service: 9-12 months (up to 27 months in certain ranks)
Reserves: 74,700: total mobilizable strength 104,000.
   Army: 55,000.
   Augmentation Force (immediate recall): (to wartime 'covering force') 4,500.
   Mobilization Forces: Field Army Reserve (FAR) 50,500 - comprising:
   Covering Force Reserve (12,000); 5 mech inf bns (1 per bde), men (to bring units to war strength).
   Other: (38,500); 5 mot inf bns, 4 arty bns men for regimental combat teams, combat and log spt.
   Navy: 7,600.
   Air Force: 12,100.
Home Guard: 75,000 (11,000 women) (to age 50).
   Army Hjemmevaernet 58,400 (8,100 women); some 550 Coys.
   Marine Hjemmevaernet 4,900 (1,500 women).
   Air Hjemmevaernet: 11,700 (1,700 women); some 90 sqns.

ARMY: some 17,000 (6,800 conscripts):
Standing Force (8,300); ('Covering Force') HQ, schools, administration (some 4,300) (trg force 4,000, UN 323). To be 72,000 on mobilization.
2 geographical commands, 2 div HQ.
5 mech inf bdes, each with 1tk, 2 mech, 1 arty bns.spt units.
6 regimental combat teams, each with 2-3 inf, 1 arty bns, 1tk sqn, spt units.
7 indep inf bns.
2 recce bns.
1 Army avn unit, some 8 platoons.
Equipment:
Tks: 210: 120Leopard 1, 90 Centurion; lt: 52 M-41 (to be updated).
APC: 530M-113, 55 M-106mor-armed, 56 TOW armed.
Arty: guns: 155mm: 24 M-59 towed.
   how: 366: 105mm: 182 M-101; 155mm: 172: 96 M-114 towed (82 to be upgraded), 76 M-109 SP; 203mm: 12M-115 towed.
   Mor: 81mm; 120mm: e60.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 470 Carl Gustav; 106mm: 190. RL: LAW. ATGW: TOW (incl 56 SP). guns: 105mm: 126 L-7A3 (ex-Centurion tk)
AD: guns: 40mm: 36 L/60. SAM: Hamlet (Redeye).
Avn: ac: 8 SAAB T-17 lt. hel: 14 Hughes 500M.
(On order: Carl Gustav RCL.)

NAVY: 5,400 (845 conscripts).
Bases: Copenhagen, Korsor, Frederikshavn.
Subs: 4: 2 Narhvalen; 2 Delfinen.
Frigates: 10:
   2 Peder Skram (at cadre crew status) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x4 Sea Sparrow SAM;
   3 Niels Juel with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM;
   5 fishery-protection: with 1 Lynx hel: 4 Hvidbjornen, 1 Beskytteren.
FAC(G): 10 Willemocs with 2x4 Harpoon SSM.
FAC(T): 6 Soteven (2 in active reserve).
Patrol craft, large: 22: 8 Daphne (to be replaced), 3 Agdlek, 2 Maagen, 9 Barso; coastal: 5 Botved<.
Minelayers: 6: 4 Falster, 2 Lindormen.
Minesweepers, coastal: 3 Sund (US MSC-60).
Misc: 2 coastal tankers, 4 ice breakers, 1 Royal Yacht.
Coast defence unit: 2 coastal fortresses; 150mm guns; 40mm AA guns. Coastal radar.
Hel: 8 Lynx (up to 4 embarked).
Reserves (Home Guard): 37 coastal patrol craft.
(On order: 3 Kobben subs, 7 Standard Flex 300 multi-role patrol boats, Type 613 torpedoes, Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM.)

AIR FORCE: 6,900 (735 conscripts).
Tactical Air Command:
FGA/AD: 4 sqns: 3 with F-16A/B; 1 with F-35XD Draken.
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with RF-35XD Draken.
Tpt: 1 sqn, 3 comms fits with C-130H Hercules, Gulfstream III, SAAB T-17.
SAR: 1 sqn with S-61A hel.
Trg: 1 flying school with T-17.
Air Defence Group:
AD: 1 SAM bn: 6 batteries with Improved HAWK.
Control/Reporting Group: 6 radar stations.
Equipment: 80 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   F-16A/B: 48 (FGA/AD).
   F-35: 32. F-35XD: 16 (FGA/AD); RF-35XD: 16 (FGA/recce).
   C-130: 3 (tpt). Gulfstream III: 3 (tpt). SAAB T-17: 21 (6 tpt, 15 trg).
Helicopters:
   S-61: 8 (SAR).
Missiles: AAM: Sidewinder.
   SAM: 36 Improved HAWK.
(On order: 12 F-16A/B FGA/trg; AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM.

Forces Abroad: Cyprus (UNFICYP): 1 bn: 323. Other: 159.

   FRANCE
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: some 546,900 (14,712 women, 245,560 conscripts) incl Gendarmerie, Service de Sante, Inter-service Central Staffs.
Terms of service. 12 months plus post-conscription voluntary system of 16-24 months.
Reserves: 391,000; Army 305,000, Navy 28,000, Air 58,000.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES: (18,800; some 2,800 Army, 5,000 Navy, 10,200 Air Force, 800 Gendarmerie).
SLBM: 6 SSBN:
   1 with 16M-4/TN-70;
   5 with 16 M-20/TN-60 msls (1 on long refit incl conversion to M-4/TN-71, SM-39 Exocet SLCM).
IRBM: 18 SSBS S-3D/TN-61 msls in 2 sqns.
   (Test centre: 4 silos).
Aircraft: 133 combat ac.
Bbrs: 2 wings, 5 sqns.
   3 sqns with 22 Mirage IVA (AN-22 nuclear bombs).
   2 sqns with 15 Mirage IVP (ASMP: Air-Sol, Moyenne-Portee nuclear ASM); 3 more Mirage IVA being converted to IVP.
Trg: 12 Mirage IIIB, 1 Mystere-Fakon 20P.
Tankers: 1 wing: 3 sqns with 11 KC-135F/FR.
Comms: 4 Transall C-160 ASTARTE airborne comms centres.
Reserve: 6 Mirage IVA recce.

'Prestrategic' Nuclear Forces: (8,450).
Army (6,100): 30 Pluton SSM;
Navy (150): 38 Super Etendard strike ac (to get ASMP nuc ASM);
Air (2,200): 5 sqns: 3 with 45 Jaguar, 2 with 30 Mirage IIIE; all with AN-52 bombs (85 Mirage 2000N with ASMP planned).
(On order: 1 SSBN (1994), 48 M-4/TN-71 SLBM, ASMP nuclear ASM.)

ARMY: 279,900 incl Army Aviation, 6,250 women (183,250 conscripts).
1 army HQ, 3 corps HQ.
6 armd divs.
2 lt armd divs.
2 motor rifle (APC) divs.
1 para regt.
3 SAM regts (11 btys with 180 HAWK) (1 school).
1 sigs, 2 ELINT/EW regts.
Army/corps units: 3 armd recce, 1 special ops, 1 drone, 1 hy arty, 5 SSM with Pluton (each with 3 btys, 2 launchers each),
   5 SAM (each of 4 btys) with 139 Roland I/II and twin 30mm AAguns, 2 inf, 3 combat hel, 5 engr, 7 sigs, 3 tpt, 3 military police (traffic),
   1 cadre (sqn strength) regts; 3 log bdes.
Rapid Action Force (FAR): 45,000.
   1 para div (13,500): 6 para inf, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 comd spt regts; 1 spt bn.
   1 air portable marine div (8,000): 4 inf, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 comd/spt regts.
   1 lt armd div (7,400): 2 lt armd, 2 APC inf, 1 arty, 1 engr, 1 comd/spt regts.
   1 alpine div (8,500): 6 mountain inf, 1 lt armd, 1 arty, 1 comd/spt regts; 1 engr bn.
   1 air mobile div (5,100): 1 inf, 3 combat hel (to be 2 inf, 4 combat hel), 1 comd/spt regts - see Army Aviation.
   1 log bde, spt units (incl 1 tpt regt).
Indep regts: 1 para, 6 arty, 4 engr, 1 EW, 6 tpt.
Foreign Legion (8,500).
   1 armd, 1 para, 4 inf (trg), 2 engr regts.
Reserves: 305,000:
Immediate manning (8,500).
1 Army, FAR units, (45,000).
Forces in Germany (18,500) 1 inf div.
Military Regions: 7 bdes (each some 3,500 men; lt armd, 2 inf regts, engrs); Strategic nuc defence: 1 div (5 inf regts); Frontier defence: 6 inf regts;
   Territorial defence: 23 regts (each some 1,000 men), some with lt armd sqn, engrs.

ARMY AVIATION (ALAT) (7,000); 243 armed hel.
1 air mobile div:
1 regt with 4 manoeuvre sqns each 11 Puma; 1 liaison sqn with 16 SA-341 Gazelle.
3 regts each with
   1 manoeuvre sqn (11 Puma),
   1 observation sqn with 9 SA-341/Athos,
   1 gunship sqn with 10 SA-341,
   3 ATK sqns each 10 SA-342 Gazelle with HOT or Alouette III with AS-11.
(Total: 240 hel: 77 Puma, 20 Alouette III/AS-11, 70 SA-342/HOT, 73 SA-341 (30 gun, 27 Athos, 16 recce.)
3 corps hel regts, each 10 Puma, 16 SA-341/-342/Alouette ATK, 10 SA-341 Gazelle (gun armed).
4 territorial defence groups.
2 hel schools, detachments to 3 armd, inf, arty schools.
1 Army liaison sqn, overseas detachment.
Equipment:
Tks: 1,340 AMX-30 (400 -B2); lt: some 200 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 250 AMX-10RC, 90 ERC-90F4 Sagaie, 650 AML-60/90 (perhaps 300 in store). MICV: 865 AMX-10P/PC/Milan.
   APC: 550 AMX-13 VTT, 2,540 VAB, 60 VAB (HOT).
Arty: 779. guns: 155mm: 120 AU-F-1 SP. how: 105mm: 30 AU-50; 155mm: 629: 165 HM-2, 208 BF-50, 42 TR-F-1 towed, 214 F-3 SP.
   SSM: 32 Pluton.
   Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 552.
ATK: RL: 89mm: 12,000; 112mm: APILAS. ATGW: 113 AMX-13/SS-11, 1,400 Milan.
AD: guns: 1,012: 20mm: 90 76T1, 475 53T2; 30mm: 390 towed, 57 AMX-13 DCA twin SP. SAM: 229: 69 HAWK, 160 Roland I/II.
Avn: hel: 80 SA-318 Alouette II, 51 SA-316 Alouette III (AS-11 ATGW), 132 SA-330 Puma,
   203 SA-341F/M (36 with HOT, 70 gun-armed, 27 recce, 70 utility), 86 SA-342M Gazelle hel with HOT.
   ac: 17 MH-1521 Broussard, 18 CL-89 drones; 30 Cessna L-19.
(On order: 478 AMX-30B2 MBT; 354 Panhard M-11 VBL, 35 AMX-10RC, 90 ERC-90F4 armd cars; AMX-10P MICV; 140 VAB APC; 170 AU-F-1 155mm SP guns; 145 TR-F-1 155mm how; 3 227mm MRL; 58 120mm mor; 12,500 APILAS RL; 850 HOT (VAB and Gazelle), ACCP ATGW; 170 20mm AA guns; 22 Roland, 297 Mistral SAM; AS-332 Super Puma (with battlefield surveillance radar), 30 SA-342M (HOT) hel.)

NAVY: 68,900 incl Naval Air, (1,500 women; 17,140 conscripts).
Comds: 1 strategic sub (ALFOST) 2 home (CECLANT, CECMED), 2 overseas: Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN), Pacific Ocean (ALPACI).
Bases: Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Toulon.
Subs (attack): 16.
   SSN: 3 Rubis (1 on trials) with SM-39 Exoce SSM.
   SS: 14: 4 Agosta, 9 Daphne, 1 Narval.
Principal Surface Combatants: 45.
Carriers: 3:
   2 attack: Clemenceau, capacity 40 ac (2 fits with 20 Super Etendard, 1 with 7 F-8E Crusader, 1 with 6 Alize;
   1 det with 4 Etendard IVP, 2 Super-Frelon, 2 Alouette III hel).
   1 ASW (LPH): Jeanne d'Arc (trg): capacity 8 Lynx hel; 6 MM-38 Exocet SSM.
Cruiser: 1 Colbert comd with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1x2 Masurca SAM.
Destroyers: 16.
   ASW: 14:
   5 Leygues (C-70) ASW with 4 Exocet (2 with MM-38, 3 with MM-40), 1x8 Crotale SAM, 2 Lynx hel;
   2 Suffren with 4 MM-38 Exocet, 1 Malafon ASW/SSM, 1x2 Masurca SAM;
   3 Tourville (F-67) with 6 MM-38 Exocet, 1x8 Crotale SAM, 1 Malafon, 2 Lynx;
   1 T-56 with 1 Malafon, 1 hel;
   1 T-53 with 4 MM-38 Exocet, 1 Lynx;
   1 T-47 with 1 Malafon;
   1 C-65 with 8 MM-40 Exocet, 1 Malafon.
   AD: 2 T-47 with 1 Tartar SAM.
Frigates: 25 (16 with Exocet):
   8 Riviere (7 with 4 MM-38);
   17 Type A-69 (3 with 2 MM-38, 6 with 4 MM-40).
Minor Surface Combatants: 35:
FAC: 10 P-400.
MCMV: 25: ocean: 5 Type-D. coastal: 20: 5 Berlaimont, 5 Eridan, 5 Circe, 5 Cantho.
Amph: 52.
   assault ships: 7: 2 Ouragan (3 SA-321 Super Frelon or 6 Gazelle/Alouette hel, 9 LCM or 2 LCU), 5 Batral.
   LST: 2 . LCT: 9 . LCM: 3 4 .
Spt: 4 replenishment, 4 spt tankers; 15 maintenance/log/supply, 18 tpts, 6 tenders, 16 trg vessels.
Msls: SSM: Exocet MM-38, MM-40, SM-39 sub launched. ASW: Malafon. SAM: Crotale, Masurca, Tartar.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (9,000).
Strike: 3 fits with Super Etendard (AN-52 nuclear weapons).
Ftr: 1 fit with F-8E (FN) Crusader.
ASW: 2 fits with Alize (mod).
MR: 6 fits, 4 with Atlantic, 2 with Gardian (Mystere-Falcon 20).
Recce: 1 fit with Etendard IVP.
OCU: Etendard IVM; Alize; Zephir.
Trg: 5 units with N-262 Fregate, Piper Navajo, EMB-121 Xingu, MS-760 Para, Mystere-Falcon 10MER, Rallye 880.
Misc: 3 comms/liaison units (1 VIP) with DC-6, Falcon 10MER, Alize, N-262, Xingu, Navajo.
   1 trial unit with N-2504. 2 lt ac units with 12 Rallye 880, 6 CAP-10.
ASW hel: 3 sqns with Lynx.
Cdo hel: 2 assault sqns with SA-321 Super Frelon.
Trg hel: SA-318/-319 Alouette II/III.
Misc hel: 2 comms/SAR units with Alouette II/III, SA-332 S H /W Puma. 1 trials unit with Alouette II/III, Lynx, Super Frelon.
Equipment: 122 combat ac, 24 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Super Etendard: 38 (strike); 26 in store. Total of 53 to be mod for ASMP.
   Etendard: 20. IVP: 8 (recce); IVM: 12 (trg).
   Crusader: 12 (ftr).
   Alize: 21 (16 ASW, 4 trg, 1 misc).
   Atlantic: 27 (MR) (2 -NG (modernized)).
   Gardian: 5 (MR).
   Zephir: 12 (trg). Nord 262: 23 (13 trg, 10 misc). Navajo: 11 (2 trg, 9 misc). Xingu: 14 (9 trg, 5 misc). Rallye 880: 16 (trg). CAP-10: 5 (trg).
   MS-760: 8 (misc). Mystere-Falcon 10MER: 6 (misc). Nord 2504: 1 (misc).
Helicopters:
   Lynx: 26 (24 ASW, 2 misc).
   Super Frelon: 16 (13 cdo, 3 misc).
   Alouette: 38 (10 trg, 28 misc).
Missiles:
   ASM: AM-39 Exocet, AS-12/-30, Martel AS-37.
   AAM: R-530, R-550 Magic, Sidewinder.
   ASW: Malafon (torpedoes).

COMMANDOS (460): 4 assault units, 1 sub spt unit.

NAVAL BASE DEFENCE FORCE (2,400).

(On order: 1 Rubis, 3 Amethyste SSN, 1 nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; 2 C-70 ASW, 2 Cassard AA destroyers; 5 Eridan minehunters; 1 TCD-90 LSD, 2 LCT; 1 ocean tanker; 33 SM-39 Exocet sub-launched SSM; 14 Crotale EDIR SAM; 16 Atlantic II ASW ac (total of 42 to be bought).)

PUBLIC SERVICE FORCE (MHSP): Naval personnel, general coastguard, fishery,
   SAR duties; 1 Sterne, 1 Mercure patrol craft, 1 ex-trawler, 1 P-681 Albatros fishery protection vessel, 3 N-262 ac, 1 Dauphin hel. (To get 4 more vessels.)

AIR FORCE: 96,000 (5,850 women, 34,300 conscripts).
Air Defence Command (CAFDA): (7,150).
Ftr: 12 sqns: 1 with Mirage IIIC (in Djibouti);
   8 with Mirage F-1C; 3 with Mirage 2000C/B.
Trg: 1 OCU with Mirage F-1B; 4 trg fits with CM-170 Magister, MH-1521 Broussard.
   AD system: automatic STRIDA II, 10 radar stations.
   SAM: 12 sqns (1 trg) with 24 Crotale btys (48 fire, 24 radar units).
   AA: 300 btys (20mm guns).
   AAM: R-530, Super 530F, R-550 Magic I/II, Sidewinder.
Tactical Air Force (FATAC): (19,350).
   FGA: 10 sqns: 3 with Mirage IIIE; 2 with Mirage 5F; 5 with Jaguar A.
   Recce: 3 sqns: 1 with Mirage IIIR/IIIRD, F-1CR; 2 with Mirage F-1CR.
   Trg: 2 OCU: 1 with Mirage IIIB/E; 1 with Jaguar A/E. 8 trg fits with Magister, Broussard.
   AAM: Sidewinder, R-550 Magic, R-530. ASM: AS-30/-30L, Martel AS-37.
(Attached to Air Transport Command - see below):
   EW: 2 sqns: 1 with C-160 ELINT/ESM (electronic support measures). 1 with DC-8 (EE-51) ELINT.
   Liaison: 3 sqns with Magister, Broussard.
   Hel: 1 sqn with SA-318/316 Alouette II/III.
   Comms Gp (GTT): 2 sigs, 1 EWng sqns.
Air Transport Command (COTAM): (4,200).
   Tpt: 21 sqns: 1 hy with DC-8F; 5 tac with C-160/-160NG;
   14 lt tpt/trg/SAR with N-262 Fregate, Mystere-Falcon 50, MS-760 Paris, Broussard, DHC-6 Twin Otter, Caravelle, EMB-121 Xingu.
   Trg: 1 OCU with Fregate, C-160.
   Hel: 5 sqns with Alouette II/III, Puma, SA-365 Dauphin, AS-350 Ecureuil.
   Trg hel: 1 OCU with Alouette II/III, Puma, Ecureuil.
Training Command (CEAA): (5,500).
   Trg: Alpha Jet, Magister, Noratlas, Xingu 1, Epsilon, CAP-10B/-20.
   Misc (trials units): 1 sqn with Mirage F-1, Mirage 2000, Jaguar, 1 sqn with DHC-6, Fregate.
Equipment: 520 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Mirage: 377. F-1B: 14 (OCU); F-1C: 120 (ftr); F-1CR: 45 (recce); IIIC: 10 (ftr); IIIE: 75 (30 strike, 30 FGA, 15 ftr); IIIB/BE: 21 (trg); -5F: 30 (FGA);
   IVA: 22 (bbr); IVP: 15 (bbr); -2000: 38 (ftr); -2000N: being delivered from 1987.
   Jaguar: 138+. -A: 116 + (45 strike, 71 FGA, +trg and trials ac); -E: 22 (trg, trials).
   Alpha Jet: 165 (trg).
   DC-8: 6 (5 tpt, 1 EE-51 AEW).
   Transall C-160: 66 (2 Gabriel ELINT/ESM, 2 ASTARTE comms, 36 tac tpt, 7 OCU, 19 -NG tac tpt).
   Fregate: 22 (21 misc, 1 trials).
   Mystere-Falcon: 13. -20: 12 (misc), -50: 1 (misc). MS-760: 23 (misc). Broussard: 38 (trg, misc). DHC-6: 10 (9 misc, 1 trials). Caravelle: 4 (misc).
   Xingu: 25 (17 trg, 8 misc). Magister: 174 (trg). Epsilon: 76 (trg). CAP-1OB/20: 56 (trg).
Helicopters:
   Alouette: 64. II: 9 (OCU); II/III: 48 (lt tpt); III: 7 (OCU).
   Puma: 29 (27 tpt, 2 OCU).
   Dauphin: 1 (tpt). Ecureuil: 8 (tpt).
(On order: some 19 Mirage 2000C/B, 47 -2000N, 17 F-1CR ftrs; 3 E-3 AEW; 91 Epsilon trg ac; 16 Ecureuil-2 hel; 40 20mm AA guns.)

INTER-SERVICE CENTRAL STAFFS: 3,600.

SERVICE DE SANTE: 8,700 (2,070 conscripts).

Deployment:
Navy:
Atlantic Fleet: (HQ, Brest): 6 SSBN, 8 other subs, 1 hel carrier, 16 escorts, 11 MCM, 8 amph.
Channel Flotilla: 3 frigates, 9 MCM.
Mediterranean Fleet: (HQ, Toulon): 2 SSN, 9 subs, 2 carriers, 14 escorts, 5 MCM, 5 amph.

Forces Abroad:
Europe: Germany: 50,000; 2 armd, 1 motor rifle divs (400 MBT; to be increased).
   Berlin: 2,700; 1 armd regt, 1 inf regt.
Overseas Dependencies: 21,400; Army 12,700,
   Navy 3,350, Air 1,450, Gendarmerie 3,900.
Four inter-service overseas commands:
   Antilles-Guyana 7,900: 1 marine inf, 1 Foreign Legion regts, 1 marine inf bn, 3 ships, 1 Atlantic MR ac (Dakar, Senegal), 1 air tpt unit (C-160 ac,
   Puma, Alouette II hel).
   South Indian Ocean (Mayotte, La Reunion): 3,300 incl ALINDIEN; 1 marine inf regt, 2 inf coys, 1 air tpt unit (C-160 ac, Alouette III hel).
   New Caledonia 4,900: 1 marine inf regt, 4 inf coys, 1 air tpt unit (C-160 ac, Alouette III hel).
   Polynesia 5,400 (incl ALPACI): 1 marine, 1 Foreign Legion regts, 1 air tpt unit (Caravelle, Twin Otter ac; Super Puma, Alouette III hel).
Two naval commands:
   Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN) (1,800): (HQ afloat, Djibouti; La Reunion) 5 frigates, 2 minor combatants, 2 amph, 4 spt ships (1 comd), 1 Atlantic MR ac.
   Pacific (ALPACI) (1,400): (HQ, Papeete; Noumea) 3 frigates, 3 minor combatants, 8 amph, 12 spt ships, 5 Gardian MR ac.
Other Overseas (some 11,000 from all services; numbers vary with local circumstances): incl 120 AFV, spt vessels, 25 combat and 25 tpt ac, 43 hel.
Central African Republic (CAR) (1,600):
   garrison: 1 bn gp incl 2 motor coys; 1 platoon AML armd cars (6); spt coy with O-1E lt ac, 120mm mor, Milan ATGW.
   from France: 2 AML armd car sqns and 1 tp, 2 inf coys, 1 arty bty (105mm), 1 ALAT det (10 attack, 6 med tpt hel); air elms with Jaguar, C-160 tpt ac;
   Puma, Gazelle (HOT) hel.
Chad (2,500): 3 inf coys; Jaguar, Mirage F-1C, FGA, Atlantic MR, C-160 tpt ac; Puma hel.
Djibouti (4,000): 2 regts; 2 lt tk sqns (AMX-13/AMX-SS-11), 1 mixed armd sqn; 2 motor inf coys; 1 arty bty (105mm); 1 AA arty bty; 1 pioneer coy;
   1 ALAT det (5 attack, 5 med tpt hel); 1 sqn with 7 Mirage IIIC FGA, 1 C-160 tpt ac, 3 Alouette II hel.
Gabon (600): 1 marine inf bn; Jaguar FGA, 1 C-160, Atlantic ac, 1 Alouette III hel.
Ivory Coast (500): 1 marine inf bn; 1 Alouette III hel.
Senegal (1,250): 1 marine inf regt; Jaguar FGA, Atlantic MR ac; 1 air tpt unit (C-160 tpt ac; Alouette II/III hel).
Middle East. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1,750): 1 log bn. Sinai MFO (40): incl 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 1 C-160 tpt ac.

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie (incl Penal Affairs): 89,816 (incl 1,112 women, 8,800 conscripts, 960 civilians);
   3,667 territorial squads, 133 intervention units; 93 general traffic units, 24 highway sqns, 6 platoons; 130 mobile sqns; 234 overseas units.
   121 AML, 28 VBC-90 armd cars; 33 AMX-VTT, 155 VBRG.170 APC; 288 81mm mor; 15 patrol boats;
   6 Cessna 206C ac; 18 Alouette II, 12 Ecureuil, 12 Alouette III hel.

* A 5-year military development plan for 1988-92, totalling fr 850 bn, is being implemented.

   GERMANY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
   []
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 488,400 (223,450 conscripts; plus 6,600 active Reserve trg posts, all Services).
Terms of service: 15 months (to be 18 months from 1989).
Reserves: 770,000 (men to age 45, officers/NCOs to 60): Army 645,000, Navy 22,000, Air 95,000, Others 8,000.

ARMY: 332,100 (175,900 conscripts).
HQ Support Elements: 25,400. General Army Office subordinate echelon and spt tps.
Field Army: 265,000.
3 corps: 12 divs (6 armd, 4 armd inf, 1 mountain, 1AB);
38 bdes:
   17 armd (each with 3 tk, 1 armd inf, 1 armd arty bns),
   15 armd inf (each with 1 tk, 3 armd inf, 1 armd arty bns),
   1 mountain (with 1 tk 4 mountain inf, 1 mountain arty bns),
   3 AB,
   2 Home Defence (each with 2 tk, 2 armd or lt inf, 1 arty or armd arty bns).
Total: 71 tk, 64 armd inf, 2 inf, 4 mountain, 12 para, 33 armd arty, 1 mountain arty, 1 fd arty bns.
11 armd recce bns.
Corps arty: 4 SSM bns with Lance.
Div arty: 11 regts (each 3 bns: 18 FH-70, 18 203mm, 16 MRL).
3 AD regts, 1 AD bn with Roland II SAM. 10 AA regts, 1 AA bn with Gepard 35mm SP guns.
3 army aviation comds, each with 1 lt, 1 med tpt, 1 ATGW hel regt.
1 mixed aviation regt.
Engr units incl 4 coys, river engrs.
TerritorialArmy (Cadre): 41,700.
Commands: 3 Territorial, 5 Military District, 29 Military Region, 80 Sub-region (county/town level):
   10 Home Defence bdes (4 with 2 tk, 2 lt inf, 1 arty bns;
   6 with 1 tk, 2 inf, 1 arty bns): 2 full strength, 2 at 65%, 2 at 52% manning levels, 4 eqpt holding units only in peacetime.
4 Territorial Service spt comds.
Security tps: 15 Home Defence Regts (with 45 mot inf bns only),
   150 coys, 296 security platoons; defensive, comms, military police gps and service units on mobilization.
Equipment:
Tks: 4,887: 650 M-48A2G (Territorial bns), 2,437 Leopard 1A1 (1,300 to be upgraded to A5), 1,800 Leopard 2.
AFV: recce: 408 SPz-2 Luchs.
   MICV: 2,136 Marder A1 (841 to upgrade to A3).
   APC: 996 TPz-1, 2,560 M-113, 220 M-577.
Arty: how: 1,227: 105mm: 199; 155mm: 216 FH-70, 586 M-109 (to upgrade to A3); 203mm: 226 M-110A2SP.
   MRL: 110mm: 209 LARS; 227mm: 2 MLRS (trials).
   SSM: 26 Lance (incl 2 in reserve).
   Mor: 120mm: 955 (535 SP on M-113).
ATK: guns: 90mm: 120 JPz-4-5 SP. RCL: 105 106mm.
   ATGW: 1,928 Milan, 346 TOW, 316 RJPz-(7/O7) Jaguar 1, 162 RJPz-(TOW) SP; (see also PAH-1 hel below).
AD: guns: 2,395. 20mm: 1,712 towed; 35mm: 432 Gepard SP; 40mm: 201 L-70.
   SAM: 723 Redeye, 143 Marder/Roland SP.
Avn: hel: 187 UH-1D, 148 SA-318 Alouette II, 210 PAH-1 (BO-105P with HOT), 95 BO-105M, 105 CH-53G.
Marine: river landing craft: 36: 23 Mannheim 59, 13 Boden; river patrol craft: 12; tugs: 4.
(On order: 150 Leopard! MBT; 312 Wiesel AB recce/MICV; 60 TPz-1 APC; 80 M-109A2 how, 198 MLRS MRL; 5,580 HOT ATK missiles; 115 Marder/Roland SAM (with 4,000 missiles).)

NAVY: 36,400, incl naval air (9,450 conscripts).
Bases: Baltic: Eckernforde, Flensburg, Kiel, Olpenitz. North Sea: Borkum, Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Emden, Wilhelmshaven.
Subs: 24: 18 Type 206 (12 to be mod to - 206A); 6 Type 205.
Destroyers: 7:
   3 Lutjens (Type 103B) with Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC, 2x4 Harpoon SSM.
   4 Hamburg (Type 101A) with 2x2 MM-38 Exocet SSM.
Frigates: 9:
   6 Bremen (Type 122) with 2x4 Harpoon, 1x8 Sea Sparrow, 2x4 Stinger SAM, 2 Lynx hel;
   3 Koln (Type-120).
Corvettes: 5 Thetis (Type 420).
FAC(G): 40 with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM: 20 Type 148, 10 Type 143, 10 Type 143A.
MCMV: 57:
   Minehunters, coastal (MHC): 12 Type 331.
   Minesweepers, coastal: 6 Type 351 Troika drone control (MSCD) with 18 F-1 drone vessels (MCD);
   fast: 19 Schutze (Type 340/341);
   inshore: 18: 8 Ariadne (Type 393/393B), 10 Frauenlob (Type 394/394A); mine diver vessels: 2 Type 732.
Amph: LCU: 22 Type 520 (incl 1 trg, 2 in reserve);
Misc: depot: 10 Rhein; spt: 6: 1 Luneburg (Type 701 A), 5 Coburg (Type 701C);
   tenders: 12: 10 Rhein (2 Type 403 sub, 5 Type 402 FAC 3 Type 401 MCMV), 2 Luneberg (Type 701).
Auxiliaries (civilian crews): 2 tpts (1 reserve), 10 tankers, 2 Aristaeus repair ships, 3 Type 422A/B AGI intelligence collection, 1 Burkner utility/trials.
(On order: 6 Type 211 subs, 2 Bremen (Type 211) frigates; 10 Type 332 MHC; 2 Type 423 AGI (1987/88); 110 SM-1 Standard, 126 RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM.)

NAVAL AIR ARM:
FGA: 3 sqns with Tornado.
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with Tornado.
MR/ELINT: 2 sqns with Atlantic.
Liaison: 1 sqn with Do-28-D2.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Sea Lynx Mk 88.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 41.
Equipment: 91 combat ac, 14 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Tornado: 72 (54 FGA, 18 FGA/recce).
   Atlantic: 19 (14 MR, 5 ELINT).
   Do-28: 19 (17 liaison, 2 environmental protection).
Helicopters:
   Sea Lynx: 14 (ASW).
   Sea King: 22 (SAR).
Missiles: ASM: Kormoran.
(On order: 40 Tornado, 8 Sea Lynx hel, Sea Skua ASM).

AIR FORCE: 108,700 (38,100 conscripts).
Tactical Command (GAFTAC).
4 divs: 2 tac, 2 AD.
FGA: 20 sqns:
   3 with F-104G;
   4 with F-4F;
   6 with Tornado;
   7 with Alpha Jet.
Ftr: 4 sqns with F-4F.
Recce: 4 sqns with RF-4E.
ECM: 1 trg sqn with HFB-320 Hansa Jet.
SSM: 8 sqns with Pershing IA.
SAM: 3 regts (each 2 bns of 4 btys) with Nike Hercules; 3 regts (each 3 bns of 4 btys) with Improved HAWK.
Radar: 4 aircraft control and warning regts; 10 sites; 3 remote radars.
AAM: Sidewinder.
Transport Command (GAFTC).
Tpt: 3 wings: 4 sans with Transall C-160.
Special operations: 1 special air mission wing: 2 sqns with Boeing 707-320C, Hansa Jet, VFW-614, CL-601, Do-28 ac; UH-1D hel.
  Hel: 2 wings: 4 sqns with UH-1D (liaison/SAR).
Training Command:
FGA: 1 det (Cottesmore, UK) with Tornado; 1 OCU (Beja, Portugal) with Alpha Jet.
Ftr: OCU (George AFB, US) with F-4E.
Trg: NATO joint pilot trg (Sheppard AFB, US) with T-37B, T-38A; primary trg unit with P-149D.
Liaison: range base fits with Do-28D.
Equipment: 604 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
F-104G: 80 (FGA).
F-4: 186. -F: 120 (60 FGA, 60 ftr); -E: 8 (OCU); RF-4E: 58 (recce).
Tornado: 165 (103 FGA, 22 OCU, 20 in trinational trg sqn, 20 reserve).
Alpha Jet: 193 (175 FGA, 18 OCU).
Transall C-160: 75 (tpt).
Boeing 707: 4 (special). Jetstar: 3 (special).
Hansa Jet: 13 (6 special, 7 ECM trg).
VFW-614: 3 (special). CL-601: 3 (special).
Do-28-D2: 60 (6 special, 54 liaison). T-37B: 35. T-38A: 41. P-149D: 34 (trg).
Helicopters:
UH-1D: 95 (91 liaison, 4 special).
Missiles:
SSM: 12 Pershing IA.
ASM: Maverick.
SAM: 532: 216 Nike Hercules, 216 Improved HAWK, 100 SHORAD.
(On order: Tornado FGA, 35 Tornado ECR, 4 CL-601 Challengerac; 14 Patriot (779 msls), 95 Roland SAM, 400 AGM-88A HARM msls, 500 MW-1 multi-purpose weapon systems.)

INTER-SERVICES STAFFS: 11,200.
(Ministry of Defence, Central Military Agencies, Central Medical Agencies.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Police (Ministry of Interior) 20,000: MOWAG SW-1/-2 APC; 2 P-149D, 1 Do-27 ac; BO-105M, 32 Alouette II, 13 UH-1D, 10 Bell 212, 22 Puma hel.
Coastguard: 1,000; 1 tug, 8 large, 5 small patrol vessels.

* Excl Berlin support costs, which amounted to DM DM 15.3 bn in 1986 and an estimated DM 15.8 bn in 1987.

  GREECE
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 209,000 (136,500 conscripts, 1,800 women).
Terms of service: Army 21, Navy 25, Air Force 23 months.
Reserves: some 404,000 (to age 50). Army some 350,000 (Field Army 227,000, Territorial Army 23,000,
   National Guard 100,000 (incl 5,000 reservists on 4-week trg)); Navy about 24,000; Air about 30,000.

ARMY: 165,500 (108,500 conscripts incl 1,400 women).
Field Army (142,500): 3 Military Regions.
4 corps, 1 special comd HQ.
1 armd div (2 armd bdes, 1 arty regt).
1 mech div (2 mech, 1 armd bdes, 1 arty regt).
11 inf divs (3 inf, 1 armd bdes, 1 arty regt).
1 para-cdo div (1 para, 1 cdo, 1 marine regts, 3 cdo, 3 lt arty bns).
5 indep armd bdes (each 2 armd, 1 mech inf, 1 arty bns).
2 indep mech bdes.
4 armd recce bns.
12 fd arty bns.
8 AA arty bns.
2 SAM bns with Improved HAWK.
3 army aviation bns.
1 indep aviation coy.
Equipment:
Tks: 1,783: 359 M-47, 1,125 M-48 (300 -A2, 600 -A3, 225 -A5), 193 AMX-30, 106 Leopard 1A3. lt: 210: 186 M-24, 24 M-41A3.
AFV: recce: 288: 180 M-8, 108 M-20 armd cars. MICV: 200AMX-10P. APC: 1,850: 300 Leonidas, 120 M-3 half-track, 430 M-59, 1,000 M-113.
Arty: 1,376: guns: 72: 155mm: 36 M-59, 175mm: 36 M-107 SP.
   how: 1,304: 105mm: 790: 180 M-56 pack, 324 M-101, 216 M-102, 70 M-52 SP; 155mm: 442: 54 M-44 SP, 240 M-114, 40 M-198, 108 M-109 SP;
   203mm: 72: 40 M-115, 32 M-110 SP.
   Mor: 81mm: M-1, EBO Type E-44, M-125A1 SP, M-4A1 (M-2/-3 APC) SP, AMX-10M-81 SP, Leonidas Gr W.I SP;
   107mm: M-2, M-30, M-84 SP (M-59 APC), M-106A1 SP; 120mm: EBO Type E-56, Leonidas Gr W.2 SP.
ATK: RCL: 90mm: 1,080 EM-67; 106mm: some 700 M-40A1.
   ATGW: 82 M-113A2 SP TOW, 14 M-901 Improved-TOW, SS-11, Cobra, TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm: RH-202 twin; 30mm: Artemis 30 twin; 40mm: incl M-42 twin SP; 75mm: M-51; 90mm: M-117/-118.
   SAM: 36 MIM-23B Improved HAWK (216 msls), 37 M-48 Chaparral, Redeye.
Avn: ac: 2 Super King Air, 2 Aero Commander, 1 DHC-2 Beaver, 50 U-17A.
   hel: 10 Bell AH-1 with TOW, 5 47E, 50 UH-1 (10 -D, 40 -H), 3 AB-204B, 43 AB-205A, 15 AB-206A, 1 AB-212, 1 A-109, 5 CH-47C
(On order: 216 M-48A2, 324 M-48A5 MBT; 292 Leonidas 2 APC; 36 M-901 Improved TOW SP ATGW (108 msls); 18 M-198 155mm how; some 60 Artemis 30 twin 30mm AA guns; 300 Milan ATGW.)
  
TerritorialArmy. 23,000 (incl 10,000 conscripts, 5,000 reservists on refresher trg).
3 Territorial, 17 Sub-Commands.
12 indep inf bdes (6 mountain).
4 armd bns.
  
National Guard: 100,000.
100 inf bns (mainly coastal defence).
100 lt arty btys.
Equipment:
It has been impossible to reconcile with confidence reports of equipment held respectively by the Territorial Army and the National Guard. Some may be identical to older items in the Field Army inventory; some no longer in that inventory may include the following:
Tks: 28 M-26; lt: 57 M-41A3.
AFV: recce: 60 M-20. APC: 380 M-2/-3.
Arty: gun/how: 88mm: 468 25-pdr (plus some 33 in store). how: 75mm: 108 M-116 pack; 155mm: M-114.
   Mor: 60mm; 81mm: M-1, M-4/-5, M-4A1 SP; 107mm: M-2.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: 900 M-18; 75mm: 396 M-20; 106mm: 420 M-40A1.

NAVY: 19,500 (12,000 conscripts incl 200 women); 14 armed hel.
Bases: Salamis, Patras, Mitilini, Thessaloniki, Souda Bay.
Subs: 10:
   8 209-class: 4 Glavkos (Type-1100), 4 Poseidon (Type-1200);
   2 US Guppy (trg).
Destroyers: 14:
   7 Gearing (6 with 1x8 ASROC, 1 with 1 SA-316 Alouette III hel);
   1 Sumner (facilities for 1 Alouette III hel);
   6 Fletcher.
Frigates: 7:
   2 Kortenaer each with 2x2 Harpoon SSM, Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 Phalanx 20mm AD, 2 AB-212 hel;
   4 US Cannon;
   1 FRG Rhein (depot ship, employed as frigate).
FAC(G): 16: 14 La Combattante II/III (8 with 4 MM-38 Exocet, 6 with 6 Penguin SSM); 2 L'Esterel with 4 SS-12 SSM;
FAC(T): 6 FRG Type 143.
Patrol craft: coastal: 10: 1 Scimitar, 9<: 4 Adamidis, 4 Panagopoulos, 1 other.
Minelayers: 2 (ex LSM-1).
Minesweepers, coastal: 14: 9 MSC-294, 5 US Adjutant.
Amph: LSD: 1, LST: 7, LSM: 5, LCT: 2, LCU: 6; smaller classes: 68.
Spt: 2 spt, 4 harbour tankers, 1 depot ship, 3 tpts.
ASW: 1 hel div: 3 sqns: 2 with 13 AB-212 (10 ASW, 3 ECM); 1 with 4 Alouette III (with ASM).
(On order: 5 4,400-ton LST, 2 tankers, 4 Phalanx 20mm AD, Artemis 30 twin 30mm gun systems.)

AIR FORCE: 24,000 (16,000 conscripts incl 200 women).
Tactical Air Force: 7 combat wings, 1 tpt wing.
FGA: 10 sqns: 3 with A-7H;
   3 with F-104G.
   2 with F-5A/B.
   2 with F-4E.
Ftr: 4 sqns: 1 with F-4E;
   1 with F-5A/B;
   2 with Mirage F-1CG.
Recce: 3 sqns: 1 with RF-84F, RF-4E;
   1 FGA/recce with RF-5A,
   1 with RF-104G/F-104G/TF-104G.
MR: 1 sqn with HU-16B Albatross.
Tpt: 3 sqns with C-130H Hercules, YS-11, N-2501 Noratlas, C-47 (DC-3), Do-28, Gulfstream.
Liaison: T-33A.
Tpt hel: 3 sqns with AB-205A, AB-206A, Bell 47G, UH-1D, AB-212, CH-47C Chinook.
AD: 1 bn with Nike Hercules SAM (36 launchers); 20 btys with Skyguard/Sparrow SAM, twin 35mm guns.
Air Training Command:
Trg: 4 sqns. 1 with T-41A; 1with T-37B/C; 2 with T-2E.
Hel: 2 NH-300.
Equipment: 395 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
A-7H: 57.46 (FGA); 6 (reserve); TA-7H: 5 (FGA).
F-104: 88. F-104G: 60 (FGA); 8 (reserve); TF-104G: 8 (FGA); RF-104G: 12 (recce).
F-5: 84: -A: 62 (36 FGA, 18 ftr; 8 reserve) -B: 8 (6 FGA, 2 ftr); RF-5A: 14 (recce).
F-4: 62. -E: 50 (30 FGA, 16 ftr; 4 reserve); RF-4E: 12 (recce).
Mirage F-1GC: 38 (34 trg; 4 reserve).
F-84F: 66: (32 trg; 18 reserve); RF-84: 16 (recce).
HU-16B: 12 (8 MR; 4 being updated). C-130H: 12 (tpt). YS-11-200: 6 (tpt). C-47: 12 (tpt). Noratlas: 20 (tpt). Gulfstream I: 1 (VIP tpt).
T-33A: 59 (liaison). T-41: 20 (trg). T-37: 25. T-2: 36.
Helicopters:
AB-205A: 12 (tpt). AB-206A: 3 (tpt). Bell 47G: 17 (tpt). AB-212: 4 (tpt). CH-47C: 8 (tpt). NH-300: 2 (trg).
Missiles: AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder, Falcon, R-550 Magic. ASM: Maverick, Bullpup.
   SAM: 36 Nike Hercules (64 msls); 20 btys RIM-7 Sparrow (300 msls).
(On order: 40 Mirage 2000, 40 F-16 (plan to buy 20 more) ac; 18 NH-300 hel; Artemis twin 30mm AA guns.)

Forces Abroad: Cyprus: 3,000. 1 inf bn (950), 1 cdo bn (750), spt elms (550); officers/NCOs seconded to Greek-Cypriot forces (750).

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie: 25,000; MOWAG Roland, 15 TJR-416 APC.
Coastguard and Customs: 4,000; some 100 patrol craft, 2 Cessna Cutlass ac.
(On order: 10 OL-76 patrol craft).

   ITALY
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 388,300 (266,200 conscripts).
Terms of service. Army and Air Force 12, Navy 18 months.
Reserves: 769,000. Army 520,000 (obligation to age 45), immediate mobilization 240,000.
   Navy 221,000 (to age 38 for men, variable for officers to 73). Air 28,000 (to age 25 or 45 (specialists)).

ARMY: 265,000 (215,000 conscripts).
3 Corps HQ (1 alpine):
   1 with 4 mech, 3 armd, 1 hy spt bde.
   1 with 4 mech, 1 armd, 1 mot bdes.
   1 with 5 alpine bdes (1 reserve).
2 indep mech bdes - peninsula defence.
2 indep mot bdes - peninsula defence.
Rapid Intervention Force (FIR):
   1 AB bde (incl 1 Special Ops Force bn), 1 mot bde, 1 Marine bn (see Navy), 1 hel unit (Army), 1 air tpt unit (Air Force).
2 amph bns.
1 hy corps spt bde (1 Lance SSM, 3 hy arty, 3 Improved HAWK SAM bns).
Aviation:
4 wings org in sqns and fits (fit usually has 6 ac/hel):
   9 lt ac fits with SM-1019/Cessna O-1E.
   10 hel sqns, 14 fits with AB-206.
   Multi-role: 17 hel sqns: 1 with AB-204B; 15 with AB-205; 1 with AB-212B.
   Med tpt: 4 hel sqns with CH-47 Chinook.
   Other: 1 trg, 1 repair units.
Equipment:
Tks: 1,720: 500 M-47 (incl 100 in reserve); 300 M-60A1, 920 Leopard.
APC: 4,365: 450 M-106, 2,425 M-113 (incl 300 with TOW), 220 M-548, 220 M-577, 1,050 VCC1/-2.
Arty: 1,110: how: 105mm: 320 Model 56 pack; 155mm: 767: incl 164 FH-70 towed, 256 M-109G/L SP; 203mm: 23 M-110 SP.
   SSM: 6 Lance.
   (In reserve - 18 M-107 155mm SP, 36 M-115 203mm how.)
   Mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: APILAS. RCL: 57mm; some 80mm; 106mm (to retire). ATGW: Cobra, SS-11, TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm; 40mm: 230. SAM: 60 Improved HAWK, Stinger.
Avn: ac: 106: 73 SM-1019, 33 O-1E (target acquisition/utility).
   hel: 21 A-47G/J, 5 A-109 Hirundo, 18 AB-204B (multi-role), 100 AB-205A, 140 AB-206A/A1 multi-role/utility, 14 AB-212, 6 AB-412,
   24 CH-47C Chinook recce/tgt acquisition/utility/tpt.
(On order: M-109 155mm how; 20 FIROS 6 51mm MRL; 800 Folgore RCL; APILAS RL; Milan ATGW; 10 AB-412, 60 A-129 Mangusta hel.)

NAVY: 50,300, incl 1,500 air arm, 750 special forces (21,200 conscripts).
Bases: La Spezia, Taranto, Ancona, Brindisi, Augusta, Messina, La Maddalena, Cagliari, Naples, Venice.
Subs: 9: 4 Sauro, 4 Toti, 1 US Tang.
Carrier (hel): 2:
   1 Garibaldi with 14 SH-3D hel, 4 Teseo (Otomat Mk 2) SSM, 2 Albatros/Aspide SAM; (to get AV-8 ac).
   1 Vittorio Veneto with 9 AB-212 ASW hel, 4 Teseo SSM, 1x2 Terrier/Standard SAM.
Cruisers: 2 Andrea Doria with 1x2 Terrier SAM, 4 AB-212 ASW hel.
Destroyers: 4 GW:
   2 Audace with 4 Teseo SSM, 1 Standard, 1 Albatross/Aspide SAM; 2 AB-212 ASW hel.
   2 Impavido with 1 Standard SAM.
Frigates: 14:
   8 Maestrale with 4 Teseo SSM, 1x8 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 2 AB-212 hel;
   4 Lupo with 4 7eyeo SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 AB-212 hel;
   2 Alpino with 2 AB-212 hel.
Corvettes: 11:
   4 Minerva CLG with 1x8 Albatros SAM;
   4 De Cristofaro;
   3 Albatros.
Hydrofoils: 7 Sparviero with 2 Teseo SSM.
MCMV: 23: minesweepers, ocean: 4 Storione; coastal: 7 Agave (retiring). minehunters, coastal: 4 Lerici, 1 Agave, 7 Mandorlo.
Amph: LPD: 1 San Giorgio. LST: 2 US De Soto County. LCM: 15. LCVP: 5.
Spt: 2 Stromboli replenishment tankers, 1 spt ship, 5 coastal tpt.

Special Forces (Comando Subacque Incursori):
6 gps: 1 raiding ops; 1 underwater ops; 1 special ops; 1 marine bn; 1 school; 1 research.
Equipment: 30 VCC-1, 10 LVTP-7 APC, 61 81mm mor, 8 106mm RCL, 6 Milan ATGW.

NAVAL AIR ARM (1,500); 83 armed hel.
ASW: 5 hel sqns with 36 SH-3D Sea King, 62 AB-212.
Trg: 20 AB-204 hel.
ASM: Marte Mk 2.
(On order: 2 mod Sauro subs, 2 Audace destroyers, 4 Minerva corvettes with Albatros multi-role weapon system, 8 Gaeta (mod Lerici) MCMV, 5 LPD (in 1987).

AIR FORCE: 73,000 (30,000 conscripts).
FGA: 6 FGA/recce sqns:
   3 with Tornado;
   1 with F-104S (being modernized);
   2 with G-91Y.
Tac: 3 sqns:
   1 lt attack with MB-339;
   2 lt attack/recce with G-91R/R1/R1A (to be replaced).
Ftr: 7 sqns with F-104S.
Recce: 2 sqns with F/RF-104G.
MR: 2 sqns with Atlantic (Navy-assigned; to be modernized).
ECM: 1 ECM/recce sqn with G-222VS and PD-808.
Calibration: 1 navigation-aid calibration sqn with G-222, PD-808.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 2 with G-222; 1 with C-130H.
Comms: sqns with Gulfstream III, Mystere-Falcon 50, P-166, SIAI-208M, PD-808, MB-326, DC-9 ac; SH-3D Sea King hel.
Trg: 1 OCU with TF-104G; 1 det (Cottesmore, UK) with Tornado; sqns with G-91, MB-339A, SF-260M ac; AB-204B, AB-47 hel.
SAR hel: 1 sqn and 3 dets with HH-3F. 6 dets with AB-212.
AD: 8 SAM groups with Nike Hercules; 4 SAM btys with Spada.
Equipment: 460 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Tornado: 64 (54 FGA, 10 in tri-national trg sqn).
   F-104: 156. -S: 102 (18 FGA, 84 ftr); RF-104G: 30 (recce); TF-104G: 24 (OCU).
   G-91: 142. -Y: 36 (FGA); -R: 36 (lt attack/recce); -T: 70 (trg).
   MB-339: 78 (15 tac, 63 trg). MB-326: 30 (liaison).
   Atlantic: 14 (MR).
   C-130: 10 (tpt). G-222: 38 (32 tpt, 4 calibration; -VS: 2 ECM). DC-9: 2 liaison.
   Gulfstream III: 2 (VIP tpt). Mystere-Falcon 50: 2 (VIP tpt). P-166: 22: -M: 16 (liaison); -DL3: 6 (liaison). PD-808: 14 (6 ECM, calibration, 8 liaison).
   SF-260: 30 (trg). SIAI-208: 32 (liaison).
Helicopters:
   HH-3F: 19 (SAR). SH-3D: 2 (liaison). AB-204: 10 (trg). AB-212: 25 (SAR). AB-47: 20 (trg).
Missiles: AAM: AIM-7E Sparrow, AIM-9B/L Sidewinder (Improved). ASM: Kormoran.
   SAM: 96 Nike Hercules, Spada.
(On order: 20 Tornado; 231 AMX FGA; 20 MB-339; SF-260M trg ac; 11 AB-212, 10 HH-3F. 50 NH-500 hel; AGM-65 Maverick ASM; Spada SAM systems, Aspide AAM.)

Forces Abroad:
Egypt (Sinai MFO) (90); 3 minesweepers. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (51).

PARA-MILITARY:
Carabinieri 90,000: 1 mech bde: 13 bns, 1 AB bn, 2 cav sqns;
   37 M-47 MBT; Fiat 6616, 80 M-6, M-8 armd cars; 470 Fiat 242/18AD, 240 M-113 APC; 23 AB-47, 2 A-109, 5 AB-205, 23 AB-206 hel.
Ministry of Interior: Public Security Guard 80,372: 11 mobile units;
   40 Fiat 6614 APC, 3 Partenavia P-64B ac; 1 AB-47, 12 A-109, 18 AB-206, 8 AB-212 hel.
Treasury Department: Finance Guards 53,252; 9 A-109, 68 Nardi-Hughes 500M hel; 282 patrol craft.

* Excl budget for Carabinieri.

   LUXEMBOURG
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 630.
Terms of service: voluntary, minimum 3 years.

ARMY: 630.
1 lt inf bn.
1 indep coy.
Equipment:
APC: 5 Commando.
ATK: RL: LAW. ATGW: TOW some SP (Hummer).

AIR FORCE: (Luxembourg has no air force of its own, but for legal purposes NATO's E-3A AEW ac have Luxembourg registration.)
1 sqn with 18 E-3A Sentry (NATO Standard), 2 Boeing 707 (trg).
(On order: 1 Boeing 707).

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 470.
  

   NETHERLANDS
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 108,100 (incl 3,950 Royal Military Constabulary, 1,050 Inter-Service Organization); 1,600 women; 50,275 conscripts.
Terms of service: Army 14-16, Navy and Air Force 14-17 months.
Reserves: 175,400 (men to age 35, NCOs to 40, officers to 45).
   Army 149,700 (some - at the end of their conscription period - on short leave, immediate recall), Home Guard (4,300);
   Navy some 19,700 (7,000 on immediate recall); Air 6,000 (immediate recall).

ARMY: 68,000 (43,000 conscripts), though see Reserves.
1 Corps HQ, 3 mech div HQ.
2 armd bdes.
4 mech inf bdes.
1 SSM bn with Lance.
3 AD bns.
3 hel sqns (Air Force manned).
Reserves: 1 armd, 2 mech inf bdes, corps troops and 1 indep inf bde would be completed by call-up of reservists;
   some inf bdes could be mobilized for territorial defence.
Home Guard: 3 sectors; inf weapons.
Equipment:
Tks: 913: 468 Leopard 1A4, 445 Leopard 2.
APC: 744 M-113, 718 YP-408 (to retire), 1,716 YPR-765.
Arty: how: 480: 105mm: 42 M-101; 155mm: 140 M-114 (81 to be mod), 222 M-109A2; 203mm: 76 M-110A2SP.
   SSM: 6 Lance.
   Mor: 81mm: 154; 107mm: 195; 120mm: 152.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 57 Carl Gustav; 106mm: 185. ATGW: 436 Dragon, 326 TOW.
AD: guns: 35mm: 95; Gepard SP; 40mm: 54 L-70 towed. SAM: 474 Stinger.
Avn: hel: 64 SA-316 Alouette III (to be replaced), 28 BO-105.
Marine: 1 tk tpt, 3 coastal, 15 river patrol boats.
(On order: 424 YPR-765 APC; 21 MLRS MRL.)

NAVY: 17,100, incl naval air arm and marines (1,650 conscripts).
Bases: Den Helder, Flushing, Curasao (Antilles).
Subs: 5: 2 Zwaardyis, 2 Potvis, 1 Dolfijn.
Frigates: 16, all with 8 Harpoon SSM:
   2 Tromp (flagships) with 1 SM-1 Standard, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 hel;
   2 Van Heemskerk AD with 1 SM-1 (MR) Standard, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1 hel;
   10 Kortenaer ASW with 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1-2 Lynx hel;
   2 Van Speijk ASW with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx hel.
MCMV: 24: 11 Dokkum coastal, 13 Alkmaar.
Amph: LCA/LCVP: 12<.
Misc: 2 Poolster spt, 3 survey (2 Buyskes, 1 Tydemari).

NAVAL AIR ARM: (1,378);
MR: 3 sqns (1 trg) with P-3C Orion II, F-27 (see Air Force).
ASW hel: 1 sqn with Lynx SH-14B/C.
SAR hel: 1 sqn with Lynx UH-14A.
Equipment: 13 combat ac, 17 armed hel.
Aircraft: P-3: 13 (MR).
Helicopters:
   Lynx: 22.
   SH-14: 17. -B: 9 (ASW); -C: 8 (ASW). UH-14A: 5 (SAR).

MARINES: (2,800).
2 amph cdo gps.
1 mountain/arctic warfare coy.
(Reserve): 1 amph cdo gp.
(On order: 4 Zeeleeuw SS; 8 Karel Doorman frigates; 2 Alkmaar MCMV, 10 Goalkeeper AA systems, 25 Harpoon SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 18,000 (5,000 conscripts).
FGA: 5 sqns:
   3 with F-16A/B;
   2 with NF-5A (converting to F-16).
Ftr: 2 FGA/ftr sqns with F-16A/B.
Recce: 1 sqn with F-16A.
MR: 2 F-27 (assigned to Navy).
Tpt: 1 sqn with F-27.
OCU: 2 sqns: 1 with NF-5B; 1 with F-16B(temporarily integrated with 1 F-16A ftr sqn).
SAR hel: 1 fit with SA-316 Alouette III.
AD: SAM: 12 sqns: 10 with Improved HAWK (6 in Germany); 2 with Patriot; 100 Stinger.
   guns: 25 VL4/41 Flycatcher radar, 40 L-70 40mm systems.
Equipment: 188 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   NF-5: 70. -A: 49 (FGA), -B: 27 (OCU).
   F-16: 142. -A: 112 (FGA, ftr); -B: 30 (OCU).
   F-27: 14 (12 tpt, 2 MR).
Helicopters:
   Alouette: 4 (SAR).
Missiles:
   SAM: 36 Improved HAWK missiles, 33 Nike Hercules III, 5x4 Patriot, 100 Stinger.
(On order: 56 F-16A/B FGA ac; 16 Patriot SAM launchers, 64 msls.)

INTER-SERVICE ORGANIZATION: 1,050 (250 conscripts).

Forces Abroad:
Germany: 5,500. 1 armd bde, 1 recce, 1 engr bns, spt elements.
Egypt (Sinai MFO): 105: 1 sigs det.
Netherlands Antilles: 1 frigate, 1 amph combat det, 1 MR det with 2 F-27MPA ac.
Iceland: 30: 1 P-3C Orion (at Keflavik).

PARA-MILITARY: 8,700:
Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee): 3,950 (375 conscripts);
   3 'divs' comprising 9 districts with 87 'bdes'.
Civil Defence: (Corps Mobiele Colonnes): 4,750: 22,000 on mobilization; disaster relief under Army command.
   Civil Defence (Corps Mobiele Cobmesy). 22,000 on mobilization; disaster relief under Army command.

   NORWAY
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: some 36,900 (23,000 conscripts) incl Joint Services orgs, Coastguard, Home Guard and Civil Defence permanent staffs. Civilian support services: 12,000.
Terms of service:Army, Navy coast arty, Air AD elms, Home Guard 12 months plus 3 to 5 refresher training periods; Navy, Air Force 15 months.
Reserves: first-line: 284,600; obligation to 45 (conscripts); (officers: reserves: 55; regulars: 60).
   Army: 146,000
   Navy: 26,000.
   Air: 27,900.
   Home Guard 84,700. (See Para-Military below.)
Annual refresher trg: some 85,000 (Army: 20,000, Navy: 3,000, Air Force: 2,000, Home Guard: 60,000) do 1-3 weeks (conscript),
   some 17,000 officers and NCOs do 1-4 weeks to age 44 and may volunteer for extension.
Second-line reserves: 65,000 (all services).
Total mobilized military strength (24-72 hours), all services incl Home Guard, some second-line reserves, some 320,000.
War strength, full national mobilization, incl Civil Defence, planned some 435,000.
Civilian resources total mobilization obligation: services, supplies, eqpt incl: engr eqpt, hy tpt veh, 50-60 tpt ac, 80-100 med/hy hel, 220 vessels as required.

ARMY: 19,000 (13,200 conscripts).
On mobilization some 165,000 (+ e 41,000 second-line).
4 Land, 5 Regional, 16 subordinate commands.
North Norway:
   1 bde: 2 inf, 1 tk, 1 SP fd arty, 1 engr bns, 1 AA bty, spt units.
   1 border garrison bn.
   1 reinforced inf bn task force: inf, tk coys, fd arty, AA btys.
South Norway.
   1 inf bn (Royal Guard).
   Indep units.
Reserves: 42 cadre units for mobilization:
   3 div HQ, 3 armd, 4 mech, 6 lt inf bdes, 5 mech, 23 inf, 7 arty bns; 55 indep inf coys, tk sqns, arty btys, engr coys, sigs units, spt.
Equipment:
Tks: 80 Leopard 1, 42 M-48A5. lt: 70 NM-116 (M-24/90).
AFV: MICV: NM-135 (M-113/20mm) some NM-142 (M-113/TOW-2). APC: 150 M-113, some 200 Bv-206 over-snow veh.
Arty: 405: how: 105mm: 120 M-101; 155mm: 285: M-114: 155 (48 to be mod), 130 M-109SP. Mor: 81mm (some SP), 107mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18; 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: M-40A1. RL: 66mm: M-72. ATGW: TOW-2.
AD: guns: 20mm: FK20-2; 40mm: L60/70. SAM: 108 RBS-70.
Avn: lt ac: 20 O-1E, 8 L-18C.
(On order: 36 M-48A5 MBT; 16 M-113, some 44 NM-142/rOJFII APC/MICV; some 1,800 Bv-206 over-snow veh; some 300 TOW II ATGW; RBS-70 SAM.)

NAVY: 7,000, incl 2,000 coast artillery (4,500 conscripts).
On mobilization 33,000 (+ 6 9,000 second-line).
8 Naval/Coast defence commands.
Bases: Horten, Haakonsvern (Bergen), Ramsund, Olavsvern (Tromso).
Subs: 14 Kobben (Type 207) (5 to retire, 9 to be reconditioned of which 3 for Denmark).
Frigates: 5 Oslo with 6 Penguin Mk 2 SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x6 Terne ASW.
Corvettes: 2 Sleipner with 1x6 Terne ASW.
FAC(G): 38 (20 with Penguin Mk 2 SSM): 18 Storm, 14 Hauk (6 msls); 6 Snogg (4 msls).
Minelayers: 10: 2 Vidar, 1 Borgen, 7 Sauda (US MSC-60).
Minehunter: 1 Tana; diving tenders: 5.
Amph: LCT: 5 Reineysund.
Spt: depot/trg ship: 1 Horten; coastal tpts: 7. trg: 2; patrol vessels: 1; harbour tpts: 12.
Coast defence: some 30 fortresses: 50 arty btys: 75mm; 105mm; 120mm: ERSTA; 127mm; 150mm guns.
   Some controllable mine and torpedo btys. Local def: mor, RCL, ATGW.
SAR/recce: 1 hel sqn with 6 Westland Lynx (coastguard).
(On order: 6 Via (Type 210) SS; 6 ERSTA 120mm coast defence turret guns.)

AIR FORCE: 9,100 (5,300 conscripts).
On mobilization, 37,000 (+ 6 10,000 second-line).
FGA: 5 sqns:
   4 (1 OCU) with F-16;
   1 (OCU) with F-5A/B.
MR: 1 sqn with P-3B Orion (2 assigned to coastguard).
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 withC-130; 1 with DHC-6 Twin Otter ac, UH-1B hel.
Trg: MFI-15 Safari.
Hel: SAR: 1 sqn with Sea King Mk 43. coastguard: 1 sqn with Lynx Mk 86. liaison: 2 utility sqns with UH-1B.
AD: 5 lt AA arty bns; 1 SAM bn (4 btys).
Equipment: 93 combat ac (+14 reserve), no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   F-5A/B: 30: 16 (OCU); 14 (reserve).
   F-16: 67: -A: 57 (FGA), -B: 10 (FGA).
   P-3B: 7 (MR).
   C-130H: 6 (tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20C: 3 (EW). DHC-6: 4 (tpt). Safari: 18 (trg).
Helicopters:
   Sea King: 10 (SAR). Lynx Mk 86: 6 (Coastguard). UH-1B: (2 tpt, 26 utility).
Missiles: AAM: AIM-9L/N Sidewinder.. ASM: CVR (AGM-12B Bullpup).
Air Defence: Guns: 40mm: 32 L-60, 64 L-70. SAM: 128 MIM-14B Nike Hercules.
(On order: 22 F-16A/B, 4 P-3C MR (to replace 5 P-3B), 4 Safari trg ac; 18 Bell 412 hel (to replace UH-1B), (lease) 54 Improved HAWK launchers and 162 msls (6 btys; 1987); Penguin Mk 3 ASM.)

JOINT SERVICES ORGS: 300.

Forces Abroad: 884:
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 864; 1 inf bn, 1 service coy, plus HQ personnel. Other UN: 20.

PARA-MILITARY:
Home Guard: Peacetime: 330 military, 190 civilians. War: 85,000 (incl 5,300 Second-line reserves).
   Army: 74,700; 18 districts each divided in to 2-6 sub districts, 500 areas (500-1,500 men) and sub-areas (100-300 men).
   Indep coys and pis. Carl Gustav RCL.
   Navy: 7,000; 8 Tjeld FAC(T), 2 Kvalsund LCT, 400 fishing vessels.
   Air Force: 3,000; 2 bns (9 btys), 2 indep btys, lt AA; 72 L-60 40mm guns (being replaced by 20mm).
Coastguard: 680: 375 Navy, 139 Air Force, 166 civilians. 13 patrol vessels (3 Nordkapp fitted for 6 Penguin Mk 2 SSM, 3 Nornen/Farm, 7 chartered);
   2 P-3B Orion ac, 6 Lynx hel (Air Force manned), 7 armed fishery protection vessels.
Civil Defence: Permanent staff: some 500; mobilization strength 115,000, incl industrial: 33,000; railways: 2,000.
Regional: 54 Districts, 14 mobile columns. 108 local units.

   PORTUGAL
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 66,500 (38,850 conscripts): see Army.
Terms of service: Army 16, Navy 24, Air Force 21-24 months.
Reserves: 190,000 (all services) (obligation: men to age 45; officers to 70).

ARMY: 39,000 (30,000 conscripts, 3 intakes a year, 4 months alternating service).
6 geographical Commands (4 military region, 2 island).
1 combined arms bde.
2 cav regts.
11 inf regts, each 1 armd, 3 indep inf bns.
1 special ops bde: 1 cdo regt, 4 spt bns.
2 fd, 1 AA,1 coast arty regts.
2 engr regts.
1 sigs regt.
1 military police regt.
Equipment:
Tks: 80: 20 M-47, 60 M-48A5.
AFV: recce: 30 Saladin, 63 AML-60/-90 lt armd, 32 Ferret Mk 4. APC: 105 M-113 (incl -A2 TOW), 18 M-577A2 (81mm mor), 85 Chaimite.
Arty: guns: 140mm: 24 5.5-in. how: 118: 105mm: 72: 36 M-101A1, 18 M-101/L, 18 pack; 155mm: 46: 6 M-109A2 SP, 40 M-114.
   coast: 150mm: 27; 152mm; 234mm.
   Mor: 81mm; 107mm: 20.
ATK: RCL: 90mm: 90; 106mm: 15. ATGW: 45 TOW, 36 SS-11, 38 Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm: 10 M-163A1 Vulcan SP, 30 Rh-202; 40mm: 20 Bofors L-60. SAM: Blowpipe.
DEPLOYMENT: 3 inf regts, 2 coast arty, 2 AA btys in Azores and Madeira.

NAVY: 14,150 incl marines (4,350 conscripts).
Bases: Lisbon (Alfeite), Faro.
Subs: 3 Albacora (Fr Daphne).
Frigates: 16: 4 Belo, 2 Silva, 4 Andrade, 6 Coutinho.
Patrol craft: 19: large: 10 Cacine, coastal: 2 Aleixo, 6 Albatroz, 4 Sao Roque ex MCM, 1 other.
Amph: LCT: 2. LCM: 10.
Spt: 1 tanker.
(On order: 3 Meko-200 frigates.)

MARINES: (2,500) (1,200 conscripts).
3 bns (2 inf, 1 police), spt units.
Equipment: Chaimite APC, mor, amph craft.

AIR FORCE: 13,350 incl 2,000 para (4,500 conscripts).
1 combat command, 5 administrative wings.
FGA: 4 sqns:
   2 with A-7P;
   1 with G-91R3/T3; 1 with G-91R4/T3.
Recce: 1 sqn with C-212B.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with C-130; 1 with C-212.
SAR: 3 sqns: 1 with C-212 ac; 2 with SA-330 Puma hel.
Liaison: 4 sqns: 2 ac with Reims-Cessna FTB-337G; 2 utility hel with SA-318 Alouette II.
OCU: 1 with T-38 Talon, 1 with T-33.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with C-212 ac, SA-316 Alouette III hel; 1 with T-37C; 1 with Chipmunk.
Para: 1 para bde (3 bns), Milan.
Equipment: 135 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   A-7: 44. -7P: 38 (FGA); TA-7P: 6 (trg).
   G-91: 47. -R3: 19 (FGA); -R4: 20 (FGA);-T1: 8 (trg).
   T-38: 12 (OCU). T-33: 18 (OCU)
   C-212: 22. -A: 18 (12 tpt/SAR, 4 OCU, 2 ECM trg); -B: 4 (survey).
   C-130: 5 (MR/SAR, tpt). T-37: 24 (trg). Cessna 337: 32 (liaison; 16 COlN-capable, 8 recce-capable). Chipmunk: 33 (trg).
Helicopters: Puma: 11 (SAR/tpt). Alouette: 42. II: 6 (liason); III: 36 (trg, utility).
(On order: 3 C-130 tpt ac; 12 A-109 hel (4 with TOW).)

PARA-MILITARY:
National Republican Guard 14,600; Commando Mk III APC.
Public Security Police 15,300.
Border Security Guard: 7,400.

* Incl military aid from the FRG.

   SPAIN
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 325,000 (209,000 conscripts) (to be reduced).
Terms of service, volunteers 16 months, conscripts 12 months.
Reserves: 1,085,000 (all services) (to age 38 (men)).

ARMY: 230,000 (165,000 conscripts);
Plan META, a modernization and reorganization programme, is in progress incl strength reduction. Data is subject to change.
7 Military Regions (Regional Operational Commands), to be 6 in 1988; 2 Overseas Commands.
   1 armd div (1 armd, 1 mech bde).
   1 mech div (2 mech bdes).
   1 mot div (1 mech, 2 mot bdes).
   2 mountain divs (each 2 bdes).
   2 territorial defence bdes (to be disbanded).
   7 inf regts.
   2 armd cav regts; 1 lt cav gp.
   6 mixed arty regts; 1 coast arty gp.
   2 lt AA gp.
   2 engr regts (incl sigs bns); 6 bns combat engrs.
   1 Spanish Legion (8,500, reducing): 3 regts, spt units (overseas forces), 1 depot regt, 1 Special ops gp (incl 1 mot bn, 1 lt cav gp, spt tps).
   6 special ops gps (1 each Military Region).
General Reserve Force:
   1 armd cav bde.
   1 airportable bde (3 bns).
   1 para bde (3 bns).
   1 AD msl bde (incl 1 HAWK SAM gp, 1 Nike Hercules bty).
   1 arty bde (1 locating, 1 fd rocket, 1 lt AA regts).
   1 mixed arty regt; 1 coast arty regt.
   1 ATK regt.
   5 AA arty regts.
Special Task Units:
   5 engr (2 railway) regts.
   1 sigs regt.
Independent Units:
   Army HQ inf gp.
   Royal Guard Regt (incl inf, naval, air force coys and escort cav sqn).
Army Aviation (FAMET): 40 armed hel.
   HQ with 1 hel, 1 spt, 1 trg sqns.
   1 attack bn.
   1 tpt bn (1 med, 1 hy coys).
   3 utility units.
Equipment:
Tks: 843: 299 AMX-30 (150 to be mod), 380 M-47E (some 300 to be mod), 164 M-48A5E. lt: 127 M-41.
AFV: MICV: 510 BMR-600. recce: 240: 60 AML-60, 100 VEC, 80 AML-90. APC: 1,196 M-113.
Arty: guns: 200: 122mm: 188 122/46 towed; 175mm: 12 M-107 SP.
   coast: 88mm: 200 preserve); 152.4mm: 190 6-in.; 203mm: 24; 305mm: some 14 12-in.; 381mm: some 15 15-in.
   how: 1,078: 105mm: 858: 810 M-26 and M-56 pack, 48 M-108 SP; 155mm: 192: 84 M-114, 12 M-44, 96 M-109A SP;
   203mm: 28 8-in., 24 M-115, 4 M-55 SP.
   MRL: 28: 140mm: 12 Teruel; 216mm: 16 L-21.
   Mor: 1,200: 81mm; 107mm; 120mm: 400.
ATK: RCL: 106mm: 500. RL: 88.9mm: 42 M-65; 90mm: C-90C. ATGW: 50 Milan, 50 Cobra 18 Dragon, HOT, 12 TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm: GAI-BOI; 35mm: 64 GDF-002 twin; 40mm: 260 L-70; 90mm: 90 MA.
   SAM: 9 Nike Hercules, 24 Improved HAWK, some Roland, some Skyguard/Aspide.
Avn: hel: 69 HU-8/-10B (UH-1B/H), 70 HA-15 (BO-105; 10 with 20mm guns, 28 with HOT), 5 AB-206A, 4 AB-212, 12 HR-12B (OH-58B),
   18 HT-17 (CH-47C Chinook).
Marine: small cargo tpts.
(On order: (?145) VEC recce, 650 BMR-600 MICV; SB 155/39 155mm how, 1,100 C-90C 90mm RL, 540 TOW, 250 Milan, 150 HOT ATGW; 18 AS-332, 28 AB-412, 18 OH-58A hel; 18 Roland SAM launchers (500 msls); 13 Skyguard/Aspide SAM launchers (100 msls).)
DEPLOYMENT:
Regional Operational Commands: 7: Central, Southern, Levante, East and West Pyrenees, North.
Ceuta and Melilla: 21,000;
   2 armd cav, 2 Spanish Legion, 2 mixed arty regts; 2 lt AA regts (bns), 2 engr, 3 Regulares inf regts, 2 special ops gps, 1 coast arty gp.
Overseas Forces Comds: 2.
Balearic Islands: 5,800; 3 inf, 2 coast/AA regts; 1 engr bn; 1 lt cav gp; 1 special ops gp.
Canary Islands: 10,000; 2 inf regts (1 cadre); 1 Spanish Legion regt (2 bns), 2 coast/AA arty regts; 1 engr gp (2 bns); 2 special sea coys.

NAVY: 62,500, incl marines (44,000 conscripts).
9 Commands (Fleet, Naval Air, Submarine, Mine Warfare, Marines, 4 Naval Region HQ (Canaries, Cantabria, Mediterranean, Straits)).
Bases: Ferrol (Galicia), Cadiz (Puntales), Rota, Cartagena, Palma de Majorca (HQ), Las Palmas (Canaries).
Subs: 8: 4 Agosta, 4 Daphne.
Carriers: 2:
   1 Principe (20 ac: 6-8 AV-8B ac, 6-8 Sea King, 4-8 AB-212 hel. Trials, in service 1988).
   1 Dedalo (9 AV-8A, 24 hel).
Destroyers: 9:
   1 de Lauria;
   5 US Gearing with 1 ASROC, 1 Hughes 500 hel;
   3 US Fletcher (1 to retire).
Frigates: 12:
   1 Santa Maria (US FFG-7) with 16 Harpoon/24 Standard SSM/SAM, 2 Sea Hawk (LAMPS III) hel;
   5 Baleares (F-70) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 16 Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;
   6 Descubierta (F-30) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow/Aspide SAM.
Corvettes: 4 Atrevida (1 to retire).
FAC(P): 12: 6 Lazaga, 6 Barcelo.
Patrol craft, large: 18 (3 ex-minesweepers); coastal: 38; inshore: 23<.
MCMV, ocean: 4 US Aggressive; coastal: 8 Jucar.
Amph: LSD: 1. LST: 3. LCT: 6. LCU: 2. LCM: 12.
Tpts: 2 (force flagships); 1 cargo, 1 ocean, 12 harbour tankers.
  
NAVAL AIR:
FGA: 1 sqn with AV-8A Matador (Harrier II), TAV-8A.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 6 Comanche, Citation.
Hel: 5 sqns:
ASW: 2 sqns: 1 with Hughes 500; 1 with SH-3D/G Sea King (modified to SH-3H standard).
AEW: 1 unit with SH-3D (Searchwater radar) due to be operational in 1987.
tac: 1 sqn with AH-1G Cobra.
comd/recce: 1 sqn with AB-212.
trg: 1 sqn with Bell 47G.
Equipment: 10 combat ac, 40 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   AV-8: 10 (8 AV-8A; 2 TAV-8A) FGA.
   Comanche: 2 (liaison). Twin Comanche: 2 (liaison). Citation II: 2 (liaison).
Helicopters:
   AB-212: 12 (comd/recce). Sea King: 13 (10 ASW, 3 AEW). Hughes 500M: 11 (ASW). AH-1G: 4 (tac). Bell 47G: 8 (liaison).
  
MARINES: (11,500).
   1 marine regt (3,000): 2 inf, 1 spt, 1 log bns;
   3 arty btys.
   5 marine garrison regts.
Equipment:
Tks: 18 M-48S.
AFV: 17 Scorpion lt tks, 19 LVTP-7 amph.
Arty: how. 105mm: 12 OTO Melara M-56 pack, 8 M-52A1 SP. mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm: 72. RL: 66mm: M-72. ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
(On order: 1 lt carrier (1986), 4 FFG-7 frigates (1 in 1987), 4 32.2-m patrol craft, 20 15.9-m patrol vessels; 12 Bravo (AV-8B) ac, 18 SH-60B hel; 80 RGM-84A Harpoon SSM, SM-1 Standard SAM.)

AIR FORCE: 32,500 (to be reduced).
Combat Air Command (MACOM): 4 wings.
Ftr: 7 sqns:
   1 with EF-18 (F-18 Hornet);
   2 with F-4C/RF-4C Phantom;
   2 with Mirage IIIEE/EB;
   2 with Mirage F-1CE/BE.
Liaison: 1 fit with Do-27.
Tactical Air Command (MATAC): 2 wings.
FGA: 2 sqns with F-5A, F-5B, RF-5A.
MR: 1 sqn with P-3A Orion.
Liaison: 2 fits with Do-27.
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
Air Command, Canary Islands (MACAN):
FGA: 1 sqn with Mirage F-1EE.
Tpt: 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar, Do-27.
SAR: 1 sqn with F-27 ac, AS-332 Super Puma hel.
Transport Command (MATRA): 3 wings.
Tpt: 6 sqns with C-130, KC-130, T-7 (CASA 207), C-212, DHC-4 Caribou.
Liaison: Do-27, C-127 (licence-built Do-27).
Training Command (MAPER):
OCU: 2 sqns with F-5B.
Trg: ac: 14 sqns with Piper (Aztec, Navajo), Beech (Bonanza, Baron), C-101 Aviojet, C-212, T-34.
   hel: 2 sqns: 1 with AB-205A, UH-1H; 1 with Hughes 269A, Bell-47G/OH-13.
Air Force HQ Group (ACGA):
Tpt: 1 hel sqn with SA-330 Puma, AS-332, Super Puma.
VIP tpt: 1 ac sqn with DC-8-52, Falcon-50, Falcon-20.
SAR: 3 sqns: 1 with C-212 ac, AS-332 hel; 1 with C-212 ac, AS-332, SA-319 hel; 1 with AS-332 hel.
Spt: 2 sqns with CL-215, Do-27/C-127.
Trg: 1 sqn with C-101, C-212.
Liaison: 1 ac sqn with C-212, Do-27/C-127; 1 hel sqn with SA-330, AS-332.
Equipment: some 210 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   EF-18A/B: 24 (FGA, OCU).
   F-5: 52: -A: 15 (FGA); -B: 28 (6 FGA, 22 OCU); RF-5A: 9 (recce).
   Mirage: 90: F-1CE: 39 (ftr); F-1BE: 5 (ftr); F-1EE: 22 (ftr); IIIEE: 18 (ftr); IIIED: 6 (ftr).
   F-4C: 32 (ftr); RF-4C: 4 (recce).
   P-3A: 6 (MR).
   DC-8-52: 2 (tpt, to be replaced in 1987). C-130H: 11: 5 (tpt); KC-130H: 6 (tanker). CASA-207: 2 (tpt).
   C-212: 82 (38 tpt, 11 SAR, 5 liaison, 12 trg; -E: 14 trg; TR-12D: 2 EW).
   C-101: 85 (trg). CL-215: 14 (spt). DHC-4: 29 (tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20: 4 (calibration, tpt). Mystere-Falcon 50: 2 (tpt).
   F-27: 3 (SAR). Do-27/CASA C-127: 58 (liaison). T-34: 24 (trg). Other: 43 (Aztec 6, Navajo 2, Bonanza 29, Baron 6).
Helicopters:
   AB-205: 13 (trg). AB-206: 4 (trg). Alouette III: 6 (SAR). Puma: 6 (tpt). Super Puma: 12 (10 SAR, 2 tpt).
   Hughes 269A (TH-55A): 17 (trg). Bell 47/OH-13: 25 (trg).
(On order: 48 F-18 Hornet ftr, 4 P-3C Orion MR, 2 Boeing 707 tkr/tpt (to replace DC-8), 1 C-130H tpt, 40 T-35C Tamiz (Pilldn) trg ac; Super Sidewinder AAM; 20 AGM-84 Harpoon ASM; 90 AGM-88A HARM ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Guardia Civil: 63,500; 25 inf tercios (regts), 3 re-serve mobile comds, 1 railway security, 1 traffic security gps, 1 anti-terrorist special gp (UAR);
   BLR APC, 1 B-11T (BK-117) hel. (On order: 20 BO-105, 3 BK-117 hel.)
Policia Nacional: 47,000; 26 inf bns, 2 cav sqn gps, 3 cav tps, 1 special ops cdo gp (GEO), civil security gps.
Ministry of Transportation and Communications: Maritime Surveillance Force; some 54 patrol boats (10 320-ton, 4 32-m, 16-m), many armed.

   TURKEY
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 654,400 (575,800 conscripts).
Terms of service: 18 months.
Reserves: 951,000 to age 46 (all). Army 808,000, Navy 73,000, Air 70,000.

ARMY: 542,000 (497,000 conscripts). f
4 army HQ: 10 corps HQ.
2 mech divs.
14 inf divs.
6 indep armd bdes.
4 indep mech bdes.
11 indep inf bdes.
1 para bde.
2 cdo bdes.
5 coastal def bns.
Corps units: 10 tk, 30 hy/med, 20 AA arty bns.
Equipment:
Tks: some 3,700: 900 M-47 (700 in reserve, 200 in store), 1,085 M-48A1 (to be -A5), 1,615 M-48A5, some 77 Leopard 1A3. lt: (100 M-41 in store).
AFV: recce: (M-8in store). APC: 3,750: 700 M-59, 2,250 M-113, some 800 M-2/-3 (incl perhaps 300 in store).
Arty: some 2,000. guns: 186: 155mm: 150 M-59 towed; 175mm: 36 M-107 SP.
   how: 75mm: 100 M-116A1; 105mm: 600 M-101A1, 72 M-108 SP (plus 108 M-7 SPand 216 M-52 in store);
   155mm: 144 M-44 SP (some in store), 378 M-114A1; 203mm: 104 M-115, (81 M-55 (US) SP in store), 16 M-110A2 SP.
   Mor: 1,800: 81mm: M-1, M-4A1 (M-2/-3 APC) SP, Soltam M-125A1 SP; 107mm (incl 4.2-in.): M-2, M-30, M-84 (M-59 APC) SP, M-106A1 SP;
   120mm: 100: Soltam, TOSAM MkE HY12-DI.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: 1,400 M-18; 75mm: 1,000 M-20; 106mm: 1,200+M-40.
   ATGW: 85 Cobra, SS-11, TOW incl M-113 SP, Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm: 300: HS-820, Mk 20 RH-202 twin; 35mm; 40mm: 900 M-1A1, L/60, M-42; 75mm: M-5P, 90mm: M-117/-118. SAM: Redeye.
Avn: ac: 1 DHC-2 Beaver, 20 U-17 (Cessna 185), 50 O-1E, 8 Cessna 206, 3 Cessna 421, 5 Do-27A, 19 Do-28D, 15 T-42A (Beech Baron), 40 Citabria 150S trg.
   hel: 20 AB-204, 85 AB-205, 20 AB-206A, 2 AB-212, 30 UH-1D, 40 UH-1H, 30 Hughes TH-55, 15OH-13H.
(On order: TOW, 1,040 Milan ATGW; 26 AH-1S Cobra(Improved TOW) attack, 25 UH-1H hel; Rapier SAM (some 8 launchers, 108 msls).)

NAVY: 55,000, incl marines (42,000 conscripts).
Bases: Golciik, Istanbul, Izmir, Eregli, Iskenderun, Kara Mursel.
Subs: 17: 6 Type 1200; 9 US Guppy (2 in reserve); 2 Tang (on loan).
Destroyers: 12: 9 Gearing (5 with 1x8 ASROС); 2 Carpenter, 1 Sumner.
Frigates: 4: 2 Berk each with 1 hel; 2 Koln.
FAC(G): 15: 6 Dogan (Lurssen FPB-57) with 2x4 Harpoon; 9 Kartal (Jaguar-type) with 4 Penguin 2 SSM.
FAC(T): 5 S-141 Jaguar.
Patrol craft, large: 24: 1 Girne, 1 US Asheville, 12 AB-25, 6 PC-1638, 4 PGM-71; coastal: 4< 83-ft.
Minelayers, coastal: 7: 1 Nusret, 6 others.
Minesweepers, coastal: 22: 12 US Adjutant, 4 Cdn, 6 FRG Vegesack, inshore: 12: 4 US Cape, 8 craft.
Amph: LST: 7 (4 are dual-purpose minelayers); LCT: 40. LCU: 13. LCM: 20.
Auxiliary ships: incl 1 HQ ship; 1 destroyer tender, 1 sub tender, 2 repair ships; 4 depot ships; 1fleet, 6 spt, 3 harbour tankers; 38 tpts.

NAVAL AVIATION: 22 combat ac, 9 armed hel.
ASW: 1 sqn with 22 S-2A/E/TS-2A Tracker ac (Air Force owned, Air Force and Navy crews); 3 AB-204AS, 6 AB-212 ASW hel.

MARINES: 1 bde (4,000).
HQ, 3 bns, 1 arty bn (18 guns), spt units.

(On order: 1 Type 1200 SS, 4 Meko-200 frigates (2 in 1987/8), 12 AB-212 hel).

AIR FORCE: 57,400 (36,800 conscripts).
2 tac air forces, 1 tpt, 1 air trg commands.
FGA: 13 sqns:
   2 with F-5A/B;
   2 with F-100D/F Super Sabre,
   5 with F-4E;
   4 with F/TF-104G.
Ftr: 2 sqns with F-104S/TF-104G.
Recce: 3 sqns:
   2 with RF-5A/F-5A/B;
   1 with RF-4E.
ASW: 1 sqn with S-2A/E Tracker (see Navy).
Tpt: 4 sqns: 1 with C-130H and C-47; 1 withC-160D; 1 with C-47 (Douglas DC-3), Viscount 794 (VIP) ac; UH-1H hel.
   1 with C-47 (ECM/ELINT/SAR/calibration).
VIP: 1 fit with C-47, Cessna Citation.
Liaison: 3 HQ fits with C-47, Beech AT-11, T-33 ac; UH-1H hel;
   10 base fits with C-47, T-33 ac; UH-1H, UH-19B (Sikorsky S-55) hel.
OCU: 3 OCU fits: 1 with F-4E, 1 with F-5B/RF-5A, 1 with F/TF-104G. 2 weapons trg sqns with F-100D/F.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with T-34, T-41; 1 with T-33, T38; 1 with T-37; trg schools with C-47 ac, UH-1H hel.
SAM: 8 sqns with Nike Hercules; 2 Rapier sqns (to have 24 launchers, 324 msls).
Equipment: 412 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   F-5: 85: -A: 44 (36 FGA, 8 OCU); -B: 9 (4 FGA 1 recce, 4 OCU); RF-5A: 19 (recce). 13 in reserve
   F-100D/F: 95. 40 (FGA); 55 (trg).
   F-4E: 93: 75 (FGA); 10 (OCU); RF-4E: 8 (recce).
   F-104: ?220: -D/G: 81 (72 FGA 9 OCU); -S: 36 (ftr); TF-104: 17: 8 (FGA), 4 (ftr), 5 (OCU). 80+ in reserve.
   S-2 Tracker. 22. -A: 10 (8 ASW, 2 TS-2A trg); -E: 12 (ASW). With Navy.
   C-130: 7 (tpt). C-160D: 20 (tpt). Viscount 3 (VIP). C-47: 40+ (22 tpt, 2 VIP, 12 comms fit, trg school ac). Citation: 4 (VIP tpt).
   T-33: 82 (48 trg/OCU, 34 liaison/OCU). T-38: 29 (trg). T-37: 42 (30 trg, 12 store). T-34: 12. T-41: 20 (trg).
Helicopters: UH-1H: 15+ (15 tpt, others in liaison, base fits, trg schools). UH-19B: 5 (base fits, trg schools).
Missiles:
   SAM: 72 Nike Hercules, 24 Rapier.
(On order: 160 F-16C/D, 45 F-4 FGA, 18 S-2E Tracker ASW ac; Super Sidewinder, Sparrow AAM; AGM-65 Maverick ASM; Rapier SAM (some 8 launchers, 108 msls).)

Forces Abroad: Cyprus: 1 corps of 2 inf divs (23,000); 150 M-47/-48 MBT; 100 M-59 APC, 108 107mm mor; 150 105mm, 155mm, 203mm gun/how; 72 40mm AA guns.

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie 125,000 (incl 3 mobile bdes with V-150, UR-416APC).
Coastguard 1,100: 34 large, 9 coastal patrol craft, 4 tpts. (On order: 4 SAR-33 FAC.)

* Incl DM 130 m from Federal Republic of Germany.
f About half the divs and bdes are below strength.

   UNITED KINGDOM
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 318,700 incl 16,100 women and some 9,686 enlisted outside the UK.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 316,580.
   Army: 246,600. Regular 158,800; Territorial Army (TA) 77,900 (to be 86,000 by 1990); Home Service Force some 3,300 (to be 4,700).
   Ulster Defence Regt (UDR) 6,600 (3,700 part time).
   Navy: 32,780. Regular 24,400; Volunteer 5,500; Auxiliary Service 2,880.
   Marines: 3,400. Regular 2,300; Volunteer 1,100.
   Air Force: 33,800. Regular 32,500; Volunteer 1,300.

STRATEGIC FORCES: (2,000):
SLBM: 4 Resolution SSBN each with 16 Polaris A3TK msls.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) station at Fylingdales (to be upgraded).

ARMY: 158,700 (incl 6,500 women and 9,290 enlisted outside the UK, of whom some 8,100 are Gurkhas).
1 corps; 3 armd, 1 inf divs; 32 bdes (incl 3 engr 1 arty).
14 armd regts (2 trg).
5 armd recce regts.
52 inf bns (5 Gurkha).
3 para bns (1 in inf, 2 in para role).
1 Special Air Service (SAS) regt.
1 SSM regt with Lance (3 btys, each 4 msls).
18 arty regts: 1 hy (203mm), 2 'depth fire' (175mm), 8 SP, 6 fd (incl 1 cdo, 1 para, 1 trg), 1 locating; 4 SAM btys with Javelin.
3 SAM regts with Rapier. 2 of 3 btys (36 launchers), 1 of 4 btys (2 SP) (48 launchers), (1 Starstreak SAM regt to form).
13 engr regts: 11 fd (1 Gurkha), 1armd, 1amph.
4 army aviation regts; 16 sqns (1 cdo), 5 indep fits; 2 trg sqns, 6 fits.
RESERVES:
   Territorial Army: 2 armd recce, 3 lt recce regts, 40 inf bns, 2 SAS, 2 fd, 1 arty recce, 4 AD, 8 engr, 11 sigs regts, 8 airfield repair sqns, 1 hel sqn.
   Home Service Force: some 43 coys (to be 47).
   Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR): 9 bns (internal security role in Northern Ireland only in peace-time).
Equipment:
Tks: some 300 Challenger, 900 Chieftain (incl 210 in reserve); lt: 271 FV 101 Scorpion.
MICV: some 130 Warrior (MCV-80).
AFV: recce: 290 FV 107 Scimitar, 1,070 Ferre , some 200 Fox.
   APC: 2,338 FV 432, some 60 FV 603 Saracen, 12 FV 601 Saladin, 500 FV 103 Spartan, some 450 AT-105 Saxon.
Arty: guns: 306: 105mm: 270: 150 towed, 120 FV 433 Abbot SP; 175mm: 36 M-107 SP.
   how: 155mm: 196: 79 FH-70 towed, 101 M-109/A2/A3 SP; 203mm: 16 M-110 SP.
   MRL: 4 MLRS 227mm (trials).
   SSM: 14 Lance (incl 2 in reserve).
   Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 120mm. ATGW: Milan (incl FV 103 Spartan SP), Swingfire (FV 102 Striker SP).
SAM: Blowpipe, Javelin; 120 Rapier (some 48 SP).
Avn: ac: 9 DHC-2 Beaver AL-1.
   hel: 40 Scout; 9 SA-318 Alouette IIC, 159 SA-341 Gazelle AH-1, 110 Lynx AH-1 (some with TOW), 4 A-109.
Landing craft (Royal Corps of Transport): 2 Ardennes, 9 Arromanches log; 4 Avon, LCVP<; 3 tugs, 28 other service vessels.
(On order: some 201 Challenger MBT; some 930 Warrior (MCV-80) MICV; some 70 AT-105 Saxon, some 130 Stormer APC; 57 MRLS 227mm MRL; LAW-80 RL, Milan, TOW ATGW; some 22 SP Rapier, Rapier 2000 (2 btys), Javelin, Starstreak SAM; 16 Lynx hel.

DEPLOYMENT (see also Forces Abroad, below):
United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF): 42,100:
   Reinforcements for 1 (BR) Corps, Germany: 1 inf div HQ, 4 inf bdes (2 Regular, 2 TA), 10 inf, 1 AB bns.
United Kingdom Mobile Force (UKMF): 10,000 (would be reinforced by 5,000 TA/reservists):
   1 air portable inf bde: 4 inf bns, 1 armd recce, 1 arty regts, 1 armd sqn, 1+ SAM bty; log support group.
Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (LAND) (AMF(L)): 1 inf bn, 1 armd recce, 1 sigs, 1 engr sqn, 1 arty bty, 1 log bn; 1 avn fit.
HQ Northern Ireland:(some 9,700 excl UDR):
   2 inf bde HQ, up to 10 major units in inf role (6 resident, 4 temporary inf bns), 1 SAS, 1 engr sqn, 1 sqn army aviation. 9 UDR bns.

NAVY (RN): 66,500 (incl Air, Marines, 3,300 women and 396 enlisted outside the UK).
Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA): (2,350 civilians) man major spt vessels.
Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service(RMAS): (2,880).
Reserves: 6 HQ units, 11 Sea Trg Centres (STC), 12 Comms Trg Centres (CTC), 1 MCM sqn: 20 MCMV, 19 patrol trg, 72 auxiliary service units.
Bases: Devonport, Faslane, Portland, Portsmouth, Rosyth.
Subs (attack): 28:
   SSN: 15: 4 Trafalgar, 6 Swiftsure, 2 Valiant, 3 Churchill.
   SS: 13: 12 Oberon, 1 Porpoise (to retire 1987).
Principal Surface Combatants: 59 (incl 2 LPD):
Carriers: 3 Invincible ASW each with ac: 8 Sea Harrier V/STOL; hel: 12 Sea King: 9 ASW, 3AEW; AD: 1x2 Sea Dart SAM, 20mm Phalanx.
Destroyers (DDG): 14:
   1 County (trg) with 4 Exocet SSM, 1x2 Seaslug, 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx HAS-2 hel (to retire 1987).
   1 Bristol (flagship) with 1x2 Sea Dart SAM (to get Phalanx AD).
   12 Birmingham (Type-42) with 1x2 Sea Dart, 1 Lynx hel.
Frigates: 35:
   8 Broadsword (Type-22, 1 trials) with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 2x6 Sea Wolf SAM, 2 Lynx hel.
   6 Amazon (Type-21) with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx hel.
   19 Leander with 1 Wasp/Lynx.
   2 with Ikara ASW, 2x4 Seacat. 12 with 4 MM-38 Exocet: 4 with 2x4 Seacat, 3 with 3 x 4 Seacat, 5 with 1x6 Sea Wolf. 4 with 1x4 Seacat.
   1 trg with 20mm guns, torpedo tubes only.
   2 Rothesay with 1x4 Seacat, 1 Wasp hel.
Minor Surface Combatants: 78:
MCMV: 42. 3 sqns: minehunters: 12 Ton; minesweepers: 17: 12 River, 5 Thorny croft coastal; dual-role: 12: 11 Hunt, 1 Ton; trg/spt: 1 Abdiel.
Patrol vessels: 36: 1 Endurance, 7 Island, 2 Castle, 5 Bird (2 trg), 1 Protector (retiring), 5 Peacock, 5 Tracker, trg: 5 P 2000, 3 Fleet tenders, 2 SAR craft.
Amph: LPD: 2: each with 4 LCU, 4 LCVP, 4x4 Seacat SAM. logistic (LSL) (RFA): 6 (1 leased commercial).
   See also Army. LCM: 12 type 9; LCVP: 40
Spt (all RFA): fleet replenishment ships: 4; tankers: 14: 4 large, 5 spt, 5 small fleet; repair: 2 repair spt, 1 forward repair ships.
Misc: 1 Royal Yacht (hospital ship), 1 air spt, 2 air trg, 2 sub tenders, 9 survey vessels, 1 seabed ops vessel.
RMAS (see above): 8 coastal trg craft (1 mooring and salvage vessel, 1 twin unit tractor tug).
   Some 180 other vessels incl 6 coastal tankers, 6 armament stores, 52 stores/tenders.
Incl in above refitting or in reserve are: 1 SSBN, 3 SSN, 3 diesel subs,. 1 carrier, 1 destroyer, 4 frigates, 5 MCM, 1 offshore, 1 ice patrol vessels, 1 LPD,
   1 sub tender, 1 survey ship, one Fleet tender.

FLEET AIR ARM (FAA):
AD/attack ac: 3 sqns with Sea Harrier FRS-1.
ASW hel: 8 sqns:
   7 with Sea King HAS-5;
   1 with Wasp HAS-1 (in indep fits, Lynx HAS-2/-3 replacing).
ASW/attack hel: 2 sqns with Lynx HAS-2/-3 (in indep fits).
AEW hel: 1 sqn with Sea King AEW-2.
Cdo/assault tpt hel: 3 sqns with Sea King HC-4.
Trg/SAR hel: 1 sqn with Sea King HC-4.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with Jetstream ac; 1 with SA-341 Gazelle HT-2 hel; 1 with Wessex HU-5 hel, Chipmunk T-10, Sea Devon C-20 ac.
Fleet spt: CanberraT-18/-22, Hunter T-7/-8, GA-11, PR-11, 3 Mystere-Falcon 20 (civil registration, operated under contract).
Liaison: HS-125 (VIP, operated by RAF), Sea Heron, Sea Devon.
Equipment: 37 combat ac, 160 armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Sea Harrier/Harrier: 37. Sea Harrier FRS-1: 34 (some being mod to FRS-2). T-4N: 2 (trg). Harrier T-4A: 1 (trg).
   Canberra: 10 (3 spt, 7 store). Hunter: 26 (spt).
   HS-125: 2 (VIP tpt). Mystere-Falcon 20: 3 (spt). Jetstream: 20; T-2: 16 (trg); T-3: 4 (trg).
   Sea Heron: 4 (liaison). Heron: 1 (liaison). Sea Devon: 3 (2 liaison, 1 in reserve). Chipmunk: 14 (trg).
Helicopters:
   Sea King: 111. HAS-5: 76 (56 ASW, 20 trg). HC-4: 24 (cdo). AEW-2: 11.
   Lynx: 78. HAS-2: 45. HAS-3: 33.
   Wasp HAS-1: 15 (to be retired by 1988).
   Gazelle HT-2/-3: 22 (trg).
Missiles: ASM: Sea Skua. AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder.

ROYAL MARINES: (7,700).
1 cdo bde: 3 cdos; 1 cdo arty regt + 1 bty (Army); 2 cdo engr sqns (1 Regular, 1 Reserve), 1 log regt (tri-Service); 1 lt hel sqn.
Special Forces Group: HQ.
1 Special Boat Sqn (being reorg, increased): 3 assault sqns (2 raiding, 1 landing craft tps: 6 landing craft).
(Reserve): 1 assault tp.
Equipment:
Arty: guns: 105mm: 18. mor: 81mm: 18.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav. ATGW : Milan.
SAM: Javelin, Blowpipe.
Hel: 12 SA-341 Gazelle AH-1, 6 Lynx AH-1.
(On order: RN: 1 Vanguard SSBN, 3 Trafalgar SSN, 4 Upholder (Type-2400) SS; 4 Duke (Type-23), 6 Type-22 frigates (3 for delivery 1987/8); 3 Hunt, 1River, 1450-ton single-role minehunter, 7 coastal trg craft; 1 landing ship (log) 1987, 1 hel carrier trg auxiliary ship, 1 replenishment oiler, 1 coastal survey vessel; 2 salvage ships; 72 Trident II SLBM, 14 Goalkeeper 30mm AD systems, Harpoon SSM, Seawolf SAM; 2000 Stingray torpedoes.
FAA: 9 Sea Harrier FRS-1, 4 Jetstream Mk 3 ac; 14 Sea King (5 HAS-5, 9 HC-4), 7 Lynx HAS-3 hel; Sea Eagle ASM.
Marines: 18 Mk 4 LCVP, 3 LCU.)

AIR FORCE (RAF): 93,500 (incl 6,300 women).
Strike: 11 sqns:
   9 with Tornado GR-1;
   2 with Buccaneer S-2A/B (assigned maritime, with Sea Eagle ASM).
FGA: 5 sqns:
   3 with Harrier GR-3/T-4;
   2 with Jaguar.
AD: 9 sqns:
   1 with Lightning F-3/F-6/T-5;
   7 with Phantom.
   1 with Tornado F-3.
   (5 more sqns and 1 OCU Tornado F-3 to be formed 1987-90 to replace 2 Lightning and 5 Phantom sqns).
Recce: 2 sqns with Jaguar GR-1; 1 fit with Canberra PR-9.
MR: 4 sqns with Nimrod MR-1/-1A/-2 (Harpoon ASM, Sidewinder AAM being fitted).
AEW: 1 sqn with Shackleton AEW-2.
ECM/ELINT: 2 sqns: 1 ECM with Canberra, 1 ELINT with Nimrod R-1.
Tanker: 3 sqns: 1 with Victor K-2; 1 withVC-10K-2/-3; 1 with Tristar K-1.
Tpt: 6 sqns: 2 strategic: 1 with VC-10 C-1, 1 with Tristar C-1.
   4 tac with Hercules C-1/-1K/-1P/-3/-3P.
Liaison: 2 comms sqns with HS-125, HS-748 Andover, Pembroke), Piper Chieftain ac; Gazelle hel.
Queen's Fit: BAe HS-146-100 ac; Wessex hel.
Calibration: 2 sqns: 1 with Andover C-1, E-3/-3A; 1 calibration/target facility with Canberra B-2/E-15/T-4/TT-18.
Trg: 12 OCU: Tornado GR-1/F-2/F-3, Buccaneer S Mk 2, Phantom FGR-2, Jaguar GR-1/T-2, Harrier GR-3/T-4, Nimrod, Canberra B-2/T-4,
   C-130H, Victor K-2, VC-10, Tristar, Puma/Chinook.
   1 weapons conversion unit with Tornado GR-1.
   2 tac weapons units: Hawk T-1A, Jet Provost.
   Trg units: 7/awfc T-1/1 A, ./ef Provost, Jetstream T-1, Bulldog T-1, Chipmunk T-10, HS-125 Dominie T-1 (all BAe); Husky T-1.
Tac hel: 8 sqns: 3 with Wessex, 2 with Puma HC-1; 2 with Chinook HC-1 (CH-47); 1 spt/SAR with Chinook, Sea King HAR-3.
SAR hel: 2 sqns; 9 fits: 5 with Wessex HC-2; 4 with Sea King HAR-3.
Trg hel: Wessex, SA-341 Gazelle.
AD: 2 SAM sqns with Bloodhound 2, 1 Royal Auxiliary AF sqn with Oetlikon/Skyguard (RAF Regt).
Equipment: some 596 combat ac, no armed hel.
Aircraft:
   Tornado: some 244: GR-1: 220 (108 strike, 19 in tri-national trg sqn (Cottesmore), 21 in weapons conversion unit, 72 reserve). F-2/3: 24 (12 OCU, 12 -AD).
   Buccaneer: 52 (25 attack, 9 OCU, 18 reserve).
   Jaguar: 132 (24 FGA, 24 close spt, 24 recce, 15 OCU, 45 reserve).
   Harrier: 51 (31 close spt, 20 OCU).
   Phantom: 150. FG-1: 36 (ftr); F-3 (F-4J): 12 (ftr); FGR-2: 102 (48 ftr, 18 OCU, 36 reserve).
   Lightning: 12 (ftr).
   Hawk: 117 (72 tac weapons unit (Sidewindercapable), 45 trg).
   Canberra: 38. 31 (ECM/target facility/calibration); PR-9: 3 (recce); B-2/T-4: 5 (OCU).
   Nimrod: 34. 3 (ECM); MR-2: 31 (MR).
   Shackleton: 10 (5 AEW, 5 reserve).
   Victor: 14 (tanker/OCU).
   Tristar: 9: 2 (tanker/cargo, to be 6), 7 (strategic tpt, to be 3). Mod programme continuing.
   VC-10: 22. C-1: 13 (strategic tpt); K-2: 5 (tanker); K-3: 4 (tanker).
   Hercules: 60 C-130H (mod): C-1: 8 (ocu); C-1K: 6 (tpt/tkr); C-1P: 16 (tac tpt, air-refuelled); C-3P: 30 (tac tpt).
   Andover: 12 (6 calibration, 6 comms).
   HS-125: 25; T-1: 19 (trg); CC-1/-2: 6 (comms). Pembroke: 6 (comms, Andover replacing 1987/8). BAe-146: 2 (comms).
   Jet Provost: 147 (2 tac weapons unit, 145 trg). Jetstream: 11 (trg). Chieftain: 3 (comms).
   Bulldog: 123 (trg). Chipmunk: 65 (trg). Husky: 1 (trg).
Helicopters:
   Wessex: 64 (28 tac tpt, 18 SAR, 4 OCU, 2 VIP, 12 trg).
   Chinook: 32 (27 tac tpt, 5 OCU). Puma: 31 (26 tac tpt, 5 OCU). Sea King: 14 (SAR). Gazelle: 22 (liaison, trg).
Missiles: AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow, Red Top, Firestreak, Sky Flash. ASM: Martel, Harpoon, Sea Eagle.
SAM: 64 Bloodhound.
(On order: Harrier T-4, 62 Harrier GR-5 (AV-8B), Tornado (141 F-3, 9 GR-1 (attrition reserve)), 6 Boeing E-3 AEW, HS-125-700, BAe-146-100 (VIP), 3 VC-10 K-2/-3, 130 Short/Embraer Tucano trg ac; Sea King SAR hel; AIM-9L Sidewinder, Rapier, Rapier 2000 (3 sqns) SAM, Sky Flash AAM, 750 ALARM, Sea Eagle ASM.)

ROYAL AIR FORCE REGIMENT:
5 Wing HQ.
5 lt armd sqns.
9 SAM sqns (Rapier).
36 Scorpion lt tks; 90 Spartan APC; 72 Rapier SAM.
(Reserves (Royal Auxiliary Air Force)): 1 air movements sqn; 6 fd def sqns; 1 lt AA gun sqn with 12x2 35mm Oerlikon and Skyguard.

DEPLOYMENT:
Strike Command: 3 Gps:
   operational home command responsible for the UK Air Defence Region and Near and Far East; overseas command (RAF Germany, Belize and Falklands).
Support Command: training, supply and maintenance support of other commands.

Forces Abroad: some 90,800. Army 68,500, Navy/Marines some 5,300, Air Force: some 17,000.
Antarctica: 1 ice patrol ship (assigned; on refit).
Ascension Island: RAF: Hercules C-1K dets.
Belize: 1,400. Army: some 1,200; 1 inf bn, 1 armd recce tp, 1 fd arty bty, 1 engr sqn, 1 hel fit (4 Gazelle AH-1).
   RAF: 200; 1 fit (4 Harrier GR-3 FGA, 4 Puma hel), 1 Rapier AD det (4 fire units) RAF Regt.
Brunei: Army: some 900: 1 Gurkha inf bn, 1 hel fit (3 ac).
Canada: Army: training and liaison unit.
Cyprus: 4,943. Army: 3,317: UNFICYP (741): 1 inf bn less 2 coys, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 hel fit, engr and log spt; Garrison (2,576): 1 inf bn plus 2 inf coys,
   1 armd recce, 1 engr spt sqns, 1 hel fit.
   RAF: 1,610: 1 hel sqn, dets of Phantom, Lightning ac, 1 lt armd sqn RAF Regt.
   Navy/Marines: 16.
Egypt (Sinai MFO): 38 technical and admin personnel.
Falkland Islands: some 1,500. Army: 1 reinforced inf coy, 1 AD bty, 1-4 engr sqns (fd, plant).
   RN: 1 SSN/SS, 2 escorts, 3 patrol, spt and auxiliary ships.
   RAF: 1 Phantom sqn (9 ac), 6 Hercules C-1K, 3 Sea King HAR-3, 6 Chinook hel, 1 sqn RAF regt (Rapier SAM).
   (Details may vary through the year.)
Germany: 69,912. Army (BAOR): 56,222; 1 corps HQ; 3 armd divs incl 7 armd, 1 air mobile (trials) inf bdes (to be armd);
   1 arty bde (11 armd, 2 recce, 14 arty (1 msl, 2 loc), 2 AD, 7 engr, 3 army air (10 air sqns, 2 indep fits) regts; 13 inf bns).
   Berlin Inf Bde: 3,000; 3 inf bns, one armd sqn.
   RAF: 10,690; 13 ac, 2 hel sqns: 2 Phantom FGR-2, 6 Tornado, 1 Jaguar (recce), 2 Harrier, 1 Andover/Pembroke (comms); 1 Puma, 1 Chinook (tpt).
   RAF regt: 2 Wing HQ; 4 Rapier SAM, 1 lt armd sqns.
Gibraltar: 1,915. Army: 744; 1 inf bn, 1 engr team, 1 arty surveillance tp.
   Navy/Marines: 766; 1 escort, 1 spt ship; Marine dets, 2 twin Exocet launchers (coast defence). Base unit.
   RAF: 405; periodic Jaguar ac dets.
Hong Kong: 6,729: Army: 5,792 (British 1,842, Gurkha 3,950) Reserves: Hong Kong Regt 1,335;
   Gurkha Field Force with 1 Br, 3 Gurkha inf bns, 1 each Gurkha engr, sigs, tpt regts, 1 hel sqn (-) with 10 Scout AH-1, spt units,
   3 small landing craft, 3 other vessels.
   Navy/Marines: 668 (396 locally enlisted); 5 Peacock patrol craft, (12 patrol boats in local service), 1 Marine Raiding sqn.
   RAF: 269; 1 Wessex hel sqn (10 HC-2).
Indian Ocean: 1 destroyer, 2 frigates, 1 spt ship; Diego Garcia, 1 naval party, 1 Marine det.
West Indies (see also Belize): 2 destroyers/frigates, 2 survey vessels, 2 RFA.
Military Advisers: 599 in 30 countries.

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES


There have been no changes over the last twelve months in the politico-military status of the countries listed in this section from that described in The Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 80.

ДРУГИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЕ СТРАНЫ

   За последние двенадцать месяцев не произошло никаких изменений в военно-политическом статусе стран, перечисленных в настоящем разделе, по сравнению с тем, который описан в The Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 80.

   ALBANIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:.
Active: 42,000 (22,400 conscripts).
Terms of service: Army 2 years; Air Force, Navy and special units 3 years.
Reserves: 155,000 (to age 56): Army 150,000, Navy/Air Force 5,000.

ARMY: 31,500 (20,000 conscripts).
1 tk bde.
4 inf bdes.
3 arty regts.
6 lt coastal arty bns (?sub-units of 1 regt).
1 engr regt.
1 sigs regt.
Equipment: f
Tks: 190: T-34, T-54.
AFV: recce: 13 BRDM-1.
APC: 80: BTR-40/-50/-152, K-63.
Arty: guns: 76mm: M-1942, SU-76 SP. 85mm: D-44, Type-56. 122mm: M-1931/37. 130mm: Type-59-1.
   guns/how: 122mm: M-1938, Type-60. 152mm: M-1937, Type-66. how: 152mm: D-1.
   MRL: 107mm: Type-63.
   Mor: 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 82mm: T-21. guns: 45mm: M-1942; 57mm: M-1943; 85mm: D-44, Type-56.
AD: guns: 80: 23mm: ZU-23 twin; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60; 85mm: KS-12.

NAVY: 3,300 (1,000 conscripts). 400 may serve in coast defence. f
Bases: Durres, Valona, Sazan Island, Pasha Liman.
Subs: 2 Sov W-class (plus 1 trg unserviceable).
Patrol craft, large: 2 Sov Kronshtadt.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-II.
FAC(T): 12 Ch P-4 (probably unserviceable).
Hydrofoil: 32 Ch Huchwan 45-ton.
MCMV: inshore: 2 T-301;
Spt: 1 Khobi harbour trawler.

AIR FORCE: 7,200 (1,400 conscripts); some 95 combat ac, no armed hel. f
Ftrs: 6 sqns with 15 MiG-15, 20 MiG-17, 40 MiG-19/J-6, 20 J-7.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 I1-14M, 10 Y-5 (An-2).
Hel: 2 sqns with 20 Mi-4.
Trg: MiG-15UTI, CJ-5 (Yak-18A), Yak-11.
SAM: some 4 SA-2 sites, 22 launchers.

PARA-MILITARY: 12,000.
Internal security force: (5,000).
Frontier guard: (7,000).

* Est total since 1949.
f Spares are short; some eqpt may be unserviceable.

   AUSTRIA
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Air Service forms part of the Army):
Active: 54,700 (27,300 conscripts; some 70,000 reservists a year undergo refresher training, a proportion at a time).
Terms of service:6 months recruit trg, 60 days reservist refresher trg during 15 years (or 8 months trg, no refresher); 30-90 days additional for specialists.
Reserves: 186,000 ready reserves; 970,000 (being increased) have a reserve commitment (men to age 51, specialists, NCOS, officers 65).

ARMY: 50,000 (25,000 conscripts).
Army HQ.
Standing Alert Force: (some 15,000):
   1 mech div of 3 mech bdes (3 tk, 3 mech inf, 3 SP arty, 2 SP ATK bns); 3 comd/spt, 1AA, 1 engr, 1 sigs bns.
   1 air-mobile, 2 mountain bns.
Field Units (regional defence force - cadre units):
   Army: 1 HQ, 1 recce bns; 1 sigs, 1 log regts.
   Corps: 2 HQ, 1 guards, 2 arty, 1 SP ATK, 2 AA, 2 engr, 2 sigs bns.
   2 log regts.
   9 Regional (county) Commands.
   30 Landwehrstammregimente (trg regts): Peacetime: trg and maintenance. Mobilization: active personnel for mobile and territorial forces.
Cadre Force (full strength on mobilization): 8 mobile bde HQ: Bde tps: (45,000): 24 inf, 8 arty, 3 engr/ATK, 8 comd/spt bns.
Territorial tps: (82,000): 26 inf regts, 90 inf coys, 42 guard coys; 16 hy, 15 lt inf, 1 MRL, 11 inf/ATK bns, 5 hy arty btys (static), 13 engr, 6 ATK coys.
Equipment:
Tks: 50 M-60A3, 120 M-60A1 (to be A3).
APC: 460 Saurer 4K4E/F.
Arty: how: 105mm: 108 IFH (M-2A1); 155mm: 24 FHM-1, 56 M-109/-A2, 6 GN-45 (trials).
MRL: 128mm: 18M-51.
Mor: 81mm: 135 M1/M29, 100 L-16, 216 M8/112; 107mm: 105 M-2/M-30; 120mm: 50 M-60 (M-38/41), 50 M-43.
ATK: RL: LAW. RCL: 74mm: Miniman; 84mm: CarlGustav; 106mm: 397 M-40A1.
   guns: 75mm: M-6 PAR; 84mm: 60 (20-pdr tk guns, turret mounted); 85mm: 240 M-52/M-55 towed; 90mm: some 150 M-36, M-47 (tk);
   105mm: some 120 L7A2 (Centurion tk mobile and fixed), 237 Kuerassier JPz SK SP, 150 M-68 (L7Al); 155mm: 24 SFKM2 fortress.
AD: guns: 20mm: 360; 35mm: 40 Oerlikon twin towed; 40mm: 37 M-42 twin SP, 24 Bofors L/60.
(On order: 120 L7A2 105mm gun turrets (Centurion MBT for fixed defences).)

AIR FORCE: 4,700 (2,300 conscripts); 32 combat ac, no armed hel.
1 Air Div HQ; 3 Air Regts:
Multi-role (ftr/FGA/recce): 4 sqns with 32 SAAB 105OE.
Recce: 5 O-1E (arty fire control, retiring).
Hel: 6 sqns: recce/arty fire control: 12 OH-58B Kiowa, 13AB-204.
   tpt: (med): 23 AB-212; (lt): 12 AB-206A. SAR: 25 SA-316 Alouette III.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 2 Skyvan 3M, 12 PC-6B.
Trg: 18 SAAB 91D, 16 PC-7.
AD: 3 bns with 36 20mm, 18 M-65 twin 35mm AA guns; Super-Bat and Skyguard AD, Goldhaube EWng, Selenia MR(S-403) 3-D radar systems.
(On order: 24 J-35D interceptors.)

Forces Abroad: Cyprus (UNFICYP): 1 inf bn (301). Syria (UNDOF): 1 inf bn (532). Other Middle East (UNTSO): 17.

   REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS
Data presented here represents the de facto situation in the island. It in no way implies legal recognition for, or IISS approval of, the political entities concerned.
Представленные здесь данные отражают фактическую ситуацию на острове. Это никоим образом не подразумевает юридического признания или одобрения со стороны соответствующих политических образований.
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 13,000.
Terms of service, conscription, 29 months, then Reserve to age 50 (officers 65).
Reserve: 60,000 (have yearly refresher training): 30,000 immediate; 30,000 second-line.

NATIONAL GUARD: 13,000.*
3 recce/mech inf bns.
20 inf bns (under strength).
1 cdo bn.
8 arty bns.
8 spt units.
Equipment:
Tks: 8 T-34 (static defence).
AFV: 120 EE-9 Cascavel,28 EE-3 Jararaca, 24 Marmon-Harrington annd cars (in reserve).
   APC: 120+VAB-VTT/-VCI, 19 BTR-152.
Arty: 159: guns: 108: 76mm: 12 M-42; 88mm: 52 25-pdr; 100mm: 20 M-1944; 105mm: 20 M-101. how: 51: 75mm: 6 M-116A1 pack; 105mm: 45 M-56.
   MRL: 128mm: 8 Yug M-77 (YMRL-32).
   Mor: 81mm: 70 M-29; 82mm: 80 M-41/-43; 107mm: 26 M-2.
ATK: RL: 89mm: 198 M-20. RCL: 57mm: 198 M-18; 106mm: 132 M-40. ATGW: 20+ Milan.
AD: guns: 100: 20mm: M-55; 40mm; 94mm: 3.7-in. SAM: 20+ SA-7.
Patrol craft: 1 32-metre.
Air wing: ac: 1 BN-2 Islander.
  
PARA-MILITARY: Armed police 3,666; 2 17-m patrol boats.

* Mainly Greek-Cypriot conscripts, but some 650 seconded Greek Army officers and NCOS.

   NORTHERN CYPRUS
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: some 3,000.
Terms of service: conscription, 24 months, then reserve to age 50.
Reserves: 5,000 first-line, 10,000 second-line.
7 inf bns.
1 armd coy.
Equipment:
Tks: 5 T-34 (operability questionable).
Mor: 85: 81mm: 45; 107mm: 10 4.2-in.; 120mm: 30.

* Officially reported figure

   FINLAND
   []
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 34,400 (25,000 conscripts).
Terms of service. 8-11 months (11 months for officers and NCOs); three entries per year.
Reserves (all services): some 700,000 (35,000 a year do conscript training; 44,000 reservists a year do refresher training:
   total obligation 40 days (75 for NCOs, 100 for officers) between conscript service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60)).
Some 250,000 would, with the Regulars, form the 'fast deployment force' to cover full mobilization.
Mobilization units in military areas support general, local or spt forces; org in some 20 bdes, some 70 indep bns, etc.

ARMY: 30,000 (22,300 conscripts).
7 Military Areas; 23 Military Districts: 1 armd bde (1 armd, 1 mech inf, 1ATK, 1 arty bns, 1 AA bty).
8 inf bdes (each 3 inf bns (1 cadre), some with 1 arty bn).
7 indep inf bns.
Field arty: 3 regts, 2 indep bns.
Coast arty: 2 regts; 3 indep bns ((1 mobile) to form 2 regts).
1 AA arty regt (incl 1 SAM bn with SAM-79).
4 indep AA arty bns (to form AD regt).
2 engr bns.
Sigs: 1 regt, 1 bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 100 T-54/-55, 50 T-72. lt: 15 PT-76.
AFV: MICV: 30 BMP-1. APC: 90 BTR-50P, some 60 BTR-60, some 50 A-180 Sisu, MT-LB reported.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 170 M-54 (M-46). coastal: 100mm: D-10T (tank turrets); 122mm: M-60; 130mm: 170; 152mm: 240.
   guns/how: 155mm: 12K-83. how: 105mm: 70+ M-37/-61; 122mm: M-38/D-30; 150mm: M-40; 152mm: 240 M-38.
   Mor: 81mm: 880; 120mm: 550.
ATK: RCL: 55mm: M-55; 74mm: Miniman; 95mm: 100 SM-58-61. ATGW: 24 M-82 (AT-4 Spigot), 12 M-83 (BGM-71C Improved TOW).
AD: guns: 20mm; 23mm: ZU-23; 30mm; 35mm: GDF-002; 40mm: 100+ L-60/L-70; 57mm: 12 S-60 towed, 12 ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: SAM-79 (SA-3), SAM-78 (SA-7), SAM-86 (SA-14).
(On order: some 250 A-180 Sisu APC; APILAS ATK weapon.)

NAVY: 1,900 (1,200 conscripts).
Bases:Upinniemi (Helsinki), Turku.
4 functional Flotillas (gunboat, missile, patrol, mine warfare).
Corvettes: 2 Turunmaa.
FAC(G): 9: 4 Helsinki with 8 RBS-15SF SSM; 4 Tuima (Sov Osa-II) with 4 MTO-66 (SS-N-2B) SSM; 1 Isku (trg/trials) with 4 MTO-66 (SS-N-2A) SSM.
FAC: 6 Nuoli.
Patrol craft, large: 3 Ruissalo, 2 Rihtriemi ASW; coastal: 1 Hurja (experimental).
MCMV: minelayers: 2 (1 trg); inshore minesweepers: 6 Kuha, 7 Kiiski 'slave'.
HQ/logship: 1.
Spt: 3 Pukkio.
Tpt: 5 Valas, 6 Hauki<. LCU: 14<; 3 Kampela, 6 Kala, 5 Kave.
(On order: 4 Helsinki FAC(G).)

AIR FORCE: 2,500 (1,300 conscripts); 89 combat aircraft.
3 AD districts: 3 fighter wings.
Ftrs: 3 sqns with 33 MiG-21bis, 39 SAAB J-35F/BS/XS Draken.
OCU: 4 MiG-21U/UM, 5 J-35B/-C.
Recce: 1 fit with 8 Hawk Mk 51.
Tpt: ac: 1 sqn with 2 F-27-100, 3 Learjet 35A. hel: 1 fit with 10 Mi-8 (also SAR), 2 Hughes 500.
Trg: 41 Hawk Mk 51, 30 L-70 Vinka.
Liaison: 5 CM-170 Magister, 14 Piper (8 Cherokee Arrow, 6 Chieftain).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, RB-27, RB-28 (Falcon).
(On order: AD system.)

Forces Abroad: 926 (UN only, not within Force totals). Cyprus (UNFICYP) 10. Syria (UNDOF) 1 bn (395). Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1 bn (495).
   Other Mid-East (UNTSO) 22. Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 4.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Interior: Frontier Guard 4,400;
   4 frontier, 3 coastguard districts, 18 coys; 7 large, 12 coastal, 34 patrol craft<; ac, 3 Mi-8 (SAR), and 1 Agusta-Bell 412 hel.
(On order: 4 Kiisla, 1 Lokki coastal patrol craft<, 2 AS-332, 2 AB-412 hel.)

   IRELAND
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 13,600.
Terms of service, voluntary, 3-year terms to age 60, officers 65.
Reserves: 15,800 (obligation to age 60, officers 57-65). Army: first-line 950, second-line 14,500. Navy 350.

ARMY: 11,900.
1 inf force (2 inf bns).
4 inf bdes:
2 with 2 inf bns, 1 with 3, 1 fd arty regt, 1 motor recce sqn, 1 engr coy; 1 with 2 inf bns, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 fd arty bty.
Army tps: 1 lt tk sqn, 1 AD regt, 1 Ranger coy.
(Total units:
   12 inf bns (3 with MICV coy; 1 UNIFIL bn ad hoc - dets from other bns).
   1 tk sqn.
   4 recce sqns (1 armd).
   3 fd arty regts (each of 2 btys); 1 indep bty.
   1 AD regt (1 regular, 3 reserve btys).
   3 fd engr coys.
   1 Ranger coy.)
Reserves:
   4 Army Gps (garrisons).
   18 inf bns.
   6 fd arty regts.
   3 motor sqns.
   3 engr sqns.
   3 supply, 8 tpt coys.
   3 sigs coys.
   3 AA btys.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 14 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 20 AML-90, 32 AML-60. APC: 60 Panhard VTT/M3, 10 Timoney.
Arty: guns: 105mm: 12 lt. guns/how: 88mm: 48 25-pdr.
   Mor: 60mm: 199; 81mm: 250; 120mm: 72.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 447 Carl Gustav; 90mm: 96 PV-1110. ATGW: 4 Milan.
AD: guns: 40mm: 24 L/60, 2 L/70. SAM: 7 RBS-70.

NAVY: 900 (to be increased to about 1,500).
Base. Cork.
Patrol vessels: 5: 1 P-31 (with 1 Dauphin hel), 3 P-21, 1 Deirdre.

AIR FORCE: 800; 15 combat ac, no armed hel.
3 wings (1 trg):
COIN: 1 sqn with 6 CM-170-2 Super Magister.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 9 SF-260WE ac, 2 SA-342L Gazelle trg hel.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 7 Reims Cessna F-172H, 1 F-172K.
Hel: 2 sqns. 1 with 8 SA-316 Alouette III; 1 with 5 SA-365 Dauphin (3 SAR, 2 to serve with Navy).
Composite sqn: 3 King Air (2 MR, 1 trg), 1 HS-125-700 (VIP).

Forces Abroad: (775).
   Cyprus (UNFICYP) 8. Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1 bn+ (746); 4 AML-90 armd cars, 13 VTT/M-3 APC, 4 120mm mor. Other Middle East (UNTSO)21.

   MALTA
   []
  
TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 910.
Terms of service, voluntary.

'TASK FORCE': 500.
1 inf coy; RPG-7 RL, 81mm and 82mm mor, 50 ZPU-4 14.5mm quad machine guns.
1 coast arty bty (82mm mor).
1 marine sqn; 11 patrol, 4 spt craft<.
1 hel fit; 1 AB-206, 1 AB-204 (SAR), 4 AB-47G, 3 SA-316 Alouette III (serviceability questionable).

'ARMED FORCES OF MALTA': 410.
1 AD bty, 6 40mm AA guns.
1 general duties coy.
1 electrical and mechanical engr coy.
1 construction coy.

PARA-MILITARY: Reserves (Id Dejma): some 900.

   SWEDEN
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 67,000 (48,950 conscripts); 22,500 civilians (spt services).*
Terms of Service: Army and Navy 7V2-15 months, Air Force 8-12 months.
Reserves (obligation to age 47): 709,000: Army 550,000, Navy 102,000, Air Force 57,000.*
   Voluntary auxiliary organizations 500,000.
Mobilization strength about 800,000 in 72 hours. Maximum total mobilized strength 850,000 plus 500,000 auxiliary services (=1,350,000).

ARMY: 47,000 (37,7000 conscripts).*
6 Military commands; 26 Defence districts (Laens).
Peace establishment:
   44 armd, cav, inf, arty, AA, engr, sig, spt regts (local defence, cadre for mobilization, basic conscript plus refresher trg).
War establishment (700,000 on mobilization, incl 100,000 Home Guard):
   4 armd bdes.
   1 mech bde.
   18 inf, 5 Norrland, 1 Gotland bdes.
   60 indep armd, inf, arty and AA arty bns.
   1 army aviation bn.
   9 arty aviation platoons.
   Local Defence Districts: 100 indep bns, 400-500 indep coys and Home Guard units.
Equipment:
Tks: 340 Strv-101, 110 Strv-102/-104 (Centurion), 335 Strv-103B. lt: 200 Ikv-91.
APC. 600 Pbv-302.
Arty: 1,020: guns: 155mm: 30 BK-1A SP. how: 105mm: 550 Type-40; 150mm: 140 M-39; 155mm: 300 FH-77-A and (SP)-B.
   Mor: 81mm: 1,000; 120mm: 500.
ATK: RCL: 74mm: Miniman; 84mm: AT-4, Carl Gustav; 90mm: PV-1110. ATGW: RB-53 (Bantam), RB-55 (TOW, incl Pvrbv 551 SP).
AD: guns: 20mm: 114; 40mm: 600.
SAM: RB-69 (Redeye), RBS-70 (incl Lvrbv SP), RB-77 (Improved HAWK).
Avn: ac: 19 SK-61C (BAe Bulldog) observation, Dornier Do-27 tpt.
   hel: 15 HKP-3 (Agusta-Bell AB-204B) tpt, 10 HKP-5 (Hughes 300C) trg, 24 HKP-6 (Bell 206) utility.
(On order: 20 MBB BO-105 (HKP-9A) hel with TOW ATK, RBS-56 Bill ATGW.)

NAVY: 12,000, incl coast arty and naval air (6,250 conscripts);* some vessels with Coast Defence.
Bases: Musko, Harnosand, Karlskrona, Goteborg (spt only).
Subs: 13: 3 Ndcken; 4 Draken; 5 Sjoormen; 1 Mala 2-man diver vessel.
FAC(G): 30:
   2 Stockholm (Spica III) with 4x2 RBS-15 SSM (weapon fit may vary);
   16 Hugin with 6 RB-12 (Penguin) SSM;
   12 Spica II (R-131) with 2 RBS-15 SSM.
FAC(T): 6 Spica I (T-121).
Patrol craft, large: 4 Hand; coastal: 11<: 3 Dalaro, 8 Skanor.
Minelayers: large: 3 (1 trg); coastal: 13: inshore: 22<; 1 spt ship.
MCMV: 3 Landsort, 10 Arko coastal, 21 inshore.
Amph: LCM: 12.
Icebreakers: 6.
Spt: 1 AGI, 3 spt tkrs.

COAST DEFENCE: (2,650; 1,700 conscripts).*
Arty: 5 bdes: 30 mobile and static bns:
   guns: 40mm incl L/70 AA, 75mm, 120mm incl CD-80 Karin(mobile); 75mm, 120mm (static).
   SSM: RBS-17 Hellfire (to equip planned mech bns), RBS-08A, RB-52.
Rangers (org in coys):
Minelayers: 10 coastal, 17 inshore.
Patrol craft: 18 60-/70-class.
Amph: 9 LCM, 80 LCU, 55 LCA.

NAVAL AIR: 10 armed hel.
ASW: 1 C-212 ac.
Hel: 2 sqns with 10 HKP-4B/C (KV-107) ASW, 10 HKP-6 (AB-206) liaison.

(On order: 4 A-17 Vastergotlandsubs (in 1987), 4 KKV-90 GoteborgFAC(T), 4 Landsort minehunters; 1 icebreaker; RBS-15 SSM; 6 MCMV; 25mm turret gun; 700 Hellfire SSM (ships and coast arty); 4 HKP-4 hel (to be transferred from Air Force).)

AIR FORCE: 8,000 (5,000 conscripts);* 501 combat ac, no armed hel.
1 attack gp.
4 AD districts.
9 wings liaison ac: 42 SK-50 (SAAB 91 Safir).
FGA: 5 sqns with 82 AJ-37 Viggen.
AD: 11 sqns:
   3 with 53 J-35F Draken;
   8 with 141 JA-37 Viggen.
Recce: 3 sqns with 49 SH/SF-37 Viggen, 2 Caravelle (ELINT).
OCU: 1 with 16 SK-37 Viggen (6 SK-35C Draken in store).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 C-130E/H Hercules.
Comms units: SK-60 (SAAB 105), 3 Cessna 404, 1 Metro III (leased).
Trg: incl 144 SK-60A/B/C (also have lt attack/recce role), 50 SK-61 (Bulldog), 22 J-32 Lansen (14 -32E ECM trg, 8 -32D target tug).
SAR: 1 sqn with 10 HKP-4 (KV-107, 4 to transfer to Navy), 4 HKP-9B (BO-105).
Utility unit: 6 HKP-2 (to retire), 7 HKP-3 (AB-204) hel.
AAM: RB-24, AIM-9J/L Sidewinder, RB-27 (Falcon), RB-28 (Improved Falcon), RB-71 (Skyflash).
ASM: RB-04E, RB-05A, RB-75 (Maverick).
AD: Semi-automatic control and surveillance system, Stril 60, co-ordinates all AD components.
(On order: 30 JAS-39 Gripen multi-role ac; 2 BO-105, 10 AS-332 SAR hel; RBS-15F ASM, AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM.)

Forces Abroad: 1,118. Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1 inf bn (374), to be withdrawn. Lebanon (UNIFIL) 774: 1 log bn (630), medical tps (144).

PARA-MILITARY:
Coast Guard: (550); 2 TV-171 fishery protection vessels, 70 patrol craft<; (Air Arm:) 2 C-212 MR, 1 Cessna 337G, I 402C ac.
Civil Defence: shelters for some 5 million people outside military ages (16-65).

* There are normally some 95,000 more conscripts (70,000 Army, 4,500 Navy, 6,000 Air Force), plus 15,000 officer and NCO reservists, doing 11-40 days refresher training at some time in the year. Obligation is 5 times per reservist between ages 20 and 47.

   SWITZERLAND
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Air Corps forms part of the Army):
Active: about 1,500 regular and 18,500 recruits* (mobilizable to some 1,100,000, incl e 460,000 Civil Defence, in 48 hours).
Terms of service. 17 weeks recruit training followed by reservist refresher training of 3 weeks over an 8-year period between ages 20-32 for Auszug (= call out),
   2 weeks over 3-year period (33-42) for Landwehr (= militia),
   1 week over 2-year period (43-50) for Landsturm (= Home Guard/last reserve).
Reserves (all services): 625,000 (45,000 officers, 110,000 NCOS, 3,000 women auxiliaries).

ARMY: War establishment: 580,000 on mobilization.
3 fd corps, each of 1 mech, 2 inf divs:
Corps tps (totals):
   3 inf, 3 cyclist, 3 Rapier SAM, 3 engr regts (3 bns); 3 sigs, 3 traffic control bns; 3 hel sqns, 3 lt ac fits.
1 mountain corps of 3 mountain inf divs:
   Corps tps:
   1 mountain inf, 1 engr, 1 sigs regts; 7 indep inf, 2 pack horse bns; 1 traffic control bn, 1 hel sqn.
15 indep bdes (9 frontier, 3 fortress, 3 redoubt).
6 Territorial Zones: 13 medical, 12 log, 11 civil def regts.
Indep units: 3 hy arty, 3 engr, 2 sigs.
20 Fortress Guard companies.
Equipment:
Tks: some 875: some 35 Vz-Leopard 2, 300 Pz-55/-57 (Centurion), 150 Pz-61, 390 Pz-68.
APC: 600 M-63/-73/-64 (mor) (M-113).
Arty: guns: 105mm: some 360 Model-35. how: 105mm: 468 Model-46; 155mm: M-50 towed, 470 PzHb-66/74 (M-109U) SP.
   MRL: 81mm: RWK-014 30-tube.
   Mor: 2,600: 81mm: M-33, M-72; 120mm: 261 M-64/-74.
ATK: guns: 90mm: 850 Model-50/-57. RCL: 106mm: 600 M-58. RL: 83mm: 20,000 M-80.
   ATGW: 6 MOWAG Piranha with TOW (trials); 800 B/B-65 (Bantam), B/B-77 (Dragon).
AD: guns: 20mm: 790; 35mm: 260 GDF-002. SAM: B/L-84 (Rapier).
Marine: 11 Aquarius patrol craft<.
(On order: some 345 Leopard 2 MBT, 310 MOWAG Piranha with TOW-2 ATK veh, Dragon, TOW-2 ATGW.)

AIR CORPS: 45,000 on mobilization (maintenance by civilians); 295 combat ac, no armed hel.
3 air regts.
FGA: 9 sqns with 135 Hunter F-58/T-68.
Ftrs: 6 sqns with 92 F-5E, 12 F-5F.
Interceptors: 2 sqns with 34 Mirage IIIS/BS.
Recce: 1 sqn with 18 Mirage IIIRS.
Liaison/SAR: 1 sqn with 18 PC-6 Turbo-Porter, 2 Do-27, 3 Twin Bonanza.
Hel: 7 sqns with 21 SA-315 Alouette II, 75SA-316 Alouette III.
Trg: incl 40 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer, 34 Vampire T-55, 63 Vampire Mk 6, 4 Mirage IIIBS, 65 Pilatus P-3.
AAM: Sidewinder, AIM-26B Falcon.
ASM: AGM-65 Maverick.
1 air force fd bde (3 fd regts, 1 para coy, 1 lt ac wing).
1 airbase bde with 3 AA arty bns, each with 4 batteries of 20mm and 35mm guns.
1 AD bde:
1 SAM regt (2 bns, each of 2 btys; 64 B/L-64 (Bloodhound), 60 Rapier SAM);
7 AA arty regts (each of 3 btys; 20mm and 35mm guns, Skyguard fire control).
3 comd and comms, 1 log regts.
(On order: 3 AS-332 Super Puma hel, 200 AGM-65 Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Civil Defence: 480,000 (300,000 fully trained). Shelter programme for 5,500,000; emergency supplies and medical facilities.

* Two recruit intakes a year (Feb/Jul) each of 17,000. Some 400,000 reservists a year do refresher training.

   YUGOSLAVIA
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:.
Active: 213,500 (123,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: 12 months.
Reserves: Army 500,000; Navy 45,000, Air 30,000 (to age 55, officers 60); mobilization troops to complete units to war establishment.

ARMY: 165,000 (110,500 conscripts) (being re-org):
7 Military Regions; 1 Military District.
3 Corps HQ.
12 inf divs: 9 active (est 75% strength), 3 reserve (cadre).
9 inf bdes (3 mech, 3 mot, 3 lt).
8 indep tk bdes.
3 mountain bdes.
6 hy fd arty regts.
6 ATK regts.
11 AA arty regts; 4 army-, 7 air force-assigned.
4 SAM regts (SA-6).
Equipment:
Tks: 760 T-54/-55, some 200 M-84 (T-74; mod T-72) and T-72, 60 M-47. lt: 20 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 100 M-3A1, 20 M-8, some 50 BRDM-2. MICV: 300 M-80. APC: 200 BTR-40/-50, 300 M-60P.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 1,800 M-48 pack, 411 M-1942, SU-76 SP; 122mm: 241 M-1931/37; 130mm: 186 M-46; 155mm: 132 M-59.
   guns/how: 215: 152mm: M-1937, D-20/M-84.
   how: 556: 105mm: M-101, M-56, M-18, M-7 SP; 122mm: 378 M-1938/D-30; 2S1 (M-1974) SP; 155mm: 426 M-65, M-114.
   MRL: 128mm: 122 M-77 (YMRL-32), M-63.
   SSM: 4 FROG-7.
   Mor: 82mm: 3,215; 120mm: 2,703.
ATK: guns: 75mm: 748: M-1943, PAL-40; 90mm: 540: M-63B2 (incl SP); 100mm: 511 T-12.
   RCL: 57mm: 1,418; 82mm: 1,838 M-60PB SP; 105mm: 526 M-65.
   ATGW: BOV-1 veh with AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 20mm: 2,178: M-55/-75, BOV-3 SP triple; 30mm: 540: M-53, M-53/59, BOV-3 SP; 37mm: 418 M-1939; 40mm: 128: M-1, L/70;
   57mm: 304: S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm: 260 M-1944; 90mm: 210 M-117; 3.7-in. (94mm): 46.
   SAM: SA-6/-7/-9.
Reserves: some 250 T-34/85, 400 M-4 MBT, AA guns; 300 M-18 Hellcat 76mm, M-63B2 90mm SPATK guns in store.
(On order: M-84 MBT, some 200 M-80 MICV.)

NAVY: 12,500 incl 900 marines, 2,300 coast defence (6,000 conscripts).
Bases: Lora/Split, Pula, Sibenik, Kardeljevo, Kotor.
Subs: 7: 2 964-ton Sava; 3 714-ton Heroj; 2 S-11 (Una) 88-ton diver minelayers; ?5 Mala 2-man diver vessels.
Frigates: 4:
   2 Koni with 4 SS-N-2B SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
   2 Kotov with 4 SS-N-2C SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM, hel deck.
Corvettes: 3: 2 Mornar, 1 Le Fougueux.
FAC(G): 17:
   1 Type-400 Kobra with 4 SS-N-2C SSM;
   6 Type-211 Rade Koncar with 2 SS-N-2B;
   10 Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2A.
FAC(T): 14 Shershen.
Patrol craft, large: 80: 10 Kraljevica;
   coastal: 70: Type-80 80-ton, Type-20 55-ton, Type-18 29-ton, Type-15 19.5-ton; Type-16 23-ton reported. (Types-15/-16/-18 can also carry cargo).
MCMV: 33: coastal: 4 Fr Sirius minesweepers/hunters, 4 VukovKlanac; inshore: 10: 4 Ham, 6 M-117; river: 15: 7 Nestin (some in reserve), 8 M-301.
Amph: 43: LCT/minelayers: 12: 10 DTM-211 type (retiring), 2 PO-91 (replacing). LCU: 22 DSC-601 32-ton.
Spt: 9 coastal tpts, 6 tankers, 1 flagship.
1 marine bde (3 bns).
25 coast arty btys (2,300):
   guns: 85mm: 58 M-44; 88mm: 69 M-36; 122mm: 75 M-37; 130mm: 82 M-54; 152mm: 75 D-20.
   SSM: SS-C-3 Shaddock, Bronx (truck-mounted SS-N-2).
(On order: Sara-class SS, 9 Type-400 Kobra FAC(P) (status doubtful), new Biokovo-class corvette reported, 1 PO-91 spt/trg ship.)

AIR FORCE: 36,000 (7,000 conscripts); some 395 combat ac, 160 armed hel.
2 air corps each 1 air def div, incl ac, AA arty, SAM.
FGA: 12 sqns with 25 P-2 Kraguj, 90 Galeb/Jastreb, 30 G-4 Super Galeb, Orao B.
Interceptors: 9 sqns with 120 MiG-21F/PF/M/bis, 20 MiG-21U.
Recce: 4 sqns with 35 Galeb, 20 Jastreb RJ-1, 25 Orao.
OCU: 30 Galeb/Jastreb J-1/Ty-1, some Orao.
ASW hel: 1 sqn with 10 Ka-25 (Navy-assigned).
Other hel: 4 sqns with 70 Mi-8, 160 Partizan (armed, licence-built Gazelle).
Tpt: ac: 2 sqns with 6 Yak-40, 2 An-12, 15 An-26, 2 Douglas DC-6B, 2 Mystere-Falcon 50 (VIP), 2 Learjet, 3 Canadair CL-215 (SAR), PC-6 Porter,
   hel: 1 sqn with 20 Mi-8, SA-341 Gazela (Navy-assigned).
Liaison: some 50 UTVA-66.
Trg: ac incl 80 Galeb/Jastreb, 100 UTVA-75; hel: 15 Gazela (licence-built Gazelle).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AGM-65 Maverick.
14 SAM bns (8 SA-2, 6 SA-3).
1 AB bde (Air Force-manned, Army officers and trg, HQ control).
(On order: Super Galeb, some 180 Orao FGA, PC-6A Turbo Porter lt tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY (under Army):
Frontier Guards: 15,000; 10 Mima, 6 Type-131 patrol craft.
Police Forces: (5,000): in wartime a Territorial Defence Force (militia) comprising 1 million (regional ?300,000, Local 7700,000);
   mobile inf bdes, arty, AA bns; TAB-71/-72 anti-riot APC, arty incl SU-76/-100, AA.
Civil Defence: 2 million on mobilization.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean

   This section now includes Djibouti, Mauritania, and the Somali Republic, all members of the Arab League, formerly listed in Sub-Saharan Africa. This change has been adopted to reflect the Islamic nature of the states themselves as well as their links to the League. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is also a member; its elements are listed under Lebanon.
   The Persian Gulf
   The problem of assessing the nature and extent of deliveries of materiel to Iraq and Iran continues to be intractable. Neither of the two protagonists is willing to state details of procurement, let alone strengths and losses, and estimates continue to be imprecise. The Soviet Union, along with Egypt, still provides most of Iraq's munitions and spare parts. Iran continues to have difficulty in purchasing its needs from commercial sources, but has managed to acquire sufficient avionics spares to put into combat service some 10 of its F-14s. It is also believed to have some 10 Chinese J-6 interceptors. Both sides have used Soviet surface-tosurface missiles. Iran claims to be building a battlefield missile with a shorter range than the FROG, called the Oghab.It is also reported to have the Chinese HY-2 (US: Silkworm) coastal defence missile, which is apparently being deployed by both the Navy and the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran). The Pasdaran maritime element is believed to be manning a number of fast patrol launches to intercept merchant vessels plying to Kuwait and other Gulf ports. A Pasdaran air element is believed to be responsible for some portion of the air defence role. It also has some pilots, though no aircraft are known to be assigned to it.
   Elsewhere in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has formed a 1,500-man corps of Marines, comprising a naval infantry regiment equipped with light infantry combat vehicles. It has also created an independent Air Defence Force which controls much of the air defence equipment formerly assigned to the Army. The relationship between it and the interceptor elements within the Air Force is unknown. The Saudi Air Force has begun to receive the Tornado, and a small decline in the number of F-5s is noted.
   Eastern Mediterranean
   A slight reduction in Israeli military manpower may have occurred. There appears to have been a slight increase in the number of tanks and artillery, and the slow modernization of the air inventory continues. Budgetary considerations have forced the abandonment of earlier plans to produce the indigenous Lavi fighter in favour of the acquisition of a US aircraft. This should improve funding prospects for some of the less prominent yet important programmes in all three Services.
   Syria has apparently reorganized its ground forces, which have reportedly absorbed the Saraya ad-Difer, a guard force for government offices. Despite this, both the Army and the Air Force have reduced their numbers, which may reflect a lower level of alert status as well as a desire to economize. Little new equipment is reported, though the Navy is believed to have ASW helicopters, and the Air Force could be getting MiG-29s by the end of 1987.
   The Lebanon continues to be divided on factional lines. Our entry for the PLO cites the groups and their strengths; we have been unable to ascertain the nature and extent of the arms inventories of each.
   North Africa and the Maghreb
   Morocco's extension of the 'wall' to and along the Mauritanian frontier puts further strains on the Moroccan Army, which deploys a reported 100,000 men to garrison it and has had to add additional forces in order to do so. It has, however, forced Polisario to use Mauritanian territory if it wishes to reach the coast. Polisario continues to make sporadic probing attacks, and both sides claim to have caused casualties, while denying serious loss to themselves. The cost to Morocco, however, remains more economic than military in nature.
   A squadron of Algeria's MiG-23s have been identified as interceptors; there is no change in the total held. The Air Force, however, has received additional Mi-24 helicopters. The Tunisian Navy is to receive additional patrol craft. The civil war in the Sudan continues; the Army may have received some equipment from Egypt. Egypt's procurement programme, by which it planned to replace Soviet equipment and improve overall military capability has been seriously hampered by increasing financial constraints. Orders are being delayed or curtailed, and the status of many is in doubt. It has, however, received French Mirage 2000EM and two E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft.
   Reports suggest that Libyan Armed Forces strengths have increased slightly. Libyan equipment losses in Chad, though politically impressive, are of little real military consequence, given the large inventory held. The Libyan Air Force has received a further 40 Fitter FGA and the reconnaissance version of the MiG-25. The Air Defence Force is installing a command and control system known as Senezti about which no details are available.
   Political Agreements
   Details of bilateral agreements with external powers and agreements within the region are to be found on pp. 89-90 of The Military Balance 1986-1987. No significant developments under these headings have been noted.
   Peacekeeping Forces
   The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), which contains some 298 officers and men including the Observer Group, Beirut (50), continues to patrol Israel's northern border. In the Golan Heights the UN deploys the 1,410-man Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) with contingents from Austria (532), Canada (226), Finland (495) and Poland (157). Finally, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) consists of some 5,533 men from France (500), Fiji (640), Finland (495), Ghana (690), Ireland (746), Italy (51), Nepal (800), Norway (864) and Sweden (774).
   The Egyptian/Israeli border is patrolled by the 2,665-man Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) set up under the Israeli/Egyptian Peace Treaty; contingents come from the US (1,186), Canada (136), Britain (38), Colombia (500), Fiji (500), France (40), Italy (90), the Netherlands (105) and Uruguay (70).
   Economic Developments
   The Middle Eastern recession continues unabated. Regional GDP declined by a further 3.1% in 1986, following the fall of 3.8% in 1985. Moreover, the region has experienced an average inflation rate of 11 % over the year. To a large extent this was due to the dramatic fall in the oil price (55% between 1985 and 1986) to a level 15% below the 1978 price in real terms. As a result of this and a low output quota (about 13.4 million barrels per day in 1986), Gulf oil exporters have been forced to draw heavily on their reserves; Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran each drew well over $1 billion in 1986. As a further result, regional debt increased by $15 billion, from about $130 billion to $145 billion.
   While most of the oil producers have considerable financial reserves - Saudi Arabia's cash reserves alone stand at $46 billion - the non-oil-producing or minor oil-producing Middle Eastern states can only resort to borrowing. In terms of debt/GDP ratios, Morocco is the region's largest debtor with $16 billion (110% of GDP), followed by Egypt with $44 billion (about 80% of 1986 GDP). The Egyptian figure includes the bulk of the country's military debts (some $11 billion, $4.6 billion of which is owed to the United States) but excludes military debt to the Soviet Union of an estimated $3 billion. Iraqi war-related expenditure has led to an accumulated debt estimated at about $50 billion (excluding about $40 billion of presumably non-repayable debts to the Gulf Co-operation Council). In Iran, which has no major long-term credit debt, the short-term commercial debt appears to remain at a level of about $ 1 billion (underwritten by about $5.5 billion in cash reserves, excluding the country's unknown gold holdings). Israel's debt, in per capita terms the world's highest, has stabilized at around $30 billion. Moreover, its inflation rate has settled at a manageable 20%. The Lebanese economy, near to total collapse, has seen its currency devalued by over 300% in one year, forcing the 'government' to sell off 20% of its gold holdings. The Sudan, certainly the poorest of the Middle Eastern countries, continues to slide into debt, with the 1986 total of at least $13 billion equal to some 300% or more of its actual export income.
   Regional per capita income continues the decline which began in 1979 (despite the extremely high per capita income in the Gulf Co-operation Council countries). In 1986 it slipped by a further 3.7%. In a region with some of the world's highest population increases (between 3 and 6%) economic progress is constantly being eroded. The disparity between the rich oil producers and those with few, and often badly managed, resources has visibly increased regional tension. Not only the Iran-Iraq war, but that between Chad and Libya, the Sudanese civil war, Moroccan-Algerian tension over Polisario, and the Lebanese civil war all contribute to, and in some measure also reflect, underlying economic stress and pressures. The appeal of Islamic fundamentalism is also in part prompted by this economic malaise.
   Regional exports declined further to about $115 billion (compared to $253 billion in 1980). Only in the arms export market have Egypt and Israel seen notable earnings improvements; it is estimated that each exported armaments to a value of about $300 million in 1986. Moreover, Egypt appears to be committed to the establishment of a substantial military-industrial complex, encouraged not only by the Iran-Iraq war, but by future arms requirements in the whole region. Recent joint Turkish-Egyptian arms production agreements are an indication of this development.
   Defence outlays in the region have, however, decreased. Even Iraq and Iran have had to spend less, while Saudi Arabia, the region's largest defence spender, has reduced its outlays by over 40% in the past three years. Nevertheless, in most countries of the region, defence spending remains the single largest expenditure item in their budgets.

Ближний Восток и Северная Африка

   В настоящее время в этот раздел включены Джибути, Мавритания и Сомалийская республика - все члены Лиги арабских государств, ранее включенные в список стран Африки к югу от Сахары. Это изменение было принято, чтобы отразить исламский характер самих государств, а также их связи с Лигой. Организация освобождения Палестины (ООП) также является членом; ее элементы перечислены в разделе "Ливан".
   Персидский залив
   Проблема оценки характера и масштабов поставок материальных средств Ираку и Ирану по-прежнему остается неразрешимой. Ни один из двух главных действующих лиц не желает указывать детали закупок, не говоря уже о сильных и слабых сторонах, и оценки по-прежнему являются неточными. Советский Союз вместе с Египтом по-прежнему поставляет большую часть иракских боеприпасов и запасных частей. Иран по-прежнему испытывает трудности с закупкой для своих потребностей из коммерческих источников, но ему удалось приобрести достаточное количество запасных частей для авионики, чтобы поставить на боевую службу около 10 своих F-14. Также считается, что у него есть около 10 китайских перехватчиков J-6. Обе стороны использовали советские ракеты класса "земля-земля". Иран утверждает, что строит боевую ракету меньшей дальности, чем FROG, называемую Oghab. Сообщается также, что у него есть китайская ракета береговой обороны HY-2 (США: Silkworm), которая, по-видимому, развертывается как ВМС, так и Революционной гвардией (Pasdaran). Считается, что морской элемент Пасдаран включаяет ряд быстрых патрульных катеров для перехвата торговых судов, курсирующих в Кувейт и другие порты залива. В воздухе Пасдаран элемент, как считается, отвечает за какую-то часть противовоздушной обороны. У него также есть несколько пилотов, хотя не известно, назначены ли им самолеты.
   В других районах залива Саудовская Аравия сформировала корпус морской пехоты численностью 1500 человек, включающий морской пехотный полк, оснащенный легкими боевыми машинами пехоты. Она также создала независимые силы противовоздушной обороны, которые контролируют большую часть средств противовоздушной обороны, ранее приписанных к армии. Связь между ним и элементами перехватчика в составе ВВС неизвестна. ВВС Саудовской Аравии начали получать Торнадо, и отмечается небольшое снижение количества F-5s.
   Восточное Средиземноморье
   Возможно, имело место небольшое сокращение численности израильских военнослужащих. Как представляется, произошло незначительное увеличение числа танков и артиллерии, и продолжается медленная модернизация воздушных сил. Бюджетные соображения вынудили отказаться от прежних планов по производству отечественного истребителя Lavi в пользу приобретения американского самолета. Это должно улучшить перспективы финансирования некоторых менее заметных, но важных программ во всех трех службах.
   Сирия, по-видимому, реорганизовала свои наземные силы, которые, как сообщается, поглотили Сарайя ад-Дифер, силы охраны правительственных учреждений. Несмотря на это, как армия, так и ВВС сократили свою численность, что может отражать более низкий уровень боеготовности, а также стремление к экономии. Сообщается о незначительном количестве нового вооружения, хотя ВМС, как полагают, имеют противолодочные вертолеты, а ВВС могут получить МиГ-29 к концу 1987 года.
   Ливан по-прежнему разделен по фракционному признаку. В нашем заявлении ООП упоминаются группы и их силы; мы не смогли установить.
   Северная Африка и Магриб
   Расширение Марокко "стены" до мавританской границы и вдоль нее создает дополнительную нагрузку для марокканской армии, которая, согласно сообщениям, направляет в ее гарнизон 100 000 человек, и для этого ей пришлось добавить дополнительные силы. Однако он вынудил Полисарио использовать мавританскую территорию, если он хочет достичь побережья. ПОЛИСАРИО продолжает совершать спорадические зондирующие нападения, и обе стороны утверждают, что они привели к жертвам, отрицая при этом серьезные потери для себя. Однако расходы Марокко по-прежнему носят скорее экономический, чем военный характер.
   Эскадрилья алжирских МиГ-23 была идентифицирована как перехватчики; никаких изменений в общей сложности не произошло. Однако ВВС получили дополнительные вертолеты Ми-24. ВМС Туниса получат дополнительные патрульные корабли. Гражданская война в Судане продолжается; армия, возможно, получила некоторую технику из Египта. Осуществлению программы закупок Египта, в рамках которой он планировал заменить советское оборудование и повысить общий военный потенциал, серьезно мешали растущие финансовые трудности. Заказы задерживаются или сокращаются, и статус многих вызывает сомнения. Однако он получил французский Mirage 2000EM и два самолета раннего предупреждения E-2C Hawkeye.
   Согласно сообщениям, численность ливийских вооруженных сил несколько возросла. Потери ливийской техники в Чаде, хотя и впечатляют с политической точки зрения, имеют мало реальных военных последствий, учитывая большой запас. Ливийские ВВС получили еще 40 истребителей-бомбардировщиков и разведывательный вариант МиГ-25. Силы противовоздушной обороны устанавливают систему командования и управления, известную как Senezti, о которой нет никаких подробностей.
   Политические соглашения
   Подробности двусторонних соглашений с внешними державами и соглашений в регионе можно найти на стр. 89-90 военного баланса 1986-1987 годов. Никаких существенных изменений по этим разделам отмечено не было.
   Миротворческие силы
   Организация Объединенных Наций по наблюдению за выполнением условий перемирия (UNTSO), в состав которой входят 298 офицеров и военнослужащих, включая группу наблюдателей в Бейруте (50 человек), продолжает патрулировать северную границу Израиля. На Голанских высотах Организация Объединенных Наций развертывает силы по наблюдению за разъединением (UNDOF) численностью 1410 человек с контингентами из Австрии (532 человека), Канады (226 человек), Финляндии (495 человек) и Польши (157 человек). Наконец, Временные силы Организации Объединенных Наций в Ливане (UNIFIL) состоят примерно из 5533 человек из Франции (500), Фиджи (640), Финляндии (495), Ганы (690), Ирландии (746), Италии (51), Непала (800), Норвегии (864) и Швеции (774).
   Египетско-израильская граница патрулируется 2665-мя многонациональными силами и наблюдателями (MFO), созданными в соответствии с израильско-египетским мирным договором; контингенты прибывают из США (1186), Канады (136), Великобритании (38), Колумбии (500), Фиджи (500), Франции (40), Италии (90), Нидерландов (105) и Уругвая (70).
   Экономические процессы
   Ближневосточная рецессия не ослабевает. Региональный ВВП сократился еще на 3,1% в 1986 году после падения на 3,8% в 1985 году. Более того, в регионе за год средний уровень инфляции составил 11%. В значительной степени это было связано с резким падением цен на нефть (55% между 1985 и 1986 годами) до уровня на 15% ниже цены 1978 года в реальном выражении. В результате этого и низкой квоты на добычу (около 13,4 млн. баррелей в день в 1986 году) экспортеры нефти из стран Залива были вынуждены активно использовать свои резервы; Кувейт, Саудовская Аравия и Иран в 1986 году привлекли более 1 млрд. долл.США. В результате, региональный долг вырос на $15 млрд, примерно с $130 млрд до $145 млрд.
   В то время как большинство нефтедобывающих стран имеют значительные финансовые резервы - только наличные резервы Саудовской Аравии составляют 46 миллиардов долларов, - не нефтедобывающие или мелкие нефтедобывающие государства Ближнего Востока могут прибегать только к заимствованиям. По соотношению долг/ВВП Марокко является крупнейшим должником региона с 16 миллиардами долларов (110% ВВП), за ним следует Египет с 44 миллиардами долларов (около 80% ВВП 1986 года). Египетская цифра включает в себя основную часть военных долгов страны (около $11 млрд, $4,6 млрд., который принадлежит США), но исключает военный долг СССР оцениваемый в 3 миллиарда долларов. Иракские военные расходы привело к накопленной задолженности, которая составляет около 50 миллиардов долларов (не считая около 40 миллиардов долларов, предположительно безвозвратные долги в Совет по сотрудничеству стран Персидского залива). В Иране, который не имеет крупного долгосрочного кредитного долга, краткосрочный коммерческий долг, по-видимому, остается на уровне около $ 1 млрд (около $5,5 млрд в наличных резервах, исключая неизвестные золотые запасы страны). Задолженность Израиля, самая высокая в мире в пересчете на душу населения, стабилизировалась на уровне около 30 млрд. долл. Более того, ее инфляция установилась на уровне 20%. Ливанская экономика, близкая к полному краху, за год обесценилась более чем на 300%, что вынудило "правительство" продать 20% своих золотых запасов. Судан, безусловно, самая бедная из ближневосточных стран, продолжает скатываться в долговую яму, при этом общий объем задолженности в 1986 году составил по меньшей мере 13 млрд. долл.
   Региональный доход на душу населения продолжает снижение, начавшееся в 1979 году (несмотря на чрезвычайно высокий доход на душу населения в странах Совета сотрудничества стран Залива). В 1986 году он снизился еще на 3,7%. В регионе с одним из самых высоких в мире ростом населения (от 3 до 6%) экономический прогресс постоянно подрывается. Диспропорция между богатыми производителями нефти и теми, у кого мало ресурсов, и зачастую плохо управляемыми, заметно усилила региональную напряженность. Не только Ирано-Иракская война, но и война между Чадом и Ливией, Гражданская война в Судане, марокканско-алжирская напряженность в отношении Полисарио и гражданская война в Ливане - все это способствует и в некоторой степени также отражает лежащие в основе экономического стресса и давления. Привлекательность исламского фундаментализма также отчасти вызвана этим экономическим недугом.
   Региональный экспорт сократился до около 115 млрд. долл. (по сравнению с 253 млрд долларов в 1980 году). Лишь на экспортном рынке вооружений Египет и Израиль добились заметных улучшений в доходах; по оценкам, в 1986 году каждый экспортировал вооружения на сумму около 300 млн. долл.США. Кроме того, Египет, как представляется, привержен созданию значительного военно-промышленного комплекса, чему способствует не только Ирано-Иракская война, но и будущие потребности в вооружениях во всем регионе. Свидетельством этого являются недавние совместные турецко-египетские соглашения о производстве оружия.
   Однако расходы на оборону в регионе сократилось. Даже Ираку и Ирану пришлось потратить меньше, в то время как Саудовская Аравия, крупнейший в регионе транжира обороны, сократила свои расходы более чем на 40% за последние три года. Тем не менее в большинстве стран региона расходы на оборону остаются самой крупной статьей расходов в их бюджетах характер и масштабы запасов оружия каждой из них.
  
  
   ALGERIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 169,000 (70,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:2 years Army only; 6 months basic, 18 months 'National Service' (= civil construction).
Reserves: Army: up to 150,000, to age 50.

ARMY: 150,000 (70,000 conscripts).
6 Military Regions.
2 armd bdes (2 tk, 1 mech, 1 arty, 1 engr bns, recce coy, ATK, log bns).
5 mech bdes (2 mech, 1 tk, 1 arty, 1 engr recce, ATK, log bns).
9 mot inf bdes (3 inf, 1 arty, 1 engr bns).
1 AB/special force bde.
28 indep inf bns.
4 para bns.
5 indep arty bns.
5 AD bns.
4 engr bns.
12 coys desert troops.
Equipment:
Tks: 910: 95 T-34, 390 T-54/-55, 325 T-62, 100 T-72. lt: 40 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 140 BRDM-2. MICV: 690 BMP-1. APC: 770: 460 BTR-50/-60, 310 BTR-152.
Arty: 780: guns: 400: 76mm: 85 ZIS-3 (M-1942); 85mm: 85 D-44; 122mm: 110 M-1931/37, 70 M-1974; 152mm: 50 ISU-152 SP.
   how: 280: 122mm: 50 M-30, M-1938, 170 D-30; 152mm: 60 M-1937.
   MRL: 100: 122mm: 70 BM-21; 240mm: 30 BM-24.
   Mor: 100: 120mm: M-43; 70mm: M-43.
ATK: guns: 195: 57mm: 145 ZIS-2; 100mm: 50 SU-100 SP.
   RCL: 155: 82mm: 110 T-21; 107mm: 45 B-11.
   ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (some SP/BRDM-2), Milan.
AD: guns: 850: 14.5mm: 65 ZPU-2/-4; 20mm: 100; 23mm: 60 ZU-23; 37mm: 150; 57mm: 75; 85mm: 20; 100mm: 150; 130mm: 20 towed;
   210 ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: 65 SA-6, SA-7/-8/-9.

NAVY: 7,000.
Bases: Algiers, Annaba, Mers el Kebir.
Subs: 2 R-class.
Frigates: 3 Koni with 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 3 Nanuchka with 4 SS-N-2B/C SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 12with 4 Styx SSM: 2 Osa-I, 10 Osa-II.
Patrol craft, coastal: 1 Zhuk (?operational).
MCMV: 1 T-43 ocean minesweeper.
Amph: LST: 2 Brooke; LSM: 1 Polnocny.
Coastguard (under naval control): 550; 24 vessels: 6 Kebir FAC (1987); 18 patrol craft ( (2 P-6, 16 Baglietto (6 Mangusta, 10 Type-20 GC)).
(On order (status uncertain): 2 corvettes, 3 Kebir (Brooke Marine 37-m) FAC.)

AIR FORCE: 12,000; some 346 combat ac, 45+ armed hel.
FGA: 141: 8 sqns:
   1 with 12 Su-7BM;
   3 with 51 MiG-17;
   3 with some 60 MiG-23BM;
   1 with some 18 Su-20 (Fitter C).
Interceptors: 155: 10 sqns:
   8 with 125 MiG-21MF/F;
   1 with 15 MiG-23.
   1 with 15 MiG-25 Foxbat A.
Recce: 1 sqn with 6 MiG-25R Foxbat B.
MR: 10: 1 sqn with 8 F-27-400 (Navy-assigned), 2 Super King Air B-200T.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 An-12, 11 C-130H Hercules, 6 C-130H-30, 1 I1-18, 1 Mystere-Falcon 20, 2 Caravelle Super B.
Hel: 9 sqns:
   attack: 3 sqns with 45 Mi-24;
   tpt: (hy): 3 sqns with 29 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 4 Mi-6; (med): 2 sqns with 40 Mi-4,5 SA-330 Puma; (lt): 6 Hughes 269A, 4 SA-31SC Alouette II.
Misc: 2 CL-215 SAR, 12 King Air, 12 Sierra 200, 3 Queen Air.
Trg: 56: combat: 17 MiG-17, 8 MiG-21U, 3 Su-7U, 6 MiG-23U, 3 MiG-25U, 3 MiG-15U, 10 MiG-15, 6 T-34C;
   basic: 63: 22 CM-170 Magister, 41 Gumhuriya (Biicker-181 type).
AD: guns: 3 bdes+: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm.
SAM: 1 regt: 30 SA-2 (96 msls), some 20 SA-3.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

PARA-MILITARY:
(Ministry of Interior): Gendarmerie 30,000; 44 Panhard AML-60/M-3 APC.

* Excl eqpt and internal security costs.

   BAHRAIN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 2,800.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,300.
1 bde:
1 inf bn.
1 armd car sqn.
1 arty, 2 mor btys.
Equipment:
Tks: 60 M-60A3.
AFV: recce: 8 Saladin, 20 AML-90, 8 Ferret.
APC: some 10 AT-105 Saxon, 90 Panhard M-3.
Arty: guns: 105mm: 8 lt. how: 155mm: 7 M-198. Mor: 81mm: 6.
ATK: RCL: 120mm: 6 MOBAT. ATGW: 60 BGM-71A TOW.
AD: SAM: 50+ RBS-70.

NAVY: 300.
Base. Jufair (Manama).
FAC(G):
   2 Lurssen type 62-001 (62-m) with 2x2 Harpoon SSM;
   2 Lurssen 45-m with 4 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
FAC: 2 Lurssen 38-m.
Amph: LCU: 1 40-m.

AIR FORCE: 200; 12 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 6 F-5E, 6 F-5F.
Tpt: 1 Gulfstream II (VIP).
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 AB-212, 3 BO-105, 2 Hughes 500D.
AAM: AIM-9P3 Sidewinder.

PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Interior):
Coast-Guard 180; 23 coastal patrol craft, 2 landing craft, 1 hovercraft.
Police 2,000; 2 Bell 412, 2 Scout AH-1 hel.

* Excl a $ 1.0-bn GCCsubsidy, shared between Bahrain and Oman, probably used for equipment purchases and military construction projects. Also excl internal security costs, est at D35 m for 1986 and 1987.

   DJIBOUTI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl Gendarmerie, form part of the Army):
Active: 4,230 incl 1,200 Gendarmerie.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,870.
1 inf regt, incl mor, ATK platoons.
1 armd sqn.
1 spt bn.
1 border cdo bn.
1 para coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: some 10 BRDM-2, 4 AML-60, 16 AML-90. APC: 12 BTR-60.
Mor. 81mm; 120mm: 4.
ATK: RL: 89mm. RCL: 106mm.

NAVY: 60.
Base: Djibouti.
Patrol boats, coastal: 3<: 2 Plascoa 23-m, 1 Tecimar.
Amph: LCA: 3<.

AIR FORCE: 100; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 Mystere 20 (VIP), 2 N-2501 Noratlas, 2C-212. lt: 1 Cessna 206G, 1 Socata 235GT.
Hel: 2 SA-315B Alouette II, 3 AS-355 Ecureuil.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,200. Gendarmerie: 1 bn, 1 patrol boat.
  
* Excl French military assistance.

   EGYPT
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 445,000 (some 250,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:3 years (selective).
Reserves: 604,000; Army 500,000, Navy 14,000, Air Force 20,000, AD 70,000.

ARMY: 320,000 (perhaps 180,000 conscripts).
2 Army HQ:
   4 armd divs (each with 2 armd, 1 mech bdes).
   6 mech inf divs (type: 2 mech, 1 armd bdes).
   2 inf divs (each with 2 inf, 1 mech bdes).
1 Republican Guard bde.
1 indep armd bde.
3 indep inf bdes.
2 airmobile, 1 para bdes.
3 indep arty bdes (2 more to form).
2 hy mor bdes.
7 cdo gps (1,000 men).
2 SSM regts (1 with FROG-7, 1 with Scud B).
Equipment:^
Tks: MBT: T-72,250: 900 T-54/-55, 600 T-62, 753 M-60A3. lt: 15 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 300 BRDM-2. MICV: 200 BMP-1, some 250 BMR-600P.
   APC: 2,500: OT-62, Walid (to National Guard), Fahd (being introduced), BTR-50, 1,200 M-113A2.
Arty: guns: 122mm: 48 M-31/37; 130mm: M-46. guns/how: 152mm: 12 M-1937 (ML-20).
   how: 122mm: M-1938, D-30 (some SP); 155mm: some 100 M-109A2 SP.
   MRL: about 300: 80mm: VAP-80-12; 122mm: BM-21/as-Saqr-18/-30; 130mm: M-51/Praga V3S; 132mm: BM-13-16; 140mm: BM-14-16; 240mm: BM-24.
   SSM: 12 FROG-7, 9 Scud B.
   Mor: 82mm; 400: 120mm: M-43; 160mm: M-43; 240mm: M-1953.
ATK: RCL: 107mm: B-11.
   ATGW: 1,000 AT-1 Snapper, AT-2 Swatter, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2); Milan; Swingfire; 480 TOW (incl 52 on M-901 (M-113) SP).
AD: guns: 1,000: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 23mm: ZU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 SP; 35mm: GDF-002; 57mm: S-60, 254 ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: SA-7/as-Saqr, SA-9.
(On order: 90 M-113, some 305 BMR-600P APC; some 100 M-109A2 155mm SP how; as-Saqr (SA-7), 25 btys (384 msls) Chaparral SAM.)

NAVY: ї 20,000 (10,000 conscripts).
Bases: Alexandria, Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Port Tewfig; Red Sea: Hurghada, Safaqa.
Subs: 12: 10 R-class (4 Ch Type-O-33); 2 Sov W-class.
Destroyers: 3:
   2 Sov Skory (1 with 1x2 Styx SSM) (?non-operational);
   1 Br Z-class (trg).
Frigates: 6:
   FFG: 4: 2 Ch Jianghu (1 on refit) with 4 Hai Ying-2 SSM;
   2 Spanish F-30 (Descubierta) with 2x4 Harpoon;
   FF: 2 Br (1 Black Swan, 1 Hunt).
FAC(G): 30:
   6 Ramadan with 4 Otomat SSM;
   8 Sov Osa-I with 4 SS-N-2A SSM, SA-7 SAM;
   6 October-6 (P-6) (with 2 Otomat);
   6 Hegu (Komar-type)< with 2 Hai Ying-2 SSM;
   4 Komar< with 2 SS-N-2A SSM.
FAC(T): 10 P-6<.
FAC: 22:
   6 Shershen with BM-21 (8-tube) 122mm or 1 BM-24 (12-tube) 240mm MRL, 1 SA-7 SAM;
   12 P-6< with 1x8 BM-21;
   4 Shanghai II (plus 4 in reserve).
Patrol craft, large: 41:
   12 Sov SO-1 (some with SA-7 SAM), 8 Ch Hainan, 12 Timsah, 9 Swift 93-ft.
MCMV: 12 minesweepers: ocean: 10: 6 T-43, 4 Yurka; inshore: 4: 2T-301, 2 K-8.
Minelayers: 3 SRN-6 hovercraft.
Amph: LSM: 3 Polnocny; LCU: 14 (10 Vydra, 4 SMB1).
Coastal defence unit (Army tps, Navy control):
   guns: 130mm: SM-4-1.
   SSM: 30 Otomat and Samlet.
(On order (lack of funds delays deliveries): 4 Luda DDG; 2 Tripartite MCMV; 10 Timsah, 3 Hyundai patrol boats; 11 SRN-6 hovercraft; 6 LST; Stingray torpedoes; 16 Harpoon, Otomat SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 25,000 (10,000 conscripts); some 441 combat ac, 53 armed hel (incl AD comd).ї
Bbr: 1 bde (sqn): 9Tu-16.
AD/FGA: 102: 2 bdes (4 sqns): 70 J-6, 32 F-4E.
FGA: 83: 2 bdes (4 sqns) with 54 Mirage 5SDE, 14 Mirage 2000EM, 15 Alpha Jet MS-2.
Interceptors: 161: 6 bdes (8 sqns):
   5 sqns with 100 MiG-21
   1 with 19 J-7;
   2 with 42 F-16A.
Recce: 20: 1 bde (2 sqns) with 6 Mirage 5SDR, 14 MiG-21.
ELINT: 2 EC-130H Hercules, 2 E-2C Hawkeye.
Hel: 15 sqns:
   attack: 1 bde (2 sqns) with 24 SA-342M Gazelle (HOT), 24 SA-342L (20mm gun).
   ASW: 1 bde (sqn) with 5 Sea King Mk 47.
   tac tpt: 3 bdes: hy: 1 sqn with 15 CH-47C Chinook, med: 4 sqns: 3 with 27 Mi-8, 1 with 19 Commando Mk 2 (1 VIP). lt: 1 sqn with 18 Hiller UH-12E.
Tpt: 2 bdes (3 sqns) with 21 C-130H, 5 DHC-5D Buffalo, 3 Mystere-Falcon 20 (VIP), 2 Gulfstream III, 4 Boeing 707, 1 Boeing 737.
Trg: incl 16 MiG-19, 30 Alpha Jet MS-1, 20 L-29 (being replaced), 35 Gumhuria (Bucker-181 type), 10 PZL-104 Wilga,
   4 JJ-6 (2-seat), 6 Mirage 5SDD, 6 F-16B, 12 EMB-312 Tucano, 4 DHC-5 Buffalo.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, Matra R-530, Sparrow, R-550 Magic, AIM-9P3/-9L Sidewinder.
ASM: AS-1 Kennel, AS-5 Kelt, AGM-65 Maverick, HOT.
(On order: Some 40 J-7, 80 F-16C/D, some 26 Mirage 2000EM, 4 -BM, 16 Mirage 5E2 ftrs, 26 J-6; 5 E-2C AEW, 6 Beech 1900 ESM (2 MR), 3 C-130H tpt, some 18 Tucano trg ac; 12 Sea King ASW, AS-332 Super Puma, 24 AH-1 Cobra with TOW, 15 CH-47, 18 Hiller UH-12E, 24 Gazelle (some 12 with HOT ATGW), 4 Bell 222, 1 AS-61 tpt hel; Sparrow, 560 Sidewinder AAM; Exocet AM-39, Maverick ASM.)

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: 80,000 (50,000 conscripts).
12 centres under construction.
AD: 4 divs: regional bdes.
   100 AA bns.
   65 SA-2, 60 SA-3 bns.
   Radar bns.
Equipment:
Arty: guns: 2,500: 20mm, 23mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm, 85mm; 100mm.
SAM: some 400 SA-2, 240 SA-3, 75 SA-6, 9 btys Improved HAWK (108 launchers, 389 msls), 16 Crotale, SA-9.
Some 18 Amoun AD systems (Skyguard/AIM-7F Sparrow - some 36 twin 35mm guns, some 36 quad SAM).
Radar: msl/gun: AN/TPS-43/-59/-63, AN/TSQ-73, Fan Song, Flat Face P-15, Spoon Rest P-12, Low Blow, Straight Flush;
   EWng: Squint Eye, Long Track.
(On order: Ch CSA-1, Spada/Aspide SAM, LPD-20 search radar.)

Forces Abroad: Oman, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire.

PARA-MILITARY: 439,000.
Central Security Forces 300,000.
National Guard 60,000 (getting Walid APC).
Frontier Corps 12,000.
Defence and Security 60,000.
Coast Guard 7,000; 3 Nisr, 6 Crestitalia, 6 Bertram patrol boats, 34 rescue launches.

* Est military debt $11 bn, of which some $3 bn is owed to the USSR and some $4.6 bn to the US.
f Excl credit arrangements with individual suppliers.
t Egypt operates five exchange rates; for consistency, the principal rate is used here.
ї Most Soviet eqpt now in reserve, incl MBT, some combat aircraft. Some shown as Soviet has been rebuilt with Western, Chinese and domestically produced components.

   IRAN
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 654,500.
Terms of service. 24 months.
Reserves: Army: 350,000, ex-service volunteers.

ARMY: 305,000 (perhaps 250,000 conscripts).
(?3) Army HQ.
3 mech divs (each 3 bdes: 9 armd, 18 mech bns).
7 inf divs.
1 AB bde.
1 Special Forces div (4 bdes).
Some indep armd, inf bdes (incl 'coastal force').
12 SAM bns with Improved HAWK.
Ground Forces Air Support units.
Reserve: 'Qods' bns (ex-service).
Equipment: ^
Tks: perhaps 1,000: T-54/-55, 260 Ch T-59, T-62, T-72, Chieftain Mk 3/5, M-47/-48, M-60A1. lt: 50 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 130 EE-9 Cascavel. MICV: 180 BMP-1. APC: 500 BTR-50/-60, perhaps 250 M-113.
Arty: some 750+: guns: 130mm: M-46, 175mm: 30 M-107 SP.
   how: 105mm: M-101, 36 Oto Melara; 155mm: M-109A1 SP; 203mm: 10 M-110 SP.
   MRL: 12x107mm: Ch Type-63; 40x122mm: 65 BM-21.
   SSM: Scud;local manufacture msls reported incl Oghab 40-km range (FROG-type).
   Mor: 81mm; 107mm: M-30 4.2-in.; 120mm: 3,000.
ATK: RCL: 57mm; 75mm; 106mm: M-40A/C. ATGW: ENTAC, SS-11/-12, M-47 Dragon, BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 1,500: 23mm: ZU-23 towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; 35mm: 92; 37mm; 57mm: ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: Improved HAWK, SA-7, some 300 RBS-70.
Avn: ac: incl 56 Cessna (185, 310, O-2A), 2 F-27, 5 Shrike Commander, 2 Mystere-Falcon;
   hel: (attack): AH-1 Cobra;(hy tpt): CH-47C Chinook.
   (270 Bell 214A, 35 AB-205A, 15 AB-206 were also held.)
(Captured Iraqi eqpt in service.)
(On order: no confirmed information.)

REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (Pasdaran Inqilab):
Ground Forces: some 300,000; 11 Regional Commands: loosely org in bns of no fixed size, grouped into perhaps
   8 divs and many indep bdes, incl inf, armd, para, special forces, arty incl SSM, engr, AD and border defence units, serve indep or with Army;
   small arms, spt weapons from Army; controls Basij (see below) when mobilized.
Naval Forces: strength unknown, five island bases (Al Farsiyah, Halul (oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Larak);
   some 40 Swedish Boghamma Marin small launches armed with ATGW, RCL, machine guns. Italian SSM reported.
   Controls coast defence elms incl arty and Ch HY-2 Silkworm SSM in at least 3 sites, each 3-6 msls.
Marines: 3 bdes reported.
Air Forces: forming; to have AD role in static defence of major installations. Some pilots, possible 'manned bomb' suicide role. May have 22 F-6.

NAVY: 14,500, incl naval air and marines. f
Bases: Bandar Abbas (HQ), Bushehr, Kharg, Bandar-e-Anzelli, Bandar-e-Khomeini, Chah Bahar (building).
Principal Combatants:
Destroyers: 3 (believed non-operational):
   1 Br Battle with 2x4 Standard SSM, 1x4 Seacat SAM;
   2 US Sumner with 4x2 Standard SSM reported.
Frigates: 4 Vosper Mk 5 with 1x5 Seakiller SSM (1 possibly operational).
Corvettes: 2 (?1) US PF-103 (non-operational).
Minor Combatants (few operational):
FAC(G): 11 Kaman (La Combattante II) (? 10 serviceable) fitted for Harpoon SSM (none now held).
Patrol craft, large: 4 Cape; hovercraft<: 6 BH-7 Mk 4, coastal: 3 S. Korean 30-m.
MCMV: coastal: 1 US MSC 292/268.
Amph: LST: 4 Hengam. LSM: 4 Neth.
Spt: 1 replenishment, 2 Bandar Abbas oiler fleet supply, 1 repair ship.
Msls: SSM: ~200 HY-2
Marines: 3 bns.
(On order: 6 Type-1200 subs; 1 more sub stated to be under domestic construction, may be for Pasdaran.)

NAVAL AIR: ?1 combat ac, ?14 armed hel.
MR: 1 sqn with 5 P-3F Orion (?1 operational)
ASW: 1 hel sqn with ?12 SH-3D
MCM: 1 hel sqn with 2 RH-53D.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 Shrike Commander, 4 F-27, 1 Mystere-Falcon 20 ac, 7 AB-212 hel.

AIR FORCE: 35,000; ?60 serviceable combat ac, no armed hel. f
FGA: 8 sqns:
   4 with some 35 (?20) F-4D/E;
   4 with some 45 (?20) F-5E/F.
Interceptor: (?10) F-14; 10 J-6.
Recce: 1 sqn (dets) with some 5 F-5, 3 RF-4E.
Tanker/tpt: 2 sqns: 17 Boeing (10 707, 7 747).
Tpt: 5 sqns: 26 C-130E/H Hercules, 9 F-27, 2 Aero Commander 690, 4 Mystere-Falcon 20.
Hel: 10 HH-34F (S-55), 10 AB-206A, 5 AB-212, 39 Bell 214C, 10 CH-47 Chinook, 2 S-61A4.
Trg: incl 26 F-33A/C Bonanza, 7 T-33, 46 PC-7, 2 J-6.
SAM: 5 sqns with Rapier, 25 Tigercat, CSA-1 (Ch. version of SA-2).
AAM: Phoenix, AIM-9 Sidewinder, AIM-7 Sparrow. ASM: AS-12, Maverick.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon: Revolutionary Guard 1,000.

PARA-MILITARY:
Basij 'Popular Mobilization Army' volunteers, mostly youths: strength varies to as high as 1 million during periods of offensive operations.
   Org in up to 500 300-350-man 'bns' of 3 coys, each 4 platoons and spt; grouped in named formations/forces with a strength of up to 130,000;
   small arms only.
Gendarmerie (45,000 incl border guard elm); Cessna 185/310 lt ac, AB-205/-206 hel, patrol boats, 96 coastal, 40 harbour craft (purchased, some lost). f
Sevama secret police.
Kurds: Kurdish Democratic Party armed wing Pesh Merga 712,000.

OPPOSITION:
Kurdish Communist Party of Iran (KOMALA) strength unknown.
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK): perhaps 10,500.

* Excl some $0.8 bn available from the development fund, and $2.8 bn in foreign exchange for military purchases.
f Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes eqpt estimates very tentative. Reports of Chinese tk and ac deliveries possible but unconfirmed; MRL identified. Operational status of US-source eqpt impossible to confirm.

   IRAQ
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,000,000.
Terms of service: basic 21-24 months, extended for war.
Reserves: Peoples Army (Para-military) ~650,000

ARMY: 955,000 (incl perhaps 480,000 active reserves).
7 corps HQ.
5 armd divs ('type': 1armd, 1mech bde; varies).
3 mech/mot inf divs.
30 inf divs (incl Peoples Army/volunteer inf and Reserve bdes).
1 Presidential Guard Force (3 armd, 1 inf, 1 cdo bdes).
6 special forces bdes.
Equipment:^
Tks: some 4,500: T-54/-55/-62/-72, 1,500 T-59/-69 II, 150 Chieftain Mk 3/5, M-60, M-47, 60 M-77. lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: about 4,000: recce: incl BRDM-2, FUG-70, ERC-90, MOWAG Roland, EE-9 Cascavel, EE-3 Jararaca.
   MICV: 1,000 BMP.
   APC: BTR-50/-60/-152, OT-62/-64, VC-TH (with HOT ATGW), M-113A1, Panhard M-3, EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: 3,000: guns: 122mm: D-74; 130mm: M-46, Type 59-1; 155mm: some 5 GCT SP. guns/how: 152mm: M-1937; 155mm: 40 G-5, 40 GHN-45.
   how: 105mm: M-56 pack; 122mm: D-30 towed, M-1938, M-1974 (2S1); 152mm: M-1943, M-1973 (2S3) SP; 155mm: M-114/M-109 SP.
   MRL: 200: incl 122mm: BM-21; 127mm: 60 ASTROS II; 132mm: BM-13/-16.
   SSM: 30 FROG-7, 20 Scud B.
   Mor: 81mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm: SPG-9; 82mm: B-10; 107mm. guns: 85mm; 100mm towed; 105mm: 100 JPz SK-105 SP.
   ATGW: AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2), AT-4 Spigot reported, SS-11, Milan, HOT.
Avn (Army Air Corps): (?150) armed hel.
   attack (?40) Mil Mi-24 Hind Wiih AT-2 Swatter, 50 SA-342 Gazelle (some with HOT); 10 SA-321 Super Frelon, some with Exocet AM-38 ASM;
   some 30 SA-316B Alouette III with AS-12 ASM; some 56 BO-105 with AS-11 ATGW; 86 Hughes (26 -530F, 30 -500D, 30 -300C).
   tpt: (hy): 10 Mi-6 Hook, (med): 100 Mi-8, 20 Mi-4, 10 SA-330 Puma.
AD: guns: 4,000: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939 and twin; 57mm: incl ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm.
   SAM: 120 SA-2, 150 SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, 60 Roland.
(Captured Iranian eqpt in service.)
(On order: 250 EE-9 Cascavel AFV; 80 GCT 155mm SP guns, Bell 214 ST hel.)

NAVY: 5,000.t
Bases: Basra, Umm Qasr.
Frigates: 5:
   4 Lupo with 8 Otomat-2 SSM, 1x8 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 1 hel; held in Italy.
   1 Yug (trg).
Corvettes: 6 Assad all with 1x4 Albatros/Aspide SAM: 2 with 2 Otomat-2 SSM, 1 hel; 4 with 6 Otomat-2 (completed, held in Italy).
FAC(G): 8 Osa (6 II, 2 I) with 4 Styx SSM.
FAC(T): 4 P-6< (may not be operable).
Patrol craft: large: 3 SO-1; coastal: 5 Zhuk(.
Minesweepers: ocean: 2 Sov T-43, 3 Yevgenya<; inshore/river: 3 Nestin<.
Amph: LSM: 3 Polnocny; LST: 3 mod cargo.
Spt ships: 1 Stromboli (held in Italy); 2 Poluchat torpedo spt, 1 Agnadeen tanker, 1 tpt.

AIR FORCE: 40,000 incl 10,000 AD personnel; 500+ combat ac, no armed hel.
Bbrs: 2 sqns: 1 with Tu-22, 1 with Tu-16.
FGA: 11 sqns:
   4 with MiG-23BM;
   4 with Mirage F-1EQ5 (Exocet-equipped), Mirage F-1EQ-200;
   3 with Su-7 and Su-20.
   (Su-25 reported.)
Interceptors: 5 sqns:
   Some 25 MiG-25, some 40 MiG-19, some 200 MiG-21, 30 Mirage F-1EQ.
   (MiG-29 reported.)
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 MiG-25.
Tpt: ac: 2 sqns: 10 An-2 Colt; 10 An-12 Cub, 6 An-24 Coke (retiring); 2 An-26 Curl, 19 I1-76 Candid, 19 I1-14 Crate, 1 DH Heron.
Trg: incl MiG-15/-21/-23U, Su-7U, Hunter T-69; 16 Mirage F-1BQ; 50 L-29 Delfin, 40 L-39 Albatros, 50 PC-7 Turbo Trainer, 21 EMB-312 Tucano.
AAM: R-530, R-550 Magic, AA-2/-6/-7/-8. ASM: AS-30 Laser, Armat, Exocet AM-39, AS-4 Kitchen, AS-5 Kelt.
(On order: no confirmed information.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Frontier Guards.
Security troops 4,800.

OPPOSITION: Kurds.
Kurdish Democratic Party KDP: 10,000 (20,000 more in militia); small arms, some Iranian It arty, MRL, mor, SAM-7.
Kurdish Workers Party: strength unknown; breakaway from KDP, anti-Iran, Syria-based.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 4,000 combat (plus 6,000 spt).
Eqpt: MBT: 6 T-54/-55. mor: 450: 60mm; 120mm. RCL: 106mm. AD guns: 12.5mm: some 200, SAM: SA-7.
Socialist Party of Kurdistan: ?1,500 armed.

* Excl $35-45 bn in economic and military subsidies from GCC members over the past seven years.
f Losses and incomplete reporting of resupply makes eqpt estimates very tentative.

   ISRAEL
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 141,000 (110,000 male and female conscripts).
Terms of Service:officers 48 months, men 36 months, women 24 months (Jews, Druze only; Christians and Arabs may volunteer).
Annual training as reservists thereafter to age 54 for men, 34 (or marriage) for women.
Reserves: 504,000: Army 494,000; Navy 1,000 immediate recall; Air Force 9,000 immediate recall. Reservists complete establishments incl HQ staffs.
   Others, such as Nahal (Noar Halutzi Lohen = Pioneer Fighting Youth) act as a Home Guard.

STRATEGIC:
Recent unconfirmed reports from a single source suggest that Israel may have produced some 100 nuclear warheads.
   The IISS has no further evidence to confirm or deny these reports.
Nuclear-capable delivery systems could include aircraft or the Jericho SSM (range up to 450 km or, in modified form, some 800 km),
   first reported as having been developed from the French MD-620/660.
   Again we cannot confirm whether these systems are actually developed for delivery purposes.

ARMY: 104,000 (88,000 conscripts, male and female); some 598,000 on mobilization.
11 armd divs (many cadre; on mobilization comprise 33 armd bdes (each 3 tk, 1 mech inf bns)).
9 mech inf bdes.
3 inf bdes.
5 para bdes.
12 territorial/border inf bdes with Nahal militia.
15 arty bdes (each 5 bns of 3 btys).
2 AD btys (with Vulcan/Chaparral).
Equipment: f
Tks: 3,900: incl 1,100 Centurion, 600 M-48A5, 1,300 M-60/A1/A3, 250 T-54/-55, 150 T-62, 500 Merkava I/II.
AFV: recce: about 400 incl Ramta RBY, M-2/-3, BRDM-2. APC: 5,900 M-113, BTR-50P, 4,000 M2/-3 halftrack.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 85 M-46; 175mm: 140 M-107 SP.
   how: 105mm: 70 M-101; 122mm: 100 D-30; 155mm: 300 Soltam M-68/-71, M-839P/-845P, L-33 SP; 120 M-50, 450 M-109A1/A2; 203mm: 36 M-110 SP.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 160mm: LAR-160; 240mm: BM-24; 290mm: MAR-290.
   SSM: MGM-52C Lance, Ze'ev (Wolj).
   Mor: 81mm: 1,100; 120mm; 160mm (some SP).
ATK: RL: 82mm: B-300; RCL: 106mm: 250. ATGW: BGM-71 TOW, M-47 Dragon, Picket 81mm, Togger (TOW/Sagger derivative).
AD: guns: 20mm: 900; 30 M-163 Fulcan/M-48 Chaparral gun/msl systems; 23mm: ZU-23-2 and 50 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm and 40mm: L-70.
   SAM: MIM-42A Redeye.
(On order: Merkava MBT, Re'em AFV; M-107 175mm SP guns; Lance SSM, TOW, Dragon ATGW.)

NAVY: 9,000 (3,300 conscripts), 10,000 on mobilization.
Bases: Haifa, Ashdod, Eilat.
Subs: 3 Type 206.
Corvettes: 4:
   2 Aliya (Sa'ar 4.5) with 4 Gabriel II, 4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Bell 206 Kiowa ASW hel.
   4 Romat.
FAC(G): 22:
   8 Reshef (Sa'ar 4) with 4 Gabriel III, 8 Harpoon SSM;
   6 Sa'ar 3 with 3 Gabriel III, 1x2 Harpoon;
   6 Sa'ar 2 with 2 Gabriel II;
   (1 Dvora with 2 Gabriel III is export sales prototype only);
   hydrofoil: 2 Shimrit (Flagstaff 2) with 2 Gabriel III, 4 Harpoon SSM.
Patrol craft, coastal: 36<: 32 PCBR Mk 1 Dabur, 4 Yatush.
Amph: LSM: 3; LCT: 6; LCM: 3.
MR: ac: 7 Seascan 1124N.
Spt: 1 tender, 2 armed tpts, 2 trg ships (1<), 4 coastal patrol auxiliaries<.
Naval cdo: (300), 1 Firefish III attack craft.
(On order: 1 sub, 20mm Phalanx AD systems.)

AIR FORCE: 28,000 (19,000 conscripts, in AD), 37,000 on mobilization; some 676 combat ac (perhaps 90 stored), 76 armed hel.
FGA/interceptor: 15 sqns:
   2 with some 52 F-15;
   5 with 128 F-4E;
   5 with 135 Kfir C1/C2/C7;
   3 with 68 F-16A, 8 -B (F-16C/D to replace, being delivered).
FGA: 4 sqns with 130 A-4N/J Skyhawk.
Recce: 14 RF-4E, 5 RC-12.
AEW: 4 E-2C.
ECM: 6 Boeing 707 (some comd).
Tpt: 1 wing: incl 10 Boeing 707 (3 tanker mods), 22 C-130E/H, 18 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2KC-130H.
Liaison: 1 BN-2 Islander, 16 Dornier (5 Do-27, 11 Do-28D); 20 Cessna (18 U-206C, 2 180); 12 Queen Air 80; 2 Westwind; 30 Super Cub.
Trg: incl 20 TA-4H/J Skyhawk, 10 Kfir (incl TC-2), 16 F-4E, 80 CM-170 Magister/Tzugit.
Hel: attack: 3 sqns: 2 with 40 AH-1S, 1 with 36 Hughes 500MD;
   ECM/SAR: 1 sqn with 20 Bell 206, 212;
   tpt: (hy): 33 CH-53A/D; (med): 9 SA-321 Super Frelon, 17 UH-1D; (lt): 2 sqns with 50 Bell 206A, 212.
Drones: Mastiff I, Scout, Teledyne Ryan 124R, MQM-74C Chukar II, Delilah.
SAM: 15 bns with MIM-23B HAWK/Improved HAWK.
AAM: AIM-9/-9L Sidewinder, AIM-7E/F Sparrow, Shafrir, Python III.
ASM: Luz, AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-45 Shrike, AGM-62A Walleye, AGM-12 Bullpup, Gabriel III (mod).
(On order: 75 F-16 ftrs; 60 Kfir-C7/-TC-2 trg ac; 25 AH-1S, 12 AS-365 Dauphin hel; 200 Improved HAWK SAM; 200 Sidewinder AAM.)

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (1,500).

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Guards 4,500; BTR-152 APC.
Arab Militia; small arms.
Coastguard; 3 US PBR, 3 other patrol craft.
Gadna (youth bns), volunteers 15-18, pre-military service trg by Defence Force.

* US military aid has so far reached a total of some $22.5 bn, of which $12.2 bn is to be repaid.
f Does not include captured PLO equipment: T-34, T-54 MBT, APC, 130mm guns, BM-21 MRL, ZSU-23-4 AA guns, SA-9 SAM.

   JORDAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 80,300.
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription, 2 years authorized.
Reserves 35,000: (all services), Army 30,000 (obligation to age 40).

ARMY: 70,000.
2 armd divs (?each 2 tk, 1 mech inf bdes).
2 mech inf divs (?each 2 mech inf, 1 tk bdes).
1 indep Royal Guards bde.
1 Special Forces bde (3 ABbns).
16 arty bns.
4 AA bdes.
Equipment:
Tks: some 986: 200 M-47/-48A5 (in reserve), 225 M-60A1/A3, 270 Khalid, 291 Tariq (Centurion).
AFV: recce: 140 Ferret. APC: 1,200 M-113, 30 Saracen, some EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: some 247: guns: 155mm: 17 M-59. guns/how: 155mm: 180 GHN45.
   how: 105mm: 36 M-101A1; 155mm: 38 M-114 towed, 20 M-44, 108 M-109A2 SP; 203mm: 4 M-115 towed (in store), 24 M-110 SP.
   Mor: 400: 81mm, 107mm and 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 300 106mm. ATGW: 300 BGM-71A TOW, 310 M-47 Dragon.
AD: guns: 20mm: 100 M-163 Vulcan; 40mm: 250 M-42 SP. SAM:SA-7B2, SA-14, Redeye.
(On order: EE-11 Urutu APC; APILAS 112mm RL; Javelin, Rapier SAM.)

NAVY (Coast Guard): 300.
Base: Aqaba.
Patrol craft: 6 (2 armed<).

AIR FORCE: 10,000; 109 combat ac, 24 armed hel.
FGA: 3 sqns with 66 F-5E/F.
Interceptor: 2 sqns with 32 Mirage F-1CJ/EJ.
OCU: 1 sqn with 5 F-5B, 6 F-5F.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-130B/H Hercules, 2 C-212A.
VIP: 1 sqn with 2 Boeing 727, 2 MystereFalcon 50 ac, 4 S-76 hel.
Hel: 4 sqns: 2 with 24 AH-1S (with TOW ASM; for eventual transfer to Army);
   1 with 5 SA-316B Alouette III, 14 S-76, 8 Hughes 500D.
Trg ac: 17 T-37C, 18 Bulldog, 1 C-212, 18 Piper (12 Warrior-II, 6 Seneca-II).
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder. ASM: TOW.
AD: 2 bdes:
   14 btys with 112 Improved HAWK SAM.
   3 btys with 12 SA-8 SAM.
   3 btys with 12 SA-13 SAM.
   3 btys with 36 ZSU-23-4 guns.
(On order: 14 C-101/5 Aviojet trg/COIN, 2 CN-235 tpt, 1 C-212 lt tpt ac; 6 Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY: 6,500:
Public Security Force 4,000.
Civil Militia 'People's Army' 2,500: men 16-65; women 16-45.
Palestine Liberation Army: 1,500; bde.

* Excl some D 25 m for 'internal security, civil defence and Islamic Justice'.

   KUWAIT
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 15,000 (excl Navy).
Terms of service : 2 years (university students, 1 year).
Reserves: conscript force; exists, no details.

ARMY: 13,000.
2 armd bdes.
2 mech inf bdes.
1 SSM bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 90 Vickers Mk 1, 10 Centurion, 160 Chieftain.
AFV: recce: 100 Saladin, 60 Ferret. APC: 200 M-113, 100 Saracen.
Arty: guns: 155mm: 40 AMX Mk F-3 SP. how: 18 M-109A2 SP. SSM: 4 FROG-7. Mor: 81mm.
ATGW: HOT, BGM-71A TOW/Improved TOW (incl 56 M-901 SP), Vigilant.
SAM: SA-6, SA-7, SA-8 Gecko.
(On order: Scorpion lt tks, some 4,000 Improved TOW, SA-7, SA-8 SAM.)

NAVY (administered by Ministry of the Interior): 1,100.
Base. Kuwait City.
FAC(G): 8 all with 4 MM-40 Exocet SSM: 6 Lurssen TNC-45. 2 Lurssen FPB-57.
Patrol craft, coastal: some 50< (15 armed).
Amph: LCM: 4 Loadmaster, LCU: 6.
Spt ships: 3 320-ton.
Marine cdos: ~50.
(On order: 20 Sedan patrol craft; 6 SRN-6 hovercraft; SA-365N Dauphin II hel; Exocet MM-40 SSM.)

AIR FORCE: 2,000 (excl foreign personnel); 80 combat ac, 23 armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 30 A-4KU, 4 TA-4KU Skyhawk.
Interceptor: 1 sqn with 32 Mirage F-1CK, 2 F-1BK.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 12 Hawk.
Tpt: 2 DC-9, 4 L-100-30; used also in civil role.
Hel: 3 sqns: attack: 23 SA-342K Gazelle; tpt: 12 SA-330 Puma, 5 AS-332 Super Puma.
Trg: incl 9 BAC-167 Strikemaster.
AD: 1 bn (4 btys) with 8 twin Improved HAWK SAM.
AAM: R-550 Magic, Super R-530, AIM-9 Sidewinder. ASM: AS-11 /-12.
(Store: 12 Lightning, 9 Hunter.)
(On order: 6 AS-332F Super Puma hel; 12 AM-39 Exocet ASM; AD radar and command system.)

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard: Palace, Border Guard. 20 V-150, 62 V-300 Commando APC.

* Excl capital expenditure.

   LEBANON
   Given the continuing conflict, the development of at least two economies, the political impotence of the Presidency and the National Assembly, and the existence of several armed forces, it is at present impossible to provide macro-economic and population data. However, the Government reported a defence budget of some $100 m for 1986, while admitting a defence debt of about $1 bn (for 1984-5) to the US and France.
   There are no longer any truly 'national' forces. Even the respective sectarian militia forces vary in their degrees of cohesion. They all have small active cadres, rapidly expanded by mobilizing reserves. Much of the equipment of the former national forces is held by these groups; some is stored unserviceable. The militias have their own sources of supply, and it is not possible to determine types and quantities accurately.
   Учитывая продолжающийся конфликт, развитие по крайней мере двух экономик, политическое бессилие президента и Национального собрания и существование нескольких вооруженных сил, в настоящее время невозможно представить макроэкономические и демографические данные. Однако правительство сообщило об оборонном бюджете в размере около 100 млн. долл.США на 1986 год, признав при этом оборонный долг США и Франции в размере около 1 млрд. долл.
   Подлинно "национальных" сил больше нет. Даже соответствующие силы сектантской милиции различаются по степени сплоченности. Все они имеют небольшие активные кадры, быстро расширяющиеся за счет мобилизации резервов. Большая часть снаряжения бывших национальных сил находится в руках этих групп; некоторые из них находятся в непригодном состоянии. Ополченцы имеют свои собственные источники снабжения, и невозможно точно определить их типы и количество.

CHRISTIAN:

ARMY: some 15,000.
5 nominal brigades.
Equipment:
Tks: some 90 M-48 A1/A5. lt: 50 AMX-13 (35 with 75mm, 15 with 105mm guns).
AFV: recce: 80 Saladin, 20 Ferret. APC: 300 M-113, Saracen, 20 VAB-VTT.
Arty: guns: 130mm: M-46. how: 105mm: 15M-101A1. 122mm: 18 M-102, M-1938/D-30; 155mm: 36 M-50, M-114, M-198.
   Mor: 200 81mm; 120mm.
ATK: RL: 85mm: RPG-7; 89mm: M-65. RCL: 106mm. ATGW: ENTAC, Milan, BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm; 23mm: ZU-23; 30mm: towed; 40mm: M-42 SP.

NAVY: some 500.
Base: Juniye.
Patrol craft: coastal: 1 Esterel FV 38-m, 3 Byblos 20-m.
Landing craft: 2 Fr EDIC 670-ton.

AIR FORCE:
1 operational base (Juniye-Jubayl highway strip).
Equipment (?operational):
Ftrs: 7 Hunter F-70 (5 operational).
Hel: 1 sqn: attack: 8 SA-342 Gazelle with SS-11/-12 ASM; tpt: (med): 7 AB-212, 12 SA-330 Puma; (lt): 9 SA-315/-316 Alouette II/III.
Trg: 5 Bulldog, 3 CM-170 Magister.
Tpt: 1 Dove, 1 Turbo-Commander 690B.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of the Interior:
Internal Security Force 8,000 (largely ineffective: law courts closed); 30 Chaimite APC.
Customs: 1 Tracker, 5 Aztec patrol craft.

MILITIAS:
Lebanese Forces Militia (Kata'eb = Phalange): 5,000 active, 30,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: some 100 T-34, T-55, M-48, M-4A/E-4. lt: some 20 AMX-13 tks.
APC: M-113.
Arty: some 100: 105mm, 122mm, 130mm, 155mm.
Mor: 60mm, 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RPG-7.
AD: 12.7mm, 14.5mm, 23mm guns.
Patrol boats: 1 Tracker, 2 Dvora.

Guardians of the Cedars: (Right-wing): ?300.

Marada Brigades (Zehorta Liberation Army) (pro-Syrian): 400 active, 600-1,000 reservists.

South Lebanon Army (SLA; Israeli-backed): 75% Maronite, 25% Shi'ite: (varies; perhaps 1,200 active, 1,500 militia).
Equipment:
Tks: 40 M-4, 30 T-54.
Arty: 122mm: M-1938; 130mm: M-46; 150mm: Fr; 155mm: M-198.

DRUZE:
1 nominal army bde.

MILITIA:
Progressive Socialist Party (Jumblatt): e 5,000 active; perhaps 7,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: 50 T-34, T-54/-55.
APC: BTR-60/-152.
Arty: 122mm, 130mm. MRL. Mor: 82mm.
Patrol craft: 18 small.

SUNNI:
2 nominal army bdes.
MILITIAS:
Al-Mourabitoun (independent Nasserites; underground): e 400.
October 24 Movement (secular; pro-Syria).
Islamic Unification Movement (Taweed; Tripoli): ~1,000; some arty and mor, small arms incl ATK.
Junudullah ('soldiers of God'; PLO-financed; Taweed ally): (?few hundred).
Popular Liberation Army (pro-Palestinian; Sidon).

SHI'A:
2 nominal army bdes.

MILITIAS:
Amal (orthodox pro-Syria; Berri): ~5,000 active; some 10,000 reservists.
Equipment:
Tks: M-48, 50 T-54/5.
AFV: recce: Saladin. APC: VAB, BTR, M-113.
Arty: guns: 130mm. how: 105mm, 122mm, 155mm. MRL: 107mm, 122mm.
ATK: guns: 85mm, 100mm. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 23mm ZU-23. SAM: SA-7.

Al Amal al Islam (Islamic Amal; break-away faction, links with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps): 600.
Equipment incl
Arty: 130mm. mor.
ATK: RL: RPG-7.
AD: guns: 20mm ZPU-2.

Hizbollah ('The Party of God'; fundamentalist, pro-Iranian): ~3,500.
Equipment incl: AFV, arty, RL, RCL, ATGW, AA guns.

Islamic Resistance Movement: ~400.

Islamic Jihad (Imad Mugniyah): elms function under many names, often chosen for particular op.
Equipment:
ATK: RL: Grad (single launchers of BM-21 122mm).
ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO): (Strength: est active - militias perhaps three times strengths shown).
al-Fatah (Arafat): 1,500.
Fatah dissidents (Abu Musa): 1,200.
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP; Hawatmeh; pro-Soviet): 600.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP; Habash): 900.
PFLP (General Command) (PFLP (GC); Jibril): 500.
Popular Struggle Front (PSF): 100.
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF): 100.
as-Saiqa (pro-Syria): 600.
Palestine Communist Party: 100.

OTHER:
Lebanese Arab Army (Lebanese Army deserters; pro-Syrian): ~300, numbers decreasing.
Lebanese National Resistance Front (umbrella for anti-Israeli forces in South Lebanon).

   LIBYA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 76,500.
Terms of service: selective conscription, term varies - 3 to 4 years.
Reserves: People's Militia, some 40,000.

ARMY: 60,000.
1 tk div (2 tk, 1 mech bde, 1 arty regt),
2 mech inf divs (each 2 mech, 1 tk bde, 1 arty regt).
30 tk bns.
50 mech inf bns.
1 National Guard bde.
41 arty, 2 AA arty bns.
14 para/cdo bns.
6 SSM bdes.
3 SAM bdes.
Equipment:)
Tks: 2,100 T-54/-55/-62, 180 T-72.
AFV: recce: 280 BRDM-2, 380 EE-9 Cascavel. MICV: 800 BMP. APC: 700 BTR-50/-60, OT-62/-64, 100 EE-11 Urutu, Fiat 6614.
Arty: some 1,300: guns: 122mm: 60 D-74; 130mm: 350 M-46.
   how: 105mm: some 60 M-101; 122mm: 330 D-30 towed, 126 M-1974 SP; 152mm: 48 M-1973, DANA SP; 155mm: 190 Palmaria, 18 M-109 SP.
   MRL: some 600: 107mm: Type 63; 122mm: BM-21/RM-70; 130mm: 36 M-51.
   SSM: 48 FROG-7, 80 Scud B.
   Mor: 450: 81mm, 120mm, 160mm, 240mm.
ATK: RCL: 200 106mm. ATGW: 3,000: Vigilant, Milan, AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM SP).
AD: guns: 600: 23mm: ZSU-23-2, ZSU-23-4 SP, 30mm: M-53/59 SP; 40mm: L/70; 57mm: S-60.
   SAM: SA-7, 32 quad Crotale.
(On order: Fiat 6616 recce, ASTROS II, SS-40 MRL.)

NAVY: 6,500.
Bases: Tarabulus, Benghazi, Darnah, Tubruq, Ras Hilal, Al Khums.
Subs: 6 Sov F-class; 2 R-2 Mala 2-man diver vessels.
Frigates: 2:
   1 Vosper Mk 7 with 4 Otomat SSM, 4 Albatros/Aspide SAM;
   1 Koni with 4 SS-N-2C SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM.
Corvettes: 7:
   4 Assad with 4 Otomat SSM.
   3 Sov Nanuchka II with 2x2 SS-N-2C SSM, 1x2 SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 24:
   9 Sharara (La Combattante II) with 4 Otomat SSM;
   12 Sov Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2C SSM;
   3 Susa with 8 SS-12M SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 7: 4 Garian, 3 100-ft Benina; coastal: 1 Thorneycroft 78-ft.
MCMV: 8 Sov Natya ocean.
Amph: LST: 2 PS-700; LSNi: 3 Polnocny; LCU: 2 C-107 57-m.
Drone craft: 50.
(On order: 1 Koni FFG, 13 SAR-33 large patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 10,000; some 544 combat ac, 52 armed hel. f
Bbrs: 1 sqn with 6 Tu-22.
Interceptors: 3 sqns and 1 OCU: some 26 Mirage F-1ED, 4 F-1BD, 131 MiG-23 Flogger E, 49 MiG-25 Foxbat A, 49 MiG-21, 12 MiG-25U.
FGA: 5 sqns and 1 OCU: 45 Mirage 5D/DE, 13 5DD, 14 Mirage F-1AD, 44 MiG-23BM Flogger F, 14 MiG-23U, some 90 Su-20/-22 Fitter E/F/J.
COIN: 1 sqn with 30 J-1 Jastreb.
Recce: 1 sqn with 5 Mirage 5DR, 10 MiG-25.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 18 An-26 Curl, 13 Lockheed (8 C-130H, 3 L-100, 2 L-100-30), 2 Boeing 707, 20 G-222, 2 Mystere-Falcon-20, 2 C-140 Jetstar, 2 CL-44,
   19 I1-76 Candid, 1 Corvette 200, 2 King Air, 5 F-27-600, 18 L-410.
Hel: 9 sqns:
   attack: 2 with 27 Mi-24 Hind;
   ASW: 2 with 25 Mi-14 Haze;
   SAR: 1 with 7 SA-321 Super Frelon.
   tpt: (hy): 1 with 19 CH-47C Chinook; (med): 1 with Mi-8, 2 AB-212; (lt): 1 with 5 AB-206, 1 with 11 SA-316B Alouette III, 9 AB-47.
Trg: 4 sqns: 2 with 61 G-2 Galeb ac; 2 with 20 Mi-2 (Hoplite) hel;
   2 Tu-22 Blinder D, 85 L-39ZO, 12 CM-170 Magister, 133 SF-260WL.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-6 Acrid, AA-7 Apex, AA-8 Aphid, R-550 Magic. ASM: Swatter ATGW (hel-borne).

AD Comd: ~13,000.
   'Senezh' AD comd and control system.
   3 SA-5A bdes: each 2 bns of 6 launchers, some 4 AA gun bns; radar coys, 2 AD schools.
   3 Regional Sections: 2 bdes each 18 SA-2, 2-3 bdes each 12 twin SA-3, ?3 bdes each 20/24 SA-6/-8.
(On order: MiG-25, MiG-23 ftrs; 25 EMB-121 Xingu tpt, 50 SF-260M trg ac; SA-342 Gazelle, 2 A-109 hel; Super 530 AAM.)

Forces Abroad:
Chad: ~2,000; 2 mech bns, 2 tk bns: T-55 tks, BMP-1 MICV, MRL, AD guns, SAM, 5 SF-260W ac, 3 Mi-24hel.
Sudan: 700-1,000 reported.

PARA-MILITARY:
Liwa Haris Al-Jamahiriya (Revolution Guard Corps).
   Eqpt: MBT: T-54/-55/-62. AFV: armd cars, APC. arty: MRL. AD: ZSU-23-4, SA-8 (Army inventory).
Islamic Pan-African Legion, some 2,500; 1 armd, 1 inf, 1 para/cdo bdes.
   Eqpt: MBT: some 75 T-54/-55. MICV: EE-9. APC:BTR-50/-60 (Army inventory).
Muslim Youth.
People's Cavalry Force; parade unit.
Customs/Coastguard (Naval control).
   Eqpt: 12 SAR-33 Lurssen-type FAC; 3 Benina, 3 Jihad patrol craft.

* Excl ? $5.0 bn military and commercial debt to the USSR.
f Much eqpt, incl 1,200 MBT,450 combat ac (Tu-22, MiG-21/-23/-25, Su-22) in storage. Syrian pilots also reportedly fly Libyan ac, while some Soviet, Korean and Pakistani personnel act as instructors. Some 2,000 Soviet personnel reportedly man the SA-5 complexes. Expatriates form a large proportion of the technical support staff.

   MAURITANIA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 14,870.
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription (2 years) authorized.

ARMY: 14,400.
2 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 Camel Corps.
3 armd recce sqns.
2 AA btys.
1 engr coy.
1 para coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 15 EBR-75 hy, 39 AML-60, 14 -90, 12 M-3A1. APC: 40 M-3 half-track.
Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 8.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20; 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 14.5mm; 23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm: 6 M-1939. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 320.
Bases: Port Etienne (Nouadhibou).
Patrol craft: 9: 1 Fr Patra-class; 3 SpBarcelo; 4 Fr Esterel< (2 32-m, 2 18-m), 1 launch<.

AIR FORCE: 150; 13 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 6 BN-2 Defender, 5 Cessna 337 (2 armed, 3 forward air control).
MR: 2 Cheyenne II.
Tpt: 1 DHC-5D Buffalo, 1 Caravelle, 2 Skyvan 3M, 2 BN-2 Islander, 1 Broussard,1 AL-60.
Hel: 4 Hughes 500 tpt.

Forces Abroad: Mozambique elms 1 bn reported.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,400.
Gendarmerie 2,500; 6 regional coys (Defence Ministry).
National Guard 2,800.
Border Guard 100.
Auxiliaries 1,000 (Interior Ministry).

   MOROCCO
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 203,500 incl Gendarmerie.
Terms of service: conscription 18 months authorized; most enlisted personnel are volunteers.
Reserves: obligation, details unknown.

ARMY: 170,000.
2 mech inf bdes.
1 mot inf bde.
1 lt security bde.
1 para bde.
4 mech inf regts.
4 mot inf regts
Independent units:
   9 arty gps.
   1 AAgp.
   7 armd sqn gps.
   29 inf bns.
   3 camel corps bns.
   1 cav bn.
   1 mountain bn.
   3 sigs bns.
   10 engr bns.
   9 log spt gps/bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 110 M-48A5. lt: 110 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: some 325: 20 EBR-75, some 60 AMX-10RC, 175 AML-90, 30 AML-60-7, 40 Eland 90mm.
   APC: some 850: 390 M-113, some 300 VAB (270 -VTT/VCI, 20 with 120mm mor, 30 other mods), 70 UR-416, 30 Ratel-20, 30 -90, 20 M-3;
   some 45 OT-62/-64 may be operational.
Arty: guns: 151: 85mm: 30 D-44; 105mm: 36 lt (L-118) SP; 130mm: 15 M-46; 155mm: 70 AMX-F-3 SP.
   how: 170: 105mm: 40 M-101 towed, 35 HM2 (Fr M-101A1); 155mm: 35 M-114 towed, 60 M-109 SP.
   MRL: 122mm: 25 BM-21.
   Mor: 1,690: 60mm: 595; 81mm: 625; 82mm: 70; 120mm: 400.
ATK: RL: 66mm: LAW; 88mm: M-20 3.5-in., STRIM-S9. RCL: 570: 75mm: 200 M-20; 90mm: 30 M-67; 106mm: 340 M-40.
   guns: 90mm: 25 M-56; 100mm: 10 SU-100 SP; 105mm: 110 Steyr SK-105 Kuerassier SP.
   ATGW: M-47 Dragon, Milan, BGM-71A TOW.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 180 ZPU-2, 20 ZPU-4; 20mm: 70 towed, 55 M-163 VulcanSP; 23mm: 105 ZU-23-2; 37mm: 25 M-38/-39; 100mm: 15 KS-19 towed.
   SAM: SA-7, 35 M-730 Chaparral.

NAVY: 7,000 incl 1,500 naval infantry.
Bases: Casablanca, San, Agadir, Al Hoceima, Dakhla.
Frigate: 1 Descubierta with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1x8 Albatros/Aspide SAM.
FAC(G): 4 Lazaga with 4 MM-38 Exocet.
FAC: 2 PR-72.
Patrol craft, large: 4: 1 Sirius ex-MCMV, 2 CMN (1 174-ft, 1 133-ft), 1 Esterel 104-ft; coastal: 11: 6 P-32, 2 Arcoz 31, 3 Ifri.
Amph: 4: LSM: 3 Batral; LCU: 1 EDIC-type.
1 naval inf bn.
(On order: 6 Lazaga, 2 Osprey patrol boats.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000; 117 combat ac, 24 armed hel.
FGA/recce: 4 sqns:
   2 with 21 Mirage F-1C, 17 F-1E;
   2 with 28 F-5 (5 A, 14 E, 3 B, 4 F, 1 RF-5A).
COIN/recce: 1 sqn with 5 OV-10 Bronco.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 17 C-130H Hercules, 3 KC-130H, 1 Gulfstream, 4 King Air, 3 Do-28D.
Hel: attack: 24 SA-342 Gazelle.
   tpt: (hy): 8 CH-47 Chinook; (med): 29 SA-330 Puma, 30 AB-205A; (lt): 16 AB-206, 4 AB-212;
Trg: 23 Alpha Jet, 24 CM-170 Magister, 10 T-34C, 9 AS-202/18A Bravo.
AAM: AIM-9J Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Magic.
(On order: 20 IA-58 Pucara COIN, 25 Gepal Mk IV trg ac; 381 AGM-65 Maverick ASM.)

ROYAL GUARD: 1,500,
1 Royal Guard bn.
1 Royal Guard cav sqn.
DEPLOYMENT: South West Sahara: some 100,000.

Forces Abroad: Equatorial Guinea: 300.

PARA-MILITARY: 35,000.
Gendarmerie Royale: 10,000;
1 bde, 2 mobile gps; coastguard unit; air sqn.
Eqpt: armd cars, 7 fast patrol boats; 2 Rallye ac; 8 SA-315/-316 Alouette II/III, 6 Gazelle, 6 Puma hel.
ForceAuxiliaire: 25,000 incl Mobile Intervention Corps (5,000).

OPPOSITION:
Polisario:Military Wing: Saharoui People's Liberation Army: 15,000 (perhaps 4,000 active) org in bns, spt elms.
Eqpt: T-55 tks; BMP-1, 20-30 EE-9 Cascavel MICV; M-1931/37 122mm how; BM-21 122mm MRL; 120mm, 160mm mor; AT-4 Spigot ATGW;
   ZSU-23-2 23mm SP AA guns; SA-6/-7 SAM.
(Captured Moroccan eqpt incl AML-90, Eland AFV, Ratel-20, Panhard APC, Steyr SK-105 105mm SP ATK guns.)

   OMAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 21,500 (excl Royal Household tps, but incl some 3,700 foreign personnel).
Terms of service, voluntary.
Reserves: National Volunteer Reserve Force (Army): 1,000; obligation to age 35-45.

ARMY: 16,500.
2 bde HQ.
1 armd regt (2 tk sqns, 1 SP arty bty).
3 arty regts (2 lt, 1 med), 1 lt AA bty.
1 recce regt (2 armd car sqns).
8 inf'regts'(bns).
1 sigs regt.
1 fd engr regt (2 sqns).
1 para regt.
Equipment:
Tks: 6 M-60A1, 33 Qayid al-Ardh (Chieftain). lt: 30 Scorpion, 6 VBC-90.
AFV: MICV (VAB): 2 VCAC with Milan, 2 VD (AD; 20mm), 2 PC. APC: 6 VAB VCI, 15 AT-105 Saxon.
Arty: 93: guns: 105mm: 39 ROF lt; 130mm: 12 M-1946. guns/how: 88mm: 18 25-pdr. how: 155mm: 12 FH-70, 12 M-109A2 SP.
   Mor: 60mm; 81mm: L-16; 107mm: 12 M-30 4.2-in.; 120mm: 12.
ATGW: 10 BGM-71A TOW, Milan.
AD: guns: 16: 23mm: 4 ZU-23-2; 40mm: 12 Bofors L/60. SAM: Blowpipe.

NAVY: 2,000.
Bases: Muscat, Raysut, Ghanam (Goat) Island, Wadam Alwi.
FAC(G): 3 Province with Exocet SSM: 2 with 2x4, 1 with 2x3 MM-40.
FAC: 4 Al Wafi.
Patrol craft, inshore: 4 60-ton.
Amph: LST: 2 (1 comd); LCM: 3; LCU: 2.
Trg ship: 1.
(On order: 1 Province FAC(G).)

AIR FORCE: 3,000; 53 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 20 Jaguar S(O) Mk 1, 4 T-2.
FGA/recce: 1 sqn with 12 Hunter FGA-73, 4T-7.
COIN/trg: 1 sqn with 13 BAC-167 Strikemaster Mk82.
Tpt: 3 sqns:
   1 with 3 BAC-111, 1 Mystere-Falcon 20;
   2 with 7 BN-2 Defender/Islander, 15 Skyvan 3M, 3 C-130H Hercules.
Hel: 2 sqns: tpt: (med): 20 AB-205, 4 AB-212, 2 AS-332 Super Puma, 5 AB-214B. (lt): 3 AB-206.
AD: 2 sqns with 28 Rapier SAM.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder, R-550 Magic.
(On order: 8 Tornado ftr; 1 C-130H, 2 DHC-5D Buffalo tpts; 6 Bell 214ST hel; 300 AIM-9P Sidewinder AAM; 2 S-713 (3-D radar) systems, 28 Blindfire radars.)

ROYAL HOUSEHOLD:
1 Royal Guard bde.
1 special force regt.
Royal Yacht: 1.
Royal fit: 1 Gulfstream, 1 DC-8, 1 VC-10 tpts; 2 AS-202 Bravo.

PARA-MILITARY:
Tribal Home Guard (Firqat): 5,000.
Police Coastguard: 15 AT-105 APC, 11 coastal, 3 inshore patrol, 13 spt craft, 28 speedboats (.
Air Wing: 1 Gates Learjet, 2 Do-228-100, 2 Merlin IVA, 2 DHC-5 Buffalo ac, 5 AB-205, 3 AB-206 hel.
Musandam Security Force (Shikuk Tribal Militia): 85.

* $1.8 bn military subsidy from GCCbetween 1984 and 1991.

   QATAR
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 7,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 6,000.
1 Royal Guard regt.
1 tk bn.
5 inf bns.
1 arty bty.
1 SAM bty with Rapier.
Equipment:
Tks: 24 AMX-30.
AFV: recce: 10 Ferret. MICV: 30 AMX-10P. APC: 25 Saracen, 136 VAB, 8 Commando Mk3.
Arty: gun/how: 88mm: 8 25-pdr. how: 155mm: 6 Mk F-3 SP. Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav. ATGW: Milan.
AD: SAM: 18 Rapier, Blowpipe.

NAVY: 700 incl Marine Police.
Base: Doha.
FAC(G): 3 La Combattante IIIB with 8 MM-40 Exocet SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 6 Vosper Thornycroft 120-ton; coastal: 43<: 2 75-ft, 4 Tracker, 2 13-ton, 7 P-1200-type, 25 Spear, 2 Interceptor (SAR), other.
Coast defence: 3 MM-40 Exocet.

AIR FORCE: 300;
23 combat ac, 3 armed hel.
FGA: 14 Mirage F-1 (12 -E, 2 -B), 2 Hunter FGA-78, 1 T-79, 6 Alpha Jet.
Tpt: 1 BN-2 Islander, 1 Boeing 727, 2 707.
Hel: 3 SA-342 Gazelle, 17 Westland (2 Whirlwind, 3 Commando Mk 2A, 1 Mk 2C, 8 Mk 3, 3 Lynx), 6 AS-332 Super Puma).
SAM: 5 Tigercat
.
PARA-MILITARY: Police: 3 Lynx, 2 Gazelle hel.

   SAUDI ARABIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 73,500+ (incl 10,000 National Guard).
Terms of service: voluntary; conscription, males aged 18-35, authorized.

ARMY: 45,000.
2 armd bdes.
4 mech bdes.
1 inf bde.
1 AB bde (2 para bns, 3 special forces coys).
1 Royal Guard regt (3 bns).
5 arty bns.
18 AA arty btys.
33 SAM btys:
   16 with 128 Improved HAWK (each 3 msls);
   17 with 68 Shahine (Crotale) fire units (each 6 msls) and AMX-30SA 30mm SPAA guns plus 73 fire units (each 6 msls) as static defence.
Equipment:
Tks: 550: 300 AMX-30, 150 M-60A1 (converting to A3), 100 M-60A3.
AFV: recce: 200 AML-60/-90. MICV: 350 AMX-10P. APC: 800 M-113 (incl TOW/APC/comd/spt variants), 30 EE-11 Urutu, 130 Panhard M-3.
Arty: 505: how: 105mm: some 24 Model 56 pack, 100 M-101/-102; 155mm: 72 FH-70, 34 M-198 towed, 224 M-109, 51 GCT SP.
   MRL: 127mm: some ASTROS II.
   Mor: 81mm: 200; 107mm: 360 M-30 4.2-in.
ATK: RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 106mm.
   ATGW: BGM-71A TOW (incl 200 VCC-1 SP), M-47 Dragon, HOT (incl AMX-10P SP).
AD: guns: 40mm: M-42 SP; 90mm: 15 M-117.
   SAM: FIM-92A Stinger, 500 FIM-43 Redeye, Shahine, MIM-23B Improved Hawk.
(On order: 60 AMX-10P; EE-11 Urutu APC; 8 M-198; some 400 JPz SK-105 SP ATK guns; ASTROS II MRL; TOW ATGW.

NAVY: 3,500; 20 armed hel.
Bases: Western Fleet: Jiddah (HQ), Al Wajh, Yanbu. Eastern Fleet: Jabayl (HQ), Al Qatif, Ras Tanura, Al Dammam, Ras al Mishab.
2 Fleet HQ.
Frigates (FFG): 4 F-2000S with 8 Otomat-2 SSM, 1 Crotale SAM, 1 AS-365 hel.
Corvettes (FLG): 4 PCG-1 with 2x4 RGM-84A HarpoonSSM.
FAC(G): 9 PGG-1 with 2x2 Harpoon SSM.
FAC(T): 3 Jaguar (Lurssen).
Patrol craft, large: 1 (100 tons); coastal: 45<.
MCMV: 4 MSC-322 coastal.
Amph: LST: 3; LCU: 4 US Type-1610; LCM: 8 US Type-6; LCVP: 4.
Spt: 2 Durance log spt ships, 2 Royal Yachts.
Hel: 24 AS-365N Dauphin 2 (4 SAR, 20 with AS-15TTASM).

MARINES: (1,500).
1 naval inf regt.
Eqpt: MICV: 140 BMR-600P.
(On order: 2 Atlantic II MR ac; 100 Harpoon, Otomat coast defence SSM; AS-15TT ASM.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000; 226 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 3 sqns with 60 F-5E. 10 Tornado (being delivered).
Interceptor: 3 sqns (1 forming) with 45 F-15C.
Recce: 1 sqn with 10 RF-5E.
AEW: 1 sqn with 4 E-3A (more being delivered).
Tkr: 1 sqn with 2 KE-3A (more being delivered).
OCU: 2 with 20 F-5F, 15 F-5B, 17 F-15D.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 35 C-130E/H Hercules, 8 KC-130H, 2 VC-130H, 9 L-100-30HS (hospital ac), 2 CN-235, 35 C-212, 2 C-140 Jetstar.
Hel: 2 sqns: 15 AB-206B, 15 AB-205, 15 AB-212, 15 KV-107, 5 Sea King.
Trg: 39 BAC-167 Strikemaster Mk 80, 14 PC-9 (replacing Cessna 172), 6 Tornado IDS.
AAM: AIM-9J/L/P Sidewinder, AIM-7F Sparrow. ASM: Maverick.
(On order: 56 Tornado (32 IDS FGA, 24 ADV ftrs); 1 Boeing 747, 10 CN-235, 5 C-212-200 tpts; 6 Boeing KE-3A (707-320C), 2 Jetstream 31, 30 Hawk, 16 PC-9 trg; 22 AB-212 hel; 1,000 AIM-7F Sparrow,3,000 AIM-9L/P Sidewinder AAM; 400 Maverick ASM.)

AIR DEFENCE FORCES:Strength unknown:
A separate force, of equal standing with the Army and Air Force. Provides fixed and mobile point defence of key targets throughout the Kingdom.
Equipment:
AD: guns: 20mm: 100 M-163 Vulcan; 30mm: AMX-30SA; 35mm: 180.
SAM: 60 Shahine, 70 MIM-23B Improved HAWK.

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard: ~50,000 (10,000 active, ~15,000 reserve; ~25,000 tribal levies):
Bde HQ:
   8 all-arms, 16 active, 24 irregular inf bns.
   1 ceremonial cav sqn.
   spt units.
Equipment:
APC: 240 V-150 Commando.
Arty: how: 105mm: 50 M-102. mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 106mm. ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm: 30 M-40 Vulcan.
(On order: 489 Commando incl V-300 APC, V-150 SP 20mm AA guns, SP TOW, 90mm armed AFV.)
Foreign contract military personnel: some 10,000(1 bde).
Ministry of Interior:
Counter-terrorist unit; hel.
Frontier Force and Coastguard 8,500; 8 BH-7, 16 SR-N6 hovercraft, 132 coastal, 300 inshore patrol craft.
General Civil Defence Administration units; 10 Kawasaki hel.

* Total indigenous Saudi population ? 6,900,000 in 1987; expatriates ? 3,500,000 in 1985.

   SOMALI REPUBLIC
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 65,000.
Terms of service:conscription (males 18-40), 18 months selective.

ARMY: 61,300 (730,000 conscripts).
4 'corps', 12 'div' HQ (formations in name only; below establishment in units, men and eqpt).
4 tk 'bdes' (bns).
45 mech and inf 'bdes' (bns).
4 cdo 'bdes' (bns).
1 SAM bde.
3 fd arty bdes.
30 fd, 1 AA arty bns.
Equipment:*
Tks: 30 Centurion, 123 M-47, 30 T-34, 110 T-54/-55, lt: 10 M-41.
AFV: recce: 30 BRDM-2, 15 AML-90.
APC: 64 BTR-40/-50/-60, 100 BTR-152, 310 Fiat 6614/6616; BMR-600 reported.
Arty: guns/how: 144+: 76mm: M-1942; 85mm: 60 D-44; 100mm: M-1944; 122mm: 84M-1938. how: 105mm; 155mm: 18 M-198.
   Mor: 81mm: M-1941; 120mm: 50 M-1943.
ATK: RL: 300 STRIM-89. RCL: 106mm: M-40. ATGW: 100 Milan, TOW on 22 M-113.
AD: guns: 23mm: ZU-23, 4 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939/Type 63; 57mm: S-60; 100mm: 24 KS-19.
SAM: 40 SA-2, 10 SA-3, 20 SA-7.

NAVY:* 1,200.
Bases: Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayu.
FAC(G): 2 Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM.
FAC(T): 4 Mol.
FAC: 2 Cormoran-class.
Patrol craft: 5 Poluchat<; 1 ex-Ethiopian Swiftship 105-ft reported.
Amph: LCT: 1 Polnocny; LCM: 4 T-4.
(On order, 1 105-ft patrol vessel).

AIR FORCE: 2,500; 71 combat ac, no armed hel*
FGA: 3 sqns with 12 MiG-17, 8 Hunter (FGA-76, 1 T-77).
Frr: 3 sqns with 8 MiG-21MF, 30 J-6.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 BN-2 Islander, 3 An-24, 1 An-26, 4 G-222, 6 C-212 (2 VIP), 2 P-166-DL3 recce/tpt, 3 An-2.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Mil (6 Mi-4, 4 Mi-8), 5 Agusta-Bell (1-204, 4 -212 (2 VIP)).
Trg: incl 2 MiG-15UTI, 8 SF-260W, 2 Cessna 150, some Yak-11.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order: S-211 COIN ac; 4 Agusta-Bell hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 29,500.
Police 8,000; 2 Do-28,2 Cessna (1 185, 1 150) ac.
Border Guards 1,500.
People's Militia 20,000.

OPPOSITION:
Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) perhaps 1,200.
Somali National Movement (SNM).

* Spares are short, particularly for Soviet eqpt, and much eqpt is unserviceable.

   SUDAN*
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 58,500.
Terms of Service, voluntary; (conscription legislated, not implemented).

ARMY: 54,000 (incl AD).
10 Regional Commands.
1 armd div HQ.
   1 Republican Guard bde.
   2 armd bdes.
   10 inf bdes.
   1 para bde.
   3 arty regts.
   1 engr regt.
Air Defence (3,000):
   2 AA arty bdes.
   1 SAM bde (3 btys) with SA-2.
Equipment:^
Tks: 155 T-54/-55, 20 M-60A3. lt: 60 Ch Type-62.
AFV: recce: 6 AML-90, 15 Saladin, 50 Ferret, BRDM-1/-2. APC: 40 BTR-50/-152, 30 OT-62/-64, 36 M-113, 100 Walid.
Arty: guns: 85mm: 12 D-44; 88mm: 40 25-pdr; 100mm: 20 M-1944; 122mm: Type-60; 130mm: 36 M-46 and Ch 59-1; 155mm: 11 Mk F-3.
   how: 105mm: 18 M-101 pack; 122mm: 64 M-1938/Type-54/D-30.
   MRL: 122mm: Al Saqr-30.
   Mor: 81mm, 120mm: 100.
ATGW: Swingfire.
AD: guns: 20mm: M-167 towed, M-163 SP; 23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm: 120 M-1939/Type-63; 40mm: 60 L/60; 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19 towed.
   SAM: 20 SA-2, SA-7.

NAVY: t 1,500.
Base. Port Sudan.
Patrol craft, large: 7: 4 Yug PBR, 3 70-ton; coastal: 4 10-ton; river: (3 reported).
Amph: LCT: 2 Yug DTM-221.

AIR FORCE: 3,000; 43 combat ac, no armed hel4
FGA/interceptor: 1 sqn with some 8 MiG-21.
FGA: 1 sqn with 8 J-5 (MiG-17 type), 6 J-6 (MiG-19 type), 10 MiG-17.
COIN: 1 sqn with 3 BAC-167 Strikemaster (?operational).
MR: 2 C-212.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 C-130H Hercules, 4 C-212, 3 Mystere-Falcon 20/50, 1 DHC-5D Buffalo, 6 EMB-110P2 Bandeirante.
Hel: 1 sqn with 20 IAR/SA-330 Puma, 10 BO-105, 4 AB-212.
Trg: incl 3 Jet Provost Mk 55 (?operational), 3 MiG-15UTI, 2 MiG-21U, 2 JJ-5 (2-seat J-5), 2 JJ-6 (2-seat J-6).
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order: 6 J-6 ftr, 2 C-130 tpt ac; 6 AB-212 hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 3,000: National Guard 500; Border Guard 2,500.

OPPOSITION: Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA): ?20,000 org in bns;
   mainly small arms incl 60mm mor, 14.5mm AA, SA-7 SAM; arty reported; operating only in southern Sudan.

* Due to the internal security problems and the economic situation it is difficult to arrive at an accurate economic and defence profile.
f Excl £S 450 m for internal security.
t Eqpt serviceability questionable.

   SYRIA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 407,500.
Terms of service: conscription, 30 months.
Reserves (to age 45): 272,500. Army 270,000 active, Navy 2,500.

ARMY: 300,000 (130,000 conscripts, 50,000 reservists). Has absorbed Saraya ad-Difer (defence coys).
HQ: 2 corps.
5 armd divs (each 3 armd, 1mech, 1arty bdes).
4 mech divs (each 2 armd, 2 mech, 1arty bdes).
(1 bde per armd and mech div at cadre strength).
3 arty bdes.
1 special forces div (9 para/cdo bdes).
7 indep special forces regts.
3 SSM bdes:
2 (each 3 bns) with FROG, Scud;
1 (2 bns) with SS-21.
9 SAM bns (27 btys) with SA-6.
Coast Def:
2 bdes with SS-C-1B Sepal and SS-C-3, arty and msl bns.
(Reserves: 9 mech and inf bdes.)
Equipment:
Tks: 4,000 f: 1,800 T-54/-55, 1,100 T-62M/K, 1,100 T-72/-72M.
AFV: recce/ATK: 800 BRDM-2.
MICV: 1,800 BMP-1.
APC: 1,300 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, OT-64.
Arty: guns: 2,800; 122mm: 100 M-1931/-37 (in store), ISU-122; 150 M-1974 (2S1) SP; 130mm: M-46; 152mm: ISU-152 SP; 180mm: S-23.
   guns/how: 152mm: M-1937. how: 122mm: M-1938, D-30, 36 T-34/D-30 SP; 152mm: D-1, M-1943; 60 M-1973 (2S3) SP.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 220mm: BM-27; 240mm: BM-24.
   SSM: 24 FROG-7, some 36 SS-21 reported, 18 Scud-B; SS-C-1B Sepal, SS-C-3 coastal.
   Mor: 120mm, 160mm, 240mm.
ATK: guns: 100mm: T-12. ATGW: 1,300 AT-3 Sagger (incl BRDM-2 SP), AT-4 Spigot and Milan.
AD: guns: 1,700: 23mm: ZU-23-2 towed, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60, ZSU-57-2 SP; 85mm: M-1939/-44; 100mm: KS-19.
   SAM: SA-6/-7/-8/-9/-13 SAM.

NAVY: 2,500.
Bases: Latakia, Tartus, Minet el-Baida.
Subs: 3 R-class.
Frigates: 2 Petya II.
FAC(G): 24 with SS-N-2A/C SSM: 6 Osa-I, 12 Osa-II (4 msls); 6 Komar< (2 msls);
FAC(T): 8 P-4 25-ton.
Patrol craft, large: 1 Ch; coastal: 6 Zhuk<.
MCMV: 9: ocean: 1 Natya, 1 T-43; coastal: 2 Vanya; inshore: 5 Yevgenya.
Amph: LSM: 3 Polnocny B.
Hel: ASW: 12 Mi-14, 5 Ka-25.

AIR FORCE: 45,000; some 478 combat ac; some 110 armed hel t
FGA: 8 sqns:
   2 with 85 MiG-17;
   1 with 15 Su-7;
   2 with 28 Su-17;
   1 with 19 Su-20;
   2 with 50 MiG-23BM Flogger F.
Interceptor: 13 sqns:
   1 with 30 MiG-25 Foxbat E;
   9 with 175 MiG-21;
   3 with 70 MiG-23 Flogger E/G.
   (MiG-29 to be delivered 1987-8.)
Recce: 6 MiG-25R.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 4 An-24 Coke, 6 An-26 Curl, 4 I1-76 Candid, 6 Tu-134 Crusty, 3 Mystere-Falcon 20F.
Trg: incl 90 L-39, 20 L-29, 20 MBB-223.
Hel: attack: 50 Mi-24 Hind, 35 SA-342 Gazelle (ATK), perhaps 25 armed Mi-8;
   tpt: 60 Mi-8, 30 Mi-17 (mod-8), 10 Mi-2 Hoplite,
   ASW (Navy-assigned): 3 Ka-25 Hormone, 20 Mi-14 Haze.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AA-6 Acrid, AA-7 Apex. ASM: AT-2 Swatter ATGW.
(On order: 12 SA-342 Gazelle hel; AAM.)

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND: ~60,000;
20 AD bdes (some 95 SAM btys):
   11 (some 60 btys) with some 392 SA-2/-3;
   9 (27 btys) with some 200 SA-6, AA arty and radar.
2 AD regts (each 2 bns of 2 btys) with some 48 SA-5.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon: 2-3 indep bdes (?a div equivalent): 12,500.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence:
   Internal Security Force: Republican Guard: personal presidential and VIP protection; 1 bde with T-72 tanks, arty.
   Saraya as-sira' (struggle coys): special task group.
   Desert Guard (Frontier Force) 1,800.
   Palestine Liberation Army 4,500; 2 bdes (in Syria/Lebanon, some Syrian officers, nominally under PLO);
Eqpt: 90 T-54/-55 MBT; 105mm, 122mm, 152mm how; MRL; AT-3 SaggerATGW; SA-7 SAM.
Ministry of Interior: Gendarmerie 8,000.
Ba'ath Party: Workers Militia (People's Army).

* Excl some $15-19 bn owed to USSR and eastern-bloc countries,probably half for military eqpt.
f Tanks with units and training, perhaps 2,800; remainder as static anti-tank or reserve.
t Some aircraft believed to be in storage.

   TUNISIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 42,100 (27,000 conscripts) (incl Gendarmerie).
Terms of service. 12 months selective.

ARMY: 31,000 (25,000 conscripts).
2 mech bdes (each with 1armd, 2 mech inf bns).
1 Sahara bde.
1 para-cdo bde.
1 armd recce regts.
1 ATK regt.
1 fd arty regt.
1 AD bde (2 AA regts).
1 engr regt.
Equipment:
Tks: 14 M-48A3, 54 M-60A3. lt: 45 AMX-13, 10 M-41, 50 Steyr SK-105 Kuerassier.
AFV: recce: 20 Saladin, 23 AML-90.
APC: 100 M-113A1/-2, 24 EE-11 Urutu, 90 Fiat F-6614.
Arty: how: 78: 105mm: 58: 48 M-101A1/A2, 10 M-108 SP; 155mm: 10 M-114A1, 10 M-109 SP.
   Mor: 81mm: incl M-125 SP; 82mm; 107mm: 12 M-106A2 SP; 120mm: 18.
ATK: RL: STRIM-89. ATGW: MGM-71A TOW (incl 35 M-113 SP), Milan, SS-11.
AD: guns: 20mm: 26 M-163 Vulcan SP; 37mm: 10 M-1939/Type-55; 40mm: 10 M-42.
   SAM: 60 RBS-70, 25 MIM-72 Chaparral.
(On order: 57 M-198 155mm towed how.)

NAVY: 5,000 (700 conscripts).
Bases: Bizerte, Sfax, La Goulette, Kelibia.
Frigate: 1 US Savage.
FAC(G): 6: 3 La Combattante HIM with 8 MM-40 Exocet SSM; 3 P-48 with 8 SS-12 SSM.
FAC: 2 Ch Shanghai II.
Patrol craft, large: 5: 1 Le Fougeux, 2 Adjutant ex-MCMV, 2 Vosper Thornycroft 103-ft; coastal: 12 ( Esterel 32-m and 25-m, 1 Tunisian 20-m.
(On order: 2 Lurssen 23-m FAC; 9 20-m patrol craft.)

AIR FORCE: 4,100 (700 conscripts); 31 combat aircraft, no armed hel.
FGA: 8 F-5E, 4 F-5F.
COIN: 1 sqn with 8 MB-326K, 4 MB-326L.
Liaison: 4 S-208M ac.
Trg: 17 SF-260, 7 MB-326B, 12 T-6, 12 Safir.
Hel: 1 wing with 4 SA-318 Alouette II, 7 SA-316 Alouette III, Bell UH-1H, 1 SA-330 Puma, 18 AB-205, 6 Bell 205, 6 AS-350B Ecureuil, 1 SA-365N Dauphin.

PARA-MILITARY: 9,000:
Gendarmerie (Public Order Brigade, part of armed forces) 2,000; 3 bns; 110 Fiat 6614 APC.
National Guard 7,000.

   UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: f
Active: 43,000 (perhaps 30% foreign)
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 40,000.
3 regional commands: Western (Abu Dhabi), Central (Dubai), Northern (Ras al Khaimah).
1 Royal Guard 'bde'.
1 armd bde.
1 mech inf bde.
2infbdes.
1 arty, 1 AD bde (each 3 bns).
Equipment:
Tks: 100 AMX-30, 36 OF-40 Mk 2 (Lion). lt: 80 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 90 AML-90, VBC-40. MICV: 30 AMX-10P. APC: 30 AMX VCI, VCRTT, 300 Panhard M-3, VAB, 66 EE-11 Urutu (some with TOW ATGW).
Arty: guns: 105mm: 50 ROF lt; 155mm: 20 Mk F-3 SP. how: 105mm: 18 M-56 pack.
   Mor: 81mm, 20 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 84mm. ATGW: Vigilant, TOW.
AD: guns: 20mm: 60 M-3VDA SP; 30mm: 30 GCF-BM2. SAM: Rapier, Crotale, RBS-70.
(Store: 70 Saladin armd, 60 Ferret scout cars; 12 Saracen APC.)
(On order: 42 Improved HAWK SAM, 343 msls.)

NAVY: 1,500.
Bases: Abu Dhabi: Dalma, Mina Zayed; Ajman; Dubai: Mina Rashid, Mina Jabal 'Ali; Fujairah; Ras al Khaimah: Mina Sakr; Sharjah: Mina Khalid, Khor Fakkan; Taweela (under construction).
FAC(G): 6 Lurssen TNC-45 with 2x2 Exocet MM-40 SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 6 Vosper Thornycroft; coastal: 3 Keith Nelson<.
Spt: 2 Cheverton tenders<.

AIR FORCE (incl Police Air Wing): 1,500; 65 combat ac, 7 armed hel.
Interceptor: 2 sqns: 24 Mirage 5AD, 3 5RAD, 2 5DAD.
FGA: 1 sqn with 3 Alpha Jet.
COIN: 1 sqn with 8 MB-326KD/LD, 2 MB-339A.
Tpt: incl 5 C-130H Hercules, 1 L-100-30, 1 Boeing 707-320B, 1 G-222, 4 C-212, 1 HS-125, 5 BN-2 Islander, 9 DHC-5D Buffalo, 1 Cessna 182.
Hel: incl 7 SA-316 Alouette III with AS-11, 8 AB-205, 6 AB-206, 3 AB-212, 3 Bell 214, 9 SA-330 Puma, 10 AS-332F Super Puma, 10 SA-342 Gazelle.
Trg: some 20 PC-7, 21 Hawk (15 Mk 63, 6 Mk 61), 6 SF-260TP, 2 MB-339A.
AAM: R-550 Magic. ASM: AS-11/-12.
(On order: 36 Mirage 2000 ftrs (incl 3 recce, 3 trg), 3 Alpha Jet FGA/trg, 1 G-222, some 24 Hawk (8 Mk 61, 16 Mk 63) trg ac; 30 A-129 Mangusta, Lynx hel; Skyguard AD system with twin 35mm guns.)

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard (Ministry of the Interior): 57 coastal patrol boats/craft.

* Federal defence outlays have been substantially reduced, but procurement and project costs are not affected, since individual emirates finance these separately.
f The Union Defence Force and the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah) were fonnally merged in 1976; Abu Dhabi and Dubai still maintain a degree of independence. Non-nationals incl some 500 Moroccans.

   YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (NORTH)
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 36,800 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts).
Terms of service, conscription, 3 years.
Reserves: Army: perhaps 40,000.

ARMY: 35,000 (perhaps 25,000 conscripts).
6 armd bdes (bns).
3 mech, 9 inf bdes (1 reserve).
1 Special Forces bde.
1 para/cdo bde.
1 central guard force.
6 arty bdes.
3 AA arty bns, 2 AD bns (1 with SA-2 SAM).
Equipment:
Tks: 125 T-34, 460 T-54/-55, 34 T-62, 64 M-60A1.
AFV: recce: 50 Saladin, Ferret. APC: 90 M-113, 300 BTR-40/-60/-152, Walid.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 200 M-1942; 100mm: 30 SU-100SP; 122mm: M-1931/37. how: 105mm: M-101; 122mm: M-38; 155mm: M-115.
   MRL: 122mm: 65 BM-21.
   Mor: 200: 82mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: LAW. RCL: 75mm: M-20; 82mm. ATGW: 20 Vigilant, BGM-71A TOW, 24 M-47 Dragon.
AD: guns: 20mm: 52 M-167, 20 M-163 Vulcan SP; 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60. SAM: SA-2/-6/-9.

NAVY: 800.
Base: Hodeida.
Patrol craft: 6<: 3 Sov (2 Zhuk, 1 Poluchat); 3 US Broadsword (?non-operational).
MCMV, inshore: 2 Yevgenya.
Amph: LCM: 4: 2 T-4, 2 Ondatra.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 73 combat ac,* no armed hel.
Ftrs: 5 sqns:
   2 with 30 MiG-21;
   1 with 11 MiG-17F;
   1 with 11 F-5E;
   1 with 15 Su-22.
Tpts: 2 C-130H Hercules, 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 Skyvan, 3 An-24 Coke, 3 An-26 Curl.
Trg: 4 F-5B, 2 MiG-21.
Hel: 23 Mi-8, 8 AB-206, 5 AB-212, 2 SA-315 Alouette.
AD: 1 regt with 12 SA-2 SAM.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll, AIM-9 Sidewinder.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of National Security Force 5,000.
Tribal levies at least 20,000.

* Some 15 ac in storage.
  
   YEMEN: PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (SOUTH)
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 27,500 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: Army: 45,000.

ARMY: 24,000 (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
1 armd bde.
3 mech bdes (status uncertain).
8 inf 'bdes' (regts) (some being mechanized).
3 arty bdes.
10 arty bns.
2 SSM bdes with FROG-7 and Scud B.
2 SAM btys with SA-2/-3.
Equipment:*
Tks: 470 T-34/-54/-55/-62.
AFV: recce: BRDM-2; MICV: some 100 BMP-1. APC: 300 BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 350: 85mm: D-44; 88mm: 25-pdr; 130mm coastal: M-46, SM-4-1. how: 122mm: M-38, D-30. 152mm: D-20 reported.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14.
   SSM: 12 FROG-7, 6 Scud B.
   Mor: 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
AD: guns: 200: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60; 85mm: KS-12.
   SAM: 6 SA-2, 3 SA-3, SA-6/-7/-9.

NAVY:* 1,000.
Bases: Aden, Perim Island, Al Mukalla.
FAC(G): 6 Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2B SSM.
FAC(T): 2 P-6<.
Patrol craft: 2 Zhuk<.
Amph: LST: 1 Ropucha; LSM: 3 Polnocny, LCM: 5 T-4.

AIR FORCE: 2,500. 62 combat ac, some 15 armed hel.*
FGA: 3 sqns:
   1 with 5 MiG-17F;
   1 with 12 MiG-21;
   1 with 15 Su-20/-22.
Interceptor: 3 sqns with 30 MiG-21F.
Tpt: 1sqn with 3 An-24,3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3).
Hel: 1 sqn with 15 Mi-24, 30 Mi-8.
SAM: 1 regt with 48 SA-2, 2 btys SA-3.
Trg: 3MiG-15UTI.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AT-2 Sagger.

PARA-MILITARY:
People's Militia 15,000.
Public Security Force 30,000 (increasing); 1 Tracker 2, 4 Spear, 1 Interceptor patrol craft.

* Reports suggest 145 tanks and up to 80% of naval and 90% of air eqpts were destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of the civil war. Data on resupply is inadequate. Some eqpt believed in storage; some ac believed flown by Soviet and Cuban crews.


Sub-Saharan Africa

   In this year's Military Balance the entries for Djibouti, Mauritania and the Somali Republic, hitherto listed in this section of the book, will be found in the section covering the Middle East and North Africa. This change in presentation is intended to reflect the Islamic nature of these states and their membership of the Arab League.
   Military Developments
   French support, some US assistance, a switch of loyalties to the Habre government by opposition elements and imaginative, aggressive, mobile tactics resulted in the defeat of the Libyan forces and the recovery of much of Chad's northern territories. The Chadian forces used light wheeled vehicles armed with 0.50 machine guns and Milan ATGW, which proved more than a match for the heavier Libyan armoured forces. (This highlights a gap in our coverage of countries such as Chad, where 'soft-skinned' vehicles capable of ad hoc light weapon fits make up much of the ground force inventories. They are almost impossible to identify and to count.)
   The Angolan civil war continues. The government has received additional French Dauphin and Gazelle helicopters and Soviet Su-22 ground attack aircraft. Angolan pilots appear to be flyingan increasing number of MiG-21 missions; Soviet and Cuban pilots are said to be flying the MiG-23 and Su-22. This will improve the government's interdiction and air defence capabilities but will probably not seriously impair UNITA's hit-and-run tactics, particularly if reported deliveries of US Stinger SAM are correct. In Namibia, the security forces continue to maintain control. SWAPO has suffered severe casualties, and, although incursions continue to be attempted, they have little effect. In South Africa, though unrest continues, the police remain able to deal with it without requiring military support.
   In Mozambique, RENAMO continues to be able to assert at least local control within the northern provinces. Troops from Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have been deployed to assist the Mozambican forces which had hitherto been unable to make a significant impact on the insurgents. RENAMO has no significant outside source of major military supplies, relying for the most part on material captured during its raids. Reorganization of the Ugandan armed forces continues. Rebel groups in the border areas appear to present little real threat. Conflict between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia remains at low intensity; drought and famine are a more immediate threat to stability. Elsewhere, with the exception of Nigeria, economic constraints preclude major expansion of military capability. In most countries of the region inadequacies in training and supervision, poor maintenance and lack of spares result in forces incapable of dealing with any crisis beyond local unrest.
   Economic Factors
   Real economic growth for the African economies in 1986 proved disappointing once again; regional GDP rose by only 1.2% compared with a 2.8% increase in 1985. Both these figures were well below the increase in population, thus resulting in a further deterioration of GDP per capita. As in the case of Latin American countries, oil-exporting countries performed worse than oil-importing ones, with export income for the former falling by a staggering 44%, and for the latter by a not insignificant 29%. Prospects for Southern Africa are far from encouraging, given the intransigent position of the South African regime and no apparent resolution to other regional conflicts.
   According to the joint annual report by the African Development Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Black Africa's debt rose by 8% in 1986 to an estimated $175 million. Inability to meet these debts led to numerous reschedulings (which afforded only temporary relief), structural economic reforms and austerity packages in many countries. Improved growth in developed economies and expansion of their markets for the region's exports, greater intra-African trade, better improved prices for African commodity exports, along with flexibility over debt repayments on the part of creditors would be needed to enable economic growth even to keep pace with the rate of growth of the population.
   Defence expenditure in South Africa continues to rise in the face of undiminished internal and external opposition to the apartheid regime. Consequently, Defence and Internal Security budgets in FY 1987/8 rose some 30% and 43%respectively over FY 1986/7 and may, inter alia, provide an increased capability for destabilizing activities directed against South Africa's neighbours.
   Zimbabwe's defence budget went up by just over 40% in nominal terms in FY 1986/7, which may partially indicate the costs of its operations to protect rail and oil lines in Mozambique from attacks by South African backed RENAMO guerrillas. RENAMO's campaign has had disastrous consequences on the Mozambican economy, threatening up to one quarter of the population with starvation as a result of disruptions to agriculture and the transport network. Consequently, defence remains the largest single item in the 1987 Mozambique budget, at around 43% of the total (more than double the 1986 allocation). Angola has had its agriculture devastated and its trade and transport network disrupted by the civil war. The resulting economic contraction has been compounded by rising prices in the free market and further aggravated in 1986 by the 20% fall in oil prices, which contribute up to 95% of export earnings and over half of government revenues. As a consequence, the Angolan defence effort represents an increasing proportion of dwindling resources: put at some 40% of government revenues in 1985, it is expected to have exceeded 50% in 1986.
   One major development in sub-Saharan Africa was the victory by Chadian forces over Libyan troops, and the capture of a large quantity of Soviet-made military equipment with an estimated value of about $1.0 billion. While some of this materiel may find its way into Chadian military inventories, the bulk of it is likely to be unloaded on the world second-hand arms market, with the funds thus raised being used to back the Chadian defence effort.
   Treaties and Agreements.
   (Except for the entry below, no change from the listings in The Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 113-114, has been noted.)
   In 1981 the Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matiere de defense (ANAD) was signed between Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Benin is an observer state. This non-aggression pact foresees the eventual development of an interallied force. The existence of the ANAD did not prevent the outbreak of a brief war between Burkina Faso and Mali in December 1985, but it did play a role in ending it.

Африка к югу от Сахары


   В военном балансе этого года записи по Джибути, Мавритании и Сомалийской Республике, которые до сих пор приводились в этом разделе книги, в разделе, посвященном Ближнему Востоку и Северной Африке. Это изменение в представлении призвано отразить исламский характер этих государств и их членство в Лиге арабских государств.
   Военные события
   Поддержка Франции, некоторая помощь США, переход оппозиционных элементов на сторону правительства Хабре и изобретательная, агрессивная, мобильная тактика привели к поражению ливийских сил и восстановлению большей части северных территорий Чада. Чадские силы использовали легкие колесные транспортные средства, вооруженные 0,50 пулеметами и ПТУР Milan, что оказались более чем достойными противниками для более тяжелых ливийских бронетанковых сил. (Это подчеркивает пробел в нашем охвате таких стран, как Чад, где "мягкокожие" транспортные средства, способные к применению специальных легких вооружений, составляют большую часть запасов наземных сил. Их почти невозможно идентифицировать и сосчитать.)
   Гражданская война в Анголе продолжается. Правительство получило дополнительные французские вертолеты Dauphin и Gazelle, а также Советские штурмовики Су-22. Ангольские летчики, по-видимому, совершают все большее число полетов на МиГ-21; советские и кубинские летчики, как говорят, летают на МиГ-23 и Су-22. Это улучшит возможности правительства по перехвату и противовоздушной обороне, но, вероятно, не нанесет серьезного ущерба тактике УНИТА "ударь-и-беги", особенно если сообщения о поставках американского ЗРК Stinger верны. В Намибии силы безопасности продолжают осуществлять контроль. СВАПО понесла серьезные потери, и, хотя попытки вторжения продолжаются, они мало что дают. В Южной Африке, несмотря на продолжающиеся беспорядки, полиция по-прежнему в состоянии справиться с ними, не требуя военной поддержки.
   В Мозамбике РЕНАМО по-прежнему может осуществлять по крайней мере местный контроль в северных провинциях. Для оказания помощи Мозамбикским силам, которые до сих пор не могли оказать существенного воздействия на повстанцев, были развернуты войска из Зимбабве, Малави и Танзании. РЕНАМО не имеет значительного внешнего источника основных военных поставок, полагаясь в основном на материалы, захваченные во время рейдов. Продолжается реорганизация Вооруженных сил Уганды. Повстанческие группы в пограничных районах, как представляется, не представляют реальной угрозы. Конфликт между сомалийской Республикой и Эфиопией остается на низком уровне; засуха и голод представляют собой более непосредственную угрозу стабильности. В других странах, за исключением Нигерии, экономические ограничения препятствуют существенному расширению военного потенциала. В большинстве стран региона неадекватная подготовка и надзор, плохое техническое обслуживание и отсутствие запасных частей приводят к тому, что силы оказываются неспособными справиться с каким-либо кризисом, кроме местных беспорядков.
   Экономические факторы
   Реальный экономический рост африканских стран в 1986 году вновь оказался разочаровывающим: региональный ВВП вырос всего на 1,2% по сравнению с 2,8% в 1985 году. Оба эти показателя были значительно ниже прироста населения, что привело к дальнейшему ухудшению показателей ВВП на душу населения. Как и в случае с латиноамериканскими странами, страны-экспортеры нефти показали худшие результаты, чем страны-импортеры нефти, причем экспортные доходы первых сократились на ошеломляющие 44%, а вторых - на немалые 29%. Перспективы для Юга Африки далеки от обнадеживающих, учитывая непримиримую позицию южноафриканского режима и отсутствие очевидного урегулирования других региональных конфликтов.
   Согласно совместному ежегодному докладу Африканского банка развития и экономической комиссии ООН для Африки, долг Черной Африки вырос на 8% в 1986 году до приблизительно 175 миллионов долларов. Неспособность погасить эти долги привела к многочисленным переносам сроков (что дало лишь временное облегчение), структурным экономическим реформам и пакетам жесткой экономии во многих странах. Для обеспечения того, чтобы экономический рост даже не отставал от темпов роста населения, потребуются более высокие темпы роста в развитых странах и расширение их рынков для экспорта региона, расширение внутриафриканской торговли, более высокие цены на экспорт африканских сырьевых товаров, а также гибкость в отношении погашения задолженности со стороны кредиторов.
   Расходы на оборону в Южной Африке продолжают расти в условиях непрекращающейся внутренней и внешней оппозиции режиму апартеида. Таким образом, бюджеты на оборону и внутреннюю безопасность в 1987/8 финансовом году выросли примерно на 30% и 43% соответственно по сравнению с 1986/7 финансовым годом и могут, в частности, создать более широкие возможности для дестабилизирующей деятельности, направленной против соседей Южной Африки.
   Оборонный бюджет Зимбабве вырос в номинальном выражении чуть более чем на 40% в 1986/7 финансовом году, что может частично указывать на расходы на его операции по защите железнодорожных и нефтяных линий в Мозамбике от нападений южноафриканских повстанцев РЕНАМО. Кампания РЕНАМО имела катастрофические последствия для экономики Мозамбика, угрожая голодом до одной четверти населения в результате сбоев в сельском хозяйстве и транспортной сети. Таким образом, оборона остается самой крупной статьей бюджета Мозамбика 1987 года, составляя около 43% от общего объема (более чем в два раза больше ассигнований 1986 года). Сельское хозяйство Анголы было опустошено, а ее торговая и транспортная сеть разрушена в результате гражданской войны. В результате экономический спад усугубился ростом цен на свободном рынке и еще более усугубился в 1986 году 20-процентным падением цен на нефть, на долю которых приходится до 95% экспортных поступлений и более половины государственных доходов. Как следствие, ангольские оборонные усилия представляют собой растущую долю сокращающихся ресурсов: если в 1985 году они составляли около 40% государственных доходов, то в 1986 году, как ожидается, превысят 50%.
   Одним из основных событий в Африке к югу от Сахары была победа Чадских сил над ливийскими войсками, и захват огромного количества советской военной техники на сумму около 1,0 млрд. долл. Хотя некоторые из этих материальных средств могут попасть в чадские военные запасы, основная их часть, вероятно, будет выброшена на мировой рынок подержанного оружия, а собранные таким образом средства будут использованы для поддержки оборонных усилий Чада.
   Договоры и соглашения.
   (За исключением приведенной ниже позиции, никаких изменений по сравнению с перечнем в военном балансе 1986-1987 годов отмечено не было.)
   В 1981 году между Буркина-Фасо, Кот-Д'Ивуаром, Мавританией, Мали, Нигером, Сенегалом, того и того было подписано соглашение о ненападении и оказании помощи в целях обороны. Бенин является государством-наблюдателем. Этот пакт о ненападении предусматривает в конечном итоге создание объединенных сил. Существование Анад не предотвратило начала непродолжительной войны между Буркина-Фасо и Мали в декабре 1985 года, но сыграло свою роль в ее прекращении.

   ANGOLA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 53,000 (incl some 10,000 'Guerrilla Forces' (ODP militia), 24,000 conscripts)
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.
Reserves: Militia (ODP: see Para-Military, below): 50,000

ARMY: 49,500 (perhaps 24,000 conscripts, 10,000 ODP).
10 Military Regions, (some may be fd HQ).
5 mot inf bdes (each of 1 tk, 2 inf bns, arty).
19 inf bdes (2 ODP 'Guerrilla Force).
4 AA arty bdes.
10 tk bns.
6 arty bns.
Equipment: t.
Tks: 540: 150 T-34, 300 T-54/-55, 90 T-62. lt: some 50 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 200 BRDM-2. APC: 255 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152.
Arty: guns/how: 500: ind 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm.
   MRL: 122mm: 75 BM-21.
   Mor: 82mm: 460; 120mm: 40.
ATK: RCL 900: 75mm, 82mm, 107mm. ATGW : AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 300+: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 20mm: M-55; 23mm: M-1939, ZU-23-2, 20 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm; 57mm: 70 S-60 towed, 40 ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: SA-7.

NAVY:ї 1,500.
Bases: Luanda (HQ), Lobito, Namibe.
FAC(G): 6 Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM.
FAC(T): 5 Sov Shershen (?3 serviceable).
Patrol craft, large: 4 PortArgos; coastal: 8<: 1 Zhuk, 2 Poluchat, 1 Jupiter, 4 Bellatrix.
Amph: LCT: 3 Polnocny B, 1 Alfange (?unserviceable). LCM: 5 Sov T-4.
Coastal Defence: SS-C-1 Sepal, radar.

AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENCE: 2,000; some 148 combat ac, 21 armed hel.ї
FGA: 4 sqns with 30 MiG-23; 61 MiG-21MF; 8 Su-22, incl 2 trg.
Interceptor: 3 sqns: 1 with 8 MiG-19, 2 with 30 MiG-21bis.
COIN/recce: 1 sqn with 8 PC-7.
MR: 1 F-27MPA, 2 EMB-111 Maritime Bandeirante.
Tpt: 2 sqns with 3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), some 11 CASA C-212 (?8 operational), 10 An-2, 12 An-12 (Sov forces spt ac), 33 An-26,
   4 PC-6 Turbo-Porter, 8 BN-2 Islander.
Hel: 2 sqns with 21 Mi-25 (?A), 13 Mi-17, 50 Mi-8, 24 SA-316B Alouette III, 8 SA-365N Dauphin, 5 AS-341 Gazelle, some 6 IAR-316B.
Trg: incl 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yak-11, 11 PC-7.
AD: 5 SAM bns; 21 radar units.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
SAM: 10 btys; 12 SA-2 Guideline, 40 SA-3 Goa, 72 SA-6 Gainful, 48 SA-8 Gecko, SA-9 Gaskin, SA-13 Gopher.
Radar: EW :Tall King, Spoon Rest,
   search: Bar Lock, flat Face, Squat Eye; height-finding: Side Net,
   msl comd: Fan Song (SA-2), Low Blow (SA-3), Straight flush (SA-6), Land Roll (SA-8);
   AA arty: flap Wheel, fire Can, Gun Dish.
(On order (status uncertain): ac: An-26; hel: some 30 IAR-316B attack, 2 SA-365 Dauphin.)

Forces Abroad: Sao Tomt some 500; 1 bn.

PARA-MILITARY:
Militia (People's Defence Organization, ODP) 50,000; 11+ 'bdes'. 10,000 serving with the Regular Army at any one time.
Border Guard (TGFA): 7,000.
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO): 8,900: ?2,500 fighting UNITA, ? 1,500 in Namibia.
'Popular Vigilance Brigades': unarmed civilians support police in counter-intelligence and security role.

FOREIGN TROOPS:
Cuba:28,000 (plus 8,000 civilian instructors/advisers); 5 'Div Comds', some 13 inf regts in security and in field roles, combat ac pilots, technicians, advisers.
E. Germany.500; intelligence and security advisers.
AT.Korea: 4,000 reported.
Portugal; other.?100 incl combat pilots, technicians (contract personnel).
USSR: 950 advisers and technicians; ship repair facilities Luanda; Bear D MR ac.
Zaire. ex-Katangan Gendarmerie (FLNC) reported.
African NationalCongress (ANC):perhaps 1,000.

OPPOSITION:
UNITA (Unionfor the Total Independence of Angola): some 26,000 'regulars' (1-2 years service), 34,000 'militia' (spt and log);
Eqpt: captured T-34/85, T-55 MBT, misc APC (not in service); BM-21 122mm MRL; 75mm, 76mm, 122mm fd guns; 81mm, 82mm, 120mm mor,
   85mm RPG-7 RL; 75mm RCL; 12.7mm hy machine guns; 14.5mm, 20mm and ZU-23-2 23mm AA guns; Stinger, SAM-7;
   lt ac reported (probably inactive).
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola): (Bakongo tribesmen) claims up to 5,000, actual strength e 250; small arms only.
FLEC (Frontfor the Liberation of the Cabinda
Enclave): (200-300); small arms only.

* Incl some $1.5 bn owed to the Soviet Union, mostly for armaments.
f Angola is reported to have received up to $2 bn in Soviet military material between 1983 and 1986.
t Delivery and loss data incomplete; eqpt totals uncertain.
ї Serviceability, especially of non-Soviet eqpt, uncertain.

   BENIN
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 4,350.
Terms of service:conscription (selective), 18 months.

ARMY: 3,800.
3 inf bns.
1 para/cdo bn.
1 engr bn.
1 service bn.
1 armd sqn.
1 arty bty.
Equipment:
Tks, lt: 20 PT-76.
AFV, recce: 9 M-8, 14 BRDM-2.
Arty, how: 105mm: 4 M-101. Mor: 60mm, 81mm.

NAVY: 200.
Base: Cotonou.
Patrol boats<: 5 Zhuk (2 ex N. Korean P-4; non operational).

AIR FORCE: 350; no combat ac or armed hel.
Ac: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 2 An-26, 1 F-27 Mk 600, 1 Falcon 20, 1 Aero Commander 500B, 1 Corvette 200 (VIP), 2 MH-1521 Broussard tpts;
   1 Reims Cessna 337 lt.
Hel: 1 SA-315B Alouette II, 2 AS-350B Ecureuil, 1 Bell 47G.

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie: 2,000; 4 mobile coys.
Public Security Force.
People's Militia 1,500-2,000.

   BOTSWANA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (both services form part of the Army):
Active: 3,250.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 3,100.
2 inf bn gps (5 inf, 1 recce, 1 engr, 1 sigs, 1 log, 1 spt coys).
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 30 Shorland, 13 V-150 Commando (11 with 90mm gun). APC: 30 BTR-60.
Arty: 10: guns: 105mm: 6 lt. how: 105mm: 4 Model 56 pack. Mor: 81mm: 10; 120mm: 10.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 20 Carl Gustav.
AD: SAM: some 60 SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 150;
5 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 BN-2 Defender.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 3 Skyvan 3M, 2 BN-2 Islander.
Comms/trg: 1 sqn with 2 Cessna 152, 5 Bulldog 120.
Hel: 2 AS-350 Ecureuil.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,000 (Police mobile unit).

   BURKINA-FASO
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl Gendarmerie form part of the Army): Active: 8,700.
Terms of service, voluntary.
People's Militia: 45,000 trained; 2 years part time; men and women 20-35 (military and civic duties).

ARMY: 7,000.
6 Military Regions.
   5 inf 'regts': HQ, 3 'bns' (each 1 coy of 5 platoons).
   1 AB 'regt': HQ, 1 bde, 2 coys.
   1 tk 'bn': 2 platoons.
   1 arty 'bn': 2 tps.
   1 engr 'bn', 1 sigs 'bn'.
Honour Guard.
Garrison School.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: ?83: 15 AML-60/-90, some 24 EE-9 Cascavel reported, 10M-8, 4 M-20, 30 Ferret. APC: 13 M-3.
Arty: how: 105mm: M-101. MRL: 107mm: Ch Type-63. Mor: 60mm, 10 81mm.
ATK: RL: M-20 3.5-in. (89mm). RCL: RPG-7, Ch Type-52 75mm.
AD: 30 14.5mm hy machine guns. SAM: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 200; some combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftr: 1 sqn with MiG-17.
Tpt: 15: 2 C-47 (DC-3), 2 Nord 262 Frigate, 2 HS-748A/B, 1Aero Commander 500B, 1 MH-1521M Broussard.
Liaison: 9 SF-260, 2 Cessna (1 F-172N, 1 F-337E Super Skymaster).
Hel: 4: 2 SA-316C Alouette III, 2 SA-365 Dauphin.
(On order: 4 SF-260 ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: 1,750:
   Gendarmerie 1,500; 6 coys (2 mobile).
   Security Company (CRG) 250.
  
   BURUNDI
   []
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl Gendarmerie form part of the Army):
Active: e 7,200 (incl Gendarmerie).
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 5,500.
2 inf bns.
1 para bn.
1 cdo bn.
1 armd car coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 18+: 6 AML-60, 12 -90, Shorland. APC: 29: 9 M-3, 20 BTR-40 and Walid.
Mor: 82mm: 18.
ATK: RL: 83mm: Blindicide. RCL: 75mm: 15 Ch Type-52.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 15 quad.

NAVY: 50.
Base: Bujumbura.
Patrol boats, river: 3<: Lambro (2 in reserve).

AIR: 150; 3 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 3 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 DC-3, 3 Reims Cessna 150.
Trg: 3 SF-260C.
Hel: 2 SA-341 Gazelle, 3 SA-316C Alouette III.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie: ~1,500.

   CAMEROON
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 11,620 (incl Gendarmerie).
Terms of service: voluntary (pre-military compulsory training programme in force).

ARMY: 6,600.
3 Military Regions; 7 Military Sectors: coy gps under command.
Presidential Guard: ?1 bn.
1 armd car bn.
1 para/cdo bn.
5 inf bns(l trg).
1 engrbn.
1 arty bn (5 btys).
1 AA bn (6 btys).
HQ regt, spt units.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 8 M-8, Ferret, 8 V-150 Commando (20mm gun). MICV: 12 V-150 Commando (90mm gun). APC: 29 V-150 Commando, 12 M-3 half-track.
Arty: how: 22: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 105mm: 16 M-101. Mor: 60mm; 81mm: 20; 120mm: 16.
ATK: RL: 89mm ACI-STRIM. RCL: 57mm: 13 Ch Type-52. 106mm: 40 M-40. ATGW: Milan.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 18 Type-58; 35mm: 18 twin Oerlikon; 37mm: 18 Ch Type-63.

NAVY: 670
Bases: Douala (HQ), Limbe, Kribi.
FAC(G): 2 P-48S La Combattante, 1 with 8 MM-40 Exocet SSM.
FAC: 2 Shanghai-II (1 non-operational).
Amph: LCM: 2; LCVP: 5; lt assault/spt craft: 8.
(On order: 30 38-ft Swiftships, 3 NAPCO Raider (1988)).

AIR FORCE: 350;
13 combat ac, 2 armed hel.
1 composite sqn.
1 Presidential fit.
FGA/COIN: 5 Alpha Jet, 4 Magister, 1 BN-2T Defender.
MR: 3 Do-128D-6.
Tpt: 3 C-47 (DC-3, ?operational), 1 DHC-4, 5 DHC-5D, 3 C-130, 2 Do-28, 4 MH-1521 Broussard (?operational), 1 Boeing 727-200,
   2 IAI-201 Arava, 2 PA-23 Aztec, 1 PC-6 Turbo Porter, 1 PC-7 Turbo Trainer.
Hel: 1 SA-330 Puma, 1 AS-332 Super Puma, 6 SA-315B/316C Alouette II/III, 1 SA-315 Lama, 4 SA-342 Gazelle (2 with HOT ATGW), 1 SA-365 Dauphin II.
(On order: 4 IAI-201 Arava tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie. 4,000: 10 regional groups.
   Patrol craft: coastal: 1; inshore: 12.

   CAPE VERDE
Economic data not available.
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,185.
Terms of service, conscription (selective).

ARMY: 1,000 (Popular Militia).
4 inf coys. Spt elms.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 8 BRDM-2.
Mor: 82mm: 16 M-1941; 120mm: 8 M-1943.
ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm).

NAVY: 160.
Base: Praia.
FAC: 2 Shershen (torpedo tubes removed).
Patrol craft: 3 Zhuk coastal<.
Misc: 1 Kamenka buoy tender/patrol.

AIR FORCE: 25; no combat ac.
Tpt: 2 Antonov An-26.

   CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 7,000 incl Gendarmerie.
Terms of service, conscription (selective), 2 years; personnel have a Reserve obligation thereafter, term unknown.

ARMY: 4,000.
1 Republican Guard 'regt' (bn).
1 territorial defence 'regt' (bn).
1 combined arms regt (1 mech, 1 inf bn).
1 spt/HQ 'regt' (bn; engr, sigs, tpt coys).
1 Presidential Guard bn.
Equipment: *
Tks: 4 T-55.
AFV: recce: 10 Ferret. APC: 4 BTR-152, some 10 VAB, 25+ ACMAT.
Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 12 M-1943.
ATK: RCL: 14 106mm.
River patrol craft: 9<.

AIR FORCE: 300; 2 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 2 R-235 Guerrier (?operational).
Tpt: 3 Douglas (1 DC-4 (VIP), 2 DC-3/C-47), 1 Caravelle, 1 Corvette, 8 AL-60, 6 MH-1521 Broussard, 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster.
Hel: 1 SA-315B Alouette II, 1 AS-350 Ecureuil, 4 H-34 (Sikorsky S-58, ?operational).

PARA-MILITARY: some 10,000.
Gendarmerie 2,700; 3 Regional Legions, 8 'bdes'.
Security Forces.
National Young Pioneers 8,000 (boys and girls 14-18); unarmed, some elementary drill and discipline - status uncertain.

* All Soviet equipment probably unserviceable.

   CHAD
   []

ARMY: ~17,000; comprises regular and rejoined rebel groups.
1 armd bn.
3 inf bns and 16 inf coys.
Presidential Guard regt.
1 recce sqn and 2 recce tps.
2 arty btys.
3 sigs coys.
1 tpt coy.
Military police units.
Numerous indep guerrilla 'bns' (gps) being integrated and forming new inf coys; may form bn.
Equipment:
AFV: some 65: 4 Panhard ERC-90, some 50 AML-60/-90, 11 V-150 with 90mm.
Arty: guns: 105mm: 5 M-101. Mor: 60mm; 81mm: M-61; 82mm; 120mm: AM-50.
ATK: RL: 68mm, 89mm. RCL: 106mm: M-40; 112mm: APILAS. ATGW: Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm, 30mm.
Material captured from or surrendered by former opposition groups incl: BMP MICV; BTR-60 APC; some EE-9 Cascavel AFV; BM-21 MRL;
   RPG-7 RL; B-10 RCL; 120mm, 2 CL-106mm mor; ZU-23-2 AA guns; SA-7 SAM.

AIR FORCE: 200; 2 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 2 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer (armed).
Tpt: 2 DC-4, 4 C-130A Hercules, 6 C-47 (DC-3, 3 operational), 1 Noratlas, 1 Caravelle 6R (VIP), 1 CASA C-212,
   2 PC-6B Turbo-Porter, 2 MH-1521 Broussard (?operational).
Hel: 4 SA-330 Puma.

Reported captured Libyan eqpt (operational status uncertain) incl:
Tks: ?50 T-55, ?12 T-62.
AFV: ?19 BMP, 8 Cascavel. recce: ?100 lt armd cars.
Arty: how: 122mm: ?6+ D-30. MRL: 122mm: ?18 BM-21.
ATK: guns: 73mm. RCL: 107mm.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: ZPU-1/-2/4; 23mm: ZU-23. SAM: SA-6: 12 btys.
Ac: 11 L-39, 6 SF-260; hel: some Mi-25.

PARA-MILITARY: perhaps 5,700:
National Military Police (PMN).
Territorial Military Police (PMT).
Surete (Police) 800.

OPPOSITION: Counseil Democratique de la Revolution (CDR): e 1,000 (Libyan-backed).
(The following former opposition groups have returned to Government control and now exist, at most, as potential political groupings: Mouvement Re'volutionnaire du Peuple Tchadien (MRP), The First Army/Front de Liberation du Tchad (FROLINAT), Fundamental FROLINAT, Western Armed Downloaded by Forces, Forces Armee"s Populaires (FAP), GUNT/ANL, Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation du Tchad (MPLT).)

* Excl French military subventions. Total French costs in Chad est at French francs 1.2 bn.

   CONGO
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 8,750.
Terms of service: voluntary (2 years).

ARMY: 8,000.
2 armd bns.
2 inf bn gps (each lt tk tp, 76mm gun bty).
1 inf bn forming.
1 arty gp (how, MRL).
1 engr bn.
1 para/cdo bn.
Equipment: t
Tks: 50: 35 T-54/-55, 15 Ch T-59. (Some T-34 in store.) lt: 17: 14Ch T-62, 3 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 25 BRDM-1/-2. APC: M-3, 104 BTR (30 -50, 30 -60, 44 -152).
Arty: how: 32: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 76mm: 8 M-1942; 100mm: 10 M-1944; 122mm: 8 M-1938.
   MRL: 8 BM-21. Mor: 82mm; 120mm: 10 M-1943.
ATK: guns: 5 57mm. RCL: 57mm.
AD: guns: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: 28 M-1939.

NAVY: f 250 (some women).
Base: Point Noire.
FAC(P): 6: 3 Shanghai II; 3 Zhuk (1 Shershen, 3 Pirana HS non-operational).
Patrol craft, river: 8<: 4 ANCOR (2 13-m Type 43, 2 11.4-m Type 38), 4 Yulin.
Spt: 1 53-ft launch

AIR FORCE: 500; 21 combat ac, no armed hel.f
FGA: 1 MiG-15, 20 MiG-17.
Tpt: 1 F-28, 5 An-24, 1 An-26, 2 I1-14, 2 C-47 (DC-3), 1 N-2501 Noratlas, 1 N-262 Frigate, 2 MH-1521 Broussard.
Trg: 4 L-39.
Hel: 4 SA-315B/316C Alouette II/III, 1 AS-365 Dauphin.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,100:
   Gendarmerie 1,400; 20 coys.
   People's Militia 4,700.

* Excl equipment.
f Spares are short; much equipment may be non-operational.

   EQUATORIAL GUINEA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,400.
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 1,100.
1 inf bn (5 coys).
Equipment:
Tks: lt: PT-76.
AFV: recce: 10 BRDM-2. APC: 10 BTR-152.
Mor: 82mm: M-1937.

NAVY: 200.
Bases: Malabo (Santa Isabel), Bata.
Patrol craft: 2: 1 P-6, 1 Poluchat<; 7 small craft reported.
(On order: 1 68-ft Lantana patrol craft< (1987).)

AIR FORCE: 95; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 Reims Cessna 337, 3 C-212, 1 Yak-40.
Hel: 2 SA-316C Alouette III.

PARA-MILITARY: some 2,000. Guardia Civil: 2 coys.
  
   ETHIOPIA
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 320,000 (not incl foreign personnel).:):
Terms of service:conscription, 30 months, inol police, border guard.
Reserves: People's Militia. All citizens 18-50 do 6 months trg. Assigned to Army, Police and Border Guard.

ARMY (incl ~150,000 People's Militia): 313,000.
22 inf divs (incl 3 mot, 4 mountain, 3 lt) with some 32 tk bns.
8 para/cdo bdes.
37 arty bns (assignment to divs varies).
12 AD bns (incl 3 bns each of SA-2, SA-3 SAM).
Equipment:ї
Tks: ~750: 65 M-47, 40 T-34, ~600 T-54/-55, 50 T-62. lt: 15 M-41.
AFV: recce: 165 BRDM-1/-2. MICV: 40 BMP-1. APC:some 30 M-113, 600 BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: gun/how: some 700 incl: 75mm: M-116 pack; 105mm: 40; 122mm: 370 (incl SP); 130mm: M-46; 152mm: 12 D-20; 155mm: 6 M-109 SP.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21.
   Mor: 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 120mm: 100 M-38; 4.2-in. (107mm): 100 M-2/-30; 120mm.
ATK: guns: 100mm: M-1955. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm towed, 57mm: M-1950, ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: 18 SA-2, 18 SA-3, SA-7.

NAVY: 3,000.ї
Bases: Massawa, Assab.
Frigates: 2 Petya II.
FAC(G): 8 Sov Osa-II with 4 SS-N-2A SSM;
FAC(T): 4 Sov Mol; 1 Turya hydrofoil.
Patrol craft, large: 5: 1 Yug Kraljevica, 1 US PGM, 3 118-ton Swiftships; coastal: 7<: 4 Sewart, 1 Poluchat, 2 Zhuk.
Amph: LSM: 2 Polnocny B; LCVP: 4 T-4, 2 EDIC.
Spt: 1 6,615-ton cargo vessel.
Trg: 1 US Bamegat.

AIR FORCE: 4,000; 138 combat ac; some 30 armed hel.
FGA: 8 sqns:
   1 with 20 MiG-17;
   6 with 78 MiG-21;
   1 with 40 MiG-23.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 11 An-12, 2 An-26.
Trg: MiG-21U, 11 L-39; 9 SF-260TP.
Hel: incl 32 Mi-8 (some may be armed), 22 Mi-24, 10 Chetak (Alouette III).

PARA-MILITARY: 169,000. Border Guard.
   Mobile emergency police force (9,000).

OPPOSITION:
Afar Liberation Front (Djibouti border area).
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF): some 6,500 (14 'bdes'), consisting of Eritrean Liberation Front-People's Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF, some 5,000),
   ELF Revolutionary Council and ELF Revolutionary Committee.
Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF): some 15,000.
Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU): moderate, was Royalist, Amhara.
Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM): allied to TPLF, Sudan border, expanding.
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP): was Maoist, Sudan border, expanding.
Gambella Peoples Liberation Movement: org in bdes up to 1,000 men, Sudan border.
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): some 8,000; 12 gps. Galla tribes (Central and South, Sudan border); expanding.
People's Liberation Front Revolutionary Guard (PLFRG): some 5,000.
Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF): 7,500.
Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF): some 1000.
Eqpt: mainly small arms but captured eqpt incl T-54/55 tks; APC; 76mm, 85mm, 122mm, 130mm guns/how; 23mm, 37mm, 40mm AA guns.

* Excl debt to the USSR and Eastern Europe for military equipment.
f Figures have been revised.
t Some 1,400 Soviet, 500 Cuban, 300 E. German technicians and advisers operate ac and hy eqpt. Some 4,000 (?bde) Cuban military personnel (?to be withdrawn).
ї War situation makes equipment data suspect; older US eqpt probably unserviceable.

   GABON
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 2,850.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 1,900.
Presidential Guard bn gp (1 recce/armd, 3 inf coys, arty, AA btys) (under direct Government control).
8 inf coys.
1 para/cdo coy.
1 engr coy.
1 service coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 16 EE-9 Cascavel,24 AML-90, 12 EE-3 Jararaca. APC: 12 EE-11 Urutu, 6 Commando, M-3, 12 VXB-170.
Arty: how: 105mm: 4 M-101. MRL: 140mm: 8. Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 20.
ATK: RCL: 67mm: Armbrust; 106mm.
AD: guns: 23mm: 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm: 10; 40mm: 2.
(On order: 6 ERC-90 Sagaie (status uncertain), 4 ERC-20, 14 VBL armd cars, mor, Milan ATGW.)

NAVY: 350.
Base: Port Gentil (HQ).
FAC(G): 1 Fr 150-ton with 4 SS-12 SSM.
FAC: 3: 1 Swiftships 118-ton; 2 Esterel: 1 88-ton, 1 80-ton.
Patrol craft: 1 Brazil Type V-3.
Amph: LSM: 1 Batrai, LCM: 3; 2 launches.
(On order: 2 P-400, 1 12-m patrol craft, 1 10-m coastal).

AIR FORCE: 600; 10 combat ac, 5 armed hel.
FGA: 9 Mirage 5 (2 -G, 4 -GII, 3 -DG).
MR: 1 EMB-111P1 Bandeirante.
Tpt: 4 Hercules (1 C-130, 1 L-100-20, 2 L-100-30), 4 Douglas (3 C-47, 1 DC-8-30), 4 EMB-110 Bandeirante, 1 Gulfstream III (VIP), 1 Falcon,
   1 YS-11 A, 3 Nord 262 Frigate, 4 MH-1521 Broussard; lt: 2 Reims Cessna 337, 2 Magister, 4 T-34C.
Hel: 4 SA-330 Puma, 3 SA-316C Alouette III, 2 AS-350 Ecureuil (armed), 5 SA-342 Gazelle (3 armed).
(On order: ATR-42 tpt, 4 T-34 ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Coastguard 2,800; 11 patrol craft.
Gendarmerie 2,000; 3 'bdes', 11 coys, 2 armd sqn, air unit.
Republican Guard.
Rapid Intervention Force.

* Incl internal security.

   GHANA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 10,600.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 9,000.
2 Command HQ:
2 bdes (6 inf bns and spt units).
1 recce bn.
3 border tps bns (were police/customs).
1 para bn.
1 mor bn.
1 fd engr bn.
1 sigs bn.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 25 Saladin, 3 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 50 MOWAG Piranha.
Mor: 81mm: 50; 120mm: 28 Tampella.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 50 Carl Gustav.
AD: SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 800.
2 Command HQ:
Bases: Sekondi, Tema.
Corvettes: 2 Kromantse ASW.
FAC: 4: 2 FPB-57, 2 FPB-45.
Patrol craft: 6: 2 Dela, 2 Br Ford large; 2 Spear II coastal.
Spares in short supply, some vessels may be unserviceable.

AIR FORCE: 800; 9 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 9 MB-326 (4 -K, 5 -F).
Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 with 6 Fokker (F-27, 1 F-28); 1 with 6 Skyvan 3M; 1 with 8 BN-2 Islander.
Hel: 4 SA-316C Alouette III, 2 Bell 212.
Trg: 1 sqn with 10 Bulldog.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 bn (690).

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Guards some 2,500.
People's Militia 5,000.
Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (National Civil Defence Force).

   GUINEA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 9,900 (perhaps 7,500 conscripts).
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.

ARMY: 8,500.
1 armd bn.
5 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 cdo bn.
1 special force bn.
1 AD bn.
Equipment:*;
Tks: 45 T-34, 8 T-54. lt: 20 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 25 BRDM-1/-2. APC: 40 BTR (16 -40, 10 -50, 8 -60, 6 -152).
Arty: 26: guns/how: 76mm: 8 M-1942; 85mm: 6 D-44; 122mm: 12 M-1931/38.

NAVY: f 600.
Bases: Conakry, Kakanda.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-II.
Patrol craft, large: 1 T-58 ex-MCM; coastal: 15: 3 Sov Shershen, 6 P-6, 2 Swiftships (1 77-ft, 1 65-ft), 4 Sov (2 Poluchat, 2 MO-6);
   inshore: 2 Fr Stinger 26-ft.
Amph: LCU: 2.

AIR FORCE: 800; 6 combat ac, no armed hel.f
FGA: 6 MiG-17F (?serviceable).
Tpt: 4 An-14. In addition, 2 An-24, 4 I1-14, 2 I1-18, 1 Yak-40 of Air Guinee are available for military use. lt: 1 Reims Cessna F-337.
Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI (?serviceable), 5 Yak-18, 3 L-29, 2C-119.
Hel: 1 Bell 47G, 1 SA-330 Puma, 1 SA-341 Gazelle, 1 Hiller UH-12B.

PARA-MILITARY: 9,600.
People's Militia: 7,000.
Gendarmerie 1,000.
Republican Guard 1,600.

* US aid only. Excl loans from FRG for road engineering eqpt for Army.
f Operational status of Soviet supplied equipment uncertain.

   GUINEA-BISSAU
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl Gendarmerie are part of the Army):
Active: 9,150.
Terms of service:?conscription (selective).

ARMY: 6,800.
1 armd bn (sqn).
5 inf bns.
1 recce sqn.
1 engr coy.
1 arty bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 10 T-34. lt: 20 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 10 BRDM-2. APC: 35 BTR-40/-60/-152, 20 Ch Type-56.
Arty: 27: guns: 85mm: 8 D-44. how: 105mm: 1; 122mm: 18 M-1938/D-30. Mor: 82mm: 40 M-1937; 120mm: 8 M-1943.
ATK: RL: 89mm. RCL: 75mm: Ch Type-52; 82mm: B-10.
AD: guns: 23mm: 18 ZU-23; 37mm: 6 M-1939; 57mm: 10 S-60. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 275.
Base. Bissau.
Patrol craft, large: 1 Shershen; coastal: 9: 2 Ch Shantou, 1 Sov Poluchat, 6< others; river: some.
Amph: LCVP: 2 T-4, some Ch small craft reported.
Spt: 1 Biya-dass hydrographic survey/buoy tender.
(On order: 4 Bazan coastal patrol craft<.)

AIR FORCE: 75; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 2 Do-27, 2 Yak-40; lt: 1 Reims Cessna FTB-337.
Hel: 1 SA-315B Alouette II, 2 SA-316C Alouette III, 1 Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 2,000.

   IVORY COAST
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 14,920 (incl full time para-military).
Terms of service, conscription (selective), 6 months.
Reserves: 12,000.

ARMY: 5,500.
4 Military Regions:
1 armd bn.
3 inf bns.
1 arty gp.
1 AA arty bty.
1 engr coy.
1 HQ coy.
1 spt coy.
1 para coy.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 5 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 7 ERC-90, ?16 AML-60/-90. APC: 16 M-3.
Arty: how: 105mm: 4 M-1950. Mor: 120mm: 16 AM-50.
ATK: RL: STRIM. RCL: 106mm M-40.
AD: guns: 20mm: 14 incl 4 M-3 VDA SP; 40mm: 5.

NAVY: 690.
Base. Locodjo (Abidjan).
FAC(G): 2 PR-48 Patra (4 MM-40 Exocet SSM).
Patrol craft: 8: 2 Vigilant(PR-48 with 2 MM-40), 4 ARCOR 26-m, 2 31-m launches.
Amph: 1 Batral LSM, 13 assault boats.
Trg ship: 1.

AIR FORCE: 930; 6 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 6 Alpha Jet.
Tpt: hel: 1 sqn with 3 SA-330 Puma, 1 SA-316C Alouette III, 4 SA-365C Dauphin.
Liaison/VIP: 1 fit with: ac: 1 F-28-4000, 1 Gulfstream II/III; hel: 1 SA-330 Puma.
Trg: 6 Bonanza F-33C, 2 Reims-Cessna F-150.
Other: ac: 2 Reims Cessna F-337, 1 Cessna 421, 1 Super KingAir 200; hel: 2 SA-365C Dauphin.

PARA-MILITARY: 7,800:
Presidential Guard 1,100.
Gendarmerie 4,400; VAB APC, ARCOR (2 31-ft, 2 26-ft) patrol boats.
Militia 1,500.
Military Fire Service 800.

   KENYA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 13,350.
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 13,000 (incl Air Force).
1 armd bde (2 armd bns).
2 inf bdes (1 with 2, 1 with 3 inf bns).
1 engr bde.
1 armd recce bn.
2 arty bns.
2 engr bns.
1 indep air cav bn.
5 inf bns (cadre).
1 para bn.
1 AA bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 76 Vickers Mk 3.
AFV: recce: 40 AML-60/-90, 8 Shorland. APC: 50 UR-416, 10 Panhard M-3.
Arty: guns: 56: 105mm; 40 lt; 16 pack. Mor: 81mm: 20; 120mm: 10.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: 80 Carl Gustav. 120mm: Wombat. ATGW: Milan, 8 Swingfire.
AD: guns: 20mm: 50 TCM-20.

NAVY: 350.
Base: Mombasa.
FAC(G): 4 Brooke Marine (1 37.5-m, 3 32.6-m) with 4 Gabriel II SSM.
Patrol craft, large: 3 Vosper 31-m (Simba).
(On order: 2 Province FAC(G) (1988)).

AIR FORCE: re-formed as '82 Air Force'; 26 combat ac, 30 armed hel.
FGA: 9 F-5 (8 -E, 1 -F).
COIN: 17 BAe (5 BAC-167 Strikemaster, 12 Hawk T-52).
Tpt: 5 DHC-4 Caribou, 8 DHC-5D Buffalo, 7 Do-28D, 1 Navajo.
Trg: 12 Bulldog (5 103, 7 127).
Hel: 54: 3 SA-330 Puma, 9 IAR-330, 2 Bell 47G,
   40 Hughes (15 500MD Scout Defender, 15 500MD with TOW ATGW, 8 500M (Forward Air Control), 2 500D trg).
Msls: Sidewinder AAM, Maverick ASM.
(On order: 2 DHC-5 ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Police (General Service Unit) 1,800:
Police Air Wing, 7 Cessna lt ac, 3 Bell hel.

   LIBERIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 5,750.
Terms of service: voluntary; militia conscription males only; 8 weeks from age 16.
Reserves: ?50,000 males 16-45.

ARMY: 5,300.
1 Executive Mansion Guard bn.
6 inf bns.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 armd recce sqn.
1 service bn.
1 air recce bn (250).
Equipment:
APC: 10 MOWAG.
Arty: how: 11: 75mm pack 3; 105mm: 8. MRL: BM-21. Mor: 60mm: 20; 81mm: 10; 4.2-in. (107mm).
ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm). RCL: 57mm, 106mm.
Avn: MR: 1 Cessna 337.
tpt: 2 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 4 Arava.
lt ac: 8 Cessna (2 172, 2 185, 4 337).
(On order 3 IAI-201 Arava recce ac.)

NAVY (Coast Guard): 450.
Bases:Monrovia, Bassa, Sinoe, Cape Palmas.
Patrol craft: 6<: 3 Swed CG-27 50-ton, 3 Swiftships (2 38-ton, 1 42-ton).

PARA-MILITARY: National Police 2,000.

   MADAGASCAR
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 21,000.
Terms of service, national service (incl civil), 18 months.

ARMY: some 20,000.
2 bn gps.
1 engr regt.
1 sigs regt.
1 service regt.
7 construction regts.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 12 PT-76.
AFV: recce: ?73: 8 M-8, (?20)M-3A1, 10 Ferret, (?35) BRDM-2. APC: (?30) M-3A1 half-track.
Arty: 24: guns: 76mm: 12 ZIS-3. how: 122mm: 12D-30. Mor: 81mm: 24; 120mm: 8.
ATK: RCL: 106mm.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 50 ZPU-4; 37mm: 20 Type 55.

NAVY: 550(incl 120marines).
Base: Diego-Suarez.
Patrol craft, large: 1PR-48.
Amph: LSM: 1 Batram with 8 SS-12 SSM. LCT: 1 EDIC. LCM: 1N. Korean Nampo.
1 marine coy+.

AIR FORCE: 500; 12 combat ac,no armedhel.
FGA: 1sqn with 4 MiG-17, 8 MiG-21fl.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1HS-748 (VIP); 4 An-26; 2 Yak-40; 6 DC-3 (1 C-53D, 5 C-47); 1 BN-2 Defender,An-12; 1Aztec, 3 Cessna337, 5 other lt ac.
Hel: 1 sqn with 1Bell 47, 6 Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 7,500, incl maritime police with 5 patrol craft.

   MALAWI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 5,250.
Terms of service: voluntary, 7 years. Reserves: Army: some 1,000; ex-soldiers have a 5-year obligation.

ARMY: 5,000.
3 inf bns.
1 spt bn (incl 1reccetp).
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 10 Fox, 10 Ferret.
Arty: guns: 12 105mm. Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm). RCL: 57mm.
AD: SAM: 12 Blowpipe.

MARINE: 100.
Base. Chilumba.
Patrol boats: 5<: 1 Fr 21-m, 1 Spear, 3 lake.

AIR: 150; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 9 Dornier (7 Do-28, 2 Do-228), 3 BN-2T Defender, 1 HS-125-800 VIP.
Hel: 1 sqn with 2 SA-330 Puma, 1 SA-316C Alouette III, 1 AS-365 Dauphin, 2 AS-350 Ecureuil.
(On order: 1Do-228 lt tpt ac.)

Forces Abroad: Mozambique: ~400; elms of 1 inf bn.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,000. Police: 2 BN-2T Defenderac (border patrol), 1 AS-350 Ecureuil hel.
(On order: 1 BN-2Tac.)

   MALI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 7,350.
Terms of service, national service (incl civil), 2 years (selective).

ARMY: 6,900.
2 tk bns.
4 inf bns.
2 arty bns.
1 engrbn.
1 para bn.
1 special force bn.
2 AA arty coys.
1 SAM bty.
Equipment: *
Tks: 21 T-34. lt: 18 Type 62.
AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-2. APC: 50: 30 BTR-40, 10 BTR-152, 10 BTR-60.
Arty: 22: guns: 20: 85mm: 6 D-44; 100mm: 6 M-1944; 122mm: 8 D-30. MRL: 122mm: 2 BM-21. Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 30 M-43.
AD: guns: 12: 37mm: 6 M-1939; 57mm: 6 S-60. SAM: 12 SA-3.

NAVY: 50.
Bases:Bamako, Mopti, Segou, Timbuktu.
Patrol craft: 3 river<.

AIR FORCE: 400; 27 combat ac, no armed hel*
FGA: 13 MiG-17, 14 MiG-21.
Tpt: 2 C-47 (DC-3), 3 An-2, 2 An-24, 2 An-26, 1 Corvette 200 (VIP).
Trg: 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yak-11/-18.
Hel: 2 Mi-4, 1 Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: 7,800.
Gendarmerie1,800; 8 coys.
Republican Guard 2,000.
Militia 3,000.
National Police 1,000.

* Eqpt serviceability questionable.

   MOZAMBIQUE
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: ?31,700 (some 10,500 conscripts).
Terms of service, conscription (selective), 2 years (incl women).

ARMY: 730,000 (perhaps 75% conscripts; most units well under strength.)
10 Provincial Commands.
1 tk bde (Presidential Guard).
7 inf bdes (each 1 tk, 3 inf, 2 mot, 2 arty, 1 AD bns, spt units).
2 indep mech bns.
1 Railway Security bn.
7 AA arty bns.
Equipment: *
Tks: 250: 150 T-34, some 100 T-54/-55.
AFV: recce: 48: 30 BRDM-1/-2. MICV: 16 BMP with Sagger. APC: 100+ BTR-60, 100 BTR-152.
Arty: guns: 200: 76mm: M-1942; 85mm: D-44; 100mm: 24 M-1944; 130mm: 24 M-46/D-30.
   how: 105mm: M-101; 122mm: M-1938; 152mm: 20 D-1.
   MRL: 122mm: 30 BM-21.
   Mor: 350: 60mm, 82mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 75mm; 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-11. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 400: 20mm; 23mm: ZU-23 (ZSU-23-4 reported); 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: SA-7, SA-2, 10 SA-3.

NAVY: 700.*
Bases:Maputo (HQ), Beira, Nacala, Pemba, Metangula.
Patrol craft, large: 2 SO-1; coastal: 25<: 7 Sov (6 Zhuk, 1 Poluchat), 6 Port (1 Antares, 3 Jupiter, 2 Bellatrix), 2 Neth, 10 Indian.
Amph: LCT: 1 Port Alabarda 500-ton; LCU: 2 LDM-100.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 60+ combat ac, 12 armed hel*
FGA: 5 sqns with some 15 MiG-17, 45 MiG-21.
Hel: 2 sqns with 10 Mi-8, 12 Mi-24/-25.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Il-62, 8 An-26 (some equipped for COIN operations).
Trg: L-39, 7 Z-526, 3 MiG-15.

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Guard 9,500: 4 bdes.
Provincial, People's Militias, Local Militias (village self-defence force).

FOREIGN TROOPS: 600 Cuban, 850 Soviet, 60 N.Korean military advisers; 500 E.German security advisers reported.
   Some 6-12,000 Zimbabwean (varies), some 650 Tanzanian, e 400 Malawi tps (varies).

OPPOSITION:
Uniao Nacional Africanoda Rombezia; military wing National Resistance Movement of Mozambique (MNR or RENAMO): 18,000 reported, 710,000 trained.
4 Regular bns (active).
Special Forces (7200) in small teams.
Equipment:
Arty: guns: 76mm; rockets: 122mm B-11 (GRAD-P).
ATK: RCL: 82mm B-10, RPG-7.
Mor: 60mm, 82mm, 120mm M-1943.
AD: 6 14.5mm.

* Eqpt serviceability questionable; perhaps only 50-60% operational. Some eqpt in store.

   NIGER
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 3,290.
Terms of service, conscription (2 years), selective.

ARMY: 3,150.
3 Military Districts.
2 armd recce sqns.
6 inf coys.
1 engr coy.
1 para coy.
1 log/spt coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 50+: 10 M-8, 18 AML-90, 18 AML-60-7, some AML-60-20. APC: 14 M-3.
Mor: 60mm: M-35; 81mm: M-61.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20.
AD: guns: 20mm: 10 M-3 VDA SP.

AIR FORCE: 140; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 Boeing 737 (VIP), 2 C-130H Hercules, 3 Noratlas, 1 Do-228, 3 Do-28D, 2 Cessna 337.
(On order. 1 Dornier Do-228 lt tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: 2,550+.
Gendarmerie (7850); 5 groups.
Presidential Guard (7200).
Republican Guard (71,500).
Four Nomad patrol groups.

   NIGERIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 94,500.
Terms of service, voluntary.
Reserves planned; none organized.

ARMY: 80,000.
1 armd div (4 armd, 1 mech bdes).
1 composite div (incl 1 AB, 1 air portable, 1 amph bdes).
2 mech divs (each 3 mech bdes).
4 arty bdes (organic to divs)
4 engr bdes (organic to divs)
4 recce bns (organic to divs)
Equipment:
Tks: 132: 60 T-55, 72 Vickers Mk 3. lt: 100 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 165: 20 Saladin, 90 AML-90, 55 Fox.
   APC: 80: 10 Saracen, 70 Steyr 4K-7FA.
Arty: 497: guns: 122mm: 200 D-30/-74. how: 105mm: 200 M-56; 155mm: 72 FH-77B towed, 25 Palmaria SP.
   Mor: 81mm: 200.
ATK: RCL: 106mm.
AD: guns: some 90: some 60 20mm, 40mm towed; 30 ZSU-23-4 SP.
   SAM: 48 Blowpipe, 16 Roland.
(On order 40 ERC-90 AFV, Swingfire ATGW; Blowpipe.)

NAVY: 5,000.
Bases: Apapa (Lagos; HQ Western Command), Calabar (HQ Eastern Command).
Frigate: 1 Meko 360H with 1x4 and 4 Otomat SSM, 1x8 Aspide SAM, 1 Lynx hel.
Corvettes: 4 Vosper Thornycroft: 2 Hippo Mk 9 with 2x3 Seacat SAM; 2 Dorina (Mk 3) (?operational).
FAC(G): 6: 3 Lurssen Type-57 with 4 Otomat SSM; 3 La Combattante IIIB with 2x2 MM-38 Exocet.
Patrol craft, large: 9: 4 Makurdi (Brook Marine), 1 Yan-Yan, 4 Argungu (Abeking & Rasmussen);
   coastal: 36<: 2 Swiftships 20-m, 14 Intermarine, 2 Watercraft P-2000, 6 SM-5115 Simoneau 15.8-m, 6 Damen Stan, 6 P-20 21-m, 14.5-m.
MCM: 2 Lerici.
Amph: LST: 2 Ro-Ro 1300 (Crocodile); LCA: 4 FPB-512 RTK.
Trg: 1 ex-Neth yacht.
Hel: 3 Westland Lynx Mk 89 MR/SAR.
(On order 10 Swiftships 20-m.)

AIR FORCE: 9,500; 67 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA/interceptor: 3 sqns:
   1 with 15 Alpha Jet;
   1 with 12 MiG-21 bis, 6 MiG-21U (12 MiG-21MF being refurbished);
   1 with 18 Jaguar (14 -5N, 4 -BN).
SAR: 1 sqn with: ac: 2 F-27MR; hel: 20 BO-105C/D.
Tpt: 2 sqns with 9 C-130 Hercules (6 -H, 3 -H-30), 3 F-27, 5 G-222, 1 Gulfstream II (VIP), 1 Boeing 727-200 (VIP).
Spt: 3 sqns with 18 Do-28D, 18 Do-128-6.
Hel incl 14 SA-330 Puma, 4 BO-105C.
Trg: ac: 2 MiG-21U, 12 Alpha Jet, 4 Jaguar, 12 MB-339, P-149D, 25 Bulldog; hel: 15 Hughes 300.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
(On order 12 MiG-21MF; 3 Do-228 lt tpt; some 4 Do-128-6 utility ac; 5 Boeing CH-47 Chinook, 12 AS-332 Super Puma hel.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Coastguard: 15 Abeokuta, 3 other patrol craft.
Port Security Police 12,000.
Security and Civil Defence Corps (Ministry of Internal Affairs): Police: UR- 416 APC, 4 hel, 68 small craft, 7 hovercraft (5 AV Tiger).

   RWANDA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 5,150.
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 5,000.
1 cdo bn.
1 recce sqn.
8 inf coys.
1 engr coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 12 AML-60. APC: 16 M-3.
Mor: 81mm: 8.
ATK: RL 83mm Blindicide. guns: 57mm: 6.

AIR: 150; 4 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 2 BN-2 Defender, 2 SF-260W.
Tpt: 1 Caravelle (VIP), 1 N-2501 Nomtlas,
Liaison: ac: 2 R-235; hel: 6 SA-342L Gazelle, 7 Alouette III.
Trg: 1 CM-170 Magister.

PARA-MILITARY: Gendarmerie 1,200.

* Military aid from Belgium.

   SENEGAMBIA
   In December 1983 a confederal defence budget was introduced. In 1986/7 it was fr CFA 3.24 bn.
  
   SENEGAL
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (incl Gambian):
Active: 9,700.
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years selective.
Reserve: exists, no details known.

ARMY: 8,500 (mostly conscripts).
4 Military Zone HQ.
1 armd bn.
5 inf bns.
1 Confederal bn (serves in Gambia).
1 AB bn.
1 cdo bn.
1 arty bn.
1 engr bn.
1 residential Guard (horsed).
3 construction coys.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 AML-60, 27 -90. APC: some 16 Panhard M-3, 12 M-3 half-track.
Arty: 12: how: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 105mm: 6 M-101. 155mm: ?6 Fr Model-50. Mor: 81mm: 8; 120mm: 8.
ATK: RL: STRIM-89. ATGW: Milan.
AD: guns: 21 M-693 20mm, 40mm.

NAVY: 700.
Base. Dakar.
Patrol craft, large: 4: 1 PR-72M, 3 P-48; coastal: 3 Interceptor<.
Amph: LCT: 2 EDIC-700 410-ton; LCM: 2.
(On order: Osprey-class fast patrol vessel.)

AIR FORCE: 500; 12 combat ac or armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 CM-170 Magister, 4 R-235G, 1 Reims Cessna F-337F.
MR/SAR: 1 EMB-111 Maritime Bandeirante, 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 Boeing 727-200, 1 Caravelle (VIP); 5 C-47 (DC-3), 5 F-27-400M, 2 Broussard.
Trg: 4 Rallye (2 235A, 2 160).
Hel: incl 1 SA-341 Gazelle, 2 SA-330 Puma, 2 SA-316 Alouette III.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,800
Gendarmerie. 12 VXB-170 APC.
Customs: 17 coastal patrol craft (11 armed).

   THE GAMBIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: (600).
Terms of service, voluntary; some compulsory conditions authorized.

ARMY (with Confederal Army):
1 inf coy (125).

GENDARMERIE: 400.
Equipment:
Recce: 8 Ferret.
RL: 4 M-20 3.5-in. (89mm).

MARINE: 50.
Base. Banjul.
Patrol boats: coastal: 2<: 1 31-ton Tracker, 1 17-ton Lance.

AIR: 25; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: 1 Skyvan 3M, 1 BN-2 Defender.

   SEYCHELLES
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 1,300.
Terms of service, conscription: 2 years.

ARMY: 1,000.
1 inf bn.
2 arty tps.
Spt coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 6 BRDM-2, ?8 Shorland.
Arty: guns: 122mm: 3 D-30. MRL: 122mm: 4 BM-21. Mor: 82mm: 6 M-1937.
ATK: RL: RPG-7.
AD: SAM: SA-7.

MARINE: 200.
Base. Port Victoria.
FAC: 1 Sov Turya hydrofoil (no torpedo tubes).
Patrol craft, large: 4: 1 Fr Sirius, 1 lt FPB-42; 2 Zhuk, coastal: 1<.
Amph: LCT: 1.

AIR: 100; no combat ac or armed hel.
MR ac: 1 BN-2 Defender, 1 Merlin IIIB.
Tpt: 2 BN-2 Islander, 2 R-235E.
Hel: 2 SA-316 Alouette III.

PARA-MILITARY: People's Militia 900.

   SIERRA LEONE
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 3,100.
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 3,000.
2 inf bns.
2 arty btys (81mm mor).
1 engr sqn.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 4 Saladin. APC: 10 MOWAG Piranha.
Mor: 60mm, 81mm.
ATK: RCL 84mm: Carl Gustav.
AD: SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 100 (coastguard).
Base. Freetown.
Patrol boat: 1 Tracker II<.
Amph: 3 LCA<.
(On order 1 105-ft US-built patrol vessel (1987).)

PARA-MILITARY: 800. State Security Division: 1 special forces bn.

   SOUTH AFRICA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 97,000 (incl 67,900 National Service; 3,200 women).
Terms of service: maximum 24 months (selective) active National Service, followed by mandatory active Reserve Service of up to 720 days over 6 2-year cycles (120 days each) in Citizen Force.
Reserves: 325,000.
Active Reserves: 175,000: Army 146,000; Navy 2,000; Air 27,000.
National Reserves: 150,000: after Citizen Force service and depending upon place of residence, reservists then serve 5 years in National Reserve
   and may be allocated to Active Citizen Force Reserve or Commando Force, where they serve 30 days in the first year,
   then 12 days per year up to age 55 or transfer to National Reserve, where they may elect to serve to age 65.

ARMY: ~75,000. Regulars: 19,900 (12,000 White, 5,400 Black and Coloured; e 2,500 women).
National Service: e 55,000. Part-time Citizen Force and Commando.
11 territorial commands.
1 Corps HQ.
   1 corps arty bde (2 med, 2 loc regts).
1 armd div HQ.
   1 armd bde (2 tk, 2 armd car, 1 mech inf bns).f
   1 mech bde (1 tk, 1 armd car, 2 mot inf bns).f
   1 mot bde (2nd to form) (3 inf, 1armd car bns).f
   3 fd arty bns, 1 lt AA arty regt (-).
   1 engr regt (+), 5 fd engr sqns.
1 inf div HQ.
   3 mot bdes (each with 3 inf, 1 tk, 1 armd car bns).f
   2 arty bns.
   1 lt AA regt (3 btys (1 cadre)).
   Sigs, spt units.
1 para bde (3 para bns) (Quick Reaction Force).
1 task force (SW Africa).
4 fd, 1med, 4+ lt AA regts
Some 7 engr sqns (at partial strength)
1 special recce regt.
1 AA missile regt (3 Crotale, 3 Tigercat btys).
3 sigs regts, 3 sigs sqns.
Equipment:
Tks: some 250 Centurion/Olifant.
AFV: recce: 1,600 Eland(90mm gun, 60mm mor).
   MICV: 1,500 Ratel (20mm/60mm/90mm gun; 81mm mor).
   APC: 1,500 incl Buffalo, Hippo, Rhino, Samil, Lynx (wheeled).
Arty: 175: gun/how: 155mm: 40 G-5 towed, how: 25-pdr (88mm): 30; 5.5-in (140mm): 75 G-2; 155mm: 10 G-6 SP.
   MRL: 127mm: 20 Valkiri SP.
   Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 120.
ATK: RCL: 84mm, 106mm. guns: 6-pdr (57mm); 17-pdr (76mm); 90mm: M-67. ATGW: SS-11, 120 ENTAC.
AD: guns: 20mm; 35mm: 55 K-63 twin; 40mm: 25 L/70; 3.7-in (94mm): 15. SAM: 20 Cactus (Crotale), 54 Tigercat.
Some captured SA-9 SAM and ZU-23-2 AA guns reported in service.

NAVY: 9,000, (incl 900 marines, 4,500 conscripts; e 300 women).
Two Commands: Western (HQ, Cape Town); Eastern (HQ, Durban).
Bases: Simonstown, Durban.
Subs: 3 Daphne.
Frigates: 1 President (Br Type-12) ASW with 1 Wasp hel (trg).
FAC(G): 12:
   9 Minister (MOD) (Reshef/Saar-4-type) with 6 Skorpioen (Gabriel-type) SSM;
   3 Dvora-type with 2 Skorpioen.
Patrol craft: 4 Br Ford, 4 mod Ton, 1 other large; 30 Namacurra armed harbour.
MCMV: 6: 3 Br Ton minesweepers, 3 Ton mine-hunters.
   1 fleet replenishment ship (with hel deck; 2 hel).
   1 ocean (2 hel), 1 inshore hydrographic ships.
(On order: 3MOD, some 3 Dvora-type FAC(G).)

MARINES: (900; 600 conscripts).
   9 local harbour defence units.

AIR FORCE: 13,000 (2,400 conscripts; E 400 women); 366 combat ac (incl 93 with Citizen Force), some 14 armed hel.
3 Territorial Area Commands; Trg, Tac Spt, Log Commands.
Bbrs: 2 sqns:
   1 with 5 Canberra B(I)12, 2 T-4;
   1 with 5 Buccaneer S-50.
FGA: 4 sqns with 15 Mirage F-1AZ, 80 MB-326M/K Impala I/II.
FGA/interceptor/recce: 2 Mirage sqns:
   1 with 31 F-1Z; 1 with 19 IIICZ/EZ.
   1 fit with 7 IIIRZ/R2Z.
   (Mirage III CZ/EZ being converted to Cheetah variant.)
ELINT/EW: 1 sqn with Boeing 707 (4 reported, some may still be tankers).
Hel: 7 sqns with 14 SA-321 Super Frelon, 50 SA-330 Puma, 80 SA-316C Alouette III.
Tpt: 3 sqns:
   1 with 6 C-130B Hercules, 9 C-160Z;
   1 with 4 BAe (3 HS-125 Mercurius, 1 Viscount 781);
   1 with 10 C-47 (Douglas DC-3).
Liaison: 3 sqns with 15 AM-3C Bosbok, 25 C-4M Kudu, 20 Cessna 185.
Recce/MR: 2 sqns: 1 with some 8 C-47; 1 with 20 P-166S-DL3MAR.
(Some C-130 have a MR role).
Attack/trg: 1 sqn with 24 Impala I/II.
Trg: 1 sqn with C-47 and P-166 Albatross.
ASW: 1 hel sqn: 8 Wasp HAS-1, 6 Alouette III.
Training Command (incl OCU): 6 schools:
   ac: 130 T-6G Harvard IIA/III (80 to be updated), 39 Impala I/II, 14 Mirage III (2 BZ, 3 DZ, 9 ZZ), 12 C-47;
   hel: 30 Alouette II/III.
Reserves (Citizen Force): 93 Impala COIN ac, 15 L-100 Hercules (civil freight ac).
AAM: R-530, R-550 Magic, Sidewinder, Kukri V-3 (Sidewinder-type). ASM: AS-20/30.
(On order: 4 Partenavia (3 AP-68 Spartacus (liaison/tpt), 1 P-68 Observer (patrol)) ac.)

Medical Corps: 8,000.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA TERRITORY FORCE (SWATF): (22,000).
Conscription: 24 months (all race groups), selective, with Citizen Force (Reserve) commitment.
Standing Force:
   6 lt inf bns.
   1 SWA specialist unit.
   1 recce bn.
   1 log bde (incl 1 engr, 1 sig bn).
Reaction Force: 1 mot inf bde (3 mot inf, 1 armd car, 1 arty bns, spt units - 1 regular bn, rest Citizen Force).
   1 para bn (Citizen Force, 1 regular coy).
   1 sqn lt ac (Citizen Force).
Area Force: 4 Sector HQ: 26 area force units (COIN).

Para-Military. South West African Police COIN unit; Industrial Defence units. CasspirAPC.

PARA-MILITARY:
Commandos 130,000; inf bn-type protective units in formations of 5+; 12 months initial, 19 days annual trg.
Air Commando 20,000; 13 sqns with private ac.
South African Police 55,000 to be increased), Police Reserves 37,000.
Coastguard to form; 7 MR ac planned.

OPPOSITION:
South West African People's Organization (SWAPO): combat wing People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN): (?8,900), 90% Ovambo.
   Possibly 7 field bns.
   Deployment: most units in central Angola against UNITA (?2,500) and on rail line security, some units (?1,500) in southern Angola.
Eqpt: APC: BTR. ATGW: RPG-7. SAM: SA-7.
African National Congress(ANC): combat wing Umkhonto we Sizwe. perhaps 10,000 trained; up to 3,000 based in Angola.
Pan Africanist Congress(PAC): Azanian People's Liberation Army: ?inactive.

HOMELANDS
There are four homelands: each has its own armed forces, not included in South African data. Currency in all cases is the South African Rand.

BOPHUTHATSWANA
Population: (1,721,000).
Armed Forces: 2,600 incl Para Military.
Terms of service:volunteer. Security personnel serve 5 years (Defence Force).
6 Military Regions: HQ; 3 bases:
1 inf bn.
1 AB Special Force unit.
Maintenance unit.
Technical services unit.
Military school.
Air Wing: 1 recce, 1 lt tpt, 1 hel fits.
Eqpt: small arms incl 81mm mor. APC: Buffel. ac: C-212-200 Aviocar. hel: Alouette III.
Para Military: National Security Unit: (600+), 6 sub-unit Gp HQ; 6 sub-unit Gps.

CISKEI
Population: (790,000).
Armed Forces: e 1,000:
Inf unit.
Anti terrorist covert squad.
Air Wing. ac: 2 Islander, 2 Skyvan, 1 IAI Westwind (VIP tpt), 6 Mooney 201. hel: 1 BO-105.

TRANSKEI
Def budget 1985/86: R 203 m.
Population: (3,115,000).
Armed Forces: 1,000:
   HQ (ceremonial coy, band).
   1 lt inf/COIN bn.
   1 special forces regt: AB (para) coy, mounted sqn, marine gp.
   (Air wing planned.)
Eqpt: small arms, ?81mm mor.

VENDA
Def budget 1984/5: R 257.19 m.
Population: (429,000).
Armed Forces: 856 (1,135 authorized):
   HQ (band, police, log coy).
   1 inf bn (3 coys) (2nd to form 1987/88).
   Engr tp.
   Lt workshop tp.
   Sigs tp.
   Medical Section.
   Air wing.
Eqpt: small arms, 60mm, 81mm mor, 2 6-pdr (57mm) ATK guns, 1 BK-117 hel.

* Excl intelligence and internal security force budget. At the end of FY 1985/6 the SADFand Police received extra allocations of R 245m and R 42m respectively, in a February 1986 'mini-budget'. The allocations for the Police for FY 1986/7 and 1987/8 were respectively R 1.13bn and R 1.53bn.
f At partial strength; divs would be brought to full strength on mobilization of Citizen Force.

   TANZANIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 40,050 (perhaps 20,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:national service incl civil duties, 2 years.
Reserve: 10,000: armed elm of Citizen's Militia.

ARMY: 38,350 (some 20,000 conscripts).
3 div HQ.
8 inf bdes.
1 tk bde.
2 fd arty bns, 2 AA arty bns (6 btys).
2 mor bns.
1 SAM bn with SA-3, SA-6.
2 ATK bns.
2 sigs bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 30 Ch Type-59. lt: 30 Ch Type-62, 36 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-2. APC: 45 BTR-40/-152.
Arty: 340: guns: 76mm: 40 ZIS-3; 122mm: 200; 130mm: 50. MRL: 122mm: 50 BM-21. Mor: 350: 82mm; 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 75mm: 540 Ch Type-52.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 280 ZPU-2/-4; 23mm: 40 ZU-23; 37mm: 120 Ch Type-55.
   SAM: 9 SA-3, 12 SA-6, SA-7.

NAVY: 700.
Bases: Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mwanza.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-II.
Patrol craft: 10<: coastal: 7: 1 GDR Schwalbe, 2 GDR MB-13 50-ton; 4 Vosper Thornycroft 75-ft in Zanzibar. lake: 3 Ch Yulin,
Amph<: 4 N. Korean Nampo mod LCA.
Spares are short; many vessels are not operational.

AIR FORCE: 1,000; 29 combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftr: 3 sqns with 11 Ch J-7, 18 Shenyang (10 J-6, 8 J-4).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 BAe (1 HS-125-700, 3 HS-748), 5 DHC-5D Buffalo, 1 An-2.
Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI, 6 Cherokee, 9 Cessna (7 310, 2 404), some Piaggio P-149D.
Hel: 2 CH-47C, 6 Agusta-Bell (4 AB-205, 2 AB-206).
(On order: An-26, An-32 tpt ac.)

Forces Abroad: Mozambique: 650.

PARA-MILITARY:
Police Field Force 1,400.
Police Marine Unit (100).
Citizen's Militia; 100,000.

   TOGO
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: (all services, incl Gendarmerie, form part of the Army):
Active: 5,910.
Termsof service: conscription, 2 years (selective).

ARMY: 4,000.
2 inf regts:
   1 with 1 mech bn, 1 mot bn;
   1 with 2 armd sqns, 3 inf coys; spt units (trg).
1 Presidential Guard regt: 2 bns (1 cdo), 2 coys.
1 para cdo regt: 3 coys.
1 spt regt: 1 fd arty bty; 2 AA arty btys; 1 log/tpt/engr bn.
Equipment:
Tks: 2 T-54/55. lt: 9 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 6 M-8, 3 M-20, 3 AML-60, 7 -90, 36 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 4 M-3A1, 30 UR-416.
Arty: guns: 105mm: 4 HM-2. Mor: 81/82mm: 20.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: 5 ZIS-2; 75mm: 12 Ch Type-52/-56; 85mm: 10 Ch Type-65.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 38 ZPU-4; 37mm: 5 M-39.

NAVY: 100.
Base: Lome.
Patrol craft, coastal: 2 Fr Esterel 80-ton.

AIR FORCE: 260; some 13 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 6 EMB-326GC Xavante, 4 Alpha Jet.
COIN/trg: 3 TB-30 Epsilon.
Tpt: 1 Boeing 727, 2 DHC-5D Buffalo, 1 F-28-1000 (VIP), 2 Reims Cessna 337, 2 Baron.
Hel: 1 SA-330 Puma, 2 SA-315 Lama.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,550:
Gendarmerie 750; 1 trg school, 2 regional sections, 1 mobile sqn.
Presidential Honour Guard 800.

   UGANDA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: National Resistance Army (NRA): ?20,000; believed absorbing elms of other groups incl Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU),
   Ugandan Freedom Movement (UFM).
Loosely org in bdes and bns, mostly equipped with small arms, some hy machine guns;
   absorbing former Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA) equipment.
Terms of service: voluntary.

Equipment: f incl:
Tks: 10 T-34/-54/-55, 3 M-4 (unserviceable).
APC: 150: BTR-40/-152, OT-64C, Saracen (unserviceable).
Arty: guns: 76mm: 60; 122mm: 20.
ATK: ATGW: 40 AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 40: 23mm, 37mm. SAM: SA-7.
Ac: 6 AS-202 Bravo trg.

OPPOSITION:
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).
Uganda National Army (UNA).
Uganda Peoples Democratic Movement (UPDM): military wing
Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) claims Div HQ, 7 bdes, one of 5,000 men.
Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).
Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), status unclear, said to be seeking integration with NRA.

* Exchange rates for calendar year used to obtain dollar figures (153.86 for 1983 and 359.7 for 1984).
f Recurrent expenditure only.
t Serviceability doubtful.

   ZAIRE
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 51,000 (incl Gendarmerie).
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 22,000.
3 Military Regions.
1 inf div (3 inf bdes).
1 Special Forces div:
   1 para bde (3 para, 1 spt bns) (2nd to form).
   1 special force (cdo/coiN) bde.
   1 Presidential Guard bde.
1 indep armd bde.
2 indep inf bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 spt bn).
Equipment:
Tks: some 50 Ch Type-62.
AFV: recce: 95 AML-60, 60 -90. APC: 12 M-113, 12 K-63, 60 M-3.
Arty: 128: guns/how: 75mm: 30 pack; 85mm: 20 Type 56; 122mm: 20 M-1938/D-30, 30 Type 60; 130mm: 8 Type 59.
   MRL: 107mm: 20 Type 63. Mor: 81mm; 4.2-in. (107mm); 120mm: 50.
ATK: RCL: 57mm; 75mm; 106mm; 107mm.
AD: guns: 12.7mm; 14.5mm; 20mm; 37mm: M-1939; 40mm.

NAVY: 1,500 incl marines.
Bases: Banana, Boma, Matadi (coast), Kinshasa (river), Katemie" (lake).
FAC: 5 Ch Shanghai II.
Patrol craft: 38<: 3 N. Korean P-4 ( (no torpedo tubes, ?operational); 6 Swiftships 51-ft, 29 Arcoa 25-ft.

MARINES: (600).

AIR FORCE: 2,500; 20 combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftr: 1 sqn with 8 Mirage 5M/5DM.
COIN: 2 sqns with 6 MB-326K, 6 AT-6G.
Tpt: 1 wing with 5 C-130H Hercules, 6 C-54/DC-6, 8 C-47, 2 C-46, 1 BN-2 Islander, 2 MU-2J (VIP), Falcon-20.
Hel: 1 sqn with 7 SA-319B Alouette III, 9 SA-330 Puma, 1 AS-332L Super Puma, 1 SA-321 Super Frelon (VIP).
Trg: incl 21 Cessna (9 310, 12 150), 8 MB-326GB, 9 SF-260MC ac, 6 Bell 47 hel.
(On order: S-211 COIN/trg, 4 F-27-500 tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Gendarmerie 25,000 (to be 27,000); 40 bns.
Civil Guard 25,000.

* Excl capital expenditure.
f In 1987 China granted a credit of yuan 7m ($1.88 m) to strengthen military co-operation.
t Estimates based on reported results of 1985 census.

   ZAMBIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 16,200.
Terms of service, voluntary.

ARMY: 15,000.
1 armd regt (incl 1 armd recce bn).
9 inf bns (3 Reserve).
3 arty btys, 2 AA arty btys.
1 engr bn, 2 sigs sqns.
Equipment:
Tks: 30: T-54/55, Ch Type-59. lt: 30 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 65 BRDM-1/-2. APC: 13 BTR-60.
Arty: 153: guns: 76mm: 35; 130mm: 25. how: 105mm: 18 pack; 122mm: 25 D-30.
   MRL: 122mm: 50 BM-21.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: 12 M-18; 75mm: M-20; 84mm: Carl Gustav. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 20mm: 50 M-55 triple; 37mm: 40 M-1939; 57mm: 55 S-60; 85mm: 16 KS-12. SAM: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 1,200; 43 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns: 1 with 12 Ch J-6; 1 with 13 MiG-21.
COIN/trg: 1 sqnwith 18 MB-326GB.
Tpt: 2 sqns: 1 with 9 Do-28; 1 with 6 DHC-2 Beaver, 5 DHC-4 Caribou, 6 DHC-5D Buffalo; 1 VIP fit with 2 Yak-40, 1 HS-748.
Trg: incl 8 SF-260MZ, 20 Safari, 2 Ch BT-3, 10 Jastreb/Galeb (?operational).
Hel: 1 sqn with 3 AB-205A, 3 AB-206, 2 AB-212, 16 Bell 47G, 7 Mi-8.
SAM: 1 bn; 3 btys: SA-3 Goa.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,200.
Police Mobile Unit (PMU) 700; 1 bn of 4 coys.
Police Para-Military Unit (PPMU) 500; 1 bn of 3 coys.

   ZIMBABWE
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 47,000.
Terms of service, conscription; term unknown.

ARMY: 46,000.
7 bde HQ (incl 1 Presidential Guard).
1 armd regt.
23 inf bns (incl 3 Guard, 1mech, 1cdo, 2 para).

PARA-MILITARY: 38,000:
Zimbabwe Republic Police Force, incl Air Wing, 15,000.
Police Support Unit 3,000.
National Militia 20,000.

OPPOSITION:
Zimbabwe National Freedom Movement (ZNFM) ~1,500; Mozambique-based.

Asia and Australia


CHINA


   Military Developments
   We have had considerable difficulty in reconciling conflicting reports of the reduction in the strength of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 1982 there were suggestions that the total manpower was to be reduced by 1to 2 million men. The actual decision to make a reduction of 1 million was apparently not made by the Central Military Commission until 1985. Strength estimates in 1983 gave a force level of 4,100,000, which included some 300,000 railway construction troops. These had been transferred to the civil authorities by 1985, and the overall PLA strength was then estimated to be 3,900,000. By January 1987 reductions were said to have totalled 'over 700,000', which would have brought the total down to about 3.2 million; some 2.4 million of which would probably have been ground forces.
   In April 1987 Beijing advised that 'organs in the three PLA General Departments have been reduced by nearly 50% [and] that the Air Force, the Navy and the Second Artillery Corps [strategic rocket forces] have also made corresponding reductions'. It was suggested that some 600,000 were to retire by 1988. In May 1987 official statements reported that 320,000 officers and 410,000 men had been demobilized. The total officer demobilization in 1987 was said to be 100,000; how many had left between January and May was not stated.
   If the total reduction is only 730,000, the overall strength of the PLA could still be as high as 3.1-3.2 m, and the estimate we made last year of 2,950,000 premature. On balance, given practical difficulties of effecting such a substantial cut-back in such a short period, coupled with the resistance to reform reported in other sectors, we are inclined to accept the lower rate of reductions now indicated. We therefore show a higher figure for 1987.
   Within the Strategic Forces there have been indications that the Dong Feng 2 MRBM may be retiring. First deployed in 1970, this 1,200 km-range weapon with its 20KT warhead probably lacked the accuracy and reliability needed for what, essentially, was a long-range battlefield interdiction role. Tactical nuclear weapons have been reported in preparation, and a weapon similar to the Soviet Scud- the Type-M - is believed to be in production, with deployment perhaps by 1989; the retirement of one and the introduction of the other may overlap.
   A comprehensive reorganization of the Ground Forces organization has been taking place. The Main Force apparently first dropped the name 'Group Army' and replaced it with 'Group Corps', a term more closely parallel to the Western concept of such a formation, then replaced that in turn with 'Integrated Corps'. Each of these 'Corps' will command up to four divisions, and their assignment within the Military Regions and Districts appears to be unchanged. Speculation that 'Integrated' implies Navy and Air elements could not be confirmed. The former 'Regional Forces' structure remains a militia, now apparently called the 'People's Armed Police'. It remains under Army control, and its border guard duties appear to parallel those of the Soviet KGB border guard with some internal defence role also. In war it might perhaps act as as a holding force against an invasion while the Main Force units deploy.
   There is little of significance to report regarding the Chinese military inventories. Budgetary constraints have been imposed and, given Deng Xiaoping's assessment that no world war is likely for twelve years or so, political support for defence spending is unlikely to be strong. The Navy has two new Jianghu guided missile frigates. The first new Haija FAC(G), planned to replace the Osa-class, has been delivered, and the new fast attack torpedo boat has been identified as the Ziqiang. The Coastal Regional Defence Forces are believed to have links with border guard elements as well as the fleets, and a number of coastal defence districts have been identified. The Naval Air is now understood to be flying the H-6D with the C-601 airlaunched cruise missile in an anti-shipping role; The Military Balance 1986-1987 listed this missile with the Air Force.
   Economic Developments
   China's national economic growth, at just over 9% in real terms (14.2% in nominal terms) in 1986, continues to be impressive (amounting to a GSP/GDP of about 1,880 billion yuan); nonetheless, the government has been forced to curtail general budget spending in the light of increases of over 20% during the past two years. Moreover, China's debt has assumed serious dimensions. The IMF estimates that at the end of 1985 it stood at almost $20 billion, and had reached over $26 billion by early 1987. This economic growth was reflected in an inflation rate of over 6%.
   Chinese defence outlays appear to be continuing to contract in real terms, with a nominal increase of only 1.8% in 1987 to 20.376 billion yuan. However, this may largely reflect the reduction in manpower, and need not indicate an equally reduced allocation of available monetary resources within the PLA. Moreover, it must be remembered that other economic sectors, from health to industry, also carry a substantial share of the defence burden. The official defence budget figures are therefore only an indication of the costs of the military establishment, rather than a measurement of total expenditure on the defence sector.
   It is not known what funds have been made available for the rapidly expanding Chinese defence industry, which over the past few years has come to represent a significant proportion of the total industrial sector and export earning capacity. It has been estimated that, by the mid-1980s, China was exporting arms worth nearly $2 billion (7% of total exports), thus placing itself among the top five arms exporters worldwide.

Китай


   Военные события
   Мы столкнулись со значительными трудностями в согласовании противоречивых сообщений о сокращении численности Народно-Освободительной Армии (НОАК). В 1982 году высказывались предположения, что общая численность личного состава должна быть сокращена на 1-2 миллиона человек. Фактически решение о сокращении на 1 миллион было принято Центральной военной комиссией лишь в 1985 году. По оценкам, в 1983 году численность сил составляла 4 100 000 человек, включая примерно 300 000 военнослужащих, занятых на железнодорожном строительстве. Они были переданы гражданским властям к 1985 году, и общая численность НОАК оценивалась тогда в 3 900 000 человек. К январю 1987 года, как утверждалось, общее сокращение составило "более 700 000", в результате чего общая численность сократилась бы до 3,2 миллиона человек, из которых 2,4 миллиона, вероятно, составляли бы наземные силы.
   В апреле 1987 года Пекин сообщил, что "органы трех генеральных департаментов НОАК были сокращены почти на 50% [и] что Военно-воздушные силы, Военно-Морской Флот и второй артиллерийский корпус [стратегические ракетные силы] также произвели соответствующие сокращения". Предполагалось, что к 1988 году в отставку выйдут около 600 000 человек. В мае 1987 года в официальных заявлениях сообщалось о демобилизации 320 000 офицеров и 410 000 военнослужащих. Общая демобилизация офицеров в 1987 году составила 100 000 человек; сколько их осталось в период с января по май, не указано.
   Если общее сокращение составит всего 730 000, то общая численность НОАК все еще может достигать 3,1-3,2 м, а оценка, которую мы сделали в прошлом году, - 2 950 000 преждевременна. В целом, учитывая практические трудности, связанные с проведением такого существенного сокращения за столь короткий период, а также сопротивление реформам, о котором сообщалось в других секторах, мы склонны согласиться с более низкими темпами сокращения, о которых говорится в настоящее время. Поэтому мы показываем более высокий показатель за 1987 год.
   В рамках стратегических сил были признаки того, что БРСД Dong Feng 2 MRBM может быть снята. Впервые развернутое в 1970 году, это оружие с дальностью 1200 км с 20КТ боеголовкой, вероятно, не обладало точностью и надежностью, необходимыми для того, чтобы быть, дальнобойным боевым средством изоляции поля боя. Сообщалось о подготовке тактического ядерного оружия, и оружие, аналогичное Советскому Scud- типа М, - как полагают, находится в производстве, с развертыванием, возможно, к 1989 году; выведение одного и введение другого могут совпадать.
   Проводится комплексная реорганизация организации Сухопутных войск. Основные силы, по-видимому, сначала отказались от названия "армейская группа" и заменили его "корпусной группой", термин, более близкий к западной концепции такого формирования, затем заменили его, в свою очередь, "интегрированным корпусом". Каждый из этих "корпусов" будет включать до четырех дивизий, и их назначение в военных районах и округах, по-видимому, не изменится. Предположение о том, что "интеграция" подразумевает военно-морские и воздушные элементы, не может быть подтверждено. Бывшая структура "региональных сил" по-прежнему является милицией, которая теперь, по-видимому, называется "Народной вооруженной полицией". Он по-прежнему находится под контролем армии, и его обязанности пограничника, по-видимому, параллельны обязанностям советских погранвойск КГБ с некоторой ролью внутренней обороны. На войне они могли бы, возможно, действовать как сдерживающая сила против вторжения, в то время как основные подразделения Сил развертываются.
   О китайских военных запасах мало что можно сообщить. Были введены бюджетные ограничения, и, учитывая оценку Дэн Сяопина о том, что в течение примерно двенадцати лет не будет никакой мировой войны, политическая поддержка расходов на оборону вряд ли будет сильной. Флот имеет два новых ракетных фрегата Jianghu. Был поставлен первый новый ракетный катер Haija, которым планируется заменить класс Osa, а новый быстроходный торпедный катер был идентифицирован как Ziqiang. Считается, что силы береговой региональной обороны поддерживают связи с пограничными подразделениями, а также с флотами, и был определен ряд районов береговой обороны. Военно-морская авиация теперь понимается как H-6D с крылатой ракетой С-601 в противокорабельной роли. Военный Баланс 1986-1987гг. включил эту ракету в Военно-Воздушные Силы.
   Экономические процессы
   Национальный экономический рост Китая, составлявший чуть более 9% в реальном выражении (14,2% в номинальном выражении) в 1986 году, продолжает оставаться впечатляющим (составляя ВСП/ВВП около 1,880 млрд. юаней); тем не менее, правительство было вынуждено сократить общие бюджетные расходы в свете увеличения более чем на 20% за последние два года. Более того, долг Китая приобрел серьезные размеры. По оценкам МВФ, в конце 1985 года он составлял почти 20 миллиардов долларов, а к началу 1987 года превысил 26 миллиардов. Этот экономический рост отразился на инфляции более 6%.
   Расходы Китая на оборону, как представляется, продолжают сокращаться в реальном выражении, номинально увеличившись лишь на 1,8% в 1987 году до 20,376 млрд. юаней. Однако это может в значительной степени отражать сокращение численности личного состава и необязательно указывать на столь же ограниченное распределение имеющихся денежных ресурсов в рамках НОАК. Кроме того, следует помнить о том, что на другие секторы экономики, от здравоохранения до промышленности, также приходится значительная доля оборонного бремени. Таким образом, официальные данные оборонного бюджета являются лишь показателем расходов военного ведомства, а не показателем общих расходов на оборонный сектор.
   Неизвестно, какие средства были выделены для быстро растущей китайской оборонной промышленности,которая за последние несколько лет стала составлять значительную долю от общего объема промышленного сектора и экспортного потенциала. По оценкам, к середине 80-х годов Китай экспортировал оружие на сумму почти 2 млрд. долл.США (7% от общего объема экспорта), тем самым войдя в пятерку крупнейших экспортеров оружия во всем мире.
  
[]

   CHINA
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:*
Active: some 3,200,000 (perhaps 1,350,000 conscripts - men and women aged 18-22), being reduced.
Terms of Service, selective conscription; Army, Marines 3 years; Navy 5 years, Air Force 4 years.
   Technical volunteers can serve 8-12 more years to maximum age 35.
Reserves: 4,400,000 (obligation to age 45); with service in past 5 years:
   Army 1,800,000; Navy 115,000; Marines 750,000; Air (AD) 200,000; See also Para-Military.

STRATEGIC FORCES:
Offensive (Strategic Rocket Units): (90,000).
(a) Missiles: org in 6 (perhaps 7) divs with regts or bdes and bns; org varies by msl type.
ICBM: 6:
   2 DF-5 (CSS-4) (Dong Feng = East Wind); mod tested with MIRV.
   4 DF-4 (CSS-3).
IRBM: 60 DF-3 (CSS-2), some updated.
MRBM: 50 DF-2 (CSS-1) (may now be retiring).
(b) Subs:
   2 Xia SSBN each with 12 JL-1 (CSS-NX-4, mod DF-3) (Julang = Giant Wave).
   Range est 2,200-3,000 km, possibly 1x2MT warhead; in testing and evaluation.
   (On order: 8 SSBN (more planned); some ?Daqingyu, may have 16 launch tubes).

Defensive:
(a) Tracking stations: Xinjiang (covers central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border).
(b) Phased-array radar complex. Ballistic missile early warning.
(c) Air Force AD system:
   (i) Over-the-Horizon - Backscatter (OTH-B) dar system. Range 700-3,500 km, 60R arc of cover;
   (ii) over 4,000 naval and air force fighters;
   (iii) about 100 HQ-2JC (Hongqi = Red Flag, SA-2-type) SANJ units;
   (iv) over 16,000 AA guns; capable of limited defence of key urban and industrial areas, military installations and weapons complexes,
(d) A civil defence shelter/evacuation/local defence system in Beijing and other key cities.

ARMY: 2,300,000 (perhaps 1,075,000 conscripts), (reductions continue).
Main Force:
7 Military Regions, 29 Military Districts (Provincial Regions), 1 indep MD, 3 Garrison Comds.
Integrated Corps:
   Some 28 Corps (46,300 men; being reorganized) comprising:
   118 inf divs (some being mech ('all arms')).
   Spt elms, assigned to Corps as required.
   13 armd divs (normally 3 regts, 323 MBT).
   Some 17 field arty divs.
   16 AA arty divs.
   Some indep arty, AA regts.
   Some 21 sigs, CW regts.
   50 indep engr regts.
   20 indep recce, engr, sigs, chemical bns.
Former Regional Forces:now 'People's Armed Police' (PAP) under Army control. See 'Para-Military' below.
Equipment:
Tks: 11,450: T-54 (?trg), 6,000 Type-59, 250 T-69 (mod Type-59; not incl T-69 II, which is export only).
   lt: 1,200 Type-62, 800 Type-63 amph.
AFV: APC: 2,800 Type 531, Type-85 (YW-534), Type-55 (BTR-40)/-56 (BTR-152)/-63, Type-77-1/-2 (Sov BTR-50PK amph);
   Type-523, 6x6 wheeled with 12.7mm hy machine gun.
Arty: 12,800:
   guns: 85mm: Type-56; 100mm: Type-59 (fd/ATK); 122mm: Type-60; 130mm: Types-59/-59-1; 152mm: Type-66.
   how: 122mm: Type-54, Type-54-1 SP (Type-531 chassis) 152mm: Type-54, Type-66; Type-83 SP.
   MRL: 4,500: 12x107mm: Types-63/-81 (being replaced by 122mm); 24x122mm: Type-83, Type-81 minelayer; 40x122mm: Type-81;
   19x130mm: Type-63; Type-70 SP; 30x130mm: Type-82; 16x132mm: BM-13-16; 16x140mm: BM-14-16; 4x273mm: Type-83;
   10x284mm: Type-74 minelayer.
   Mor: 14,000: 82mm: Type-53/-67, W-84 and SP; 100mm: Type-71; 120mm: Type-55 and WZ-381 SP; 160mm: Type-56, M-160 (?Type-60).
   (SSM: Type-M (Scud B type) under development - in service ?1989.)
ATK: grenade launchers: 40mm: Types-56, -69; 62mm: Types-69-1/-70-1.
   RCL: 57mm: Type-36; 75mm: Types-52/-56; 82mm: Type-65; 105mm: Type-75 SP. RL: 90mm: Type-51.
   guns: 57mm: Type-55; 76mm: Type-54.
   ATGW: HJ-73 (Hongjian = Red Arrow, Sagger-type), HJ-8 (TOW/Milan-type).
AD: guns: 15,000: 12.7mm: Types-54, -77; 14.5mm: Types-75, -75-1 towed, Types-56, -58, -80 twin SP; 23mm: (ZSU-23 type);
   37mm: Types-55, -63 twin SP; 57mm: Types-59, -80 SP; 85mm: Type-56; 100mm: Type-59.
   SAM: HN-5, HN-5A/-C (SA-7 type); HJ-61 twin SP.

DEPLOYMENT (current re-org may alter totals):
Excl arty and AA divs, Integrated Corps divs may be:
North-East: Shenyang MR (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning MD): 5 Corps, ?2 msl, 5 armd, 23 inf; f
North: Beijing MR (Beijing, Tianjin Garrison Comds; Nei Monggol, Hebei, Shanxi MD): 6 Corps, 1msl, 4 armd, 25 inf; 1AB (Air Force);
West: Lanzhou MR (incl Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, North, South and East Xinjiang MD): 3 Corps, 2 msl, 1 armd, 13 inf; f
South-West: Chengdu MR (incl Sichuan, Sanxia, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang MD): 3 Corps, 1 msl, 15 inf; f
South: Guangdong MR (Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guanxi, Hainan (MD-equivalent)): 4 Corps, ?16 inf; f
Centre: Jinan MR (Shandong, Henan MD): 3 Corps, 2 armd, 10 inf, 3 AB (Air Force);
East: Nanjing MR (Shanghai District; Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jinagxi, Anhui MD): 4 Corps, 1 armd, 16 inf.

NAVY: 340,000 incl Coast Defence, Marines and Naval Air (some 115,000 conscripts); 3 SSGN, 114 SS/SSG, 53 major, some 1,000 minor surface combatants.
Bases: see Deployment and Bases below.
Subs: 117:
   SSGN: 3 Han with 6 SY-2 cruise missiles.
   SSG: (trials): 2: 1 Type-200 'Wuhan' (Sov G-class) with 4 ?SY-2 or C-801 SSM. 1 Type-031 (Sov R-class mod) with 6-8 C-801/SY-2 SSM.
   SS: 112: 90 Type-033 (Sov R-class), 20 W-IV/-V-class) trg. 2 Ming (R-class mod) trg.
Principal Surface Combatants: 53.
Destroyers: GW: 20:
   16 Type-05 1 Luda (Kotlin-type) with 2x3 FL-1 SSM; 1 trials with 4 YJ-6 SSM;
   4 Anshan (ex-Sov Gordy) with 2x2 FL-1.
Frigates: 33: 28 GW:
   22 Types-037 Jianghu and -O53H mod Jianghu with 2x2 YJ-6 or FL-1 SSM, 1 with 1 Harbin Z-9 hel.
   2 Type-053J Jiangdong, 1 with 2x2 HQ-61 SAM;
   4 Chengdu (ex-Sov Riga) with 1x2 FL-1 SSM;
   5 Jiangnan (Riga-type).
Minor surface combatants: some 1,000.
Some minor combatants are reportedly being assigned to para-military duties - People's Armed Police, border guards and the militia - or into reserve;
   totals should be used with caution).
Patrol escorts: 13: 9 ex-Jap, 1 ex-Br, 1 ex-Aus, 2 Ch (probably in reserve).
Patrol craft, large: 81: 60 Hainan, 1 Haijai (mod Hainan), 20 Kronshtadt;
   coastal/river: some 89: 1 Beihai, 40 Huangpu, 40 Yulin and Yingkou (with militia), 8 other.
FAC(G): 233 with FL-1 or YJ-6 SSM: 120 Osa/Huangfen (4 or 8 msls), 1 H-3 Haija (4 or 8 msls) (replacing Osa), 1 Hola, 110 Houku (Hegu)<;
   1 Houma hydrofoil (2 msls).
FAC: 355: 290 Shanghai I/II/III/IV/V, 3 Haikou, 60 Shantou; 2 Shandong hydrofoils<.
FAC(T)<: some 190: 110 Huchwan I/II hydrofoils; 60 P-6, 20 P-4 (?all in reserve); New 25-m class (?Zaqiang) reported.
MCMV: 33 T-43 ocean minesweepers.
Amph: assault tpt: 4 Qiong Sha, 2,500-ton;
   LST: 17: 4 Yukan/Zoushan, 13 Shan (ex-US 1-511, -542); (1,500-ton Chang Ming reported);
   LSM: 46: 14 Hua (ex-US LSM-1), 30 Yuliang and 1 Yuling, 1 Yudao experimental;
   LSI: 4 Min (ex-US LSIL);
   LCU: 370: 300 Yunnan, 45 Yuchin, 25 Yuchai; LCT: 9 (2 ex-Br/ex-US); LCM: 165 (140 ex-Br/US);
   SES (LCAC): Dagu, Bayi, Type-722 Jingsa types.
Spt: 10 sub (incl 1 repair), 6 other, 10 supply ships, 23 tankers, 1 V-856 trg.
Augmentation: perhaps 800 ocean-going vessels, fishing trawlers and several thous and junks could augment existing limited sealift capacity.
Msls: SSM: coastal: HY-2 (Haiying = Sea Eagle; US = Silkworm, Styx-type); HY-3 (7C-101); HY-4 (Styx-type med-range coast def msl);
   sea-launched: FL-1 (Feilong = Flying Dragon;Styx-type); HY-5 (YJ-6; Yingji = Eagle Strike = C-801).
   SAM: HJ-61 (Hongjian =Red Arrow); rail-launched, radar-guided ship- and truck-mounted msl (?mod HQ-2J).
   SLCM: SY-2 sea skimmer (?Exocet-type) reported; may be HY-5.
(On order (tentative): 3 Han SSN; 9 Type-033 SS; 6 Jianghu (4 IV and V mods), 2 Jiangdong FFG; H-3, Hegu FAC; 2 Cougar Marine patrol catamarans; 1 MCMV; 2 Qiongsha assault tpts; 2 Yukan LST.)

COASTAL REGIONAL DEFENCE FORCES: (38,000).
?35 indep arty and SSM regts deployed near naval bases, offshore islands and other vulnerable points.
   Guns: 85mm, 100mm, 130mm.
   SSM: HY-2 ('CSS-N-2'), -3, -4, SY-1 and SY-2/C-801.

MARINES (Naval Infantry): (56,500); (30,000 conscripts).
9 regts (3 cadre divs): 4 inf, 3 tk, 3 arty bns; spt elms.
Special recce units.
Reserves: On mobilization to total 8 divs (24 inf, 8 tk, 8 arty regts), 2 indep tk regts.
3 Ground Force (Army) divs also have an amph role.
Equipment:
Tks: 600 T-59. lt T-60/-63, PT-76.
APC: Type-531, LVT; some (?Type-77).
Arty: how: 122mm: Type-54 (incl -54-1 SP). MRL: Type-63.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (34,000); about 800 shore-based combat ac, no armed hel t
Org in 3 bbr, 6 ftr divs, incl:
Bbrs: some 50 H-6 (Hong = bbr), some H-6D reported with C-601 anti-ship ALCM.
   About 130 H-5 torpedo-carrying lt bbrs.
Ftrs: some 600, incl J-2 (MiG-15)/-5/-6/-7 (Jian = ftr).
Recce: H-5.
MR/ASW: 8 ex-Sov Be-6 Madge and 4 SH-5 (Y-8 mod). 1 PS-5 bbr/ASW (on trials). Y-8MP (Ch version of An-12) (on trial).
Hel: 50 Z-5 (Zhi = hel), 12 SA-321 Super Frelon ASW, 1 Harbin Z-9 (AS-365 Dauphin) on trial.
Misc: some 60 lt tpt ac; JJ-5/-6 (2-seat) trg ac.
ALCM: FL-1/C-601, FL-7.
Naval fighters are integrated into the national AD system.

DEPLOYMENT AND BASES:
Northern Naval Region:
North Sea Fleet: about 500 vessels (over half<), incl 1 sub flotilla (2 sqns), 2 SSN, some 5 DDG; from the Yalu River to south of Lianyungang.
   Bases: Qingdao (HQ), Liidda, Liishun, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan.
   Marines: 1 cadre div.
   Coastal Defence Regional Forces: Shenyang, Jinan coastal Districts.
East Sea Fleet: about 750 vessels (about 400<) including some 5 DDG with air, AD and coastal missile units; from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan.
   Bases: Ningbo (HQ), Zhoushan, Taohua Dao, Heimen, Wenzhou, Fuzhou.
   Marines: 1 cadre div.
   Coastal Defence Regional Forces: Nanjing, Fuzhou coastal Districts.
South Sea Fleet: about 600 vessels (some half <), incl 2 sub flotillas (25 subs), 5 DDG, 200 FAC, amph; from Dongshan to Vietnamese frontier.
   Bases: Zhanjiang (HQ), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai.
   Marines: 1 div (-).
   Coastal Defence Regional Forces:
   Guangzhou coastal District.

AIR FORCE: 470,000, incl strategic forces and 220,000 AD personnel (160,000 conscripts); some 5,380 combat ac, no armed hel е
7 Military Air Regions, HQ Beijing.
Combat elms org in Armies of varying numbers of air divs (each with 3 regts of 3 sqns of 3 fits of 4-5 ac, 1 maintenance unit, some tpt and trg ac).
Tpt ac in regts only.
Med bbrs: 120 H-6 (some may be nuclearcapable). Some to be converted to tkr.
Lt bbrs: Some 500 H-5 (some with C-801 msl).
FGA: 500 Q-5 (Qiang = attack).
Ftrs: ?4,000, incl 400 J-5, some 60 regts with about 3,000 J-6/B/D/E, 200 J-7/J-7M, 30 J-8.
Recce: 7130 J-5, 90 JZ-6 (J-6 variant), 40 HZ-5 (H-5 variant) ac.
Tpts: some 550, incl ?300 Y-5/An-2 (Yun = tpt), ?20 Y-7 (An-24), 12 Y-8 (An-12), ?75 ex-Sov Li-2 (DC-3 type), I1-14, I1-18 (to be retired), 18 BAe Trident.
   (It is reported that some 200 tpt ac, types unspecified, are to be transferred (with crews) to civil aviation.)
Hel: 400: incl Z-5/-6 (mod Z-5), Z-9 (SA-365N Dauphin), SA-316B Alouette III, SA-321 Super Frelon, 4 Bell 214-ST,
   6 AS-332 Super Puma, 24 Sikorsky S-70.
Trainers: 1,500 (some OCU) incl CJ-5/-6 (mod CJ-5), MiG-15UTI, JJ-4/-5/-6 (mod J-4/5/6), HJ-5 (H-5 trg).
Msls: AAM: PL-2/-2A, PL-5B Atoll-type, PL-7 (Plili = Thunderbolt).
   ASM (anti-ship): C-601 subsonic ALCM (HY-2 SSM derivative); C-801 surface skimmer.

AB: 1 corps of 3 divs:
1 indep div.
Spt tps incl comms, engr and CW units.
Eqpt: 82mm, 120mm mor, 82mm RCL, 37mm AA guns.

AA arty:
20 divs: 16,000 57mm, 85mm and 100mm guns;
28 indep AD regts (100 SAM units with HQ-2, -2J (CSA-1), -61 SAM).
(On order: 3 CL-600/601 Challenger ac; 4 S-76 hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: some 12,000,000,
People's Armed Police: (1,850,000).
   29 divisions, 1,029 bns (border)/mountain/internal defence.
   Deployment unknown but probably parallels the previous Regional Force pattern (see The Military Balance 1986-1987, p. 143).
Militia (Ministry of Defence):
Basic Militia: some 4.3 million; men and women aged 18-28 who have had, or will have, military service, grouped in the Armed Militia;
   serve with the Active forces for 30-40 days per year; org into about 75 cadre divisions and 2,000 regts,
   a Naval (Maritime) Militia (?700,000) with (?5,000) armed trawlers, small craft and a major AD component.
Ordinary Militia: up to 6 million (ages 18-35), incl the Urban Militia, receive some basic training but are generally unarmed.
   Some play a local AD role; all support the security forces.

* The term 'People's Liberation Army' comprises all services; its Ground, Naval and Air components are listed separately for purposes of comparison.
f There are 2-3 divs worth of border tps in these MR.
t Many Chinese aircraft designs stem from Soviet types. Using Chinese terms, H-5 = Il-28, H-6 = Tu-16, J-5 = MiG-17, J-6 = MiG-19, Q-5 = MiG-19
derivative, J-7 = MiG-21 derivative, J-8 = MiG-23 derivative, Y-5 = An-2, Y-7 = An-24, Y-8 = An-12, CJ-5 = Yak-18A ac; Z-5 = Mi-4, Z-6 = turboshaft Mi-4, Z-8 = SA-321, Z-9 = AS-365 hel. In export models the J is generally read as F.

OTHER ASIAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES


   Security Treaties
   The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was adopted by the South Pacific Forum at its meeting in Rarotonga on 6 August 1985. (The Forum links Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and ten Pacific island countries.) On 12 December 1986 the Treaty entered into force with its ratification by eight states, including Australia and New Zealand. The signatories undertake not to acquire, manufacture, store, station or test nuclear weapons, nor to permit nuclear testing or the disposal of nuclear waste material in their territories.
   Three protocols to the Treaty have been drafted involving countries that are not members of the South Pacific Forum. The first requires those with territories within the Zone to prohibit the manufacturing, stationing and testing of any nuclear devices within the Zone. The second and third call upon the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France and China to refrain from locating, testing or using nuclear devices within the Zone. The USSR and China have signed the Protocols. France has rejected them, as they would mean halting its nuclear testing on the Mururoa atoll in French Polynesia. The US has decided not to accept the Protocols 'at this time', and the UK has also refused to accede.
   Neither the Treaty nor the Protocols prevent the transit of warships in international waters nor of aircraft through international airspace.
   Apart from the above treaty, there are no changes to be recorded to the data on security treaties in the region presented in The Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 146-7.
   Military Developments
   For the most part there has been little change in the military structures and inventories of the countries of the region. For some countries the internal guerrilla threat has been more significant than external threats. Extensive revisions have been made to the 'Opposition' entries for Afghanistan, Burma, the Philippines (where the anti-Communist para-military groupings represent a new entry) and Sri Lanka. As usual, strength and inventory estimates under this heading must be used with caution.
   South Asia
   The Afghan Army still suffers from a high desertion rate, although this may have declined from its high point immediately after the Soviet incursion. The Government cease-fire, though widely publicized, has never been effective. Fighting continues to be general throughout most of the provinces. Rebel holdings of surface-to-air missiles such as Stinger and Blowpipe have resulted in the shooting down of a number of both Soviet and Afghan aircraft. There have been some clashes along the Pakistan border, but so far the most serious threat to Pakistan lies in disorder in and around the refugee camps. The only major military development in Pakistan's defence environment is a massive modernization programme reported for the Navy. Pakistan has also been negotiating, so far unsuccessfully, for early-warning and control aircraft; the US reaction to reports of Pakistan's nuclear weapons research and associated materiel procurement, and to Indian concern over the use Pakistan would make of such aircraft, have to date prevented a sale. India, has been seeking to augment its tank and aircraft inventories. It has bought its second aircraft carrier, and a large amount of materiel remains on order for all Services. Bangladesh services show personnel strength increases. The Air Force seems to have retired most of its Soviet aircraft, presumably due to shortage of spares. The civil war in Sri Lanka has led to increases in the size, and apparently the competence, of the Army, which is supported by a few light strike aircraft.
   South East Asia
   In Malaysia financial considerations continue to delay the formation of a Naval Air Wing. The four additional Handalan launches, earlier reported in service, appear not to have been delivered. Singapore now has all three of its A-4 squadrons equipped and operational but has not yet received its F-16s. Thailand has apparently been modifying the roles of some of its Army divisions; no major changes in equipment have been noted. The Navy is taking delivery of its new missile corvettes. Vietnam's ground forces show a 10% increase, and there is a slightly larger increase in the Air Force; this may reflect an earlier overestimation of reported troop reductions, rather than any genuine strength increase. Most of the ex-US equipment has now been phased out, some of it reportedly being sold to Iran. The Kampuchean Army has created a sixth infantry division, resulting in some reduction in independent units.
   North East and East Asia
   North Korea has formed an 8th Corps HQ. No confirmation of the reported introduction of Scud SSM has been received. South Korean personnel strengths have increased slightly, but no significant change in ground force equipment inventories is reported. The Navy has a new coastal submarine, an additional corvette and eight coastal mine countermeasures vessels. Naval Air has added ASW aircraft and helicopters, while the Air Force has taken delivery of the 30 F-5 it had on order. Mongolia is reported to have increased its military manpower by 30% and there are indications that additional equipment has been received. These increases may connect with the decision by the Soviet Union to withdraw one of the three motor rifle divisions deployed in the country. Delivery of Taiwan's two Netherlands-built submarines is expected by late 1987 and early 1988. The Philippine Army has been involved heavily in internal security issues. The equipment of both the Navy and the Air Force is largely unserviceable, funds are short, and, despite political will, these services are a long way from having adequate operational capabilities.
   Economic Developments
   In 1986 Asia provided some of the the world's fastest-growing economies: the GDPs of South Korea and Taiwan increased by 11.8% and 10.8% respectively, and Japan's GNP per capita was among the world's highest at around $17,000 per annum. But these figures contrast starkly with those of other Asian countries which are some of the world's poorest: Bangladesh, Nepal and Burma all had GNPs per capita under $200 a year for the same period. In most other Asian countries growth was on the whole unremarkable in 1986, with major countries showing slower growth than in 1985. Nevertheless, both India and Pakistan achieved economic growth comfortably exceeding their rates of population increase.
   Inflation rates for the region were moderate in 1986,being mainly in single figures. Vietnam, the most notable exception, had an inflation rate estimated at between 100%and 700%, which - combined with Soviet reluctance to support the Vietnamese economy to the same extent as hitherto - has forced Hanoi to seek economic assistance from Western nations. Afghanistan officially reported inflation at 20%, but observers suggest that the real rate was at least twice the official figure.
   Regional defence expenditures showed some expansion in 1986. North and South Korea continued to devote very substantial resources to security, with defence outlays in both countries rising by some 14%from the 1985 figure, whereas GDP grew by only 4.1%and 11.9% respectively. In South Korea's case this was accounted for by the commissioning of new equipment and the modernization of the Air Force; the cause of the North Korean spending increase is more difficult to ascertain.
   No reliable figures are available for Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, but, given the strains imposed on limited resources by the regional conflict, it is reasonable to assume that defence commitments take a substantial and increasing share of GDP. The same can be said of Afghanistan, where the 1985 defence budget was some 36% higher than that for 1984, increasing from some 7% of GDP in 1984 to around 9% in 1985. Actual expenditures can be expected to have been somewhat higher than the budget figure, and the share of national resources devoted to the military effort in 1986 is likely to have increased, which partly explains the Kabul government's desire for a negotiated solution to the conflict.
   The pace of the continuing Indian and Pakistani weapons acquisition programmes is reflected in the defence expenditure figures reported. Sri Lanka, in a state of near civil war, nearly trebled its defence budget between 1984 and 1986, and expenditure in 1987 will be more than double that of 1986. Taiwan, too, has stepped up its defence allocations for FY 1987/8 by some 10%over the previous fiscal year, but this has been backed by commensurate economic growth.
   Overall, the Asian region appears to be undertaking major defence acquisition programmes, either to update or to replace ageing systems. To some extent this reflects regional conflicts, confrontations and continuing tensions in Indochina, the Korean Peninsula and the Indian sub-continent, together with changing Taiwanese perceptions of China's objectives. Where capabilities permit, it can be expected that procurement will be undertaken either locally or by co-production under offset agreements.

ДРУГИЕ СТРАНЫ АЗИИ И ТИХОГО ОКЕАНА


   Договоры о безопасности
   Договор о безъядерной зоне южной части Тихого океана был принят Южнотихоокеанским форумом на его совещании в Раротонга 6 августа 1985 года. (Форум связывает Австралию, Новую Зеландию, Папуа-Новую Гвинею и десять тихоокеанских островных стран.) 12 декабря 1986 года Договор вступил в силу после его ратификации восемью государствами, включая Австралию и Новую Зеландию. Подписавшие договор стороны обязуются не приобретать, не производить, не хранить, не размещать и не испытывать ядерное оружие и не разрешать проведение ядерных испытаний или удаление ядерных отходов на своей территории.
   Были разработаны три протокола к договору с участием стран, не являющихся членами Южнотихоокеанского форума. Первый требует от тех, у кого есть территории в пределах зоны, запретить производство, размещение и испытания любых ядерных устройств в пределах зоны. Второй и третий призывы к Соединенным Штатам, Соединенному Королевству, Советскому Союзу, Франции и Китаю воздерживаться от размещения, испытания или применения ядерных устройств в пределах зоны. СССР и Китай подписали протоколы. Франция отвергла их, поскольку это означало бы прекращение ядерных испытаний на атолле Муруроа во Французской Полинезии. США решили не принимать протоколы "на данный момент", и Великобритания также отказалась присоединиться.
   Ни договор, ни протоколы не препятствуют транзиту военных кораблей в международных водах и воздушных судов через международное воздушное пространство.
   Помимо вышеуказанного договора, никаких изменений в данных о договорах о безопасности в регионе, представленных в военном балансе 1986-1987 годов, зафиксировано не было.
   Военные события
   По большей части в военных структурах и арсеналах стран региона произошли незначительные изменения. Для некоторых стран внутренняя партизанская угроза была более значительной, чем внешняя. Значительные изменения были внесены в "оппозиционные" позиции по Афганистану, Бирме, Филиппинам (где антикоммунистические полувоенные группировки представляют собой новую позицию) и Шри-Ланке. Как обычно, оценки численности и инвентарных запасов по этому разделу должны использоваться с осторожностью.
   Южная Азия
   Афганская армия по-прежнему страдает от высокого уровня дезертирства, хотя этот показатель, возможно, снизился сразу после советского вторжения. Прекращение огня правительством, хотя и широко освещалось, никогда не было эффективным. Боевые действия продолжаются в большинстве провинций. Наличие у повстанцев ракет класса "земля-воздух", таких, как Stinger и Blowpipe, привело к сбитию ряда советских и афганских самолетов. Вдоль пакистанской границы имели место некоторые столкновения, но до сих пор самая серьезная угроза Пакистану заключается в беспорядках в лагерях беженцев и вокруг них. Единственным крупным военным достижением в пакистанской оборонной среде является широкомасштабная программа модернизации Военно-Морского Флота. Пакистан также ведет переговоры, до сих пор безуспешно, о самолетах раннего предупреждения и контроля; реакция США на сообщения о пакистанских исследованиях в области ядерного оружия и связанных с ними закупках материальных средств, а также Индийская озабоченность по поводу использования Пакистаном таких самолетов до сих пор препятствовала продаже. Индия стремится увеличить число танков и самолетов. Она купила свой второй авианосец, и большое количество техники остается в заказе для всех родов войск. Бангладешские службы показывают увеличение численности персонала. ВВС, по-видимому, сняли большую часть своих советских самолетов, предположительно из-за нехватки запасных частей. Гражданская война в Шри-Ланке привела к увеличению численности и, по-видимому, компетенции армии, которую поддерживают несколько легких ударных самолетов.
   Юго-Восточная Азия
   В Малайзии финансовые соображения продолжают задерживать формирование Военно-морского воздушного крыла. Четыре дополнительных спущенных Handalan, о которых ранее сообщалось в службе, по-видимому, не были поставлены. В настоящее время Сингапур располагает всеми тремя эскадрильями А-4, оснащенными и действующими, но еще не получил свои F-16. Таиланд, по-видимому, изменяет роль некоторых своих армейских дивизий; никаких существенных изменений в оснащении отмечено не было. Флот принимает поставку новых ракетных корветов. Наземные силы Вьетнама увеличились на 10%, и есть немного больший рост ВВС; это может отражать более раннюю переоценку сообщаемых сокращений войск, а не какое-либо реальное увеличение численности. Большая часть бывшего американского вооружения в настоящее время выведена из эксплуатации, а часть, как сообщается, продана Ирану. Кампучийская армия создала шестую пехотную дивизию, что привело к некоторому сокращению отдельных подразделений.
   Северо-Восточная и Восточная Азия
   Северная Корея сформировала штаб 8-го корпуса. Подтверждения сообщения о внедрении ТБР Scud получено не было. Численность южнокорейского персонала несколько возросла, однако существенных изменений в запасах техники сухопутных сил не отмечается. ВМС имеют новую береговую подводную лодку, дополнительный корвет и восемь береговых противоминных судов. Военно-морская авиация добавила самолеты и вертолеты ПЛО, в то время как ВВС приняли поставку 30 F-5, которые она имела по заказу. Сообщается, что Монголия увеличила численность своих вооруженных сил на 30%, и имеются признаки получения дополнительной техники. Это увеличение может быть связано с решением Советского Союза вывести одну из трех мотострелковых дивизий, развернутых в стране. Поставка Тайваню двух подводных лодок нидерландского производства ожидается к концу 1987 года и началу 1988 года. Филиппинская армия активно занимается вопросами внутренней безопасности. Вооружение как военно-морских, так и Военно-Воздушных сил в значительной степени непригодно для эксплуатации, средств не хватает, и, несмотря на политическую волю, эти службы еще далеки от адекватных оперативных возможностей.
   Экономические процессы
   В 1986 году Азия обеспечила некоторые из самых быстрорастущих экономик мира: ВВП Южной Кореи и Тайваня увеличился на 11,8% и 10,8% соответственно, а ВНП Японии на душу населения был одним из самых высоких в мире - около 17 000 долларов в год. Но эти цифры резко контрастируют с другими азиатскими странами, которые являются одними из самых бедных в мире: Бангладеш, Непал и Бирма имели ВНП на душу населения менее 200 долларов в год за тот же период. В большинстве других азиатских стран рост в 1986 году был в целом ничем не примечательным, причем в основных странах темпы роста были ниже, чем в 1985 году. Тем не менее, и Индия, и Пакистан достигли экономического роста, комфортно превышающего их темпы прироста населения.
   В 1986 году темпы инфляции в регионе были умеренными и выражались в основном единичными цифрами. Вьетнам, наиболее заметное исключение, имел уровень инфляции, оцененный в диапазоне от 100% до 700%, что в сочетании с советским нежеланием поддерживать вьетнамскую экономику в той же степени, что и до сих пор, вынудило Ханой обратиться за экономической помощью к западным странам. Афганистан официально сообщил об инфляции в 20%, но наблюдатели предполагают, что реальный показатель был как минимум в два раза выше официального показателя.
   В 1986 году расходы на региональную оборону несколько возросли. Северная и Южная Корея продолжали выделять весьма значительные ресурсы на обеспечение безопасности, при этом расходы на оборону в обеих странах выросли примерно на 14% по сравнению с показателем 1985 года, в то время как ВВП вырос лишь на 4,1% и 11,9% соответственно. В случае с Южной Кореей это объяснялось вводом в эксплуатацию нового оборудования и модернизацией ВВС; причину увеличения расходов Северной Кореи установить сложнее.
   Достоверных данных по Вьетнаму, Лаосу и Кампучии не имеется, однако, учитывая нагрузку на ограниченные ресурсы, обусловленную региональным конфликтом, разумно предположить, что обязательства в области обороны занимают значительную и все возрастающую долю ВВП. То же самое можно сказать и об Афганистане, где оборонный бюджет 1985 года был примерно на 36% выше, чем в 1984 году, увеличившись с примерно 7% ВВП в 1984 году до примерно 9% в 1985 году. Можно ожидать, что фактические расходы будут несколько выше бюджетных показателей, а доля национальных ресурсов, выделенных на военные усилия в 1986 году, вероятно, возрастет, что отчасти объясняет стремление кабульского правительства к урегулированию конфликта путем переговоров.
   Темпы осуществления продолжающихся индийских и пакистанских программ приобретения оружия отражены в представленных данных о расходах на оборону. Шри-Ланка, находящаяся в состоянии, близком к гражданской войне, почти утроила свой оборонный бюджет в период 1984-1986 годов, а расходы в 1987 году более чем вдвое превысят расходы 1986 года. Тайвань также увеличил свои оборонные ассигнования на 1987/8 финансовый год примерно на 10% по сравнению с предыдущим финансовым годом, но это было подкреплено соразмерным экономическим ростом.
   В целом в Азиатском регионе, как представляется, осуществляются крупные программы оборонных закупок в целях обновления или замены устаревших систем. В определенной степени это отражает региональные конфликты, конфронтации и сохраняющуюся напряженность в Индокитае, на Корейском полуострове и на индийском субконтиненте, а также изменение тайваньских представлений о целях Китая. Там, где это позволяют возможности, можно ожидать, что закупки будут осуществляться либо на местном уровне, либо в рамках совместного производства на основе соглашений о взаимозачете.

   AFGHANISTAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 50,000.
Terms of service. Males 15-55: volunteers 2 years, conscription 3 years+, non-combatants 4-5 years.
Reserves: No formal force identified; call-up rom ex-servicemen, Youth League and tribesmen from age 20 to age 40.

ARMY: 45,000 (mostly conscripts).t
3 corps HQ.
3 armd divs (understrength bdes).
12 inf divs
1 mech inf div/bde.
1 cdo bde (1 cdo and 1 para regt).
2 mountain regts.
1 AA bde.
Equipment:
Tks: 50 T-34,300 T-54/-55, 100 T-62. lt: 60 PT-76.
AFV: MICV: 40 BMP-1/-2. APC: 700: BTR-40/-50/-60/-70/-152.
Arty: 800: guns: 76mm; 100mm: M-1944. 130mm: M-46. how: 122mm: M-30; 152mm: D-1.
   MRL: 132mm: 50 BM-13-16.
   Mor: 600: 82mm; 107mm; 120mm: 100; 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 73mm: SPG-9; 82mm. guns: 76mm; 100mm.
AD: guns: 550 14.5mm; 23mm: 20 ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm, 57mm, 85mm and 100mm towed.

AIR FORCE: 5,000 (incl AD Comd); Some 117+combat ac, some 13 armed hel. f
Lt bbrs: 1 regt (3 sqns) with some 18 I1-28.
FGA: 95 ac, 3 regts:
   1 with some 30 MiG-17;
   1 with 30 MiG-21 Fishbed;
   1 with 15 Su-22 Fitter A, 20 Su-22 Fitter J.
OCU: 1: 6 MiG-15UTI, MiG-17/-19/-23U, 2 MiG-21U, I1-28U.
Attack hel: 1 regt: some 13 Mi-25.
Tpt: ac: 1 regt: 1 VIP sqn with 2 I1-18D, 12 An-14; 2 sqns with some 10 An-2, 30 An-26, An-30;
   hel: 1 regt with some 12 Mi-4, up to 25 Mi-8.
Flying school: Yak-18, L-39C.

AD: 1 div (probably Soviet):.
2 SAM bdes (each 3 bns)with 115 SA-2, 110SA-3;
1 AA bde (2 bns) with 37mm, 85mm, 100mm guns;
1 radar bde (3 bns).

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Guard (under Army) some 7,000; 9 'bdes', 60 bns.
Ministry of State Security: Khad;secret police some combat units.
Regional militias incl, Defence of the Revolution (GPS), Village militia, Pioneers, Afghan Communist Party Guards, Khalqi Youth,
   tribal bdes (Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities), National Fatherland Front.
Ministry of Interior: Sarandoy (Defence of the Revolution) ~30,000.

OPPOSITION: Perhaps 130,000 guerrillas (70,000 trained, possibly 30,000 intermittently active) supported by about 110,000 'reserves'; leadership as named.
Pashtun (Sunni):
TRADITIONALIST MODERATE:
Jabhat-Nijat-Milli (National Liberation Front) Sibghatullah Modjaddidi (000s).
Mahaz-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front) Sayyed Amhad Gailani (000s).
Harakat-Inqilab-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Front)
   (1) Mohammed Nabi Mohammed (e 15,000).
   (2) Nasrullah Mansur (some 20,000).
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST:
Hizbi-Islami (Islamic Party):
   (1) Gulbaddin Hekmatyar (radical) (some 20,000).
   (2) Yunnus Khali (20,000+).
Ittihad-hlami (Islamic Unity) Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (radical) (some 10,000).
Tajik (Sunni), Islamic fundamentalist:
Jamiat Islami (Islamic Society) Burhanuddin Rabani (30,000+)
Hazara (Shi'a), radical Islamic fundamentalist:
Sazman Nasr (Organization of Victory) collective council (5-15,000).
Sepah Pasdaran (Guardians of the Revolution) Saddii Nili (n.a.).
Shur-Inqilab-Itifaq Islami (Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Union) Sayyed Beheshi (20,000+).
Mixed Tribes (Shi'a), Islamic Fundamentalist:
Harakat-Islami (Islamic Front) Assef Mohseni (000s).
Many regional 'unofficial' groups (000s).
Equipment (predominantly captured): T-34, T-55 MBT; BMP MICV, BTR-40/-60 APC; 76mm guns, 122mm D-30 how; 107mm, 122mm MRL;
   30mm AGS-17 grenade launchers; 2-in. (51mm), 60mm, 82mm M-41 mor; RPG-7 RL; 75mm SPG-9, 82mm RCL;
   12.7mm, 14.5mm, 20mm AA guns incl 40 GAI-BOI; ATK and anti-personnel mines; Blowpipe, Stinger, SA-7 SAM.

* Total Soviet military assistance since 1980 unknown. US, Western and friendly Islamic states' assistance to Afghan rebels est at over $500min 1986.
t Actual strength suspect. Divs reported to average 2,500 (about quarter strength). Desertion is common. The Soviet High Command in Afghanistan (see USSR entry for Soviet forces deployed) effectively controls the Afghan forces; it is not possible to differentiate between Soviet and Afghan holdings of identical equipment.

   AUSTRALIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 70,500.
Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves: 26,112.

ARMY: 32,000.
1 field force command: 7 military districts.
1 inf div with 3 bdes (1 mech, 2 inf) each 2 bns.
1 armd regt (3 sqns).
1 recce regt.
1 APC regt.
3 arty regts (1 med, 2 fd,); 1 locating bty.
1 AD regt; 1 lt AD bty.
1 fd engr, 1 construction, 1 fd survey regts.
2 sigs regts; 6 indep sqns.
1 Special Air Service regt (3 sqns).
3 tpt regts (one air support).
7 supply bns.
1 indep inf coy.
Army Aviation:
   1 regt (2 recce, 1 comd spt, 1 utility sqns).
   5 indep sqns (plus 9 reserve).
   1 avn school + base workshop bn.
Log comd HQ: 11 tpt units, 6 supply, 4 workshop bns; 9 supply, 7 workshop coys.
Training command.
RESERVES incl: 2 div HQ, 1 Field Force Group HQ; 4 bde HQ; 4 recce regts, 3 indep sqns; 16 inf bns, 5 indep coys;
   5 arty regts (4 fd, 1 med), 3 indep fd btys, 2 locating btys; 5 engr regts (3 fd, 2 construction); 7 sigs, 9 tpt sqns;
   1 cdo regt, 2 cdo coys; 3 surveillance units.
Equipment:
Tks: 103 Leopard 1A3.
AFV: MICV: 63 M-113 with 76mm gun (48 with Scorpion, 15 with Saladin turrets). APC: 725 M-113 (incl variants).
Arty: how: 105mm: 258; 155mm: 36 M-198. Mor: 81mm: 280.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav, 106mm: 70 M-40. ATGW: 10 Milan.
AD: SAM: Redeye, 20 Rapier, 18 RBS-70.
Avn: ac: 14: 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter, 13 GAF N-22B Missionmaster. hel: 47 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa.
Marine: 16 LCM, 87 LARC-5 amph craft.
(On order: 105 105mm lt guns, 42 RBS-70 SAM launchers; 25 S-70 hel.)

NAVY: 15,700 (incl Fleet Air Arm).
Fleet Command, Support Command, 6 Naval Area commands.
Bases: Sydney (HQ), Melbourne, Jervis Bay, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Freemantle.
Subs: 6 Oxley (mod Oberon).
Destroyers: 3 Perth (US Adams) ASW (being mod) with 1 Standard SAM, 2 Ikara ASW.
Frigates: 9:
   4 Adelaide (FFG-7) with 1 Harpoon SSM, 1 Standard SAM, 2 AS-350 hel;
   5 River with 1x4 Seacat SAM/SSM, 1 Ikara ASW.
Patrol craft, large: 20: 15 PCF-420 Fremantle, 5 Attack (5 Reserve trg).
Minehunters: 2: 1 mod Br Ton coastal; 1 itay-class inshore catamaran.
Amph: LCT: 6 (1 Reserve trg, 3 in reserve).
Spt: LSH: 1 (hy amph tpt ship).
   1 Fleet flagship/destroyer tender with 1 WessexISea King hel.
   1 ex-ocean ferry (trg/log spt)).
   1 replenishment tanker.
   3 Marine Science Force survey ships.

FLEET AIR ARM: (1,200); no combat ac, 7 armed hel.
ASW: 1 hel sqn with 7 Sea King Mk 50.
Utility/SAR: 2 sqns:
   1 hel sqn with 10 Wessex 3IB;
   1 composite sqn with 6 Bell (3 UH-1B, 3 206B), 6 AS-350B Ecureuil (Squirrel) hel, 2 HS-748 EW trg ac.
(On order: 2 FFG-7 frigates, 1 Bay-class MCM catamaran; 16 Sikorsky S-70B2 ASW hel).

AIR FORCE: 22,800; some 148 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA/recce: 2 sqns with 14 F-111C, 4 F-111 A, 4 RF-111C.
Interceptor/FGA: 3 sqns with 60 Mirage IIIO, 12 Mirage HID.
MR: 2 sqns with 20 P-3C Orion.
OCU: 1 with some 21 F/A-18, 13 MB-326H.
Forward air control: 1 fit with 4 CA-25 Winjeel.
Tpt: 6 sqns: 2 with 24 C-130E/H Hercules; 1 with 4 Boeing 707-338C (to be tanker ac); 2 with 20 CC-08 (DHC-4 Caribou);
   1 VIP with 4 BAe (2 BAC-111,2 HS-748), 3 Falcon 20.
Hel: tpt: 1 med hel sqn with 8 CH-47 Chinook (3 in reserve).
   utility: 3 hel sqns with 30 UH-1B/H Iroquois.
(All hel, except CH-47, to be transferred to Army 1987-97).
Trg: 81 MB-326H (life-extended), 8 HS-748T2, 48 CT-4/4A Airtrainer ac, 18 AS-350 Ecureuil (Squirrel) hel.
AAM: Sparrow AIM-7M, Sidewinder AIM-9L, -9M, Matra 530, -550. ASM: AGM-84 Harpoon.
Air Defence: Jindalee OTH-B radar: 1 on trials, 4 planned.
(On order: some 54 F/A-18 FGA/interceptor/trg, 67 PC-9 trg ac, 14 S-70 hel.)

Forces Abroad:
Malaysia/Singapore: 1 inf coy, 1 sqn with Mirage IIIO, 1 fit with CC-08 ac.
Papua New Guinea: 135; trg unit, 1 engr unit, 100 advisers.
Indian Ocean: 2 destroyers, 1 amph (HQ Perth).
Advisers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Is., Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, and W. Samoa.

PARA-MILITARY:
Bureau of Customs; 10 GAF N-22B Searchmaster MR ac; 6 small craft.

   BANGLADESH
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 101,500.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 30,000 (Bangladesh Rifles).

ARMY: 90,000.
5 inf div HQ.
13 inf bdes (some 26 bns)
2 armd regts.
6 arty regts.
6 engr bns.
Equipment:*
Tks: 20 Ch Type-59, 30 T-54/-55. lt: some 40 Type-62.
Arty: guns/how: 105mm: 30 Model 56 pack, 50 M-101; 122mm: 20 Type-54.
   Mor: 81mm; 82mm: Type-53; 120mm: 50 Type-53.
ATK: RCL: 106mm: 30 M-40. guns: 57mm: 18 6-pdr; 76mm: 50 Type-54.

NAVY:* 7,500.
Bases: Chittagong (HQ), Dhaka, Khulna, Kaptai.
Frigates: 3 Br (1 Type 61,2 Type 41).
FAC(G): 4 O-24 (Ch Hegu) with 2 FL-1 SSM;
FAC(P): 16 Ch: 8 Hainan; 8 Shanghai II.
FAC(T): 4 Type-123K (P-4)<.
Patrol craft, large (fishery protection): 6: 2 Singapore Meghna, 2 Ind Akshay, 1 Jap Akaqi (mod); 1 Bishkhali (river).
Patrol boats, river: 5 Pabna (Kacha)<.
Amph: 7: LCT: 4, LCVP: 3.
Misc: 1 trg, 1 barracks, 1 log spt ships, 1 tanker, 1 repair vessel, 2 O-69 coastal survey craft.

AIR FORCE:* 4,000; perhaps 55 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 36 J-6, 16 Q-5.
Interceptor: 1 sqn with 10 MiG-21MF, 2 MiG-21U (?3 ac serviceable).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 An-24, 2 DHC-3 Otter.
Hel: 3 sqns with 23 Bell (22 212, 1 206L), 12 Mil Mi-8.
Trg: 36 Ch CJ-6, 16 CM-170 Magister.

PARA-MILITARY: 55,000.
Bangladesh Rifles 30,000 (border guard).
Presidential Security Force.
Armed Police 5,000.
Ansars (Security guards) 20,000.

OPPOSITION:
Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), Comilla Province, ?8,000.

* Spares are short; some eqpt unserviceable.

   BRUNEI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 4,050 incl 150 women.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 3,380.
2 inf bns.
1 armd recce sqn.
1 AD bty: 8 dets with Rapier.
1 engr sqn.
1 sigs sqn.
Equipment:
Tks, lt: 16 Scorpion.
AFV: recce: 2 Sultan. APC: 24 Sankey AT-104.
Mor: 16 81mm.
AD: SAM: 12 Rapier/Blindfire.

NAVY: 470.
Base: Muara.
Org: incl River Division and 1 special boat sqn.
FAC(G): 3 Waspada each with 2 MM-38 Exocet SSM.
Patrol craft, coastal: 6<: 3 Perwira coastal, 3 Rotork.
Amph<: 2 Loadmaster landing craft, 24 Rigid Raider inf assault boats.
Spt: 3 23-ton utility craft.

AIR FORCE: 200; 2 combat ac, 5 armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 5 BO-105 gunship hel.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Bell 212, 1 Bell 214.
Composite sqn: 2 SF-260 (armed) ac, 2 Bell 206A/B hel.
VIP fit: 2 Boeing 727-200, 1 Gulfstream III ac; 1 BO-105, 1 Bell 212, 1 S-76 hel.
Misc hel: 2 Bell 205 hel.
(On order: 1 AUH-76 (S-76) armed hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: Royal Brunei Police elms (1,750); Gurkha Reserve Unit (900).
(On order 7 14.5-m patrol vessels).

   BURMA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 186,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 170,000.
8 Regional, 1 Garrison, commands.
7 lt inf div HQ (under central control): 3 with 3 Tactical Operational Comds (TOC=bdes); 4 with 1 or 2 TOC; each TOC up to 10 bns.
   Total: 70 bns.
16 Tactical Operational Comds.
87 inf bns.
2 armd bns.
4 arty bns.
1 AA bty.
Equipment: *
Tks: 20+ Comet.
AFV: recce: 45 Ferret. APC: 40 Humber.
Arty: guns: 88mm: 50 25-pdr. gun/how: 140mm: 5.5-in. how: 76mm: 120 M-1948; 105mm: 96 M-101.
   Mor: 81mm: 60; 82mm: 25; 120mm: 80.
ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav. guns: 60: 57mm: 6-pdr; 76.2mm: 17-pdr.
AD: guns: 40mm: 10.

NAVY:* 7,000 incl 800 Marines.
Bases: Bassein, Mergui, Moulmein, Seikyi, Sinmalaik, Sittwe.
Corvettes: 4: 2 US (1 PCE-827, 1 Admirable), 2 Nawarat.
Gunboats: 30: 9 coastal, 12 120-ton, 9<.
Patrol craft, river: 36<.
Amph: LCU: 1 US; LCM: 8 US.
1 spt vessel.
(On order: ?3 33-ft patrol craft.)

MARINES: (800): 1 bn.

AIR FORCE: 9,000; 20 combat ac, no armed hel.*
COIN: 2 sqns: 14 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer, 6 AT-33A.
Tpt: 3 sqns: 1 F-27F, 5 FH-227, 7 PC-6/-6A Porter, 5 DHC-3D Otter.
Liaison fit: 6 Cessna 180, 1 Cessna 550.
Hel: 4 sqns: 20 Bell 205/206, 10 SA-316B Alouette III.
Trg: incl 16 SF-260MB, 9 T-37C.

PARA-MILITARY: 73,000.
People's Police Force 38,000;
People's Militia 35,000.
Fishery Dept: ~250: 12 patrol boats (3 Osprey, 3 coastal, 6 inshore<).

OPPOSITION:
Regional independence forces with loose and varying alliances.
COMMUNIST
Communist Party of Burma/People's Army (CPB): 10,000 Active, 8-10,000 militia (Shan State, Eastern Kachin State)
Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO) (Pa-o): ~250; CPB-led.
Kayan New Land Council/Army (KNLC/KNLA) (Kayan Padaung): perhaps 100; pro CPB.
Kerenni People's Liberation Organization (Kerenni/Kayah splinter group.) ~50; pro-CPB.
associated with:
NON-COMMUNIST
National Democratic Front (NDF): coalition of:
Northern Command: (10,500-11,000):
   Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA): e 4,000 (+ 8 24,000 militia), 4 regional bdes, 21 bns: incl 1joint bn (3 coys) Kachin/Shan/Palaung.
   Shan State Progress Party/Army (SSPP/SSA): 2,500, 4,000 Reserves.
   Palaung State Liberation Organization/Army (PSLO/PSLA): 400.
Central Command: (1,300-1,500):
   Wa National Organization/Army (WNO/WNA): ~600.
   Pa-o National Organization/Army (PNO/PNA): ~350.
   Karenni National Progressive Party/Army (KNPP/KA): ~400; 4 bdes.
Southern Command: (4,000):
   Karen National Union/Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA): ~3,600; 3 indep bns, Thai border; 5 bdes.
   New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA): 300.
   Arakan State Liberation Party/Army (ALP/ALA): ~60.
MISCELLANEOUS
Small non-affiliated groups incl:
   Mon (leader: Nai Shwe Kyin): 200; breakaway faction of NMSP.
   Naga: 2 Groups: Nationalist Socialist Council (NSCN): 500; Naga National Council (NNC): 160.
Lahu: Lahu State Liberation Army: 700
Muslim: Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front: 500; incl: Ommat Liberation Front; Rohingya Patriotic Front (Arakan) (RPF) (Husain);
   Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) (Islamic); Arakan Communist Party: ~50.
Private Armies:
   Chang SheeFu: 2,100.
   Kan Chit: 450.
   United Revolutionary Army: ~1,000; Kuomintang-linked.
   Loi Maw Rebels/Army: ~3,000.

* Spares are short; most eqpt unserviceable.

   FIJI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 2,600.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: some 5,000 (to age 45).

ARMY: 2,500.
3 inf bns (incl 1 reserve).
1 engr coy. Spt units.
Equipment:
Mor: 81mm: 12.

NAVY: 100.
Base: Suva.
Patrol: 3 mod US 370-ton coastal minesweepers (2 with hel deck).
Misc: 2 marine survey, 1 research vessels.
(On order: 4 102-ft patrol craft, 1 hydrographic vessel.)

Forces Abroad: 1,140; 2 inf bns. Lebanon (UNIFIL) (640); Egypt (Sinai MFO) (500).

   INDIA
  
[]

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,262,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: Army 200,000. Territorial Army 40,000. Air Force (Regular, Air Defence, Auxiliary) exist, strengths unknown.

ARMY: 1,100,000.
HQ: 5 Regional Comd (= Fd Army), 9 Corps.
2 armd divs (Type: 2 tk, 1 mech bdes, SP arty, engr, sigs regts).
   1 mech div (3 mech bdes, SP arty, engr, sigs regts).
   20 inf divs (Type: 3 inf bdes (9 bns), armd, arty, engr, sigs regts; hy divs may have 4 or 5 bdes).
   9 mountain divs (Type: 3 bdes, mountain arty, sigs, engr regts).
   19 indep bdes: 7 armd, 10 inf, 1 mountain, 1 para/cdo.
   10 indep arty bdes.
   5 AD bdes.
   3 army engr bdes.
These formations comprise:
   46 tk regts.
   17 mech, 329 inf bns.
   9 para/cdo bns.
   164 arty regts: 1 hy, 5 MRL, 50 med (incl 5 SP), 69 fd (incl 3 SP), 39 mountain.
   29 AA arty regts, perhaps 10 SAM groups (3-5 btys each).
Avn: 29 air observation/fire control fits (hy hel units to form).
Equipment:
Tks: 2,750 (?500 in reserve): some 800 T-55, 350T-72, 1,500 Vijayanta. lt: 100 PT-76.
AFV: MlCV: 600 BMP-1. APC: 350 OT-62/-64, 360 BTR-60.
Arty: guns: some 2,165 (some 100 SP): 76mm: 200 Yug M-48; 88mm: 800 25-pdr (retiring); 100mm: 185 M-1944; 105mm: 340 incl 60 Abbot SP,
   some 30 IFG Mk II. 130mm: 500 M-46 (some 100 SP); 140mm: 140 5.5-in (retiring).
   how: some 1,710: 850: 75mm: 75/24 mountain; 105mm: 860 (incl M-56 pack); 155mm: some FH-77B.
   MRL: 122mm: 120 BM-21.
   Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 500; 160mm: 50.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18; 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: M-40.
   ATGW: SS-11-B1, Milan, AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 2,665: 23mm: 180 ZU 23-2, 50 ZSU-23-4 SP; 40mm: 1,245 L40/60, 790 L40/70; 94mm: 500 3.7-in.
   SAM: 120 SA-6, SA-7, 48 SA-8A, SA-9, 18 Tigercat launchers.
(On order: Arjun, 1,550 T-72M MBT; 5 BRDM recce; BMP-1/-2 MICV; some 370 IFG 105mm Mk-II guns; some 400 Bofors FH-77B 155mm how SA-8 SAM).

NAVY: 47,000, incl naval air force.
3 regional, 1 submarine commands, 3 fleets.
Bases: Western Fleet: Bombay (HQ), Goa, Kerwar (building). Southern Fleet: Cochin (HQ). Eastern Fleet: Vishakapatnam (HQ), Calcutta, Port Blair.
Subs: 11: 8 Sov F-class (to be replaced by K-class), 1 K-class, 2 Type-1500 Shishumar (= baby shark).
Carrier: 2 Br Hermes-class (capacity 5 V/STOL Sea Harrier attack ac; Alizf: ac, Sea King ASW hel.
Destroyers: 4 Sov Kashin II DDG with 4 Styx SSM, 2x2 SA-N-1 SAM, 1 Ka-25 hel.
Frigates: 21:
   2 Godavari (mod Leander) with 2 Styx SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM, 2 Sea King hel;
   6 Br Leander (4 with 2x4, 2 with 1x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Alouette or Sea King hel);
   2 Br Whitby with 3 Styx SSM, 1 SA-316B Alouette hel;
   8 Sov Petya II (to be replaced);
   3 Br Leopard (trg).
Corvettes: 4: 3 Sov Nanuchka II with 4 SS-N-2 SSM, 1 SA-N-4 SAM; 1 Veera.
FAC(G): 14: 6 Sov Osa-I, 8 Osa-II: 4 Styx SSM.
Patrol craft: 9: 6 SDB-2, 2 Osa-I, 1 Abhay.
MCMV: 18: 8 Sov Natya ocean; 4 Br Ham, 6 Sov Yevgenya< inshore hunters.
Amph: LST: 1; LCT: 8 (2 Sov, 6 Pol Polnocny); LCU: 4 Da Gama.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000); 21 combat ac, 29 armed hel.
Attack: 1 sqn with 8 Sea Harrier FRS Mk-51, 2 T-60 trg (more being delivered).
ASW: 1 ac sqn with 5 Alize 1050 (in carriers); 5 hel sqns with 5 Ka-25 Hormone A (in Kashins, Ka-27 to replace), 9 Sea King,
   11 SA-316B Alouette III (in frigates).
MR: 2 sqns: 3 11-38 May, 3 Tu-142M Bear.
Comms: 1 sqn with 18 BN-2 Defender (?2 MR).
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 10 Alouette III.
Trg: 2 sqns: 7 HAL HJT-16 Kiran, 10 BN-2 Islander ac; 4 Hughes 300 hel.
Other ac incl: ASW: 5 Alize 1050, 4 Sea King hel.
(On order: 4 Sov F-, 5 K-class, 2 Type-1500 subs (2 more planned); 2 Kashin DDG; Godavari FFG (1987); 4 Khukri 1,200-ton, 3 Nanuchka, 5 5Tarantul corvettes; 6 SDB-3 FAC; 4 Natya MCMV; 4 Polnocny LCT; 2 LST; 4 LCU; 1 survey ship; Exocet SSM; 7 Sea Harrier Mk 51, 1 T-60; 3 Tu-142M Bear, 26 Dornier Do-228 MR ac; 8 Ka-27 Helix, 20 Sea King Mk 42B ASW, 6 Sea King Mk 42C utility hel; Sea Eagle SSM; AM-39 Exocet ASM.)

AIR FORCE: 115,000; some 701 combat ac, some 60 armed hel.
5 Air Commands.
Bbrs: 53 ac: 3 sqns (1 maritime role) with 35 Canberra B(I)58/B(I)12 (to be replaced), 18 Jaguar.
FGA: some 396 ac: 11 sqns:
   2 with some 40 Mirage 2000H;
   3 with 61 Jaguar GR-1, 6 T-2;
   5 with 60 MiG-21;
   2 with 44 MiG-29 Fulcrum;
   4 with 72 Ajeet;
   5 with 95 MiG-23BN Flogger H;
   2 with some 24 MiG-27 Flogger D/J.
AD: 165 ac: 8 sqns:
   2 with 45 MiG-23MF Flogger B;
   6 with 120 MiG-21/FL/PFMA/-MF/bis;
Air Defence Ground Environment System.
Recce: 19 ac: 3 sqns:
   1 with 8 Canberra PR-57;
   1 with 6 MiG-25R, 1 MiG-25U;
   1 with 4 HS-748.
Tpt: ac: 11 sqns: 5 with 93 An-32 Sutler, 2 with 30 An-12B; 1 with 20 DHC-3 Otter, 1 with 16 DHC-4 Caribou;
   2 with 16 HS-748, 2 Boeing 737-248 (leased), 8 I1-76 Gajraj;
   hel: 6 sqns with 72 Mi-8/-17, 2 Mi-26 hy tpt, 12Mi-25.
Comms: 1 HQ sqn with 7 HS-748M.
Liaison ac fits and dets: 16 HS-748, C-47 (DC-3).
Liaison hel: 7 sqns (army-assigned; some with 4 AS-11B ATGW): 3 with 99 SA-316B Chetak (Alouette III);
   4 with 60 SA-315B Cheetah (Lama).
Trg Comd:
11 Canberra T-4/-13/-67, 20 Hunter T-66, 30 MiG-21/U, 13 MiG-23UM Flogger C/L; 5 Jaguar, 9 Mirage 2000H, 60 HT-2, 83 Kiran,
   some 20 HAL HPT-32 (replacing HT-2), 44 PZL TS-11 Iskra, 27 HS-748 ac; 20 Chetak hel.
AAM: R-23R/T Apex, R-60 Aphid, R-550 Magic, AA-2 Atoll. ASM: AS-30; AS-1IB (ATGW), AS-7 Kerry (with MiG-27).
SAM: 30 bns: 280 Divina V75SM/VK (SA-2), SA-3.
(On order: some 40 MiG-29, 31 Jaguar (to be locally assembled), some 165 MiG-27M, MiG-21bis ftrs; 30 An-32, some 20 I1-76, 116 Do-228 tpts; 90 Kiran Mk 2, some 120 HPT-32 trg ac; 6 SA-365 Dauphin, 21 W-30, Mi-17, 10 Mi-26, 45 Chetak hel; R-23R Apex, R-60 Aphid AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
National Security Guards: anti-terrorism contingency deployment force.
   Comprises elements of the Armed Forces Border Guard, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF): 80,000; 83 bns.
Border Security Force: 90,000; some 95 bns (to add 49 bns by 1991), small arms, some lt arty, tpt/liaison air spt.
Assam Rifles: 37,000.
Indo-Tibetan Border Police: 14,000.
Other groups (total strength perhaps 150,000) incl:
   Special Frontier Force.
   Central Industrial Security Force: (53,000).
   Defence Security Force.
   Railway guard forces.
   Public institutional guards.
Coastguard: 2,000; 2 Br Type 14 frigates, patrol vessels (4 P-957 offshore, 4 SDB-2 fast, 21 inshore incl 1 new Tara Bai class);
   2 air sqns with 2 Fokker F-27, 5 BN-2 Defender ac, 4 Chetak hel.
   (On order: 2 P-957 offshore, 5 inshore patrol vessels (4 more planned), 9 lt tpt ac, 6 hel.)

   INDONESIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 284,000.
Terms of service, voluntary conscription, 2 years selective authorized.
Reserves: 800,000: Army (planned): cadre units; numbers, strengths unknown, obligation to age 45 for officers.

ARMY: 216,000.
10 Military Area Commands.
2 inf divs, 1 more forming (KOSTRAD - see Other HQ below).
   1 armd cav bde (-) (2 cav bns, spt units).
   3 inf bdes (9 bns).
   2 AB inf bdes(6 bns).
   2 fd arty regts (6 bns).
   1 AA arty regt (2 bns).
   1 fd engr regt (2 bns).
8 indep cav bns.
4 indep AB inf bns.
7 indep fd arty bns.
6 indep AA arty bns; 4 indep btys.
4 construction engr bns.
Fd engrs: 6 indep bns; 10 indep dets.
Army Avn: 1 composite sqn; 1 hel sqn.
3 special warfare gps (KOPASSUS).
Military Province Commands (KOREM): 39 indep inf bns.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: some 100 AMX-13, 41 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 56 Saladin, 58 Ferret. APC: 200 AMX-VCI, 56 Saracen, 60 V-150 Commando, 80 BTR-40, 24 BTR-1S2.
Arty: guns/how: 76mm: M48; 105mm: 170 M-101, 50 FV Mk61 SP.
   Mor: 81/82mm: 480; 120mm: M-43.
ATK: RCL: 90mm: 480 M-67; 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 20mm: 20; 40mm: 90 M-1; 57mm: 200 S-60. SAM: RBS-70, Rapier.
Avn: 4 NC-212 Aviocar, 2 Aero Commander 680, 1 Beech Super-18, 1 BN-2 Islander, 18 PZL-104 Wilga, 6 Cessna (4 185/O-1, 2 310) ac;
   10+ Nurtanio-Bell 412, 16 Bell 205, 4 SA-316B Alouettelll, 13 BO-105 (some armed) hel.
Amph: LST: 1; LCU: 20 300-ton.
Marine spt: 14 tpts.
(On order: Rapier SAM.)
DEPLOYMENT: E. Timor: 15,000; 20 inf bns.

NAVY: 42,000 incl naval air and marines.
2 Fleets (Eastern, Western).
Bases: Jakarta-Tanjung Priok (HQ and West Fleet HQ), Surabaya (East Fleet), (Teluk Ratai under construction; to be W. Fleet HQ),
   Belawan, Bintan, Ujung Pandang (to be East Fleet HQ); Manado (N. Celebes); Tanjung Ubar, Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Ambon.
Subs: 2 Cakra (Type-1300; 1 on refit); 1 W-class (trg, non-operational).
Frigates: 12: 6 GW:
   2 Neth Van Speijk with 8 Harpoon SSM, 2x4 Seacat SAM; 1 Wasp hel.
   1 Hajar Dewantara (Yug; 1 hel, trg).
   3 Br Tribal with 2x4 Seacat, 1 Wasp hel.
   4 US Claud Jones.
   2 Sov Riga (reserve, to be retired).
Corvettes: 3 Fatahillah with 4 MM-38 Exocet (1 with 1 Wasp hel).
FAC(G): 4 PSMM-5 Mandau (Dagger)with 4 Exocet SSM.
FAC(T): 2 Beruang (Lurssen TNC-45).
FAC(P): 2 Andau (Lurssen PB-57).
Patrol craft, large: 12: 2 Pandorong (Sov Kronshtadt (?in reserve)), 1 Hiu (US PC-461), 3 Layang (Yug PBR-500), 6 Sibarau (Aus Attack);
   coastal: 8<: 6 Samadar (Aus Carpentaria), 2 Spear-class;
   inshore: some 5 Lurssen FPB-28 28m; 5 Jetfoil 429 hydrofoil.
Minesweepers: 2 Pulau Rani (Sov T-43) ocean.
Comd/spt ships: 2.
Amph (in Military Sealift Command (KOLIN LAMIL)): LST: 12 (4 with up to 3 hel); LCU: 5; LCM: 38; LCVP: 20.
Spt: 19: 4 cargo ships, 4 tankers (3 harbour), 2 tpts, 1 repair, 1 trg ships, 4 survey, 1 sub tender, 1 auxiliary, 1 ocean tug.

NAVAL AIR: (e 1,000); 17 combat ac, 12 armed hel.
ASW: 10 Wasp, some 2 AS-332 Super Puma hel (to carry Exocet ASM).
MR: 17: 11 GAF N-24 Searchmaster B, 6 N-22 Searchmaster L.
Other: ac: incl 6 C-47 (DC-3) (?out of service), 6 NC-212 Aviocar, 3 Aero Commander, hel: Alouette, 4 BO-105.

MARINES: (12,000).
5 regts: 2 inf (each 6 bns), 1 combat spt (arty, AD), 1 admin spt, 1 trg.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 30 PT-76.
AFV: MICV: 40 AMX-10 PAC-90. APC: 57 incl 25 AMX-10P, BTR-50P.
Arty: how: 122mm: 40 M-38. MRL: 140mm: BM-14.
AD: guns: 40mm, 57mm.
(On order: 1 Type-1300 sub, 2 Neth Van Speijk frigates (1987/88), 6 PB-57 FAC, 1 Aus Attack patrol, 2 Tripartite (Alkmaar) MCMV, 6 Jetfoil 429 patrol boats,* some 25 FPB-28* patrol launches; 1 survey ship; 18 NC-235 tpt/MR ac; ?24 Super Puma* 8 BO-105 hel, RGM-84 Harpoon SSM, Exocet ASM).

AIR FORCE: 26,000; 81 combat ac, 12 armed hel.
2 Air Operations Areas:
FGA: 2 sqns with 29 Skyhawk A-4 (27 -4E, 2 TA-4H).
Interceptors: 1 sqn with 14 Northrop F-5 (10-E, 4-F).
COIN: 1 sqn with 13 OV-10F Bronco.
MR: 1 sqn with 3 Boeing 737-200, 4 HU-16 Albatross, 2 C-130H.
Tpt: 4 sqns: 2 with 18 C-130B/H, 3 L-100-30;
   2 with 2 C-140 Jetstar, 1 C-47 (DC-3), 2 SC-7 Skyvan, 8 Fokker (1 F-28, 7 F-27), 10 NC-212A4, 1 Boeing 707, 12 Cessna 207/401/402.
Hel: 3 sqns: 1 with 9 UH-34T (S-58); 2 with 5 Bell 204B, 12 SA-330L Puma, 12 Hughes 500; 16 NBO-105.
Trg: 4 sqns with 16 Hawk T-53 (COlN/trg), 24 T-34C1,20 AS-202 Bravo ac; 12 Bell 47G hel.
Quick Reaction Forces: 5 airfield defence bns.
Spt vessels: 6 600-ton RoRo cargo ships.
(On order: 8 General Dynamics F-16 A, 4-B FGA; 32 NC-235, 3 C-160 tpt ac; SA-332F Super Puma, BK-117 hel.)

Other HQ:
KOSTRAD = Strategic Reserve Command: (16,500--19,000 men); main national force under direct control of the Commander of the Armed Forces;
   2 divs, cav bde (to form a div), spt arms and services; Marines (see above).
KOPASSUS = Special Forces Command: 3,000; 2 special para/cdo, 1 counter-terrorism gps.
KOPKAMTIB = Command for the Restoration of Order and Security; Civil government org under Commander-in-Chief; no forces assigned.

PARA-MILITARY:
Department of Defence and Security: some 115,000: Perintis ('special police') and Police 'Mobile bde' org in coys: 12,000; lt ac, 2 BO-105 hel.
Militia: 300,000 a year get 3 weeks basic trg.
Coastguard: many small patrol boats.
Customs: 30 FPB-28, (BC-4001), 24 BC-401, 8 57-m Lurssen patrol boats (12 FPB-28 on order).
Hansip ('Civil Defence'): village guards.
Warra('People's Resistance'): local forces under direct comd of Regional Military Command (KOREM).
Kamra ('Peoples Security'): local police auxiliary.
TBO ('Auxiliary Operational Forces'): bearers and carriers for Indonesian units on operations.
Maritime Security Agency. 6 patrol boats. Police Patrol craft incl 15 armed DKN 140-ton.
Sea Communications (Transport Ministry): 9 SAR craft.

OPPOSITION:
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETLIN): some 1,500 incl spt; small arms.
Free Papua Movement (OPM): perhaps 100 armed.

* Some may be for Coastguard, Customs.

   JAPAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 246,000.
Terms of service, voluntary.
Reserves: Army 44,000; Navy 600; Air 300.

ARMY (Ground Self Defense Force): 156,000.
5 Army HQ (Regional Commands).
1 armd div.
12 inf divs (5 at 7,000, 7 at 9,000 men each).
2 composite bdes (1 hel-borne, 1 trg).
1 AB bde.
1 arty bde; 8 SAM gps (each of 4 btys).
1 trg bde.
1 sigs bde.
5 engr bdes.
Avn: 1 hel bde: 24 sqns. 1 ATK hel platoon, 1 more forming.
Equipment:
Tks: 1,150 some 490 Type 61 (retiring), some 660 Type 74 (increasing).
AFV: APC: 590: 430 Type 60, 160 Type 73.
Arty: guns/how: 782: 105mm: 310 (incl some 20 Type 74 SP); 155mm: some 380 (incl 200 Type 75 SP), 60 FH-70; 203mm: 92 (incl 40 M-110A2 SP).
   MRL: 120: 130mm: some 70 Type 75 SP, 50 Type 67 SP.
   SSM: 50 Type 30.
   Mor: 1,360: 81mm: 800; (some SP); 107mm: 560 (some SP).
ATK: RCL: 75mm: 2,290; 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm (incl Type 60 SP).
   ATGW : 220 Type 64,.some 60 Type 79.
AD: guns: 35mm: 80 twin; 37mm SP; 40mm SP: (incl M-42).
   SAM: 110 Stinger, some 20 Type 81 Tan, 20 HAWK, 180 Improved HAWK.
Avn: ac: 22: 20 LR-1 (MU-2), 2 TL-1 (KM-2).
   hel: 385: 150 Fuji-Bell (20 AH-1S, 130 HU-1B/H), 50 KV 107, 180 Kawasaki-Hughes (30 TH-55, 150 OH-6D/J), 2 CH-47, 3 AS-332L (VIP tpt).
(On order: 56 Type 74 MBT; 23 Type 73 APC; 86 FH-70 (total 176 planned) 155mm, 24 M-110A2 203mm SP how; 19 Type 79 hy ATGW; 229 84mm RCL; 66 Stinger, 14 Type 81 Tan SAM launchers; 16 AH-1S ATK, 12 OH-6D lt, 5 HU-1H, 7 CH-47J, Boeing-Vertol 414 (Chinook) tpt hel.)

NAVY (Maritime Self Defense Force): 45,000 (including MSDF air) plus 4,250 civilians.
Bases:Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, Ominato.
Subs: 15: 8 Yiishio (Type 573), 4 with Harpoon SSM. 7 Vzushio (Type 566).
Destroyers: 36: 4 ASW gps.
   1 Hatakaze (Type 171) DDG with 8 Harpoon SSM, Tartar/Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC ASW, hel deck (HSS-2B SeaKing);
   2 Shirane (Type 143) with Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x8 ASROC, 3 HSS-2B ASW hel;
   2 Haruna (Type 141) with 1x8 ASROC, 3 HSS-2B ASW hel;
   12 Hatsuyuki (Type 122) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1 Sea Sparrow, 1x8 ASROC, 1 HSS-2B ASW hel; later ships to have Phalanx AD system.
   3 Tachikaze (Type 168) with 1 Tartar/Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;
   1 Amatsukaze (Type 163) with 1x8 Tartar/Standard SAM, 1x8 ASROC;
   2 Takatsuki (Type 164) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM, 1x8 Sea Sparrow SAM, 1x 8 ASROC;
   2 Mochizaki (Type 166) with 1x8 ASROC, drone ASW hel.
   6 Yamagumo (Type 113) with 1x8 ASROC;
   3 Minegumo (Type 116) with 1x8 ASROC;
   2 Ayanami (Type 103).
Frigates: 18:
   2 Yubari (Type 227) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM
   1 Ishikari (Type 226) with 2x4 Harpoon SSM
   11 Chikugo (Type 215) with 1x8 ASROC;
   4 Isuzu (Type 211).
Patrol craft, large: 1 Mizutori; coastal: 9<.
FAC(T): 5 35-metre.
MCMV: 45: 1 comd, 2 spt ships, 30 coastal minesweepers (17 Hatsushima, 19 Takami), 6 Nanago boats, 6 diving tenders.
Amph: LST: 6 (3 Miura, 3 Atsumi); LSU: 2 Yura; LCM: 15; LCVP: 22.
Trg: 9: 1 Katori, 1 Azuma, 2 Ayanami.
Spt: 3 Ayanami, 2 Murasame, 2 ASU-86, 1 Akizuki; 1 Chiyoda sub depot, 1 sub rescue, 1 spt ship; 1 spt, 24 harbour tankers; 14 tenders.

MSDF AIR ARM: (12,000); 84 combat ac, 70 armed hel.
6 Air Wings.
MR: 7 sqns:
   4 sqns with 30 P-3C;
   3 with 30P-2J, 10 PS-1.
ASW: 6 hel sqns with 50 HSS-2/2A/B Sea King.
MCM: 1 hel sqn with 10 KV-107.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 YS-HM.
ECM: 1 sqn with 2 UP-2J.
Test: 1 sqn with 2 P-3C, 3 P-2J, 2 U-36A ac; 5 HSS-2B hel.
SAR: 7 fits: 10 US-1/1A ac, 10 S-61A/2 hel.
Trg: 5 sqns with 7 P-2J, 10 YS-1 IT, 20 TC-90 King Air, 30 KM-2 ac; 10 HSS-2, 10 OH-6J/D, 1 Bell 47G hel.
(On order: 1 Improved Ytishio, 3 Ytishio (Type 53) subs; 1 Type 171, 8 Improved Hatsuyuki (Type 134), 2 Improved Yubari (Type 229) frigates; 4 Hatsushima MCMV; 7 LCU, 1 spt ship; 28 P-3C, 4 Learjet 36 (U-36A), 1 TC-90, 1 KM-2, 1 US-1A ac; 23 HSS-1B, 1 S-61 hel; 38 Harpoon SSM; Type 80 ASM; 6 Phalanx AD systems.)

AIR (Air Self Defense Force): 45,000; some 389 combat ac, no armed hel.
6 combat air wings; 1 combat air gp; 1 recce sqn; 1 AEW sqn.
FGA: 3 sqns with 77 F-1.
Interceptors: 10 sqns:
   4 with 90 F-15J/DJ;
   6 with 130 F-4/EJ (to be upgraded);
Recce: 1 sqn: 1 with 10 RF-4EJ;
AEW: 1 sqn with 10 T-2.
Aggressor trg: 1 sqn with 10 T-2, 2 T-33.
Tpt: 1 tactical wing (3 sqns) with 30 C-1, 10 YS-11, 10 C-130H Hercules.
SAR: 1 wing (10 dets) with 30 MU-2 ac; 30 KV-107 hel.
Air traffic control/weather: 1 wing with YS-11, 2 T-33A.
Trg: 5 wings: 10 sqns: 40 T-1A/B, 60 T-2, 40 T-3, 40 T-33A.
Test: 1 wing with 3 F-4EJ, F-15J, 2 F-104J, T-1, 4 T-2, 2 T-3, 10 T-33A, C-1, 4 MU-2J ac, CH-47J hel.
AAM: Sparrow, Sidewinder.

Air Defence:
Aircraft control and warning: 3 wings and 1 group; 28 radar sites.
SAM: 6 gps (19 sqns) with 180 Nike-J (Patriot replacing).
   1 Airfield defence sqn with 20mm Vulcan AA guns, Type 81 Tan, Stinger SAM.
(On order: 43 F-15J-/DJ ftrs, 4 C-130H tpt; 12 T-4, 2 T-2 trg ac, CH-47J, 4 KV-107 hel; 9 Type 81 Tan SAM launchers, 4 btys Patriot SAM (24 btys planned).)

PARA-MILITARY: 20,000:
Maritime Safety Agency (Coast Guard) 12,000:
Patrol Vessels: 332: 45 large (1 with 2, 7 with 1 Bell 212 hel), 47 med, 19 small, 221 coastal;
Misc: 102 service, 79 tender/trg vessels;
Ac: 5 NAMC YS-11 A, 2 Short Skyvan, 14 King Air, 1 Cessna U-206G; 32 Bell 212.
Hel: 4 206B, 2 Hughes 369 HS.
(On order: 2 large, 1 med, 1 small, 2 misc service patrol craft; 5 tender/trg vsls; 1 King Air ac; 3 Bell 212 hel.)

   KAMPUCHEA*
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: some 50,000 incl provincial forces.
Terms of service:conscription, 5 years; ages 18 to 35. Militia serve 3 to 6 months with Regulars.

ARMY: some 30,000.
6 inf divs.
3 indep inf regts.
1 cav regt.
4 tk bns.
Some 60 indep cav (recce), arty, AD, provincial militia inf bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 60: T-54/-55, some Type 59. lt: 10 PT-76.
AFV: APC:some 150: BTR-40/-60/-152, M-113.
Arty: some 350: guns: 76mm: M-1942; 122mm: M-1938; 130mm: Type 59. how: 122mm: D-30.
MRL: 107mm: Type-63; 132mm: BM-13-16; 140mm: BM-14-16.
Mor: 82mm: M-37; 120mm: M-43.
ATK: RCL: 82mm: B-10; 107mm: B-11.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: ZPU 1/-2/-4; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60.
Avn: ac: 12 MiG-21 reported. hel: 6 Mi-8.
(On order: tks, arty, patrol craft, ac, Mi-8 hel reported; details unknown.)
Provincial Forces: some 20,000. HQ; bn, coy district and sub-district units: org of units based on inf bn with It weapons, strengths unknown.

PARA-MILITARY: Militia, Regional Armed Forces/Self Defence forces (org in coys),
People's Police force: strengths, eqpt unknown.

OPPOSITION:
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK):
National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), some 40,000 (recruiting) org in divs and regts: perhaps 20,000 reserve/spt.
Kampuchean People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), some 15,000; 7 or 8 'Gps' incl spt.
Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS): perhaps 10,000; 6,500 reserves/spt. org in 5-6 'bdes', 4 'regts', 5 'cdo' gps.
Eqpt: small arms, incl 12.7mm machine guns, 60mm, 82mm mor, RPG-7 RL, DK-75mm mor, RCL.
These groups are not formally merged, operate largely independently and, at times, are engaged in hostilities with each other.

* Data largely estimated. Very little reliable evidence available.

   KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC (NORTH)
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 838,000.
Terms of service:Army 5-8 years, Navy 5-? 10 years; Air Force 3-4 years.
Reserves: Army 500,000, Navy 40,000.
Mobilization claimed in 12 hours; up to 5,000,000 have some Reserve/Militia commitment. See Para-Military.

ARMY: 750,000.
HQ: 1 armd, 3 mech, 8 all-arms corps (major re-org reported).
2 armd divs.
5 mot and mech inf divs.
25 inf divs.
8 indep armd bdes.
21 indep inf bdes (35 bns: some 3,800 men).
1 Special Purpose corps: 112,000: 25 bdes incl 3 cdo, 4 recce, 1 river crossing regts, 3 amph, 5 AB bns, 35 lt inf bns.
   'Bureau of Reconnaissance Special Forces'.
1 arty corps:
   Army tps: 2 hy arty, 2 mor regts; 6 SSM bns.
   Corps tps: 4 bdes incl 122mm, 152mm SP, MRL.
   AD: 2 AA divs; 7 AA regts.
Reserve: 2 inf divs; 18 indep bdes.
Equipment:
Tks: 2,900: some 2,700 T-34/-54/-55/-62, 175 Type-59. lt: 300 Type-63, Type-62.
AFV: recce: 140 BA-64. MICV: 150 BMP-1. APC: 1,400 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152, Ch Type-531, N. Korean, type unknown.
Arty: 6,000: guns: 76mm: M-1942; 85mm: D-44, Type-56; 100mm: M-1944; 122mm: M-1931/-37, D-74, Type-60;
   130mm: M-46, Type-59, N. Korean M-1975.
   guns/how: 152mm: M-1937 towed.
   how: 122mm: Type-54, D-30; 152mm: D-20, ML-20, M-1938, N. Korean M-1974/-77.
   MRL: 1,800: 107mm: Type-63; 122mm: BM-21; 130mm: Type-63; 140mm: RPU-14, BM-14-16; 200mm: BMD-20; 240mm: BM-24.
   SSM: 54 FROG-5/-7; (some 15 Scud B-type reported).
   Mor: 82mm: 11,000; 120mm; 160mm; 240mm.
ATK: RCL: 82mm: 1,500 B-10; 107mm: 1,000 B-11.
   guns: 45mm: M-1942; 57mm: M-1943; 75mm: Type-52; 85mm: D-48 towed; 800 SU-76 and SU-100 SP.
   ATGW: AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 8,000: 23mm; 37mm: Type-55, M-1939; 57mm: S-60, Type-59; 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19 towed; ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 SP;
   N. Korean SP AA, type unknown.
   SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 35,000.
Bases: East Coast: Woman (HQ), Cha-ho, Chongjin, Kimchaek, Toejo. West Coast: Nampo (HQ), Haeju, Pipaqo, Sagwon-ri.
2 Fleet HQ.
Subs: 27: 4 Sov W-class;
   16 Type-033/R-class; 4 Ch, 12 local-built.
   7 miniature subs reported, characteristics unknown.
Frigates: 2 Najin (1 may have 1x2 Styx SSM).
FAC(G): 34:
   4 Soju (Osa-I type), 10 Osa-I with 4 SSM.
   8 Komar<, 6 Sohung (Komar-type) with 2 Styx SSM.
FAC(T): 136: 45 Sov (3 Shershen, 34 P-6<, 8 P-4<), 91< (15 Iwon, 6 An Ju, 70 Ku Song/Sin Hung).
FAC: 167: 15 Shanghai I/II, 4 Chodo, 4 K-48; some 144< (20 Sov MO-V, 8 Shantou, 66 Chaho, 40 Chong-Jin (Chong-Ju-class reported), ?10 Sinpo).
Patrol craft, large: 35: 15 SO-1 (6 Sov), 2 Sov Tral, 3 Sariwan, 6 Ch Hainan, 9 Taechong; coastal: 10< Sov KM-4; inshore: 20< misc.
Amph: LSM: 6 Hantae; LCU: 9 Hanchon, 95 Nampo assault/landing craft; LCM: 25<.
Coast defence: 2 msl regts: Samlet in 6 sites; guns: 122mm: M-1931/-37; 130mm: SM-4-1; 152mm: M-1937.
(On order: (?3) miniature SS, 2 Soju, 2 Sohung FAC(G), 1 Taechong patrol craft, Hantae LSM).

AIR FORCE: 53,000; some 840 combat ac, 110 armed hel.
Bbrs: 3 lt regts with 80 I1-28.
FGA: 9 regts:
   1 with 30 Su-7;
   5 with some 280 MiG-15/-17;
   3 with some 100 MiG-19/Q-5.
Interceptors: 12 regts with 150 MiG-21, 60 MiG-19, some 40 MiG-23.
Tpt: perhaps 10 regts: 220 An-2, 10 An-24, 5 I1-14, 4 I1-18, 2 Tu-154B, 1 I1-62.
Hel: 206 incl 20 Mi-4, 50 Mi-8/-17, 50 Mi-24, 86 Hughes -300, -500 (some 60 reported to be armed).
Trg: incl 100 MiG-15UTI/-19UTI/-21U, I1-28, 30 CJ-6, 120 Yak-18.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.
SAM: 4 bdes (12 bns, 40 btys) with 800 SA-2 in 45 sites.

Forces Abroad: Iran (300); reported; 10 African countries incl
   Angola (1,000; plus some 3,000 civilians), Madagascar (100), Mozambique (50-100), Polisario (Algeria) (?50), Seychelles (50).

PARA-MILITARY:
Security forces and border guards: 38,000.
Workers-Peasants Red Guards (militia); some 3 million.
Red Youth People's Security Forces Guards: some 700,000.
Instruction force (Reserve Military units): ex-Regular and selected Militia staff/trg cadre.
HQ (corps equivalent) in each of 9 Provinces and 3 towns; bde HQ in towns; bns, coys/platoons at village, farm, factory, etc.,
   some with small arms; mor to 120mm; fd, AA arty.

   KOREA: REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH)
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 629,000.
Terms of service:all Services, 30-36 months.
Reserves: 4,840,000. Army: Regular Reserves 1,400,000, Homeland Reserve Defence Force 3,300,000. Navy 25,000. Marines 60,000. Air 55,000.

ARMY: 542,000.
HQ: 3 Army (1 Reserve), 5 Corps (each 4 divs).
   2 mech inf divs (each 3 bdes: 3 mech inf, 3 mot, 3 tk, 1 recce bns; 1 fd arty bde).
   19 inf divs (each 3 inf regts, 1 recce, 1 tk, 1 engr bn, arty gp).
7 Special Warfare bdes.
2 AA arty bdes.
2 SSM bns with Honest John.
2 SAM bdes: 3 HAWK has (24 sites), 2 Nike Hercules bns (10 sites).
1 army aviation bde.
Reserves: 1 Army HQ, 23 inf divs.
Equipment:
Tks: 1,300: 350 M-47, 950 M-48A5.
MICV: some 200 (KIFV).
APC: 450 M-113, 400 Fiat 6614/KM-900/-901.
Arty: 3,300: guns: 155mm: M-59; 175mm: M-107 SP.
   how: 105mm: M-101, KH-178; 155mm: M-114, KH-179 towed, 100 M-109A2 SP; 203mm: M-115 towed, M-110 SP.
   MRL: 36x130mm: 140 Kooryong.
   SSM: 12 Honest John.
   Mor: 5,300: 81mm; 107mm.
ATK: guns: 76mm: 8 M-18; 90mm: 50 M-36 SP. RL: LAW. RCL: 57mm, 75mm, 106mm. ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: 600: 20mm: incl 60 Vulcan; 35mm: 20 GDF-003; 40mm: 80.
   SAM: 110 HAWK, 100 Nike Hercules.
Avn: ac: 14 Cessna O-2A. hel: 100 Bell UH-1B/H, 180 Hughes 500MD Defender (50 with TOW).
(On order: Improved HAWK (28 btys), Stinger SAM (133 launchers, 599 reloads), AH-1S armed hel.)

NAVY: 29,000.
Bases: Chinhae (HQ), Cheju, Inchon, Mokpo, Mukho, Pukpyong, Pohang, Pusan.
5 Command HQ.
Subs: 1 KSS-1 Tolgorae (Dolphin) coastal.
Destroyers: 9 (to be replaced by HDF-2100):
   7 Gearing with 2x2 Harpoon SSM, 1 SA-316B Alouette III hel;
   2 Sumner with 2x4 Harpoon, 1 Alouette III hel.
Frigates: 6 (2,100-ton):
   2 HDF-2100 Ulsan with 2x4 Harpoon;
   4 US (2 Lawrence, 2 Crosley) (retiring).
Corvettes: 11 : 5 HDC-1150 CLG with 2x4 Harpoon or 2 MM-38 Exocet SSM; 6 HDP-1000 (1,400-ton).
FAC(G): 11:
   8 PSMM-5 (4 with 2x2 Standard SSM (ARM), 4 with 2x2 Harpoon);
   1 Asheville with 2x2 Standard;
   2 Wildcat with 2 MM-38 Exocet.
Patrol craft, large: 80: 4 Sea Shark, 32 Sea Dolphin, 42 Gireogi, 2 other; coastal: 47<: 45 Schoolboy/Sea Hawk, 2 other.
Minesweepers: 9: 8 ex-US: 3 MSC-268, 5 MSC-289 coastal. 1 Lerici-type (trials).
Amph: LST: 8; LSM: 8; LCU: 20; LCM: 10.
Spt ships: 2 supply, 6 tankers.
ASW: 2 sqns:
   1 ac with 25 S-2A/F;
   1 hel with 25 Hughes 500MD; 12 fits with 12 SA-316B Alouette III hel, 2 Bell 206.
(On order: 4 Ulsan frigates; 2 'Jupiter1 88-m; 3 HDP-1000, 3 PCL-827 corvettes, 20 FAC(G) (7 types), 12 river craft, 75 Harpoon SSM.)

MARINES: 25,000.
2 divs, 1 bde.
Spt units.
Equipment:
Tks: 40 M-47. APC: 60 LVTP-7. How: 105mm, 155mm. SSM: Harpoon (truck-mounted).
(On order: 40 LVTP-7.)

AIR FORCE: 33,000; some 476 combat ac, no armed hel.
7 combat, 2 tpt wings.
FGA: 18 sqns:
   2 with 20 F-16C/D,
   16 with 260 F-5A/B/E/F.
AD: 4 sqns with 65 F-4D/E.
COIN: 1 sqn with 23 A-37B.
Recce: 1 sqn with 10 RF-5A.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 26 Bell UH-1B/H.
Tpt: 2 wings, 5 sqns: 10 C-54 (Douglas DC-4), 16 C-123J/K, Aero Commander, 2 HS-748, 6 C-130H Hercules.
Trg: incl 20 T-28D, 33 T-33A, 59 Cessna (39 T-37C, 20 T-41D), 35 F-5B, 63 F-5F.
AAM: Sidewinder, Sparrow.
(On order: some 16 F-16C/D; 4 F-4E ftrs; 25 T-27 Tucano trg ac; Maverick ASM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Civilian Defence Corps (to age 50) 3,500,000.
Student Homeland Defence Corps (Schools) 600,000.
Hydrographic Service; 3 MCMV.
Coastguard; 6 HDP-1000 cutters; 4 HDP-600 Sea Whale/Dragon, 12 Sea Shark, Sea Wolf coastal, some 20 Seagull, Sea Snake inshore patrol craft,
   several hundred minor craft; 9 Hughes 500D hel.

   LAOS
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 55,500.
Terms of service, conscription, 18 months minimum.

ARMY: 52,500.
Military Regions: 4.
5 inf divs.
7 indep inf regts.
1 engr regt.
2 construction regts, indep construction bns.
5 arty, 9 AA arty bns.
65 indep inf coys.
1 lt ac liaison fit.
Equipment:
Tks: 30 T-34/-55. lt: 25 PT-76.
APC: 70 BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 10 M-46. how: 75mm: 40 M-116; 76mm: 20 M-1942; 105mm: 25 M-101; 122mm: 40 M-1938 and D-30.
Mor: 81mm: M-1; 82mm: M-37; 120mm: M-43.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18/A1; 75mm: M-20; 107mm: B-11.
AD: guns: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60. SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: 1,000.
Patrol craft, river: 14<: 8 ex-Vietnamese, 6 Sov Shmel. (Perhaps 25 more vessels incl 3 LCM, 6 tpts in reserve, probably inoperable.)

AIR FORCE: 2,000; some 34 combat ac.
FGA: 2 sqns with some 30 MiG-21.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 2 Yak-40, 5 An-24, 2 An-26, 6 An-2, C-47 (DC-3), Douglas DC-4.
Hel: 1 sqn with 10 Mil Mi-8, 2 Mi-6.
Trg: 4 MiG-21UTI, 8 Yak-18.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

PARA-MILITARY: Militia, Self-Defence forces.

   MALAYSIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 113,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 46,600. Army 45,000, Navy 1,000, Air 600.

ARMY: 90,000.
1 corps, 4 div HQ.
9 inf bdes, consisting of 36 inf bns (1 APC), 4 armd , 5 fd arty, 2 AA arty, 5 sigs, 5 engr regts; spt units.
1 Special Service regt (3 bns).
Reserve: 1 div HQ.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 26 Scorpion (90mm).
AFV: recce: 162 SIBMAS, 140 AML-60/-90, 92 Ferret (modernized).
   APC: 134 V-100/-150 Commando, 25 Stormer, 460 Condor.
Arty: how: 105mm: 150 Model 56 pack, 56 M-102A1. Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RL: 89mm: M-20. RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav: 106mm: 150; 120mm: 5. ATGW: SS-11.
AD: guns: 12.7mm: 70; 40mm: 36: 24 40/70, 12 L-70.

NAVY: 11,000.
Two Commands: Area I: Malayan Peninsula. Labuan Area (east of 109RE).
Bases: Lumut (HQ), Tanjong Gelang, Kuantan (HQ Naval Region), Woodlands (Singapore; trg base) Labuan Sungei Antu (Sarawak).

Frigates: 4:
   2 Kasturi (FS-1500) FFG with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1 hel;
   2 Yarrow FF: 1 Type-41/61, 1 1,250-ton.
FAC(G): 8 with MM-38 Exocet SSM: 4 Handalan (Spica-M) (4 SSM); 4 Perdana (La Combattante II) (2 SSM).
FAC: 6 Jerong.
Patrol craft, large: 22: 2 Musytari 1,300-ton; 2 Kedah, 4 Sabah, 14 Kris (Vosper) 109-ton.
Minehunters: 4 Lerici.
Amph: LST: 2 US 511-1152, 20 small vessels.
Spt: 2 comd/comms/cargo ships.

AIR FORCE: 12,000; 72 combat ac, no armed hel.
2 Commands.
FGA: 2 sqns with 39 A-4PTM/TA-4.
Ftr: 1 sqn with 16 F-5E/F.
Recce: 1 sqn with 2 RF-5E.
COIN: 1 sqn with 12 PC-7.
MR: 1 sqn with 3 C-130HMP Hercules.
Tpt: 9 sqns: ac: 5: 1 with 6 C-130H; 2 with 13 DHC-4 Caribou; 2 with 2 HS-125, 2 F-28, 2 HU-16 Albatross, 11 Cessna 402B;
   hel: 4 with 36 S-61A-4, 24 Alouettel III (liaison).
Trg: 3 sqns: ac: 11 MB-339, 28 PC-7; hel: 7 Bell 47.
AAM: Sidewinder, Super Sidewinder.
(On order: 4 NC-212 Aviocar tpt; 1 NAS-332 hel; Super Sidewinder AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Police Field Force 18,000; 4 Bde HQ: 21 bns (incl 2 Aboriginal);
   Shorland armd cars, 140 AT-105, SB-301 APC, 53 armed patrol boats (27<) incl 9 Brooke Marine 25-m.
   Police Air Wing: 4 Cessna 206 ac.
   (On order: 2 cutters with hel.)
Area Security Units (Auxiliary Police Field Force): 3,500 men in 89 units.
Border Scouts (in Sabah, Sarawak) 1,200.
People's Volunteer Corps (RELA) 180,000.

OPPOSITION: some 2,100.
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM):some 1,100;
2 regts (~800) (in Thailand), assault units (~300).
Communist Party of Malaysia (CPMAL): some 700; pro-Peking.
North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) - Sarawak East Malaysia: 46 (official).

* Excl internal security budget and also 2.8 bn for defence in 5-year plan 1986-90 (1981-85 plan had allocated $M 6.0 bn).

   MONGOLIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 33,500 (perhaps 17,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:Conscription: males 18-28 years; 3 years authorized, actual service may only be 2.
Reserves: Army 200,000.

ARMY: 30,000 (perhaps 17,000 conscripts).
4 motor rifle divs.
Equipment:
Tks: 650 T-54/-55/-62.
AFV: recce: 135 BRDM-2. MICV: 400 BMP, 20 BMP M-1976. APC: 450BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: 650: guns: 76mm: M-1942; 130mm: M-46; 152mm: ML-20. how: 122mm: D-30;
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 132mm: BM-13-16; 140mm: BM-14-16, BM-14-17.
   Mor: 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: guns: 100mm: T-12. ATGW: BRDM-2 with AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 200: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60. SAM: 300 SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 3,500 (100 pilots); Soviet technicians;
17 combat ac.
(Operates civil air line.)
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 17 MiG-21 (incl trg).
Tpt: at least 2 sqns: 20 An-2, 19 An-24, 1 An-26, 1 An-32.
Hel: 1 sqn with Mi-8, 10 Mi-4.
Trg: MiG-15, Yak-11/-18, 3 PZL-104 Wilga utility.

PARA-MILITARY: Ministry of Public Security (15,000): Militia (Police), internal security troops, frontier guards; BTR-60/-152 APC.
Youth groups, increasing para-military trg.

   NEPAL
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 30,000.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: none organized.
1 Royal Guard bde: incl 1cav sqn, 1garrison bn.
5 inf bdes: incl AB bn.
1 spt bde: 1 arty regt, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 cav sqn.
1 logbde: incl 1tptbn, 1air sqn (1 ac, 1 helflts).
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 25 Ferret.
Arty: 17: how: 75mm: 6 pack; 94mm: 5 3.7-in. mountain; 105mm: 6 pack.
   Mor: 81mm: 107mm: 4 4.2-in; 120mm: 18.
AD: guns: 40mm: 2 L/60.
Avn: ac: 2 Short Skyvan, 1 BAe/HS-748. hel: 4 Chetak (Alouette III), 2 SA-330 Puma, 1 AS-332 Super Puma.

Forces Abroad: Lebanon (UNIFIL): 1 inf bn (800).

PARA-MILITARY: Police force 25,000.

   NEW ZEALAND
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 12,600.
Terms of service: voluntary, supplemented by Territorial Army service: 7 weeks basic, 20 days per year.
Reserves 9,352. Regular 2,915: Army 1,370, Navy 755, Air 790. Territorial 6,437: Army 5,728, Navy 489, Air 220.

ARMY: 5,800.
2 inf bns.
1 arty bty.
1 lt armd sqn.
1 SAS sqn.
Reserves: Territorial Army: 6 inf bns, 4 fd, 1 med arty btys, 1 recce, 1 APC, 1 ATK.sqns.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 26 Scorpion.
APC: 72M-113.
Arty: 57: guns: 105mm: 8 Hamel; 140mm: 10 5.5-in. how: 105mm: 39 (incl pack). Mor: 81mm: 74.
ATK: RL: LAW. RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: 18 M-40.
(On order: 16 Hamel 105mm guns).

NAVY: 2,600.
Base: Auckland.
Frigates: 4 Leander with 1 Wasp hel: 3 have 1x4 Seacat SAM; 1 has 2x4 Seacat, 1 Ikara ASW.
Patrol craft, large: 4 Lake; inshore: 4 Kiwi (Reserves).
Surrey vessels: 3.
Misc: 1 oceanographic vessel.
Hel: 7 Westland Wasp (see Air Force).
(On order 112,300-ton tanker (1987),Seacat SAM.)

AIR FORCE: 4,200; 43 combat ac, 7 armed hel.
Ops Gp:
FGA: 2 sqns with 17 A-4K, 5 TA-4K Skyhawk.
MR: 1 sqn with 6 P-3K Orion.
COIN: 1 with 15 BAC-167 Strikemaster.
ASW hel: 7 Wasp (Navy-assigned).
Tpt: 3 sqns: ac: 1 with 5 C-130H Hercules, 1 with 7 HS-748 Andover, 2 Boeing 727-100C;
   hel: 1 with 6 Sioux (Bell 47), 12 Bell UH-1D/H.
Comms: 1 flight with 3 Cessna 421C.
Support Gp:
Trg: 1 wing with 4 Airtourer, 15 CT-4 Airtrainer, 3 F-27 Friendship ac; 3 Sioux hel.

Forces Abroad:
Singapore: 1 inf bn with log spt, 1 spt hel unit (3 UH-1); to be withdrawn.
Egypt (Sinai MFO): 35; 2 UH-1 hel.

   PAKISTAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 480,600.
Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves: 513,000. Army 500,000: obligation to ages 45 (men) or 50 (officers); active liability for 8 years after service. Navy 5,000. Air 8,000.

ARMY: 450,000.
7 Corps HQ.
2 armd divs.
17 inf divs.
4 indep armd bdes.
8 indep inf bdes.
8 arty bdes/bde equivalents.
3 AA arty bdes.
6 armd recce regts.
1 special services group (3 bns).
Equipment:
Tks: 1,600: 450 M-47/-48 (incl A5), 51 T-54/-55, some 1,100 Type-59. lt: Type-63
APC: 800 M-113, 45 UR-416, Type-531 reported.
Arty: guns: 85mm: 180 Type 56; 88mm: some 1,000 25-pdr; 100mm: Type-59; 130mm: Type- 59-1/M46; 5.5-in. (140mm) and 155mm: M-59.
   how: 105mm: 200, 12 M-7 SP, 50 M-56 pack; 122mm: 100 Type 54-1; 155mm: 60 M-114, 95 M-198 towed, 64 M-109A2 SP; 203mm: 40 M-110A2 SP.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21.
   Mor: 81mm/82mm, 107mm, 120mm.
ATK: RL: 89mm: M-20 3.5-in. RCL: 75mm: Type-52; 106mm: M-40A. ATGW: Cobra, 224 TOW (incl 24 on M-901 SP).
AD: guns: 14.5mm; 35mm; 37mm: Type-55/-65; 40mm: M1; 57mm: S-60/Type 59. SAM: 100 Stinger, 144 RBS-70.

AVIATION:
Liaison: ac: 1 sqn with 55 Mashshaq (Saab-91 Safari); hel: 4 sqns.
Observation: indep fits: ac: 45 O-1E, Cessna 421, 50 Mashshaq, Turbo Commander, Queen Air,
   hel: 20 AH-1S Cobra with TOW, 16 Mi-8, 35 SA-330 Puma, 23 SA-316B Alouette III, 13 Bell 47.
(On order: 88 M-109A2 SP how);

NAVY: 13,000 (incl Naval Air).
Base. Karachi.
Subs: 8: 6 Fr: 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne; 2 SX-404 midget.
Destroyers: 7:
   1 Br County with 2x4 Seacat SAM, 1 Alouette hel;
   6 US Gearing with 1x8 ASROC ASW;
FAC(G): 8 Ch: 4 Huangfen (4 HY-2 SSM), 4 Hoku( (2 HY-2);
FAC(T): 4 Huchwan hydrofoil<.
FAC: 12 Shanghai-II.
Patrol craft, large: 5: 4 Ch Hainan, 1 Br Town.
MCMV: 3 US: 2 Adjutant, 1 MSC-268 coastal.
Spt: 1 tanker, 1 Br Dido cruiser, 1 Br Battle destroyer (non-operational trg ships).
(On order: 3 Br Type-23, 2 Neth M-class frigates, 2 more planned; 16 RGM-84 Harpoon SSM).

NAVAL AIR: 3 combat ac, 10 armed hel.
ASW/MR: 1 sqn with 3 Atlantic ((AM-39 ASM) operated by Air Force).
ASW/SAR: 2 hel sqns with 6 Westland Sea King ASW with AM-39, 4 SA-316B Alouette III.
Comms: 1 Fokker F-27 ac (Air Force).
ASM: AM-39 Exocet.

AIR FORCE: 17,600; 381 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 107 ac: 8 sqns:
   1 with 16 Mirage IIIEP (some with AM-39 ASM);
   4 with 50 Mirage 5PA3;
   3 with 41 Q-5.
Interceptor/FGA: 209 ac: 11 sqns:
   9 with 170 J-6;
   2 with some 39 F-16.
Recce: 1 sqn with 13 Mirage IIIRP.
Tpt: 2 sqns:
   1 with 13 C-130B/E, 1 L-100 Hercules;
   1 with 1 Mystere-Falcon 20, 2 F-27-200 (1 with Navy), 2 Beech (1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza).
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 2 HH-43B, 4 SA-316B Alouette III.
Utility: 1 hel sqn with 4 SA-321 Super Frelon, 12 Bell 47.
Trg: 1 sqn with 20 T-33A, 4 Ch MiG-15UTI;
   other ac incl 2 Mirage 5DPA2, 3 Mirage IIIDP, 2 J-6, 35 Cessna T-37C, 45 JJ-5 (MiG-17U), 12 CJ-6,24 Reims Cessna FTB-337.
AD: 7 SAM btys: 6 with 6 Crotale (each 4 msls); 1 with 6 CSA-1 (SA-2).
AAM: Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Majic. ASM: AM-39 Exocet.
(On order: 10 F-16,some 100 Q-5 FGA, 60 Xian J-7; some 300 AIM-9L Sidewinder.)

Forces Abroad: 30,000 contract personnel. Saudi Arabia (10,000), Libya, Oman, UAE, Kuwait.

PARA-MILITARY: 164,000.
National Guard (75,000): Mujahid Force; Janbaz Force; National Cadet corps; Women Guards.
Civil Armed Forces (CAF) (89,000):
   Frontier Corps (65,000) UR-416 APC. Pakistan Rangers (15,000); Northern Light Infantry (7,000); Coast Guard (2,000).

* Excl proceeds of 1987 DefenceTax.
t Excl Afghan refugees.

   PAPUA NEW GUINEA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 3,530.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 3,150.
2 inf bns. 1 engr bn. 1 sigs sqn. Log units.

NAVY: 250.
Bases: Port Moresby (HQ), Lombrum.
Patrol craft, large: 4 Attack 33-m, 1 Pacific-class.
Amph: 2 500-ton landing craft.
(On order: 3 Pacific patrol vessels (1987-9)).

AIR FORCE: 130.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 N-22B Missionmaster, 3 Arava 201 for border patrol, 6 C-47 (DC-3; for disposal).

PARA-MILITARY: Police (Border Patrol) 4,600.

   PHILIPPINES
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 105,000 (plus 42,000 Para-Military).
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: 48,000. Army 20,000 (obligation toage 49), (some 75,000 more have commitments); Navy 12,000; Air 16,000 (to age 49).

ARMY: 62,000.
12 Military Regions (being re-org).
5 inf divs (4 of 3, 1 of 4 inf bdes, spttps).
1 lt armd bde.
2 indep inf bdes.
1 GHQ Bde (5 bns).
1 scout ranger regt (5 bns).
3 engr bdes; 1 construction bn.
1 people's defence regt (5 bns).
4 arty regts.
1 special services bde.
1 Presidential Security Group (2 COIN units).
1 sigs group.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 28 Scorpion.
AFV: MICV: 45 AIFV (YPR-765PRI). APC: 80 M-113, 20 Chaimite, 120 V-150.
Arty: how: 105mm: 260 M-101 and M-102; 155mm: 12 M-114. Mor: 81mm; 107mm: 40.
ATK: RCL: 75mm: M-20; 90mm: M-67; 106mm: M-40.

NAVY: 26,000 (incl 9,500 Marines, 2,000 Coast Guard).
Base: Sangley Point/Cavite, Zamboanga.
Frigates: 7: 4 Casco (non-operational); 1 Savage; 2 Cannon.
Corvettes: 10: 2 Auk, 7 PCE-827, 1 Admirable.
Patrol craft, large: 13: 1 command, 4 Kagitingan (unserviceable), 4 PGM-39, 1 PGM-71, 2 US PC-461, 1 SARship;
   coastal: 73: 31 de Haviland 9209; 39 Sewart Swift Mks 1/2/3, 3 other.
Amph: 3 spt, 24 LST, 4 LSM, 61 LCM, 7 LCVP, 3 LCU.
SAR: 1 sqn with 6 N-24A Searchmaster ac, 5 BO-105 hel.
Spt: 2 Presidential yachts, 3 repair ships, 1 spt ship, 2 tankers.

MARINES: (9,500):
3 bdes (10 bns).
Equipment:
APC: 30 LVTP-5, 55 LVTP-7.
Arty: how: 105mm: 150 M-101. Mor: 4.2-in. (107mm): M-30.
Coastguard: (2,000).
Equipment: Some 65 patrol craft incl 3 large SAR, 2 lt ac.
Much of the above equipment is unserviceable; status of the orders listed below is unclear.
(On order: 2 ex-US destroyers, 3 PSMM-5 FAC(G); 6 Kagitingan large, 50 small patrol boats (some 19 Swift-type for Coastguard); 1 LCVP amph.)

AIR FORCE: 17,000; 51 combat ac, 16 armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 12 F-8H (to be withdrawn).
AD: 1 sqn with 10 F-5A/B.
COIN: ac: 2 sqns with 26 T-28D; hel: 1 wing with 41 Bell UH-1H, 16 S-76.
MR: 3 F-27 Maritime.
Tpt: Presidential airlift wing: ac: 1 F-28, 2 F-27; hel: 1 S-76, 1 SA-330 Puma, 1 S-70AS, 1 Bell 212.
Tpt: 5 sqns: ac: 1 with 6 Hercules (3 C-130H, 3 L-100); 1 with 3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 8 F-27; 1 with 7 N-22B Missionmaster, 1 with 19 BN-2 Islander,
   hel: 1 with 10 BO-105, 18 UH-1H.
Liaison: 2 Cessna 210.
Trg: 3 sqns: 1 with 21 T/RT-33A, 18 T-41D; 1 with 24 SIAI-Marchetti SF-260;
AAM: Sidewinder.

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence: 42,000.
Philippine Constabulary: ~50,000; 13 Regional Commands, 225 provincial coys.
Civil Home Defence Force: 65,000 (declared unconstitutional, to disband, reorganized into civilian security units).
Vigilante groups incl:
Mindanao:
   Alsa Masa (Masses Arise): 5-6,000 (claim 10,000). Could be absorbed into Constabulary.
   Puluhan (Remnants (?Fragments) of God);
Mindanao Anti-Communist movement.
   Kampilan bn.
   Kilusan Laban Kommunista (KLK).
   Guerrerosde Jesus
   Nakasaka (United People for Peace).
   Surit Surit bn.
Cebu:
   Citizens' Army Against Communism (CACA).
   Sagrado Corazdn delSenor (also Tadtad).
Army Reserve Comd: 18 inf bns.

OPPOSITION:
Bangsa Moro Army (armed wing of Moro National Liberation Front; MNLF): 711,000.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (breakaway from MNLF).
New People's Army (NPA; Maoist): 24,400 (perhaps 12,000 armed).
Cordillera People's Liberation Army (breakaway from NPA): few hundred; small arms.
Figures must be used with caution.

   SINGAPORE
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 55,500, (34,800 conscripts).
Terms of service:conscription; 24-30 months.
Reserves: Army 170,000; annual trg to age 40 for men, 50 for officers. Navy (?4,500). Air Force (?7,500).

ARMY: 45,000 (30,000 conscripts).
1 inf div: 3 inf bdes (each 3 inf, 1 mor bns). 1 recce, 1 arty, 1 AA, 1 engr, 1 sigs bns.
1 armd bde (1 tk, 2 APC, 1 SP mor bns).
1 cdo bn.
1 arty, 1 hy mor bns.
1 target acquisition bn.
5 engr (1 amph), 3 sigs bns.
Reserves: 2 div, 1 armd bde, 6 inf bde HQ; 18 inf, 1 cdo, 10 arty 2 AA, 6 engr, 3 sigs bns.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 300AMX-13.
APC: 720 M-113, 30 V-100, 250 V-150/-200 Commando.
Arty: how: 155mm: 54: 38 Soltam M-71, 16 M-114A1 (other types incl M-68 and 1 Singapore-produced reported).
   Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 50 (some SP in M-113); 160mm: 12 Tampella.
ATK: RL: 89mm. RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: 90.
AD: guns: 20mm: 30; 35mm: 34 GDF-002; 40mm: 16 L-70. SAM: RBS-70.
(On order: some 40 39/165mm how (?ODE M-1986).

NAVY: 4,500 (1,800 conscripts).
Base: Pulau Brani (Singapore).
FAC(G): 6 TNC-45 each with 5 Gabriel II SSM.
FAC: 6 Vosper Types A/B.
Patrol craft, coastal: 12 Swift.
Minesweepers, coastal: 2 US Redwing.
Amph: LST: 6 US 511-1152 (1 in reserve). LCT: 8 RPL (2<).
Trg: 2 ships.
(On order: 1 Lurssen (?TNC-62) 62-m corvette (plan 5 more local-built); 2 inf landing craft.)

AIR FORCE: 6,000 (3,000 conscripts); 180 combat ac, some armed hel.
FGA: 4 sqns:
   3 with Skyhawt. 63+ A-4S/S1, 13+ TA-4S/S1.
   1 with Hunter. 29 F-74, 4 T-75.
Frr: 1 sqn with 29 F-5E, 6 F-5F.
AEW: 1 sqn with 2 E-2C Hawkeye.
Tpt: 2 ac sqns: 1 with 4 C-130B (tkr conversion), 4 C-130H. 1 with 6 Skyvan (tpt/SAR).
Hel: 3 sqns: 1 with 6 A5-350 Ecureuil, 24 UH-1B.
   1 with 16 UH-1H (some armed), 4 AB-205, 3 Bell 212 (SAR).
   1 with 6 AS-332 Super Puma (tpt/SAR, more being delivered).
Trg: 3 sqns (some 40 may also have COIN role):
   1 with 20 SIAI 5-211 (more being delivered). 1 with 14 Strikemaster Mk 81/82/84. 1 with 26 SF-260M/W.
AD: 3 bns: 1 with 28 Bloodhound 2 SAM; 1 with Rapier SAM; 1 with 6 Improved Hawk SAM.
AAM: AIM-9 J/P Sidewinder.
(On order, 4 F-16A, 4 F-16B, some 10 S-211, 2 E-2C ac; 16 AS-332 hel.)

Forces Abroad: Brunei: (500); trg school.

PARA-MILITARY:
Police/Marine Police: 7,500; 60 patrol craft, 10 (4 Vosper, 6 Carpentaria) armed.
Gurkha guard bn: some 700.
People's Defence Force Command: some 30,000; org in 2 comds, 7 bde gps, e 21 bns.

   SRI LANKA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: some 48,000 incl active Reservists.
Active: 22,000.
Terms of service, voluntary.
Reserves: some 25,000; obligation: 7 years post-Regular service.

ARMY: 40,000, incl active Reservists.
5 'Task Forces' (inf bdes: with 5 regular, 6 reserve bns).
2 recce regts (bns) (1 reserve).
2 fd arty (incl 1 reserve), 1 AA regts.
1 fd engr, 1 engr plant regts.
1 sigs bn.
Support services: log units.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 45: 18 Saladin, 15 Ferret, 12 Daimler Dingo. APC: 160: 10 BTR-152, 6 SAMIL 100, 144 other.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 16 Yug M-48; 85mm: 30 Type-56; 88mm: 25 pdr.
   Mor: 82mm: 12; 107mm: 12 4.2-in.; 120mm: reported.
ATK: RCL: 82mm: M-60; 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 40mm: 24 L-60; 94mm: 24 3.7-in.
(On order: 6 Saracen APC.)

NAVY: 4,000, incl active Reservists.
Bases: Trincomalee (HQ), Karainagar, Colombo, Tangalla, Kalpitiya.
Comd: 8: 3 amph, 5 ex-cargo ships.
Patrol craft, large: 2 Jayesagara 40-m;
   coastal: 38: 11 Pradeepa 40-ton, 6 Dabur class 35-ton, 10 Cougar Marine CAT 900 32-ft, 2 lt 36-ton, 5 Cheverton 22-ton, 4 21-ton.
   harbour: 4 Thornycroft 13-ton.
FAC: 12: 6 Israeli Super Dvora (no msls); 6 Sooraya (Ch Shanghai-II).
Amph: LCT: 2 Vosper 33-ton.
(On order: 3 Jayesagara large, 8 Super Dvora, 2 coastal patrol craft<, 8 landing craft.)

AIR FORCE: 3,700 incl active Reservists; 6 combat ac, 13 armed hel.
COIN: 6 SF-260TP.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 HS-748, 2 C-47 (DC-3), 2 Riley Heron, 1 DH Heron, 3 Cessna 337, 1 King Air 2000, 1 Cessna 421C.
Hel: 1 sqn with 24 Bell (12 206, 9 212 attack, 4 412 armed), 2 SA-365 Dauphin.
Trg: incl 6 Cessna 150/152, 8 DH (5 Chipmunk, 3 Dove).
Reserves: Air Force Regt, 3 sqns; Airfield Construction Regt, 1 sqn.
(In storage: 2 Jet Provost Mk 51 ac.)
(On order: 20 Bell 206 hel).

PARA-MILITARY:
Police Force: 21,000 (increase to 28,000 planned) incl Special Task Force: 1,500-man anti-guerrilla unit.
National Auxiliary Volunteer Force: 5,000 (to be 10,000).
Home Guard.

OPPOSITION:
Eelam National Liberation Front (EPNLF): 2 gps:
   Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Leader: Velupillai Pirabakaran: 7,500.
   Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO).
Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front: remnants of former small groups incl:
   Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).
   Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS).
   People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT).
Total strength e 5,000 activists, perhaps 8,000 supporters/reserves; small arms, RPG-7 RL, SA-7 SAM.
Eelam Revolutionary Communist Party reported, status, strength unknown.
Janatha Vimmukthi Peramura (JVP): People's Liberation Front): Maoist, largely underground; strength unknown.

* Incl extra allocation of Rs 2.5 bn to meet internal security expenditure.

   TAIWAN
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Regular: 424,000.
Terms of service. 2 years.
Reserves: 1,457,500. Army: 1,300,000 have some Reserve obligation to age 30. Navy 32,500, Marines 35,000, Air 90,000.

ARMY: 270,000.
3 Army, 6 Corps, 1 Special Force HQ.
12 hy inf divs.
6 lt inf divs.
6 mech inf bdes.
2 AB bdes.
4 tk gps.
20 fd arty bns.
5 SAM bns: 2 with Nike Hercules,3 with HAWK.
6 army aviation sqns.
9 Reserve divs (cadre).
Equipment:
Tks: 309 M-48A3/-A5. lt: 325 M-24 (90mm gun), 795 M-41/Type 64.
AFV: recce: M-8. MlCV: AIFV. APC: M-3 half-track, 1,100 M-113, 150 V-150 Commando.
Arty: guns/how: 155mm: 390 M-59, T-69 (SP).
   how: 75mm: 350 M-116 pack; 105mm: 550 M-101 (T-64), 225 M-108 SP; 155mm: M-44, 90 M-114 (T-65), 250 M-109A1 (T-69) SP;
   203mm: 10 M-115 towed, 150 M-110 SP.
   MRL: 65mm: Kung Feng (KF; WorkerBee); 45x117mm: KFVI; 40x126mm: KF III/IV towed and SP.
   SSM: Hsiung Feng (Drone Bee =Gabriel-type) coastal defence.
   Mor: 81mm.
ATK: RCL: 90mm: M-67; 106mm: 500 M-40/Type 51. guns: 76mm: 150 M-18 SP.
   ATGW: Kun Wu (Fire God = TOW-type), TOW (some SP).
AD: guns: 40mm: 300 (incl M-42 SP). SAM: 1,620: 400 Nike Hercules, 800 HAWK, 420 Chaparral; Tien Kung (Sky Bow)-1/-2.
Avn: hel: 127: 118 UH-1H, 2 KH-4, 7 CH-34.
(On order: 75 M-60 MBT, 164 M-113 APC (incl variants); 1,000 TOW, Kun Wu ATGW; 16 launchers, 366 MIM-72F Chaparralmsls; 370 Improved HAWK, Tien Kung 1 (Patriot-type) SAM.)

DEPLOYMENT: Quemoy 55,000, Matsu 18,000.

NAVY: 38,000.
3 Naval Districts.
Bases/HQ: Tsoying, Makung (Pescadores), Keelung.
Subs: 4: 2 Sea Dragon (Zwaardvis mod; being delivered 1987/8), 2 Guppy-II.
Destroyers: 26:
   13 Gearing (?3 non-operational) with 1 hel, Hsiung Feng (HF) SSM, 10 with 1x8 ASROC SSM;
   8 Sumner. 1 with 1x3, 2 with 2x2 HF;
   4 Fletcher. 3 with 1x6 Sea Chaparral SAM;
   1 Gearing radar picket with 3 HF SSM.
Frigates: 9: 3 Lawrence, 6 Crosley.
Corvettes: 4: 1 domestic, 3 Auk.
FAC(G): 57 with HFSSM: 2 Lung Chiang (PSMM-5) with 4 SSM. 5 Sui Kiang 32-m with 4 SSM. 50 Hai Ole 22-m ( (mod Dvora) with 2 SSM.
Patrol craft, coastal: 28<.
MCMV, coastal: 13: 8 Adjutant, 2 MSC-268, 3 MSC-289.
Amph: LPD: 1; LSD: 2; LST: 22 (1 comd); LSM: 4; LCU: 22; LCM: ?260; LCVP: ?150.
Spt: 1 repair ship, 3 tpts, 7 tankers.
Hel: 1 sqn with 12 Hughes 500MD ASW Defender.
(On order: 5 5M/Kiang FAC(G) (14 more planned), 2 Neth 850-ton patrol vessels; 10 ASW hel; ASROC ASW; 170 Standard SM-1, 284 Improved Sea Chaparral SAM.)

MARINES: 39,000.
3 divs.
Spt elms.
Equipment:
APC: LVT-4/-5.
Arty: how: 105mm, 155mm.
RCL: 106mm.

AIR FORCE: 77,000; 562 combat ac, no armed hel.
5 combat wings.
FGA: 13 sqns with 225 F-5E, 30 F-5F, 42 F-100A/D, 80F-104G.
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 15 F-104A.
Recce: 1 sqn with 8 RF-104G.
MR: 1 sqn with 9 S-2A, 20 S-2E.
SAR: 1 sqn with 8 HU-16B ac, 10 UH-1H hel.
Tpt: 6 sqns: with 26 Douglas (20 C-47, 5 C-54, 1 C-118B), 50 Fairchild (40 C-119, 10 C-123), 5 Boeing (1 720B, 4 727-100), 12 C-130 Hercules.
Hel: 2 sqns: 7 UH-19 (S-55), 10 Bell 47G.
OCU: 82 F-5A/B, 30 F/TF-104G, 6 F-104D, 15 F-100F.
Trg: incl 55 PL-1B Chien Shou, 49 T-CH-1, 32 T-33, T-38 Sky Sword-1/-2, 10 T-28, AT-3.
AAM: Sidewinder, Shafrir. ASM: Bullpup, AGM-65A Maverick.
(On order: 60 F-5E/F ftr, 12 C-130H tpt, 42 T-34C, 50 AT-3 trg ac; 14 S-70 hel; Sparrow AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence 'Security Authorities': Taiwan Garrison command: 25,000: National Police Administration. Bureau of Investigation. Military Police HQ.
Customs Service (Ministry of Finance): 16 patrol craft, 5 ocean (armed), 11 inshore (3 armed);
(On order: 2 850-ton patrol vessels).

   THAILAND
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 256,000.
Terms of service: 2 years.
Reserves: 500,000.

ARMY: 166,000 (80,000 conscripts).
4 Regional Army HQ.
2 cav (It armd) divs (2 cav, 1 arty regts).
7 inf divs (incl Royal Guard, 5 with 1 tk bn) (3 to be mech, 1 to be lt).
2 special forces divs.
1 arty div, 1 AA div (5 AA arty bns).
11 engr bns.
1 indep cav regt.
8 indep inf bns.
4 recce coys.
Avn: Armd air cav regt with 3 airmobile coys, some hel fits.
Reserves: 4 inf div HQ.
Equipment:
Tks: 89: 24 Ch Type 69, 65 M-48A5; lt: 150 Scorpion, 300 M-41 (most in reserve). 40 M-24 (in reserve).
AFV: recce: 56 EE-9 Cascavel, 32 Shorland Mk 3. APC: 500 M-113, M-3A1 half-track, 150 V-150 Commando, 20 Saracen.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 18 Type 59. how: 75mm: 300 M-116 pack; 105mm: ~40 M-101/-101 mod; 155mm: 110 M-114, 62 M-198, 12 GC-45.
   Mor: 81mm, 4.2-in. (107mm), 120mm.
ATK: RL: M-72 LAW. RCL: 57mm: M-18; 75mm: M-20; 106mm: 150 M-40. ATGW: TOW, Dragon.
AD: guns: 20mm: 56 M-163 Vulcan; 37mm: some 14 Ch; 40mm: 80 M-1/L-70/M-42 SP. SAM: Redeye.
Avn: ac (tpt): 4 C-47 (DC-3), 2 Short 330-UTT. (lt): Cessna 208 (on delivery), 1 Cheyenne (comms). (liaison): 23 T-41A, some 75 O-1.
   hel: 4 Bell 214 B, 2 214 ST, 6 212, 10 206, 99 UH-1 B/H. (trg): 10 OH-13, 20 TH-55, 24 Hughes 300C.
(On order: 40 M-48A5, 6 T-69 tanks; 6 GHN-45 155mm how; Ch 85mm ATK guns, Kittikhachorn 105mm MRL; 24 Vulcan 24mm AA guns; Blowpipe SAM; Short 330-UTT tpt ac, 4 AH-1S hel.)

NAVY: 42,000 (some conscripts) incl naval air and marines.
Bases: Bangkok, Sattahip, Songkla, Phan Nga, Nakhor Phanom (HQ Mekong River Operating Unit).
Frigates: 6:
   1 Br Yarrow-type with 1x4 Seacat SAM.
   2 Tapi (US PF-103);
   2 Tachin (US Tacoma)(trg);
   1 Cannon (trg).
Corvettes: 2 Tattankesin (PFMM-16) with 8 Harpoon SSM, 8 Albatros/Aspide SAM.
FAC(G): 6: 3 Ratcharit (Breda BMB-230): 4 Exocet SSM; 3 Prabparapak (TNC-45): 5 GabrielSSM.
FAC: 3 Chonburi (Breda MV-400).
Patrol craft, large: 24: 6 Sattahip (PSMM-5), 5 Sarasin (PC-461), 10 T-11 (PGM-71), 3 T-81 (Cape);
   coastal: 37 incl 1 Hysucat 18 hydrofoil (trials); river: 40<.
MCMV: 2 Lurssen 48-m minehunters, 4 Ladya (US Bluebird) coastal, 5 boats, 1 spt ship.
Amph: LST: 5; LSM: 3; LSIL: 2; LCG: 1; LCU: 15; LCM: 26; LCA: 4; LCVP: 12.
Trg ships: 2: 1 Br Algerine, 1 Jap Maeklong.
Spt ships: 1 survey ship, 2 tpts, 1 tanker.
Msls: SSM: Harpoon, MM-38 Exocet, Gabriel; SAM: Seacat, Aspide.

NAVAL AIR: (900); some 25 combat ac.
MR/ASW: 1 sqn with 10 S-2F, 3 F-27 MPA.
MR/SAR: 1 sqn with 2 F-27-400, 2 C-47, 2CL-215,
MR/attack: 5 N-24A Searchmaster, 4 Cessna T-337.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 11 UH-1H/N, Bell 212.
Observation: 1 sqn with 6 U-17, 7 O-2.
Utility: 2 Bell 214 hel.

MARINES: (20,000).
2 regts: 6 inf regts, 1 arty regt (3 fd, 1 AA bns);
1 amph assault bn; recce bn
Equipment:
APC: 61 LVTP-7.
Arty: guns/how: 155mm: 18 GC-45.
ATK: TOW, Dragon.
(On order: 2 PFMM-16 corvettes, 2 Lurssen minesweepers, 6 PS-700 LST; 3 Bell 214 hel; 24 Spada (Aspide) SAM; Harpoon SSM; 10 MM-40 Exocet coast defence msls).

AIR FORCE: 48,000; 160 combat ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 9 F-5A, 5 -B, 4 RF-5A.
Ftr: 2 sqns with 30 F-5E, 6 -F.
COIN: 6 sqns:
   2 with 35 OV-10C;
   2 with 26 AU-23A;
   1 with 12 A-37B;
   1 with 6 AC-47D (armed), 20 N-22B Missionmaster.
Elint: 1 sqn with 3 IAI-201 Arava.
Tpt: 3 sqns:
   1 with 3 C-130H, 1 C-130H-30, 1 DC-8-62F.
   1 with 21 C-123B/K (20 tpt, 1 VIP), 6 HS-748 (4 tpt, 2 VIP).
   1 with 16 C-47 (DC-3), 1 Merlin IV.
Royal flight: 1 Boeing 737-200, 1 Merlin IV, 1 King Air 200 ac; 2 Bell 212 hel.
Misc: 1 survey flight with 2 King Air E-90, 1 Commander.
Trg: 1 sqn with 40 T-33A, 4 RT-33A. Units with 24 Airtourer, 12 SF-260, some 18 T-37B/C.
Liaison: 6 T-41, 30 O-1.
Hel: 2 sqns: 1 with 18 S-58T. 1 with 29 UH-1H.
Airfield defence troops: 4 bns; Blowpipe SAM.
(On order: 8 F-16A, 4 -B FGA, 8 F-5E ftr, 6 RC-47, 3 NC-212, 2 Merlin IVA, 6 HS-748, 1 C-130H-30 tpt, some 33 V-400, V-600 Fantrainer trg ac; 4 UH-60 Black Hawk hel; AIM-9P Sidewinder AAM; Blowpipe SAM.)

PARA-MILITARY:
Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 18,500 (Rangers): volunteer irregular force; 27 regts comprising 199 coys, 196 indep coys.
National Security Volunteer Corps 33,000.
Marine Police 1,700; 14 patrol craft.
Police Aviation 500; 5 Short (3 Skyvan, 1 Sherpa, 1 330-UTT), 8 PC-6, 2 DHC-4 Caribou, 1 Do-28, 2 Cessna 310, 1 Airtourer, 1 CT-4 Airtrainer ac;
   40 Bell (27 205, 13 206), 1 S-62, 6 HH-12, 1 KH-4 (Bell 47) hel.
Border Patrol Police 20,000.
Special Action Force 3,800.
Village Scouts.
National Defence Volunteers; 20 V-150 Commando APC, 1 Coastguard cutter.

OPPOSITION:
Communist Party of Malaysia: some 1,500. expatriate force linked to CPM (see Malaysia).
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT): e 600.
Thai People's Revolutionary Movement (TPRM; also known as Pak (or Phak) Mai (New Party) New Communist Party/Sayam Mai (New Siam): 1,500 claimed;
   active guerrillas ~100. Vietnam-backed Communist Party.
Patani United Liberation Organization (Islamic); Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) (National Revolution Party) (Islamic): both Islamic parties B 400.

* Excl funds allocated by Parliament for Armed Forces' Secret Fund.

   VIETNAM
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 1,260,000.
Terms of service. 3 years, specialists 4 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years.
Reserves (all services): 'Tactical Rear Force' (Reserves for Army and Para-Military) (semi-mobilized first-line quick reinforcement org) 500,000.
   Strategic Rear Force (=Reserves for Main Force and Regional Force) 2,500,000.

ARMY ('Self Defence Force'): 1,100,000.
14 Corps HQ.
65 inf divs (perhaps 28 cadre)t
10 armd bdes.
Special Operations Force incl AB bde, demolition engrs.
some 10 fd arty bdes.
8 engr divs.
10-16 economic construction divs; 14 indep engr bdes.ї
Equipment://
Tks: 1,600 T-34/-54/-55/-62, Type 59. lt: 450: PT-76, Type 62/63.
AFV: recce: 20 BRDM-1/-2. APC: 1,500 BTR-40/-50/-60/=-60/-152, BMP, Ch Type 63, Type 531, 1,200 M-113.
Arty: guns: 76mm: 600 incl SU-76; 85mm; 100mm: incl SU-100; 122mm: incl ISU-122; 130mm: 200.
   how: 105mm: M-101/102; 122mm; 152mm: 250; 155mm: M-114 (90 SP).
   MRL: 107mm: Type 63; 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14-16.
   Mor: 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 120mm, 160mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: Type-36; 75mm; 82mm; 88mm: Type-51; 90mm; 107mm. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.
AD: guns: 23mm: 3,000, incl ZSU-23-4 SP; 30mm; 37mm: incl Type-63 SP; 40mm; 57mm: incl ZSU-57-2 SP.
   SAM: SA-7.

NAVY:// 40,000 (incl naval inf).
Bases: Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Haiphong, Hanoi, Ha Tou, Ho Chi Minh City. Kampuchea: Kompong Som, Ream.
Frigates: 7:
   1 US Barnegat with 2 Styx SSM.
   5 Sov Petya II.
   1 US Savage.
FAC(G): 8 Sov Osa-II with Styx SSM;
FAC(T): 16 Shershen, (?5) Turya hydrofoil.
FAC (gun): 22: 8 Shanghai, 14 Swatow.
Patrol craft, large: 16: 6 SO-1, 10 US PGM-59/-71; coastal: 10: 6 Zhuk, 2 PO-2, 2 Poluchat.
MCMV: 1 Yurka coastal, 1 Yevgenya inshore<, 10 K-8 boats<.
Amph: LST: 6: 3 US 510-1152, 3 Sov Polnocny; LCM: 20; LCU/LCVP: ?12.
Misc spt: some 1,000 junks and smaller craft could provide tpt and log spt.

NAVAL INFANTRY (27,000) (amph, cdo).

AIR FORCE: 20,000; some 270 combat ac, 36 armed hel (plus many in store).//
4 Air Divs.
FGA: 2 regts:
   1 (3 sqns) with 30+ MiG-23.
   1 (3 sqns) with 40 Su-20/-22.
Ftrs: 4 regts with 200 MiG-21bis/F/PF.
Tpt: 3 regts: some 135 ac incl 20 An-2, 9 An-24, An-12, 50 An-26, 2 An-30, 6 Tu-134, 11 Yak-40, 7 I1-14, 2 I1-18, 2 Boeing 707, some Cessna U-17.
Hel: 1 div (3 regts) with 200 hel incl 15 Mi-6, 36 Mi-8, 30 Mi-24, 17 Ka-25.
Trg: 3 regts with 70 ac incl MiG-21, Aero L-29, L-39 ac; Mi-8, Mi-24 hel.
AAM: AA-2 Atoll.

AIR DEFENCE FORCE: 100,000.
14 AD divs:
   SAM regts: some 66 sites with SA-2/-3;
   AA arty: ?4 bdes: 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm, 130mm; plus People's Regional Force: ~1,000 units.
   6 radar bdes: 10,000; 100 sites.

Forces Abroad (numbers fluctuate):
Laos 50,000 (4 inf divs and spt tps).
Kampuchea 140,000 (2 Front HQ, 10 army divs, + spt tps, naval base).

PARA-MILITARY:
Border Defence Forces 60,000.
People's Regional Force (militia) 500,000; 1 regt HQ at each provincial capital, local inf coys, small arms. Some Northern regts org in divs. Some AA eqpt.
People's Self Defence Force: e 1,000,000; two components: Urban; Rural (People's militia): local coy-sized units in towns, some mobile police support.
   Small arms.
Ministry of Interior: Armed Public Security Force e 60,000.

OPPOSITION: ~25,000 incl:
United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Races (FULRO; montagnards; Cambodian border) ~2,500.
National Salvation Movement.
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (remnants; Hoa Had).

* Incl some $2.3 bn owed to socialist countries.
t Soviet economic and military aid estimated at over $1.0 bn p. a. for 1984 and 1985.
f Incl forces abroad. Inf div strengths vary by geographic location, composition and role from 5,000 to 12,500; 9,000 is 'average'.
ї Men beyond normal military age; unit strength about 4,000 each, fully armed, with military and economic role; most in northern Vietnam.
// Much US, some Soviet eqpt probably inoperable.

Caribbean and Latin America


   Regional Military Developments
   The conflict in Central America continues to dominate reportage from this area. Most attention is focused on Nicaragua, and, although specific numbers differ, sources generally agree that there has been an increase in the Army strength of some 7% to 77,000, reflected in an increase in the overall force manpower figures. Equipment deliveries have included some 40 T-54/-55 tanks, additional armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft artillery and perhaps the SA-14 Gremlin man-portable SAM. The Air Force manpower has also increased by a significant 70% from 2,000 to some 3,400. The equipment inventory includes an additional 16 Mi-8/-17 assault, and perhaps one or two Mi-24/-25 attack, helicopters. Most of the fixedwing combat aircraft inventory, however, is thought to be non-operational. Among Nicaragua's neighbours, Costa Rica appears to have completed its force reorganization, from which a single Northern Border Security battalion has emerged; there is no indication of significant changes in strength or equipment inventories. Honduras appears to have reduced its army by some 14% to 14,600, which, considering its force structure, will inevitably result in serious undermanning of some units.
   Elsewhere in the region, with seven exceptions, most force manpower totals show increases. Most of these increases are below 10% - the majority, indeed, in the area of 6% - and predominantly relate to Army totals. Brazil's army, for example, is up some 12,300 (a 9% increase); Cuba 11.5% to 14,500; Guatemala 25% to 8,200. Last year we included the Police and Immigration Services in the total for Panama. Data this year enables us to separate them from the National Guard; there is an overall increase of 2,000 but the proportion assigned to each cannot be determined. Those whose forces show a decrease are Chile (4,000, Navy); Ecuador (an overall decrease of 6,000, although both the Army and Air Force show slight increases); Mexico (5,000, Navy); Peru (14,000: Army 10,000, Air Force 4,000); Uruguay (4,800, Army, Navy); Venezuela (2,000, National Guard). Given the economic situation in the region as a whole, we are surprised at the number of nations whose forces show manpower gains, and it is not clear whether all these reflect actual changes rather than improved accuracy of reporting. However, that for Brazil is clearly linked to a planned increase in the number of infantry brigades. Peru, on the other hand, has halved the number of armoured divisions and disbanded one infantry division, thus accounting for its cuts.
   Equipment inventory changes are for the most part relatively minor, and in most instances no change is reported. In Argentina, domestic production of the TAM tank has resulted in deliveries of some 200, bringing the total in service to 350; there is also some indication of modernization of field artillery and anti-tank weapons. Chile is upgrading its tanks and appears to have approximately doubled the numbers operational; the light tank inventory is halved but the EE-9 Cascavelreconnaissance vehicle total has doubled, and there has been a 60% increase in armoured personnel carriers.
   In addition to the organizational changes reported for Brazil and Peru, we note further data on Brazil's planned new army aviation, although that component is not yet operational. Chile's reorganization continues, and we note the creation of an all-arms brigade from an armoured regiment, the addition of seven armoured cavalry regiments, and changes in the infantry structure. Colombia has reduced its infantry brigade total by one, yet intends to form two others; it is possible an earlier identification was in error. We have attempted this year to evaluate the state of readiness of the Cuban Army; the disparity between strength and number of units might perhaps be closer to clarification in consequence.
   The regional navies show little real change. Argentina has received its third Meko corvette and less is heard of attempts to sell vessels under construction. Brazil still has not replaced its Guppy-class submarines. Chile now has its third ex-British County-class destroyer.
   Air Forces, also, show little change. The apparent increase in Brazil's inventory of EMB- 326 Xavante, to 98 from 75, reflects a counting error in last year's volume. Chile's F-5 inventory shows an increase of five. The Dominican Republic is now believed to have only 1A-37. It is not clear whether the other seven held last year have retired or are merely non-operational.
   Treaties and Agreements
   During the past 12 months we have noted no significant change in details concerning continental and regional treaties and agreements from those described in The Military Balance 1986-1987,pp. 174-5.
   Economic Factors
   The region had a good year in 1986 with GDP expanding by about 3.8%. This was largely due to good performances by oil-importing countries benefiting from falling oil prices (e.g. Brazil 8% and Peru 6.6%) outweighing the negative effect on oil exporters like Mexico (-4.0%, Ecuador (1.5%) and Venezuela (3.1 %). In fact, the latter two produced better economic results than had been anticipated. Central American countries performed worse than average, with Nicaragua's economy showing the worst economic performance, mainly due to the continuing Contra war.
   Most of the larger countries succeeded in reducing or holding inflation levels, and Bolivia reduced inflation from 11,980% in 1985 to 276% in 1986. Amongst other countries registering substantial reductions in their inflation rates were Brazil, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Colombia; Venezuela's rate was virtually unchanged at around 15%. However, Mexico notably failed to stem inflation, which rose from 57.8% in 1985 to 86.2% in 1986.
   The debt problem continues to cloud the economic horizon. Although interest rates fell in 1986, saving the region some $5 billion, this benefit was wiped off by the fall in the price of developing countries' commodity exports: 12%in 1985 and an estimated 4% in 1986. Rising protectionism in the industrialized countries adversely affected exports, which in turn had a negative effect on investment. Above all, it was the continued flow of funds from the region in the form of interest repayments, not replaced by new money, that undermined a sustainable recovery, since it resulted in little or no new funding becoming available for investment.
   'Debt for equity' swaps (i.e., foreign-currency-denominated debt being exchanged by the creditor for local currency of the country in question to invest in that country) might go a small way to generate some investment; however, it is argued that such arrangements carry penalties which could outweigh any advantages, and that in any case they must be limited to small percentages of the gross debt if they are not to have inflationary effects. Many renegotiation packages have emerged which demonstrate the resourcefulness and imagination of the region's central bankers and willingness, by and large, to meet debt obligations. In 1987 the largest creditor banks showed a new realism by increasing their reserve provisions, reflecting their belief that some of the debt will not be collected.
   The general trend towards keeping defence expenditure below the high levels of the late 1970s and early 1980s continues, partly dictated by the economic situation and partly due to the failing political fortunes of the military. Exceptions are Brazil, with its ambitious modernization programme, and the Central American states fighting domestic insurgency.
   The level of military aid, mainly from the US, declined in 1986 due to Congressional cuts. Nevertheless, El Salvador received military aid of $120.4 million in FY 1986 and is estimated to receive some $122.5 million in FY 1987 (more than the Philippines); Honduran figures for the same periods are $60.1 million and $77.5 million (equating to those for Portugal).

Карибский бассейн и Латинская Америка


   Региональные Военные События
   Конфликт в Центральной Америке продолжает доминировать в репортажах из этой области. Основное внимание уделяется Никарагуа, и, хотя конкретные цифры различаются, источники в целом согласны с тем, что численность армии увеличилась примерно на 7% до 77 000 человек, что отражается в увеличении общей численности личного состава сил. Поставки оборудования включали в себя около 40 танков Т-54/-55, дополнительные бронетранспортеры, зенитную артиллерию и, возможно, ПЗРК SA-14 Gremlin. Численность ВВС также увеличилась на 70% - с 2000 до 3400 человек. В инвентарный список входят еще 16 штурмовых вертолетов Ми-8/-17 и, возможно, один или два штурмовых вертолета Ми-24/-25. Однако большая часть боевых самолетов считается неработоспособной. Что касается соседних с Никарагуа стран, то Коста-Рика, как представляется, завершила реорганизацию своих сил, в результате которой был сформирован единый батальон охраны северной границы; нет никаких признаков значительных изменений в численности или инвентарных запасах техники. Гондурас, как представляется, сократил свою армию примерно на 14% до 14 600 человек, что, учитывая структуру его сил, неизбежно приведет к серьезному сокращению численности некоторых подразделений.
   В других частях региона, за семью исключениями, численность личного состава сил в большинстве случаев увеличивается. Большинство из этих повышений ниже 10% - большинство, действительно, в районе 6% - и в основном относятся к общим армейским показателям. Например, армия Бразилии увеличилась примерно на 12 300 человек (увеличение на 9%); Кубы - на 11,5% до 14 500 человек; Гватемалы - на 25% до 8200 человек. В прошлом году мы включили полицию и иммиграционные службы в общую сумму для Панамы. Данные за этот год позволяют нам отделить их от Национальной гвардии; общее увеличение на 2000 человек, но доля каждого из них не может быть определена. Те, чьи силы показывают уменьшение Чили (4,000, темно-синий); Эквадор (сокращение от 6000, хотя и армия, и ВВС покажут небольшой рост); Мексика (5,000, темно-синий); Перу (14,000: 10,000 армии, ВВС 4,000); Уругвай (4,800, Армия, Флот); Венесуэла (2,000, Национальной гвардии). Учитывая экономическую ситуацию в регионе в целом, мы удивлены числом стран, силы которых демонстрируют прирост рабочей силы, и неясно, отражают ли все это фактические изменения, а не повышение точности отчетности. Однако для Бразилии это явно связано с планируемым увеличением численности пехотных бригад. С другой стороны, Перу сократило вдвое число бронетанковых дивизий и расформировало одну пехотную дивизию, что привело к ее сокращению.
   Изменения в запасах вооружения по большей части относительно незначительны, и в большинстве случаев об изменениях не сообщается. В Аргентине в результате внутреннего производства танка ТАМ было поставлено около 200 единиц, в результате чего общее число находящихся в эксплуатации танков достигло 350; имеются также некоторые признаки модернизации полевой артиллерии и противотанкового оружия. Чили модернизирует свои танки и, как представляется, примерно вдвое увеличила их число; запасы легких танков сократились вдвое, но общий объем разведывательных машин EE-9 увеличился вдвое, а количество бронетранспортеров увеличилось на 60%.
   В дополнение к организационным изменениям, о которых сообщалось в Бразилии и Перу, мы отмечаем дополнительные данные о планируемой новой армейской авиации Бразилии, хотя этот компонент еще не функционирует. Реорганизация Чили продолжается, и мы отмечаем создание из бронетанкового полка общевойсковой бригады, добавление семи бронетанковых кавалерийских полков и изменения в структуре пехоты. Колумбия сократила численность своей пехотной бригады на одну, но намерена сформировать еще две; возможно, более ранняя идентификация была ошибочной. В этом году мы предприняли попытку оценить состояние готовности кубинской армии; в результате этого, возможно, будет ближе к прояснению несоответствие между численностью и численностью подразделений.
   Региональные флоты мало что меняют. Аргентина получила свой третий корвет Meko, и слышно о попытках продать строящиеся суда. Бразилия до сих пор не заменила свои подводные лодки типа Guppy. В Чили появился третий бывший британский эсминец типа County.
   Военно-воздушные силы также мало изменились. Очевидное увеличение числа бразильских EMB-326 Xavante до 98 с 75 отражает ошибку подсчета в прошлогоднем объеме. Число F-5 в Чили увеличились на пять. В настоящее время считается, что Доминиканская Республика имеет только 1 A-37. Неясно, выведены ли остальные семь заключенных в прошлом году или просто не работают.
   Договоры и соглашения
   В течение последних 12 месяцев мы не отметили каких-либо существенных изменений в деталях, касающихся континентальных и региональных договоров и соглашений, по сравнению с теми, которые описаны в военном балансе 1986-1987 годов, стр.174-5.
   Экономические факторы
   В 1986 году в регионе был хороший год с ростом ВВП примерно на 3,8%. Это было в значительной степени обусловлено хорошими показателями стран-импортеров нефти, получающих выгоду от падения цен на нефть (например, Бразилия 8% и Перу 6,6%), перевешивающими негативное влияние на экспортеров нефти, таких как Мексика (-4,0%, Эквадор (1,5%) и Венесуэла (3,1 %). На самом деле, последние два дали лучшие экономические результаты, чем ожидалось. В центральноамериканских странах показатели были хуже, чем в среднем, при этом экономика Никарагуа демонстрировала худшие экономические показатели, главным образом из-за продолжающейся контрреволюции.
   Большинству крупных стран удалось снизить или сдержать уровень инфляции, а Боливия сократила инфляцию с 11 980% в 1985 году до 276% в 1986 году. Среди других стран, в которых произошло существенное снижение темпов инфляции, были Бразилия, Перу, Аргентина, Чили, Эквадор и Колумбия; уровень инфляции в Венесуэле практически не изменился и составил около 15%. Однако Мексика не смогла остановить инфляцию, которая выросла с 57,8% в 1985 году до 86,2% в 1986 году.
   Долговая проблема продолжает омрачать экономический горизонт. Хотя процентные ставки снизились в 1986 году, сэкономив региону около 5 млрд. долл.США, эта выгода была сведена на нет падением цен на сырьевой экспорт развивающихся стран: 12% в 1985 году и, по оценкам, 4% в 1986 году. Рост протекционизма в промышленно развитых странах негативно сказывается на экспорте, что, в свою очередь, негативно сказывается на инвестициях. Прежде всего, устойчивый процесс восстановления подрывается продолжающимся притоком средств из региона в форме выплаты процентов, а не заменой их новыми деньгами, поскольку это приводит к тому, что новые средства для инвестиций практически не выделяются или вообще не выделяются.
   Обмен долга, деноминированного в иностранной валюте, кредитором на местную валюту соответствующей страны для инвестирования в эту страну) может пойти небольшим путем для генерирования некоторых инвестиций; однако утверждается, что такие механизмы предусматривают штрафы, которые могут перевешивать любые преимущества, и что в любом случае они должны быть ограничены небольшими процентами валового долга, если они не имеют инфляционных последствий. Появилось много пакетов переговоров о пересмотре, которые демонстрируют изобретательность и воображение центральных банков региона и готовность, в целом, выполнять долговые обязательства. В 1987 году крупнейшие банки-кредиторы продемонстрировали новый реализм, увеличив свои резервные резервы, что отражает их убежденность в том, что часть долга не будет взыскана.
   Общая тенденция к удержанию расходов на оборону ниже высоких уровней конца 70-х и начала 80-х годов сохраняется, что отчасти продиктовано экономическим положением, а отчасти-политической неудачей военных. Исключение составляют Бразилия с ее амбициозной программой модернизации и Центральноамериканские государства, борющиеся с внутренним мятежом.
   Уровень военной помощи, в основном из США, снизился в 1986 году из-за сокращения Конгресса. Тем не менее Сальвадор получил военную помощь в размере $120,4 млн. в 1986 финансовом году и, по оценкам, получит около $122,5 млн. в 1987 финансовом году (больше, чем Филиппины); гондурасские показатели за те же периоды составляют $60,1 млн. и $77,5 млн.

   ARGENTINA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 78,000 (~30,000 conscripts).
Terms of Service:Army 6-12 months, Air Force 1 year, Navy 14 months; some conscripts may serve less.
Reserves: 377,000: Army 250,000 (National Guard 200,000, Territorial Guard 50,000), Navy 77,000, Air 50,000.

ARMY: 45,000 (?25,000 conscripts).
HQ: 4 army corps, 5 Military Region.
(Many units cadre status only.)
2 armd cav bdes (each 2 armd cav, 1 tk regts, 1 arty bn).
3 mech inf bdes (each 3 regts of 1 bn, plus armd cav sqn, arty bn, engr coy).
2 mountain inf bdes (each 3 inf, 1 arty bns, 1 engr coy, 1 recce det).
1 jungle bde (3 lt inf, 1 arty (how) bns).
1 AB bde (3 AB bns, 1 arty gp, 1 trg regt).
15 arty bns (11 with bdes).
Presidential Guard: 1 mech inf regt, 1 mech cav bn (ceremonial),
5 AD bns (to be 4).
1 indep engr gp (regt), 5 indep engr bns (to be 3).
5 log bns.
1 aviation bn (5 dets), 1 spt coy.
Equipment:
Tks: 450: 100 M-4 Sherman, 350 TAM. lt: 60 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: Panhard ERC-90. MICV: 300 AMX-VTP, some 150 TAM VCTP.
APC: 295: 85 M-3 half-track, 125 M-113, 80 MOWAG Grenadier (mod Roland), 5 BDX.
Arty: guns: 155mm: 50 M-59 towed.
   how: 105mm: 100 incl M-101 and M-56 pack; 155mm: 168: 70 M-114 towed, 24 Mk F3, 68 CITEFA Models 77/-81, 6 M-109 SP.
   MRL: 105mm: SALM-Pampera; 127mm: SAPBA-1.
   Mor: 81mm: 200; 120mm: 120 (some SP in VCTM MICV).
ATK: guns: 105mm: 140 KuerassierSP. RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 105mm; RL: 89mm M-65. ATGW: SS-11/-12, Cobra, Mathogo, Mamba.
AD: guns: 20mm: Rh 202 twin HSS-669; 30mm: HS-83/4; 35mm: K-63; 40mm: L-60, L-70; 90mm: 50 M-117.
   SAM: Tigercat, Blowpipe, Roland, SAM-7.
Avn: ac: 3 G-222, 3 DHC-6, 5Turbo-Commander 690A, 3 Turbo-Porter, 4 Merlin IIIA, 2 Queen Air, 1 Sabreliner,
   48 Cessna (15 182, 20 U-17A/B, 7 207, 1 Citation, 5 T-41).
   hel: 9 A-109, 29 Bell (7 206, 18 UH-1H, 4 212), 6 FH-1100, 2 CH-47C Chinook, 6 SA-315B Lama, 14 SA-330 Puma, 12 AS-332B Super Puma.
(On order: 158 Kuerassier SP ATK; 9 A-109 hel.)

NAVY: 20,000 incl naval air force and marines (incl 2,000 conscripts).
3 Naval Areas (North, Centre, South):
Bases: Buenos Aires, Rio Santiago (HQ North), Puerto Belgrano (HQ Centre), Mar del Plata (HQ: subs), Ushuaia (HQ South).
Subs: 4: 2 Salta (Type 1200);
Carrier: 1: capacity 18 ac and hel, complement: ac: 4 Super Etendard, 4 A-4, 3 S-2; hel: 3 SH-3D/H, 1 S-61D.
Destroyers: 6 with Exocet SSM:
   4 Meko 360H-2 with 2x4 MM-40, 1x8 Aspide, 2 AB-212 hel;
   2 Type 42 (for sale; unserviceable) with 4 MM-38, 1 twin Sea Dart SAM, 1 hel.
Corvettes: 6 with Exocet SSM:
   3 Espora (Meko 140) with 4 MM-40, 1 hel;
   3 Fr A-69 with 4 MM-38.
Patrol ships: 5: 2 US Cherokee, 2 King (1 trg), 1 Sotoyomo.
Patrol craft, large: 1 Surubi( (to retire).
FAC: 2 TNC-45.
FAC(P): 4 Dabur coastal<.
MCMV coastal: 6 Br Ton minesweepers/hunters (in reserve).
Amph: 1 LST. 4 LCM<. Some 8 LCVP<.
Spt: tpt: 5: 3 Costa Sur, 2 Polar.
Msls: SSM: MM-38, MM-40 Exocet; SAM: Sea Dart, multi-role Aspide.
Coast Defence: some 10 arty batteries: 87mm: 12 M-1898, 155mm: 16 M-3, 280mm: 12 (?deactivated).
(On order: 2 TR-1700 subs, 3 Espora corvettes)

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000); 33 combat ac, 13 armed hel.
Attack: 2 sqns: 1 with 7 A-4Q Skyhawk, 1 with 14 Super Etendard.
MR/ASW: 2 sqns: 1 with 8 S-2E Tracker, 1 with 4 L-188 Electra.
Hel: 2 sqns: 1 ASW with 5 ASH-3H; 1 with 8 A-103 (SA-316 Alouette III).
Tpt: 2 sqns with 7 Super King Air B-200, 3 L-188A Electro, 1 HS-125, 3 Fokker F-28/3000 ac; 4 A-109 hel.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 5 Queen Air B-80, 3 Pilatus PC-6 (Antarctic fit).
Trg: 2 sqns: 9 EMB-326GB Xavante; 12 MB-339A; 11 Beech T-34C.
(Store: ac: 1 C-45, 5 MB-339A, 12 T-28; hel: 6 Hughes 500.)
ASM: 20 Exocet AM-39E/H, ASM-2 Martin Pescador (Kingfisher).
(On order: 12 A-4 attack ac, 4 AS-61 hel.)

MARINES: (4,000; to increase to ?6,000) (~2,000 conscripts).
Fleet Forces: 2: each 2 bns, 1 amph recce gp, 1 fd arty bn, 1 hy mor, 1 ATK, 1 engr coys.
Amph spt force: 1 marine inf bn.
1 AA regt.
1 sigs bn.
1 serviceAog bn.
1 indep inf bn.
6 indep inf (security) coys.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 12 Panhard ERC-90 Lynx.
APC: 79: 15 LVT-3/-4,19 LVTP-7,15 LARC-5, 6 MOWAG Roland, 24 Panhard VCR/TT.
Arty: how: 105mm: 40 M-56. Mor: 81mm, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 75mm, 90mm, 105mm: M-1968. ATGW: 20 Bantam.
AD: guns: 20mm, 30mm, 35mm: K-63. SAM: 7 Tigercat, Blowpipe.

AIR FORCE: 13,000 (3,000 conscripts); 143 combat ac, 18 armed hel (more could be armed).
10 air bdes; 10 ADbtys; Special Forces (AB) coy.
Air Operations Command (10 bdes):
FGA/interceptor: 4 sqns:
   2 (1 OCU) with 14 Mirage IIIEA, 19 IIICJ;
   2 with 9 Mirage 5P, 30 Dagger (Nesher).
Bbr: 1 sqn with 5 Canberra B-62, 2 T-64.
FGA: 3 sqns with 24 A-4P Skyhawk.
COIN: 4 sqns:
   2 ac with 40 IA-58A Pucara;
   2 hel with 12 Hughes 500M, 6 Bell UH-1H.
SAR: 1 sqn with 4 AS-315 Lama.
Tpt: 5 sqns with: ac: 6 Boeing 707, 8 C-130E/H, KC-130H, 3 Learjet 35A, 4 C-47 (DC-3), 18 Fokker (13 F-27, 5 F-28), 5 DHC-6 Twin Otter,
   20 IA-50 Guarani II, 2 Merlin IVA.
Antarctic: 1 sqn with: ac: 1 DHC-6, 1 LC-47; hel: 2 S-61R/NR, 2 CH-47C Chinook (SAR); 11 Bell (4 UH-1D, 1 47G, 6 212).
Comms: 1 sqn with 1 Sabreliner, 6 Aero Commander.
Air Training Command: 34 MS-760 Paris, 35 Beech T-34C, 10 EMB-312 Tucano (to replace T-34).
Msls: AAM: R-530, R-550. ASM: AS-11/-12, ASM-2 Martin Pescador.
(Store: 37 A-4P FGA, 70 IA-58 Pucara COIN).
(On order: 1 Boeing 707-131 ELINT ac, some 12 IA-63 Pampa, 20 EMB-312 Tucano (being delivered) trg ac.)

PARA-MILITARY (Ministry of Defence): 27,000.
Gendarmerie (mainly frontier duties) (18,000): 3 Regional HQ; org in groups (agrupaciones), sqns, 'gps' (platoons), sections.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: Shorland (RAM V-2 to replace).
APC: 40 M-113.
Avn: ac: 22 It. hel: 3.
Prefectura Naval (coastguard) (9,000);
Patrol ship: 1 Delfin.
Patrol craft: large: 12: 3 Lynch, 3 Dorado, 1 Tonina, 5 Halcdn with 1 hel (1 more on order); coastal<: 17; small<: 31.
Avn: ac: 5 Short Skyvan 3M-200; hel: 6 Hughes 500M Defender, 3 SA-330 Puma, 2 AS-332 Super Puma.
Ministry for Justice: Police Task Force for Constitutional Order (CEPOC; 1,100); anti-terrorism.

* Excl security police budget of A771 m.

   BAHAMAS
   []

TOTAL SECURITY FORCE (Para-Military):
Active: 496.
Terms of Service: voluntary.
Coastguard: 496.
Base: Coral Harbour, New Providence Island.
Patrol: 16: 3 Fairey Protector (Port Nelson) 100-ton, 1 103-ft (109-ton), 5 Vosper Thornycroft 60-ft (30-ton), 4 Phoenix 29-ft (8-ton) armed.
Supply/spt: 2: 1 148-ft, 1 94-ft vessels.

* Incl Police allocation.

   BELIZE
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 600.
Terms of Service: voluntary.
Reserves (militia): ~300.

ARMY: 545.
1 inf bn (three Active, three Reserve coys).
Equipment:
Mor: 81mm: 6.
  
MARITIME WING: 40.
Patrol boats: 2 Souter 20-m.

AIR WING: 15.
MR/tpt: 2 BN-2B Defender.

   BOLIVIA
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 27,600 (some 19,000 conscripts).
Terms of Service: 12 months, selective.

ARMY: 20,000 (some 15,000 conscripts).
HQ: 7 Military Regions.
Army HQ direct control:
   2 armd 'regts' (bns).
   1 mech cav regt.
   1 Presidential Guard inf regt.
   1 Military Police bn.
   1 sigs coy.
10 divs; org, composition varies; comprise:
   6 cav regts (5 horsed, 1 mot).
   4 mot inf regts, each with 2 bns.
   11 inf regts (1 mountain), each with 2 bns.
   4 arty 'regts' (bns).
   1 ranger regt.
   1 para regt.
   7 engr bns.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 24 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 30 M-113, 15 V-100 Commando, 24 MOWAG Roland, 24 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: guns: 75mm: 26. how: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack; 105mm: 6 M-101. Mor: 60mm; 81mm: 45.
ATK: guns: 105mm: 36 JPz-SK Kuerassier SP. RCL: 106mm.

NAVY: 3,600 (incl 1,000 marines) (perhaps 1,800 conscripts).
5 Naval Districts; each 1 Flotilla.
Bases: Riberalta (HQ), Tiquina (HQ), Puerto Busch, Puerto Guayaramorin (HQ), Puerto Villaroel, Guayaquil (HQ), Puerto Suarez (HQ).
Patrol craft: 7 52-ton, 1 27-ton river, 24 small; gunboat: 1 66-ft with 20mm AA gun.
Spt: 2 ex-US PBR II (clinic) launches, 2 hospital vessels, 1 cargo tpt.
Ac: 1 Cessna 206G.
Marines: 1 bn (600; coy+ in each District).

AIR FORCE: 4,000; 48 combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftr/trg: 1 sqn with 10 T-33A, 18 T-33N, 5 F-86F (?3 operational).
COIN: 5 AT-6G, 12 PC-7.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 SA-315B Gaviao (Lama).
Tpt: 1 sqn with (1 Electra, 1 L-100-30, 1 C-130H), 1 Sabreliner, 2 Learjet, 2 IAI-201 Arava, 3 Convair CV-580, 8 C-47,
   1 King Air, 4 Fokker F-27, 2 U-3A (Cessna 310).
Utility: ac: incl 1 Turbo-Porter,27 Cessna (3 172K, 3 Turbo-Centurion,8 185/U-17A, 9 206C/G, 2 414,2 421). hel: 7 UH-1H, 2 Bell 205.
Trg ac: incl 2 T-41D, 18 T-23 Uirapuru, 3 SIAI SF-260M, 12 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer.
1 airbase defence regt (Oerlikon twin 20mm, some track-mounted guns).

PARA-MILITARY: Carabineros: some 19,000.

* A new currency unit, the Boliviano, was introduced on 1 January 1987 at a rate of 1 Boliviano = 1,000,000 Bolivian pesos.

   BRAZIL
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 295,700 (145,200 conscripts).
Terms of Service. 12 months (can be extended by 6 months).
Reserves: Trained first-line 1,115,000; 400,000 subject to immediate recall. Second-line (limited trg) 225,000; state military police schools, centres.
   Para-Military (q.v.) 243,000.

ARMY: 197,000 (to be 296,000); (143,000 conscripts).
HQ: 7 Military Comd, 12 Military Region;
   8 div (3 with Region HQ).
   1 armd cav bde.
   3 armd inf bdes.
   4 mech cav bdes, 3 regts.
   12 motor inf bdes.
   2 'jungle' bdes (7 bns).
   1 mountain bde.
   1 frontier bde.
1 AB bde (3 AB, 1 Special Forces bns).
2 coast and AD arty bdes.
3 cav guard regts.
27 arty gps (4 SP, 6 med, 17 fd).
2 engr gps each 4 bns; 10 bns (incl 2 railway) (to be increased to 34 bns).
Equipment:
Tks: lt: some 440: some 150 M-3, some 80 X-1A, 30 X-1A2 (M-3 mod); 180 M-41B.
AFV: recce: 160 EE-9 Cascavel, 30 M-8. APC: 150 EE-11 Urutu, 20 M-59, ?600 M-113.
Arty: guns: some 240 57mm to 12-in. (304.8mm) coast incl 26 Mk 5 6-in. (152mm).
   how: 105mm: 480 incl some 60 M-7/-108 SP; 155mm: 150 M-114 towed.
   MRL: 108mm: SS-06; 180mm: SS-40; 300mm: SS-60 incl SP.
Mor: 81mm, 4.2-in. (107mm), 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: 240 M-18A1; 75mm: 20; 108mm, 106mm. RL: 3.5-in. (89mm). ATGW: 300 Cobra.
AD: guns: 12.7mm: M-55 quad; 35mm: 30; 40mm: 60; 57mm: some 180; 90mm: M-1A1.
   SAM: 4 Roland II, BOFI AD system (40mm L/70 gun with RBS-70 SAM) reported.
Avn: Army Air Arm to be formed, to comprise 14 units, 146 hel.
(On order: GH N-45 155mm gun/how (some to be SP), SS-60 (FGT-X40) 300mm MRL, TOW ATGW, 40mm L/70 BOFI AD system, M-55 mod quad 12.7mm.)

NAVY: 48,000 (2,200 conscripts) incl naval air and marines.
6 Naval Districts: 1 Comd.
Bases: ocean: Rio de Janeiro, Aratu (Salvador, Bahia) Val de Caes (Belem, Para"), Rio Grande (do Sul), Natal (Rio Grande do Norte);
   river: Ladario (Mato Grosso), Manaus (Amazonas).
Subs: 7: 3 Humaita (Oberon class); 4 US Guppy II/III (to be replaced).
Carrier: 1: 19,900-ton ASW - capacity 20 ac: typically 7-8 S-2E ASW ac; 8 SH-3D/SH-3H Sea King hel.
Destroyers: 10:
   5 Sumner (1 with 1x4 Seacat SAM, 4 with 1 Wasp hel);
   2 Gearing with ASROC ASW, 1 Wasp hel;
   3 Fletcher.
Frigates: 6 Niteroi, all with 2x3 Seacat SAM, 1 Lynx hel: 2 GP with 2x2 MM-38; 4 ASW with Ikara (to get 4 MM-38).
Corvettes: 9 Imperial Marinheiro.
River ships: 6:
   patrol: 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira, 3 Roraima;
   monitor: 1 with 1 x 3-in. (76mm), 2x47mm, 2x40mm, 6x20mm guns.
   Patrol craft large: 6 Piratini (US PGM-95).
MCMV: 6 Aratu (Schutze-type) minesweepers.
Amph: LST: 2 US; LCU: 3 US 1610; LCVP: 28<.
Spt: 7 trg ships (3<); 1 fleet spt, 2 river tankers; 25 tpts (2 12,000-ton, 4 7,300-ton, 17 harbour, 2 river), 1 repair, 1 sub rescue ship;
   8 survey ships (2 oceanographic), 6 survey launches; 5 ocean, 19 coastal tugs; 2 hospital ships.
Msls: SSM: MM-38 Exocet; ASW:ASROC, Ikara;. SAM: Seacat.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (700);
16 armed hel.
ASW: 2 hel sqns with 4 SH-3D, 4 ASH-3H Sea King, 8 WG-13 Sea Lynx.
Utility: 1 hel sqn with 8 Wasp, 12 AS-350B Esquilo (Ecureuil).
Trg: 1 hel sqn with 16 Jetranger II (to be replaced with Jetranger III).

MARINES: (15,000).
Fleet Force: 1 amph div (1 comd, 3 inf, 1 Toneleros special operations bns, 1 arty gp (2 fd, 1 AD btys), 1 service bn).
Reinforcement Comd: 5 bns incl 1 engr, supply.
Internal Security Force: 6 regional, 1 special ops gps.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 6 EE-9 Mk IV Cascavel.
APC: 16 M-113, 6 EE-11 Urutu, 12 LVTP-7A1.
Arty: how: 105mm: 8 M-102, 155mm: 8 M-114. MRL: 108mm: SS-06. Mor: 81mm: M-29.
ATK: RL: 3.5-in. (89mm): M-20. RCL: 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 40mm: 8 M-1 towed.
(On order 2 Tupi (Type 1400) subs, 4 V-28 frigates, 2 river patrol ships, 1 gunboat, 2 log spt ships; 12 Exocet AM-39 SSM; Sea Skua ASM; 60 Tigerfish torpedoes; 6 AS-332M Super Puma, 11 AS-355F Ecureuil hel.)

AIR FORCE: 50,700; 195 combat ac, some armed hel.
AD Command: 1 Gp (17 combat ac):
Interceptors: 2 sqns with 15 F-103E (Mirage IIIEBR), 2 F-103D (Mirage IIIDBR).
Tactical Command: 10 Gps (153 combat ac).
FGA: 3 sqns with 31 F-5E, 4 F-5B.
COIN: 3 sqns with 98 AT-26 (EMB-326) Xavante.
Recce: 2 sqns with 8 RC-95 Bandeirante, 12 RY-26 Xavante.
Spt/observation/liaison: 6 sqns: 1 ac with 7 T-25A Universal (to be replaced with 8 T-27 Tucano);
   5 hel with 5 SA-330 Puma (to be replaced), 30 UH-1H, OH-13.
All sqns with some EMB-810 (Piper Seneca II) for liaison.
Maritime Command: 4 Gps (25 combat ac).
ASW (afloat): 1 sqn with 8 S-2E Tracker, 7 S-2A (trg).
MR/SAR: 4 sqns with: ac: 3 RC-130E Hercules, 14 EMB-110B Bandeirante (C-95), 10 EMB-111 Maritime Bandeirante (P-95); hel: UH-1H armed.
Transport Command: 6 Gps (6 sqns), 7 regional indep sqns:
Hy: 2 sqns: 1 with 7 C-130E/H Hercules; 1 with 2 KC-130H, 1 KC-137 (Boeing 707) tkr/tpt.
Med/lt: 2 sqns: 1 with 12 C-91 (HS-748); 1 with 23 C-95A/B (EMB-110 Bandeirante).
Tac: 1 sqn with 20 C-115 (DHC-5 Buffalo).
VIP: 1 sqn with 2 VC-96 (Boeing 737), 1 VC-91 (Vickers Viscount), 11 VC/VU-93 (HS-125, to be withdrawn), VU-9 (EMB-121 Xingu),
   2 VC-97 (EMB-120 Brasilia).
Indep sqns: 7 with 7 C-115, 68 C-95A/B, VU-9.
Training Command:
Ac: 117 T-27 Tucano, 44 AT-26, some EMB-110, 4 C-42/U-42.
Hel: 18 Bell (2-206, 16-47).
Calibration unit: 1 with 2 HS-125 (EC-93, U-93), 2 C-95A, 4 EC-95.
AAM: R-530, Piranha (MAA-1).
(On order: 79 AMX FGA, 3 Boeing 707 tkr/tpt, 3 C-130, 10 EMB-120 Brasilia tpts, 3 Learjet survey, 100 YT-17 (A-123) Tangara, 6 EMB-110K Bandeirante trg ac; 8 AS-332 Super Puma, 15 AS-350 Ecureuil, some 32 UH-1H hel; Piranha AAM.)

PARA-MILITARY: Some 243,000 Public
Security Forces in state, military police orgs (State Militias) under Army control and considered an Army Reserve.

   CHILE
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 97,500 (32,000 conscripts).
Terms of Service: 2 years all services.
Reserves: 100,000 active; all able-bodied citizens have a Reserve obligation to age 45.

ARMY: 57,000 (30,000 conscripts).
HQ: 6 all arms div (3 under strength - being re-org).
   1 mixed bde.
   1 armd regt.
   10 armd cav regts.
   23 inf regts (9 mot, 4 inf, 10 mountain; 8 with recce unit and arty gp).
1 indep inf bde (regt).
7 indep arty regts.
1 engr regt and 6 bns.
1 sigs regt and 6 bns.
1 hel-borne ranger unit.
6 cdo bns.
Aviation:
   1 hel regt.
   1 composite gp with 1 log bn and spt unit.
Equipment:
Tks: 171: 150 M-4A3/M-51, 21 AMX-30. lt: 110: 50 M-24, 60 M-41.
AFV: recce: 300 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 450: 60 M-113, 200 Cardoen/MOWAG Piranha, 300 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: how: 105mm: 108: 72 M-101, 36 M-56; 155mm: 12 Mk F3 SP. Mor: 81mm: M-1, 120mm.
ATK: RCL: 57mm: M-18, 106mm. ATGW: Milan/Mamba.
Avn: tpt: 6 CASA C-212, 1 Cessna Citation, 8 Piper Dakota 236, 3 Piper Navajo.
   trg: 18 Cessna R-172 Hawk XP.
   hel: 20 SA-330FL Puma, 1 AS-332 Super Puma, 10 SA-315B Lama, 2 AB-206B.
(On order: 27 AMX-30 (in France, under an embargo)

NAVY: 25,500 (2,000 conscripts), incl naval air, marines and Coast Guard.
3 Naval Zones. 3 Naval Districts:
Bases:Talcahuano, Valparaiso, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, Puerto Williams, Iquique.
Subs: 4: 2 Thompson (Type 1300); 2 O'Brien (Obemn-class).
Destroyers: 7:
   3 Br County DDG (1 active, 1 fitting out, 1 in reserve, 1 to follow) with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1x 2 Seaslugll, 2x2 Seacat SAM, 1hel.
   2 Almirante with 4 MM-38 SSM, 2x4 Seacat SAM;
   2 US Sumner with 1 hel.
Frigates: 2 Leander with 4 MM-38 Exocet SSM, 1x4 Seacat SAM, 1 hel.
FAC(G): 2 Saar-IV with 6 Gabriel SSM.
FAC(T): 4 Lurssen-type.
Patrol craft: large: 4: 1 Cherokee, 2 Sotoyomo, 1 PC-1638. coastal: 6.
Amph: LST: 3 Batral, 2 Orompello lt.
Spt: 4 tankers, 4 tpts, 1 sub spt vessel.
Msls: SSM: Exocet MM-38, Gabriel. SAM: Seacat, Seaslug II.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (500); some 18 combat ac, no armed hel.
4 sqns.
MR: 6 EMB-11IN Maritime Bandeirante.
Utility: 3 EMB-1 ION Bandeirante, 3 CASA C-212A.
Hel: 8 SA-316BAlouette III, 4 SH-57 (Bell 206A).
Trg/COIN: 10 Pilatus PC-7; 2 IAI Westwind.

MARINES: (5,200).
4 gps: each 2 inf bns, 1 cdo coy, 1 fd arty btys.
1 amph bn.
Equipment:
AFV: APC:MOWAG Roland, 30 LVTP-5.
Arty: how: 105mm: 16; 155mm: 35 M-114. coast guns: 155mm: 16 GPFM-3. Mor: 60mm: 50; 81mm: 50.
AD: SAM: Blowpipe.

COAST GUARD (1,600)
Buoy Tenders: 2.
Patrol: 1 80-ton, 10 43-ton Anchova-class,
Spt:< 5 SAR craft; 1 hospital launch.
Hel: 1 Bell 206B.
(On order: 1 4,500-ton tpt.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000; 118 combat ac, no armed hel.
4 Air Bdes: 5 combat wings and 2 gps; each wing incl comms fit with ac/hel.
FGA: 2 sqns with 32 Hunter F-71/FGA-9, 18F-5E, 3F-5F.
COIN: 2 sqns with 27 A-37B (C-101 Halcon to replace).
Ftr/recce: 1 sqn with 10 Mirage 50FC, 15 C-101 Aviojet.
Recce: 2 photo sqns with 2 Canberra PR-9, 2 Learjet 35-A.
Tpt: 1 sqn with: ac: 2 Boeing (1 727-22C, 1 707-351C), 2 C-130H, 9 Beech (8 99A, 1 King Air A-100).
Utility/liaison fits: ac: incl 17 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 3 Twin Bonanza. hel: 3 S-55T, 4 SA-315 Lama.
Trg: 1 wing, 3 flying schools: ac: 4 Hunter 1-12, 30 Beech T-34A, 25 Cessna T-37B/C, 6 Cessna T-41A, some 18 T-35A/B Pilldn (Piper PA-28),
   5 JT-3 Halcdn (C-101), 10 Piper Dakota 236.
   hel: 6 UH-1H, 3 Bell 212.
AAM: AIM-9 Sidewinder, Shafrir. ASM: AS-11/-12.
AD: 1 regt (5 gps) with: guns: 20mm: S-639/-665, GAI-CO1 twin, 35mm: 36, K-63 twin;
SAM: Blowpipe, 12 Cactus (Crotale); radar: 4 sqns.
(On order: 21 C-101BB COIN, 2 EMB-120 tpts, Piper Dakota, some 40 T-35A, -35B Pillan trg ac; 3 AS-332 Super Puma hel, BO-105 hel (licence-built).)

PARA-MILITARY: Carabineros: 27,000.

OPPOSITION:
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front ?700.
Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

   COLOMBIA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 66,200 (some 28,200 conscripts).
Terms of Service: 1 year (all services).
Reserves: 116,900. Army 100,000, Navy 15,000, Air 1,900.

ARMY: 57,000 (25,800 conscripts).
11 inf bdes ('Regional Bdes'):
   7 with 3 inf, 1 arty bns, 1 engr gp, 1 mech or horsed cav gp;
   4 with 2 inf bns only;
   (2 others to form).
1 trg bde, incl Presidential Guard (mech bn).
1 indep mech gp.
1 Ranger, 1 para, 1 AA bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 12M-3A1.
AFV: recce: 20 M-8, 120 EE-9 Cascavei, APC: 50 M-113, 76 EE-11 Urutu, 45 M-3A2 half-track.
Arty: how: 105mm: 50 M-101; Mor: 81mm: 125; 107mm: 148; 120mm: 120 Brandt.
ATK: ATGW: TOW.
AD: guns: 37mm: 30; 40mm: 30 M-1A1.

NAVY: 9,000 (incl 5,000 marines) (some 500 conscripts).
Bases: ocean: Cartagena, Buenaventura; river: Puerto Leguizamo, Puerto Orocue", Bahia de Malaga (building).
Subs: 2 Type 1200; 2 SX-506 midget (reserve).
Destroyer (trg/comd): 1 (reserve).
Frigates: 4 FS-1500 each with 8 MM-40 Exocet SSM.
Patrol craft: large: 4 US Cherokee, coastal: 2. river<: 8.
Gunboats, river: 6: 2 Ashevilk, 3 Arauca, 1 Barranquilla.
Spt: 1 tanker, 4 tpts.

MARINES: 1 bn, 3 indep coys, cdo units.
2 bns Naval police.
No hy eqpt (to get EE-9 Cascaveirecce, EE-11 Urutu APC).

NAVAL AIR: forming.
Trg: 2 Aero Commander, 1 Piper Cherokee.
Hel: 4 BO-105.

COAST GUARD: 1,500
Patrol craft: 2 130-ton, 2 103-ton, 1 85-ton.

AIR FORCE: 4,200 (some 1,900 conscripts); 43 combat ac, 16 armed hel.
Combat Air Command 1:
   FGA: 2 sqns with 15 Mirage 5COA, 5COR, 5COD.
Combat Air Command 2:
   COIN: 1 sqn with 15 AT-33A, 2 RT-33
Combat Air Command 3:
   COIN: 12 A-37 B/D
Tactical Air Support Command:
   COIN: hel: 1 sqn with 10 Hughes 500M (OH-6A Cayuse), 6 Hughes 500-MG Defender.
   Recce: 1 sqn with: ac: 3 RT-33A; hel: 7 Hughes 300C, 10 Hughes 500C.
Military Air Transport Command: Ac: 1 sqn with C-130E Hercules, 3 C-130H, 1 C-54 (Douglas DC-4), 12 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), 8 HS-748,
   2 IAI-201 Arava, 2 F-28, 10 DHC-2 Beaver, 1Aero Commander 560A, 12 PC-6 Turbo-Porter.
   Hel: 1 sqn with 17 Bell UH-1B/H, 11 Bell 205 A-1.
Training Command:
   Ac: 21 Cessna T-41D, 21 T-34A/B.
   Hel: 8 Bell 47 (OH-13 Sioux), 7 Hughes 300C, 14 Hughes 500C.
AD: 3 Skyguard/Sparrow system sites.
AAM: R-530.

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO) 500.

PARA-MILITARY:
National Police Force 55,000; 1 HS-748 ac, 30 hel.
(On order: Bell hel: 2 212, 2 412.)
Carabineros 37,500.

OPPOSITION: 17,000 (possibly 7,000 active - estimates vary widely).
Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera (CNG; National Guerilla Co-ordinating Board); links with FMLN of El Salvador.
   (1) M-19 (?1,500).
   (2) National Liberation Army (ELN 500; proCuban).
   (3) People's Liberation Army (EPL; pro-Albanian).
   (4) Quintin Lame (Indian)
   (5) America Bn: nationals also incl Bolivian, Ecuadorean, El Salvadorean, Nicaraguan (Sandinistas), Panamanian, Peruvian.
Indep:
(1) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); 12,000: 73,500 active, pro-Moscow.
(2) Ricardo Franco Front.

* Excluding Public Order and Security Budget

   COSTA RICA
  
   []
   []

TOTAL SECURITY FORCES (Para-Military):
Active: 9,500 (incl 3,000 reserves).*

Civil Guard: 6,000.
Presidential Guard: 1 COIN bn, 7 coys.
1 Northern Border Security bn.
Equipment: APC: 1 UR-416; mor: 81mm; RL: 90mm; grenade launchers: M-203.
(marine:) patrol craft: 1 Swiftships 105-ft fast, 4 65-ft, 1 42-ft, 2 34-ft coastal<, 8 18-ft inshore (.
(air) ac: 2 Cessna 206, 3 O-2, 6 Piper (2 Aztec, 3 Cherokee, 1 Seneca).
hel: 1 FH-1100 (VIP), 2 Hughes 500E.

RESERVES: incl Air element; 30 lt ac and hel.

Rural Guard
(Ministry of Government and Police): 3,500. Small arms: 5 18-ft inshore patrol craft. Numerous private armed guard units.

OPPOSITION: 7900; 3 gps.

* No armed forces. Figures are for Security, Interior and Police ministries.

   CUBA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 175,500 incl E 15,000 Ready Reserves, (79,500 conscripts).
Terms of service:3 years.
Reserves: 130,000. Army: 110,000 Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and Reserve units; Navy: 8,000, Air: 12,000.
   See also Para-Military.

ARMY: 145,000 (inc e 15,000 Ready Reservists). (?60,000 conscripts)
HQ: 4 Regional Command; 3 Army, 1 Isle of Youth.
4 corps.
1 armd div (Cat 1).
3 mech inf divs, (3 mech inf, 1 armd, 1 arty, 1 AA regt) (Cat 2).
AD: 26 arty regts and SAM bdes (Cat varies: SAME Cat 1, arty 2 or 3).
Special Force (1,500): 2 bns (Cat 1).
1 AB assault bde (Cat 1).
Forces combat readiness system is similar to that of the USSR:
   category (Cat) 1 divs fully manned by Active Duty tps; Cat 2: partial manning augmented by Reservists;
   Cat 3: Active cadre, full manning by Reservists.
   Time required to complete manning unknown. Possible Cat status listed above.
Reserve:
5 inf divs (Cat 2 = e 60% strength - 3 inf, 1 arty, 1 AA regt).
2 armd, 8 inf divs (Cat 3).
8 indep inf regts (Cat 2/3).
Equipment:
Tks: 650 T-54/-55, 300 T-62 (some 150 T-34 in reserve or static coast defence). lt: 60 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 100 BRDM-1/-2. MICV: 50 BMP. APC: 500BTR-40/-60/-152.
Arty: 1,400: guns: 76mm: M-1942; 122mm: M-1931/37 (A-19), D-74. 130mm: M-46.
   guns/how: 152mm: M-1937 (ML-20), D-20. how: 152mm: D-1.
   MRL: 122mm: BM-21; 140mm: BM-14; 240mm: BM-24.
   static defence arty: some 15 JS-2 (122mm) hy tks, T-34 (85mm) MBT, SU-100 (100mm) SP guns reported; all in fixed emplacements.
   SSM: 65 FROG-4/-7.
   Mor: 120mm: M-38-43.
ATK: guns: 85mm: D-44; 100mm: SU-100 SP. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger, AT-1 Snapper.
AD: guns: 1,600 incl 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU-23-4 SP; 30mm: M-53 (twin)/BTR-60P SP; 37mm: M-1939; 57mm: S-60 towed, ZSU-57-2 SP;
   85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19.
   SAM: 12 SA-6, SA-7/-9/-13/-14.

NAVY: 12,000 (8,500 conscripts).
3 Territorial, 4 operational (Sub, FAC(G),-(T), -(ASW)) Flotillas.
Bases: Cienfuegos, Cabanas, Havana, Mariel, Punta Movida, Nicaro.
Subs: 3 F-class.
Frigates: 2 Koni with 1 twin SA-N-4 SAM.
FAC(G): 23 with Styx SSM: 5 Osa-I, 13 Osa-II, 5 Komar<.
FAC(T): 10: 4 P-6<, 6 P-4<.
FAC(P): 44: 9 Turya, 35 Zhuk<.
Patrol craft: 8: 4 SO-1 large, 4 Stenka.
MCMV: 15 minesweepers: 4 Sonya, 11 Yevgenya<.
Amph: 2 Polnocny LSM, 6 T-4 LCM.
Spt: 1 replenishment ship.
Misc: 1 intelligence collector.

NAVAL INFANTRY: (550+).
1 amph assault bn.

COASTAL DEFENCE:
Equipment:
Arty: guns: 122mm: M-1931/37; 152mm: M-1937; 130mm: M-46. SSM: 50 Samlet (inactive).

AIR FORCE: 18,500, incl air defence forces (11,000 conscripts); some 262 combat ac, some 42 armed hel.
FGA: 4 sqns:
   1 with 15 MiG-17;
   3 with 36 MiG-23BN Flogger F.
Interceptors: 16 sqns:
   2 with 30 MiG-21F;
   3 with 34 MiG-21PFM;
   2 with 20 MiG-21PFMA;
   8 with 100 MiG-21bis;
   1 with 15 MiG-23 FloggerE.
Tpt: 4 sqns: 16 I1-14, 35 An-2, 3 An-24, 22 An-26, 4 Yak-40.
Hel: 8 sqns: 60 Mi-4, 40 Mi-8 (perhaps 20 armd), 18 Mi-24 Hind D, 4 Mi-14 Haze ASW.
Trg: incl 12 MiG-21U, some An-2, 30 Zlin 326, some 25 Aero L-39.
AAM: AA-1 Alkali, AA-2 Atoll, AA-8 Aphid.
AD: 200+ SAM launchers: SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-9, S-13.
Civil Airline: 10 11-62, 7 Tupolev Tu-154 used as tp tpts; 2 I1-76 long-range tpts.

Forces Abroad:
Angola 30,000 (some 13 inf regts, plus some 8,000 civilian advisers). Congo 500, Ethiopia 4,000, Mozambique 600, S. Yemen 500,
   Nicaragua 3,500 (incl 3,000 civilian),
Afghanistan (reported).

PARA-MILITARY:
Ministry of Defence: Youth Labour Army 100,000; Civil Defence Force: 50,000;
Territorial Militia 1,200,000.
Ministry of Interior: State Security 17,000.
Frontier Guards 3,500, 15 coastal patrol, some 100 small craft.

* Excl cumulative debt to COMECONcountries and the USSR (est at up to $30 bn).
t Level of military assistance not known. Value of Soviet economic aid reported to be Roubles 8.2 bn in 1985 by Granma, but thisfigureis likely to have been substantially lower in 1986 dueto the fall in oilprices.

   DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 21,365.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 13,000.
5 Defence Zones.
4 inf bdes (17 bns).
1 arty bn.
1 armd bn.
1 Presidential Guard bn.
1 engrbn.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 2 AMX-13, 12 M-41A1 (76mm).
AFV: recce: 20 AML. APC: 8 V-150 Commando, 2 M-3A1 half-track.
Arty: how: 105mm: 22 M-101. Mor: 81mm; 120mm: 24.
ATK: RCL: 106mm.

NAVY: 4,600, incl naval inf.
Bases: Santo Domingo (HQ), Haina, Las Calderas.
Frigate: 1 Cdn River (trg).
Patrol craft: 15: 5 large (+2 US Argo, in reserve), 8 coastal<.
Amph: LSM: 1; LCU: 2.
Auxiliary/misc service craft: 12.
Naval inf: 1 bn; 1 cdo unit.

AIR FORCE: 3,765;
21 combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftrs: 1 sqn with 1 A-37B, 10 T-34B Mentor, 7 T-41D Mescalero, 3 AT-6A Texan.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 6 C-47 (DC-3), 1 Queen Air 80, 1 Aero Commander, 2 Cessna (1 310, 1 404), 2 Mitsubishi MU-2.
Hel: 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 8 Bell 205, 3 OH-6A (Hughes 369), 3 SA-318/316B Alouette II/III, 1 SA-360 Dauphin; 6 Bell 206.
AB: 1 para gp.
AD: 1 AA bn with 10 40mm guns.

PARA-MILITARY:
National Police 'special ops unit' 1,000.

   ECUADOR
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 37,000.
Terms of service:conscription 2 years, selective; most are volunteers.
Reserves: system in force, ages 18-47, numbers unknown.

ARMY: 29,000.
HQ: 4 Military zones (6 div HQ): 11 bdes.
2 armd cav bdes
7 inf bdes
2 'jungle' bdes
   comprising 4 armd cav, 15 inf, 4jungle, 4 arty, 4 engr bns, 5 cav gps, 2 recce sqns.
1 Special Force (AB) bde of 2 units.
1 Presidential Guard sqn.
3 AA btys.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 132: 40 M-3, 92 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 27 AML-60, 10 EE-9 Cascavel.
APC: 20 M-113,55 AMX-VCI, 18 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: how: 105mm: M-56 pack, 50 towed; 155mm: 10 M-198 towed, 10 Mk F3 SP.
   Mor: 81mm: 400; 160mm: 12.
ATK: RCL: 90mm, 106mm. AD: guns: 20mm: 28 M-1935; 35mm: 30 GDF-002 twin; 40mm: 30 M-1 A1
SAM: 240 Blowpipe.
Avn: ac: 3 PC-6 Turbo-Porter, 1 Learjet, 2 King Air, 3 IAI-201 Arava, 2 Cessna (1 172G, 1 182) tpt.
   hel: 5 SA-330 Puma, 8 AS-332 Super Puma, 10 SA-341 Gazelle, 2 SA-315 Lama, Bell 214.

NAVY: 4,000, incl some 700 marines.
Bases: Guayaquil, Jaramijo, Galapagos Islands.
Subs: 2 Type 1300.
Destroyers: 2: 1 Gearing; 1 Lawrence.
Corvettes: 6 Esmeraldas each with 4 MM-40 SSM; 1x4 Albatros/Aspide SAM; 1 hel.
FAC(G): 6: 3 Quito (Lurssen) with 4 MM-38 SSM; 3 Manta with 4 GabrielSSM.
Patrol craft: 7 coastal<.
Msls: SSM: MM-38, -40 Exocet, Gabriel; SAM: Albatros/Aspide.
Amph: LST: 1; LCVP: 6 9-ton Rotork.
Avn: ac: 1 Super King Air, 3 T-34C, 1 IAI-201 Arava, 1 Cessna 320E;
Marines: 3 bns: 2 on garrison duties, 1 cdo (no hy weapons/veh).

AIR FORCE: 4,000; 69 combat ac, no armed hel.
4 Wings:
Interceptor: 1 gp with 15 Mirage F-1JE, 1 F-1JB.
FGA: 2 gps:
   1 with 10 JaguarS, 2-B;
   1 with 12 Kfir C-2, 1 TC-4.
   COIN: 1 gp with 7 A-37B, 15 AT-33.
   COIN/trg: 1 gp with 6 BAC-167 Strikemaster Mk89.
Military Air Transport Gp (incl civil/military airline): 9 Boeing (3 727-2T3, 4 707, 2 720), 5 Lockheed (3 Electra, 1 C-130H, 1 L-100-30),
   1 Transall C-160, 2 DHC-5D Buffalo, 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 1 King Air 90, 1 Cessna 337D, 2 HS-748, 5 IAI-201 Arava.
   Liaison/SAR hel fits: 6 SA-316 Alouette III, 1 Bell 212.
   Trg: incl 20 T-34C, 8 T-41.
   AAM: R-550 Magic, Super 530.
1 para sqn.
(In store: 3 Canberra B-6 bbrs.)
(On order: 18 AT-33 COIN, 1 F-28-4000 tpt.)

PARA-MILITARY: Coastguard (200): 14 40-ft patrol craft.

   EL SALVADOR
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 47,000.
Terms of service:conscription, selective, 2 years: all services.
Reserves: ex-soldiers registered.

ARMY: 43,000 (some conscripts).
3 Military Zones (14 Regions).
6 inf bdes (22 med bns).
9 cadre inf regts (up to 40 bns).
1 arty bde (3 bns).
1 mech cav regt (2 bns).
1 engr bn.
14 lt inf bns.
6 indep COIN bns (1,100-1,400 men).
1 para bn, 1 AA arty bnj (See Air Force).

Equipment:
Tks: 12 AMX-13 It.
AFV: recce: 10 AML-90. APC: 66 M-37B1 (mod), 20 M-113, 8 UR-416.
Arty: how: 50: 105mm: 30 M-101, 6 M-102, 14 Yug M-56; Mor: 81mm: 300; 120mm: 80 UB-M52.
ATK: RCL: 90mm: 400 M-67. RL: LAW.
(On order: 6 M-102 105mm how.)

NAVY: 1,500 (incl 600 Marine bn, 200 cdo; some conscripts).
Patrol craft: 30, incl 3 31-m Camcraft, 1 20-m Sewart, 1 20-m Swiftships, 11 36-ft Lantana, 4 35-ft, 1 40-ft coastguard utility.

AIR FORCE: 2,500 (incl AD, security gp; some conscripts); 31 combat ac, some 23 armed hel.
FGA: 1 sqn with 8 Ouragan.
COIN: ac: 1 sqn with 7 Douglas C-47 (2 armed for airborne fire-spt), 10 A-37B;
   hel: 1 sqn with 9 Hughes 500MD attack, some 14 UH-1M gunships, 38 UH-1H tpt, 3 SA-315 Lama, 3 SA-316 Alouette III tpt.
Recce: 1 fit with 11 O-2A (Cessna 337).
Tpt: ac: 1 sqn with 6 C-47 (DC-3), 1 DC-6B, 3 IAI-201 Arava, 2 C-123K.
Trg: 1 fit with 1Cessna T-41, 6 CM-170 Magister.
AB: 1 para bn Army Personnel Air Force control
AD: 1 AA arty bn (24 Yug M-55 20mm guns, 4 SP) Army Personnel Air Force control

PARA-MILITARY:
National Guard 3,600. National Police 6,000.
Treasury Police 2,400. Defensa Civil (territorial civil defence force) 12,000.

OPPOSITION:
Direction Revolucionaria Unificada (DRU): alliance of Frente Democrdtico Revolucionaria (FDR, political wing) and Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN, military wing): perhaps 6,500 combatants.
(1) Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP; 2,700).
(2) Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL; 2,600).
(3) Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN or RN; 600).
(4) Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC; 250).
(5) Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL; 500).
(6) International groups in country incl:
   (a) Alfaro Vive Carajo (Ecuador)
   (b) Tupac Amaru (Peru)
   (c) Bandera Roja (Red Banner) (Venezuela)

   GUATEMALA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:*
Active: 40,200.
Terms of service : Conscription; selective 30 months.
Reserves: Army 35,000, Navy (some), Air 200.

ARMY: 38,000.*
HQ: 19 Military Zones.
1 armd sqn.
39 inf bns.
18 fd arty btys.
2 AA btys.
1 Military Police (MP) bn.
1 engr bn.
7 recce sqns.
1 Presidential Guard bde (2 bns).
1 Special Forces bde (2 bns).

Equipment:
Tks:lt: 10 M-41A3, 7 M-3A1.
AFV: recce: 5 M-8, 10 RBY-1; APC: 10 M-113, 7 V-150 Commando, 10 Armadillo.
Arty: how: 75mm: 62 M-116 pack; 105mm: 60: 4 M-101; 8 M-102, 48 M-56.
   Mor: 81mm: M-1; 4.2-in (107mm): 12 M-30; 120mm: 12 EC1 A.
ATK: RCL: 106mm. AD: guns: 40mm: 12 M-1A1.

NAVY: 1,500 incl 650 marines (4 coys), (900 conscripts).*
Bases: Santo Tomds de Castillas, Sipacate, Puerto Quetzal.
Patrol craft<: 8 inshore, 36 small (some 30 armed).
Amph<: 1 LCM, 2 8-ton tp carriers, 12 Zodiac-type assault boats (marines).

AIR FORCE: 700 (500 conscripts);* 12 combat ac, 7 armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 6 Cessna A-37B, 6 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 8 Douglas (1 DC-6B, 7 C-47), 6 IAI-201 Arava.
Comms: 1 sqn with 17 Cessna (4 170A/B, 8 172K, 2 180.2 206C, 1 310).
Hel: 1 sqn with 18 Bell (perhaps 12 operational): 7 UH-1, 2 212, 4 412, 5 206B.
Presidential fit: 1 Beech Super King Air 200.
Trg: 6 Lockheed T-33A, 3 Cessna T-37C.
Tactical Security Group: 3 coys; 4 M-3A1 White scout cars.

PARA-MILITARY:
National Police 9,500.
Regular and special naval police corps.
Treasury Police 2,100.
Territorial Militia (CDP) E725,000 formed.

OPPOSITION:
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG): some 2,000; 4 groups:
   Ejercito Guerrillerode los Pobres(EGP),
   Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT),
   Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR),
   Organizacidn del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA).

* National Armed Forces are combined; the Army provides logistic support to the Navy and Air Force.

   GUYANA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (Combined Guyana Defence Force):
Active: 5,425.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: some 3,000 People's Militia. (see Para-Military).
'ARMY': 5,000.
2 inf bns.
1 guards bn.
1 special forces bn.
1 spt weapons bn.
1 arty 'bn' (bty).
1 engr coy.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 4 Shorland.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 6 M-46. Mor: 81mm: 12; 82mm: 18; 120mm: 18.
AD: SAM: SA-7.

'NAVY': 225;
Bases: Georgetown, New Amsterdam.
Patrol craft: 14: 1 Vosper large; 4 N. Korean Sin Hung fast; 6 coastal incl 4 mod trawlers; 3 GDR river.

'AIR FORCE': 200; no combat ac or armed hel.
Tpt: ac: 6 BN-2A Defender, 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 2 Skyvan Srs 2, 1 Super King Air B-200, 1 Cessna 206F;
   hel: 8 Bell (3 206B, 3 212, 2 412), 3 Mil Mi-8.

PARA-MILITARY: 3,500.
Guyana People's Militia (GPM) some 2,000.
Guyana National Service (GNS) 1,500.

   HAITI
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 7,600.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 7,000 (has police/gendarmerie, fire-fighting,immigration, etc, roles.)
Presidential Guard (1 inf bn, 1 armd sqn).
1 inf bn.
1 Special Forces bn.
1 arty gp (2 btys).
6 Garrison dets (21 coys).
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 9 M-5A1.
APC: 5 M-2, 6 V-150 Commando.
Arty: how: 10: 75mm: 4 M-1A1 pack; 105mm: 6 M-101. Mor: 60mm: 36; 81mm.
ATK: guns: 37mm: 10 M-3; 57mm: 10 M-1. RCL: 57mm: M-18; 106mm: M-40.
AD: guns: 20: 20mm: 6 RAMTA TCM-20, 4 other; 40mm: 6; 57mm: 4.

NAVY: 325 (Coastguard).
Base: Port au Prince
Patrol craft: 14: 1 Sotoyomo; 13 coastal (2 Sewart, 9 3812-VCF, 2 Bertram).

AIR FORCE: 275; 7 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 7 Cessna 337.
Tpt: 3 C-47 (DC-3), 2 DHC-2 Beaver, 3 DHC-3 Otter, 1 Baron, 2 Cessna (1 140, 1 402).
Trg: 4 S-211, 4 SF-260TP, 1 Bonanza, 4 Cessna (3 152, 1 172).
Hel: 5 CH-34C (S-58), 3 Hughes 269C/369C.

   HONDURAS
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 16,950; (11,300 conscripts).
Terms of service:conscription, 24 months.
Reserves: 50,000 (personnel only; no units).

ARMY: 14,600 (10,000 conscripts).
10 Military Zones:
3 inf bdes (each 3 inf, 1 arty bns).
1 armd cav regt.
5 indep inf bns.
1 indep arty regt.
1 engr bn.
1 special forces bn.
1 Presidential Guard coy (ceremonial).
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 12 Scorpion, 3 Scimitar.
AFV: recce: 72 Saladin, 10 RBY Mk 1.
Arty: how: 105mm: 24 M-101/-102; 155mm: some 10M-198. Mor: 60mm; 81mm: M-1; 120mm: 30 Soltam M-65.
ATK: RCL: 106mm. RL: Carl Gustav.
AD: guns: 20mm.
(On order: M-198 155mm how.)

NAVY: 850 (600 marine conscripts).
Bases: Puerto Cone's, Amapala.
Patrol craft: 33: 15 Swiftships: 5 103-ton, 5 50-ton, 5 33-ton Lantana 36-ft; 18 river patrol launches.
Spt: 1 log ship.

AIR FORCE: 1,500 (700 conscripts); 37 combat aircraft, no armed hel.
Ftr: 1 sqn with 13 Super Mystere B2 (to be replaced), 9 F-86 Sabre.
COIN: 1 sqn with 15 A-37B.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 2 C-130D Hercules, 10 C-47 (DC-3), 2 IAI-201 Arava, 1 Electro, 1 IAI-1124 Westwind.
Spt: 1 sqn with: ac: 1 Beech Baron, 4 Cessna (2 180, 2 185), 2 Piper (1 Cheyenne, 1 Comanche). hel: 1 Sikorsky S-76.
Hel: 10 Bell 412, 11 UH-1H, 11 UH-1B, 1 Hughes 500, 8 TH-55 (Hughes 300).
Trg: 4 CASA C-101BB, 12 EMB-312 Tucano, 8 CessnaT-41A.
(On order: 2 CASA C-101 ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: Public Security Forces (FUSEP) (national police) 5,000.

OPPOSITION: ?600. 4 small groups.

* Excl internal security costs.

   JAMAICA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form combined Jamaica Defence Force): Active: 2,520.
Terms of service: voluntary.
Reserves: some 745: Army 700 (1 inf regt); Coastguard: 45.

'ARMY': 2,200.
2 inf bns, 1 spt bn.
APC: 15 V-150 Commando.
Mor: 81mm: 12.

'COASTGUARD': 150.
Base: Port Royal
Patrol boats: 5: 4 Sewart: 1 107-ton, 3 60-ton; 1 Swiftships 93-ton.

'AIR FORCE': 170; no combat ac or armed hel.
Ac: 2 BN-2 Islander, 1 King Air, 4 Cessna (1 210 Centurion, 1 337, 2 185). Hel: 7 Bell (4 202, 3 212).

   MEXICO
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES: 254,500.
Active: 134,500 plus 120,000 rural militia.
Terms of service:Active: voluntary; militia: part-time conscription (by lottery).
Reserves: 300,000.

ARMY: 105,000 regular incl ~60,000 reservists).
36 Zonal Garrisons: incl 24 mot cav, 3 arty regts, 69 indep inf bns.
1 mech inf bde (Presidential Guard) (3 bns).
2 inf bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 arty bn).
3 armd regts.
AA, engr and spt units.
Equipment:
Tks: lt: 45 M-3/-8.
AFV: recce: 50 Panhard ERC-90F (Lynx), 40 Panhard M-11VBL, DN-3/-4/-5 Caballo. APC: 40 HWK-11, 30M-3.
Arty: how: 75mm: 23: 18 M-116 pack, 5 M-8 SP; 105mm: 50 M-101.
   Mor: 1,250 60mm, 81mm; 120mm: 60.
ATK: guns: 37mm: 30 M-3. RCL: 106mm. ATGW: Milan (incl 8 Panhard M-11 VBL).
AD: guns: 40 12.7mm.
(On order. ?50 TAM lt tanks reported, 30 Panhard ERC-90 (Lynx).)

NAVY: 23,000, incl naval air force and marines.
2 Areas (Gulf, Pacific) of 5 Zones (6 Subordinate Sectors) and 11 Zones (5 Sectors) respectively.
Bases: Gulf: Vera Cruz (HQ), Tampico, Chetumal, Ciudad del Carmen, Yukalpeten.
   Pacific: Acapulco (HQ), Ensenada, La Paz, Puerto Cortds, Guaymas, Mazatlan, Manzanillo, Salina Cruz, Puerto Madero, Lazaro Cardenas,
   Puerto Vallarta.
Destroyers: 3: 2 Gearing, 1 Fletcher.
Frigates: 6: 4 US Lawrence/Crosley, 1 Durango, 1 US Edsall (trg ship).
Corvettes: 6 Halcdn each with 1 BO-105 hel.
Patrol ships: 35: 1 Guanajuato, 16 Admirable ex-minesweepers, 18 Auk.
Patrol craft: large: 31 Azteca; coastal: 6< (5 Polimar, 1 Azueta); river: 14< (8 Olmeca, 6 AM-4).
Amph: LST: 2 US 511-1152; LCU: 6 Pegasos<.
Spt: 1 repair ship; 1 tpt, 2 harbour tankers.
Coastal defence: guns: 75mm: M-1902/-1906, 120mm: L/27 (probably de-activated).
  
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (500); 15 combat ac, no armed hel.
MR: 1 sqn with 11 HU-16 Albatross, 4 C-212.
Liaison: 1 sqn with 1 Learjet 24D, 1 F-27, 11 Bonanza; 3 Cessna.
Hel: 1 sqn with 4 SA-316B Alouette III, 12 BO-105 (6 afloat).

MARINES: (3,800).
1 AB bde.
1 Presidential Guard bn.
13 groups.
32 security coys.
(On order: 4 Aguila corvettes (mod Halcdn); 5 Olmeca river patrol boats; 6 CASA C-212MP ac).

AIR FORCE: 6,500 (incl 2,000 ABbde); 92 combat ac, no armed hel.
Interceptors: 1 sqn with 9 F-5E, 2 F-5F.
COIN: 6 sqns with 50 PC-7, 12 T-33.
Recce: 1 photo sqn with 14 Aero Commander 500S.
SAR: 2 sqns: ac: 1 with 8 IAI-201 Arava; hel: 1 with 3 Alouette III, 2 SA-330 Puma, 13 Bell (1 47G, 5 206B, 5 212, 2 205A).
Presidential (tpt) sqn: ac: 2 Boeing 727, 1 F-27, HS-125-400, 6 T-39 Sabreliner, 1 Cessna 310R(U-3A);
hel: 1 Bell 212, 2 SA-330 Puma, 2 AS-332L Super Puma.
Tpt: 5 sqns with 7 Boeing 727, 29 Douglas (1 DC-7, 12 C-118, 4 C-54, 12 C-47), 3 Skyvan, 1 Islander, 3 F-27, 1 Cessna 206E.
Trg: 54 Beech (20 Bonanza, 34 Musketeer); 5 PC-7 Turbo-Trainer, 20 CAP-10B.
1 AB bde (2 regular, 1 trg bns).
(On order: 25 PC-7 COIN,21 Bonanza F33C trg ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: Rural Defence Militia 120,000.

   NICARAGUA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 77,000 incl active duty reserves and militia (720,500 conscripts).
Terms of service: conscription, males 17-50, 2 years service plus commitment to age 45.
Reserves: All males 18-40 required to register, total perhaps 250,000. Army 22,000 (6,000 active duty). Navy and Air totals unknown.

ARMY: 74,000: 37,000 Active (20,000 conscripts), 30,000 Active Reserves and militia, 7,000 Border Guard.
7 Military Regions.
2 mot inf bdes (other territorial bde orgs reported).
4 armd bns.
1 mech inf bn.
23 inf bns (1 AB, some 18 COIN).
7 Border Guard bns.
1 fd arty bde (4 bns).
4 fd arty gps.
4 engr bns.
1 AA arty gp.
Reserves/Militia: some 160 'bns'.
Equipment:
Tks: some 150 T-54/55. lt: 25 PT-76.
AFV: recce: 50 BRDM-2. APC: 40 BTR-60, 105 BTR-152.
Arty: guns: 76mm: some M-1942. guns/how: 122mm: 30 D-30; 152mm: 36 D-20.
   MRL: 122mm: 36 BM-21. Mor: 60mm; 82mm; 120mm: 24 M-43.
ATK: guns: 57mm: 100 ZIS-2.
AD: guns: 300 reported: 14.5mm: ZPU-1/-2/-4; 23mm: ZU-23, ZSU 23-4; 37mm: M-1939; 100mm: KS-19.
   SAM: 350 SA-7 some SA-14 reported.

NAVY: 1,000 (some conscripts).
Patrol craft<: 2 Fr 28.2-m, 6 Sov Zfiuk, 2 N. Korean Sin Hung, 2 N. Korean Kimjin, 2 Dabur, 6 other coastal.
MCMV<: 4 Pol K-8, 2 Sov Yevgenya inshore.
Amph: 1 LCM.

AIR FORCE: 3,400, incl AD (some conscripts); 16 combat ac, 12+ armed hel.
COIN: 1 sqn with 3 AT-33A ^nonoperational), 3 SF-260 Warrior, 6 Cessna 337, 4 T-28.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 An-26, 2 CASA C-212A, 1 IAI-201 Arava, 1 C-47 (DC-3), 10 An-2, 2 Aero Commander, 1 Twin Bonanza.
Hel: 1 sqn with 4 Mil Mi-2, 34 Mi-8/-17, 12 Mi-24/-25, 2 SA-316B Alouette III.
AD (Army/Air Force): radar: 4 installations.

PARA-MILITARY:
Border guard (Tropas Guardafronteras (TGF)): some 7,000; 7 bns (under Army).
Civilian militia (Milicia Popular Sandinista): perhaps 50,000.
Ministry of Interior troops (Tropas Pablo Ubeda): some 2,000.

OPPOSITION:
United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO): some 24,000 reported; active strength 12-15,000;
   ammunition, equipment and clothing reported in short supply in some areas; inter-group feuds hamper operations.
Northern Front (Honduras):
Fuerza Democrdtica Nicaraguense (UNO/FDN) (US-backed).
Nicaraguan East Coast Indian Unity UNO/KISAN): 71,000 armed. HQ: Honduras.
Southern Front:
(1) (Costa Rica): Union Democrdtica Nicaraguensel Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Nicaraguenses (UDN/FARN): estrange 1,500-3,000.
(2) Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS): Caribbean Coast: Miskito, Sumo, Rama and Sandinistan Unity (Misurasata) 500. HQ: Costa Rica.
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) (US-backed) 200 active.

* Value of economic and military support from socialist countries not known.
t Figure given by President Ortega in address to the Nation, 21 February 1987.

   PANAMA
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 5,200.
Terms of service: voluntary (conscription authorized).

ARMY (National Guard): 4,500. 2 bns, 8 inf coys (1 Special Force).
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 28: 16 V-150, 13 V-300 Commando.
Mor: 60mm.
ATK: Rl: 3.5-in.

NAVY: 500.
Bases: Balboa (HQ), Colon.
Patrol craft: 8: 2 Vosper large, 6 coastal<.
Amph: 4: 2 Batral lt tpts, 1 LSM, 1 LCM.

AIR FORCE: 200.
Recce: 1 sqn.
SAR: 1 sqn.
Tpt: 'Service'.
Equipment:
Ac: 1 Electra, 2 BN-2A Islander, 3 CASA C-212, 3 C-47, 2 DHC-3 Otter, 1 Skyvan, 1 Dassault Mystere 20 (VIP), 3 Cessna 185/U-17A,
   2 Aero Commander, 1 Piper PA-31, 1 U-21F, 1 Bonanza.
Hel: 1 AS-332 Super Puma, 17 Bell UH-1B/D/H/N.

PARA MILITARY: 8,800. Police and immigration.

   PARAGUAY
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 17,050 (9,800 conscripts).
Terms of service: 18 months; Navy 2 years.
Reserves: some 36,300. Army 30,500, Navy 2,200 (incl some 400 Marines), Air 3,600.

ARMY: 12,500 (8,100 conscripts).
HQ: 6 Military Regions, 3 corps.
Army HQ:
   1 Presidential Escort regt.
   2 inf regts.
   3 arty bns.
   6 engr bns.
   Log spt, sigs bns.
3 corps:
   1 cav div (bde) (2 mech, 2 horsed cav regts, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty bty).
   8 inf divs (8 inf regts and 16 reserve cadre regts/bns).
2 frontier inf bns.
Equipment:
Tks: 12 M-4A3; lt: 12 M-3A1.
AFV: recce: 12 M-8, M-3 halftrack, 20 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 3 M-2 med, 10 EE-11 Urutu.
Arty: coastal guns: 152mm: 6 Mk V 6-in. how: 75mm: 25 Model 1927/1934; 105mm: 48 M-101.
   Mor: 81mm; 107mm: 4.2-in.
ATK: RCL: 75mm.
AD: guns: 20mm: 20; 40mm: 10 M-1A1.
Avn: ac: 8 Fokker S-11. hel: 3 Bell 47G.

NAVY: 3,150 (1,000 conscripts) (incl Marines, Coast Defence Corps, Harbour and River Guard).
Bases : Asunci6n/Puerto Sajonia, Bahia Negra, Puerto Presidente Stroessner.
River defence vessels: 2 Paraguay. 3 Arg Bouchard ex-minesweepers. 1 Itaipu gunboat.
Patrol craft: 9 coastal<.
Amph: 1 US LSM (with hel deck, carries UH-12), 2 LCU.
Spt/cargo: 3.

MARINES: (500 (200 conscripts)).
1 marine 'regt' (bn).
1 cdo 'bn'.

COAST DEFENCE CORPS: (?250):
4 btys.
Guns: see Army.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (55).
Utility: 1 C-47 (DC-3), 9 Cessna (4 206, 4 150M, 1 210).
Trg: 2 T-6G.
Hel: 3 OH-13 (Bell 47G), 2 UH-12E (Bell 47J).
(On order: 2 HB-350B Esquilo hel.)

AIR FORCE: 1,400 (700 conscripts); 8 combat ac, no armed hel.
Composite sqn: 1.
COIN fit: 8 EMB-326 Xavante.
Liaison fit: 7 Cessna (1 337, 1 402, 5 185).
Hel fit: 8 OH-13A, 2 UH-12.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 16 Douglas (3 DC-6B, 2 C-54, 11 C-47), 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter (VIP), 1 DHC-3 Otter, 4 C-212, PBY-5A Catalina.
Trg: 10 T-25 Universal,8 T-23 Uirapuru, 7 T-6.
1 para regt (bn).

PARA-MILITARY: Capital Police Force, Special Police Service: 6,000.

   PERU
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 113,000 (69,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:2 years, selective.
Reserves: Army only, all persons of military age not on active duty (188,000).

ARMY: 75,000 (50,000 conscripts).
5 Military Regions:
   2 armd divs (bdes).
   1 cav div (3 mech, 1 horsed regts).
   7 inf divs (bdes, each of 4 bns, 1 arty gp).
   1 AB div (bde; 3 para bns).
   1 jungle div (bde).
2 indep fd arty gps; 2 indep arty bns.
1 indep AA gp, 1 indep SAM gp.
4 indep inf bns.
7 indep 'jungle' inf bns.
4 indep engr bns.
3 hel sqns.
Equipment:
Tks: 300 T-54/-55. lt: 110 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 60 M-8/-20, 10 Fiat 6616. APC: 200 M-113, 150 UR-416.
Arty: guns: 130mm: 30 M-46. guns/how: 155mm: 36. how: 105mm: 180: 10 M-56 pack; 122mm: 30 D-30.
   MRL: 122mm: 14 BM-21. Mor: 120mm: 300.
ATK: RCL: 105mm; 106mm.
AD: guns: 23mm: 35 ZSU-23-4 SP; 40mm: 40 towed. SAM: SA-3/-7.
Avn: hel: 25 Mil Mi-8, 6 AS-318 Alouette II.

NAVY: 23,000 (12,000 conscripts) incl naval air, marines.
3 Naval Force Areas: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River.
Bases: ocean: Callao, San Lorenzo Island, Paita, Talara. lake: Puno. river: Iquitos, Puerto Maldonado.
Subs: 12: 6 Type 1200; 2 Guppy IA; 4 Abtao.
Cruisers: 2 Neth De Ruyter (1, with 3 SH-3D hel, to get Exocet; on refit 1987/8).
Destroyers: 8: 2 Br Daring DDG with 8 MM-38 SSM; 6 Friesland.
Frigates: 4 Carvajal (mod Lupo) FFG with 8 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 8 Otomat SSM, 1 AB-212 hel.
FAC(G): 6 PR-72P Velardewith 4 MM-38 SSM.
River gunboats: 4.
Patrol craft<: lake: 3; river: 3.
Amph: 5.
Spt: 9: 2 tpts, 7 tankers (3 replenishment, 2 spt, 2 harbour).
Msls: SSM: MM-38 Exocet, Otomat; SAM: Albatros/Aspide.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: 13 combat ac, some 10 combat hel.
ASW/MR: 4 sqns with:
   ac: 7 S-2E Tracker, 2 F-27MPA, 4 Super King Air B-200T;
   hel: some 10 AS-61, AB-212.
Utility: 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 206B, 6 AB-212.
Tpts: 2 C-47 (DC-3).
Trg: ac: 6 T-34C; hel: 2 Bell 206B.
Msls: ASM: 40 Exocet AM-39.

MARINES: (2,500).
1 Marine bde (3 bns).
Equipment:
AFV: recce: V-100. APC: 40 V-200 Chaimite.
Arty: RCL: 106mm. RL: 84mm.
Mor: ?18 120mm.
AD: guns: twin 20mm SP.
Coast defence: 3 btys with 18 155mm how (may have been deactivated).
(On order: 1 Carvajal frigate; 3 EMB-111 MR ac.)

AIR FORCE: 15,000 (7,000 conscripts);96 combat ac, 16 armed hel.
Bbr: 1 Gp (3 sqns) with 17 Canberra B-2/B(I)-8.
FGA: 4 Gps: 9 sqns:
   2 with 15 Mirage 5P;
   5 with 30 Su-22;
   2 with 25 Cessna A-37B.
COIN: 1 hel sqn with 16 Mil Mi-25 (probably Army-assigned).
Recce: 1 photo sqn with 2 Queen Air A-80, 4 Learjet (2 36A, 2 25).
Tpt: 2 Gps (3 sqns): ac: 4 L-100-20/C-130H, 2 DC-8-62CF, 13 An-26, 5 An-32, 8 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 14 CC-115 (DHC-5 Buffalo), 4 PC-6 Turbo-Porter,
   hel: 2 sqns with 32 Bell (6 206, 20 212, 6 214), 3 SA-316B Alouette III, 6 Mi-6, 5 Mi-8, 3 BO-105;
liaison: 10 Queen Air A-80.
Presidential Fit: 1 F-28 ac.
Trg: 4 sqns with 42 Cessna (19 T-41D, 23 T-37B/C), 13 MB-339A, 4 EMB-312 Tucano.
ASM: AS-30.
(On order: some 12 Mirage 2000P/DP ftr, 17 An-32 tpt, 16 Tucano trg ac; 8 Sikorsky UH-60A hel (status uncertain).)

PARA-MILITARY: 51,600.
Guardia Civil, 36,000; MOWAG Roland APC.
Coastguard (600); 12 large patrol craft, 12 coast/river.
Republican Guard 15,000.
Rondas Campesinas (self-defence force or People's Militia) forming: no details.

OPPOSITION:
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path): some 2,000; rural gp.
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA): urban gp.

* Military debt to the USSR estimated at some $1.2 bn.
t Incl $20 m loan from Argentina for building complex for Peruvian Air Force at Collique.

   SURINAME
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form part of the Army):
Active: 2,690.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 2,450.
1 inf bn (4 inf, 1 armd car coy).
1 cdo coy.
1 Military Police bn.
Equipment:
AFV: recce: 6 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 9 YP-408, 15 EE-11 Urutu.
Mor: 81mm: 6.
RCL: 106mm.

NAVY: 180.
Base: Paramaribo.
Patrol craft: 10: 3 large, 7< (4 coastal, 3 river).

AIR FORCE: 60; no combat ac or armed hel.
ac: 6: 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter, 4 BN-2 Defender, 1 Cessna 206.
hel: 3: 2 SA-316B Alouette III, 1 Bell 205.

PARA-MILITARY: National Militia 900.

OPPOSITION: Surinamese Liberation Army or 'Jungle Commando': 200-300; small arms only.

   TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
   []
   []

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services are part of the Army):
Active: 2,075.
Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 1,500.
1 inf bn.
1 reserve bn (3 coys).
1 spt bn.
Equipment:
Mor: 60mm: e 40; 81mm: 6.
ATK: RL: 82mm: 13 B-300.

COASTGUARD: 525.
Base: Staubles Bay.
Patrol craft: 11: large: 4: 2 Swed Type CG-40 133-ft, 2Vosper 103-ft; coaslal:< 7: (incl 6 Souter 55-ft).

AIR FORCE: 50.
Ac: 2 Cessna (1 402, 1 310).

PARA-MILITARY: Police (4,000).
   Ministry of National Security; 2 SA-341 Gazelle, 2 Sikorsky S-76 (SAR) hel.

   URUGUAY
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 27,100.
Terms of service: voluntary; 1-2 years, extendable.

ARMY: 18,800.
4 Military Regions.
Army troops:
   Presidential Escort (1 cav regt).
   1 inf bde (1 AB, 1 mot bns).
   1 engr bde (3 bns).
   1 sigs bde (2 bns).
4 inf divs:
   3 cav bdes with 4 mech, 1 mot, 5 horsed regts.
   4 inf bdes: 12 bns.
   5 fd arty gps.
1 AA gp.
6 engr bns.
Equipment:
Tks, lt: 17 M-24, 28 M-3A1, 22 M-41A1.
AFV: recce: 20 FN-4-RM-62, 18 EE-3 Jararaca, 15 EE-9 Cascavel. APC: 16 M-113, 50 Condor.
Arty: how: 75mm: 12 Bofors M-1902; 105mm: 30: 20 M-101A1, 10 M-102; 155mm: 18 M-114A2.
   Mor: 81mm: 40; 107mm: 5 4.2in.
ATK: guns: 57mm: 30 M-1. RL: 57mm. RCL: 10 106mm. ATGW: 10 Milan.
AD: guns: 20mm: 6 M-167 Vulcan; 40mm: 2 L/60.

NAVY: 4,400 incl naval air, naval infantry.
Base: Montevideo.
Frigates: 3: 1 Dealey, 2 Cannon.
Corvette: 1 US Auk.
Patrol craft: 4 large: 1 US Adjutant, 3 Vigilante.
Amph: 5: 3 LCU, 2 LCVP.
Spt: 2 tankers, 1 transport.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (390);
7 combat ac, no armed hel.
ASW: 1 fit with 6 S-2A/G Tracker.
MR: 1 fit with 1 Super King Air B-200T.
Tpts: 2 Expeditor (C-45J); 1 Super Cub utility.
Trg: 5 T-28, 1 T-34B, 1 T-34C.
Hel: 1 fit with 1 Sikorsky S-58 (SH-34G), 1 Bell 222 (SAR).
  
NAVAL INFANTRY: (450); 1 bn.

AIR FORCE: 3,000; 26 combat ac, no armed hel.
COIN: 2 sqns:
   1 with 4 AT-33A, 6 A-37B;
   1 with 6 IA-58B Pucara.
Recce/trg: 1 sqn with 10 T-6G.
SAR: 1 sqn with: ac: 5 Cessna 185C (U-17A); hel: 2 Bell 212, 8 UH-1B/H.
Tpt: 3 sqns with 1 C-47 (DC-3), 6 EMB-110B/C Bandeirante (tpt/survey), 5 C-212 (tpt/SAR), 6 Queen Air B-80, 1 Learjet (VIP), 2 F-27, 2 FH-227.
Trg: 6 T-41D, 25 T-34B.

Forces Abroad: Egypt (Sinai MFO), 70.

PARA-MILITARY:
Metropolitan Guard 650.
Republican Guard 520.
Coastguard 1,500; 6 coastal patrol craft<.

   VENEZUELA
   []


TOTAL ARMED FORCES:
Active: 69,000 incl National Guard (perhaps 18,000 conscripts).
Terms of service:2 years (Navy 2.5 years) selective, varies by region for all services.

ARMY: 34,000 (incl conscripts).
HQ command:
   Presidential Guard Regt. (3 bns),
   1 army avn regt.
   1 construction engr regt (2 bns).
   1 Sigs regt.
   1 Military Police regt (2 bns).
   1 log regt.
1 cav div HQ:
   3 cav gps.
   1 arty, 1 avn, 1 sigs gp.
1 ranger bde (4 ranger, 2 inf bns).
1 AB regt (2 ABbns, 1 cdo unit).
2 AA arty gps (2 more forming).
3 regional inf divs comprising:
   6 inf bdes (16 inf bns, 5 arty gps, 3 engr bns).
Equipment:
Tks: 81 AMX-30. lt: 35 M-18, 36 AMX-13.
AFV: recce: 10 AML-245, 12 M-8, 60 M-706E1.
APC: 25 AMX-VCI, 70 V-100, 46 M-113.
Arty: how: 120: 105mm: 70: 40 M-56, 30 M-101; 155mm: 50: 20 MkF3, 20 M-114; 10 M-109 SP.
   MRL: 160mm: 25 LAR SP. Mor: 81mm: 100; 120mm: 85.
ATK: RCL: 106mm. ATGW: SS-11, AS-11.
AD: guns: 50: 20mm: 12 AML S-530 twin SP; 40mm: 38: 18 Breda L/70 towed; 20 M-42A1 twin SP.
   SAM: 4 Roland.
Avn: ac: 1 tpt sqn with 1 BN-2 Islander, 4 IAI-202 Arava, 1 Super King Air, 1 King Air, 8 Cessna 182/206;
   hel: 1 sqn with 12 Bell (2 206, 7 UH-1H, 3 205) 8 A-109 ATK, 4 AS-61D.
(On order: 18 40mm L/70 AD system.)

NAVY: 10,000 incl naval air, marines and coast guard (e 4,000 conscripts).
5 Commands (Fleet (unassigned subs and surface vessels), Marines, Naval Avn, Coastguard, River Forces).
5 sqns: sub, frigate, patrol, amph, service.
Bases: Caracas (HQ), Puerto Cabello, La Guaira, Puerto de Hierro, Punto Fijo, Puerto La Cruz, El Amparo (HQ Arauca River).
Subs: 3: 2 Type 1300; 1 Guppy III (harbour trg).
Frigates: 6 Sucre (Lupo) FFG with 8 Otomat SSM, 1x8 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 1 AB-212 hel.
Amph: 7: 4 LST, 1 LSM, 2 LCU.
Spt: 3 transports.

NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,500);
6 combat ac, 6 armed hel.
MR: 1 sqn with 6 S-2E Tracker ac.
ASW: 1 hel sqn (afloat) with 6 AB-212AS.
SAR: 1 sqn with 4 CASA C-212/200MR.
Tpt: 1 sqn with 1 DHC-7, 1 HS-748, 1 Super King Air 200, 3 Cessna (2 310R/Q, 1 402).

MARINES: (5,200).
4 bn gps.
1 arty bn: 3 fd btys; 1 AA bty.
1 amph veh bn.
1 river patrol unit.
Spt units: 1 engr, 1 sigs, 1 tpt.
Naval Police: 1 regt.
Para-cdo: 2 units.
Equipment:
APC: 11 LVTP-7 (to be mod to -7A1), 30 EE-11 Urutu, 10 Fuchs/Transportpanzer 1.
Arty: how: 105mm: 18.
AA: guns: 40mm: 6 M-42 twin SP.

COAST GUARD: (?800).
Frigates (patrol vessels): 2 Almirante Clemente.
FAC: 6 Vosper 121-ft: 2 msl, 4 gun.
Patrol: 2 Cherokee.
(On order: 1river patrol boat; 2 tpt ac; 35M-41Clttks.)

AIR FORCE: 5,000 (some conscripts); 94 combat ac in 10 Air Groups, no armed hel.
Bbr/recce: 1 Air Group with 19 Canberra B-82, B(I)-82, PR-83, T-84.
Interceptor/FGA: 3 Air Gps:
   1 with 15F-5A, 2F-5D;
   1 with 11 Mirage (4 IIIEV, 5 -5V, 2 -5DV);
   1 with 24 F-16A/B.
COIN: 1 Air Gp with 11 OV-10E Bronco.
Presidential flight: ac: 1 Boeing 737, 1 Learjet, 2 Gulfstream (1 II, 1 III). hel: 2 UH-1H.
Tpt: 1 Air Gp with 5 C-130H, 5 C-47 (DC-3), 8 G-222.
VIP/administration tpt: 2 Air Gps: ac: 22: 3 King Air, 9 Queen Air, 10 Cessna (8 182N; 2 Citation).
   hel: 26: 12 Alouette III, 10 UH-1D/H, 4A-109A.
Trg: 1 Air Gp (1 more to form) with 19 T-2D Buckeye (12 armed), 30 EMB-312 Tucano, 23 T-34 Mentor (12 Jet Provost stored ?serviceable).
AAM: R-530 Magic, AIM-9P Sidewinder.
1 para bn.
(On order. 15 F-5A ftrs, 24 IA-58 Pucara (6 trg), 4 F-5B, 16 Bell 206, 4 A-109A hel.)

NATIONAL GUARD: Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacidn20,000 (internal security, customs).
Equipment:
AFV: MICV: 25 UR-416. APC: 15 Shorland.
Mor: 60mm: 120.
Avn: ac: 23: 3 IAI-201 Arava, 1 BN-2 Islander, 1 King Air B-90, 3 Queen Air B-80, 15 Cessna, hel: 16: 4 A-109A, 12 Bell (6 47J, 5 206B, 1 206L);
Coastal patrol craft: 65: 26 Type-A, 12 Bertram, 10 Lago, 15 Monark (Bertram), 2 other.


TABLES


   Табл.1. СРЕДСТВА ДОСТАВКИ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ: ПО ВСЕМУ МИРУ
   []
   []
   []
   []
   []
   []
   []
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a. Дальность в км; для морских миль разделите на 1,852. Использование максимальной полезной нагрузки может уменьшить рабочую дальность ракеты до 25% приведенных цифр. Цифры для самолетов теоретический максимум дальность полета без дозаправки на оптимальной высоте и скорости. Высшая скорость, меньшие высоты и полная боевая нагрузка уменьшают дальность действия, особенно для ударных самолетов, например для А-6, на рабочей высоте и скорости и максимальной боевой нагрузкой, боевой радиус составит 1,870 км, по сравнению с максидальной дальностью 4,700 км.
b. Throw-weight - вес головной части после разгона (боеголовки(ок), системы наведения, средства проникновения), доставляемого нa данную дальность. Цифра максимального веса системы под вопросом и не обязательно совместимы с приведеннойй максимальной дальностью.
c. КВО (круговое вероятное отклонение) = радиус окружности вокруг цели, в рамках которой существует 50% вероятность того, что оружие, нацеленное на эту цель, упадет. По понятным причинам, эта цифра с довольно большой степенью неопределенности.
d. Мощьности боеголовок сильно различаются; приведенные цифры оцениваются по максимуму. KT range = до 1MT; MT range = более 1 MT.
e. Приведенные числа представляют собой совокупность теоретически ядерных потенциалов. Не обязательно для использования в ядерной роли, и на практика сравнительно немногие из них будут ипользоваться в ядерной роли одновременно.
f. Переменная дальность; некоторые для периферийных целей.
g. Все перечисленные типы двойного назначения. В NATO показаны только самолеты, которые оборудованы для ядерной роли; в Варшавском договоре самолеты теоритически способные к ядерной роли.
h. Кроме французского и британского оружия, ядерные боеголовки для этих средств доставки поставляют американцы. Нет ядерных боеголовок на территории Канады, Дании или Норвегии. В некоторых случаях М-109, вероятно, будет играть ядерную роль.
i. Все ракеты НАТО американского происхождения, кроме SSBS, Pluton и MSBS (французского).
j. Nimrod британского происхождения; F-4, F-16, F-104, P-3 американского; Mirage, Super Etendard, Atlantic французского; Jaguar англо-французского; Tornado британско-немецко-итальянского.
k. Ядерные боеголовки находятся под контролем Советского Союза. Самолеты все советское происхождение. Неясно, насколько многие из них действительно обладают ядерным потенциалом.

Табл.2. ЯДЕРНЫЕ ВООРУЖЕНИЯ ТЕАТРА: НАТО / ВАРШАВСКИЙ ДОГОВОР
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a. Сведения о производительности системы см. В Таблице 1.
b. Территории ФРГ, стран Бенилюкса, ГДР, Польши и Чехословакии.
c. Также классифицируется как БРСД; подлежит контролю над вооружениями в рамках переговоров по РСМД.
d. Крылатая ракета береговой обороны дальностью 450 км; не подлежит переговорам по контролю над вооружениями в рамках РСМД.
e. Также классифицируется как БРМД; подпадает под контроль над вооружениями в рамках РСМД
переговоры.
f. Количества и развертывание SS-23 неизвестно, но как полагают все к западу от Урала. Общие агрегированные количества советских SS-23
и пусковые установки Scud: NGA, 76; от Атлантики до Урала, 495; Всего, 600.
g. Разбивка холдингов союзников приведена в Таблице 1.
h. Совокупное число всех теоретически ядерных типов.
i. В т.ч. в Испании.
j. Исключая стратегические бомбардировщики дальнего действия и военно-морские бомбардировщики наземного базирования.
Данные НАТО включают только самолеты, который, как полагают, поготовлены для ядерной роли; цифры Варшавского договора для всех самолетов с теоретическим ядерным потенциалом.
k. Также регулярно базируются 165 стратегических бомбардировщиков дальнего радиуса действия западнее Урала.
l. 400 американских боеголовок Poseidon также назначены ВГК ОВС НАТО в Европе.
m. Предполагает пропорциональное развертывание судов, вооруженных КРМБ в европейских и Атлантических водах.
n. Исключая самолеты S-3, которые подсчитаны в цифре ПЛО.

   Табл.3. ОСНОВНЫЕ ИДЕНТИФИЦИРОВАННЫЕ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ О ПРОДАЖЕ ОРУЖИЯ ИЮЛЬ 1986-ИЮНЬ 1987 ГОДОВ
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   Табл.4. ВОЕННЫЕ ЛЮДСКИЕ РЕСУРСЫ
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   Табл.5. ГЛОБАЛЬНАЯ СЕРИЯ РАСХОДОВ НА ОБОРОНУ
   (в миллионах текущей местной валюты (т. е.) долл. США в ценах 1980 года и в процентах от национального ВВП)
В этой таблице показаны тенденции расходов на оборону за последние 30 лет. Там, где это возможно, мы использовали фактические общие расходы на оборону (т. е. оперативные и капитальные затраты), но в некоторых случаях приходилось рассчитывать расходы. Некоторые страны были исключены либо потому, что их расходы на оборону являются относительно незначительными, либо потому, что недостаточно надежных данных для построения стоящего временного ряда.
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a. Советские цифры - это официально объявленные бюджеты, конвертированные в цены 1980 года и доллары. Эти цифры, как правило, считаются заниженными (см. стр.29-32 для полного обсуждения и западных оценок). Процентная доля от ВНП соответствует западным оценкам.
Для несоветских стран Варшавского договора данные о расходах на оборону официально объявленные бюджеты (за исключением бюджетов Болгарии, которые являются сметами). Недавние исследования показывают, что эти бюджеты "содержат большинство основных компонентов военных расходов: персонал, закупки, операции и техническое обслуживание и, возможно, строительство" (Кит Крейн, Военные расходы в Восточной Европе, Rand, R-3444-USDP, май 1987 года). Для Чехословакии и Польши уни (Усвояемый Национальный Доход) используется вместо ВВП; для Болгарии и ГДР NMP; и для Венгрии и Румынии ВВП, рассчитанный МВФ.
Для всех стран данные о паритете покупательной способности по состоянию на 1980 год использовались в пересчете на доллары. (Для анализа трудностей конвертации валют Варшавского договора в доллары, см. Павел Марэр ВВП в долларах СССР и Восточной Европы (Вашингтон, округ Колумбия:Университет Джонса Хопкинса UP, 1985.)
b. Все расходы НАТО на оборону определяются в соответствии с определением НАТО (см. 5), за исключением Испании, где используются данные национального бюджета за 1983, 1984-1985 годы.
c. Кроме помощи Западному Берлину.
d. Миллиарды.
e. Валовый Материальный Продукт.
f. Цифры за 1955-1970 годы в тысячах новых шекелей; 1975-1985 годы в миллионах новых шекелей.
g. Ливия не публиковала оборонных бюджетов более десяти лет. Поэтому все цифры являются оценочными и весьма предварительными.
h. Вместо ВВП используется национальный доход; см. стр.145 для обсуждения финансовых затрат китайской обороны.
i. Цифры за 1955-1975 годы, выраженные в миллионах песо Нуэво, введены 1 января 1970 года; 1978-85 в тысячах астралос, введенных в июне 1985 года.
j. Цифры для 1955-84 в миллионах песо; 1985 в миллионов боливиано.
k. Цифры для 1955-84 в миллионах после 1967 крузеро; 1985 в миллионах крузадо.

ANALYSES


Estimating the Strategic Nuclear Balance

   In estimating any balance of military forces, it is necessary first to decide the specific aim, since the methods of calculation and assumptions will vary according to the purpose to be served. So far as methods are concerned, some relatively simple purposes can be satisfied by comparing static aggregations of weaponry; more complex aims, such as determining the outcomes of nuclear exchanges, will demand dynamic analysis. But whether static or dynamic, any analysis of the strategic nuclear balance will depend critically on the assumptions made as to:
   - what systems will be included and excluded
   - which of these systems will be counted
   - what numbers of weapons will be assigned to each nuclear system.*
   As to the systems to be included as 'strategic', the US and the Soviet Union agreed to a number of definitions in the SALT I and SALT II treaties. There is currently no controversy about the systems to be included under these definitions. In the Table opposite, the systems defined as strategic are those in SALT I and SALT II with the FB-111A and Backfire bombers excluded, as well as SLCM and US forward-based systems (or FBS).
   In the SALT treaties, both sides agreed that all launchers for strategic systems would be counted except those for testing and training. This is the definition used in the Table for counting the launchers to be assigned to the strategic systems, with one exception: the older US moth-balled bombers are excluded. No discount is made for operational readiness or for systems converted to conventional missions.
   The most difficult task in estimating the strategic nuclear balance is assigning nuclear warheads to the launchers of strategic systems. The impossibility of knowing or verifying the operational loadings of individual systems makes it necessary to assign warheads through elaborate counting rules. The SALT II rules for ballistic missile warheads impose a maximum permissible number of MIRV warheads on ICBM and SLBM, and these are used in the Table.
   Defining counting rules for bombers is much more difficult. For heavy bombers, SALT established the number of ALCM to be deployed on cruise missile carriers: for B-52, B-1, Bear or Bison no more than 20 ALCM. The Reagan Administration in its START proposals has called for direct limits on the number of ALCM within an overall ceiling on strategic nuclear warheads. Whether and how such a limit could be verified is not clear. The Table uses the SALTII counting rule for ALCM.
   A variety of formulae have been suggested for counting the gravity bombs and SRAM which heavy bombers carry. SALT II did not place constraints on bomber weapons other than ALCM, and so no counting rules were defined for gravity bombs or SRAM. The Table assumes 12 bombs for B-1 bombers and B-52G/H, 2 for Bear and 4 for Bison.

* For a discussion of the utility of both static and dynamic measures for estimating the strategic nuclear balance, as well as a description of the considerations involved in making these assumptions, see The Military Balance 1986-1987, pp. 218-221.

Оценка стратегического ядерного баланса

   При оценке любого баланса вооруженных сил необходимо сначала определить конкретную цель, поскольку методы расчета и допущения будут варьироваться в зависимости от цели, которой они будут служить. Что касается методов, то некоторые относительно простые цели могут быть достигнуты путем сравнения статических совокупностей вооружений; более сложные цели, такие, как определение результатов ядерных обменов, потребуют динамического анализа. Но будь то статический или динамический, любой анализ стратегического ядерного баланса будет критически зависеть от допущений относительно:
   - какие системы будут включены и исключены
   - какая из этих систем будет учитываться
   - какое количество оружия будет присвоено каждой ядерной системе.*
   Что касается систем, которые должны быть включены в качестве "стратегических", то США и Советский Союз согласились с рядом определений в договорах ОСВ I и ОСВ II. В настоящее время нет никаких разногласий относительно систем, которые должны быть включены в эти определения. В таблице напротив системы, определенные как стратегические, относятся к системам ОСВ I и ОСВ II, за исключением бомбардировщиков FB-111A и Backfire, а также КРМБ и американских систем передового базирования (или FBS).
   В договорах по ОСВ обе стороны согласились, что все пусковые установки для стратегических систем будут учитываться, за исключением пусковых установок для испытаний и обучения. Это определение используется в таблице для подсчета пусковых установок, которые будут назначены стратегическим системам, за одним исключением: старые американские бомбардировщики на консервации исключены. Не делается никаких скидок на оперативную готовность или на системы, преобразованные для обычных миссий.
   Наиболее сложной задачей при оценке стратегического ядерного баланса является отнесение ядерных боеголовок к пусковым установкам стратегических систем. Невозможность знать или проверять оперативные нагрузки отдельных систем обусловливает необходимость назначения боеголовок с помощью сложных правил подсчета. Правила ОСВ II для боеголовок баллистических ракет устанавливают максимально допустимое количество боеголовок MIRV на МБР и БРПЛ, и они используются в таблице.
   Гораздо сложнее определить правила подсчета для бомбардировщиков. Для тяжелых бомбардировщиков ОСВ установила количество КРВБ, которые должны быть развернуты на ракетоносцах: для B-52, B-1, Bear или Bison не более 20 КРВБ. Администрация Рейгана в своих предложениях по СНВ призвала к прямым ограничениям числа АЛКМ в рамках общего потолка стратегических ядерных боеголовок. Неясно, можно ли и каким образом проверить такой предел. В таблице используется правило подсчета ОСВ II для КРВБ.
   Были предложены различные формулы для подсчета бомб и SRAM, которые несут тяжелые бомбардировщики. ОСВ II не накладывала ограничений на оружие бомбардировщиков, кроме КРВБ, и поэтому правила подсчета не были определены для бомб или SRAM. Таблица предполагает 12 бомб для бомбардировщиков В-1 и B-52G/H, 2 для Bear и 4 для Bison.

* Обсуждение полезности как статических, так и динамических мер для оценки стратегического ядерного баланса, а также описание соображений, связанных с этими предположениями, см. В военном балансе 1986-1987 годов, стр.218-221.
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The Conventional Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact


   For twenty years the IISS has included in The Military Balance a section on the East-West conventional balance in Europe, presenting levels of forces and equipment on the two sides and, since the 1981-1982 edition, providing force ratios. This comparison has been much quoted, but also at times misrepresented. Recent events - including progress towards the signing of an INF agreement, the prospect of a new round of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, debates over NATO's military spending and modernization requirements, and proposals for modifying or even radically altering NATO strategy - have all focused increased attention on the issue of the balance of forces in Europe.
   In the light of these developments, the Institute has decided to adopt a different approach to presenting the conventional military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This essay will examine the various reasons for attempting to assess what is commonly called the 'balance' of military forces, discuss some of the considerations which should inform such attempts, and describe several methodologies that might be employed, together with their limitations. A summary table of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces is included at the end, drawn from the country entries. No single overall conclusion or assessment of the 'balance' will, however, be offered.
   Why Attempt to Measure the Balance?
   There are a variety of possible reasons for attempting to assess the relationship between the conventional military forces of the two blocs in Europe. It is critical for any analysis to understand the range of these potential reasons, since the data and methodology that are appropriate will differ depending on the reason chosen.
   Analysis may be designed to assess relative force effectiveness, either to judge the ability of one side to deter aggression by the other, or to determine the likely outcome of conflict over a chosen period of time. Force comparisons, and the areas of vulnerability they disclose, can be useful in assigning priorities for investment in defence and for choosing whether to spend scarce resources on defence or other programmes. The arms controller may need to assess the relative capabilities and vulnerabilities of military forces on both sides, with a view to identifying possible measures to reduce tension and promote stability. Political leaders, East and West, sometimes use assessments of the 'balance' selectively to rally public support for their foreign and defence policies.
   No single approach is likely to prove useful for all purposes. Indeed, it is a misnomer to speak of a single, overall 'balance'. Although, for ease of exposition, the term 'balance' is retained in this essay, it should be clearly understood that the word refers to the complex of interrelationships between the two sides' forces.
   What We Ought to Compare
   After defining the purpose to be served, the first step in constructing an approach to assessing the balance is to decide what should be compared, and with what.
   Static comparisons of like versus like - weighing each side's holdings of comparable weapon systems against the other's - have been widely criticized as irrelevant and potentially misleading. This conclusion is generally valid. In the case of arms control, however, because future treaty limitations will almost certainly be denned in terms of categories of forces and equipment, static comparisons will undoubtedly be used in evolving proposals and coming to assessments of the results. What it is important to remember is that such comparisons provide only partial illumination as to relative force capabilities.
   NATO has never sought to build a conventional force structure that is a one-for-one match for the Warsaw Pact's, in part because its strategy is designed to deter a Warsaw Pact attack through a combination of conventional defence and the threat of nuclear escalation. Unless one is prepared to argue that NATO ought to have the same strategy as the Warsaw Pact (and that the Pact has chosen the optimum force structure for achieving that strategy), it is not particularly relevant that NATO may be numerically inferior in certain categories of weapons. Moreover, some like-to-like comparisons totally miscategorize the relevant mission - for example, the number of ASW systems NATO requires is not a function of how many ASW systems the Warsaw Pact has, but rather of how many submarines the ASW systems must contend with.
   In addition, to understand the effectiveness of military forces, the synergy between military forces and weapons must be taken into account. The ground battle will not be fought in isolation; it will be influenced very directly by the capabilities of the air forces and air defences of both sides. Developments at sea will also affect the land battle, especially if the conflict is extended and its outcome will depend upon reinforcement and resupply.
   Assumptions
   The next step in constructing an approach to assessing the balance is to specify the assumptions. Conclusions about the balance are highly dependent on the assumptions employed.
   In developing static comparisons, the most important questions which must be answered are:
   - Which military forces will be included and excluded?
   - How will the forces be aggregated for comparison, in terms both of geographical dimensions (e.g. an overall European theatre, or separate fronts and flanks) and of categories of equipment (e.g. combat aircraft, or sub-categories such as interceptors, attack aircraft, etc.)?
   - How (if at all) will the readiness and combat capability of equipment or formations be introduced?
   Dynamic analysis, designed to investigate what might actually happen if war were to occur, is even more critically dependent upon a wide range of assumptions. These include:
   - The scenario. Why has the conflict begun? What are the political and military objectives of each side? What, if anything, is happening in other theatres (particularly in those which might divert resources otherwise available for operations in Europe)?
   - Critical time factors. What time has elapsed between the start of mobilization by one side and the response of the other side? How quickly can the forces mobilize and deploy? How long after the start of mobilization does combat begin?
   - Participating forces. In the case of NATO, what role will French and Spanish forces play, and what access to their bases will US forces have for reinforcement? For the Warsaw Pact, will the East European allies fight alongside their Soviet counterparts, and for how long?
   - The nature of the combat. What will be the tempo of battle (in terms of rates of fire, attrition, etc.)? What is the likely relationship between offence and defence, given the terrain and each side's ability to mass troops? How will equipment, personnel, C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) systems, etc., perform in actual combat?
   Many of the aspects requiring assumptions are interactive. Thus, while some errors in assumptions will probably be self-cancelling, others - especially in any dynamic analysis or gaming - will be cumulative, or even multiplicative. Ideally, therefore, analysis should explore the full range of reasonable assumptions for each relevant factor and thus produce a variety of potential outcomes.
   Assessing the Intangibles
   Efforts to characterize the military balance inevitably face the problem of quantifying factors that are difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Over the years, The Military Balance has identified a number of such factors: including quality of units or equipment, geography, doctrine, military technology, deployment, training, logistic support, morale, leadership, tactical initiative, terrain, weather, political will, alliance cohesion and interoperability. Some analysts have argued that these factors far outweigh more common numerical indicators. 'Battle outcomes are quite insensitive to force ratio... The available historical evidence indicates that, short of huge force disparities, the dominant aspects of combat capability are training and tactics'.1 Some of these factors may be especially important to the European balance, for NATO, according to some analysts, has the edge in leadership, training and morale and invests considerable resources in what are known as 'force multipliers' such as C3I and surveillance. These intangibles seem inherently incapable of meaningful quantification. Others, such as technology and logistic support, will be difficult but perhaps not impossible to quantify.
   Evaluating the Data
   Even relatively tangible variables - such as numbers of tanks or personnel - are subject to varying degrees of confidence in the accuracy of the data. For example, data on NATO forces is likely to be more accurate than that on the Warsaw Pact, and, for Warsaw Pact forces, data on the Central Region is more accurate than for the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union. Some analysts capture this uncertainty by assigning a range of values to each variable.
   Alternative Approaches to Assessing the Balance
   A number of analysts both in and out of government have attempted to build models to capture elements of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance. The models fall into two broad categories of approach: those that present static comparisons of forces, but attempt to provide a more sophisticated measure of force capability; and those involving dynamic modelling that explore the interaction of the two opposing forces. Each progresses beyond the simple static comparison or 'bean-counts', but each also has it own limitations, principally relating to the inevitably debatable nature of the assumptions used.
   Enhanced Static Comparisons
   In the past, one of the elements tabulated for comparison in The Military Balance has been the number of divisions on each side. As we have acknowledged, 'divisions are not a standard formation between armies', they differ in size, equipment and combat readiness. For this reason The Military Balance has included aggregate data on quantities of equipment to give some measure of the firepower and combat capability of forces.
   Some analysts have gone one step further, to create indices of combat capability for whole formations. Such an approach uses assessments of firepower capabilities derived from more or less authoritative estimates of weapon effectiveness to bring all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces onto a common basis for comparative purposes. They also assign separate values for each force depending on whether it is operating in offence or defence. The outcome has typically been expressed in such units of measurement as 'Armoured Division Equivalents',2 'firepower units',3 'Standard Division Equivalents' and 'Heavy Division Equivalents'.4 This approach can lead to results that differ considerably from raw divisional counts. For example, in the studies cited, the Warsaw Pact advantage is reduced.
   While establishing common units of measurement should facilitate more meaningful comparisons between force capabilities, such units are not without limitations. They necessarily ignore most of the significant intangibles (training, leadership, morale, etc.). They require continuous updating; force effectiveness alters with every equipment update or structural change, and changes on one side (e.g. equipping Soviet tanks with reactive armour) will change the effectiveness of the other side's equipment (e.g. NATO's anti-tank weapons). Moreover, any attempt to grade force effectiveness against uniform standards of offensive and defensive capability is likely to require somewhat sweeping assumptions about the mix of combat circumstances typical of each role, and also to pose the difficult problem of how to take proper account of the differing tactical concepts and practices of national forces.
   This approach to comparing force capabilities can be enhanced to distinguish combat-ready in-place forces from those which must be mobilized and deployed. Given data, or assumptions, about realistic force mobilization rates, and using a common unit of measurement, one can plot over time the growing availability of in-theatre ground and air force capabilities for each side. The force ratios can be calculated for any point in time, and the implications can be seen of delays between Warsaw Pact and NATO mobilization, or between mobilization and the start of hostilities. Such an approach has been developed for division equivalents by Andrew Hamilton and for tanks by Anthony Cordesman.5
   A notable difficulty in such analyses is that experts differ considerably in their estimates of how quickly Soviet divisions in the 'non-ready' category could be manned, trained and deployed, as well as of how soon NATO's reinforcing divisions would arrive. While Cordesman's tank study assumes the availability of Soviet Category II divisions at about M+30 days, and Category III divisions at M+130, the author notes that 'other US and most European experts feel. . . that the USSR would rely on mass and ignore problems of training and the ability to fight as a cohesive unit. They credit Category II units with almost immediate combat capability once they fully mobilize - something that requires 48-96 hours'. Uncertainties of this magnitude significantly diminish the utility of the analysis for resolving questions of relative capability.
   Yet another key aspect of static force comparisons is sustainability - an advantage in tank numbers is illusory if the ammunition or fuel to sustain them is lacking. Comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in this respect are difficult: stock levels are not generally made public, and expenditure rates will be highly dependent upon the intensity of combat. Comparisons are further complicated by the fact that offensive and defensive operations may have differing logistic requirements for ammunition and fuel.
   Dynamic Measures
   Although the static models described provide additional data on capabilities, they do not examine the interaction between the two forces, and so do not help the analyst seeking to understand 'how well' NATO might reasonably be expected to perform. This is a critical deficiency in the European context, where NATO's goal is not necessarily parity in a particular measure of capability, however sophisticated, but rather an appropriate degree of ability to resist an attack.
   Analysts have long employed criteria based on force ratios to judge the probability of an attack succeeding. The two best-known sources are the Lanchester 'concentration of firepower' approach (which suggests that, other things - terrain considerations, training, morale, etc. - being equal, offense and defence are equally matched at 1.4:1) and the long-standing military rule of thumb reflected in the 1976 edition of the US Army manual Operations: FM 100-5, which suggests that the defence can hold against an attack at a ratio of 3:1. Other analysts have argued in favour of force ratios from as little as 1.2:1 to as much as 5:1 or 6:1. (It is, however, notable that the in-theatre balance of forces at the time of the successful 1940 German offensive on the Western Front was approximately 1:1, and that operations in the Falkland Islands appear similarly to lie outside the theoretical norms.) Any effort to devise a reliable rule of thumb therefore has its pitfalls, with the danger that such key factors as the ability to use surprise and deception, or to exploit a key vulnerability of the other side (for example by destroying vital command and control nodes), may affect the outcome totally independently of the ratio of the two sides' combat capability. It is also important to keep in mind that, insofar as force ratios may be relevant to the outcome, it is likely to be local, rather than theatre-wide, ratios that are determinative.
   Some analysts both inside and outside governments have constructed more complex models involving the interaction of military forces in Central Europe. Some are interested in assessing how successful NATO would be in resisting a Warsaw Pact conventional attack; others use the models to define requirements for ammunition stocks and war reserve materials, while yet others focus on sectors of the Front to decide how best to allocate scarce resources between different kinds of new equipment: e.g. helicopters or tanks.
   Dr Richard Kugler has developed the 'Attrition/FEBA Expansion Model', which the US Department of Defense has used as part of its programming and budgeting review process, and Dr Barry Posen has applied this to the scenario of a concentration of Warsaw Pact forces attacking along three corridors into West Germany - seeking to assess the likelihood of a Pact breakthrough (or, conversely, a successful NATO resistance).6 His analysis takes into account relative combat potential (using Armoured Division Equivalents), time (mobilization rates), the 'pace' of combat (attrition rates) and the ratios of force to space and advance rates, as well as the effect of tactical aviation on the ground battle.
   This model uses a number of simplifying assumptions, the uncertain validity of which the author explicitly recognizes. Tactical skill and innovation is ignored, and so is the potentially very significant factor of terrain. Also, the model gives a poor representation of the situation as it would exist in a surprise attack with only a few days of mobilization - that is, before NATO could establish a true defensive line. Perhaps most important, the analysis is highly sensitive to the values assigned to the variables, which are a matter of considerable debate. It does, however, have the advantage of treating NATOand Warsaw Pact forces alike in one case, and then introducing a second case in which NATO is credited with a 'combat enhancement factor' to reflect assumed advantages in command, control, communications and logistics. The model also has scope to allow for variations in the delay between Warsaw Pact and NATO M-Days, and between both of these and the start of combat operations.
   Andrew Hamilton has constructed a different dynamic model, which also seeks to establish the number of NATO forces required to halt a Warsaw Pact attack by looking at two principal variables. The first of these is 'relative tactical effectiveness' (the 'local ratio of attackers at which the defense will have a better than even probability of defeating an attack'). The second is an 'efficiency index' (the fraction of available NATO operational reserves which can be moved to shore up sectors under heaviest attack).
   William Kaufman has constructed yet a third model to try to determine the probability of a Warsaw Pact success - which he defines as a breakthrough sufficient to make substantial territorial gains in the Federal Republic of Germany and eventually defeat NATO. He also seeks to show the degree of Warsaw Pact penetration after seven days of combat, using a number of variables: the days of mobilization before attack, the type of attack (broad front or concentrated), whether there has been strategic delay in reacting to Warsaw Pact mobilization, tactical error in responding to the specific axis of Warsaw Pact attack, and the existence of barriers along the inter-German border.
   In an effort to transcend some of the limitations of the simple dynamic models discussed above, the Strategy Assessment Center of the Rand Corporation in California has begun to develop complex simulation models to assess such key elements as command and control, logistics, the interconnection among elements of combinedarm forces, high technology, barrier defences and the impact of alternative operational strategies (e.g. mobile defences). Through the development of'automated' war-gaming, Rand is able to integrate the contextual richness of wargaming (and its feel of operational realism) with the predictive power of analytic modelling. Rand's approach allows for multi-scenario analysis (beyond the simple variables of warning time and rate of mobilization), permitting the analyst or policy-maker to manipulate a broad range of variables and assess their effect on outcomes. Its model employs 'scripted scenarios', to allow consideration of contingencies (e.g. an early Warsaw Pact breakthrough) outside the scope of models that depend on averaged values (such as the Attrition/FEBA expansion model).7
   Defining a satisfactory model for assessing the results of a dynamic interchange of military forces is obviously an important task, but the wide range of 'answers' derived from the models, coupled with their high degree of sensitivity to critical assumptions, underlines the difficulty of producing meaningful results. Indeed it is probably fair to say of analysis, modelling and gaming of the types described above that, although they can be very useful in elucidating relative aspects of force comparisons - such as whether and how much NATO benefits from equipment upgrades and force structure and doctrine changes (the principal aim of such analyses in defence establishments) - it is extremely doubtful whether they can produce dependable absolute answers to questions such as who wins, or how long a defence can hold.
   The preceding discussion has focused on problems of assessing the interrelationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, but the issues are applicable outside the European theatre as well, and models developed for this context can be adapted to other regional settings. Although the scenario of bipolar conflict in Europe in some respects makes the analysis easier, it is important to remember that the models do not take into account the possible role of neutral states - which in some cases (for example, Finland and Sweden on the Northern Flank) could have a significant impact on the outcome of a conflict.
   NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces
   In the light of the considerations discussed above, the IISS has decided not to present any overall judgments of the state of the conventional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is not to differ with the conclusions in earlier editions of The Military Balance that under a wide range of circumstances general military aggression is a high-risk option with unpredictable consequences, particularly where the possibility of nuclear escalation exists. Nonetheless, it is important to underline that a numerical comparison of the forces presented in this volume cannot by itself answer basic questions about the relative capabilities of each side's forces to perform their required mission.
   In using the data in the The Military Balance 1987-1988, it is important to keep all the foregoing factors and considerations in mind - especially when seeking to draw any conclusions from the Tables which follow.
   The first of these, Table A, provides aggregated data on NATO and Warsaw Pact military manpower and key equipment, derived from the relevant country entries. This table has been designed with conventional arms-control negotiations in mind (since it is in this context that static comparisons of aggregated figures may be of greatest relevance and utility) and shows the relevant holdings of ground forces and land-based air forces within three geographical areas:
   - the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA), consisting of the area under discussion in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations. This comprises the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries for NATO; the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia for the Warsaw Pact.
   - the Atlantic-to-Urals area now subject to the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) recently negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at Stockholm, and likely to be the subject of further CSBM and force-reduction/stability negotiations. For the purposes of this table, the 'zone of application' of the Stockholm agreement is used, with the exception that all Turkish forces are included. For NATO, this means that Iceland and the Atlantic islands are included, and for the Warsaw Pact, Soviet forces in the Moscow, Volga, Ural, North and Trans-Caucusus Military Districts (as well as the Western, North-Western and Southwestern TVDs).
   - Global holdings include all forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, even those committed to other theatres of operation (e.g. US forces in Korea, Soviet forces in Vietnam, French forces in Chad, etc.).
   Maritime forces (naval and air) are aggregated on two geographical bases:
   'Atlantic/European' - which comprises forces in the Atlantic and European waters north of the Tropic of Cancer and the Mediterranean, including the Soviet Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and Mediterranean squadron; for the US it includes all forces belonging to CINCLANT.
   'Global' comprises all holdings of NATOand Warsaw Pact countries, wherever deployed.
   With a view to enhancing the picture presented by the static comparison in Table A, Table B seeks to make possible a better comparison of relative tank capabilities by providing data on certain key indicia of capability for the tanks in the NATOand Warsaw Pact forces. Although tank capabilities are highly dependent on the circumstances of the engagement, tactics and the skills of crew, this data provides a somewhat more complete portrait of the the two sides' tank holdings than the simple aggregation in the main force-structure comparison.

1 Jack N. Merritt and Pierre M. Sprey, 'Negative Marginal Returns in Weapon Acquisition', in Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke (eds), American Defense Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1973).
2 William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (Washington DC: Brookings, 1983).
3 William W. Kaufmann, 'Non-Nuclear Deterrence', in John D. Steinbrunner and Leon V. Sigal (eds), Alliance Security and the No-First-Use Question (Washington DC: Brookings, 1983).
4 Andrew Hamilton, 'Redressing the Conventional Balance' in International Security, Summer 1985.
5 'The Nato Central Region and the Balance of Uncertainty', in Armed Forces Journal International, July 1983.
6 'Measuring the European Conventional Balance' International Security, Winter 1984/5.
7 See Paul K. Davis, 'Game Structured Analysis as a Framework for Defense Planning', in R.K. Huber (ed.) Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe (New York: Plenum, 1986).

Обычные силы НАТО и Варшавского Договора


   В течение двадцати лет IISS включала в Военный баланс раздел, посвященный обычному балансу между Востоком и Западом в Европе, в котором представлены уровни сил и техники с обеих сторон и, начиная с издания 1981-1982 годов, приводятся соотношения сил. Это сравнение часто цитируется, но иногда и искажается. Недавние события, включая прогресс в подписании соглашения по РСМД, перспективу нового раунда переговоров по сокращению обычных вооруженных сил в Европе, дебаты по военным расходам и требованиям модернизации НАТО, а также предложения по изменению или даже радикальному изменению стратегии НАТО, - все это привлекло повышенное внимание к вопросу о балансе сил в Европе.
   В свете этих событий институт решил принять иной подход к представлению обычных вооруженных сил НАТО и Варшавского договора. В этом эссе будут рассмотрены различные причины попыток оценить то, что обычно называют "балансом" вооруженных сил, обсуждены некоторые соображения, которые должны лежать в основе таких попыток, и описаны несколько методологий, которые могут быть использованы, вместе с их ограничениями. В конце приводится сводная таблица обычных сил НАТО и Варшавского договора, составленная на основе данных по странам. Однако единого общего вывода или оценки "баланса" предложено не будет.
   Зачем пытаться измерить баланс?
   Существует множество возможных причин для попытки оценить взаимоотношения между обычными вооруженными силами двух блоков в Европе. Для любого анализа крайне важно понять диапазон этих потенциальных причин, поскольку соответствующие данные и методология будут отличаться в зависимости от выбранной причины.
   Анализ может быть направлен на оценку относительной эффективности сил, либо на оценку способности одной стороны сдерживать агрессию другой, либо на определение вероятного исхода конфликта в течение выбранного периода времени. Сопоставление сил и выявленных ими областей уязвимости может быть полезным при определении приоритетов для инвестиций в оборону и при выборе того, тратить ли скудные ресурсы на оборону или другие программы. Контролеру вооружений, возможно, потребуется оценить относительный потенциал и уязвимость вооруженных сил обеих сторон в целях определения возможных мер по снижению напряженности и содействию стабильности. Политические лидеры Востока и Запада иногда избирательно используют оценки "баланса" для мобилизации общественной поддержки своей внешней и оборонной политики.
   Ни один подход не может оказаться полезным для всех целей. Действительно, неправильно говорить об одном общем "балансе". Хотя для удобства изложения термин "равновесие" в данном эссе сохранен, следует четко понимать, что это слово относится к комплексу взаимосвязей между силами обеих сторон.
   Что мы должны сравнить
   После определения цели, которая должна быть достигнута, первым шагом в построении подхода к оценке баланса является принятие решения о том, что следует сравнивать и с чем.
   Статические сравнения подобного с подобным - взвешивание запасов сопоставимых оружейных систем каждой стороны против запасов другой - широко критиковались как неуместные и потенциально вводящие в заблуждение. Этот вывод в целом справедлив. Однако в случае контроля над вооружениями, поскольку будущие договорные ограничения почти наверняка будут определяться категориями сил и оборудования, статические сопоставления, несомненно, будут использоваться при разработке предложений и при оценке результатов. Важно помнить, что такие сравнения дают лишь частичное представление об относительных силовых возможностях.
   НАТО никогда не стремилась создать структуру обычных вооруженных сил, которая соответствовала бы структуре Варшавского договора один на один, отчасти потому, что ее стратегия предназначена для сдерживания нападения Варшавского договора посредством сочетания обычной обороны и угрозы ядерной эскалации. Если только кто-то не готов утверждать, что НАТО должна иметь ту же стратегию, что и Варшавский пакт (и что пакт выбрал оптимальную структуру сил для достижения этой стратегии), не особенно важно, что НАТО может быть численно уступает в определенных категориях вооружений. Более того, некоторые подобные сравнения полностью искажают соответствующую миссию, например, количество систем противолодочных средств, требуемых НАТО, зависит не от того, сколько систем противолодочных средств имеется в Варшавском договоре, а от того, с каким количеством подводных лодок должны бороться системы противолодочных средств.
   Кроме того, для понимания эффективности вооруженных сил необходимо учитывать синергизм между Вооруженными силами и оружием. Наземное сражение не будет вестись изолированно; на него будут оказывать непосредственное влияние возможности Военно-воздушных сил и ПВО обеих сторон. Развитие событий на море также скажется на сухопутных боях, особенно если конфликт будет затянут и его исход будет зависеть от усиления и пополнения запасов.
   Предположения
   Следующим шагом в построении подхода к оценке баланса является уточнение допущений. Выводы о балансе в значительной степени зависят от используемых допущений.
   При разработке статических сравнений наиболее важными вопросами, на которые необходимо ответить, являются:
   - Какие вооруженные силы будут включены и исключены?
   - Как будут агрегироваться силы для сравнения с точки зрения как географических размеров (например, общий европейский театр военных действий или отдельные фронты и фланги), так и категорий техники (например, боевые самолеты или подкатегории, такие как перехватчики, штурмовики и т.д.)?
   - Как (если вообще) будет введена готовность и боеспособность техники или соединений?
   Динамический анализ, предназначенный для исследования того, что могло бы произойти в случае войны, еще более критически зависит от широкого круга предположений. К ним относятся::
   - Сценарий. Почему начался конфликт? Каковы политические и военные цели каждой из сторон? Что, если вообще что-то, происходит на других театрах (особенно на тех, которые могут отвлечь ресурсы, иначе доступные для операций в Европе)?
   - Критические временные факторы. Сколько времени прошло между началом мобилизации одной стороны и реакцией другой стороны? Как быстро могут быть мобилизованы и развернуты силы? Через какое время после начала мобилизации начинаются боевые действия?
   - Участвующие силы. В случае НАТО, какую роль будут играть французские и испанские силы, и какой доступ к их базам будут иметь силы США для усиления? Будут ли восточноевропейские союзники сражаться за Варшавский договор бок о бок со своими советскими коллегами и как долго?
   - Характер боя. Какой будет темп сражения (с точки зрения скорострельности, потертость, и т. д.)? Какова вероятная связь между наступлением и обороной, учитывая рельеф местности и способность каждой стороны к сосредоточению войск? Как будет вооружение, персонал, системы C3I (командование, управление, связь и разведка)и т. д. выступать в настоящем бою?
   Многие аспекты, требующие предположений, носят интерактивный характер. Таким образом, в то время как некоторые ошибки в предположениях, вероятно, будут самоуничтожающимися, другие-особенно в любом динамическом анализе или игре - будут кумулятивными или даже мультипликативными. Поэтому в идеале анализ должен охватывать весь диапазон разумных предположений по каждому соответствующему фактору и, таким образом, давать различные потенциальные результаты.
   Оценка нематериальных активов
   Усилия по определению военного баланса неизбежно сталкиваются с проблемой количественной оценки факторов, которые трудно, если вообще возможно, измерить. За прошедшие годы Военный баланс выявил ряд таких факторов: качество подразделений или техники, география, доктрина, военная техника, развертывание, подготовка, материально-техническое обеспечение, моральный дух, лидерство, тактическая инициатива, рельеф местности, погода, политическая воля, сплоченность и взаимодействие альянса. Некоторые аналитики утверждают, что эти факторы намного перевешивают более распространенные числовые показатели. Исход битвы совершенно нечувствителен к соотношению сил... Имеющиеся исторические данные свидетельствуют о том, что, за исключением огромных различий в силах, доминирующими аспектами боеспособности являются подготовка и тактика. 1 Некоторые из этих факторов могут быть особенно важны для европейского баланса, поскольку НАТО, по мнению некоторых аналитиков, имеет преимущество в лидерстве, подготовке и моральном духе и инвестирует значительные ресурсы в то, что известно как "мультипликаторы силы", такие как C3I и наблюдение. Эти нематериальные активы, по-видимому, не поддаются количественной оценке. Другие, такие, как технология и материально-техническая поддержка, будут трудными, но, возможно, не невозможными для количественной оценки.
   Оценка данных
   Даже относительно осязаемые переменные - такие, как количество танков или личного состава - в той или иной степени зависят от достоверности данных. Например, данные о силах НАТО, вероятно, будут более точными, чем данные о силах Варшавского договора, а для сил Варшавского договора данные о Центральном регионе более точны, чем для западных военных округов Советского Союза. Некоторые аналитики фиксируют эту неопределенность, присваивая каждой переменной диапазон значений.
   Альтернативные подходы к оценке баланса
   Ряд аналитиков как в правительстве, так и вне его пытались построить модели для баланса НАТО/Варшавского договора. Модели подразделяются на две широкие категории: те, которые представляют статические сравнения сил, но пытаются обеспечить более сложную меру способности силы; и те, которые включают динамическое моделирование, которое исследует взаимодействие двух противоположных сил. Каждый из них выходит за рамки простого статического сравнения или "подсчета бобов", но у каждого также есть свои ограничения, главным образом связанные с неизбежно спорным характером используемых предположений.
   Расширенные Статические Сравнения
   В прошлом одним из элементов, подлежащих сопоставлению в военном балансе, было число дивизий с каждой стороны. Как мы уже признали, "дивизии не являются стандартным формированием между армиями", они различаются по размеру, оснащению и боевой готовности. По этой причине военный баланс включает сводные данные о количестве оборудования для огневой мощи и боеспособности войск.
   Некоторые аналитики пошли еще дальше, создав показатели боеспособности целых соединений. Такой подход использует оценки потенциала огневой мощи, полученные на основе более или менее авторитетных оценок эффективности оружия, для приведения всех сил НАТО и Варшавского договора на общую основу для сравнительных целей. Они также присваивают отдельным силам отдельные значения в зависимости от того, действуют ли они в состоянии нападения или обороны. Результат обычно выражается в таких единицах измерения,как "эквиваленты бронетанковых дивизий",2 "единицы огневой мощи",3 "эквиваленты стандартных дивизий" и "эквиваленты тяжелых дивизий".4 Этот подход может привести к результатам, которые значительно отличаются от сырьевых отделов счету. Например, в приведенных исследованиях преимущество Варшавского договора снижается.
   Хотя установление общих единиц измерения должно способствовать более значимым сопоставлениям между возможностями сил, такие единицы не лишены ограничений. Они обязательно игнорируют большинство важных нематериальных активов (обучение, лидерство, моральный дух и т. д.). Они требуют постоянного обновления; эффективность сил меняется с каждым обновлением оборудования или структурными изменениями, и изменения с одной стороны (например, оснащение советских танков реактивной броней) изменят эффективность оборудования другой стороны (например, противотанковое оружие НАТО). Кроме того, любая попытка сопоставить эффективность сил с единообразными стандартами наступательного и оборонительного потенциала, вероятно, потребует несколько широких предположений о сочетании боевых обстоятельств, характерных для каждой роли, а также создаст трудную проблему того, как должным образом учитывать различные тактические концепции и практику национальных сил.
   Такой подход к сопоставлению возможностей сил может быть усовершенствован, с тем чтобы проводить различие между боеспособными силами на местах и теми, которые должны быть мобилизованы и развернуты. Учитывая данные или предположения о реалистичных темпах мобилизации сил и используя общую единицу измерения, можно со временем построить график растущей доступности наземных и воздушных сил для каждой стороны. Соотношение сил может быть рассчитано для любого момента времени, и можно увидеть последствия задержек между Варшавским договором и мобилизацией НАТО или между мобилизацией и началом военных действий. Такой подход был разработан для эквивалентов дивизий Эндрю Гамильтоном и для танков Энтони Кордесманом.5
   Заметная трудность в таком анализе заключается в том, что эксперты значительно расходятся в своих оценках того, как быстро советские дивизии в категории "неготовые" могут быть укомплектованы, обучены и развернуты, а также как скоро прибудут подкрепляющие дивизии НАТО. В то время как исследование Кордесмана предполагает наличие советских дивизий категории II примерно в течение 30 дней, а дивизий категории III в течение 130 дней, автор отмечает, что " другие американские и большинство европейских экспертов чувствуют. . . что СССР будет опираться на массовость и игнорировать проблемы подготовки и способности воевать как единое целое. Они приписывают подразделениям категории II почти немедленную боеспособность после полной мобилизации , что требует 48-96 часов". Неопределенности такого масштаба значительно снижают полезность анализа для решения вопросов относительной способности.
   Еще одним ключевым аспектом сравнения статических сил является устойчивость - преимущество в количестве танков иллюзорно, если отсутствуют боеприпасы или топливо для их поддержания. В этой связи трудно провести сравнение между НАТО и Варшавским договором: объемы запасов, как правило, не предаются гласности, а уровень расходов будет в значительной степени зависеть от интенсивности боевых действий. Сопоставление еще более осложняется тем фактом, что наступательные и оборонительные операции могут иметь различные материально-технические потребности в боеприпасах и топливе.
   Динамическое Сравнение
   Хотя описанные статические модели предоставляют дополнительные данные о потенциалах, они не изучают взаимодействие между двумя силами и, таким образом, не помогают аналитику, стремящемуся понять, "насколько хорошо" НАТО может разумно ожидать выполнения. Это критический недостаток в европейском контексте, где целью НАТО не обязательно является паритет в определенной мере потенциала, каким бы сложным он ни был, а скорее соответствующая степень способности противостоять нападению.
   Аналитики уже давно используют критерии, основанные на соотношении сил, чтобы судить о вероятности успешного нападения. Два наиболее известных источника - подход Ланчестера "концентрация огневой мощи" (который предполагает, что, другие вещи - соображения местности, обучение, моральный дух и т. д. - будучи равными, нападение и защита в равной степени соответствуют 1.4:1) и давнему военному эмпирическому правилу, отраженному в издании 1976 года "Операции армии США: FM 100-5", которое предполагает, что защита может выдержать атаку в соотношении 3:1. Другие аналитики утверждали в пользу соотношения сил от 1.2:1 до 5:1 или 6:1. (Следует, однако, отметить, что в момент успешного наступления немцев 1940 года на Западном фронте соотношение сил на театре военных действий составляло приблизительно 1:1 и что операции на Фолклендских островах, как представляется, также выходят за рамки теоретических норм.) Любая попытка разработать надежное эмпирическое правило поэтому имеет свои подводные камни, с опасностью, что такие ключевые факторы, как способность использовать неожиданность и обман, или использовать ключевую уязвимость другой стороны (например, путем уничтожения жизненно важных командных и контрольных узлов), может повлиять на исход совершенно независимо от соотношения боевых возможностей обеих сторон. Важно также иметь в виду, что в той мере, в какой соотношение сил может иметь отношение к результату, оно, скорее всего, будет локальным, а не театральным.
   Некоторые аналитики как внутри правительств, так и за их пределами разработали более сложные модели взаимодействия вооруженных сил в Центральной Европе. Некоторые заинтересованы в оценке того, насколько успешно НАТО смогла бы противостоять обычному нападению Варшавского договора; другие используют модели для определения потребностей в запасах боеприпасов и военных резервных материалах, в то время как другие сосредоточиваются на секторах фронта, чтобы решить, как лучше всего распределить скудные ресурсы между различными видами нового оборудования: например, вертолеты или танки.
   Д-р Ричард Куглер разработал "модель истощения/расширения FEBA", которую Министерство обороны США использовало в рамках процесса обзора программирования и бюджета, и д-р Барри Позен применил это к сценарию концентрации сил Варшавского договора, атакующих по трем коридорам в Западную Германию - стремясь оценить вероятность прорыва пакта (или, наоборот, успешного сопротивления НАТО).6 Его анализ учитывает относительный боевой потенциал (с использованием эквивалентов бронетанковой дивизии), время (темпы мобилизации), "темп" боя (темпы истощения) и соотношение сил к пространству и темпам продвижения, а также влияние тактической авиации на наземный бой.
   В данной модели используется ряд упрощающих допущений, неопределенность обоснованности которых автор явно признает. Тактические навыки и инновации игнорируются, а также потенциально очень важный фактор местности. Кроме того, модель дает плохое представление о ситуации, поскольку она существовала бы при внезапном нападении всего за несколько дней мобилизации, то есть до того, как НАТО смогла бы установить настоящую оборонительную линию. Возможно, наиболее важным является то, что анализ весьма чувствителен к значениям, присвоенным переменным, которые являются предметом значительных дебатов. Однако у него есть преимущество в том, что в одном случае он одинаково относится к силам НАТО и Варшавского договора, а затем вводит второй случай, в котором НАТО приписывается "фактор боевого усиления", чтобы отразить предполагаемые преимущества в командовании, управлении, связи и материально-техническом обеспечении. Модель также имеет возможность учитывать различия в задержках между Днем-М Варшавского договора и НАТО, а также между этими днями и началом боевых действий.
   Эндрю Гамильтон построил другую динамическую модель, которая также стремится установить количество сил НАТО, необходимых для отражения атаки Варшавского договора, рассматривая две основные переменные. Первый из них - "относительная тактическая эффективность" ("локальное соотношение атакующих, при котором оборона будет иметь больше, чем даже вероятность поражения атаки"). Во-вторых, это "индекс эффективности" (доля имеющихся оперативных резервов НАТО, которые могут быть перемещены для укрепления секторов в условиях наиболее сильного удара).
   Уильям Кауфман построил еще третью модель, чтобы попытаться определить вероятность успеха Варшавского договора , который он определяет как прорыв, достаточный для того, чтобы добиться существенных территориальных завоеваний в Федеративной Республике Германии и в конечном итоге победить НАТО. Он также стремится показать степень проникновения Варшавского договора после семи дней боевых действий, используя ряд переменных: дни мобилизации перед атакой, тип атаки (широкий фронт или сосредоточенный), была ли стратегическая задержка в реагировании на мобилизацию Варшавского договора, тактическая ошибка в реагировании на конкретную ось атаки Варшавского договора и наличие барьеров вдоль межгерманской границы.
   Стремясь преодолеть некоторые ограничения простых динамических моделей, рассмотренных выше, Центр оценки стратегии корпорации Rand в Калифорнии приступил к разработке сложных имитационных моделей для оценки таких ключевых элементов, как командование и управление, логистика, взаимосвязь между элементами объединенных вооруженных сил, высокие технологии, барьерная оборона и влияние альтернативных оперативных стратегий (например, мобильная оборона). Благодаря развитию "автоматизированных" военных игр Rand может интегрировать контекстное богатство wargaming (и его ощущение операционного реализма) с прогностической силой аналитического моделирования. Подход Рэнд позволяет проводить анализ нескольких сценариев (помимо простых переменных времени предупреждения и скорости мобилизации), позволяя аналитику или разработчику политики манипулировать широким спектром переменных и оценивать их влияние на результаты. Его модель использует "сценарии сценариев", чтобы учитывать непредвиденные обстоятельства (например, ранний прорыв Варшавского договора) вне рамок моделей, которые зависят от усредненных значений (таких как модель истощения/расширения FEBA).7
   Определение удовлетворительной модели для оценки результатов динамического обмена вооруженными силами, очевидно, является важной задачей, однако широкий диапазон "ответов", полученных на основе моделей, в сочетании с их высокой степенью чувствительности к критическим предположениям, подчеркивает трудность получения значимых результатов. Действительно, вероятно, справедливо сказать об анализе, моделировании и играх описанных выше типов, что, хотя они могут быть очень полезны для разъяснения относительных аспектов сравнений сил, таких как, например, извлекает ли и в какой степени НАТО выгоду от модернизации вооружения и изменения структуры сил и доктрины (основная цель такого анализа в оборонных учреждениях), крайне сомнительно, что они могут дать надежные абсолютные ответы на такие вопросы, как кто победит или как долго может продержаться оборона.
   Предыдущее обсуждение было сосредоточено на проблемах оценки взаимосвязи между силами НАТО и Варшавского договора, но эти вопросы применимы и за пределами европейского театра действий, и модели, разработанные для этого контекста, могут быть адаптированы к другим региональным условиям. Хотя сценарий биполярного конфликта в Европе в некоторых отношениях облегчает анализ, важно помнить, что модели не учитывают возможную роль нейтральных государств, которые в некоторых случаях (например, Финляндия и Швеция на северном фланге) могут оказать значительное влияние на исход конфликта.
   Силы НАТО и Варшавского договора
   В свете вышеизложенных соображений IISS решила не представлять каких-либо общих суждений о состоянии обычного баланса между НАТО и Варшавским договором. Это не должно отличаться от выводов, сделанных в предыдущих изданиях Военного баланса, о том, что в широком диапазоне обстоятельств общая военная агрессия является вариантом высокого риска с непредсказуемыми последствиями, особенно там, где существует возможность ядерной эскалации. Тем не менее важно подчеркнуть, что количественное сопоставление сил, представленных в настоящем томе, само по себе не может дать ответа на основные вопросы об относительных возможностях сил каждой стороны выполнять свою требуемую миссию.
   При использовании данных в военном балансе 1987-1988 годов важно учитывать все вышеперечисленные факторы и соображения, особенно при попытках сделать какие - либо выводы из нижеследующих таблиц.
   В первой из них, таблице а, приводятся сводные данные о военном контингенте и ключевом вооружении НАТО и Варшавского договора, полученные на основе данных по соответствующим странам. Эта таблица составлена с учетом переговоров по контролю над обычными вооружениями (поскольку именно в этом контексте статические сопоставления агрегированных данных могут иметь наибольшее значение и полезность) и показывает соответствующие запасы сухопутных войск и сухопутных военно-воздушных сил в трех географических районах.:
   - область руководящих принципов НАТО (NGA), состоящая из области, обсуждаемой в ходе переговоров о взаимном и сбалансированном сокращении сил (МБФР). Она включает Федеративную Республику Германию и страны Бенилюкса для НАТО; Германскую Демократическую Республику, Польшу и Чехословакию для Варшавского договора.
   - район Атлантического океана-Урал в настоящее время подпадает под действие мер укрепления доверия и безопасности (МССБ), недавно согласованных на конференции по разоружению в Европе (КДЕ) в Стокгольме, и, вероятно, станет предметом дальнейших переговоров по МССБ и сокращению сил/стабильности. Для целей настоящей таблицы используется "зона применения" Стокгольмского соглашения, за исключением того, что в нее включены все турецкие силы. Для НАТО это означает включение Исландии и Атлантических островов, а для Варшавского договора-советских войск в Московский, Приволжский, Уральский, Северный и Закавказский военные округа (а также западные, северо-западные и Юго-Западные ТВД).
   - Глобальные холдинги включают все силы стран НАТО и Варшавского договора, даже те, которые направлены на другие театры военных действий (например, силы США в Корее, советские войска во Вьетнаме, французские войска в Чаде и т.д.).
   Морские силы (военно-морские и воздушные) объединены на двух географических базах:
   "Атлантический / Европейский" - который включает силы в атлантических и европейских водах к северу от Тропика Рака и Средиземного моря, включая Советский Северный, Балтийский и Черноморский флоты и Средиземноморскую эскадру; для США он включает все силы, принадлежащие CINCLANT.
   "Глобал" включает в себя все холдинги стран НАТО и Варшавского договора, где бы они ни были развернуты.
   В целях улучшения картины, представленной статическим сопоставлением в таблице а, в таблице в предпринимается попытка обеспечить более эффективное сопоставление относительных возможностей танков путем предоставления данных о некоторых ключевых показателях потенциала танков сил НАТО и Варшавского договора. Хотя возможности танков в значительной степени зависят от обстоятельств боя, тактики и навыков экипажа, эти данные дают несколько более полный портрет танковых запасов обеих сторон, чем простая агрегация в сравнении основных силовых структур.
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a. Французские и испанские силы не входят в состав объединенного военного командования НАТО, но включаются в него в той мере, в какой они развернуты в соответствующем географическом районе. Французские силы в Западной Германии включены в NGA колонку в силу их развертывания, но не являются предметом переговоров MBFR.
b. Наземные силы не включают военизированные формирования, пограничников и силы безопасности. Варшавский пакт мог бы быть увеличен примерно на 500 000-700 000 (от Атлантического до Уральского) и примерно на 800 000-150 000 (от глобального) за счет включения в него предполагаемого сухопутного "ломтика" советских войск железной дороги, строительства, труда, командования и общей поддержки - все они одеты в форму, вооружены и прошли хотя бы базовую военную подготовку. Резервы, возможно, можно было бы пропорционально увеличить.
c. Резервы, как правило, не включают персонал после пятилетнего периода после прекращения службы, независимо от того, приписан он к подразделениям или нет. Для более полного объяснения подсчетов резерва см. пункт "рабочая сила" на стр. 6.
d. Дивизии не являются стандартным формированием между армиями, и дивизии не содержат сопоставимого количества или типов техники или персонала. Для целей этой таблицы три бригады или полка считаются дивизионным эквивалентом.
e. "С личным составом в мирное время" включает все советские и ОВД дивизии категории 2 в соответствующем географическом районе.
f. Включает только силы, мобилизованные в соответствующих географических районах. Таким образом, базирующиеся в Северной Америке американские и канадские формирования, предназначенные для укрепления Европы в ходе или после мобилизации, показаны под рубрикой "глобальные", а не в колоннах " NGA" или "Атлантика-Урал".
g. Данные включают оборудование, находящееся на хранении или в резерве, где это известно.
h. Распространение ПТРК создает особые трудности для реалистичных правил подсчета. Приведенные цифры представляют собой оценочные всех носимых ПТРС и тех видов оружия, которые установлены на транспортных средствах и играют основную роль в ПТРК. Предполагается, что советские дивизии категории 3 будут иметь сокращенную (на 50%) шкалу носимого оружия. Итоговые данные исключают ПТРК на БМП (например, М-2/-3 "Брэдли", БМП, БМД) или выстрелянные из основного боевого танка (например, Т-80) и, следовательно, не представляют собой общий доступный ПТРК для обеих сторон.
i. Пусковые установки ЗРК исключают оружие с плеча. Они включают в себя оружие ВВС и сил противовоздушной обороны.
j. Включает в себя все вертолеты, основной функцией которых является ближнее воздушное или противотанковое вооружение (т. е. включенное в предыдущюю строчку
k. Классификация самолетов между ролями отражает то, что показано в записях страны, но следует использовать с осторожностью. Многие из этих самолетов играют определенную роль; основные роли для аналогичных самолетов различаются между странами, и различия между атакой и бомбардировщиком и между истребителем и истребителем-бомбардировщиком (FGA - штурмовик) не могут быть определены с уверенностью. Кроме того, учебные самолеты были исключены, хотя они могли бы обеспечить некоторое подкрепление или замену в ходе операций.
l. Исключая ПЛРБ, ПЛАРБ, ПЛРК, ПЛАРК.
m. Цифра в скобках - количество вертолетов, включенных в общую сумму.
n. Включает прибрежные суда; исключает минные заграждения и вспомогательные суда.
o. Исключая малые суда LCU, LCVP и LCA.
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a. Предполагаемый.
b. S = гладкий ствол; R = нарезной ствол.
c. AP = бронебойный; HT = кумуллятивный; HE = фугасный; HS = осколочно - фугасный; C = канистра; S = дымовой; AT = противотанковое управляемое оружие.
d. Цифры указывают на фактическую толщину брони; поскольку броня часто наклонена под углом, толщина, которая должна быть пробита, может превышать показанную.
e. N = ночной прицел; C = компьютеризированного управления огнем; SG = стабилизированной пушки; DW = со шнорхелем; AL = автомат заряжания.
f. Подробности отсутствуют. Вероятно, сравнима с серией М-60.
g. Некоторые из Leopard 1A3.
h. Некоторые Т-80, Т-64Б (и Т-72?) приспособлены для крепления динамической защиты.
i. Накладная броня добавлена к некоторым моделям.
j. M-77 является румынской модификацией Т-55.

   Notes to Insert Map
   This edition of The Military Balance carries a loose insert sheet with, on one side, charts of Warsaw Pact and NATO command and control structures, and, on the other, a map of short-range nuclear system coverage of Europe.
   The map shows the reach of ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 500 km and the areas within range of theatre attack aircraft types.
   For missiles with ranges of less than 150 km, the coverage is shown by means of shading. For those of 150-500-km range, the area of cover is indicated by an outline. In Central Europe, the arcs of cover of Scud, SS-23 and SS-12 are centred on the positions of major headquarters; elsewhere the missile arcs are drawn from points of origin on national borders.
   Aircraft arcs are for High-Low-High mission profiles. This assumes that flight to and from enemy territory could be made at high altitude to conserve fuel.
   Numbers of NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions in the area covered are also shown. In a few cases these differ slightly from the most up-to-date information given in the country entries. In such cases, the country entry data should be used.
   Примечания для прилагаемой карты
   В этом издании Военного баланса имеется свободный вставной лист с, с одной стороны, диаграммами Варшавского договора и структур командования и управления НАТО, а с другой - картой охвата Европы ядерной системой ближнего радиуса действия.
   На карте показан радиус действия баллистических ракет с дальностью до 500 км и районы в пределах дальности действия типов штурмовиков театра военных действий.
   Для ракет с дальностью менее 150 км покрытие показано с помощью затенения. Для тех, кто имеет дальность 150-500 км, площадь покрытия обозначена контуром. В Центральной Европе дуги прикрытия Scud, SS-23 и SS-12 сосредоточены на позициях главных штабов; в других местах дуги ракет рисуются из точек происхождения на национальных границах.
   Дуги самолетов предназначены для профилей миссии High-Low-High. Это предполагает, что полет на вражескую территорию и с вражеской территории может осуществляться на большой высоте для экономии топлива.
   Показано также количество дивизий НАТО и Варшавского договора в охватываемом районе. В некоторых случаях они несколько отличаются от самой последней информации, содержащейся в страновых позициях. В таких случаях следует использовать данные страны.

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Defence Expenditure: NATO, Japan, Sweden

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Trends in Global Defence Spending and Defence Industries


   Total global defence expenditures are very difficult to calculate, since knowledge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact outlays is extremely imperfect. In addition, the exact defence burden incurred by command economies, or by many military regimes in the Third World, is not known. However, on the assumption, that the Warsaw Pact, China, Cuba, North Korea and Indochina spend some $350 billion, total global defence expenditures in 1986 were approximately $900 billion.
   The two super-powers and their respective alliance partners continue to account for 75-80% of all global defence expenditures. In 1986 the US and its NATOallies spent about $420 billion, compared to about $300 billion for the USSR and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. Only six of the NATO members met the agreed target of a 3% annual defence spending increase in real terms; Turkey and the US led, with over 14% and 5% respectively, while Belgium (-7.6%), Greece (-7.4%) and Norway(-4.5%) were the worst performers. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members also showed uneven growth. Hungary and the GDR led, with 8% and 7.6% increases respectively, but in Romania President Ceaucescu's decision to reduce military spending by 25% by 1990 found almost unanimous support in a plebiscite.
   The Middle East and North Africa continued to show the second highest regional defence spending in the developing world, totalling some $63 billion in 1986. Of this amount almost $19 billion was spent by Iraq and Iran alone. The Fertile Crescent states (which includes Israel with a defence budget of $5.1 billion) and Egypt spent a total of about $15 billion, while the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states accounted for at least another $23 billion.
   Defence outlays continued to decline in subSaharan Africa, totalling some $8 billion. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, however, have shown considerable increases as intrastate tensions continue to mount. Southern Africa together accounted for some $4 billion. Most other sub-Saharan states are not substantially increasing their defence outlays. This may in part be due to the fact that few economies have shown significant improvement, but it may also reflect a reduction in border disputes and improvements in internal security in many states. It must also be noted, however, that some data indicate higher expenditures for internal security.
   Similar trends are also shown in Latin America, where it is almost only in the conflict areas of Central America that defence expenditures continue to rise. Apart from Brazil, where the military is in the middle of a modernization programme and which is in the process of further expanding its military industries, none of the other major regional states show either the desire or the economic ability significantly to increase defence spending. Nevertheless, there exist a number of regional territorial disputes which could necessitate higher outlays in the future. Overall, Central and South America expended about $10.5 billion on defence in 1986, of which two-thirds was accounted for by the largest countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), along with Cuba.
   Asia is the only third-world area where defence spending continues to rise. The Afghan war has imposed heavy financial burdens on the three parties involved. Soviet occupation costs, although unknown, must have run to several billions of roubles since 1979; the Afghan government's conflict with the Mujaheddeen elements has not only been financially exhausting but has prevented Kabul from developing the country's economy; and Pakistan has been forced to accommodate well over a million refugees, besides becoming increasingly dependent on the US for both economic and military aid. At the same time, India and Pakistan are both engaging in substantial arms procurement programmes. The Indian 1985-1990 Defence Plan envisaged defence expenditure increases of 10% (in real terms) in 1986 and 15% in 1987; Pakistan matched this with a 10% increase of its own in 1986. In Sri Lanka the continuing internal security crisis has doubled defence outlays in three years. Malaysia, however, has begun a substantial defence budget cut, while Singapore is levelling off its defence expenditures, and Indonesia has effected a salary freeze in the services.
   In the Far East and the Pacific basin, Japan, because of its economic growth, could increase its military strength and become a significant arms producer. Australia, now aiming for greater selfreliance in security matters, has indicated an intention to improve defence capabilities through a 3% real (10% nominal) increase in defence budgets for the next ten years. North and South Korea are also increasing their defence budgets, while the People's Republic of China, although ostensibly maintaining recent expenditure levels, appears to have redirected its financial resources into the modernization of its forces and the expansion of its arms industry. Taiwan appears to be doing the same, but in addition has increased its outlays. It is impossible to assess the expenditures of Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos, but, given the continued precarious security situation, there must be a considerable strain on the meagre financial resources available. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Vietnam has committed about two-thirds of its budget to defence in recent years. Total Asian defence expenditure for 1985-6 therefore appears to have been in the region of $65 billion, excluding Indochina.
   Taking known global defence expenditures in 1986 as a percentage of global GNP/GDP and comparing this with the corresponding figures for 1985, the defence burden can be said not to have increased. However, its incidence and distribution is, of course, not uniform, and insofar as any generalizations are valid (which is debatable), the tendency has been for the burden to diminish, or at least stand still, in the developed world but to increase elsewhere - often where it can least easily be afforded.
   Defence Industries
   Since World War II four major developments have occurred in the defence industries in general. One is the increase in the costs of producing highly complex and technologically sophisticated weapons. The second is the greater degree of co-operation over arms production in the West, both between individual companies and also between countries. The third is the dramatic expansion in the number of countries producing arms, especially in the Third World. And the fourth is a rapid increase in counter-trade, barter and offset practices in the transfer of arms.
   The costs of modern equipment include not only the production expenses but also the expenditures for Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E). Both are increasing in scale, as well as in the time they require. Whereas in the early 1940s it took only nine months to develop and produce the Mosquito fighter, forty years later it takes about ten years to develop and produce a combat aircraft. In this Fiscal Year alone, the United States will spend over $43 billion on RDT&E - in real terms double the amount spent ten years ago. And during the last ten years the United Kingdom has increased RDT&E expenditure by over 50% in real terms to ё2.3 billion, while France has doubled its investment to almost fr 25 billion over the same period. While we do not know the precise sums spent by the Soviet Union, some estimates exceed the US figures, both in real terms and in respect of the rate of increase.
   Given these enormous costs and the technological and structural changes in the production of weapons, a far greater interdependence has evolved both between industries and between countries. By subcontracting, the industries can gain access to new technologies (information, micro-electronics, and laser), potentially reduce their costs, gain wider markets for their products, and reinforce alliance solidarity. This is one of the reasons why even the US (the leader in military R&D) subcontracts a considerable portion of its requirements to non-American firms.
   There are, however, attendant security problems. The US demand for trade restrictions on the sale to potentially hostile countries of components or systems (such as computers) with potential military applications has not met with unanimous support. During the past few years, therefore, there has been substantial debate about 'sharing and protecting', particularly in the context of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), but also in the context of technology transfers to other areas, such as the Middle East (AWACS to Saudi Arabia, computers to Iran) and China (avionics and electronics), while some sales or transfers of technology to the East have clearly been damaging to Western security interests.
   If European arms exporters (including neutral Sweden and Switzerland) are now, far more than in the past, finding it necessary to compete for markets, this is largely due to the rapid expansion of third-world producers. During the past two years these countries - led by Brazil, Egypt and India - have been active in seeking co-operation agreements both with the developed and, even more, with the developing world. Brazil has agreements with Argentina and Egypt, and is now concluding one with Nigeria, while in the summer of 1987 Egypt signed an arms co-operation agreement with Turkey. These agreements tend to reinforce the 'south-south' trade patterns which have evolved over the past few years.
   The striking feature of the arms trade over the past fifteen years is that, at an intermediary technological level, third-world producers have captured a considerable share of the international market. Between 1974 and 1985, third-world arms exports rose from about $1.5 billion to about $8.5 billion; over the same period there appears to have been a notable relative decline in such exports by both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. NATO arms exports declined by some 30%, and those of the Warsaw Pact by some 25%, between 1983 and 1985. Within NATO, the arms trade is still dominated by the US, although there appears to have been an improvement in European arms exports to the US since 1985.
   A final development in the international arms trade has been counter-trade, offset and co-production agreements; 1986-7 has been no 240 exception to this trend. India is probably the most important newcomer to the practice, having signed a license agreement with the USSR to co-produce the MiG-29. The United Kingdom's deal involving Tornado aircraft for Saudi Arabian oil is probably the largest counter-trade deal in modern history (excepting Soviet arms for Egyptian cotton in the 1950s). This trend enables cash-poor developing countries to exchange raw materials for weapons. Most such agreements also involve offset deals which provide for local production and/or servicing of the 'imported' items, thus enabling these countries to gain valuable technical experience.

Тенденции в глобальных оборонных расходах и оборонной промышленности


   Общие глобальные расходы на оборону очень трудно подсчитать, поскольку знания о расходах Советского Союза и Варшавского договора крайне несовершенны. Кроме того, точное бремя обороны, которое несут командные экономики или многие военные режимы в странах третьего мира, неизвестно. Однако, исходя из предположения о том, что Варшавский договор, Китай, Куба, Северная Корея и Индокитай расходуют около 350 млрд. долл.США, общие глобальные расходы на оборону в 1986 году составили примерно 900 млрд. долл. США.
   Двух супер-держав и их партнеров по альянсу по-прежнему составляют 75-80% всех мировых расходов на оборону. В 1986 году США и НАТО потратили около 420 миллиардов долларов, по сравнению с 300 миллиардами долларов для СССР и других стран Варшавского договора. Только шесть из членов НАТО выполнили согласованный целевой показатель ежегодного увеличения оборонных расходов на 3% в реальном выражении; Турция и США лидировали, с более чем 14% и 5% соответственно, в то время как Бельгия (-7.6%), Греция (-7.4%) и Норвегия (-4.5%) были худшими показателями. Не советские члены Варшавского договора также демонстрировали неравномерный рост. Венгрия и ГДР лидировали, с 8% и 7,6% увеличением соответственно, но в Румынии решение президента Чаушеску сократить военные расходы на 25% к 1990 году нашло почти единодушную поддержку в плебисците.
   Ближний Восток и Северная Африка продолжали показывать вторые по величине региональные расходы на оборону в развивающихся странах, в 1986 году на общую сумму около 63 миллиардов долларов. Из этой суммы почти 19 миллиардов долларов было потрачено только Ирак и Иран. Плодородные государства полумесяца (который включает в Израиле оборонный бюджет 5,1 млрд долларов) и Египет провели в общей сложности около 15 миллиардов долларов, в то время как Совет сотрудничества стран Залива (ССЗ) Штаты приходилось по крайней мере, еще 23 миллиардов долларов.
   Расходы на оборону в засахарской Африке продолжали сокращаться, составив в общей сложности около 8 млрд. долл. Южная Африка, Зимбабве, Ангола и Мозамбик, однако, продемонстрировали значительный рост по мере роста внутригосударственной напряженности. На Южную Африку в целом приходится около 4 млрд. долл. Большинство других государств к югу от Сахары существенно не увеличивают свои расходы на оборону. Отчасти это может объясняться тем фактом, что лишь немногие страны добились значительных улучшений, но это может также отражать сокращение числа пограничных споров и улучшение внутренней безопасности во многих государствах. Следует также отметить, что некоторые данные указывают на увеличение расходов на внутреннюю безопасность.
   Аналогичные тенденции наблюдаются и в Латинской Америке, где расходы на оборону продолжают расти почти только в районах конфликтов в Центральной Америке. За исключением Бразилии, где военные находятся в середине программы модернизации и которая находится в процессе дальнейшего расширения своей военной промышленности, ни одно из других крупных государств региона не проявляет ни желания, ни экономической способности существенно увеличить расходы на оборону. Тем не менее существует ряд региональных территориальных споров, которые могут потребовать более значительных расходов в будущем. В целом в 1986 году Центральная и Южная Америка израсходовала на оборону около 10,5 млрд. долл.США, из которых две трети приходилось на крупнейшие страны (Аргентину, Бразилию, Венесуэлу, Мексику, Перу, Чили и Кубу).
   Азия является единственным регионом третьего мира, где расходы на оборону продолжают расти. Афганская война наложила тяжелое финансовое бремя на три вовлеченные стороны. Расходы на советскую оккупацию, хотя и неизвестные, должны были составить несколько миллиардов рублей с 1979 года; конфликт афганского правительства с элементами моджахедов не только истощил финансы, но и помешал Кабулу развивать экономику страны; и Пакистан был вынужден разместить более миллиона беженцев, кроме того, становясь все более зависимым от США как в экономической, так и в военной помощи. В то же время Индия и Пакистан участвуют в крупных программах закупок оружия. В Индийском плане обороны на 1985-1990 годы предусматривалось увеличение расходов на оборону на 10% (в реальном выражении) в 1986 году и на 15% в 1987 году; Пакистан сопоставил это с 10% - ным увеличением своих собственных расходов в 1986 году. В Шри-Ланке продолжающийся кризис в области внутренней безопасности за три года удвоил расходы на оборону. Вместе с тем Малайзия приступила к существенному сокращению оборонного бюджета, в то время как Сингапур выравнивает свои расходы на оборону, а Индонезия ввела мораторий на выплату заработной платы военнослужащим.
   На Дальнем Востоке и в Тихоокеанском бассейне Япония в силу своего экономического роста может увеличить свою военную мощь и стать крупным производителем оружия. Австралия, В настоящее время стремящаяся к большей самостоятельности в вопросах безопасности, заявила о намерении улучшить обороноспособность путем реального (10% номинального) увеличения оборонных бюджетов на 3% в течение следующих десяти лет. Северная и Южная Корея также увеличивают свои оборонные бюджеты, в то время как Китайская Народная Республика, хотя и якобы поддерживает уровень расходов в последнее время, как представляется, перенаправила свои финансовые ресурсы на модернизацию своих сил и расширение своей оружейной промышленности. Тайвань, как представляется, делает то же самое, но, кроме того, увеличил свои расходы. Невозможно оценить расходы Вьетнама, Кампучии и Лаоса, однако, учитывая сохраняющуюся нестабильную ситуацию в плане безопасности, имеющиеся скудные финансовые ресурсы должны быть в значительной степени ограничены. Неподтвержденные сообщения свидетельствуют о том, что Вьетнам в последние годы выделил на оборону около двух третей своего бюджета. Таким образом, общий объем расходов на оборону в Азии за 1985-1966 годы составил, по-видимому, около 65 млрд. долл.
   Принимая известные глобальные расходы на оборону в 1986 году в процентах от глобального ВНП / ВВП и сравнивая их с соответствующими показателями за 1985 год, можно сказать, что бремя обороны не увеличилось. Однако его распространенность и распределение, конечно, неравномерны, и в той мере, в какой какие - либо обобщения справедливы (что спорно), существует тенденция к тому, чтобы бремя уменьшалось или, по крайней мере, стояло на месте в развитом мире, но увеличивалось в других местах-часто там, где оно может быть наименее легко предоставлено.
   Оборонная промышленность
   После Второй мировой войны в оборонной промышленности в целом произошли четыре крупных события. Одним из них является увеличение расходов на производство весьма сложного и технологически сложного оружия. Во-вторых, это большая степень сотрудничества в области производства оружия на Западе как между отдельными компаниями, так и между странами. Третье - резкое увеличение числа стран, производящих оружие, особенно в странах третьего мира. А четвертый стремительный рост встречной торговли, товарообменных и смещение практики в передаче оружия.
   Затраты на современное оборудование включают не только производственные затраты, но и расходы на исследования, разработки, испытания и оценку (RDT&E). Оба увеличиваются в масштабе, а также во времени, которое они требуют. Если в начале 1940-х годов на разработку и производство истребителя Mosquito ушло всего девять месяцев, то сорок лет спустя на разработку и производство боевого самолета ушло около десяти лет. Только в этом финансовом году Соединенные Штаты потратят на RDT&E более 43 миллиардов долларов - в реальном выражении вдвое больше, чем десять лет назад. И за последние десять лет Великобритания увеличила расходы на RDT&E более чем на 50% в реальном выражении до ё2,3 млрд, в то время как Франция удвоила свои инвестиции почти до fr 25 млрд за тот же период. Хотя мы не знаем точных сумм, потраченных Советским Союзом, некоторые оценки превышают цифры США, как в реальном выражении, так и в отношении темпов роста.
   С учетом этих огромных издержек, а также технологических и структурных изменений в производстве оружия значительно возросла взаимозависимость как между промышленными предприятиями, так и между странами. Благодаря субподряду отрасли могут получить доступ к новым технологиям (информация, микроэлектроника и лазер), потенциально сократить свои расходы, получить более широкие рынки для своей продукции и укрепить солидарность альянса. Это одна из причин, почему даже США (лидер в военные НИОКР) субконтракты значительную часть своих потребностей в неамериканских фирм.
   Однако существуют сопутствующие проблемы безопасности. Требование США о торговых ограничениях на продажу потенциально враждебным странам компонентов или систем (таких как компьютеры) с потенциальным военным применением не встретило единодушной поддержки. Таким образом, в течение последних нескольких лет велись серьезные дебаты о "совместном использовании и защите", особенно в контексте независимой европейской группы по программам (IEPG), а также в контексте передачи технологии в другие области, такие, как Ближний Восток (АВАКС-Саудовская Аравия, компьютеры - Иран) и Китай (авионика и электроника), в то время как некоторые продажи или передачи технологии на Восток явно наносят ущерб интересам безопасности Запада.
   Если европейские экспортеры оружия (включая нейтральные Швецию и Швейцарию) в настоящее время в гораздо большей степени, чем в прошлом, считают необходимым конкурировать за рынки, то это в значительной степени объясняется быстрым ростом производителей из третьего мира. В течение последних двух лет эти страны - во главе с Бразилией, Египтом и Индией - активно добивались заключения соглашений о сотрудничестве как с развитыми, так и с развивающимися странами. Бразилия имеет соглашения с Аргентиной и Египтом и в настоящее время заключает соглашение с Нигерией, а летом 1987 года Египет подписал соглашение о сотрудничестве в области вооружений с Турцией. Эти соглашения, как правило, укрепляют торговые модели "Юг-Юг", сложившиеся за последние несколько лет.
   Поразительная особенность торговли оружием За последние 15 лет состоит в том, что на промежуточном технологическом уровне производители из стран третьего мира захватили значительную долю международного рынка. Между 1974 и 1985 годах, Третьей-мировой экспорт оружия вырос с $1,5 млрд до примерно 8,5 млрд долларов; за тот же период наблюдалось заметное относительное снижение экспорта со стороны НАТО и стран Варшавского договора. В 1983-1985 годах экспорт вооружений НАТО сократился примерно на 30%, а Варшавского договора-примерно на 25%. В НАТО в торговле оружием по-прежнему доминируют США, хотя, по-видимому, наблюдается улучшение европейского экспорта оружия в США с 1985 года.
   Последним событием в международной торговле оружием стали соглашения о контртрейдинге, взаимозачете и совместном производстве; 1986-1987 годы не стали исключением из этой тенденции. Индия, пожалуй, самый важный новичок в этой практике, подписав лицензионное соглашение с СССР о совместном производстве МиГ-29. Сделка Соединенного Королевства, связанная с самолетами Tornado для Саудовской Аравии за нефть, является, вероятно, крупнейшей контрторговой сделкой в современной истории (за исключением советского оружия для египетского хлопка в 1950-х годах). Эта тенденция позволяет бедным наличными средствами развивающимся странам обменивать сырье на оружие. Большинство таких соглашений также предусматривают офсетные сделки, предусматривающие местное производство и/или обслуживание "импортируемых" товаров, что позволяет этим странам приобрести ценный технический опыт.
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