Methods of influencing the situation under a despotic regime (on the example of the work by Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler "The Battle of Stalingrad"). Essay
Аннотация: Methods of influencing the situation under a despotic regime (on the example of the work by Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler "The Battle of Stalingrad"). Essay.
Methods of influencing the situation under a despotic regime (on the example of the work by Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler "The Battle of Stalingrad"). Essay.
The historical experience of mankind, for example, the Bible, provides options for more or less effective actions in the conditions of an authoritarian despotic regime. The Old Testament repeatedly addresses this topic. The focus of attention of the biblical texts: support from Above, the role and importance of women ...
But if the characters are moderately religious, if the participation of women is excluded?
An interesting subject for analysis is the book "The Fatal Decisions" (a collection of analytical materials of Hitler's commanders - generals of the Wehrmacht, prepared after 1945), and in this collection - the memoirs of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces [Chief of Staff of the OKH], Colonel-General [Generaloberst] Kurt Zeitzler. (Colonel General Zeitzler was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces [Chief of the OKH General Staff] in September 1942 to replace Colonel General Halder, who had been removed from this post). (All quotes below are from K. Zeitzler's work "The Battle of Stalingrad", published in the book 'Seymour Freiden, William Richardson (eds): The Fatal Decisions. New York 1958'). (Translations from the Russian-language text into English).
According the distribution of responsibilities, Zeitzler was directly related to the planning of military operations and the management of Hitler's troops during the battles at Stalingrad.
Many arguments convinced Zeitzler that Hitler's troops at Stalingrad were on the verge of defeat - even before the start of the Red Army's offensive. (In such way the situation is presented in Zeitzler's memoirs).
Seems, Zeitzler saw his main strategic task in facilitating the withdrawal of German troops from Stalingrad - at least before the start of the Red Army's offensive near Stalingrad.
The withdrawal of German troops could be started only on the personal order of Adolf Hitler.
Thus, Kurt Zeitzler was faced with the task of influencing the situation under the conditions of a despotic regime (Zeitzler himself does not mention his religiosity. The situation and traditions made the participation of women in the situation an impossible).
What methods of influencing the situation under the conditions of a despotic regime can we find in Zeitzler's memoirs?
1. Appeal to reason. A usage of formal logical arguments. A taking into account some psychological characteristics (statistical data produced a relatively strong impact on Hitler).
'... I asked Hitler for permission to present him with a detailed and highly confidential report. He agreed. (...)
In the final part of my report, I touched upon ... further developments that were to be expected over the coming weeks and months. I ended the talk with five clear requirements. (...)
The first part of my report was presented in a form accessible to a person not versed in military matters. I have provided numerous statistics, tables and maps. For example, a table was made of the correlation of forces of both sides for one kilometer of the front. (...)
... onto Hitler himself, one can say without exaggeration, my report made an amazing impression. (...)
Hitler was partial to statistics, and the mass of figures I have cited to support the points I have put forward probably affected him as strongly as my convincing charts. However, perhaps he simply did not want to upset the "new man" at the very beginning of our joint work. (...)
When I finished, he smiled and said: "You are a desperate pessimist. Here, on the Eastern Front, we have gone through much worse times and have survived. We will cope with new difficulties."
As for my final conclusions, he tried to diminish their significance. He said: "Of course, in some sectors of the front the Russians outnumber us. But our soldiers are superior in quality to those of the enemy. And our weapons are better. Besides, soon we will have new weapons, even better than the old ones."
This is how Hitler reacted to my report. (...). As chief of the general staff, I hoped that at least part of what I said would remain in the head [in brain] of the supreme commander in chief, that he would think about my remarks and my report would eventually bring at least some benefit. "
2. A usage of psychological techniques. In addition to statistics and diagrams, Zeitzler uses the method of repetition, reminders.
'I already knew that we can convince Hitler of something only by reminding him of it over and over again. I did this for several weeks, repeating my five requirements. ... his advisers could instill in him this or that thought, if they repeated it often, firmly adhering to their point of view ....
... I had to again and again focus Hitler's attention on the seriousness of the situation at Stalingrad, reminding him of those five demands... To do this, despite Hitler's anger, was my official duty. (...)
Unfortunately, he [Hitler] was generally inclined to compromise solutions, which were often implemented too late. (...)
Stubbornly refusing to accept any of the main decisions, Hitler, however, allowed measures aimed at strengthening the troops occupying the sector of the front, over which the Russian threat hung.
... when it comes to prestige, dictators are known to be highly sensitive ...
During the first weeks of November [1942], I presented my basic demands to Hitler again and again. (...)
The entire General Staff - from senior chief to rank-and-file officer - shared my gloomy forebodings and anxiously awaited the inevitable, as we all understood, Russian offensive. If successful, it will put the entire Stalingrad army in a desperate situation. It is terrible to foresee an impending catastrophe and at the same time not be able to prevent it. ... the only variant for real defence under those conditions is rejected by the only person who can make decisions - Hitler."
3. A violation of the rules of royal court etiquette.
The successful offensive of the Red Army at Stalingrad began. It developed successfully.
'... I was officially informed that Hitler wishes to see me at noon the next day to discuss the situation with me. I replied that it would be too late. Then I was told that it was impossible to see Hitler earlier, since he needed to rest after a long journey. It should be noted that this conversation took place at a time when the entire front was on fire and hundreds of brave soldiers were killed every hour.
I ignored this warning, and at midnight, when Hitler's train was due to arrive, I arrived at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander. I insisted that Hitler received me immediately, since a delay of even a few hours could have a catastrophic effect on the course of hostilities. Hitler and his entourage were enraged that I showed up there at midnight, without waiting for noon the next day. Finally, I was, still, admitted to him. (...)
... he continued with some pathos in his voice: "Do not be discouraged. In misfortune we must show strength of character. We must remember Frederick the Great." (...)
Hitler again lost his temper and began to interrupt me, but I continued ...
... Hitler has completely lost his composure. Striking the table with his fist, he shouted: "I will not leave the Volga, I will not leave the Volga!"
That ended our meeting, from which I, the General Staff, Army Group B and the 6th Army expected so much. I have achieved nothing. But past experience has shown that, as chief of the general staff, I should not lose hope, but, on the contrary, should continue to insist on my own, since perhaps Hitler could still be persuaded to change his decision. However, it is also true that if he had finally agreed with me, his positive answer might have been too late. Time was running out, and the situation was getting worse every hour. "
4. An emotional impact, reaching the point of rudeness.
'Day after day, I urged Hitler to allow the 6th Army to break out of the encirclement. We discussed this issue for a long time almost every night. (...) If Hitler shouted at me, I also shouted in responce: when he got irritated, that was the only way to make him to listen.
Once it seemed to me that I had achieved my goal. Hitler seemed to be ready to sign an order allowing the 6th Army to leave the encirclement. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief and set about developing preliminary instructions. But when the order was presented to Hitler for signature, he did not sign it for a long time, and then told me that he had changed his mind. It was all in vain: again endless conversations and arguments would have to start... "
5. A usage of elements of favoritism.
'I... sent a radiogram to the headquarters of the 6th Army with a request to send to us General Hube, who enjoyed Hitler's special favor. I hoped that Hitler would perhaps heed at least Hube's words. (...)
... he [Hube] literally begged Hitler to save the Stalingrad army.
But Hitler remained adamant. When Hube realized that the detailed description of the situation did not make any impression on the dictator, he lost his temper. Hube was an outspoken man and said bluntly: "The supply with usage of aircrafts failed. After all, someone is guilty of this. My Fuhrer, why don't you execute one of the Air Force generals? Until now, only army generals have been shot [punished] for mistakes. It's time to prescribe a dose of this medicines and for our aviation colleagues. "
It was too much for Hitler. (...)
Thus, Hube's visit didn't bring anything. '
6. A disguised protest.
'... Hitler continued to encourage [morally] the surrounded troops even after the failure of the 4th Panzer Army's offensive. He addressed them with a New Year's order, which said: "I give my word that everything possible will be done for your release." This order was written personally by Hitler, and the Fuehrer's senior adjutant brought it to me to be sent to the 6th Army. I refused to do this, since I did not have the slightest desire to send an order, the content of which was clearly impracticable. The senior adjutant said that Hitler insistently demanded that the order be sent and that he would have to report my disobedience to Hitler. But no consequences could make me agree with Hitler, and in the end the order was sent to Stalingrad through other channels. Incidentally, Hitler did not bring me to justice and never once reminded me of this incident. "
7. Semi-illegal official activities.
'There is a threat to the entire Caucasian front. (...) The December offensive of the Russians west of Stalingrad, and then the failure of the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army, put Army Group A in the Caucasus in an extremely dangerous position.
(...) It was necessary to take the necessary precautions, so I agreed with the headquarters of Army Group A to develop a detailed plan for the withdrawal of two armies - the 17th field and the 1st tank. All this was done without Hitler's knowledge. If he found out about this, I could have paid with my life [it was risky for life of Kurt Zeitzler]. "
8. A long-term calculation and a service (official) maneuver.
'I wanted to do the preparing so that, upon receiving the order to withdraw, both of these armies would be able to immediately execute it. ... of one thing I was absolutely sure, if Hitler ever gave the order to withdraw Army Group "A", he would do it only at the very last moment. Therefore, every minute was counted, and the slightest delay in developing a plan could decide the fate of the Caucasian army group.
(...) Once, alone with him, I described the situation in the south and ended my message like this: "If you do not give the order to retreat from the Caucasus now, we will soon have to survive the second Stalingrad."
This seemed to make an impression on Hitler, and I had to make use of his indecision. I managed to literally squeeze agreement out of him. "Okay," he said at last, "give the appropriate order." Leaving the room, I gave the order (from Hitler's waiting room by telephone) to retreat. I ordered that the order be conveyed to the troops immediately and that their withdrawal began immediately.
I was in a hurry not in vain. When I arrived at my headquarters just half an hour later, an urgent telephone message was already waiting for me: Hitler ordered to call him immediately. Knowing in advance what this meant, I picked up the telephone receiver and asked to speak to Hitler. He said: "Do not give orders to withdraw from the Caucasus yet. Tomorrow we will discuss this issue again."
... Hitler was about to start another series of endless delays, postponing his decision until it was too late to do anything. I said: "My Fuhrer, it's too late. I sent the order from your headquarters, and now it has already reached the front units and formations. The retreat has begun. To cancel the order now would cause incredible confusion. I have to ask you not to do this."
Hitler was silent, apparently not knowing what to decide on. Finally, he said, "Okay, so be it."
9. A moral demonstration.
"... I and the officers of my staff, out of comradely solidarity with the surrounded army, have cut their food rations to the level of those given to Paulus's soldiers."
'For several months I tried to convince Hitler to make the right decision. But my efforts were in vain. Having made the decision to resign from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, I went to Hitler and asked to be me removed from this post. Hitler was furious and replied sharply: "The General has no right to leave his post."
A generalization.
In the memoirs of Kurt Zeitzler, we see attempts to influence the situation under the conditions of a despotic regime:
1. Appeal to reason,
2. A usage of psychological techniques. In addition to statistics and diagrams, Zeitzler uses the method of repetition, reminders.
3. A violation of the rules of royal court etiquette.
4. An emotional impact, reaching the point of rudeness.
5. A usage of elements of favoritism.
6. A disguised protest.
7. Semi-illegal official activities.
8. A long-term calculation and a service (official) maneuver.
9. A moral demonstration.
Paradoxically, the situation looks in such a way that a person who sought to benefit the regime found himself in opposition to the regime and was forced to conduct an endless tedious quasi-struggle against the regime ...
October 8, 2020 12:02
Translation from Russian into English: October 9, 2020 09:36.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский 'Методы влияния на ситуацию в условиях деспотического режима (на примере работы генерал-полковника Курта Цейтцлера 'Сталинградская битва'). Очерк'.