Аннотация: Sergei Korolev and the Soviet Lunar Financial Bluff. An essay on the history of space exploration.
Sergei Korolev and the Soviet Lunar Financial Bluff. An essay on the history of space exploration.
In the building of the prospects of space activities in the USSR, we can see three modalities:
The first modality is the competition logic. To the greatest extent, it was characteristic of the top leadership of the USSR.
The second modality is initiatives (genius initiatives). This modality was characteristic of Sergei Korolev and other outstanding designers. Sergei Korolev used the collective thinking, the "common brain" of the Council of Chief Designers. So we can talk about a combination of individual initiative (Sergei Korolev) and collective initiative. Some period after Sergei Korolev left this world (1966), the collective initiative was capable of productive actions. An example of this is the collective will to switch, to reorient from the "lunar program" to the launch (April 19, 1971) of the first long-term orbital station Salyut (Salyut-1).
The third modality is an attempt to systematically build multi-term plans for space activities. This attempt was carried out by a wide range of Soviet technocrats and Soviet bureaucracy involved in space exploration activities.
The attempt to deliver a Soviet man on the Moon was based mainly on the logic of competition. Both ingenious initiative and the "habit of success" were present.
The attempt to land a Soviet man on the Moon was based on the will of Nikita Khrushchev: "Do not give off the Moon to the Americans!"
After the task set by US President John F. Kennedy on May 25, 1961 - to land a man on the moon (with a safe return to Earth) before the end of the decade - the logic of competition began to operate.
The achievements of the USSR (and Sergei Korolev) in space, in near space, were a continuation of the activities on arming the Soviet Army and the Navy with ballistic missiles. Accordingly, the achievements of the USSR (and Sergei Korolev) in space, in near space, were financed to a large extent from the budget of the Ministry of Defense.
An attempt to land a Soviet man on the Moon (an attempt at manned deep space exploration) required such financial costs that were beyond the power of the USSR.
Perhaps, at beginning, this circumstance wasn't understood, or was not completely clear. It was quite natural to hope for ingenious decisions, sudden insights, for those very ingenious steps that made it possible to achieve civilizational achievements in near space.
However, very soon it became clear that the exploration of deep space needed new technical solutions, new expenses - expenses that were inaccessible to the USSR.
Sergei Korolev took part in the "lunar program" partly voluntarily, partly under pressure. He was not free from a kind of euphoria that was generated by the atmosphere of competition and the achievements of extraordinary successes in space, in near space.
But he could not help but take part in the Soviet "lunar program", as he had to reckon with the will of the political leadership of the USSR, and with the fact that his activities in the space industry were conditioned by his consent to join the implementation of the Soviet "lunar program".
There is no necessity now to go into the details of the organization of the Soviet "lunar program". Attempts to build a local system of checks and balances are visible here. But these attempts did not play the main negative role.
The main issue was the lack of sufficient funds for the USSR to implement the "lunar program".
The chief designers had no rights to dispose of the state budget of the USSR.
The lack of funds for the Soviet "lunar program" was felt and was understood by the top Soviet political leadership (some members of the Politburo).
There were no other people in the country of the Soviets who would have had access to reliable information about the state budget of the USSR.
Lack of funds made the Soviet "lunar program" an adventurous attempt, making the success of the landing of a Soviet man on the Moon dependent on circumstances with an uncertain level of probability of occurrence. 'Maybe everything will turn out well? Let's try! "
After it became clear (1) the scope of tasks that had to be solved for the landing of a Soviet man on the Moon, (2) the amount of funding, (3) the obvious lack of financial resources, subsequent actions could theoretically be carried out either in the format of an honest political position, or in the format of a political bluff.
An honest political position assumed that all interested parties, including Sergei Korolev and other participants, executors of the Soviet "lunar program", would be informed about the impossibility of manned deep space exploration due to lack of financial resources. For reasons of prestige and other motives, this path was not chosen.
De facto, the Soviet "lunar program" was underfunded. This made her obviously, beforehand unsuccessful. However, none of the Soviet leaders officially acknowledged the fact that financial resources were insufficient for the Soviet "lunar program".
Sergei Korolev and other participants, performers of the "lunar program" turned out to be participants in a drama of a huge scale, being involved in deliberately, beforehand unsuccessful activities.
After Sergei Korolyov leaving this world (January 14, 1966), the Korolyov's deputy Vasily Mishin came to the leadership of Korolyov's organization on January 17, 1966. Mishin tried to continue the "lunar program", albeit unsuccessfully.
Vasily Mishin was replaced on May 21, 1974 by Valentin Glushko, who - may be - acted on the basis of the informal expression of the will of the Soviet leaders.
The "Lunar Program" was formalized by a number of resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Nobody canceled these decisions during the period when Valentin Glushko entered the new position.
During period, when the not canceled resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR were acting, Valentin Glushko, by his personal orders, stopped work on the main directions of the "lunar program".
Thus, for outside observers, the political leadership of the USSR was, as it were, aloof from the termination of the "lunar program". Valentin Glushko was the main decision-maker. Valentin Glushko has been a long-term critic of some of the fundamental elements of the "lunar program". He had disagreements on these issues with Sergei Korolev. Glushko's position was initially motivated not by financial but by technical considerations.
For outside observers, the Soviet "lunar program" was terminated not because the USSR lacked sufficient financial resources, not by the will of the Soviet political leadership (who replaced Khrushchev in 1964), but by the will of the technocratic elite dealing with space issues (by the will of Valentin Glushko, by the will of those who supported him on this issue, and those who did not dare and did not have the opportunity to object and resist him).
Thus, participating in the Soviet "lunar program", Sergei Korolev and other chief designers, numerous participants and performers became (regardless of their will) participants in a big game in which it was impossible to win due to circumstances beyond their control; however, this game continued in accord with "political traditions", because of the need to preserve "prestige" and "reputation".
Naturally, this had a destructive effect on the moral atmosphere, and on the space industry in a broad sense, and on all participants in space achievements.
The tradition of financial bluffing in the cosmic field was added to the existing political traditions.
September 20, 2021 07:16
Translation from Russian into English: September 20, 2021 10:36.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский 'Сергей Королев и Советский Лунный Финансовый Блеф. Очерк истории освоения космоса'.